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This file contains:
From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Poll Analysis and Wave II. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/12/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John n. Mitchell RE: Second Wave Polling. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Committee for the Re-election of the President RE: Wave II Polling. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Celebrities. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/8/1972
From: Jon A. Foust To: John N. Mitchell RE: Celebrities for the President American Music for the President Athletes for the President. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/5/1972
From: H.R. Haldeman To: Jeb S. Magruder RE: Celebrities. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 3/21/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: New York Conservatice Ballot. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/4/1972
From: Robert H. Marik To: John N. Mitchell RE: Priority Ranking of the States for the Campaign.4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/1/1972
From: Gordon Strachan To: Fred Malek RE: RNC Research Materials. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 2/21/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 16-22
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WHSF: Contested, 16-22
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This file contains:
From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Campaign Poll Analysis and Wave II. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/12/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John n. Mitchell RE: Second Wave Polling. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Committee for the Re-election of the President RE: Wave II Polling. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman RE: Celebrities. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/8/1972
From: Jon A. Foust To: John N. Mitchell RE: Celebrities for the President American Music for the President Athletes for the President. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/5/1972
From: H.R. Haldeman To: Jeb S. Magruder RE: Celebrities. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 3/21/1972
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N. Mitchell RE: New York Conservatice Ballot. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/4/1972
From: Robert H. Marik To: John N. Mitchell RE: Priority Ranking of the States for the Campaign.4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/1/1972
From: Gordon Strachan To: Fred Malek RE: RNC Research Materials. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 2/21/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
22
5/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Campaign Poll Analysis and Wave II. 1
pg.
16
22
5/11/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N.
Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8
pgs.
16
22
5/11/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John n. Mitchell
RE: Second Wave Polling. 3 pgs.
16
22
5/11/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: Committee for
the Re-election of the President RE: Wave II
Polling. 1 pg.
Monday, March 07, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
22
5/11/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N.
Mitchell RE: Final First Wave Analysis. 8
pgs.
16
22
5/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Gordan Strachan To: H.R. Haldeman
RE: Celebrities. 1 pg.
16
22
5/5/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Jon A. Foust To: John N. Mitchell RE:
Celebrities for the President American Music
for the President Athletes for the President. 3
pgs.
16
22
3/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: H.R. Haldeman To: Jeb S. Magruder
RE: Celebrities. 2 pgs.
16
22
5/4/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert M. Teeter To: John N.
Mitchell RE: New York Conservatice Ballot.
8 pgs.
Monday, March 07, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
16
22
5/1/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Robert H. Marik To: John N. Mitchell
RE: Priority Ranking of the States for the
Campaign.4 pgs.
16
22
2/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From: Gordon Strachan To: Fred Malek RE:
RNC Research Materials. 1 pg.
Monday, March 07, 2011
Page 3 of 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
May 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Poll Analysis
and Wave II
Bob Teeter submitted his Final First Wave Analysis to you
and John Mitchell today. It is attached at Tab A. The
conclusions and recommendations are specific and surprising.
You may want to use this memorandum as a talking paper at
one of the regular political meetings, either with or without
Teeter present.
Teeter also asked Mitchell for authority to conduct the
second series of polls in mid-June. The cost is approxi-
mately $250,000. Teeter is soliciting suggestions from
the Campaign and White House Staffs. The final question-
naire will be submitted to you and Mitchell for final
approval on June 1. Teeter's memoranda are at Tab B.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 11, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
E.O. 12005, Section 6-102
By Emp Date 8-26-81
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Final First Wave Analysis
During the past several weeks we have analyzed the first wave
polling results utilizing a number of the most advanced statistical
techniques available. This analysis has enabled us to identify
the most important independent variables which influence presi-
dential vote and to develop a very sophisticated analysis package
which can be run and interpreted rapidly on all of our subsequent
polling.
While it is not necessary to have knowledge of these techniques in
order to use the results, I would be happy to go over them in more
detail with you anytime.
Our conclusions from this analysis are:
1. Past party voting behavior is the single most important factor
which affects the presidential vote. The classification of voters
into behavioral Republicans, Democrats, or Ticket-splitters accounts
for almost three times as much of the variance why people vote for
or against the President as is explained by any other variable.
This appears to be particularly true in Wisconsin, Indiana, and
California.
2. The next most important factors affecting the Presidential
vote are the voters' perceptions of the President's trust and his
issue handling ability. Trust is best defined by the following
variables - honesty, open minded, and just. Seemingly, these
personality traits are related to perceptions of credibility. To
a lesser degree the presidential vote is related to perceptions of
competence -- experienced, trained, and informed.
Most voters have a general perception of how well the President
handles issues and problems overall and that appears to be more
important to voting than is their perception of his handling of
any one or two issues. This overall issue handling ability secms
to be perceived by the voters as a single personality dimension
similar in many ways to the dimensions of trust, competence, etc.
-2-
The only individual issues which appear to have any significant
independent effect on voting are Vietnam, inflation, and general
unrest. Vietnam and inflation were also, fortunately, the issues
that the President was seen as handling well, and his ability to
handle the general unrest problem was rated about equally to that
of his opponents:
Those issues on which the President is rated relatively poorly --
crime, drugs, and unemployment --- do not appear to affect presidential
voting to any major degree. This is particularly true of crime and
unemployment. Apparently the President is seen as having done a
good job on those problems that the voters think have gotten better
overall, while he is seen as having done a poor job on those pro-
blems which have become worse during the last few years. There
also appears to be little believability that the President will
make much difference in the crime or drug problems.
3. Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than
past party voting behavior, and less important than perceptions of
the candidates trust, competence, and issue handling ability. Once
party behavior is taken into account there is little difference in
the vote for various demographic groups. In other words, differences
in the rate that various demographic groups support Nixon can be
explained almost entirely. by party preferences rather than member-
ship in any particular demographic group. The factors having some
but small effect on the vote are age, income, and education. Gen-
erally speaking, voters who are older, have higher incomes, and
have more education seem to have a greater propensity to vote for
the President, primarily because of their propensity to vote Repub-
lican more than as a result of their demographic group. Bloc voting
against the President is evident only with a limited number of
groups --- blacks, young voters (18 to 25 year olds especially in
California), and Jewish voters in New York. All appear to oppose
the President to a greater degree than would be predicted by their
past voting behavior or party preference.
It appears to be possible to improve the vote for the President in
several demographic groups where he is weak. We have made these
conclusions from our analysis of the data from the individual voting
blocs:
A. Older voters (60 years and over) are the single
most important group in the election. In Missouri
and Oregon, the President is especially weak. Taxes,
inflation, and the economy are the important issues.
B. The President is running very poorly with young voters
(18 to 24). Heavy turnout and registration by this
group could be devastating. The percentage of Repub-
licon support among youth is very small. Vietnam and
the economy are the issues. We have special weakness
in California and Wisconsin.
-3-
C. The vote for Nixon among blacks varies greatly. The
President is running well with this group in the south,
the border states, and New Jersey and New York. There
is a severe credibility problem and racial appeals to
this group are unlikely to work. Pocketbook issues will
be important.
D. Spanish-Americans are supporting the President to a
greater degree than expected. The support appears to
be flexible. We could expect to improve our support
with this group by at least 15% in California.
E. Ethnic support in Philadelphia is very weak and seems to
be causing our poor showing there.
4. The importance of each of the vote determining factors varies
considerably from state to state. Generally, the relative importance
of these factors in affecting the vote is listed below:
Party
Nixon Trust
Comparative Issue Handling Ability
Age
Opponents Competence
Income
Religion
Education
After party, the voters' perceptions of Nixon trust and comparative
issue handling ability are the factors which have the greatest
influence on the President's vote.
