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This file contains:
From: Robert M.Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Second Wave Questionnaire. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1972
Subject: Political Strategy. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 5/21/1971
From: The President To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Position Business Chairman. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 16-21
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WHSF: Contested, 16-21
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This file contains:
From: Robert M.Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Second Wave Questionnaire. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1972
Subject: Political Strategy. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 5/21/1971
From: The President To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Position Business Chairman. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Type
Document Description
16
21
5/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell
RE: Second Wave Questionnaire. 14 pgs.
16
21
5/21/1971
Campaign
Report
Subject: Political Strategy. 17 pgs.
16
21
5/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: The President To: H.R. Haldeman RE:
Position Business Chairman. 2 pgs.
16
21
5/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Charles Colson To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Issue Management. 9 pgs.
Monday, March 07, 2011
Page 1 of 1
Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
May 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Second Wave Questionnaire
Attached please find our long form draft questionnaire for the
second wave. The circled questions will be used on the short form.
We are going to field test this questionnaire the first of next
week and I would like to go over it with you on Tuesday. I am sure some
changes will have to be made as it appears to be too long in its
present form. Also we have not included a number of specific issue
questions which various people have asked for. These include subjects
such as farm subsidies, abortion, marijuana and so forth. I. would
also like to discuss this list of questions with you next week.
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE
Hello, I'm Mrs.
from Market Opinion Research, a national research
company with headquarters in Detroit. We are making a study of problems and
political figures in
and would like to have your opinions.
(STATE NAME)
1.
Are you now registered to vote here in
?
(STATE NAME)
1 Yes
2 No
(IF "YES", CONTINUE WITH INTERVIEW BEGINNING WITH QUESTION 2)
(IF "NO", ASK:)
a. Do you intend to register so you will be able to vote in the 1972
Presidential election?
1 Yes
2 No
(IF "NO", TERMINATE INTERVIEW)
(IF "YES CONTINUE WITH INTERVIEW)
2.
What do you think are the most important problems facing the United States
as a nation at this time? (CIRCLE BELOW)
Most
Single
Important
Most
Problems
Important
(Multiple)
Problems
1
1
Vietnam
2
2
Inflation/Economy
3
3
Unemployment
4
4
Taxes
5
5
Crime
6
6
Drugs
7
7
General Unrest/Demonstrations/Riots
8
8
Environment/Pollution
9
9
Racial Problems (Not Schools)
10
10
Bussing
11
11
Education (Not Race or Bussing)
12
12
National Defense
Other (Specify)
3.
Which one of these do you think is the single most important problem
facing the United States? (CIRCLE JUST ONE ABOVE)
4. Do you feel things in the country are generally going in the right direction
today or do you feel things have pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong
track?
1 Right direction
2 Wrong track
0 Don't know
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont 'd.)
Page 2
5.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Richard Nixon is handling his job
as President?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
a. Why do you say that? (PROBE)
6,
Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Nixon is handling the
Vietnam situation?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
7
Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Nixon is dealing with
the economic conditions in this country?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
8.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way Spiro Agnew is handling his job
as Vice President?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
9.
Now, I'd like you to take this group of cards. (HAND 7 ISSUE CARDS) Each
card has an issue or problem facing our country on it. I'd like you to
pick out the one that has the issue or problem on it that you will most
seriously consider when deciding how to vote for President this fall and
hand it to me. Now pick the one that will be the second most important
to you in deciding how you will vote. Now pick out the one that will be
the third most important and so on until you have handed me all of the
cards.
(RECORD THE ORDER IN WHICH YOU ARE HANDED THE CARD)
Drugs
Taxes
Vietnam
Unemployment
Crime
Inflation
Bussing
(ROTATE THE ORDER IN WHICH YOU ASK QUESTIONS 10, 11, 12)
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONAIRE (Cont
Page 3
10.
Now I'd like to read through the list of problems and issues again and as I
mention each one I'd like you to rate President Nixon on how well he's
handling each one.
(HAND ABILITY CARD)
Extremely
Very
Fairly
Not Very
Not At
Well
Well
Well
Well
All Well
Drugs
1
2
3
4
5
Taxes
1
2
3
4
5
Health Care
1
2
3
4
5
Vietnam
1
2
3
4
5
Unemployment
1
2
3
4
5
Racial Problems
1
2
3
4
5
National Defense
1
2
3
4
5
Crime
1
2
3
4
5
Inflation
1
2
3
4
5
Pollution/Environment
1
2
3
.4
5
Bussing
1
2
3
4
5
General Unrest
1
2
3
4
5
11. Now I'd like to go through the list again and have you rate Hubert Humphrey
on his ability to handle each problem.
Extremely
Very
Fairly
Not Very
Not At
Well
Well
Well
Well
All Well
Drugs
1
2
3
4
5
Taxes
1
2
3
4
5
Health Care
1
2
3
4
5
Vietnam
1
2
3
4
5
Unemployment
1
2
3
4
5
Racial Problems
1
2
3
4
5
National Defense
1
2
3
4
5
Crime
1
2
3
4
5
Inflation
1
2
3
4
5
Pollution/Environment
1
2
3
4
5
Bussing
1
2
3
4
5
General Unrest
1
2
3
4
5
12. Now, I'd like to go through the list once more and have you rate George
McGovern on his ability to handle each problem.
Extremely
Very
Fairly
Not Very
Not At
Well
Well
Well
Well
All Well
Drugs
1
2
3
4
5
Taxes
1
2
3
4
5
Health Care
1
2
3
4
5
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont 'd.)
Page 4
Extremely
Very
Fairly
Not Very
Not At
Well
Well
Well
Well
All Well
Vietnam
1
2
3
4
5
Unemployment
1
2
3
4
5
Racial Problems
1
2
3
4
5
National Defense
1
2
3
4
5
Crime
1
2
3
4
5
Inflation
1
2
3
4
5
Pollution/Environment
1
2
3
4
5
Bussing
1
2
3
4
5
General Unrest
1
2
3
4
5
13. What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of
Richard Nixon?
a. Do you consider this good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE) a. Good
Bad
b. Is there anything else?
