Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
From Teeter to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and 1968 presidential campaigns and their relevance to the 1972 election. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: previous presidential elections involving RN. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: Buchanan's response to a memorandum from Haldeman. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: the political relevance of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. Graphs of election trends attached. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Cole to Haldeman RE: RN's posture during the election and general campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Timmons to Haldeman RE: campaign issues and strategies. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: a response to Haldeman's previous memo, including advice on presidential posture and general campaign strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: detailed advice on RN's behavior during the 1972 campaign and general campaign strategies, including the role of television and key issues. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Ziegler to Haldeman RE: strategies for the 1972 campaign. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From Casper Weinberger to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1972 election. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 6/15/1972
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 6/16/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145822
label
WHSF: Contested, 20-12
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145822
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 20-12
description
This file contains:
From Teeter to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and 1968 presidential campaigns and their relevance to the 1972 election. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: previous presidential elections involving RN. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: Buchanan's response to a memorandum from Haldeman. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: the political relevance of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. Graphs of election trends attached. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Cole to Haldeman RE: RN's posture during the election and general campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by Haldeman. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Timmons to Haldeman RE: campaign issues and strategies. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: a response to Haldeman's previous memo, including advice on presidential posture and general campaign strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: detailed advice on RN's behavior during the 1972 campaign and general campaign strategies, including the role of television and key issues. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Ziegler to Haldeman RE: strategies for the 1972 campaign. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From Casper Weinberger to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1972 election. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 6/15/1972
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 6/16/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26145822
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
b08dfc3ce657da81
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
12
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Teeter to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and
1968 presidential campaigns and their
relevance to the 1972 election. 4 pgs.
20
12
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: previous
presidential elections involving RN. 5 pgs.
20
12
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Khachigian to Haldeman RE:
Buchanan's response to a memorandum from
Haldeman. 1 pg.
20
12
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: the
political relevance of the 1960 and 1968
campaigns. Graphs of election trends
attached. 7 pgs.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
12
6/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Cole to Haldeman RE: RN's posture
during the election and general campaign
strategies. Handwritten notes added by
Haldeman. 4 pgs.
20
12
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Timmons to Haldeman RE: campaign
issues and strategies. 3 pgs.
20
12
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haig to Haldeman RE: a response to
Haldeman's previous memo, including advice
on presidential posture and general campaign
strategies. 4 pgs.
20
12
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: detailed
advice on RN's behavior during the 1972
campaign and general campaign strategies,
including the role of television and key
issues. 10 pgs.
20
12
6/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ziegler to Haldeman RE: strategies for
the 1972 campaign. 7 pgs.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
12
6/15/1972
Campaign
Report
From Casper Weinberger to Haldeman RE:
RN's role in the 1972 election. 4 pgs.
20
12
6/16/1972
Campaign
Letter
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
the campaign. 4 pgs.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Page 3 of 3
Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
June 29, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
1960 and 1968 Elections
This memorandum is in reply to your request for a comparison of
the 1960 and 1968 campaigns and of the changes that occurred in
the survey data during the two campaigns. It is based on an
analysis of public polls (largely Gallup), the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center's After-Election Studies, individual Market-
Opinion statewide polls and my observations of the 1968 campaign.
I do not have the campaign polling for either 1960 or 1968, and I
was not actively involved in the 1960 campaign.
The following campaign polls taken during 1960 and 1968 indicate
great differences between the two races:
Date
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
(1960)
March
47%
47%
5%
June
48
46
5
Late Sept.
47
46
7
Early Oct.
45
49
6
November
48
49
3
Date
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
(1968)
April
43%
34%
9%
14%
Early May
40
36
14
10
Late May
36
42
14
8
Early June
37
42
14
7
Early Sept.
43
31
19
7
Late Sept.
44
29
20
7
Early Oct.
43
31
20
6
Late Oct.
44
36
15
6
November
42
40
14
4
1/ It was impossible to obtain demographic breakdowns of the Callup
vote for 1960 in the time allotted for this paper. We are,
however, making arrangements to get this information.
-2-
The 1960 election was neck and neck throughout the campaign. The
undecided vote was considerably less in 1960 than in 1968. The
undecided vote only increased from 5% to 7% following the initial
Nixon-Kennedy debates, at which time Kennedy took the lead and
eventually won the election.
In April of 1968 the undecided vote was high with 14% of the voters
unable to make a choice. Nixon held a substantial early lead until
the North Vietnamese agreed to Paris as a negotiating site. Then
Humphrey surged ahead in the polls and maintained his lead until
after the conventions. Later, the Humphrey lead declined and there
was a corresponding increase in the Wallace strength. Apparently,
the disorder at the convention caused a swing to Wallace away from
traditional Democratic vote. In the closing days of the campaign
the Humphrey vote greatly increased. According to Gallup,
Humphrey's dramatic gains in the last days of the campaign resulted
from a decline of the Wallace strength in northern states returning
to their traditional Democratic vote.
It is significant to note that the Nixon strength remained fairly
constant between 42% to 48% after the convention in both years.
Very little switching seemed to occur to and from Nixon.