The factors in the individual state studies are shown in Attachment
A. Attachment B graphically shows the importance of these factors.
5. While the President was in relatively good shape against any of
his potential opponents in January, there was a relatively small
undecided vote for that point in time and there appears to be some
limits on the President's potential vote. There are relatively
large groups of voters who vote for the President on all of the
sample ballots and who vote against the President regardless of
who his opponent is on all the sample ballots. This indicates to
me that once the Democratic nominee is selected the undecided vote
may be very small. This, along with the probability that the Demo-
cratic candidate will increase his support and that the ratio will
get closer during September and October, means that we should attempt
to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national
conventions on the theory that we will lose ground after the con-
ventions. Moreover, every point we can gain between now and the
conventions will come with less effort and at less cost than those
percentage points needed during the fall campaign.
-4-
6. There does not appear to be any definite ideological basis for
voting on any of the ballots. That is, very few people if any are
voting for the President because they feel he is particularly con-
servative or liberal, or that people are voting against the President
because they feel he is too conservative or too liberal.
7. The Vice-President's approval rating is somewhat lower than the
President's in almost all of the states but follows up and down
about in line with the President's. I cannot identify any particular
segment of voters with whom the Vice-President is either adding or
subtracting from the ticket.
8. The net effect of a Wallace third party candidacy was very
small in January and has undoubtedly changed since then. We should
defer any hard conclusions as to whether we want him on or off the
ballot until after the second wave of polling, but my inclination
at this point is that we would do better without him on the ballot.
9. There is no question but that we have a very realistic chance
to carry any or all of the big states -- New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California and we should
continue to make a maximum effort in those states. California
appears to me to be the one state where we may not be doing as
well as we might be at this time and where there are indications
of future problems. Voters in California seem to have a more fixed
perception of the President. That is, of course, logical in that
California voters probably know him better than those in any other
state.
Recommendations
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:
1. A ticket-splitter analysis should be done in each of the priority
states by precinct or ward and township. For the rest of the country,
the analysis should be done by county. This is undoubtedly the most
efficient way to locate ticket-splitters and to develop priority
areas for both our organizational and communications efforts. More-
over, it will allow us to identify Democratic areas which have some
propensity to split their ticket, and from these areas we may be
able to cause ticket-splitting in favor of the President.
2. With apparently small undecided vote, a strong organizational
effort will be critical. I would recommend putting a dispropor-
tionate share of our resources into organizational personnel to
assure that this effort is maximized. I also think our organiza-
tional effort should be structured so that we have the flexibility
to concentrate our people in a few states late in the campaign,
even to the degree of assigning one to each county or congressional
district for the top priority states in late September and October.
-5-
Special organizational effort should be made to improve the
President's voting strength in Philadelphia (especially with ethnics),
New York City (outside Manhattan), Buffalo, Los Angeles (Orange
County), Baltimore suburbs, Montgomery County (Maryland), Mid-Texas
(Austin), rural Missouri, and Kenosha/Racine Wisconsin.
3. As indicated before, I think the development of an overall
theme or idea for the campaign is imperative and that this should
be done before the Democratic convention and should center around
the President's hopes and aspirations for our country. To be effec-
tive it must be positive and give people the hope that many of our
problems can and will improve.
4. As the President's overall issue handling ability is more impor-
tant to determining vote than his handling of any individual issue,
those issues on which he is perceived as handling well should be
emphasized and those he is seen as handling poorly should only be
used if-we have an impressive story to tell or if the appeal is
designed for some particular group.
5. We should emphasize the following personal attributes in our
media programs:
Trust - Just
Honest
Open Minded
Competence - Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent
It is possible to use the President's ability to handle issues in
communicating the above attributes. No special effort needs to be
directed to make the President appear -- warm, relaxed, and having
a sense of humor. To the extent that it is possible to convey
these characteristics, we should do so, but not at the expense of
the trust and competence variables.
6. Special efforts should be implemented to maximize the President's
strength with specific voting blocs.
A. A campaign directed at older Americans through the
voting bloc group should be given top priority. Maximum
available resources should be allocated into this program.
A massive turnout drive should be implemented, and a
supportive direct mail effort should be considered.
Because of the current high level of registration, no
special effort in this regard needs to be made to register
older voters. Special emphasis should be made to improve
our level of support with older Americans in the follow-
ing priorities:
-6-
Missouri (Primarily Rural)
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maryland
Indiana
California
Pennsylvania
New York
Taxes and inflation should be given emphasis.
B. All registration drives among young voters should be
stopped. Our primary objective with this group should
be low turnout and persuasion of Democrats and swing
voters to vote for the President. Areas for special
emphasis to improve support among young voters should
be:
Wisconsin
California
Maryland
Pennsylvania
New York
Primary issue emphasis should be made on Vietnam, jobs
for youth, and pollution.
In meeting our objective of converting Democrats and
independents, we must be careful not to direct our young
voter campaign solely at our own voters. To keep turnout
at a minimum we should attempt to keep the marijuana
referenda now proposed for California and Michigan off
the ballot if possible.
C. The Jewish vote bloc should implement a program to
improve the President's strength with this voter group
in New York state. Careful consideration should be
given to the question of parochial schools with this
group. Our data indicates support of aid to parochial
schools may be a negative with Jewish voters.
D. In order to carry several critical northern states we
will need to carry a greater percentage of blacks than
we did in 1968. Because of our credibility problems,
we must be careful in making any racial appeals so that
our efforts are not counterproductive.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
ATTACHMENT A
CALIFORNIA
NEW JERSEY
OHIO
TEXAS
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
WISCONSIN
INDIANA
Party Type
21%
Party Type
7%
Opp. Issue
11%
Nixon Trust
10%
Age
12%
Opp.
Party Type
29%
Party Type
14%
Competence
9%
Opp. Trust
4
Nixon Trust
6
Party Type
6
Party Type
8
Party Type
7
Age
8
Party Type
7
Opp. Issue
11
Age
4
Opp.
Education
5
Nixon Issue
8
Nixon Issue
7
Income
3
Competence
6
Income
7
Income
9
Income
4
Age
4
Age
7
Nixon Trust
5
Opp. Issue
3
Age
5
Age
5
Nixon Trust
4
Nixon
Opp.
Nixon
Opp. Issue
4
Religion
2
Strength
3
Opp. Issue
4
Strength
3
Strength
5
Opp. Issue
2
Nixon Issue
4
Income
4
Nixon Trust
2
Nixon
Income
4
Nixon Issue
3
Opp. Issue
3
Education
2
Age
4
Competence
3
Education
4
Opp. Trust
1
Religion
3
Religion
2
Income
2
Nixon
Religion
2
Sex
3
Nixon
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon Issue
2
Opp.
Religion
2
Competence
2
Education
1
Strength
1
Nixon Trust
2
Competence
1
Opp. Trust
1
Sex
2
Opp.
Sex
2
Nixon
Education
1
Nixon Issue
2
Nixon Trust
1
Strength
2
Nixon Trust
1
Competence
1
Education
1
Opp. Trust
1
Nixon Issue
1
Education
2
Income
1
Opp. Trust
1
Nixon Issue
1
Opp.
Nixon
Nixon
Competence
1
Nixon
Opp.
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon
Strength
1
Religion
*
Competence
1
Competence
2
Competence
*
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon
Opp.
Sex
*
Strength
1
Opp.
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Opp.
Competence
1
Strength
*
Strength
1
Competence
*
Competence
1
Nixon
Opp. Trust
1
Opp.