[ ] [ ]
C. Do you consider this good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE) C. Good
Bad
d. Is there anything else?
[ ] [ ]
e Good
Bad
e. Do you consider that good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE)
[ ] [ ]
14. What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of
Hubert Humphrey?
a. Do you consider this good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE) a
Good
Bad
b. Is there anything else?
[ ] [ ]
C. Good
Bad
C. Do you consider this good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE)
[ ] [ ]
d. Is there anything else?
e. Good
Bad
e. Do you consider that good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE)
[ ] [ ]
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont 'd.)
Page 5
15. What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of
George McGovern?
a. Good
Bad
[ ] [ ]
a. Do you consider this good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE)
b. Is there anything else?
C. Good
Bad
[ ] [ ]
C. Do you consider this good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE)
e. Good
Bad
d. Is there anything else?
[ ] [ ]
e. Do you consider that good or bad? (ANSWER ABOVE)
16. Do you think President Nixon has an overall plan for this country?
1. Yes
2 No
What is it?
17. What does the phrase "general unrest" mean to you?
18. Some people have accused the Congress of partisan tactics in blocking
the President's legislation, while others say the President's program
is inadequate. The differences between the two points of view mean
there has been few bills passed during this session of Congress.
(SHOW SCALE)
President is at Fault
Congress is at Fault
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
b. Where would you place George McGovern on this scale?
C. Where would you place Hubert Humphrey on this scale?
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont
Page 6
19. Some people have said that much of the money we are spending for war
will become available for domestic programs when the Vietnam war winds
down. Others have said that much of this money will need to be spent
to replace and modernize our armed forces. (SHOW SCALE)
Need National Defense Spending
Need Domestic Spending
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
b. Where would you place President Nixon on this scale?
C. Where would you place George McGovern on this scale?
d. Where would you place Hubert Humphrey on this scale?
20.1 Some people have said that having a strong national defense at least
equal to the Russians and Chinese is the best hope for peace. Others
have said that we have more important needs in our own country and
that we should spend more of our money on domestic programs even if it
means that our military strength would be less than some other countries.
(SHOW SCALE)
Spend At Home and
Strong National Defense
Less Strong Defense
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a. Where would you place yourself on this scale?
b. Where would you place President Nixon on this scale?
C. Where would you place George McGovern on this scale?
d. Where would you place Hubert Humphrey on this scale?
20.2 It has been said that this country needs major tax reform. Some say the
present tax structure is unfair to the little man and favors big
business and those with high income. Others say that taxing of big
business and those with large incomes at a high rate would cause a lack of
incentive and economic decline. (SHOW SCALE)
Need Tax Reform
Do Not Need Tax Reform
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
a. Where do you place yourself on this scale?
b. Where do you place President Nixon on this scale?
C. Where do you place George McGovern on this scale?
d. Where do you place Hubert Humphrey on this scale?
Page 7
WAVE II DEATT CUESTIONALITY
20.3 According to some recent court cases, our traditional method of financing
schools with local property taxes may be in for some changes. Do you favor
or oppose retaining the local school property taxes to finance schools?
1 Favor
2 Oppose
0 Not sure
(IF OPPOSE, ASK:)
a. Which of the following would you prefer as a replacement for local property
taxes. (READ LIST)
1 Increased federal income tax
2 Increased state income tax
3 Increased state sales tax
4 Increased state property tax
5 Some type of national sales tax
20.4 Generally speaking, do you believe the steps taken by President Nixon
have satisfactorily slowed inflation?
1 Yes
2 No
20.5 Do you believe inflation of food prices has been slowed?
1 Yes
2 No
a. (IF NO, ASK:) Would you support or oppose a total freeze on food
prices similar to Phase I.
1 Support
2 Oppose
21
Do you think business, labor unions, the President, Congress, or the
consumer is most responsible for rising prices and inflation?
1 Business
2 Labor Unions
3 President
4 Congress
5 Consumer
0 Don't know
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont'd.)
Page
8
GO TO GREEN SCALES (HAVE RESPONDENT COMPLETE PERSONALITY SHEETS)
22.
Now, I'm going to hand you six sample Presidential election ballots. I
would like you to mark each one of the ballots just as you would if the
election were being held today, and return them in this sealed envelope
to me.
23.
Using this scale card (HAND INTEREST CARD), how interested are you in
seeing the Presidential candidate you support being elected in the fall?
1 Very Interested
2 Fairly Interested
3 Not Very Interested
4 Not At All Interested
0 Don't know
24
In the election this fall will you definitely vote, probably vote, may or
may not vote, probably not vote, or definitely not vote?
1 Definitely vote
2 Probably vote
3 May or may not vote
4 Probably not vote
5 Definitely not vote
0 Don't know
25.
What do you think are the most important problems facing the state of
at the present time?
26.
Which one of these do you think is the single most important problem
facing
? (CIRCLE JUST ONE ABOVE)
27.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way
is handling his
job as Governor?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
28.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way
is handling his
job as United States Senator?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
29.
Do you approve or disapprove of the way
is handling his
job as United States Senator?
1 Approve
2 Disapprove
0 Don't know
30. Now, I'm going to hand you another secret ballot for the State election.
I would like you to mark it just as you would if the election were being
held today, and return it in this sealed envelope to me.
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont )
Page 9
31
Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat
or what?
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
0 Don't know
32
(IF INDEPENDENT, ASK:) How do you lean?
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 Independent
0 Don't know
33
In the last general election in which you voted, which answer on this
card (HAND POLITICAL CARD) best describes how you voted for state and
local offices such as Governor and Senator?
1 Straight Democratic
2 Mostly Democratic
3 A few more Democrats than Republican
4 About equally for both parties
5 A few more Republicans than Democrats
6 Mostly Republican
7 Straight Republican
8 Never Voted
0 Don't know
34.
For whom did you vote for President in 1968?
1 Nixon
2 Humphrey
3 Wallace
4 Didn't vote
0 Don't vote
35.
