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This file contains:
From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's presidential posture and general campaign strategies. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: the president's domestic policy stances in the campaign season and dealing with McGovern's opposition. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Safire to Haldeman suggesting a lighter approach to the campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Haig to Haldeman answering a memorandum on presidential posture and attack strategies for the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Buchanan to RN, per Haldeman, RE: an analysis of the 1964 and 1968 presidential races. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
Anonymously-authored document laying out strategies for how to approach campaign issues, the Republican National Convention, and television coverage. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From JPS to RN RE: strategies to use against McGovern. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: RN's presidential image in the 1972 campaign. Outlines of keynote address attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: the First Family's schedule during the campaign season. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the role of the Vice President (Agnew) in the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
Talking paper from Haldeman to Buchanan RE: Agnew's campaign responsibilities. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Buchanan and Khachigian to Haldeman RE: RN's national image and McGovern's strategies, as well as useful campaign themes and quotations. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman presenting a response to the latter's memorandum on the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
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26145703
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WHSF: Contested, 16-11
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document
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1
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26145703
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document
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WHSF: Contested, 16-11
description
This file contains:
From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's presidential posture and general campaign strategies. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: the president's domestic policy stances in the campaign season and dealing with McGovern's opposition. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Safire to Haldeman suggesting a lighter approach to the campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Haig to Haldeman answering a memorandum on presidential posture and attack strategies for the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Buchanan to RN, per Haldeman, RE: an analysis of the 1964 and 1968 presidential races. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
Anonymously-authored document laying out strategies for how to approach campaign issues, the Republican National Convention, and television coverage. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From JPS to RN RE: strategies to use against McGovern. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: RN's presidential image in the 1972 campaign. Outlines of keynote address attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: the First Family's schedule during the campaign season. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the role of the Vice President (Agnew) in the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
Talking paper from Haldeman to Buchanan RE: Agnew's campaign responsibilities. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/13/1972
From Buchanan and Khachigian to Haldeman RE: RN's national image and McGovern's strategies, as well as useful campaign themes and quotations. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman presenting a response to the latter's memorandum on the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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26145703
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
11
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's
presidential posture and general campaign
strategies. 5 pgs.
16
11
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: the
president's domestic policy stances in the
campaign season and dealing with
McGovern's opposition. 5 pgs.
16
11
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman suggesting a lighter
approach to the campaign. 3 pgs.
16
11
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haig to Haldeman answering a
memorandum on presidential posture and
attack strategies for the campaign. 4 pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
11
7/5/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN, per Haldeman, RE:
an analysis of the 1964 and 1968 presidential
races. 8 pgs.
16
11
Campaign
Other Document
Anonymously-authored document laying out
strategies for how to approach campaign
issues, the Republican National Convention,
and television coverage. 8 pgs.
16
11
6/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From JPS to RN RE: strategies to use against
McGovern. 8 pgs.
16
11
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: RN's
presidential image in the 1972 campaign.
Outlines of keynote address attached. 8 pgs.
16
11
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: the First
Family's schedule during the campaign
season. 2 pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
11
7/23/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: the role of the
Vice President (Agnew) in the campaign. 4
pgs.
16
11
7/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
Talking paper from Haldeman to Buchanan
RE: Agnew's campaign responsibilities. 1 pg.
16
11
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan and Khachigian to
Haldeman RE: RN's national image and
McGovern's strategies, as well as useful
campaign themes and quotations. 7 pgs.
16
11
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman presenting a
response to the latter's memorandum on the
1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs.
Friday, March 04, 2011
Page 3 of 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
HSD
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Suggestions
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
The President essentially should continue the present
strategy of being a professional President working to
solve national and international problems. From now until
the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal
emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period
might be right for some non-political type travelling to
important states not to be visited in the campaign--appear-
ances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees
Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.
Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket
and the issues.
2. What should the President's posture be from the
Republican Convention to the election? When should he start
campaigning? How much travel
where
what type
?
The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the
election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted
with the Truman style. The approach should be one of
humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy.
Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President
should address himself in appearances to his vision of the
- 2 -
kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further
down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change
horses in the middle of this dream."
Of course, the President would envision an America with a
realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient
national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on
fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforce-
ment; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued
individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast
with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated
by the opponent, in the right way.
The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-
September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a
short campaign in the public interest. We should start
this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having
campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.
Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and
at least two big rallies in each region SO no area should
feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies
could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19
visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits
should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.
The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan
and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as
possible without hurting the candidates, especially key
prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide
and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.
Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At
these affairs, the President could be honored with key
leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President
has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician.
He should be depicted as the statesman building a better
and more stable USA and world.
Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on
- 3 -
the type forums or activities available or which could be
created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.
3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on
issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and
others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern state-
ments, policies and record on the line through speakers and
advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of
McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious
enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as
the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and
appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party
leaders should be charged with undermining the President's
efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote
to condemn the President in a time of international crisis
(mining). We should contrast peace through strength with
peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus
irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on
stability, individual and national security, and public
safety.
The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal
security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The
Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public
saturation in every good detail.
Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism
should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these
times, based on a solid record of performance under very
adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol
Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care
here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority
party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize
all the obstacles in the President's path.
Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on
developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from
- 4 -
the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat
Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements
should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.
We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue--that
this determines the success of everything else. The big
line of difference should be drawn- on this issue.
4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and
how we should meet it.
The opposition strategy will turn on these major points:
Vietnam, tax reform, haves VS. have-nots, unemployment,
cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensi-
tivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).
If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength
theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam
charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate
and the campaign.
Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the
President's solid record of achievements could blunt most
of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we
have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968),
the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to
positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more
to show that the higher percentage today is due to the
influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and
point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy.
With war we can get unemployment statistics down but
casualties back up (jobs VS. lives).
Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered
with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without
bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation admin-
istration with all the black, chicano, women, et al,
appointments contrasted with previous, ending of section-
alism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can
put together a paper on this.
- 5 -
Trying to pit the have-nots VS. the haves can be made into
a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare--
also, they have promoted race VS. race and section VS.
section, all ended now under RN.
Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack.
Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information
that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the
loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the
ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in
the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately,
McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable
us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.
Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based
on opportunities, that further underscore the President's
credibility and get them well publicized. The record of
withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word.
Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In
fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting
out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means
also finding ways to stress the President's personal
characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive
and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through
anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he
did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and
how much it meant to his family.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes VS. services strategy before a
prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip -- the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign pa ce should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared SO that the President would fly into a city and be
met with no less than 200, 000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
3.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc.) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices,
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews -- and
negative -- i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center -- but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues -- amnesty,
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
abortion can only help Mc Govern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges
i.e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc. --
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He'knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count. And since it is possible and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should .worry about countering McGovern's potential
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive his defense budget or that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers:
St would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i. e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing -- the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTÓN
DETERMINED TO BE AN
confidential
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
June 14, 1972.
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By 8MP
Date 8-19-81
,
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Campaign
You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of
the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff,
etc., and I will not belabor that point.
Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E.
Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.
1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists, 11
as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-
nothing 80th Congress. 11 With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation --
in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who
greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public
interest.
If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the
villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the
campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after
us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.
2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR
tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning
hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an
anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and
fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also
warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It
is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader
should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's
greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.
-'2-
For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls
should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each
involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots
stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it
is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.
I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning.
It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on
a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Con-
vention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition
looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into
"I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes. 11
We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either;
the President should begin to say now, well before the convention,
that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants
to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting
people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the
electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the
system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take
the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to
campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-
elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.
Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:
If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take
New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews:
Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's
attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak
on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee
ever and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks
like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never
before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175, 000 of those
wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-
holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy
Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan,
about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half
Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on
oldtimers who have a defeati st attitude about Nixon and Jews --
this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.