Religion
1
Strength
*
Sex
*
Opp. Issue
1
Strength
*
Nixon
Education
*
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Religion
1
Opp. Trust
*
Sex
*
Strength
*
Strength
*
Competence
*
Sex
*
Sex
*
*
Less than 1%
Numbers following each factor indicate percentage of influence on the presidential vote.
ATTACHMENT B
NIXON - MUSKIE
Rep.
.9
T-S, Dem. ,Marg.
.4
Nixon Trust
Nixon Trust
Dem.
Hi
Lo
.6
.2
.1
T-S, Marg.
Dems.
T-S, Marg.
.8
.4
.4
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Comp
Comp.
Trust
Trust
Trust
Trust
Lo
Hi
Lo
Hi
Lo
Hi
.9
.6
.5
.2
.5
.1
Muskie
Muskie
Nixon
Nixon
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
Lo
lli
Hi
Lo
.9
.5
.6
.3
Muskie
Muskie
Issue
Issue
Lo
Hi
.5
.2
Prot.
Other
Religions
.7
.5
Numbers under boxes indicate probability of voting for Nixon. The
higher the number, the greater the probability of voting for Nixon.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 11, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
By
E.O. Emp 12085, Section 6-102
,
Date 8-26-81
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Second Wave Polling
The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend the design of our
second wave polling and to get your approval of the basic design
so I can begin to work with the vendors on questionnaire design
and specific cost estimates.
Purpose
The purpose of this wave of polling will be to update our polling
information in the priority states after all the major Presidential
Primaries are over and after perception of the potential Democratic
candidates is better defined. The Primaries and national events
have undoubtedly changed public opinion in several important areas
since January, and we need current polling data to reevaluate our
position in each of the priority states, to further define our
national campaign plan, and to develop individual state campaign
plans.
This set of polls will allow us to identify changes in the various
candidates ballot strength or perception or in the basic issue
structure since January. It will also allow us to begin to develop
some trend lines on both the candidates and issues for the campaign.
Some of the major areas I think should be covered on this wave are:
Secret ballot measurement of the President VS. Humphrey,
McGovern, and Kennedy with and without Wallace
Ballot effect of various potential Vice-Presidential
candidates
Perception of the major candidates
Familiarity/Amount of knowledge of the candidates
Approval rating/Why
Personal perception data
Measurement of core pro and anti Nixon vote
National issue structure
Rating of intensity of issue concern
Rating of candidates ability to handle major issues
Perception of whether a problem has gotten better or
worse under the Nixon administration
Attitudes toward specific national problems
Tax reform/VAT
National defense
Status and attitudes toward police
Attitudes toward Congress
Attitudes toward trade unions/George Meany
Attitudes toward Phase II
Marijuana/Drugs
Farm problems
Women's issues
This data would all be tabulated and analyzed by past voting behavior,
by current voting intention, by degree of commitment for or against
the President, by geographic regions, and by the various demographic
groups. These are essentially the same breaks that we used in Wave
I and would allow us to identify any specific changes in the Presi-
dent's strength since January. The data from this wave would also
be run by Area of Dominate influence (ADL) which would allow the
advertising people to use the data more effectively by relating it
to the major media markets.
Design
I think we should divide the states to be polled into two groups
on this wave and do a fairly long interview designed to get in-depth
data on the candidates and issues only in the top priority states
and do a much shorter (and less expensive) interview designed to get
the basic head-to-head and issue data in the other states.
The states I recommend we do in June are:
Long Interview
California
Texas
Illinois
Ohio
New Jersey
New York
-3-
Short Interview
Alabama
Pennsylvania
Maryland
Michigan
Connecticut
Washington
Wisconsin
Missouri
Oregon
West Virginia
Indiana
While Indiana and Alabama are not on our list of priorities, I
think we ought to check Indiana because of various state problems
and we should survey Alabama to ascertain the President's voting
strength in one of the deep south states. Alabama was selected
simply on the basis that we can conduct the study on a shared cost
basis with Red Blount.
Timing
The appropriate schedule of this wave would be:
Approval of basic design
May 15
Development of questionnaire and final design
May 16-25
Preliminary approval of questionnaire and
signing of contracts with vendors
May 30
Final approval of questionnaire
June 8
Interviewing
June 15-30
Preliminary reports
July 5
Final reports
July 15
Cost
The approximate cost of this wave would be $250,000. This cost
estimate does not, however, take into consideration any shared cost
studies with individual states which I will negotiate as soon as
this project is approved. I now anticipate the shared cost arrange-
ments in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Texas, and
possibly Washington, and Oregon.
The final cost would be determined after the questionnaire and design
is finalized and will be submitted to you for approval.
Recommendation: That you approve the second wave of polling, the
list of states to be polled, and the schedule. The questionnaire and
exact cost estimated will be submitted for your approval by May 30.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 11, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
MR. KENNETH R. COLE, JR.
MR. CHARLES W. COLSON
MR. PETER H. DAILEY
MR. HARRY S. DENT
MR. PETER M. FLANIGAN
MR. HARRY S. FLEMMING
MR. LEONARD GARMENT
MR. ALLAN G. KAUPINEN
MR. FRED C. LA RUE
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
MR. FREDERIC V. MALEK
MR. CLIFFORD A. MILLER
DR. ROBERT H. MARIK
MR. ROBERT C. MARDIAN
MR. DONALD M. MOSIMAN
MR. HERBERT L. PORTER
MR. RAYMOND K. PRICE, JR.
MR. GORDON C. STRACHAN*
MR. CLAYTON K. YEUTTER
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Wave II Polling
We plan to do a second wave of polling in late June with results
being available in early or mid July. It will consist of personal
interview studies in several of the priority states and a national
oversample similar to the first wave.
If there are any specific areas or subjects you would like to have
covered, I would like to have this information from you by Wednesday,
May 17.
This group of polls will be somewhat shorter and more limited in
scope than the January wave and while it will probably not be possible
to include everything everyone would like to have included, we will
make every attempt to get the data that would be of use to you.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 11, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By Emp
MR
Date- 8-26-81
,
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Final First Wave Analysis
During the past several weeks we have analyzed the first wave
polling results utilizing a number of the most advanced statistical
techniques available. This analysis has enabled us to identify
the most important independent variables which influence presi-
dential vote and to develop a very sophisticated analysis package
which can be run and interpreted rapidly on all of our subsequent
polling.
While it is not necessary to have knowledge of these techniques in
order to use the results, I would be happy to go over them in more
detail with you anytime.
Our conclusions from this analysis are:
1. Past party voting behavior is the single most important factor
which affects the presidential vote. The classification of voters
into behavioral Republicans, Democrats, or Ticket-splitters accounts
for almost three times as much of the variance why people vote for
or against the President as is explained by any other variable.
This appears to be particularly true in Wisconsin, Indiana, and
California.
2. The next most important factors affecting the Presidential
vote are the voters' perceptions of the President's trust and his
issue handling ability. Trust is best defined by the following
variables -- honesty, open minded, and just. Seemingly, these
personality traits are related to perceptions of credibility. To
a lesser degree the presidential vote is related to perceptions of
competence -- experienced, trained, and informed.
Most voters have a general perception of how well the President
handles issues and problems overall and that appears to be more
important to voting than is their perception of his handling of
any one or two issues. This overall issue handling ability seems
to be perceived by the voters as a single personality dimension
similar in many ways to the dimensions of trust, competence, etc.