(How are you registered to vote in
?)
1 Republican
2 Democrat
3 American Independent Party
4 Conservative
5 Liberal
0 Don't know
Now a few questions for statistical purposes
36.
What is your occupation?
a. (IF RESPONDENT IS NOT HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD) What is the occupation of
the head of this household?
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont 'd.)
Page 10
37.
What is your approximate age? (SHOW AGE CARD)
1 17-20
2 21-24
3 25-29
4 30-39
5 35-39
6 40-44
7 45-49
8 50-54
9 55-59
10 60-64
11 65 and over
0 Refused
38
What is the last grade of school you completed?
1 Grade school or less (grades 1-8)
2 Some high school
3 Graduated high school (grades 9-12)
4 Vocational/Technical school
5 Some college
6 Graduated college
7 Post graduate work
0 Refused
39
What is your religion?
1 Roman Catholic
2 Protestant
3 Jewish
4 Other (SPECIFY:)
40.
(BY OBSERVATION)
Race:
1 White
2 Negro
3 Oriental
4 Mexican-American
'41.
What is your nationality?
1 American/U.S.
14 Netherlands
2 Austria
15 Norway
3 Czechoslovakia
16 Poland
4 Denmark
17 Portugal
5 England
18 Rumania
6 Estonia
19 Russia
7 France
20 Spain
8 Germany
21 Sweden
9 Hungary
22 Ukraine
10 Ireland
23 Yugoslavia
11 Italy
24 Other
12 Latvia
(SPECIFY)
13 Mexico
0 Don't know
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont'd.)
Page 11
42.
Are you a labor union member?
1 Yes
2 No
a.
(IF "NO", ASK:) Is any member of your immediate family a union member?
1 Yes
2 No
43
(BY OBSERVATION) Sex:
1 Male
2 Female
44
(SHOW INCOME CARD) Which classification includes your TOTAL FAMILY INCOME
in 1971 before taxes?
1 0-$2,999
2 $3,000-$4,999
3 $5,000-$5,999
4 $6,000-$6,999
5 $7,000-$9,999
6 $10,000-$14,999
7 $15,000-$24,999
8 $25,000 and over
0 Refused
45
What is the make, series and year of your principal car?
Make
(example: Chevy, Ford, Plymouth)
Series
(example: Impala, Torino, Belvedere)
Year
46.
Do you have a telephone?
1 Yes
2 No
a. (IF "YES", ASK:) Is your number listed or unlisted?
1 Listed
2 Unlisted
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont 'd.)
Page 12
SCALE SHEET
liberal
:
:
/
7
:
:
conservative
close minded
:
:
/
7
:
:
open minded
trained
:
:
/
7
:
:
untrained
bold
:
:
/
/
:
:
timid
experienced
:
:
/
7
:
:
inexperienced
dishonest
:
:
/
/
:
:
honest
safe
:
:
/
7
:
:
dangerous
uninformed
:
:
/
7
:
:
informed
meek
:
:
/
/
:
:
aggressive
just
:
:
/
7
:
:
unjust
incompetent
:
:
/
7
:
:
competent
tough
:
:
7
7
:
:
soft
WAVE II DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE (Cont 'd.)
page 13
SECRET BALLOTS
If you had to decide today, how would you vote between the candidates in the
following election situation?
PRESIDENT
Richard Nixon [ ]
Hubert Humphrey
[ ]
Richard Nixon [ ]
George McGovern
[ ]
Richard Nixon [ ]
Edward Kennedy
[ ]
Richard Nixon [ ]
Hubert Humphrey
[ ]
George Wallace
[ ]
Richard Nixon [ ]
George McGovern
[ ]
George Wallace
[ ]
Richard Nixon [ ]
Edward Kennedy
[ ]
George Wallace
[ ]
May 21, 1971
SUBJECT:
Political Strategy
This is in response to the President's request for "some free
thinking" on how to make our programs more meaningful to the
people. This can only be done effectively in the context of the
overall campaign strategy; hence this analysis attempts to
broaden the question somewhat -- and to examine several ways
In which the President's base of political support can be
strengthened for 1972.
The primary emphasis here is on domestic issues; we obviously
have the greatest control in this area and there is more certainty
in the political effect of what we do. This by no means suggests
that international issues may not be decisive -- they very well
could be -- but with international conditions as volatile as they
are It would be foolhardy to predicate a total strategy on them.
The following is an effort to Identify some of the major factors
that have proven decisive in prior elections, 235055 where we
stand today in relation to those factors and suggest certain
strategic considerations for 1972.
A. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
At the risk of oversimplifying history, successful Presidential
politics in modern times have been generally beilt on
combination) of four dominant factors.
1. Personal Image - Charisma: Kr
S th
example. Despite a mediocre Admit
undistinguished record in foreign all
legislative tally, he might well have
in 1934; if so it would probably have been largely due
to the successful mystique he created (with the help of
a friendly press). The.fact that he was able to main-
tain a substantial case of political support a year before
the election would suggest that even a relatively inef-
fectual President can support himself on personality
alone.
2. Respect for Lendership: Clearly FDR was the master in
this category. A large majority of the people were con-
vinced that FDR was the Nation's only salvation; it was
irrelevant that most New Deal programs didn't work and
that we were SQ preoccupied at home that we watched the
world drift into the most dangerous war in history.
Roosevelt's gift was the believable promise -- setting
the great goals which he would inspire the Nation ( a very
important point which you made in our meeting). The
1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, for example, became the
national credo; young and old alike knew what the four
freedoms were. (Even though it was 30 years ago I can
still remember the Four Freedoms Saturday Evening Post
cover.) With a few well chosen phrases he was able to
rally enduring support through difficult times. 1
3. Success on the Big Issues: There were at least two elections
in modern times decided principally on the grounds that times
were good, the President had done a satisfactory job of
running the country and there was no great public demand
for 2. change; the big issues of the day were well in hand.