There are several significant differences between 1960 and 1968
which would make it unwise to conclude the 1960 Nixon campaign was
more effective than the 1968 campaign:
1. The 1960 election was a two-way race and the 1968 election was
a three-way race. The three-way race tended to delay the final
decision and increase switching simply because of more choices pre-
sented to the voter. This is a characteristic of all elections with
more than two candidates and we have observed this in primary elec-
tions and in Canada. Also, this was the first time that most American
voters were confronted with such a situation and Wallace's candidacy
caused them to be ambivalent in their choice. In order to vote for
Wallace they had to break lifelong voting traditions. This explains why
more older voters returned to the Democratic column than younger voters.
2. The Catholic issue was very important in 1960 and not in 1968.
It caused a large number of voters to make up their minds on that
basis as soon as Kennedy was nominated.
3. Another major difference is the 1968 Democratic convention which
divided the Democratic party as compared to a relatively united
party in 1960. Kennedy had the support of an active and united
party in 1960, while Humphrey had to contend with major splits on
both left and right with McCarthy and Wallace in 1968.
4. Kennedy was also a clearly more attractive and popular person-
ality in a time when the electorate was looking for a young and
dynamic leader. He also had the advantage of representing change
and running against an incumbent administration, while Humphrey
had the problem of having to separate himself from a very unpopular
-3-
administration of which he was a key part. Kennedy could blame
the Eisenhower/Nixon administration for all the problems of the
time; but, Nixon, on the other hand, was not a beneficiary of
Eisenhower's personal appeal and Eisenhower got credit for all the
successes of his administration.
5. The issue structure was very different in 1960 and 1968 in
terms of the general attitude of the country and the specific
areas of concern. The general attitude of the country was rela-
tively positive, optimistic, and hopeful in 1960, but extremely
negative and without hope in 1968. In 1960 the country was at
peace, the economy was in relatively good shape, the race, crime,
drug problems had not become critical and there was no major
environmental/consumer issue. In 1968, however, the electorate was
frustrated over the war, personally feeling the effects of inflation,
frightened over the domestic unrest, and worrying about the environ-
ment. The fact that there were more serious problems in 1968 and
that each of these were becoming worse combined to give the country
a very negative pessimistic attidude.
There are several reasons why I believe it would also be unwise to
conclude that 1972 is similar to either 1960 or 1968. First, and
most important, is that each election is to a large degree unique
in terms of the perception of the candidates, the general attitude
of the electorate, and the specific issues. Therefore, the 1972
election with the President running as an incumbent against McGovern
will not be particularly comparable to 1960 or 1968. In fact, I
suspect it may be more comparable to 1956 than 1960 or 1968. The
reason for this is the incumbency. In 1956, the last time an incum-
bent was running for re-election, voters decided how they would vote
earlier than any election in recent time. 76% of those who voted
had decided how they were going to vote by the week after the conven-
tion. Studies by the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan have demonstrated that in both 1960 and 1968 the percentage
deciding how to vote immediately after the convention dwindled.
George Gallup wrote in 1960 that the only time there was a major
shift in sentiment during 1948, 1952, or 1956 came as a result of
a dramatic international event. I believe we are at such a stage
now, and that most people will have made up their minds how to vote
by the time of the Republican convention unless there is an inter-
national event to change their minds.
There is one recurring problem for the President which is evident
throughout all of this data. We have a very difficult time moving
the committed vote over 50%. The job seems to become increasingly
more difficult the closer we come to the election because of the
declining number of voters who are undecided. This suggests that
we should be actively trying to increase the President's committed
vote in the next 30 to 45 days. Once voters actually decide they
are going to vote for a candidate, most of them stay committed.
-4-
Every point we can gain now will come much easier than those we
have to get in the Fall. This would have to be done largely
through the President's policies, programs, statements, surrogates
and not through the campaign. I do not think we should do anything
to lengthen the period of the actual political campaign. The
shorter the actual campaign, the better for us.
Overall, we would suggest that consideration be given to increasing
Presidential appearances during the next 45 days and also beginning
the surrogate program earlier than originally planned.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLET will
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 27.
Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost
no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline
during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is
true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than
it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but
since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures
are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the
attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent
support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to
47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the
campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz.
Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking
most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the
election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was
remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall.
What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the elec-
torate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote
declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas
in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and
ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the
electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base
of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.
In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the
convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing
with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appro-
priate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention
period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-
media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as
2.
usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum
with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across
the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford
it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur
his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech
and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign
continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the
White House.
Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was
better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally,
approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates,
deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-
Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse
observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and
steel strike activies in the pre-1960 period why more of this was not
done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's
attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me)
and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented,
even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his
office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage
of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and
the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before
that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually
losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative
media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he-paused to give
decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on con-
stant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would
have probably won.
Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The
tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance
of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate
is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of
rallies and the institution of thoughful speeches, etc. The failure in
1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which
the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out;
only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there
were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being
radio speeches and not visual events poorly designed to attract attention
from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly
3.
designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening
on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the
1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried
out, both by the President and the people around him.