-2-
The only individual issues which appear to have any significant
independent effect on voting are Vietnam, inflation, and general
unrest Vietnam and inflation were also, fortunately, the issues
that the President was seen as handling well, and his ability to
handle the general unrest problem was rated about equally to that
of his opponents:
Those issues on which the President is rated relatively poorly --
crime, drugs, and unemployment -- do not appear to affect presidential
voting to any major degree. This is particularly true of crime and
unemployment. Apparently the President is seen as having done a
good job on those problems that the voters think have gotten better
overall, while he is seen as having done a poor job on those pro-
blems which have become worse during the last few years. There
also appears to be little believability that the President will
make much difference in the crime or drug problems.
3. Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than
past party voting behavior, and less important than perceptions of
the candidates trust, competence, and issue handling ability. Once
party behavior is taken into account there is little difference in
the vote for various demographic groups. In other words, differences
in the rate that various demographic groups support Nixon can be
explained almost entirely. by party preferences rather than member-
ship in any particular demographic group. The factors having some
but small effect on the vote are age, income, and education. Gen-
erally speaking, voters who are older, have higher incomes, and
have more education seem to have a greater propensity to vote for
the President, primarily because of their propensity to vote Repub-
lican more than as a result of their demographic group. Bloc voting
against the President is evident only with a limited number of
groups -- blacks, young voters (18 to 25 year olds especially in
California), and Jewish voters in New York. All appear to oppose
the President to a greater degree than would be predicted by their
past voting behavior or party preference.
It appears to be possible to improve the vote for the President in
several demographic groups where he is weak. We have made these
conclusions from our analysis of the data from the individual voting
blocs:
A. Older voters (60 years and over) are the single
Older
most important group in the election. In Missouri
Voters
and Oregon, the President is especially weak. Taxes,
inflation, and the economy are the important issues.
B. The President is running very poorly with young voters
(18 to 24). Heavy turnout and registration by this
young
group could be devastating. The percentage of Repub-
Voters
lican support among youth is very small. Vietnam and
the economy are the issues. We have special weakness
in California and Wisconsin.
-3-
C. The vote for Nixon among blacks varies greatly. The
Black
President is running well with this group in the south,
the border states, and New Jersey and New York. There
is a severe credibility problem and racial appeals to
this group are unlikely to work. Pocketbook issues will
be important.
D. Spanish-Americans are supporting the President to a
Spenise
greater degree than expected. The support appears to
be flexible. We could expect to improve our support
with this group by at least 15% in California.
E. Ethnic support in Philadelphia is very weak and seems to
be causing our poor showing there.
4. The importance of each of the vote determining factors varies
considerably from state to state. Generally, the relative importance
of these factors in affecting the vote is listed below:
Party
Nixon Trust
Comparative Issue Handling Ability
Age
Opponents Competence
Income
Religion
Education
After party, the voters' perceptions of Nixon trust and comparative
issue handling ability are the factors which have the greatest
influence on the President's vote.
The factors in the individual state studies are shown in Attachment
A. Attachment B graphically shows the importance of these factors.
5. While the President was in relatively good shape against any of
his potential opponents in January, there was a relatively small
undecided vote for that point in time and there appears to be some
limits on the President's potential vote. There are relatively
large groups of voters who vote for the President on all of the
sample ballots and who vote against the President regardless of
who his opponent is on all the sample ballots. This indicates to
me that once the Democratic nominee is selected the undecided vote
may be very small. This, along with the probability that the Demo-
cratic candidate will increase his support and that the ratio will
get closer during September and October, means that we should attempt
to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national
conventions on the theory that we will lose ground after the con-
ventions Moreover, every point we can gain between now and the
conventions will come with less effort and at less cost than those
percentage points needed during the fall campaign.
-4-
6. There does not appear to be any definite ideological basis for
voting on any of the ballots. That is, very few people if any are
voting for the President because they feel he is particularly con-
servative or liberal, or that people are voting against the President
because they feel he is too conservative or too liberal.
7. The Vice-President's approval rating is somewhat lower than the
President's in almost all of the states but follows up and down
about in line with the President's. I cannot identify any particular
segment of voters with whom the Vice-President is either adding or
subtracting from the ticket.
8. The net effect of a Wallace third party candidacy was very
small in January and has undoubtedly changed since then. We should
defer any hard conclusions as to whether we want him on or off the
ballot until after the second wave of polling, but my inclination
at this point is that we would do better without him on the ballot.
9. There is no question but that we have a very realistic chance
to carry any or all of the big states -- New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California and we should
continue to make a maximum effort in those states. California
appears to me to be the one state where we may not be doing as
well as we might be at this time and where there are indications
of future problems. Voters in California seem to have a more fixed
perception of the President. That is, of course, logical in that
California voters probably know him better than those in any other
state.
Recommendations
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:
1. A ticket-splitter analysis should be done in each of the priority
states by precinct or ward and township. For the rest of the country,
the analysis should be done by county. This is undoubtedly the most
efficient way to locate ticket-splitters and to develop priority
areas for both our organizational and communications efforts. More-
over, it will allow us to identify Democratic areas which have some
propensity to split their ticket, and from these areas we may be
able to cause ticket-splitting in favor of the President.
2. With apparently small undecided vote, a strong organizational
effort will be critical. I would recommend putting a dispropor-
tionate share of our resources into organizational personnel to
assure that this effort is maximized. I also think our organiza-
tional effort should be structured so that we have the flexibility
to concentrate our people in a few states late in the campaign,
even to the degree of assigning one to each county or congressional
district for the top priority states in late September and October.
-5-
about
why wony md
Special organizational effort should be made to improve the
President's voting strength in Philadelphia (especially with ethnics),
New York City (outside Manhattan), Buffalo, Los Angeles (Orange
County), Baltimore suburbs, Montgomery County (Maryland), Mid-Texas
(Austin), rural Missouri, and Kenosha/Racine Wisconsin.
3. As indicated before, I think the development of an overall
theme or idea for the campaign is imperative and that this should
be done before the Democratic convention and should center around
the President's hopes and aspirations for our country. To be effec-
tive it must be positive and give people the hope that many of our
problems can and will improve.
4. As the President's overall issue handling ability is more impor-
tant to determining vote than his handling of any individual issue,
those issues on which he is perceived as handling well should be
emphasized and those he is seen as handling poorly should only be
used if-we have an impressive story to tell or if the appeal is
designed for some particular group.
5. We should emphasize the following personal attributes in our
media programs:
Trust - Just
Honest
Open Minded
Competence - Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent
It is possible to use the President's ability to handle issues in
communicating the above attributes. No special effort needs to be
directed to make the President appear -- warm, relaxed, and having
a sense of humor. To the extent that it is possible to convey
these characteristics, we should do so, but not at the expense of
the trust and competence variables.
6. Special efforts should be implemented to maximize the President's
strength with specific voting blocs.
A. A campaign directed at older Americans through the
voting bloc group should be given top priority. Maximum
available resources should be allocated into this program.
A massive turnout drive should be implemented, and a
supportive direct mail effort should be considered.
Because of the current high level of registration, no
special effort in this regard needs to be made to register
older voters. Special emphasis should be made to improve
our level of support with older Americans in the follow-
ing priorities:
-6-
Missouri (Primarily Rural)
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maryland
Indiana
California
Pennsylvania
New York
Taxes and inflation should be given emphasis.
B. All registration drives among young voters should be
stopped Our primary objective with this group should
be low turnout and persuasion of Democrats and swing
voters to vote for the President. Areas for special
emphasis to improve support among young voters should
be:
Wisconsin
California
Maryland
Pennsylvania
New York
Primary issue emphasis should be made on Vietnam, jobs
for youth, and pollution.
In meeting our objective of converting Democrats and
independents, we must be careful not to direct our young
voter campaign solely at our own voters. To keep turnout
at a minimum we should attempt to keep the marijuana
referenda now proposed for California and Michigan off
the ballot if possible.