The first was Coolidge's election in 1924; the second, Ike's
in 1936. The Peace, I regress and Prosperity slogan clearl,
reflected the public mood in 1956. Ike had the big issues
well under control; he had restored the country to a period
of normaley. He was obviously also greatly helped by his
powerful "Father image". Ike fit the times and the times fit
Ike.
1It WLS all the more remarkable in that the "Four Freedoms"
were enunciated by Roosevelt, after he had been in office for eight
years, at the tag end of a speech in which he outlined the dismal
state that the world was then in, that we were at war or would-be
soon, that creat sacrifices were necessary, that our defense pro-
duction program was 3 disaster, that we weren't equipped to fight
the war and the All hell Breaking loose.
3.
4. The Veters' Self Interest: On certain occasions in
modern times the people have been moved to vote
primarily according to their own economic self-interest.
1948 is the classic example, Certainly President Truman
had little charisma (at least at the time); the times were
not that good and there was a strong sentiment for
change in the country. Although Truman was a strong,
tough individual, it can hardly be said that in 1948 there
was widespread public respect for his leadership as
there had been for Roosevelt's. Yet he won -- largely
because he made his own re-election important to the
economic interest of large segments of the voting popula-
tion. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson succeeded in appealing to
the economic interests of key groups and in frightening
the electorate as to the economic (and international)
consequences of electing his opponent.
B. WHERE WE STAND
These four categories give us some yardstick -- albeit arbitary --
to examine where we stand and our opportunities.
1. Image-Charisma: We cannot and should not try to make
the President something he isn't. (I gather this is the
point of Buchanan's memo, as it was the point made in
the Fierson column.) It would be foolish and counter pro-
ductive to try to build a Kennedy-type mystique -- there
isn't time, the press would never let us get away with it
nor is it necessarily a very reliable source of political
strength. A President doesn't have to be likeable, have
a sense of humor or even love children. It is important
only that his personal qualities engender confidence.
2. Respect for I endership: There is an important distinction
between this and the image point above (a distinction we
haven't clearly made). We can and we should make people
better understand the Fresident -- why he is the strong,
determined, disciplined and self-confident leader that he is.
4.
The Connelly thesis in this respect is absolutely
valid. These who know the President and work with
him 20 we do, recognize bis brillient, extraordin-
arily retentive and perceptive mind, his long-range
strategic view of problems, his high purpose and we,
in turn, come to have enormous confidence in him.
We must try to get this across; the electorate can
develop some of the same confidence if the story is
told correctly. The obvious handicap in developing
the Connally thesis is that it will almost invariably
be filtered out, discounted and at times rd diculed by
a very hostile press. The press have painted 80 many
negative images over the years that even if we do the
most superb job in the world, I doubt that we can shift
enough opinion in the next 13 months to make this the
decisive factor in the election. Whatever we can do,
however, will help and is important.
The great goals approach is perhaps the toughest.
Roosevelt's speech caught the public imagination at
a time when the country was uniting in the face of a
common danger. The President has used some truly
great phrases a "Coneration of Peace" etc. Maybe
because of the press or because the country has be-
come excessively blase, these haven't become national
rallying themes. Between now and next year's State of
the Union, we should study in depth those things the
people of the Nation most desire and the way in which
we can state the goals for the country that will, in fact,
inspire and gain confidence. None of us should shoot
from the hip in this area. We must know the public
mood, not just what the polls report, but by examining
it in depth. If there is any one thing peculiar to our
times it is the extreme volatility of public attitudes.
caused more than anything else by the constant impact
of the electronic media which can cause very dramatic
almost overnight shifts in attitudes.
5.
What people may want more than anything else is to
have their confidence in the future re-established and
our constituency at least wants to believe in America
and in what they regard as fundamental values. They
are tired of constantly being told what is wrong with
society and of having their consciences wracked with
continuous recrimination. We are on the right side of
this issue but the real question is how to lift 200 million
people out of their seats.
In short, I believe that this is a terribly important area
for us. We must work to develop public confidence in
the President personally, to gain respect for him as a
leader and to give the nation an uplift; the obstacles are,
however, very great and this, therefore, should be but
one of several strategies.
3. The Big Issues: Obviously the war (foreign policy
generally) and the economy are the two big ones; our
domestic program next.
a. The War. Even if we are virtually out of Vietnam the
Democrats will cynically argue that we could have ended it
much sooner, that we dragged it out to no avail and that we
got out only because the Doves in the Congress forced us
out. A war weary people are likely to want to turn their
attention to other things and forget Southeast Asia. What
they will be more concerned with is who can best keep the
peace. It is obvious to us that by remaining strong, by
getting out of Vietnam on a responsible basis, by preserving
the credibility of the United States we are doing a better
job of building a lasting peace. On the other hand n an
era of growing isolationism, people might well feel that
our firmness and our resolve to do those things necessary
(Laos and Cambodia) run a greater risk of getting us into
another war than the head-in-the-sand Dove line. We can
be vulnerable to demagoguery on this issue.
Moreover the war is, in a sense, a negative issue.
We are badly hurt Lf we don't end it but we may not
gain = great deal of credit if we do. 2
Obviously if major events -- SALT, Disarmament,
a summit, Vietnam, China -- go our way there could
be such an overwhelming positive reaction in the
foreign policy area that the President would be un-
beatable regardless of anything else. While we are
hoping this happens, we should not rely on it since so
much of this .S beyond our control.
b. The Economy. Even if the economy is back in full
swing by next year, as I personally expect it will be, the
Democrats will argue that we still have inflation and we
had more unemployment through the Nixon years than
under the Democrats. The Democrats will traffic heavily
on the public's traditional suspicions about economics.
In almost every issue poll the Democrats outscore us in
public confidence with respect to handling of the economy
and thus this is at best always an uphill issue. Whether
we win on this will depend on whether we are able to allay
fears about the future, convince people that unemployment
will not again rise and that prices can remain relatively
stable.
