Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
From: Thomas W. Benham To: H.R. Haldeman RE: President Nixon's Approval Base. Original attached. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 3/29/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145717
label
WHSF: Contested, 16-18
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145717
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 16-18
description
This file contains:
From: Thomas W. Benham To: H.R. Haldeman RE: President Nixon's Approval Base. Original attached. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 3/29/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26145717
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
63452c3bdf274852
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
18
3/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Thomas W. Benham To: H.R.
Haldeman RE: President Nixon's Approval
Base. Original attached. 14 pgs.
Monday, March 07, 2011
Page 1 of 1
Opinion Research Corporation
NORTH HARRISON STREET, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540
telephone: 609/924-5900
CHICAGO
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THOMAS W. BENHAM
President
MEMORANDUM
March 29, 1972
TO:
H. R. Haldeman
FROM:
Thomas W. Benham
SUBJECT: President Nixon's Approval Base
The question of how to raise the base of public approval for the President
certainly does not yield to any simple solutions. There are some observations
that should be made about this phenomenon of presidential approval:
a. The ratings of previous presidents have shown without
exception that the trend from time of taking office to
the end of the term is one of general decline in popularity.
Obviously, as the chief executive must face the serious prob-
lems and crises that arise during his term, he must make de-
cisions and accept responsibility for actions that cannot
please everyone. He may also be the victim of factors beyond
his control, as failures at any administrative level tend to
reflect back on the head.
b. The Gallup popularity rating is also quite a sensitive bar-
ometer. A look at Exhibit 1 shows that some of the major
reversals in downtrend that have occurred so far during
President Nixon's term have come about when he went directly
to the people, in a highly visible manner, to seriously dis-
cuss some important problem. Note the jump after his Vietnam
speech of November 1969, the increase after the committment
of troops to Cambodia, the reversal after the scheduled with-
drawal from Cambodia. Notice the uptrend with the serious
economic discussions of Phase 1 and Phase 2. And finally,
the trend upward after the highly visible Peking trip.
The President has exhibited the ability to capture the public's
attention and to get them to listen to somewhat complex dis-
cussions of our serious problems -- and get good reactions.
More about this later.
Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman
-2-
March 29, 1972
C. While it may be frustrating to break away from the 50% level
in popularity, and then fall back, it may well be unrealistic
to expect to establish a base as high as the 60% level.
Exhibit 2 graphically demonstrates the point that President
Nixon came in with a much lower level of general enthusiasm
than his four predecessors in the White House. He has -- so
far -- maintained an extremely high average of approval when
this basic fact is taken into account, and when one considers
that he has sprung from a minority party, and was elected by
a narrow margin as a minority candidate. He obviously could
not have maintained a base at the 50% level unless many critics
had been won over to respect for his leadership and performance.
It is also apparent in Exhibit 2 that the approval of Presi-
dents Johnson and Truman went to disastrous levels when each
finally came face to face with an unsolvable problem --
in Truman's case, the Korean War, and in Johnson's case,
the Vietnam War. Certainly if some such "unsolvable problem"
(e.g., rampant inflation, another war somewhere) came up, a
similar result could be President Nixon's lot.
d. Most fundamental, of course, is the simple fact of life that
Republicans are outnumbered almost two to one by Democrats.
As shown in Exhibit 3, the sales curve of the Republican Party
has not looked good for thirty years. President Nixon has
done a remarkable job of maintaining public support in spite
of this imbalance. To expect a one-fifth greater level of
approval (from a base around 50% to a base around 60%) almost
assumes a radical change in our political culture. It is
hard to see how this could occur in the short period of any
president's term in office. It assumes a state of public
happiness and contentment that seems highly unlikely in this
period of conflicting pressures and problems.
So what are some of the implications?
1. The President should continue to be unafraid to tackle and
discuss difficult issues with the public. He has done it
successfully in the past. He can continue to do it. He
has managed to snatch some issues right out of the hands of
the opposition.