1
-3-
We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New
York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there
is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should,
for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed
in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every
week between now and November. We tend to think of our
Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is
important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh
chance there.
I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a
Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (When-
ever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.)
The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't
gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemploy-
ment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a
smart opponent.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
@
Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised
in your memorandum of June 12:
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Conven-
tion and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the
ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture
it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is
best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally
consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to
his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance
in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive
attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were
masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests
are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has
consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally
associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the
solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has
captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking
and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the
development of a "Mr. & Mrs. II team image which would not have been
possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.
Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of
a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the
campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a
Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organiza-
tional arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of
accomplishment.
I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions
about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are
taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.
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This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet
meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in
favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic
Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor,
Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate
of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously
threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning
must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which
would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning?
How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type
of activities should he engage in?
Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full
cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions,
I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that
of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political
campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should
be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid
over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe
we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one
adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced
and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken.
That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's
attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived
ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and
excessive campaign energy.
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the
campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should
therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern
posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which
I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is
McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we
emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage
the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent
on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we
should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's
strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing,
aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the
EYES ONLY
-3-
Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-
McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase
of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in
the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more
than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes
can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also
have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-
balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns
between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern
vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we
do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most
importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which
can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or
domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis
should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be
tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be
tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather
than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to
develop compensatory neutralization programs.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the
following:
(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc.
The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront
Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by
our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some
break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our
policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will
therefore become moot.
(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT
agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President
has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a
qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight
factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.
(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously
try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound
by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily
blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the
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Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of
improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen
setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be
counted as a strong continuing asset.
(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international
economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization
and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords
the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful
assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to inter-
national trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will
flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international
monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that
statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm
that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve
some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps
have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.
(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism
but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly
strong popular base.
On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments
in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his
statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
(Per HRH)
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.
First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial
decline during the campaign. 11 (If there is a single hallmark of RN's
runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the
Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not
so much lose votes fro m August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a
historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to
it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed
a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?
A)
Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate,
if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some
of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention,
but not a Nixon voter at heart.
B)
We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North,
who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This
return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably
partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to
our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the
Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our
opportunity is renewed.)
The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise
correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls.
Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which
surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide"
that might have been.
-2-
But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings
in 1968. Basically, they were these:
a)
A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed
it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that
we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The
hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and
unity HHH did not, was Ideal for September. It was not for October.
Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should
have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force
back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and
the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were
yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By DO doing,
he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.
On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges,
to attract interest.
b)
The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the
identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press.
Teddy White testifics to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition,
I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types
who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at
election time.
What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut
down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where
we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvere
into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two
leading candidates. We did not deviate from the get-speech-Man-in-the-
Arona-Handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or
interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story,
The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio
Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two.
Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the
campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of
liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through
late in the game.
-3-
c)
But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may
or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of
the various campaign, which are many -- but which are 28 well
counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate
those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the
campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What wo face in my
view is:
THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964
If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:
1)
We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not
let him off of 12 until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we
did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on
Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order, and our issue
hand had been played. Again, we have enough C7 McGovern to keep
him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it
out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
2)
We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in
1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning
is essential; plans are worthless. " We should have a mapped-out
game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the
Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be
a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at
least once a week.
3)
While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on
the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the
country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
4)
We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the
press and media between now and November. In my view, we have
discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years --
indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the dedine. But
should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press
corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to
carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-
McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in
time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc --
because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why
RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise In the national
polls by a single cubit.
-4-
5)
We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and
personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal
of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.
In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the
smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better
than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united
party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate
who 18 far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with
their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent,
we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.
Thus -- it will not be how wondorful we aro, but how terrible McGovern
is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear
victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this
in mind.
To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues, "
clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should
deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the
record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such
media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Caper, which
they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues
and his positions and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."
6)
One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of
McGovern, if nominated, being case into the role of "under-dog"
"anti-Establishment, " "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign
will provide one hell of a good doal more media interest and human
interest than ours.
Wo should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to
attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but
unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average
Man agains the Establishment and the Radical Chic.
Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign
shortcomings and through the media. Again, how the media handles
this will determine much The medi a could treat McGovern like
Goldwater, or they could make him into an incpt, but good "under-dog"
like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.
-5-
7)
As for the suggestion that RN 80 out and do more, is la 1960, I
would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning. 11 However
Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in
action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon
addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutos as President, to strike a
contrast with McGovorn, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as
President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.
8)
Schoduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN
into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities,
Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is
only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not
who wins, but whether or not 10 is a landslide, and quite frankly, that
20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make
appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the
ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of
the North we never carried before.
9)
Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum
importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-
on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with
his positions, and if we nood any characterization -- we can take that
from the Democrate. Regretiably, the media does not allow us the same
latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged
the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.
Buchanan
50
45
RN
40
35
HHH
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Gallup Poll - 1968
RN
HHH
Wallace
April
43%
34%
9%
10
Lato May
36
42
14
July
40
38
16
Aug. 21
45
29
18
Late Sept.
43
28
21
Early Oct.
44
29
20
5
Mid Oct.
43
31
20
Oct. 27
44
36
15
Nov. 4
42
40
14
0
April
was unbate
July
Aug. 21
Late
Early
Mid Oct.
Oct. 27
No
May
Sept.
Oct.
!
60
Gallup Poll OF 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und.
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
55
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50
RN
45
40
35
REN 1.Darly
Late
July
August
Sept.
October
Nov.
June
June
50
45
HHH
40
35
RN
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Harris Poll - 1968
10
RN
HHH
Wallace
May
36%
30%
13%
June
36
43
13
July
36
41
16
is
Aug.
40
34
17
Sept.
39
31
21
Nov. 1-2
42
40
12
Nov. 3
40
43
13
0
MW
1,
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Nov. 1-2
Nov. 3
THEME AND TONE OF CONVENTION
1.
The past is past and merely a basis for the future. Our theme
should be future-oriented.
2.
No single theme will enhance the convention or campaign.
The important thing is to do the appropriate things and not
to overstate or charge off in unnecessary directions.
3.
People have intense feelings about many issues these days.
It is difficult, therefore, to choose one specific issue but
the Convention and campaign must reflect a sympathetic
understanding of these feelings.
4.
The campaign theme should be simple, unambiguous and not
invite argument. Compare "Trust Muskie" (all wrong) with
McGovern's "Demand the Truth" (very sound). Garment
feels "Now More Than Ever" is ambiguous and less effective
than "A Better Future for All" which he likes.
5.
Tone of the Convention should be crisp, not emotional,
confident without being smug or complacent, lively and
factual without being gradiloquent and self-serving.
6.
Convention should report on the Administration at work, and
not prepare for a political fight with the Democrats.
7.
McGovern is trying to unite the dissatisfied but even they
want "change without chaos". It should be pointed out that
the Administration is effecting that now.
8.
Our Convention mustn't look slick or overstaged.
9.
Convention can't appear to be a vacation for the delegates.
10.
Should emphasize that the Presidenthas overwhelmingly pre-empted
the Democrats theme of "Bring America Home" (re: Vietnam)
in the last 3-1/2 years. McGovern is 4 years too late.
NETWORK COVERAGE
1.
Try to get ABC to cover opening session live.
2.
Networks should be provided fact sheets on speakers and
other information to make coverage more interesting.
3.
Networks should be provided with a list of names and seat
locations of our celebrities.
4.
Networks should be given a complete podium program well
in advance.
5.
Podium mini-documentary -- Each network should be provided
an opportunity to video tape a tour of the podium, its inner
workings and functions to give the television audience a better
understanding of how the Convention works.
6.
CBS ran a mini-documentary on McGovern. If they're
planning to do the same for the President, we should provide
some good stills.
7.
During "Pledge of Allegiance", cameras could cut to film clips
of flags flying in various locations and various scenes of the country.