C. The Jewish vote bloc should implement a program to
so what
improve the President's strength with this voter group
lot more more Catholics
there are a
in New York state. Careful consideration should be
given to the question of parochial schools with this
group. Our data indicates support of aid to parochial
than years
schools may be a negative with Jewish voters.
D. In order to carry several critical northern states we
will need to carry a greater percentage of blacks than
we did in 1968. Because of our credibility problems,
we must be careful in making any racial appeals so that
our efforts are not counterproductive.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
ATTACHMENT A
CALIFORNIA
NEW JERSEY
OHIO
TEXAS
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
WISCONSIN
INDIANA
Party Type
21%
Party Type
7%
Opp. Issue
11%
Nixon Trust
10%
Age
12%
Opp..
Party Type
29%
Party Type
14%
Competence
9%
Opp. Trust
4
Nixon Trust
6
Party Type
6
Party Type
8
Party Type
7
Age
8
Party Type
7
Opp. Issue
11
Age
4
Opp.
Education
5
Nixon Issue
8
Nixon Issue
7
Income
3
Competence
6
Income
7
Income
9
Income
4
Age
4
Age
7
Nixon Trust
5
Opp. Issue
3
Age
5
Age
5
Nixon Trust
4
Nixon
Opp.
Nixon
Opp. Issue
4
Religion
2
Strength
3
Opp. Issue
4
Strength
3
Strength
5
Opp. Issue
2
Nixon Issue
4
Income
4
Nixon Trust
2
Nixon
Income
4
Nixon Issue
3
Opp. Issue
3
Education
2
Age
4
Competence
3
Education
4
Opp. Trust
1
Religion
3
Religion
2
Income
2
Nixon
Religion
2
Sex
3
Nixon
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon Issue
2
Opp.
Religion
2
Competence
2
Education
1
Strength
1
Nixon Trust
2
Competence
1
Opp. Trust
1
Sex
2
Opp.
Sex
2
Nixon
Education
1
Nixon Issue
2
Nixon Trust
1
Strength
2
Nixon Trust
1
Competence
1
Education
1
Opp. Trust
1
Nixon Issue
1
Education
2
Income
1
Opp. Trust
1
Nixon Issue
1
Opp.
Nixon
Nixon
Competence
1
Nixon
Opp.
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon
Strength
1
Religion
*
Competence
1
Competence
2
Competence
*
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon
Opp.
Sex
*
Strength
1
Opp.
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Opp.
Competence
1
Strength
*
Strength
1
Competence
*
Competence
1
Nixon
Opp. Trust
1
Opp.
Religion
1
Strength
*
Sex
*
Opp. Issue
1
Strength
*
Nixon
Education
*
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Religion
1
Opp. Trust
*
Sex
*
Strength
*
Strength
*
Competence
*
Sex
*
Sex
*
* Less than 1%
Numbers following each factor indicate percentage of influence on the presidential vote.
ATTACHMENT B
NIXON - MUSKIE
Rep.
.9
T-S, Dem. Marg.
.4
Nixon Trust
Nixon Trust
Dem.
Hi
Lo
.6
.2
.1
T-S, - Marg.
Dems.
T-S, Marg.
.8
.4
.4
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Comp.
Comp.
Trust
Trust
Trust
Trust
Lo
Hi
Lo
Hi
Lo
Hi
.9
.6
.5
.2
.5
.1
Muskie
Muskie
Nixon
Nixon
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
Lo
Hi
Hi
Lo
.9
.5
.6
.3
Muskie
Muskie
Issue
Issue
Lo
Hi
.5
.2
Prot.
Other
Religions
.7
.5
Numbers under boxes indicate probability of voting for Nixon. The
higher the number, the greater the probability of voting for Nixon.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
May 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Celebrities
Several developments have occurred since your March 21
memorandum to Magruder on the Celebrities program for
the President:
1) Jon Foust replaced Bart Porter as the one man
primarily responsible for the success of the Celebrities
program. Foust's May 5 memorandum for Mitchell is attached
at Tab A;
2) Mitchell has agreed to participate in a briefing
for the confirmed celebrities at Richard Zanuck's home in
California in June. Taft Schreiber has received tentative
agreement to participate from Henry Kissinger. Mitchell
strongly recommends Kissinger attend. Kissinger wants
clearance from you as to the advisability and timing. A
memorandum for your signature is attached at Tab B;
3) Mitchell met with Sammy Davis, Jr. on April 14
to re-affirm his commitment to the President's re-election;
4) Butterfield is meeting with mixed success with
Rose Mary Woods in increasing the number of celebrities at
the Mexican State Dinner;
5) Contrary to press reports, Glen Campbell is not
going to participate in the Democratic fundraising telethon.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 5, 1972
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
JON A. FOUST
bust
SUBJECT: Celebrities for the President
American Music for the President
Athletes for the President
1. BACKGROUND
In November, 1971, you met with studio presidents, executive and
senior vice presidents, etc., and formed "The Executive Committee for
Celebrities for the President" to re-elect the President with Richard
Zanuck as Chairman. Taft Schreiber, a member of this Committee, is the
"moving force" behind the whole celebrity operation, but with his fund
raising and business responsibilities Taft does not have ample time to
spend recruiting celebrities, etc. Therefore, Joe Horacek, who was
replaced by Ed Crane, was appointed Executive Director to handle the
day-to-day operations.
Plans were also made and approved in March and April to select
Executive Directors for the "Athletes" and "American Music (Country and
Western) for the President."
2. PURPOSE
The purpose of the three celebrities/athletes committees are:
1. To enlist as many celebrities/athletes as possible
to publicly support the President's re-election;
2. To supply talent for events scheduled and/or created
by the Scheduling Division;
3. To coordinate all details pertaining to the celebri-
ties'/athletes' attendance of an event; and
4. To assist the Scheduling Division in producing ideas
for events.
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
May 5, 1972
Page 2
3. CURRENT STATUS
A. Celebrities
At present 130 entertainers have committed to the President.
This is the largest group ever assembled for a Republican candidate.
They include some of the best known names in the youth group; i.e., Mary
Ann Mobley, Chad Everett, Clint Eastwood, etc. Thus far thirty-five of
these celebrities have been scheduled into eleven events.
Also, the Executive Committee has been formed and publicized
to promote the impression that an entertainer who commits to the Presi-
dent will have some friends at the top of their industry. Hopefully this
would allay the fears of some of the up-and-coming stars that their
career would be adversely affected by supporting the President. In
recruiting talent, the Executive Committee has not accomplished the
desired results although they have been very successful raising funds.
B. American Music for the President
A working Executive Committee chaired by Dr. Nat Winston has
been formed with Richard Frank, an attorney representing many stars,
and Frank Rogers, a prominent Nashville promoter, as members.
They have commitments from several stars at this point; i.e.,
Bobby Goldsborough, Arch Campbell, Chet Atkins. The Committee feels
quite strongly that most of the Country and Western stars will publicly
support the President, with few exceptions.
A request to appoint Harry Warner as Executive Director has
been submitted.
C. Athletes for the President
Last week Tom Scott, former captain of the New York Giants,
was appointed Executive Director. Tom and I have discussed specific
plans and by next week he plans to establish a program for recruiting
"superstar" athletes.
4. PLANS AND PROGRAMS
A. Celebrities
The Committee is working on compiling a list of all celebrities
to show if they are committed and to whom, and if they are undecided and
our recommended action. Also, the availability and possible participation
of the stars supporting the President is being determined. These lists
will tell us what we are able to do with our celebrities and also show
us the direction in which to go in recruiting the uncommitted stars.