One topic that presently might become a candidate for such
a discussion with the public is the recent burst of high
food prices. While sympathizing with the housewife, perhaps
the President can explain that food is taking a smaller
share of the family budget than it did 20 years ago; that
our situation compared with the rest of the world -- whether
it be our allies or our opponents -- is unique in this
regard.
Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman
-3-
March 29, 1972
In this same presentation he could again point out (what the
public already accepts) that big labor must bear its share of
the blame and, specifically, the union leaders. Labor leaders
apparently never took on their real assignment to represent
all working people -- not just their own narrow constituency.
Also on the economic side is the number of employed versus
unemployed. The positive side of this story is not getting
across.
2. Another way to keep the base up and to hopefully improve it
is to work with issues on the key subgroups that have been
most reluctant to show high approval for the President.
Independent voters comprise a large proportion of the public
with open minds politically. This group will vote basically
on how well they feel problems are being handled, and the
leadership provided by the President, rather than on the
basis of party loyalty.
Another group are new voters. While this group is register-
ing more Democratic 40d Republican, a large proportion are
refusing to affiliate with either party. Even those who do
commit to a party will be less strong in their committment
than voters who have habitually pulled a particular party
lever. The President already has made inroads in this group
with his deescalation in Vietnam and his daring initiative
in Peking.
One issue that should be dramatized with youth is what the
President has done to eliminate the draft, where there is
a tremendous statistical story that needs to be told
dramatically.
Women. Trial heats show the President running less well
among women than among men. This may well be related to
prices and inflation, and possibly a lack of appreciation
of any interest the President may have in women's problems
as a group, and the bettering of their general status in
terms of equal opportunity. It would be a mistake to assume
that because the Nixon Administration has appointed more
women to high positions than any of its predecessors that
this fact will speak for itself. It needs to be demonstrated
and told again and again.
Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman
-4-
March 29, 1972
Women are a potential source for strong organizational effort.
While there are more women eligible to vote than men, their
performance turnoutwise has historically been lower (4 per-
centage points lower than men in 1968 -- 66% versus 70%) .
Some of the more active women's groups will be making a
greater effort to get them to the polls -- mainly in behalf
of Democratic candidates.
4. Timing for the President's presentations seems to be very
important from now until election day. The President needs
periodic presentations to keep the base from slipping, obviously
with the objective of building a peak in late October. The
key would be that the President come through as President
providing leadership in key problems, rather than as candidate
presenting a partisan point of view.
EXPIBIT ONE
Nixon's Popularity
68
65
Withdraw
Peking
from Cambodia
trip
61
61
59
59
Phase II
58
56 TV
Phase I
56
Moon
56
report
Program
T
52
54
landing Vietnam
53
53
Congressional
50
51
speech
elections
Troops sent
Laos
48
49
49
to Cambodia
invasion
Red China
Pentagon
in UN
papers
(Dota are percentages)
J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J. F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S 0 N D J F M
A 2
a 9
0 @ 1 9 1
10
CM
ENHIBIT Tw.
Presidential Popularity
Nixon Johnson Kennedy Eisenhower Trur
8:
83%
80%
79%
High
I
68%
70%
= 66%
Average
II
П
57%
54%
57%
50
48%
49%
=
Low
35%
--2
PARTY AFFILIATION: 1940 - 1971 (Tallup)
%
%
50
50
DEMOCRAT
40
40
30
REPUBLICAN
30
INDEPENDENT
20
20
1940
1950
1960
1964
1966
1968
1970
In politics, as of today do you consider yourself a Repub-
lican, Democrat or Independent?
Following is the 31-year trend:
18 and Older
Rep.
Dem.
Ind.
%
%
%
LATEST
25
44
31
Jan.-March
26
45
29
21 and Older
Oct., 70
29
45
26
July-Aug.
29
44
27
May-June, '69
28
42
30
June, '68
27
46
27
Oct., 67
27
42
31
Feb.