8.
Democratic keynote film was suitable for simulcasting on radio.
Good idea.
9.
Floor cameras should be allowed each network so interviewees
don't appear to be looking at the floor but into the cameras.
10.
VIP-movements must be carefully programmed to receive the
best network coverage.
11.
When VIP principals move, they should go through large groups
where enthusiasm can be generated and will be shown to the public.
12.
Coverage of McGovern watching balloting in his hotel room seemed
poor decision. Perhaps to prevent this with the First Family, we
could have them go to dinner together, to Grand Cay or to Bebe's.
13.
Need one or two lively or controversial events which can't damage
the President but will create enough public interest to generate
a television audience for the Convention.
14.
Somehow networks should be made to talk about upcoming
GOP strength, e.g. the Brocks and Bushes.
15.
Networks should be provided with a breakdown of the composition
of the Republican Party.
DELEGATES AND SPOKESMEN
1.
Democratic delegates represented a broad cross section.
Hopefully, ours will do the same.
2.
Democratic delegates lacked color. Should we strive for
businesslike looking people or those showing enthusiasm
through decorations and costumes?
3.
Delegates should always stand, never be seated, when interviewed.
4.
Delegates shouldn't lean over people's shoulders during interviews.
5.
Delegates should be told to arrive 15 minutes early and that
the door will close 5 minutes prior to the beginning of each session.
6.
No one should give interviews during the opening ceremonies
of each session.
7.
Delegates should be briefed to respond with enthusiasm,
to stay in their seats and to pay attention to proceedings.
8.
Spokesmen on floor should talk not must about the President' S
political contributions but about him as an individual -- his
origins and so forth.
9.
Our top Administration leaders should be available for interviews
to show our depth.
10.
Delegates must reflect a commitment to the President as
more than just a nominee.
11.
Delegate chairmen should be given one-liners to precede
their vote casting, e.g. "Michigan, the State which represents
where America stand on busing, casts its 100 votes
12.
As networks will start coverage 30 minutes before each
day's opening, we must have well-versed, key spokesmen
available on the floor for Interviews.
PROGRAM AND EFFECTS
1.
To lend a sense of heritage, perhaps a different gavel should be
used at each session and a fact shoet about each one given to the
networks. The Democrats' gavel sounded tinny. Ours should be solid.
2.
Each State should bring its own Stage flag and an American flag.
3.
Some thought the Parade of Flags at the Democratic Convention
added too much confusion to an already confused Convention.
Others thought it was great.
4.
Pledge of Allegiance should be conducted as more than just
a procedural necessity. The delegates could be asked to stand,
cross their hearts, etc.
5.
Everyone should sing the National Anthem.
6.
Orchestra playing National Anthem should have more brass,
creating a "band" sound rather than an "orchestra" sound.
7.
Treasurer's report should:
-- set the record straight on the alleged $40 million war chest.
-- indicate that we spent far less in the primaries than
the Democrats.
--point out how much we are paying for the soup *kitchen
in Flamingo Park, if there is one,
8.
Podium movement should be kept to a minimum, and numbers
on the podium to a minimum.
9.
Good idea to dim halllights and spotlight podium when appropriate.
10.
GOP Convention should be opened with fanfare unlike the
vague Democratic opening.
11.
Good idea to have young flag bearers during the Parade of Flags.
12.
Think about putting seatcovers on the chairs nearest the aisle,
maybe 5 or 6 into the row so our slogan appears.
13.
Everything should start precisely on time.
14.
Consider using a flag blowing on a multi-media background for
the opening of the Convention.
15.
Note the songs which carried on TV during the Democratic
Convention and repeat them during ours.
16.
Should have at least one foreign accent doing the Pledge of
Allegiance.
17.
Our speeches should be short (1) and the only way to prevent
their dragging out is to monitor them constantly.
18.
Perhaps a better effect than Ethel Merman singing
"God Bless America" would be a young group singing
"Born Free".
19.
Should balloons be used during the demonstrations?
20.
We shouldn't announce all escorts for our principals going
to the podium. Too confusing.
21.
Should preserve our traditional system of conducting roll calls
alphabetically. Democrats' system was confusing.
22.
Speakers should be humorous, a contrast to the Democrats,
as the President will be serious.
23.
Delegates should be allowed to leave their seats during
demonstrations (Dems did not) as it encourages genuine
spirit and is much more exciting to the delegates and viewers.
24.
Democratic keynote film:
-- made all the people look like "the guy next door" and
appealed to a sense of civic responsibility rather than
the issues. Interviews were too long, some people were
interviewed more than once (bad), and names and occupations
of people interviewed weren't indicated.
-- Good length (7-8 minutes)
25.
Keep in mind that the Dems invocation was too long and
the Archbishop, too political.
26.
Something interesting should always be happening, either
on the podium, the floor or outside to insure good network coverage.
Must program every movement.
27.
Get approval for use of U.S. seal on front of podium.
28.
Podium microphones should be less obvious than Dems were.
29.
Podium workers should wear neutral colors so as not to distract
from the speakers.
30.
Audio expert should be consulted for musical events setup.
31.
In order to insure ideal sound pickup and framing of the picture
from the head-on cameras, a hydraulically controlled platform
should be built into the podium. This will allow proper elevation
for each speaker.
32.
Our keynote address should be shorter than their 28-30 minute
one.
33.
Use of large screen projection of keynote speech in hall was
very effective.
34.
Republican keynoter should poke fun at McGovern with
one-liners prepared by a comedy writer.
35.
Seconding speakers should be carefully selected to represent
various interests and groups.
36.
Good musical entertainment should be arranged for the half hour
preceding each day's session.
37.
Physical set-up:
:
GOP hospitality lounge for delegates.
--
Sign outside Convention Hall should read "GOP Convention"
rather than "Democratic and GOP Conventions"
Chairman of each delegation to be provided with riser
near microphone so he can be seen.
Collapsible fence should be reinforced so demonstrators
can't push through as they did during the Dem Convention.
Three interview areas could be set up, away from the p.a.
system and band.
--
VIP arrival area needs to be better lighted.
--
Should be no empty spectator seats.
MISCELLANEOUS
1.
Democratic contributor figures should be put out. Telethon
reported their list had grown three-fold to 350, 000 indicating
that before they only had 120, 000.
2.
McGovern had new hairstyle for Convention -- TV slicker image?
3.
Midwesterners should be polled for their feelings on conventions.
4.
Get the Variety article out to the celebrities.
5.
Have Ann Dorh do Conventi on briefing instead of Ziegler or
Klein?
6.
Secret Service agents moving with First Family must be kept
to a minimum.
7.
GOP fund raiser should be business dress, not dinner jackets,
for an informal look.
8.
McGovern needs to play down his extreme positions from now on,
80 we should be constantly keeping him on the defensive and
trying to frustrate and irritate him.
9.
The McGovern and Eagleton families are attractive and articulate.
Families will assume a large role in the campaign.
MEMORANDUM
TO:
RN
June 26, 1972
FROM: JPS
I.
Democratic Situation
The Democrats are on the verge of providing us with
a magnificent opportunity by nominating a Presidential
candidate whom a majority of their party does not want. In
the name of "reform", the Democrats have allowed the control of
their party to pass into the hands of an ultra liberal,
activist minority which is unrepresentative of any of the former
factions of the old coalition, (Southern Democrats, labor,
ethnics and minorities).
The key to taking advantage of the situation does not
involve labeling McGovern as an ultra-liberal, however. Keeping
in mind that the extra votes which we will be aiming for are
people who have voted Democratic automatically most of their
lives, the wrong thing to do would be to group McGovern as a
liberal and us as conservatives; most Democrats still feel
"liberal" is a good word.