What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz
the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led
to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that
he should remain above and beyond the battle remain Presidential is
the way Ray Price would put it as he did in 1968. The first approach
would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the cam-
paigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled
it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's
Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach,
in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public
attention it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could
manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate,
and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to
ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican
majority.
What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism
of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days,
with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's
incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should
be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices,
fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax
reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and --
although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R.
wise bringing about a new structure of peace and he should be doing
all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve
some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking
should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the
media operation our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential
appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political
rally appearances made should be few and far between and the rallieth
should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not
just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed
suggestions and I will not repeat them here.
4.
I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is
beginning to get battle-hungry the sight of Geo rge McGovern galavanting
around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to
resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of
the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him
in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-
charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960
campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President,
we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving
the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't
done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our
domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with
business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few cor-
porations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the
environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed
out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at govern-
ment expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the
substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the
President now in the White House.
The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not and should not
be taken as doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and
I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can
lose it assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach the
only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take
advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense
of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off
those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who
can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the
President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good.
But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office,
not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive
against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad,
not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new
sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican
or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference,
and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of
what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our
advantage in the election campaign now facing us.
GALLUP POLL
1960
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
Early June
48
52
Late June
48
52
July (After Convention)
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November 6
48
49
3
GALLUP POLL
1968
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
June
35
40
16
9
July
40
38
16
6
August
45
29
18
8
September 3-7
43
31
19
7
September 20-22
43
28
21
8
September 27-30
44
29
20
7
October 3-12
43
31
20
6
October 17-21
44
36
15
5
November 1-2
42
40
14
4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN
Q
You asked Mr. Buchanan to prepare an analysis of the 1960
and 1968 campaigns in terms of the changes in the polls and
surveys. Pat asked for my thoughts on this. Because Pat was
tied up with his efforts on the briefing book, he asked that I go
ahead and send you my memorandum as an interim report, though
not one which necessarily reflects his views.
Pat indicated that he will respond to the request as soon
as he is able.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM:
KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN the
SUBJECT:
POLLS AND THE 1960, 1968 CAMPAIGNS
Mr. Haldeman is correct in his reading of the polls in 1960 versus
those in 1968. (See attached graphs) In 1960, between June and November,
the Gallup poll was virtually unchanged. RN had in November the same
percentage he had in June, and JFK had only slightly more in June
than he did in November. In 1968, the 16 point spread we had in August
went down to the two point spread which Gallup gave us in November.
It should be noted that the Harris Poll in August, 1968, taken about
the same time as the Gallup, showed only a six point lead for RN over
HHH compared to the larger Gallup spread.
In 1960, RN only had the lead once during the campaign, and this
was immediately following the Republican National Convention -- after
which he jumped 6 points over JFK. In 1968, as we all remember, the
lead continued to dwindle with Humphrey taking votes right out of the
hide of George Wallace and out of the undecided voter. From the polls,
it is apparent that RN had a solid bloc of votes that stayed with him
throughout the year while HHH steadily picked up from the switches
and undecideds.
What does this all mean?
One interpretation is that RN gets a solid bloc of voters which lean
to him, and this bloc is very difficult to enlarge as well as very difficult
to diminish. If that is the case, then in a two-man race this year, the
election will be fairly close with RN winning by about four percentage
points or less. This interpretation, however, is somewhat like a
doctrine of predestination, with the assumption that events between June
and November will not change things. I'm not willing to accept that inter-
pretation totally since for the first time RN will be running as an incumbent
President and will be much more in command of the determining events.
The other way to interpret these phenomona, however, is in terms of
the manner in which the campaign is conducted, and I lean towards this
interpretation especially in a year where we control the levers of govern-
ment.
Page 2
In 1960 (and I confess I was still struggling through high school),
there were two types of campaigns run -- the JFK style where you
start out at virtually full steam and continue at full steam, winning by
the sheer force of momentum and the RN style where you slowly build up
steam and momentun in order to have the campaign "peak" on election
day. I don't subscribe fully to the theory that a candidate can fully "time"
his campaign to meet the standards of "game plans. 11 On the contrary,
in the heat of the campaign, there is such an intense movement of events
as to require a virtually daily requirement to alter strategy one of
the mistakes I believe we made in 1968 was to get locked in to a broad
game plan from which we were unwilling to extricate ourselves until
too late.
The 1960 campaign is not easily interpreted along the "game plan"
lines because of all the interrupting factors -- RN's knee injury, the
debates, etc. Thus, to an extent, the 1960 campaign handled the events
as they came.
Moreover, the 1960 campaign was a fairly classic campaign in
issues confrontation. I grant that personality played a role it always
does but JFK and RN did battle hammer and tong on a lot of damned
important issues. From the outset RN took the case to the country that things
were pretty good in America, that there was room to improve things, but
that by and large we don't need anyone knocking America around. JFK,
of course, took the position that we had to mobilize the country along his
suggested lines, and the debate was joined with the issues falling in line
with considerable distance between RN and JFK on most of them.