27
46
27
1966
27
48
25
1965
27
50
23
1964
25
53
22
1960
30
47
23
1950
33
45
22
1940
38
42
20
LR
Opinion Research Corporation
File
NORTH HARRISON STREET, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540
telephone: 609/924-5900
CHICAGO
LONDON
LOS ANGELES
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON, D.C.
THOMAS W. BENHAM
President
MEMORANDUM
March 29, 1972
TO:
H. R. Haldeman
FROM:
Thomas W. Benham
SUBJECT: President Nixon's Approval Base
The question of how to raise the base of public approval for the President
certainly does not yield to any simple solutions. There are some observations
that should be made about this phenomenon of presidential approval:
a. The ratings of previous presidents have shown without
exception that the trend from time of taking office to
the end of the term is one of general decline in popularity.
Obviously, as the chief executive must face the serious prob-
Tems and crises that arise during his term, he must make de-
cisions and accept responsibility for actions that cannot
please everyone. He may also be the victim of factors beyond
his control, as failures at any administrative level tend to
reflect back on the head.
b. The Gallup popularity rating is also quite a sensitive bar-
ometer. A look at Exhibit 1 shows that some of the major
reversals in downtrend that have occurred so far during
President Nixon's term have come about when he went directly
to the people, in a highly visible manner, to seriously dis-
cuss some important problem. Note the jump after his Vietnam
speech of November 1969, the increase after the committment
of troops to Cambodia, the reversal after the scheduled with-
drawal from Cambodia. Notice the uptrend with the serious
economic discussions of Phase ] and Phase 2. And finally,
the trend upward after the highly visible Peking trip.
The President has exhibited the ability to capture the public's
attention and to get them to listen to somewhat complex dis-
cussions of our serious problems -- and get good reactions.
More about this later.
Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman
-2-
March 29, 1972
C. While it may be frustrating to break away from the 50% level
in popularity, and then fall back, it may well be unrealistic
to expect to establish a base as high as the 60% level.
Exhibit 2 graphically demonstrates the point that President
Nixon came in with a much lower level of general enthusiasm
than his four predecessors in the White House. He has -- so
far -- maintained an extremely high average of approval when
this basic fact is taken into account, and when one considers
that he has sprung from a minority party, and was elected by
a narrow margin as a minority candidate. He obviously could
not have maintained a base at the 50% level unless many critics
had been won over to respect for his leadership and performance.
It is also apparent in Exhibit 2 that the approval of Presi-
dents Johnson and Truman went to disastrous levels when each
finally came face to face with an unsolvable problem --
in Truman's case, the Korean War, and in Johnson's case,
the Vietnam War. Certainly if some such "unsolvable problem"
(e.g., rampant inflation, another war somewhere) came up, a
similar result could be President Nixon's lot.
d. Most fundamental, of course, is the simple fact of life that
Republicans are outnumbered almost two to one by Democrats.
As shown in Exhibit 3, the sales curve of the Republican Party
has not looked good for thirty years. President Nixon has
done a remarkable job of maintaining public support in spite
of this imbalance. To expect a one-fifth greater level of
approval (from a base around 50% to a base around 60%) almost
assumes a radical change in our political culture. It is
hard to see how this could occur in the short period of any
president's term in office. It assumes a state of public
happiness and contentment that seems highly unlikely in this
period of conflicting pressures and problems.
So what are some of the implications?
1. The President should continue to be unafraid to tackle and
discuss difficult issues with the public. He has done it
successfully in the past. He can continue to do it. He
has managed to snatch some issues right out of the hands of
the opposition.
One topic that presently might become a candidate for such
a discussion with the public is the recent burst of high
food prices. While sympathizing with the housewife, perhaps
the President can explain that food is taking a smaller
share of the family budget than it did 20 years ago; that
our situation compared with the rest of the world -- whether
it be our allies or our opponents -- is unique in this
regard.
Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman
-3-
March 29, 1972
In this same presentation he could again point out (what the
public already accepts) that big labor must bear its share of
the blaine and, specifically, the union leaders. Labor leaders
apparently never took on their real assignment to represent
all working people -- not just their own narrow constituency.
Also on the economic side is the number of employed versus
unemployed. The positive side of this story is not getting
across.
2. Another way to keep the base up and to hopefully improve it
is to work with issues on the key subgroups that have been
most reluctant to show high approval for the President.
Independent voters comprise a large proportion of the public
with open minds politically. This group will vote basically
on how well they feel problems are being handled, and the
leadership provided by the President, rather than on the
basis of party loyalty.
Another group are new voters. While this group is register-
ing more Democratic and Republican, a large proportion are
refusing to affiliate with either party. Even those who do
commit to a party will be less strong in their committment
than voters who have habitually pulled a particular party
lever. The President already has made inroads in this group
with his deescalation in Vietnam and his daring initiative
in Peking.
One issue that should be dramatized with youth is what the
President has done to eliminate the draft, where there is
a tremendous statistical story that needs to be told
dramatically.
Women. Trial heats show the President running less well
among women than among men. This may well be related to
prices and inflation, and possibly a lack of appreciation
of any interest the President may have in women's problems
as a group, and the bettering of their general status in
terms of equal opportunity. It would be a mistake to assume
that because the Nixon Administration has appointed more
women to high positions than any of its predecessors that
this fact will speak for itself. It needs to be demonstrated
and told again and again.
Memorandum to H. R. Haldeman
-4-
March 29, 1972
Women are a potential source for strong órganizational effort.
While there are more women eligible to vote than men, their
performance turnoutwise has historically been lower (4 per-
centage points lower than men in 1968 -- 66% versus 70%) .
Some of the more active women's groups will be making a
greater effort to get them to the polls -- mainly in behalf
of Democratic candidates.
4. Timing for the President's presentations seems to be very
important from now until election day. The President needs
periodic presentations to keep the base from slipping, obviously
with the objective of building a peak in late October. The
key would be that the President come through as President
providing leadership in key problems, rather than as candidate
presenting a partisan point of view.
EXHIBIT ONE
Nixon's Popularity
68
65
Withdraw
Peking
from Cambodia
trip
61
61
59
59
Phase II
58
56 TV
Phase I
56
Moon
56
52
report
Program
54
landing Vietnam
53
5
speech
Congressional
50
51
elections
Troops sent
Laos
48
49
49
to Cambodia
invasion
Red China
Pentagon
in UN
papers
( Doto are percentages)
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0
N
D
J.
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
O
N
D
J
F
M
A
M
J
J
A
S
0
N
D
J
F.
M
-
1970
1971
1972
EXITIBIT Two
Presidential Popularity
Nixon Johnson Kennedy Eisenhower Truman
87%
83%
80%
79%
High
68%
=)=
70%
I
-- 66%
Average
n
57%
54%
57%
50
49%
=
I
48%
Low
35%
23%
--2
EXIMB T Turra
PARTY AFFILIATION: 1940 - 1971 (Tallup)
%
%
50
50
DEMOCRAT
40
40
REPUBLICAN
30
30
INDEPENDENT
20
20
1940
1950
1960
1964
1966
1968
1970
In politics, as of today do you consider yourself a Repub-
lican, Democrat or Independent?
Following is the 31-year trend:
18 and Older
Rep.
Dem.
Ind.
%
%
%
LATEST
25
44
31
Jan.-March
26
45
29
21 and Older
Oct., 70
29
45
26
July-Aug.
29
44
27
May-June, 69
28
42
30
June, '68
27
46
27
Oct., '67
27
42
31
Feb.
27
46
27
1966
27
48
25
1965
27
50
23
1964
25
53
22
1960
30
47
23
1950
33
15
22
1940
38
42
20