Although he will attempt to hide his strategy, McGovern
will wage a large state campaign (Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington,
Oregon and California) which would yield just enough electoral
votes to win (276). Additional states where he will make an
-2-
effort are Maryland, West Virginia, Hawaii, Alaska, North
Dakota and South Dakota (31 electoral votes). The rest of the
country he will concede. It is important for us to keep this
in mind in planning our own strategy since it will mean that
we will have the capability of concentrating our own finances,
strategy and organizational talents in the few states which he
means to contest.
On the Vice Presidency, I still think he will choose some
one from a large state which we carried in 1968 (California,
Illinois, Ohio or New Jersey). The possibilities here are
rather limited (Tunney, Stevenson and Gilligan) and the
strongest possibility would be Stevenson. His other possible
approach would be to select some one who would be pleasing to
organized labor but there doesn't seem to be any obvious choice
in this regard. I doubt seriously if Senator Kennedy would
accept a Vice Presidential nomination. Abe Ribicoff might have
some attraction because of his following in the Jewish and Black
communities but he would not run well in the mid-West where
McGovern needs desperately to win. Most of the other non-Southern
Senators and Governors are not well enough known, would not take
it or are too battle scarred.
It would be a mistake to feel that we are looking ahead
to a victory of Goldwater purportions since (1) the press will
help McGovern to look more reasonable than Goldwater did and
(2) the McGovern people, different from Goldwater, realize that
they must move toward the center in order to win. We, however,
can keep the press honest if we go about it correctly.
-3-
II. Strategy Against McGovern
In most incumbent races the incumbent has most of the
advantages and only one disadvantage - to a certain extent
he is on the defensive since his non-incumbent opponent is
constantly alleging a failure to perform adequately in office.
We have a unique opportunity to remove this one advantage of
non-incumbency from McGovern.
A. Intra-Party Disagreements
Over the next few weeks, both before and after the
Democratic convention, Humphrey, Muskie, Jackson and
others can be counted upon to disagree pointedly and
often with many of McGovern's stands. We should
do nothing to interrupt this process since the most
damning criticism against any man are the words of
people in his own party. Any criticism of his stands
which come from us during this period will harm the
credibility of our disagreements against him in the
fall. If we can succeed in making the same criticisms
of McGovern which Democrats are used to hearing from
other Democrats, we'll have made a great stride toward
gaining the support of many Democratic voters in the,
fall.
B. Labels and Personalities v/v The Issues
In most Presidential elections there really are no
issues which are clear enough for the people to under-
stand since both candidates are trying to seek the votes
of a broad center of the populace and usually agree in
principal on the larger issues in foreign and domestic
policy. Therefore, in past elections, so called issue
-4-
debates have degenerated into a difference of means to
accomplish agreed upon ends, which leave the voter in a
state of confusion and force him to make his choice on
the basis of personality, philosophical label or party
loyalty.
A McGovern candidacy represents a rather drastic
difference of opinion about ends, both in foreign and
domestic policy. We therefore have the opportunity, if
we can discipline ourselves to stick to the differences
in ends between the two candidates, to wage a campaign
based solely on the issues. The more we stray from this
discipline and rely on personality, philosophical labels,
or fear tactics, the more we give McGovern, with the
cooperation of the press, the chance to represent that
he is not as bad as we say he is, that we are unfairly
characterizing him and we lose the value of the obvious
difference that exists between RN and McGovern on ends.
C. Scheduling
RN should ignore the fact that there is an election
campaign going on. Some large rallies and public appear-
ances can be scheduled in October but as much as possible
it should appear that RN is too busy with the affairs of
state to pay too much attention to the election. The
Vice Presidential candidate on the other hand should have
an extremely full schedule starting the day after Labor
Day. He should attack McGovern on the issues every day
demanding answers to questions raised by McGovern's
programs to redistribute wealth, guarantee income, cut
defense spending, etc. The Vice President should have
-5-'
"a-question-a-day" for George McGovern which will
create constant pressure on him to start answering the
charges of the Vice President. If this is done correctly,
the Vice President will be on the news each day with his
new question, McGovern will be forced to spend much of
his time answering our charges and little attacking the
Administration and, since his answers will never quite
catch up with the questions, we will be constantly
raising new doubts about him in the minds of the voters.
Some original thinking should go into formulating these
questions so that we can use the most damaging ones with
the proper timing to keep the emotions of the campaign
at a high pitch and be sure to create hard news every
day. Some attention should be given to rifle-shotting
many of these questions to appeal to Jews, the laboring
man and Catholic ethnics. Of course, the questions
should be used to keep the Democrats divided on the
issues.
Once again, the Vice President should never refer
to liberals or conservatives or use trick phrases to
characterize McGovern as a radical. We are after
normally Democratic voters who will begin to feel sorry
for their party if they feel we are being underhanded
or unfair in our criticism.
D. Organizational Programs
Special efforts should be made to isolate and inform
the conservative Democratic vote in all the states where
McGovern will concentrate his campaign. In Michigan, for
-6-,
instance, this consists of the laboring and ethnic vote
in and around Wayne County which supported George Wallace
in the primary. In the other states it will involve a
much more agressive campaign in the large cities than we
have ever waged before. The Vice President should be
seen in union halls and at ethnic picnics and outings
which the Democrats are used to attending. If we can
go over the heads of the labor leaders to their con-
stituency, at the very least, McGovern will have to spend
a great deal of time trying to recapture votes which a
Democrat normally gets by default.
E. Helping the Remainder of the Ticket
If we can succeed in grabbing the initiative, thereby
placing McGovern on the defensive during the first weeks
of the campaign, many Democrats, especially in those
states outside McGovern's projected target areas, will
lose interest in the top of the ticket and devote most
of their attention to saving Gubernatorial, Senatorial
and Congressional seats. This will happen quite swiftly
in the South and, later, on a state by state basis in the
smaller states in the middle and far west. Of course
all of our candidates in these areas should be reminded
to run against McGovern (and not their opponent) but in
aid of their success we should: (1) see that we adequately
coordinate the questions which we will be asking of McGovern
with local candidates SO that they may use them to embarrass
their opponents; (2) coordinate all local efforts to ask
voters to vote the straight Nixon ticket in order to preempt
the predictable ticket spliting efforts by the Democrats;
-7-
(3) coordinate advertising efforts to include the names
of local candidates on billboards and T.V. spots. While
the Vice Presidential candidate will be useful in trying
to convert labor and ethnic votes in the larger states,
he should also be used to assist the local candidates in
areas where we can make some headway.
III. General Observations and Summary
We can place McGovern on the defensive by sticking to
the "ends" differences between Nixon and McGovern. This battle
should be carried by the Vice Presidential candidate without use
of name calling, philosophical labels or sheer fear tactics.
McGovern should be confronted with a "question-a-day" and forced
to answer on the substance of his proposals.
If this strategy is successful, it will result in (1) hard
political news on a daily basis; (2) continued division among
Democratic politicians and voters; (3) a continuing conflict
between the Republican Vice Presidential candidate and McGovern
which will keep RN above the battle in a statesman-like position
and (4) a failure on McGovern's part ever to successfully bring
criticism to bear on the Nixon Administration.
One general observation: in 1968 we spent a tremendous
amount of money on television advertising, much of which was
unproductive and even boring by the end of the campaign. There
is no doubt that the value of political advertising is suspect
these days since the voters are unwilling to believe selfserving
statements of any kind from the candidates themselves. The
"question-a-day" approach mentioned above is intended to guarantee
daily news coverage on the 6 o'clock news shows which still is of
-8-
great value because such coverage comes from an objective source.
I would hope to some degree, if the "question-a-day" method is
successful, we could tailor much of our spot advertising to
those questions which seem to provoke the most interest among
the electorate. The value in this approach is to first interest
the voters from an objective source (the 6 o'clock news) and
then reiterate the most telling points by our advertising. By
first testing these items through the news media we gain credi-
bility for each point and then can properly select which we
should drum home through spot advertising.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
I've no changes in my June 16 memo, but would add a few
additional thoughts:
1. The target is McGovern, not the Democrats. I was
glad this point was made so forcefully this morning, and I think
it's essential that we stick with it. We should stress the open door
theme, and keep coming back to the argument that RN represents
the great, bi-partisan traditions of America -- the traditions not
only of Lincoln and TR and Eisenhower, but also of Wilson and FDR,
of Truman and Kennedy.