TO THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
May 5, 1972
Page 3
As you know, three Dolf Droge parties for the 18 to 35 year-
old group have been planned on May 15, 16, and 17. The day following
these parties each star will be sent a package explaining the President's
program. One to two weeks following the parties, the host will make a
personal pitch to each star to support the President.
These parties will be followed up with parties for other
administration spokesmen. The following are likely possibilities:
June
Dwight Chapin
Russia and China
July
Donald Rumsfeld
The Economy
August
John Ehrlichman
Domestic Policy
A briefing for our committed celebrities has been planned.
To help make the celebrities feel like part of the President's team,
you would explain the campaign and Dr. Kissinger would talk about
foreign policy. This briefing should serve to generate enthusiasm in
our committed celebrities.
The Celebrities Committee plans to concentrate on recruiting
young stars. By May 26 each member of the Executive Committee will be
personally contacted to determine those stars that they know personally
and would ask to support the President, and to ascertain other sources
of contacting these stars. These personal meetings will be followed up
by phone calls one week and two weeks later. If these do not produce
results, Taft Schreiber will be consulted for other courses of action.
In addition, our Executive Director will ask each member of the Executive
Committee to appoint a staff member to handle the day-to-day operations.
The chairman of the sub-committee for the rock industry has
not been too helpful up to this point. By May 26 our Executive Director
will determine if another approach to rock industry should be found.
B. American Music for the President
If the Executive Director is approved to start on May 15, he
will submit his plan by May 31.
C. Athletes for the President
Tom Scott will submit his plan for recruiting athletes by
May 12.
H
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
March 21, 1972
FU
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By OMP
NARL,
Date 8-26-81
CONFIDENTIAL ONLY
3/26
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
SUBJECT:
Celebrities
Your report to the President from Bart Porter on the calebrities
situation has been reviewed. Listed below are several points that
should be followed up on.
1) The list of committed entertainers is of little use until
they are locked in to a carefully planned series of speaking
engagements, rallies, appearances, etc. This plan should
assign celebrities to events where they will have the biggest
impact.
2) Perhaps young celebrities could be recruited with special
briefings, tours, or participation in Presidential events.
Why weren't there some celebrities invited to either the
China departure or arrival ceremonies or other special
events at the White House?
3) What can be done to recruit Johnny Cash and Charley Pride
without involving the President directly? Perhaps a one on one
briefing with a top White House Staff member? The American
music idea sounds great.
4) Drugs appears to be one of the best issues to involve
celebrities with the President. Witness the success with
Sammy Davis Jr. Elvis Presley had been involved with
Krogh and the drug problem, yet, Presley is not on your
list.
2
5) Alex Butterfield should work closely with Taft Schreiber
and Bart Porter on strictly White House events but the
campaign should assume primary responsibility for recruit-
ment and utilization of celebrities.
6) We need to use the White House more, if possible, to
recruit these people. This is our unique asset and we
should utilize it to the maximum.
As to your pending items list:
1) Make sure Dave Parker and Alex Butterfield know of the
importance of the White House function for movie industry
people.
2) Can't we develop a method of involving the White House
in the Academy Awards on April 10 even if the President
cannot host the April 8 reception?
3) Please advise me as to what's being done with Jack Benny.
4) Please work with Alex Butterfield to double the number of
celebrities at all White House functions.
5) What about getting a group of pro celebrities, briefing
them and getting them on talk shows. This would be a
natural, particularly in the drug srea.
Jeb, these are some random comments -- what is obviously needed
is an overall program of cultivation beginning immediately.
ce: Alex Butterfield
Chuck Colson
Dave Parker
HRH:LH:kmt
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 4, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By Emp NARI, Date 8-26-81
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
New York Conservative Ballot
Additional cross runs were made on the New York data to determine
whether the President's name should be added to the Conservative
ballot in New York.
The President is currently enjoying substantial support from the
conservative end of the political spectrum.
Ballot
Liberal
Neutral
Conservative
Nixon
25%
48%
65%
Muskie
64
43
25
Wallace
4
3
6
Undecided
7
6
4
This shows that the President's voting strength clearly increases
toward the conservative end of the spectrum. Similarly, 55% of the
Republican support is at the conservative end of the spectrum. With
ticket-splitters, 25% are conservative compared to 33% at the liberal
end.
Party Type
Republican
Ticket-Splitter
Democrat
Liberal
18%
33%
47%
Neutral
23
41
31
Conservative
55
25
18
If the President's name were on the Conservative ballot, he would
presumably run very well with those voter segments included with
the box shown on the above chart. In other words, we would expect
him to run well with the Republicans and the conservative elements
of ticket-splitters and Democrats. This includes 41% of the total
vote. With the balance of the New York electorate, the President
should be able to attract sufficient voters to have some probability
of winning the state.
-2-
By not running on the Conservative ticket the President faces a
risk that the Conservatives could run some other candidate. This
would undermine the President's strength from the right.
We would expect that a coalition of Republicans and Conservatives
would undoubtedly alienate some liberals of the Republican Party
and liberal ticket-splitters; however, our data shows that there
are very few liberal Republicans. Although there are more liberal
ticket-splitters, a large segment of ticket-splitters (41%) are in
the middle of the spectrum and a Nixon candidacy on the Conservative
ballot would be unlikely to alienate these "middle-of-the-road"
ticket-splitters.
The 1970 senatorial race has shown that a conservative coalition
can effectively be used to win the state. Buckley won the 39%
using a coalition of the Conservative Party and the "Independent
Alliance.' Therefore, it seems feasible to produce more than 49%
of the vote (1968 Humphrey vote) using a coalition of the Republicans
and the Conservatives.
Without a candidate on the Conservative ballot in 1968, the President
tallied 44% of the vote. If the Conservative Party chooses to run
some candidate other than the President, the vote for the President
would probably be reduced to the point where victory was impossible.
In summary, we believe that it would be to the President's advantage
if he were to run on both the Republican and Conservative ballots.
However, if the President is not on the Conservative ballot, we
should make every effort to see that the Conservative Party does
not run an opposition candidate.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
M.O.R. JOB NO. 2100 T-002
New York
NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY
January 4-19, 1972
1,007 Interviews
CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE
TOTAL/ LIB
THREE
FIVE
CONSER
ERAL
TWO
FOUR
SIX
VATIVE
SAMPLE
TOTAL
1007
103
131
132
329
112
92
77
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
BALLOT D
NIXON
444
19
30
44
157
66
65
53
44.
18.
23.
33.
48.
59.
71.
69.
MUSKIE
453
70
86
77
142
34
18
17
45.
68.
66.
58.
43.
30.
20.
22.
WALLACE
40
4
4
5
10
6
7
4
4.
4.
3.
4.
3.
5.
8.
5.
UNDECIDED
69
10
11
6
20
6
2
3
7.
10.
8.
5.
6.
5.
2.
4.
BALLOT E
NIXON
472
18
40
49
167
69
68
52
47.
17.
31.
37.
51.
62.
74.
68.
HUMPHREY
395
68
73
67
116
30
14
17
39.
66.
56.
51.
35.
27.
15.
22.
WALLACE
47
3
4
5
19
5
6
5
5.
3.
3.
4.
6.
4.
7.
6.
UNDECIDED
92
14
14
11
9.
8.
??
8
4
3
14.
11.
7.
4.
4.
BALLOT F
NIXON
452
15
30
59
152
71
04
55
45.
15.
23.
45.
46.
63.
70.
71.
KENNEDY
432
75
83
61
135
28
20
17
43.
73.
63.
46.
41.
25.
22.
22.
<
WALLACE
46
6
4
3
20
4
5
3
5.
6.
3.
2.
6.
4.
5.
4.
UNDECIDED
76
7
14
9
22
9
3
2
8.