Consequently, in 1960 the voters knew what the choice was very
little was fuzzed up. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising
that the polls changed very little. Only minor twists and turns in the
campaign, plus some bizarre pieces of bad luck the heavy beard in
the debates, the arranged release of M. L. King, Jr. by the Kennedys,
the theft of votes in Texas and Illinois -- made the difference.
In 1968, we may have overreacted to the criticism that there was
not enough planning in the 1960 campaign, and of course the decision
was made to pick the direction in which to go and stay on course until
the end. Unfortunately, this made us unable to deal sufficiently with
the liberation of HHH at the time of his Vietnam speech -- and once he
was liberated, a whole new strategy was needed. I will grant that the
bombing halt overly distorted the campaign and inured overwhelmingly
to the benefit of Hubert. Nevertheless, I do not doubt for a minute that
Hubert had the momentum going for him on election day. He was on
the move.
Page 3
The thing about 1968 is that Hubert began beating us to death
over issues. Medicare, the poor, a good economy, decent jobs
these were all in the HHH attack plan, and we did not respond until
too late. He damn near made it sound like we were the "ins" and
they were the "outs. " We had the basic issues going for us but used
them insufficiently to win the greater margin which we might have.
Having said all this, I must warn against comparisons between
1960 and 1968. The Wallace candidacy made a great deal of difference,
I believe. Wallace made it difficult for the lines to form early in the
campaign. He was a damned nuisance who clouded things up. HHH
figured this out earlier than we did and began playing RN off against
Wallace, picking up the pieces as he went along. If Wallace is out of
the 1972 campaign, I feel the situation will be much more like 1960
(which, as you know, has been a favorite thesis of mine for some time).
The 1972 campaign will be an important "issues" campaign with
two extremely distinctive philosophies battling against each other. We
are, I believe, on the right side of the preponderance of these issues,
and it will be McGovern who tries to fuzz the issues in favor of
personality, trust, and all the other crap. Nonetheless, if we accept
the notion that issues will be fairly determinative (and by this I mean
four or five big ones not revenue sharing or the environment), then
broad planning should fall along the lines of drawing the issue differences
sharply at the outset of the campaign.
Once the differences have been drawn (and I think they almost
already have) the campaign is going to be one -- like 1960 of playing
that confrontation in such a way as to keep our issues out front, not
letting up on our strengths and not playing to our weaknesses. Unlike
1960, we have much more going for us in terms of differences with
McGovern; i. e., in terms of what the American public wants. In 1960,
there was probably a 50/50 split in terms of what the public wanted.
Our task, then, is to keep this advantage by pressing those issues and
pressing them in such a way as to keep McGovern away from the weak
links which could bring us down.
Thus, if we start in August with a 54% to 46% edge over McGovern,
my guess is that we can keep this lead right on through if we don't let
the differences slide by through a skilled McGovern campaign. Every
two or three days, we should look at how things are going and plan
accordingly -- following a basic outline, but not being SO blind as to
ignore major shifts of opinion once they start to occur. If something
works, let's keep using it: if it doesn't work, let's toss it aside and go
with something clse.
Page 4
I confess that it is not easy for me to map this out with short
time and space constraints, but I think the fundamental points are
in here. I caution against too much comparison between 1960 and 1968;
the times were different; the circumstances were different; the candidate
was different. I opt more for a comparison between 1960 and 1972 and
hold the belief that much is to be gained by understanding the basic
similarity of conditions. The lesson of 1968 lies in campaign "technique,"
not in historical analogy. So let's understand what is similar between
1960 and 1972 and learn from what we did wrong in 1968, and I think we
are well on the way to four more years of keeping the rascals out.
80%
Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und.
70%
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
60%
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50%
RN
40%
30%
20%
10%
01101
0
early June late June July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
November 6th
PERCENT
POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
80
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
August 24
40%
34%
177
70
November 1-2
42%
40%
12%
November 3
40%
43%
13%
60
HARRIS POLL
50
NIXON
40
HUMPHREY
30
20
10
WALLACE
DATES
August 24,
November 1-2,
November 3,
1968
1968
1968
POST-CONVENTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
PERCENT
80
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
August 21
45%
29%
18%
70
Early Sept.
43%
31%
19%
Late Sept.
43%
28%
21%
Early Oct.
44%
29%
20%
Mid Oct.
43%
31%
20%
October 27
44%
36%
15%
60
November 4
42%
40%
14%
GALLUP POLL
50
NIXON
40
30
HUMPHREY
20
WALLACE
10
DATES Aug. 21
Early
Late
Early
Mid
October
Nov. 4
(1968)
Sept.
Sept.
October
October
27
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN COLE
This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which
requested my views and analysis of the following points:
1. The President's posture between the Conventions.
Most people are "down" on politicians and political
campaigning. The longer the President can stay
above the battle, the better off he will be. The
President should keep being "President" just as long
as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue
as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.
During the Convention interlude, the President should
be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him -
follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at
ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the suc-
cess of his economic program and his concern for the
still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one
last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining
Hopeal
legislation proposed by this Administration. This
could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate
and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee
members. In addition, the President could meet with
supportive special interest groups.