2. Whenever possible, RN should help cement this ïm-
)
pression by referring back to these traditions, and to positions
associated with them: to FDR's leadership of the free world in its
time of peril, to HST's forging of the Atlantic alliance, etc.
3. Throughout our history, there have been fringe move-
ments that were briefly and dramatically in the spotlight, then faded
back into the shadows from whence they came -- while the great
bi-partisan traditions were carried on. We should zero in on
McGovern's as the latest of these.
4. We should have a moratorium on discussion of forging
a new coalition that will make the GOP the majority party for the
next generation -- this will scare off those dispossessed Democrats
who see a resounding defeat of McGovern as the only way they can
take their party back.
2
-2-
5. Non-partisan forums are the best forums. The President
made this point to the surrogates; at this point it's doubly true for him,
if we're to make him the rallying-point for disaffected Democrats as
well as Republicans and Independents. To the maximum extent possible,
the forums we book him into should be ones associated with those great
bi-partisan traditions.
6. We should do our damnedest to avoid getting into situations
like the one we found ourselves in with Packwood and the Crippling
Strikes Prevention Act. This hurts us at our most vulnerable point: it
provides some of the most damaging support yet for the picture of RN
as an unprincipled politician who would sacrifice anything for electoral
support. We could use some fights on principle for unpopular causes
to offset it; or at least to resist some obvious pressures to take the
expedient course. I saw Packwood on two networks last night; it was
devastating. We shouldn't delude ourselves that we can do this sort of
thing (if we did) without getting caught at least part of the time, and being
severely hurt by it. I think Stew Alsop was right in his column when he
asked who could defeat RN in November, and concluded that only RN
could.
7. In general, I thought the presentation of strategy thisʳ
)
1
morning was right on target.
8. Attached is an outline I did last Sunday for the keynote
presentation at the convention, together with some notes explaining it.
It builds up to a direct appeal to dissident Democrats to join with us.
I think this kind of thing could also be the keynote of the campaign.
Ra81
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
Attachments
PRICE
July 16, 1972
Keynote Presentation: Outline
1. Moderator. There are discontents and dissatisfactions in the
land; Americans feel frustrated with the present, and often fed up
with government. We share these discontents and dissatisfactions,
and we too are fed up with what all too often have been the failures
of government. But we don't just complain. For three and a half
years we've been doing something about it; we've made progress;
the direction is set, the momentum is established, the players are
lined up, the openings have been made to Russia, China and others
abroad, and to new departures at home. Highlights of what we've
achieved. What we've accomplished is a beginning, and a credential;
now we're eager to get on with the job, and to finish what we've
begun. In the film you're about to see, you will see some of those
beginnings.
FILM: THE NIXON YEARS
2. Keynoter A: What we will do for you. Our plans, our goals, for
the future, as we look from now to 1976. A new prosperity without
war and without inflation; the beginnings of a full generation of peacc;
a rebirth of pride in America; a fair shake for the farmer, security
for the elderly, progress on the environment, etc.
-2-
3. Keynoter B: What we will not do to you. (The attack speech.)
All the McGovern nasties -- we won't take money out of the workers'
pockets for a $1,000 dole, we won't bus your kids, we won't let
America become a second-rate power whose President has to beg,
we won't spawn a new permissiveness that collapses moral values;
we'll work with the young, but won't ignore the old; we'll turn
America around without turning it upside down. We'll respect the
student, the professor, the farmer -- and also the worker who
wears a hard hat. Note: the focus of this will be entirely on the
sins of the present Democratic nominee, not on the sins of past
Democratic administrations.
4. Keynoter C. From the party of the Open Door, an Invitation.
From the podium of this Republican convention, we address this
talk to the millions of loyal Democrats left homeless by Hurricane
McGovern. Speaking to them directly, we invite them to make
their home with us -- try it, you may like it. Think about why
you're a Democrat. Is it because the Democratic party is the party
of FDR, Truman and Kennedy? If so, then ask yourself whether
Roosevelt or Truman or Kennedy would advocate crippling our
defenses and abandoning our allies -- Roosevelt, who led the defense
5
-3-
of freedom in World War II; Truman, the architect of NATO and the
Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and patron at the founding
of Israel; Kennedy, who declared we would "bear any burden, 11 etc.
Is it because the Democratic party is the party of labor? -- through
a litany of why people in the past have been Democratic, and why
those same reasons should now lead them to cast their lot with us
in 1972. Its tone is one of respect for the Democratic Party as a
great national institution, and sympathy with those members who
have seen it seized by a self-appointed elite determined to convert
it into a narrow ideological faction -- of warm and open-hearted
welcome to those left on the outside at Miami a month ago, and of
)
common cause with them because we share their hopes, their dreams,
their concerns about America. In his acceptance speech, George
McGovern said, "Come home, America. 11 To millions of Demo-
crats whose ideas no longer have a hearing in the national Democratic
Party, I say tonight, "Come home, Americans -- come share our
home -- give us not only your votes, but your hands, we will give
you ours in welcome. " This is the real keynote -- and it should
be echoed throughout the rest of the convention proceedings.
#######
PRICE
July 16, 1972
Notes on the keynote outline, and on the invitation:
1. Structure. This is broken into sections not by issue area, but to
make a logical progression leading up to what I think should be the
real "keynote" of the keynote, and of the convention: an explicit,
direct appeal to disaffected Democrats to take refuge with us.
One of our real dangers has been that we'd come across as
smug and complacent. This counters that, at the outset of the con-
vention, in two ways: first, by starting off identifying ourselves with
the dissatisfactions most Americans feel in one way or another,
saying we share those, and that's why we want another four years to
complete the unfinished task of combatting them; and second, by
reaching out to the Democrats rather than merely patting ourselves
on the back. There are more of them than there are of us, SO we
need them; people like to be courted, and this does SO showing that
we care about them.
The intro establishes an audience rapport by saying we know how
you feel; it brags a bit, but without smugness, and leads logically
into the film, which shows RN grappling with the inherited troubles
)
and making headway against them in his first term; the film leaves
us at 1972; Keynoter A then takes us from 1972 to 1976, in terms of
our hopes and plans; Keynoter B draws the sharp distinctions be-
tween what we're offering and what the opposition is; this sets the
stage for Keynoter C to make his appeal to the traditional Democrats
to come with us.
2. Advantages. Keying off with this unusual sort of appeal to
Democrats has several distinct advantages:
a. Being unusual, it makes news.
b. It plays against the weakness of the opposition candidate,
and highlights Democratic divisions.
C. It keys off our "party of the open door" theme.
-2-
d. It sets up some possible additional convention highlights
(see notes below on this).
e. It establishes a set of explicit rationales for dissident
Democrats to join with us.
f. It adds interest to what could otherwise be a dull convention,
by introducing an element of contest and confrontation -- but making
it confrontation among Democrats rather than among Republicans.
g. It provides a theme for the commentators to talk about, with
a cast of characters.
3. Convention follow-up. I'd like to see us issue this call to Demo-
crats at the outset, and then follow it up throughout the convention
-- not only returning to it in subsequent speeches, but adding some
items to the program that would pick it up. Examples:
a. A special, spotlighted appearance by Connally, speaking
as a Democrat to his fellow Democrats.
b. On the second night, a special series of short speeches by
Democrats responding to the Republican invitation -- assuming the
right people can be rounded up. Examples: a prominent labor leader,
life-long Democrat, saying the candidate who in 1972 best represents
what labor represents is not McGovern, but RN; an attractive, artic-
ulate young voice of the New South, saying his party has left him; a
respected academic or student leader, saying he's been a Democrat
but McGovern is too much, and we need responsible leadership;
Floyd McKissick saying the real road to black progress is not the
McGovern way, but the Nixon way.