C. The Domestic Program. This may well be our biggest
problem at the moment but, at the same time, our biggest
opportunity. Cur domestic programs are "managerial
oriented" not "people oriented". In my view this is both a
PR and 2 substantive problem with a much heavier emphasis
on the latter. As you pointed out, there is very little "what's
in it for me" in our domestic program.
2 It is very much like the recent demonstrations. Had there been
a disaster, we would have been hurt; we handled it beautffully and gained
little -- not because the people don't associate the President with the
handling of the demonstrations (because they did) -- but rather because
it is a negative issue and there is little profit in what the public regards
as something basically unpleasant. Two pollsters have told me that even
though the public overwnelmingly agreed with our stand on the demonstra-
tions entirely and even though people associated the President with the
demonstrations, that this does not translate into a positive response with
respect to the President.
Our domestic program is, on the merits, excellent;
the six great goals are strong. Reform, change, local
decision making -- those are our strong points but it is
hard to make a plausible, understandable case of what
they do for the pocketbook. Revenue sharing, for
example, could be made appealing as a way to stop
rising property taxes but it is not being sold that way,
probably now can't be sold that way and is a very
indirect and obtuse argument as long as it S structured
the way it is in our proposal.
We have 3 fantastically good record in the area of
governmental reform but this too is managerial, not
economic, and once again it is what people expect of us;
that 5, Republicans run the Government better but
Democrats do things for people.
A second deficiency in our domestic program has been
our apparent vacillation. The public never gets one,
clearly perceived consistent image of the Administration.
There is no real substance to the allegation that we have
been expedient, but from a PR standpoint, we do in fact
often give legitimacy to the charge perhaps because we
ourselves are still seesing that central thrust that, in
fact, will capture the public imagination.
In trying to orient our efforts more to people and economic
issues we may be able to develop the thrust that it seems
to me we have been groping for.
It is possible -- there is time -- to reorient our domestic
pfforts and to capture the high ground. This leads directly
into the fourth category.
4. The Voters' Self-Interest: It is not hard to draw the profile
of what comprises the average individual's economic self-
interest today. Obviously jobs and employment rank on
the top of the list. High also on the list are taxes --
particularly real property taxes: this is now a nation of
homeowners -- 66 million. Moreover, most Americans
8.
work hard in the hopes that they will be able to educate
their children. The desire for education is strongest
among those adults who did not obtain a higher education
themselves; and they represent perhaps our most signi-
ficant political potential. Most Americans who work
resent those who do not and especially resent paying
higher taxes for loafers who abuse the welfare system.
Finally most middle class Americans fear a catastrophic
illness which can wipe out their savings and security.
Middle-aged people worry about their retirement; older
people worry about their ability to live on their retire-
ment and rising prices. The farmers have a set of
economic problems all their own. 3 There are things we
can do at this point to position ourselves and our programs
on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues that
such a profile suggests. For example:
a. Revenue Sharing. Most people today look at general
revenue sharing as simply another "hand out" from the
Federal Treasury to local politicians. If the public has
a poor attitude toward Federal bureaucrats, it has a
worse perception of local politicians.
Unfortunately our revenue sharing does not have any
tangible, economic meaning to the individual. We haven't
made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax
burden.
We had the choice originally of proposing what would have
been the purest form of revenue sharing, i.e. individual
tax credits by individual taxpayers for a portion of local
income, sales or real property taxes. After a very
extensive study, the Domestic Council and the Treasury
concluded that general revenue sharing involving grants
from the Federal government to states and local com-
munities was more equitable, more efficient and would
3 The social issues are perhaps equally important -- race, crime
inithe streets and narcotics -- but these aren't economic and are
essentially negative. We are also postured correctly on these.
9.
provide the financial assistance needed more quickly.
It was clearly = better solution on the merits, but it
ran headlong into the ophosition of Byrnes and Mills
who over the years had devored the credit approach;
it also ran counter to the traditional Republican philo-
sophy of revenue sharing, first advanced by Mel Laird
in the Fifties and subsequently endorsed by various
Republican Policy papers through the Sixties. Most
importantly it missed the political mark (a point Clark
MacGregor and i vainly tried to make before the final
decision was made).
A credit arrangement would give the opportunity (also the
burden) to state and local communities to increase their
levels of taxation. (The majority of which are now con-
trolled by the Democrats)
It is not too late to do this, although we would need an
excuse to shift our position -- perhaps if Mills scuttles
our bill or perhaps whenever we propose a value added
tax. With a new source of Federal revenue we could
couple with it a tax credit revenue sharing arrangement
arguing that the value added tax normits a much larger
(and different form of) revenue sharing.
It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the
present Congress (it could pass since Syrnes and Mills
are committed to this approach) -- SO that next April 15
every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his
Form 1040 and receive a federal credit refund a direct
abatement for local taxes. We could argue that we - - the
Nixon Administration -- had brought tax relief to home-
owners and taxpayers all across the country.
b. Tax Credits for Education. Ferhaps coupled with revenue
sharing tax credits we could include some tax credit or
deduction for educational expenses. Costs of higher
education are becoming nearly prohibitive for middle income
families, the group which offers us the greatest opportunity
10.
for political gain. For years there have been proposals
in the Congress to provide some tax credit or deduction
arrangement. The issue is there for the taking. Indeed
it is expensive, but once again, if it were coupled with
a substitute tax arrangement we could do it and still be
fiscally responsible. This is clearly a prime "what's in
it for me" issue.
C. Lifting the Ceiling of Farmings of Social Security
Recipients. What is better Republican philosophy than
to encourage Social Security recipients to earn more than
the current $1800 ceiling We worry about all the little
things we can do to improve upon HEW's programs to
benefit the aging. These get us absolutely nothing
politically and really appeal only to the professional
senior citizens' lobby. The vast majority of retired citizens
couldn't care less about pilot programs for feeding the
elderly in Chicago. What they reall care about is making
ends meet when they retire. Lifting the ceiling. for
example to $3000. would be expensive and would probably
also have to be tied to something like the value added tax
to give LS the fiscal rationale. The fact is, however, that
it is = very powerful "what's in it for me" economic issue
and particularly potent with a constituency whose support
is vital to us (remember too that the retired vote can be
decisive in California and probably is decisive in Florida).
d. Medical Frogram. Our present medical program is so
complicated that as you point out few of us ever know what
is in it, let alone the vast majority of the American people.