7.
11.
7.
7.
8.
3.
3.
BALLOT G
NIXON
417
19
29
43
144
60
63
49
41.
18.
22.
33.
44.
54.
68.
64.
MUSKIE
351
34
61
58
117
35
16
21
35.
33.
47.
44.
36.
31.
17.
27.
WALLACE
36
3
3
5
12
3
6
4
4.
3.
2.
4.
4.
3.
7.
5.
MC CARTHY
105
28
20
19
25
8
2
1
10.
27.
15.
14.
8.
7.
2.
1.
CHISHOLM
47
16
11
2
14
1
2
1
5.
16.
8.
2.
4.
1.
2.
1.
UNDECIDED
50
3
7
5
17
5
3
1
5.
3.
5.
4.
5.
4.
3.
1.
M.O.R. JOB NO. 2100 T-001
New York
NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY
January 4-19, 1972
1,007 Interviews
CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE
TOTAL/ LIB
THREE
FIVE
CONSER
ERAL
TWO
FOUR
SIX
VATIVE
SAMPLE
TOTAL
1007
103
131
132
329
112
92
77
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
1968 VOTE
NIXON
428
16
28
42
146
68
66
54
43.
16.
21.
32.
44.
61.
72.
70.
HUMPHREY
325
52
57
58
92
24
15
15
32.
50.
44.
44.
28.
21.
16.
19.
WALLACE
21
1
2
13
3
2
2.
1.
2.
4.
3.
3.
DON'T KNOW/DIDN'T VOTE
233
34
46
30
78
17
11
6
23.
33.
35.
23.
24.
15.
12.
8.
CONSIDER SELF
REPUBLICAN
283
13
18
20
85
51
47
41
28.
13.
14.
15.
26.
46.
51.
53.
DEMOCRAT
443
56
82
62
150
32
24
24
44.
54.
63.
47.
46.
29.
26.
31.
INDEPENDENT
218
26
26
37
73
25
16
10
22.
25.
20.
28.
22.
22.
17.
13.
BEHAVIORAL
REPUBLICAN
218
8
16
16
50
44
38
39
22,
8.
12.
12.
15.
39.
41.
51.
DEMOCRAT
353
58
63
47
110
24
17
22
35.
56.
48.
36.
33.
21.
18.
29.
TICKET-SPLITTER
320
21
32
51
130
36
32
13
32,
20.
24.
39.
40.
32.
35.
17.
MARGINAL
116
16
20
18
39
8
5
3
12.
16.
15.
14.
12.
7.
5.
4.
M.O.R. JOB NO. 2100 T-003
New York
NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY
January 4-19, 1972
1,007 Interviews
CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE
TOTAL/ LIB
THREE
FIVE
CONSER
ERAL
TWO
FOUR
SIX
VATIVE
SAMPLE
TOTAL
1007
103
131
132
329
112
92
77
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
CURRENT VOTING BY COMMITMENT
HARD NIXON
344
12
22
32
115
56
57
45
34.
12.
17.
24.
35.
50.
62.
58.
SOFT NIXON
173
9
18
29
71
20
9
12
17.
9.
14.
22.
22.
18.
10.
16.
HARD DEMOCRAT
285
61
59
45
77
17
10
8
28.
59.
45.
34.
23.
15.
11.
10.
SOFT DEMOCRAT
252
18
33
40
96
'29
15
16
25.
17.
25.
30.
29.
26.
16.
21.
HARD WALLACE
22
2
2
2
8
2
4
2
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
2.
4.
3.
SOFT WALLACE
40
3
4
5
13
6
5
3
4.
3.
3.
4.
4.
5.
5.
4.
VOTE SWITCHING
NIXON-WALLACE/UNDECIDED
19
1
1
6
3
2
6
2.
1.
1.
2.
3.
2.
8.
MUSKIE-WALLACE/UNDECIDED
22
3
2
4
6
4
1
2.
3.
2.
3.
2.
4.
1.
ALL OTHERS
965
100
128
127
317
105
89
71
96.
97.
98.
96.
96.
94.
97.
92.
M.O.R. JOB NO. 2100 T-002
New York
January 4-19, 1972
NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY
1,007 Interviews
CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE
TOTAL/ LIB
THREE
FIVE
CONSER
ERAL
TWO
FOUR
SIX
VATIVE
SAMPLE
TOTAL
1007
103
131
132
329
112
92
77
100.
10.
13.
13.
33.
11.
9.
8.
BALLOT D
NIXON
444
19
30
44
157
66
65
53
100.
4.
7.
10.
35.
15.
15.
12.
MUSKIE
453
70
86
77
142
34
18
17
100.
15.
19.
17.
31.
8.
4.
4.
WALLACE
40
4
4
5
10
6
7
4
100.
10.
10.
13.
25.
15.
18.
10.
UNDECIDED
69
10
11
6
20
6
2
3
100.
14.
16.
9.
29.
9.
3.
4.
BALLOT E
NIXON
472
18
40
49
167
69
68
52
100.
4.
8.
10.
35.
15.
14.
11.
HUMPHREY
395
68
73
67
116
30
14
17
100.
17.
18.
17.
29.
8.
4.
4.
WALLACE
47
3
4
5
19
5
6
5
100.
6.
9.
11.
40.
11.
13.
11.
UNDECIDED
92
14
14
11
27
8
4
3
100.
15.
15.
12.
29.
9.
4.
3.
BALLOT F
NIXON
452
15
30
59
152
71
64
55
100.
3.
7.
13.
:
34.
16.
14.
12.
KENNEDY
432
75
83
61
135
28
20
17
100.
17.
19.
14.
31.
6.
5.
4.
WALLACE
46
6
:9.
3
20
4
5
3
100.
13.
7.
43.
9.
11.
7.
UNDECIDED
76
7
14
9
2.20
22
9
3
2
100.
9.
.18.
12.
29.
12.
4.
3.
BALLOT G
NIXON
417
19
29
43
144
60
63
49
100.
5.
7.
10.
35.
14.
15.
12.
MUSKIE
351
34
61
58
117
35
16
21
100.
10.
17.
17.
33.
10.
5.
6.
WALLACE
36
3
8³.
5
12
3
6
4
100.
8.
14.
33.
8.
17.
11.
MC CARTHY
105
28
20
19
25
8
2
1
100.
27.
19.
18.
24.
8.
2.
1.
CHISHOLM
47
16
11
2
14
1
100.
34.
23.
4.
42
1
30.
2.
2.
UNDECIDED
50
3
7
5
17
5
3
1
100.
6.
14.
10.
34.
10.
6.
2.
M.O.R. JOB NO. 2100 T-001
New York
NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY
January 4-19, 1972
1,007 Interviews
CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE
TOTAL/ LIB
THREE
FIVE
CONSER
ERAL
TWO
FOUR
SIX
VATIVE
SAMPLE
TOTAL
1007
103
131
132
329
112
92
77
100.
10.
13.
13.
33.
11.
9.
8.
1968 VOTE
NIXON
428
16
28
42
146
68
66
54
100.
4.
7.
10.
34.
16.
15.
13.
HUMPHREY
325
52
57
58
92
24
15
15
100.
16.
18.
18.
28.
7.
5.
5.
WALLACE
21
1
2
13
3
2
,
100.
5.
10.
62.
14.
10.
DON'T KNOW/DIDN'T VOTE
233
34
46
30
78
17
11
6
100.
15.
20.
13.
33.
7.
5.
3.
CONSIDER SELF
REPUBLICAN
283
13
18
20
85
51
47
41
100.
5.
6.
7.
30.
18.
17.
14.