C. Release telegrams and letters from dissident Democrats
during the convention, saying they're going Republican.
d. Plug dissident Democrats into the outside-the-hall schedule.
-3-
4. TV Coverage. Perhaps the biggest payoff, if we follow a course
like this, will be in the cud-chewing of the TV reporters and commen-
tators. They desperately need something to talk about, and if we can
get them talking about how many Democrats the Republicans are going
to get, and speculating about what Democratic switch-overs we're
going to parade out next, we've achieved four crucial goals:
a. We've used our convention to condition Democratic voters,
in explicit, personal terms, to thinking about voting Republican.
b. We've established a "prior approval" factor -- that is, we've
made switching seem respectable to the TV viewer by showing him
that other good Democrats are doing it.
C. We've injected a note of drama into the convention, and
we've done it by moving the battle to the other guy's turf.
d. We've got the commentators talking about our issues.
Not to mention that we've opened our convention in an even
better way than the Democrats opened theirs -- we've made it noty
)
just a GOP Convention, but a convention of and for the new coalition.
#####
9
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
First Family Scheduling
I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope
that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate
asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as
possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening
and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things,
and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans
are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about
alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters
like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus
-- especially with parents and grandparents.
Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where
I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a
chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense
of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got
to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials
to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels
Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by
visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can
remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political
visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things.
for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks
ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to
Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people, " etc., that
there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap:
I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly
come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, in-
volved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous
pleasure-sceker from Camelot.
10
-2-
I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly.
Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous
non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were
represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular
would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.
A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could
organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as
an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that
maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in
Peoria.
RaSA
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
I
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
(As Requested)
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: The Vice President and the Campaign
Because the Vice President remains, outside RN, the biggest gun
we have, the Veep should be staffed up at least on the level of
the 1970 campaign. Full plane, and gear and constant contact and
communication with the White House and Re-Election Committee.
1.
He will have to visit those states the President cannot visit,
as of course the first responsibility.
2. However, as often as possible, the Vice President should be
scheduled into those areas and among those groups -- that are the
battleground in 1972. And that is not Republicans. We, by and
large, have the South now. In the North, it is Catholic, ethnic,
urban, Jewish, middle-income, working class Democrats who are the
swing votes, the ones who will decide by how large a margin we will
win this one, if we do win it.
Therefore, schedulers should look to Pulaski Day Parades, Columbus
Day Parades (What about a WH function, along the lines of the
St. Pat's Party), union halls, Knights of Columbus, Queens, PBA,
and ethnic community meetings.
This is vital, in my judgment and we should schedule Dole and
MacGregor into the GOP functions, using the Veep for those areas
where he can do us the most good -- among the Wallace Democrats
in the North, in places like Michigan and elsewhere.
3. The Vice President should have a set-piece speech, as the
President had, and instead of an entire new text every day -- as in
1970 we should have a new "Ten Graphs" in each speech. This
is one hell of a lot easier on speech writers, and gives us greater
control of the material that the press runs.
-2-
4.
The Vice President should carry the fight to the opposition
ticket, by and large ignoring Eagleton -- and zeroing in on McGovern.
The Veep has the Assault Book. What is needed now more than
anything is co-ordination of the attack strategy so that we don't pee
away everything in the first weeks, and so that our strategies can
be co-ordinated.
5.
Frankly, we need better press relations between the Vice
President and the national and local press; this might well require
a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Veep's staff toward
the traveling press. (We had good relations we thought, by and
large, in the 1970 election.) Certainly, the Vice President should
do something for the locals at each stop. And we ought, of course,
to shelve for the campaign the broad anti-media attacks; unless
a) it proves politically necessary in light of their shafting. We have
the political dividends out of this -- our target is McGovern.
6.
Contact on a regular basis between the President and the Vice
President would be especially helpful not simply for morale purposes,
but to review the success of failure of a given strategy and to maintain
campaign flexibility.
7.
We should, on the campaign trail, avoid I think, the epithet
and make our charges - - based strictly on the record. So that
McGovern is forced to respond to what he himself said -- not to what
we called him. However, the extremism of the McGovern positions
and statements, and the "elitism" of the New Left controllers of the
Democratic Party remains an effective theme appealing to Democrats.
8.
We should remember that the swing voters in this election are
Democrats and strictly Republican appeals this fall are only useful
for rallying the troops, nothing more. The "McGovernites" is right
on the mark.
9.
The situation of 1970 where the President's people were on
board the Veep's plane- at the Veep's invitation -- was a good one.
Since the President is not going to be stumping, his top writing talent,
or much of it, should be withthe Vice President.
10.
I recognize the need to defend the President and his Administration,
but what the press considers "news" is usually negative news, i.
an "attack" rather than a defense. And we must not allow McGovern
to swing over onto the offensive i.e., I would argue that the Vice
President should be carrying the struggle to their ticket, rather than
waiting for them to attack, and defending the President.
-3-
In my view, whereas in 1968 it was relatively easy to scare the
voters, with attacks on RN's economics and position on medicare,
etc. that tactic on the part of the other side won't work today.
Whether they agree with RN or not, very few Americans are
"frightened" by the prospect of another RN term. The same cannot
be said of McGovern; and this is the factor which opens up the
possibility of a landslide. Thus, a campaign which continually raises
specters about McGovern's extremism, and the crazyness of his
ideas, is the only kind of campaign I think that can win us a major
landslide. A defensive strategy, thus, does not commend itself to
me -- especially for our biggest gun outside of the President. We
ought to have other views on this.
11.
We have to be wary of making George a Martyr. Mean-spiritedness
has no place in this campaing; thus, it is important that the campaign
staff not be tired and bitchy as the campaign heats up. The humor
used should be light and needling not mean in character.
Again, on this score, though unfair, it is true that we have a smaller
margin for error than the Democrats. The Veep can call McGovern a
"fraud" and be excoriated for it McGovern can compare RN to Hitler
and his policy in Vietnam to the "extermination of the Jews" and get
away with it, without comment. Without tearing into our friends in the
media, we have got to keep pointing this up.
12.
Vitally important that we not allow a situation to develop, as
in 1960 with RN or 1968 with the Veep, when the candiate and his
fraveling press were at sword's point. Even if the press is shafting
us, it is not to our advantage to conduct a Cold War with them when
they are reporting what we say and do. In the fall, on the Vice
President's plane, there should be some who will bring that "can of oil"
when necessary, and will, in a good cause, eat a little crow and
humble pie.
13.
Essential that the Vice President, this fall, feel that he has
the full confidence and support of the President, and regular backing.
My view is that in 1968, when the Vice President was under attack,
we would have done better by bringing him on to answer the charges
against him. In 1972, we can be sure that the Vice President will be
an issue -- the answer to this is to put him on the air, on national
television, and to let him in his own calm way, with his own accents,
answer the allegations that will be made against him. To show he does
not have horns. We might even consider a visit to some campus -- or
a youth confrontation on the tube for the campaign. As in 1952, a
-4-
harsh and strident and unfair attack on a Vice President can be made
to back-fire against its perpetrators.
Considering that one of the advantages of McGovern is that he may
be perceived as the underdog, the anti-Establishment candidate, it
might be good to get the Vice President into this role, and come
fighting back fairly, against all these elements and institutions that
are out to get him.
14.
Lastly, the major appearance the Vice President -- the major
national impression will come from his acceptance speech. This
speech can do a tremendous job for him, and for us, in laying out the
record of the Democratic ticket, in appealing to those Democrats who
have bolted, and in leaving an impression of the Vice President before
the country.
PJB would like to help put some of this together for the Vice President,
and if the President suggested that, would be most helpful.
15.