We should seize upon one or two salient points like cata-
strophic health insurance, more doctors, and initiatives
like the cancer cure and then demagogue these points to death.
We mainly want to neutralize this issue because we can't
win on it; the Democrats can always offer more in the way
of national health insurance than we can responsibly accept.
The fact remains however that we can talk about it -- and
continually should the need for curing dread diseases,
better medical services and our health insurance program.
The key to this one is to keep it simple and understandable
and relate it always to the individual's economic (and health)
interest.
A
5.
Welfare Reform. We own this issue presently; we must
keep on husing :-, constantly. People simply don't like
to pay tames to support loniers. The tougher we are in
tightoning one work requirements, the more the political
gain. It is indirectly, therefore, a "what's in it for me"
economic issue.
6. Special Interest Cultivation -- 1948 Example. In developing
those issues which appeal to the voters' economic self-
interest it is particularly instructive to examine the
Truman election of 194S. There are some interesting
political similarities with our own situation. Truman was
derided and scoffed at by the sophisticated opinion makers,
as we often are. He faced a hostile Congress, == we do.
Based on results of the 1946 election, he could not count
on his party being in the majority. He was faced with a
third party threat. He had been forced to do unpopular
things in the international field and he had inherited the
difficult economic problems of converting from war to peace.
While Dewey went into the 1948 campaign talking about
national unity, peace and the need to make government more
effective, Truman devoted all of his resources to the bread
and butter gut issues.
A recent column by Henry Owen (attached as Tab A) makes
the very perceptive point that Truman won the election because
people thought he would better protect their bread and butter
interests "pocketbook politics had carried the day, dignity
and efficiency came in a poor second. 11 The Owen column
interestingly enough makes the point that the same issues
that elected Truman are perhaps even more important today.
If, indeed, there is a valid lesson from the 1948 election, it
is that we can build the same kind of a political base to make
the President's re-election important to the economic self-
interests of large segments of the voting population and we
4
According to Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dowey
and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution,
which had so captivated the eastern electorate in the post war years,
would captivate the rest of the country 3.8 well. 11
5
12.
must escape the Republican managerial syndrome.
For example -- (these are only examples) a very
comprehensive analysis should be prepared to pick
our best targets and best issues):
a. I abor and Puilding Trades: We are on the verge of
being irrecarably damaged with the "hard hats" even
though 5 months ago this represented one of our most
fertile fields for political gain. We had to crack them
hard on the wage issue and we did. We are not, however,
intensifying the minority hiring campaign in the building
trades. While most people view this as a racial question
it is, plain and simple, a pocketbook issue with the "hard
hats"; they interpret our efforts as an attempt to break
down the existing union structure, to destroy the appren-
ticeship program and to eliminate their job security.
There are approximately 3. 8 million building tradesmen
in the United States: at the moment they feel that we are
threatening not only wages but, more important, job
security.
As with 40 many issues, this requires a tough political
choice. Do we play to the blacks, which in my opinion
will get us nothing, or do we play to the "hard hats",
a large percentage of whom we got in 1968 and as to
whom we had been making enormous political progress.
This is a natural "new" constituency, newly emerging
middle-class Americans, most of them homeowners
living in the suburbs, becoming increasingly conservative
on social, international and racial issues. The combination
of wage stabilization, Davis-Bacon and minority hiring
will make it impossible for any of their leaders to support
us or to make gains with the rank and file.
We have another opportunity with the building trades. Most
building tradesmen have discovered that their hourly wage
increases have been largely offset by the fact that they are
working less and less throughout the course of a year: the
higher their hourly wages, the greater the incentive
for labor saving devices and hence the less labor hours
available. Many of them, are beginning to seek annual
contracts, rather than hourly wage increases. It is
argued that hourly wages could be significantly reduced
by annual contract negotiations, thereby benefiting
both the worker and the cost of construction. We don't
have to endorse this; wer merely have to recognize the
problem which we have not done. If we were merely
to announce a study of the feasibility of annual contracts
in the building trades, asking the Construction Industry
Collective Bargaining Council to come up with recom-
5
mendations, the political impact could be huge.
This is the kind of issue that we need with labor generally.
One of the recommendations that the Rosow Report made
was that we provide for vesting of pension plans after
perhaps 10 or 15 years. Every blue collar employee
has a direct economic stake in this. While it is a tough
issue with business it is one that could help us make real
inroads with the rank and file of labor. All we need are
a couple of major items like this, which represent very
direct pocketbook benefit to the individual worker and
regardless of what Al Darken and Cope do next year we
will make important gains with the rank and file.
b. Business Community, While the business community's
political clout is minimal it is a source of support we cannot
overlook; the attitude of business leaders has an impact on
the white collar. professional category as to which Muskie
has shown surprising strength in the polls.
This has been the most activist Administration in history
in the field of anti-trust, the environment and consumer
issues. lie can argue that had the Democrats been in power
5
Such studies have beencconducted over the years in the
Department of Labor; merely recognizing them and grabbing the
issue is all that is required.
14.
they would have been worse, but that is a tough case
to make with politically haive businessmen. All we have
to is to help business in the pocketbook is to begin to
slow down dramatically in the anti-trust field, gradually
in the other two,
C. The Farm Vote. In 1968 we kicked hell out of the
Democrats on the issue of carity. It was 74; today
it is slightly below 70. Hardin tells us that there is no
way between now and next November to get back up to
the 1960 level. (This is in the nature of the parity
formula). This one fact alone tells us with certainty
that this will be a 1972 issue,
We can, however, get farm prices up: farmers have
been in a very severe price/cost squeeze. Farm prices
have to improve by the Fall of 1972 (regardless of the
impact on the wholesale price index) if we are to regain
our traditional support in the farm belt. It can be done
on a commodity by commodity basis as we know from
our experience with milk. We can further aid the farmer
by programs such as REA, home ownership loans, etc.