Meetings such as these would allow the President the
opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic
legislation and to articulate the principles which
support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed
with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if
desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,
- 2 -
if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network
and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the
President is trying to correct and how his solution
would work. For instance, on the environmental issue,
we could encourage the networks and local TV stations
to get film of water pollution which could be utilized
in their reports of the President's meeting with Congres-
sional representatives to encourage them to pass his water
pollution legislation.
Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday
we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy
Price?
and the balance of international power. He needs to
re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what
he stands for - what he's for and against domestically.
It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention
would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic
philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis,
but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for
the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to
the Election.
Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better
off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress
is in session will have some bearing on what the President
Probably
is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President
should continue the scenario outlined for the between Con-
ventions period. If it is not in session, then we must
find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the
failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips
to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a
problem to go on because of their failure to pass the
legislation the President recommended. These trips should
be "non-political".
In either event, the President should not start political
campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October.
If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of
Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be
stretched to include one trip during the week, although I
think it is important to convey the image of the President
being in Washington "running the country" while others are
out campaigning.
- 3 -
The President's efforts should be concentrated in key
states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but
he might make some regional visits which would include
states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states.
He should do events which provide for some kind of
encounter with the "average man". Generally these
should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he
should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and
Note
although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited
the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which
was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we
ifrom
can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging
the panel.
3.
Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
The President should not attack anvone for anything
during the campaign. This should be left to the
surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman
who has brought peace to the world and economic stability
to our country. And, who has applied and intends to
continue to apply these same visionary attributes to
our domestic problems. The President should articulate
only positive things relative to key issue areas and key
interest groups.
The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack
beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention.
What they should be attacking will, of course, be depen-
dent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own
positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the
candidate is there are two things which we can challenge
Row
regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the
second is the inability of the Federal Government to
E
produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should
have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment,
even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although
I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.
4.
The opposition's strategy and what we can do.
The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and
his lack of concern for the average man. They will have
absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their
charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food
prices and high unemployment - and other people issues
- 4 -
such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate
their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the
Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get
a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.
The President should stay above all of this. He should
be on the offensive with issues like peace, the conomy
and the3failure of Congress to legislate his domestic
reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the
Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should
be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared,
in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the
fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposi-
tion for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme
and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be
too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long
as the President is not making them. Presidential spokes-
men will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than
will the President.
We should have our own plan as to how to win this election,
and the development of the plan should assume that the
worst charges possible are made against the President.
We should then operate against this plan, and never, once,
deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some
false charges, the President should not be rushing out to
respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a sur-
rogate handle it.
My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the
people of this country desire most a President who is
strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments
and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they
have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I
believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit,
Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong
action to bring the economy back in line is becoming
increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything
the President does between now and the election must be
geared to contribute to this image.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
BT
SUBJECT:
Your June 12th Memorandum
1.
I believe the President's posture between the Conventions should
be non-political, statesmanlike, our national leader. However, the
President can use those six weeks to set the stage for election issues
by taking positions which the public approves, but which contrast with
the opposition. He should consider built-in appearances before
national conventions and regularly scheduled meetings (Jaycees, Older
Americans, Spanish-Speaking, etc.) where he can appear as President,
not candidate.
For example, if busing is a campaign issue, the President might meet
with school superintendents, hold legislative sessions on his busing
proposals, submit a Constitutional Amendment, engage in discussions
with parents and students who suffer under excessive busing, etc. In
this way, in his proper role as President, the Chief Executive would
be building on an issue to exploit in the campaign. The same could be
applied to POWs, Vietnam, defense spending, drugs, amnesty, 6th
Fleet-Israel, or other issues which may be politically attractive.
Since his opponent will come from Congress, the post DNC Convention
period should see implied criticism of the Democratic controlled Senate
for not acting on the President's substantial legislative recommendations.
Making Congress a whipping boy is always difficult but it will at least
highlight the President's initiatives.
Cabinet officers, Congressmen, Governors and other surrogates should
use this time to attack the opposition: its candidates, record and platform.
Since Party behavior is the first test of voters, one of the most important
activities would be the President's personal and private involvement in
getting Democrats to switch parties after McGovern is nominated. I
believe there is a possibility in this area and the President could negate
the party issue substantially.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-2-
2.
The President, I feel, should hold back from overt political
action until early in October, staying above the partisan fights.
Then I recommend an aggressive, concentrated campaign for the
final weeks.
Earlier, the President will have developed issues and the Surrogates
battered the opposition, leaving the President free to revitalize the
campaign and deliver the "knock-out" in the closing days.
I think the President should schedule a number of regional addresses,
rallies, parades, news conferences, telethons, etc. in major cities
like New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City, Denver, Seattle.
Additionally, he should concentrate his time in the target states,
planning at least two appearances in each. The "quickie" swings of
1970, stopping in three or four states in one day, provide a good
format for a short campaign. Each event should be built around the
key campaign issues as they develop to mòre dramatically focus
attention on the President's positions. The President should resist
personal attacks on his opponent.
3.