Recognizing that there are many within the White House and
the Hill who are not exactly enthusiasts of the Vice President, word
should go forth that this is a "team" effort, there should be no
"background" knocking the Number Two man, who will be shouldering
as RN did, much of the nasty workload of the party and the campaign.
Nothing is more embittering than to pull off the wire some holier-than-
thou statement from a fellow Republican, when- in the interests of the
Administration -- we are throwing Goodell to the sharks. Even a
word from RN to all involved that this is a team effort; that no good
is served us or the Party by background back-stabbing, and that this
is an all-for-one, one-for-all operation, would be beneficial in the
campaign, I would think -- from the 1970 experience.
Buchanan
It
TALKING PAPER FOR DUCHANAN
FU
7/20
You should talk with the Vice President and sell him on
your idea of the day talk with the pre- 3.
Also, we need seme heavy thinking regarding the Vice President's
role and how he chould play it if he in the nominee for reelection.
We should determine first how be can help, and second, how be
can avoid hurting the prospects of the ticket.
We need your strategy views OR this, but we also need you to talk
with the Vice President, try to get him to stop the swipes at the
NEW YORK TIMES, and BO forth, and also to avoid the personal
attacks OR McGovern as you suggest in your latest memorandum.
HRH
July 13, 1972
HRH:kb
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING 8-102
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By OMP NARS, Date 8-19-81
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN
SUBJECT:
Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972
Many of the points HRH mentions were omitted in our original Assault
Strategy memo for the basic reason that we were focusing exclusively
upon the "negative" rather than the positive. Some recommendations
in the HRH memo we would concur with -- others we do not. Let's
take them point by point:
"1. The Buchanan memorandum fails to recognize the
necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In
other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition
should end up emphasizing our strengths. 11
We don't agree with this. For the following reasons. First, millions of
Americans vote not for, but against -- their hostility toward one candidate
is the compelling motive at the voting booth, not their enthusiasm for.
And a "negative" campaign -- largely directed from the positive one on
RN would in our judgment be much more convincing to those swing
voters who have never been pro-RN, but who can be "terrified" by this
new phenomenom. LBJ could not conveivably have gotten his sixty per
cent against RN he got it against Goldwater, not because of the
positive LBJ "ads, 11 but because Goldwater was portrayed as a threat
to the Republic. We should, in our judgment, recognize that potentially
millions of knee- jerk Democratic voters are going to come our way, if
they come -- because though they are not enthusiastic about RN, they are
nti-radicalism.
Secondly, when one observes that McGovern apparently lost 15 points
in one week in California -- among Democrats, it is clear that there is
tremendous room for movement downward by McGovern -- from a
relatively small investment. Ori the other hand, we see that RN -- from
the unprecedented China trip and attendant publicity, and from the historic
-2-
Moscow visit and SALT agreement -- has only risen seven or eight
points.
The lesson is clear. The potential for movement by McGovern --
downward is far easier and less costly, than the potential for
additional upward RN movement. In short, if it takes a Peking and
Moscow summit, and a SALT agreement -- and reams of hours of heroic
copy to move up up seven points while George can be dropped fifteen
in a week by some hard-nosed Humphrey attacks -- dollar-for-dollar --
when it comes to McGovern this argues we ought to put our campaigning
dollars into attacking him, rather than boosting ourselves.
Third, and related: RN is known to the nation; impressions of RN have
hardened over a period of twenty-five years. There are not likely to be
any sudden new perceptions of RN by the masses, in five months. On
the other hand, the perceptions about McGovern have not even begun to
harden with the nation as a whole. We have a far better chance of
affecting a change in the present image of McGovern -- than we do in the
present image of the President.
Fourth, let's look at it this way. RN cannot possibly get below 40% of the
vote, and cannot probably exceed 60%. Those swing voters are more than
likely Democrats, or independents somewhat lukewarm toward the
President (a group that would probably split half for RN and half for JFK
in 1960.) What is most likely to convince them to vote 95% for RN: Is
it a major campa ign convincing them of what they already know farily
well that RN is competent, experienced and innovative in foreign
affairs. (Even many of RN's opponents would concede this.) Or is it
more likely to result in greater returns if we convince them rather that
the "alternative" is an utter disaster for the country. In short, anyone
who can be convinced that McGovern is a disaster is automatically a vote
for RN. While someone who can be persuaded that RN is an imaginative
foreign policy leader is not necessarily a vote for RN and he can still
vote for McGovern. My view is that the negative McGovern campaign
need not be -- and should not necessarily be -- tied to a pro-RN pitch
at the end. If there were five people in the race, I would subscribe wholly
to point one but there are only two; and anyone whom we can convince
that McGovern is a wild man is ours -- for certain -- even if he at the
same time thinks RN is a conservative square.
Fifth, and finally -- not only does the pro-RN approach tend to dilute an
anti-McGovern message; the President should not be twinned with
McGovern on those issues where our disagreements are of degree rather
than kind. For example, if we are going to say McGovern is toying with
the security of our country whereas we, too, have cut back. but only
responsibly on defense then we are weakening our case. Where the
-3-
President can be contrasted with McGovern is where the breach is clean
as a whistle. I. e. McGovern favors abortion on demand -- RN thinks this
is morally wrong; i.e. McGovern favors legalization of marijuana; RN
thinks this is wrong, and a threat to the American family. We should
keep in mind that what we have is a President and a statesman and what
they have is a light-weight and a wild man -- and we ought not to be
comparing them too much in speeches, just as we don't want any debates
which would have the effect of putting them on the same plane.
Lastly, look at it this way. During the fall campaign the pro-RN news
footage of RN as President will probably amount to seven times the pro-
RN advertising footage. Thus, the pro-RN ad materials will only be a
minor reinforcement of the RN national image -- a minor fraction of the
time RN is seen. On the other hand, given the pro-McGovern disposition
of the liberal media, the anti-McGovern material from our campaign
is liekly to be a major and crucial segment of the entire anti-McGovern
materials that go out to the nation.
"2. We must not gettrapped into McGovern's bog of peddling
himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this
Administration has the boldest initiatives in history. 11
We agree with the first sentence, but not necessarily with the second.
The reason is this: We have spent 6 untless hours and unrecorded effort
selling the bold dynamic "New American Revolution, 11 -- more effort
probably than we can duplicate between now and November -- and the
returns are, in my judgment, not encouraging. If we took a national
poll dealing with RN's domestic proposals -- and asked how many
considered them bold, new, imaginative and then further, how many were
going to go with RN because of them -- the returns, one assumes, would
not be particularly heartened. Dollar-for-dollar, again, it is not a
cost-effective investment of PR time, money or effort to attempt to
portray the Nixon Administration domestic program as "exciting". We
would be going against a public perception; we would be attempting to
convince millions of the attractiveness of "programs" when increasing
numbers have about had it with government "programs" in general.
The first sentence -- about knocking down the "new face, 11 is right on
the money. McGovern has been part and parcel of the Congress which
has sat on its duff for two years; he has been a member of the Democratic
majority which has controlled both houses of Congress, since McGovern
came to Washington.
-4-
Who wrote the loopholes in the law; who raised the taxes; who failed
to provide relief; who is now sitting on its can doing nothing for
the average man but waste his dollars. Why who, other than the
Congress of which George McGovern has been an integral part sim e
1956, the Congress he and the left-wing liberals have been in control of,
absolutely, ever since McGovern came to Washington. Wallace hit
them on this, and so can we. McGovern should rightly be portrayed as
not someone with new ideas, but someone with a plan to dump new
billions in tax dollars down the old ratholes, he and his friends constructed
over the last 16 years.
(Both the Broder and Drummond columns hit the nail on the handling of
this issue.)
"3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with
domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which
are foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the
fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?
Bascially, we agree that foreign policy will be a long suit for the President
and we mentioned specifically attacks on McGovern on Israel, Europe,
defense and Vietnam. But, again, the same question arises. The entire
nation has seen RN in China, seen RN in Moscow, seen RN sign SALT -- the
coverage has been sweeping and massive. Can we really advance that
appreciably with speeches and verbal references to what the nation
already knows and already believes that RN is an imaginative statesman.