As to these, we have been acting as good Republican
managers, consistently cutting back on the farm budget;
the time is now at hand to begin increasing it.
C. The Retired Vote. In addition to the obvious -- an
increase in the earnings' ceiling of social security recl-
pients and cost of living social security increases --
there are special resired groups we can appeal to: for
example the 850, 000 retired military personnel, a large
number of whom live in Florida (62, 000) and California
(145, 000). In 1968 we promised to support recomputation
of military pay: we have not. Finally we have underway
a study which will lead to some recomputation recommenda-
tions; it will be very modest but a step forward, correcting
some of the gross inquities in the present military retirement
15.
system. This is a real pocketbook issue. When the
recommendations come from the study committee in
July (approximate cost 4150 million year) there will
be strong opposition from OMB. If we want to practice
pocketbook politics, this is a very good place to start.
c. Veterans Groups: I have had a running battle for
months over cuts made by OMB in the VA hospital care
budget. The amount cut was slightly in excess of $100
million. Two months ago a head count of the Veterans
Affairs Committees in the House and the Senate revealed
that we would be rolled in both committees; it was clear
that not only would these funds be respred but the Congress
would probably add substantially to our bodget requests
and would, moreover, attach a mandatory spending clause.
Had we been willing to restore the $100 million cut, we
could have gotten the agreement of the veterans organizations
to stick with our budget figures; we would have avoided a
confrontation with the Congress and we then simply could
have withheld funds during FY 1972. As it is now. we
will probably be forced to spend the money and will have
lost on a gut economic issue with the veterans organization
whose membership totals over 6 million. Their recent
publications point up theludierous situation we find ourselves
in: on one page they strongly support us for our foreign
policy and on the next tear us apart for cutting health care
for the veterans. What's more, we gave Teague, Hartke and
Albert = marvelous issue you may recall two weeks ago
they were all on national TV networks blasting the
Administration for being "anti-veteran."
My sole point is that we can do a much better job in
appealing to the economic self-interest of large groups of
citizens than we have done. We have to be just a little less
concerned about managerial efficiency and a little more
concerned about "people politics".
In this area we cannot ascribe fault to our public relations
effort; nor really can publicarelations help us. In some
cases it is downright erous to make a major FR effort
when substantively we have scrious problems. Salute to
10,
Agriculture is a very good case in point. The public
believes that most politicians are phoney and we only
give our critics an opportunity to exploit this when we
launch major FR efforts in an attempt to cover up a basic
economic or political problem.
The other side of this coin is equally valid. If we have
made the right political decisions, the public relations
effort is relatively painless. For example, if we were
to do something in the building trades area, we would
have no difficulty in getting our story told and getting the
credit. Through mailings, trade journals and speeches
every builling tradesmen would very soon know what we
had done.
C. CONCLUSION
After two and a half years the die is farily well cast on the big
issues. Elther we have or we have not done the things necessary
for those issues to be working for us next year.
We do have, however, two areas which we can most effectively exploit
and there is time to do it. Revemping our domestic program to make
it more people oriented and making a major effort to cultivate the
economic interest of those voting bloks that either have represented
our traditional constituency or should be part of our emerging new
constituency. These are identifiable. They ways to reach them
politcally are no mystery and we have all the equipment -- the
advantage of incumbency -- with which to exploit them.
I am especially impressed, 23 you may have gathered, by some of the
fascinating parallels with the Truman re-clection in 1948. Truman
rejected the advice that he try to reform his image or that he mount
2 major sales cilort. What he did instead, based on the Clark Clifford
memo of November 1947, was to analyze cynically, coldly and
shrewdly the rag-tag assortment of special interest groups and
minorities that FDR had welded together into a majority coalition;
he determined what political and economic favors were necessary
to retain or regain cheir loyalties and then met them head on. As
a result Truman devoced all of his resources to the subject which
most Americans cared most about then (and perhaps still do): How
to make a living.
17.
While I have emphasized the similarities with 1948, I, of course,
recognize that the circumstances then were quite different than
they are now. In 'pril bf 1943 Touman had a 36% approval rating
in the Gallup Poll and for him, therefore, this was a last ditch
desperate effort. We are certainly not in that condition.
Nonetheless in formulating our strategy for 1972, there is the
political gain of explaining 10 the fullesthe advantages of incumbency --
which on the issues we have not done as well 28 we could.
Memo Colson Stans
Mitchell
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
I was distressed to learn from Don Kendall that in his trying to get
Business Chairmen for us in the various States, he had struck out
in city after city after going down the list of names that he received
from people on the White House staff, the Campaign Committee, and
from other sources. He said that he had to date called 12 business
leaders in San Francisco and not one of them would agree to serve
as the Nixon Chairman. He said that he had also had some difficulty
in Los Angeles although he had finally come up with a name. Only
through Connally's intervention was he able to get Clement to take
the job in Texas.
As I have already told you, Kendall's reaction of course was that,
immediately after the election we had to spend more time romancing
the business community and developing a group of them to support us.
I told him that, if I looked back over my calendar for the last three
years, that businessmen probably took two-thirds of my time when
we figured my appearances before Chambers of Commerce, NAB,
the Business Council, and the terribly boring series of meetings
I have had with business advisors and consultants on a number of
issues.
I told Don that we have to realize that the old establishment just like
the old establishment in the university community and in the media
simply weren't going to be with us and that we had to build a new
establishment. I told him that we needed people like himself, Bob
Abplanalp, Mulcahy and others who, though they don't fit socially
with the business elite, have real character. There are simply
bound to be a number of people around the country who will fit this
category. Stans probably knows some of them because he had to
build a whole new group of contributors when he went through the
last campaign. I would also imagine that the wire and letter response
to the May 8 speech might prove very useful in getting some names
for Kendall to approach.