Until the Democratic Convention and its platform, specific
issues are difficult to guess. Obviously, the Vietnam War will be an
issue, taxes, busing, jobs, cost of living, etc. George McGovern has
a record in Congress he must defend as well as his positions during
the campaign. Careful research will develop his weak points. I think
over-all he should be projected as an extreme radical whose wild ideas
would destroy the country. With this general strategy every issue can
be tailored to make the point. (McGovern is already in trouble over
his welfare-taxes proposal and has been backtracking on defense
spending.)
4.
"Right from the Start" McGovern is considered a one-issue candi-
date who created a good grass-roots organization to deliver delegates.
Should Vietnam be removed as an issue, McGovern would appeal only
to a few and certainly not the middle-road. At any rate, we can look
forward to the war issue and must publicize the President as the one
who is getting us out honorably and most important will never turn
his back on our POWs.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-3-
I suspect the Democrats are sitting on several potential scandals (like
ITT) in the government and will try to show the Administration as
corrupt, handling favors, pro-big business, etc. Unemployment and
food prices surely will be Democratic issues. The opposition is
certain to attempt to use the "trust" issue in an effort to show a
credibility gap.
The best defense is a good offense, and several attractive issues
should be constantly repeated to drive points home. For example,
the surrogates can talk about the President's handling of his job,
experience, ability etc.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
@
Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised
in your memorandum of June 12:
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Conven-
tion and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the
ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture
it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is
best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally
consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to
his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance
in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive
attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were
masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests
are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has
consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally
associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the
solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has
captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking
and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the
development of a "Mr. & Mrs. " team image which would not have been
possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.
Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of
a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the
campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a
Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organiza-
tional arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of
accomplishment.
I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions
about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are
taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-2-
This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet
meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in
favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic
Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor,
Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate
of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously
threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning
must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which
would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning?
How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type
of activities should he engage in?
Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full
cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions,
I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that
of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political
campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should
be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid
over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe
we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one
adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced
and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken.
That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's
attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived
ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and
excessive campaign energy.
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the
campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should
therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern
posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which
I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is
McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we
emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage
the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent
on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we
should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's
strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing,
aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-3-
Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-
McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase
of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in
the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more
than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes
can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also
have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-
balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns
between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern
vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we
do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most
importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which
can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or
domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis
should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be
tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be
tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather
than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to
develop compensatory neutralization programs.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the
following:
(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc.
The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront
Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by
our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some
break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our
policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will
therefore become moot.
(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT
agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President
has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a
qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight
factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.
(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously
try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound
by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily
blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-4-
Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of
improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen
setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be
counted as a strong continuing asset.
(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international
economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization
and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords
the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful
assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to inter-
national trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will
flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international
monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that
statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm
that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve
some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps
have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.
(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism
but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly
strong popular base.
On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments
in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his
statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.
EYES ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRAT U MARKING
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102
NARL, bute 3-12-82
June 14, 1972
By Ef
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN Of
SUBJECT:
Response to HRH June 12 Memo
1.
What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
ANSWER
- Continue non-political approach
- Schedule 3 or 4 major announcements or actions which
serve to remind public of President Nixon's achievements
in office.
Example:
- Tricia to China
- Speech on occasion of passage of SALT
- Trip to Midway (maybe post-Convention)
- First week after Democratic Convention, offer their
candidate full briefing. Try to set it for second week.
- One or two half day trips to key states, i.e. Ohio Armstrong
Museum. Make it good positive crowd event.
- Remain every bit the President.
- A sign of toughness on the war might be most appropriate.
Would drive the libs crazy and solidify some of the
Democratic support on our side.
- If a Vice Presidential change is made it should be structured,
if this is possible, so the least amount of political
brutality is expanded upon. A sloppy move here no matter
how well planned will have serious consequences.
-2-
2.
What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election?
ANSWER
- He should move into and out of the Convention in a way
which helps to keep him on the highest Presidential level.
The key is not to come off our present high until absolutely
necessary. The Convention should be proclaiming their
great President. He should be aloof from the political
hog wash. He should avoid, as of now, everything except
his visionary and emotional acceptance speech appearance,
(unless he has to participate in a Vice Presidential change-
and if that is necessary maybe it can be done without his
appearing before the Convention).
- After the Convention he should fight the tendency to go
right to California. Proceed directly from Florida to
Washington. Lock in a couple of events the week after
the Convention which only the President can handle and
that sets him apart from the Democratic candidate.
- In the second week of September, go to California, hold
the seminar and make the kick-off speech.
- Next return to Washington making one or two stops for
massive public events en route home.
- Otherwise do no politicking until the last week in
September or the first of October. Then let him break
loose.
- The President will want to campaign hard and should.
- The obvious which everyone will say is, the President
should maintain his Presidential posture - but that does
not mean he can't swing hard and be his toughest self.
-3-
A. When should he start campaigning?
- All out campaigning shouldn't start until, at the
earliest, the last week of September. Jeb says the
Surrogates will start on Labor Day.