We should in our positive advertising, and in RN's posture during
the camapign, publicly, emphasize the Somber Statesman, the imaginative
statesman, who has mastery over the issues of peace and war. But
we don't need to constantly draw explicit comparisons. The implicit one
is satisfactory. If we can get individuals like Rockefeller, liberals
and moderates, saying that McGovern is naive and a madman, if he thinks
we can gut the Sixth Fleet, without Israel going down the tubes. If
George can be portrayed as something totally out of his element in
questions of foreign policy, a man who is both too soft and too much of a
light-weight, a foolish man whom Brezhnev would eat for breakfast
than anyone who is convinced of that is automatically an RN voter. There
is no other choice.
There are two foreign policy problems we see. One Vietnam. Polls
show McGovern's support is tied inextricably is the desire to get out of
Vietnam. In our view, the "wrong from the start" materials in the
Assault Book, portraying McGovern as repeatedly duped, and misled by
-5-
Communist profession of good intentions, and his "abandoning" of our
prisoners should help neutralize his potential strength here. Also,
if RN pulls the rug out on McGovern, with a settlement -- we should lace
into him as a "squalid nuisance" who only harassed and nit-picked and
back-stabbed the President who brought America out of the war while
McGovern and company got us into a war they could not win or could not
end.
The second serious problem is that McGovern is milking the old right
and the new left isolationism both. Frankly, foreign aid truly has no
constituence left and McGovern recognized this. The argument
against spending our money for exotic weapons, whe n we need to re-build
here at home; the argument that maybe our allies should do more for
themselves -- these arguments hit home far beyond the McGovern
constituency. (The McGovern endorsement of that 1% of GNP foreign
aid [$11 billion] with "priority on Africa" ought thus to be hung around
his neck. Like Mr. Wallace used to say, "Those fellows want to give
mor e billions of dollars away to Hottentots. ")
Given the necessity for foreign military assistance and its growing
unpopularity, we may have to out-demagogue George on this one, case
him in that role, and use the arguments that the only way to prevent
Americans from fighting future wars is to provide the natives with the
guns to defend themselves. If we don't we'll have American Marines,
rather than South Vietnamese Marines defending South Vietnam, as we
did when McGovern's men sat in the White House.
"4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our
point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped
into putting out the enemy line. 11
We concur. We think this is covered in our earlier points.
"5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of
the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other
words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-
reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let
an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at
this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White
House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and
-6-
naivety in the foreign policy field would be disasterous.
Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White
House?"
Excellent here. This is one area where we can contradict No. 3
especially in a possible RN speech. How should we build RN up
while tearing McGovern down. Here are several ideas:
The theme that RN has brought 500, 000 boys out of Vietnam, ha S saved
that little nation from collapse, has opened the door to China, has
neogitated a truce in the Cold War, has brought into bearing the most
historic arms agreement in history -- and, for God's sake, let's not
throw this away by putting into the White House, some rank amateur
and clown who doesn't know his fanny from first base about foreign
policy.
We can buil up this theme, and should. The United States today stands
on the threshhold of building a structure of peace that can last for the
remainder of this century. There is a chance, a good chance, but not
a certain chance, that if RN can finish the structure which is now half
built -- that for the remainder of this century no more American boys
will be dying in places like Vietnam. But for God's sake, to fire the
architect when the cathedral is half finished, and replace him with an
engineering student is insane. This is like firing the research physicians
at NIH right at the point at which they may have a cure for cancer -- and
replacing them with some hippie medical students.
This could serve as a counter to the McGovern argument that RN's
initiatives in foreign policy are good -- but that job is done. We must
now turn to the home front. Our argument has to be the job is not done --
and anyone who thinks it is and acts on that belief, is likely to bring down
the entire structure just before it is completed. The concrete is still
soft -- it has not yet hardened; now is not the time to change builders.
Further, along these lines, we should emphasize the incredible naivete of
McGovern who thinks that the wayyou negotiate with the Soviets is to cut
your fleet in half, reduce your army to pre-Pearl Harbor level,
mothball half your bombers, scrap much of your nuclear deterrent and
then negotiate. RN and the people high up around him can say We
have been there in Peking and Moscow and candidly, they will not be
impressed by a nation which strips itself naked to show its good will.
-7-
They will not treat an America that abandons its strength with respect,
but with contempt. They will not then be convinced that the path of
peace is best, but the path of hostility and testing. My friends, a
weakened and softened and beseeching America is not the kind of America
that can keep the peace. Only a strong and resolute and tough nation will
be respected, and be treated with respect. If we throw our arms into
the sea the enemy response will not be to love us, but to laugh at us --
and to treat our friends and allies as totalitarians and bullies have always
treated the weak.
Lines such as, "My friends, the price of peace cannot be unilaterally
reduced by the United States, or George McGovern. You cannot buy
security in a nuclear world by cutting your defense budget in half --
and doubling your hopes. 11
"My friends, the greatest threat to peace today is not the American
defense budget; it is the mistaken and indeed naive belief that permanent
peace is guaranteed -- and we need not make any great sacrifices or
efforts to maintain. That is not reality. That is a dream from which
Americans will awake with a terrible shock, if we believe it is reality. 11
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT July
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 27.
Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost
no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline
during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is
true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than
it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but
since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures
are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the
attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent
support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to
47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the
campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz.
Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking
most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the
election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was
remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall.
What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the elec-
torate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey --- the Wallace vote
declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas
in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and
ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the
electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base
of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.
In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the
convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing
with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appro-
priate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention
period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-
media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as
2.
usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum
with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across
the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford
it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur
his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech
and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign
continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the
White House.
Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was
better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally,
approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates,
deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-
Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse
observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and
steel strike activies in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not
done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's
attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me)
and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented,
even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his
office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage
of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and
the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before
that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually
losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative
media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give
decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on con-
stant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would
have probably won.
Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The
tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance
of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate
is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of
rallies and the institution of thoughful speeches, etc. The failure in
1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which
the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out;
only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there
were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being
radio speeches and not visual events poorly designed to attract attention
from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly.
3.
designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening
on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the
1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried
out, both by the President and the people around him.
What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz
the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led
to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that
he should remain above and beyond the battle remain Presidential is
the way Ray Price would put it as he did in 1968. The first approach
would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the cam-
paigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled
it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's
Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach,
in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public
attention it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could
manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate,
and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to
ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican
majority.
What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism
of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days,
with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's
incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should
be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices,
fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax
reform, solving pollution problem: S, bleeding a bit for the poor, and
although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R.
wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing
all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve
some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking
should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the
media operation our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential
appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political
rally appearances made should be few and far between and the rallied
should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not
just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed
suggestions and I will not repeat them here.
4.
I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is
beginning to get battle-hungry the sight of George McGovern galavanting
around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to
resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of
the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him
in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-
charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960
campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President,
we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving
the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't
done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our
domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with
business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few cor-
porations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the
environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed
out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at govern-
ment expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the
substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the
President now in the White House.
The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not and should not
be taken as doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and
I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can
lose it assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach the
only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take
advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense
of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off
those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who
can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the
President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good.
But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office,
not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive
against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad,
not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new
sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican
or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference,
and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of
what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our
advantage in the election campaign now facing us.
GALLUP POLL
1960
Nixon Kennedy Undecided
Early June
48
52
Late June
48
52
July (After Convention)
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November 6
48
49
3
GALLUP POLL
1968
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
June
35
40
16
9
July
40
38
16
6
August
45
29
18
8
September 3-7
43
31
19
7
September 20-22
43
28
21
8
September 27-30
44
29
20
7
October 3-12
43
31
20
6
October 17-21
44
36
15
5
November 1-2
42
40
14
4