DEMOCRAT
443
56
82
62
150
32
24
24
100.
13.
19.
14.
34.
7.
5.
5.
INDEPENDENT
218
26
26
37
73
25
16
10
100.
12.
12.
17.
33.
11.
7.
5.
BEHAVIORAL
REPUBLICAN
218
8
16
16
50
44
38
39
100.
4.
7.
7.
23.
20.
17.
18.
DEMOCRAT
353
58
63
47
110
24
17
22
100.
16.
18.
13.
31.
7.
5.
6.
TICKET-SPLITTER
320
21
32
51
130
36
32
13
100.
7.
10.
16.
41.
11.
10.
4.
MARGINAL
116
16
*20
18
39
8
5
3
100.
14.
17.
16.
34.
7.
4.
3.
M.O.R. JOB NO. 2100 T-003
New York
NEW YORK STATEWIDE STUDY
January 4-19, 1972
1,007 Interviews
CONSIDER SELF-LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE SCALE
TOTAL/ LIB
THREE
FIVE
CONSER
ERAL
TWO
FOUR
SIX
VATIVE
SAMPLE
TOTAL
1007
103
131
132
329
112
92
77
100.
10.
13.
13.
33.
11.
9.
8.
CURRENT VOTING BY COMMITMENT
HARD NIXON
344
12
22
32
115
56
57
45
100.
3.
6.
9.
33.
16.
17.
13.
SOFT NIXON
173
9
18
29
71
20
9
12
100.
5.
10.
17.
41.
12.
5.
7.
HARD DEMOCRAT
285
61
59
45
77
17
10
8
100.
21.
21.
16.
27.
6.
4.
3.
SOFT DEMOCRAT
252
18
33
40
96
'29
15
16
100.
7.
13.
16.
38.
12.
6.
6.
HARD WALLACE
22
2
2
2
8
2
4
2
100.
9.
9.
9.
36.
9.
18.
9.
SOFT WALLACE
40
3
4
5
13
6
5
3
100.
8.
10.
13.
33.
15.
13.
8.
VOTE SWITCHING
NIXON-WALLACE/UNDECIDED
19
1
1
6
3
2
6
100.
5.
5.
32.
16.
11.
32.
MUSKIE-WALLACE/UNDECIDED
22
3
2
4
6
4
1
100.
14.
9.
18.
27.
18.
5.
ALL OTHERS
965
100
128
127
317
105
89
71
100.
10.
13.
13.
33.
11.
9.
7.
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE NW
WASHINGTON D C 20006
May 1, 1972
12021 333.0320
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
By Emp
E.O. 12065, Section 8-26-81 6-102
NARS,
Date
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT:
Priority Ranking of the States for
the Campaign
This memorandum summarizes the decisions made in the strategy
meeting of April 28, regarding current priority ranking of the
states, for the purpose of developing strategy and resource
allocation for the campaign. A brief rationale is presented
with each state or grouping of states.
CATEGORY I - SAFE STATES - (Have supported the President by
large margins in the past. Should be won in 1972.)
1968 Nixon
Farm States
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Nebraska
5
+28
Kansas
7
+20
North Dakota
3
+18
Iowa
8
+12
South Dakota *
4
+11
27
*
Would not be safe if George McGovern is on the ticket.
Mountain and
1968 Nixon
Western States
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Idaho
4
+26
Wyoming
3
+20
Arizona
6
+20
Utah
4
+19
CONF IDENTIAL
- 2 -
New Mexico
4
+12
Colorado
7
+ 9
Montana
4
+9
Nevada *
3
+8
35
*Nixon lost Nevada by 2% in 1960. With a Democratic re-
gistration edge of 58%D-35%R-7%I, it is the least "safe"
of these states.
Border States (Recent polls suggest the President has
increased his margin from 1968, particu-
larly if George Wallace does not run.)
1968 Nixon
State
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Oklahoma
8
+16
Virginia
12
+10
Florida
17
+10
North Carolina
13
+ 8
Kentucky
9
+ 6
South Carolina
8
+ 6
Tennessee
10
+ 4
77
New England States (Will hot be "safe" if Muskie or
Kennedy is on the ticket.)
1968 Nixon
State
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Vermont
3
+ 9
New Hampshire
4
+ 8
Maine *
4
-12
11
* Lost in 1968 with Muskie on the ticket; won in 1960,
against a New Englander, JFK, by 14%.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
*1968 Nixon
Midwest States
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Indiana
13
+12
Total "safe" states: 24 (163 electoral votes)
CATEGORY II - WALLACE STATES - (States won by Wallace in 1968.
The President may win some, even with Wallace in
the race; if Wallace is out, they should be rela-
tively safe.)
1968 Nixon
State
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Arkansas
6
+ 8 (Nixon Second)
Louisiana
10
+20 (Nixon Third)
Mississippi
7
+40 (Nixon Third)
Alabama
9
+47 (Nixon Third)
Georgia
12
+12 (Nixon Second)
44
CATEGORY III - PRIORITY STATES - (Close election expected; intensive
campaign must be run including maximum organizational
effort within the states. These will undoubtedly
be Democratic target states).
Top Prioritv - (Maximum allocation of resources and focus of
management attention. "Must win" states.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
California
45
+0.2
+3
Illinois
26
-0.3
+3
Texas
26
-2
-1
Ohio
25
+6
+2
New Jersey
17
-1
+2
139
Second Priority - (High allocation of resources and management
attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
New York
*
41
-6
-5
Pennsylvania *
27
-2
-4
Maryland
*
10
-8
-2
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
Michigan
*
21
-2
-7
Connecticut *
8
-8
-5
Washington
9
+3
-2
116
Third Priority - (Lower allocation of resources and management
attention.)
Nixon Margin (%)
State
Electoral Votes
1960
1968
Missouri **
12
-0.5
+1
Wisconsin **
11
+4
+4
Oregon
6
+6
+6
West Virginia *
6
-6
-9
Alaska
3
+2
+3
Delaware
3
-2
+4
41
* Although past electoral behavior would indicate an uphill
battle for the President, / recent polls suggest he has a good
chance at this time to carry these states. Ultimate strategy
will depend on the Democratic nominee. These states must be
watched closely during the campaign, to be sure that they
are treated as target states only so long as they remain
winnable.
**States with the most apparent erosion since 1968.
CATEGORY IV - PROBABLE LOSS STATES
1968 Nixon
State
Electoral Votes
Margin (%)
Massachusetts
14
-30
Minnesota
10
-12
Hawaii
4
-21
Rhode Island
4
-32
District of Columbia
3
-64
35
Administratively Confidential
February 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FRED MALEK
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
RNC Research Materials
I talked with Bill Horton at some length last week regarding
the volume and quality of the RNC research materials. I
have attached the most recent package for your information.
You may want to have Bill Horton look through these regularly
for you. The crucial point is that there is plenty of research
information -- the problem is the translation of this infor-
mation into an effective attack against the Democrats. What
formal system there is is haphazardly concentrated in Pat
Buchanan's office under Ken Khachigian, as well as periodic ad
hoc projects by Chuck Colson. At one point, there was discussion
about having Bob Marik be the one man responsible for trans-
lating the information into attack for the 1701 operation.
He bacame inundated with other projects for Magruder. For
a few weeks Bart Porter handled many of the attack operations.
Now, Gordon Liddy, as General Counsel, supervises some
activities. The problem is that there is no single, effective,
one man responsible for this essential function. Pat Buchanan,
Ken Khachigian and Mort Allin have some helpful ideas about
how to implement such a system. I can give you a more complete
description over the phone.
In any event, I would appreciate your thoughts as to how such
a system could be implemented.
Thank you.
GS:lm