B. How much travel should he do? Where should he go?
- This really depends on the polls. I would envision
his wanting to hit at an absolute minimum each of the
four regions once. Our current key state list would
probably be the most logical list of locations. Where
he goes in those states will have to depend on our polling
data.
C. What type of activities should he engage in?
- This is probably the most important question.
- Only the President can have "Presidential press
conferences" so maybe that is a once a week or
once every other week activity.
- Some big, massive, public demonstrations or rallies
are necessary. A Chicago or Atlanta parade, the
Astrodome, and an Upstate New York rally.
- Television will be key. Maybe he does regional talks
on a network we put together. This would be in addition
to one or two national T.V. talks.
- Airport rallies should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise
they will dominate, and they are degrading to the President.
- Anytime possible, the President should return to overnight
in the White House.
- His schedule when in Washington should include items
only the President can do-- and relate to issues or news
we want to hypo.
- Quadriad or CCEP meetings
- Cabinet meeting on a key subject
-4-
- NSC - maybe on a pending crisis situation
- An emergency meeting with another head
of state - i.e. Heath, Pompidou, Brandt,
or Golda.
Special Note: As with 1968. - except even more so--
we should strictly limit his activity putting time against
only what counts. Figure our news cycles - have one
national event per day and keep any other activity regional
oriented. In addition we should give him plenty of time
to think and realize that he is four years older than 1968.
3.
Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign
on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
ANSWER
There are three general points.
- We should not launch all of our issue attack rockets
too early in the campaign. A plan should be developed
which in the public's mind keeps us in what is interpreted
as an offensive position. This will mean a great deal of flexibility
and an ability to almost instantly react (which Pete Daily
plans in the T. V. area).
Our tendency is to use the sledge hammer approach
and we should have a calculated release of issue positions
and attack so that halfway through October we still have
something new to present the people and hit McGovern on.
- We should keep the debate on issues (if the war is not
over) on the broadest range possible. A one issue
campaign such as law and order became in 1970 should be
avoided. It does not play to our advantage. The exception
would be a foreign policy crisis.
- The one issue which everything we do and say (beginning
now) should stress is the credibility of President Nixon.
Our surrogates, the dialogue in the convention, our
-5-
printed materials -- everything should build credibility.
Over and over in different ways the McGovern documentary
infers and once again directly states, "we need a
President we can believe in. 11 The President has
credibility now. We need to keep it and build on it--
once it starts to collapse under fire it will be very
difficult to recover.
- Assuming the candidate will be McGovern, I am
for third party persons or organizations attacking him
lightly now and heavily the day the Democratic
Convention ends. He should be hit not only on issues
but also on his credibility, honesty and lack of experience
and understanding of the institution of the Presidency.
There is no reason to let the Honest George image
keep floating.
4.
Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
ANSWER
The Attack on the President
- Give him credit for the Summits and say the Hallmark
for the Nixon Presidency has been made. Now we must
move on.
- Say the war must end -- if it is about to end say it
hasn't been soon enough. Over promise- - Nixon did
in 1968.
- Nixonomics haven't worked.
- Unemployment up- with analogies to Hoover. Scare people.
- Nixon is a devisive President. He wins by dividing
Americans. The people want to be brought together.
We must unite and rededicate ourselves.
- Crime has gone up.
-6-
- The most isolated President. Makes decisions alone,
doesn't consult advisors. Away from the White House
constantly -- no consultation with Congress.
- And over and over again, bang Nixon's credibility.
Bring up big business, ITT, the Court, his brother
Don, anything that helps to point negatives.
Response to the attack
- The President never takes on McGovern by name or
directly. If he does it should be during the last days
of the campaign crunch and only if necessary.
- The Vice President and Surrogates can bang around
McGovern striking hard on the issues and his qualifications.
- Prominent conservative Democrats who are popular in key
states should be signed up under the table now by Mitchell.
We can use them in the State where they' re popular just
at the right time. But- get them tied up today and before
McGovern moves right.
- The President should talk about what he has done, that
it is only the beginning of the beginning and where he is
headed. Aloof and above reproach. As long as it works-
under attack - he should turn the other cheek, and hold off
any heavy attack by himself until mid-October.
- The best Presidential attack is in stressing what he has
done. Get the public to decide he's done a tremendous
amount while McGovern yells not enough.
- I am not sure on the precise attack which should be
made on McGovern. Just keep him to the left if it means
using some of our issue material and equity early. (Higby
has given me Buchanan's memo which looks like it outlines the
basis for the McGovern attack. ) We must make sure our
attack does not come too heavy handed, with too much PR
and build him into a martyr.)
-7-
- The best point of attack now is the Convention arena.
Walkouts, platform donnybrooks, anything which splits
and disunites should be undertaken - on a very sophisticated
level. (Jeb says this is being done - so good!)
What the opposition strategy will be and how we should
meet it.
NOTE: Assuming McGovern or Kennedy - perhaps even a
combination, we must realize they are what we are in spades.