- 2 -
What I am sure of is that what we have been doing to date with
the business community is altogether wrong. When I think that
we have had the likes of Irwin Miller in to Blair House meetings
and when I look over the lists as I sometimes do of those who are
invited to such meetings, I find that even our most conservative
people on the White House staff inevitably go to the so-called
business elite when they want to get support for some of our policies.
I want you to have a really tough talk with Flanigan and Ehrlichman
on this subject and eventually, as a result of your discussions, per-
haps we can give Kendall some help in attempting to develop this new
group on the business side. Malek, of course, could be helpful in
such a discussion and Stans, also, from time to time.
In sum, what I am trying to say in this memo is that we have been
striking out over and over again in attempting to enlist business
support for our policies due to the fact that we have been talking to
the wrong audience. The business elite, if anything, has less guts
than the labor elite or the farm elite. What we have to do is to find
those few people in the business community who have some reputation
as being successful in business but who haven't been taken in by the
idea that they must only attach themselves to "fashionable" causes.
THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Issue Management
The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you
regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with
the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is
not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having some-
one, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to
the issues we need to pursue, how we are going to pursue them
and then let the troops execute.
One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has
to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks
very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we
have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all
results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens
to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am
also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues
or questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image.
The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't
be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line"
of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's
personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of
the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close
the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on
the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum;
it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in
handling the tough issues.
The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on
the substantive follow-through we need.
2.
A. The New Populism. Without trying to define.this, I think it falls
right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the
Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment
with government i.e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:
1.
We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard
to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we
can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to
you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we
can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and
sharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our
pension program which we have totally neglected) then we
might be able to slide away from the big business label
somewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible
association with big business or establishment-type events
should be considered for the President.
2.
There is no way politically that we can defend the present
tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern
will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of
their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can
be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins"
Taxes
and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax
structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my
memo of May 21, 1972 page 7). There are 66 million home-
owners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should
be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an
unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property
tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the
Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.
Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't
going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite
candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient,
inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are
on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-
free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the
most regressive and onerous of all.
3.
We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change
the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the
Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim
it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlich-
man got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if
it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps,
the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all
John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next
possible?
year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the
ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President.
The President should adopt the recommendation that property
taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should
then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the
preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific
objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by
various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas
of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the
architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the
President can direct a simplification of tax forms and proce-
dures. By July 1, we will be able to announce that one essen-
tail underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a
minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short
the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in
1969 and were defeated it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they
aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the
public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of
four or five key elements of the tax package that we will pro-
pose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the
President should have been seen visibly involved in managing
a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach.
In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar
as the President is concerned meetings with tax experts,
Treasury officials, etc. etc.
What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series
of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set
of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year
(and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground
out from under the demogogic arguments of McGovern and
Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting
defensively through the months of September and October.
4.
3.
Particularly if McGovern is. the nomince, he will campaign
against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of
Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very
Effective Novernment.
effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred
with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put
some day light between the President and the bureaucracy.
We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will
use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect plat-
Market
form to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and
issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done
this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but
3
need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster,
the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps
fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough
orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective
for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it
in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody
understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back
on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things
management-wise; now it is time to do a few demogogic things
which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful
President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to
the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the
people.
B.
Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is
that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against
busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing
plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see
the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the
gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area
and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.
hibe
built
In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is
in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the
North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the
South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If
Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute,
then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but
we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we
5.
have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major
effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the
President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment
making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing
plans can be undone.
Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly under-
stood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign
on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key
areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is
clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular
areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up
with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing,
but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday,
which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here
as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).
C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless.
People do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly
important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price
of Ford Pintos by $30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity
that people buy every day food. Food prices have been rising so
long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They
are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we canhhope
for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand,
if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can
have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action,
perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I
happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a
significant political upheaval building in the country over this one
done Whatbering here.
issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic
action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider
possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise SO that we can
crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import
quotas).
All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion
either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing
things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either
6.
going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously
be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot
substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense
spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the
opponent.
In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not
much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that
we can doanything about).
D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear get no bill from
the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If
we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would
urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger inso-
far as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is
later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem.
The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds
to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards,
(a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded
Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will
revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it
and it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric
if it were done under the proper circumstances in September.
The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to
do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore
taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in
the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot
programs in New York and California as we have done to curb
excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to
the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which
would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the
same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I
watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a
gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons
why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how
we can if we want to.
E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional sub-
stantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of
the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive
initiatives in this area.
7.
P.R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by
building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the
final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is
much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned
a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits
to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.
F.
Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will
be decided by the over $15, 000 a year, upper middle-class, white
suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to
promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions
that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good,
rather appealing little package that could be used especially with
certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because
none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we
need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for
exploitation of the good record we have made.
G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper
issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particu-
larly in those states where it has either come into effect or has
been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like
property taxes, everybody feels they are being cheated. The
Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There
is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can
take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the
big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we
really have no position.
Key Voter Blocs
In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and
Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining
what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we
will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should
come to some subjective consensus.
I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of
May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the
8.
self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same
opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class,
Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have
a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other
area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal.
For example:
1.
We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan
cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have
children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited
to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7
or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is
one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic
hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational
effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial
schools SO at the very least we would neutralize him on this
issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are
immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly
exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2.
We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for
the building trades. All of the staff work has been done on this
within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes
the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen
in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue
now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas
where it too can be a cutting issue.
3.
Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney
in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous
political dividends.
The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically
established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without
a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now SO much
mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern
to poverty level clderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not
the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in
this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that
the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security
9.
benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in
the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign
issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could
lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of
H.R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this
one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property
tax issue is also hig with the old folks. We are badly treading water
in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will
be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really
hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.
In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the
over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics
(including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking -- we are doing well
in this area ) these two blocs could be decisive.
As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a
list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day
in September and October things like maritime contracts, parks being
returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc.
Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation,
and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum
impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become
ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be
used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving
the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears
blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the
President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to
do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political
or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to re-
mind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe
that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the
other side can do is promise.