They are organized, have good supporting people, great
merchandising talent behind them, the "Kennedy appeal,"
an understanding of the power and potentials an incumbent
President has at Command, dedicated workers, a Government
in exile, and so on. Most important neither are the President-
nor are they their own man. Neither has the leadership
capabilities or intellect of the President. But, we must
recognize they have much going for themselves.
- The first most important strategy for the opposition out
of the Convention must be to unite the Party. I would
expect the Presidential candidate to either set up his
own San Clemente and bring in the leader of his party
from the key states, etc., or to go on a grand tour of
the country holding private unity meetings and striking
deals.
Response:
State by state McGovern should be hit by sign carrying
mothers (on abortion, drugs), laborers ($1000 to
everyone), middle class suburban types etc. Put a
truth squad with him state by state. Never let him up
for air from the time he leaves the convention.
- What are the odds that McGovern or his Vice President
(if Kennedy) could be dispatched on a world trip for the
period of the Republican Convention? Would Chou see
him, Brezhnev, Golda, Heath, Pompidou?
Response:
Watch for this to happen in some form - and let other
governments know confidentially our displeasure at any
such meetings.
-8-
- Summit of the Cities. Meeting of big Democratic wheels-
Mayors, City Council types, etc., to discuss the urban
and suburban problems and the Democratic/McGovern
solutions. A united Democratic front - good media attention
and forces the President into highlighting his domestic
program. We would be very much on the defensive.
Response:
A PR gimmick. Use a special Vice President and Cabinet
task force as the counter and denounce the effort as a
stunt early in its planning.
- Major address to an evening session of Congress by the
Democratic challenger. Attack the way the President
has handled Congress, his inability to work with Congress,
the lack of consultation regarding the war. (This is a
good idea - for them!)
Response:
Then send the Vice President? Demand equal time?
- The Liberals will launch a personal attack - they always
do (like the right wing).
Response:
Early on our surrogates - everyone - should say -
I wonder when McGovern will sink to the personal attack.
It is inevitable so we should mention it early - in a
joking way.
- As the opposition I would love to see Nixon jump on a car,
throw some V's, make a massive error, get mad, have
his friend Mitchell or Bebe in trouble.
Response:
Pray all is o.k.
-9-
- Television is paramount. It is the single most important
element in the McGovern strategy. It won them California.
Television has made McGovern what he is. The workers,
the kids, the "mystique of the Kennedys" - to accomplish
all this T. V. has been the key.
We must assume crowds, events - everything will be
staged effectively for television. It has got to be their
feeling that the right television campaign keyed on a
regional, or state by state basis can defeat the
President.
Via television they will show:
- A Presidential candidate who listens to the public -
understands their problems, is sympathetic.
- People, all kinds, black, white, Mexican American,
you name it, rallying around one man. The one man
who really can "bring us together again" and unite the
nation.
- They will strike out for the little man. The Bobby
Kennedy and George Wallace thrust. The fight against
big government. The impersonalism of the Fed. As
they do this Nixon will become the symbol of bigness
and what is wrong.
- Issues will be fought on the emotional level and they will
avoid lengthy explanations and specifics. It will be good
solid T.V. Watch for their own Archie Bunker approach-
after all, Liberals created Archie and look at the power
Archie has with that segment now. Carroll O'Connor
doing McGovern commercials is not an impossibility.
Response:
Pete Daily has this in hand. However, I think we should
look very seriously at how we would run a T.V. campaign
against the President. This exercise on our part might
give us some specific thoughts.
-10-
- Mobilization of the key liberal lobbying forces will be a
source of much irritation for us. Everyone from Common
Cause to the garment unions to Operation Bread Basket
will be running their own campaign against the President.
I would suspect a McGovern umbrella strategy which will
coordinate all of these groups. They will point Nixon as
anti-humanitarian, against minorities, etc. etc.
Response:
Our best strategy is to counter via those lobbying groups
who are for us. Or, we should get readings on those
groups who will oppose us and assess the threat. Next
we should set up front groups playing to the same
constituency, using a similar name and launch some
back-fires. (You have Common Cause - how about
Common Course to prove the nation is headed in the right
direction.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
SUBJECT:
RONALD Views and L. Analyses ZIEGLER requested RZ.
in memorandum
of June 12, 1972
There probably is no one who would not say the President should best
campaign by being President; that the most effective candidate posture is
the Presidential posture. That is not so much a recommendation as it is
fact.
The posture exists because it is his posture. It is present because of his
accomplishments as a statesman both in his widely approved foreign initia-'
tives and in the less appreciated domestic initiatives.
That posture cannot be split in two. The campaign is what the President
wants to do for the nation and the world. So there cannot be candidate actions
and Presidential actions, or a Presidential period and a campaign period.
He cannot be two people or approach events or actions into two kinds.
So we can direct our attention not to what the President should be, but what
opposition strategies will be used in an attempt to diminish what he is.
These fall into two areas:
1. Tactics to describe statesmanship as aloofness.
2. Approaches which will grant foreign affairs accomplishments
but suggest this has been a preoccupation to the expense of
domestic needs.
Page 2
Taking the Offense
Both strategies should be approached by undercutting them rather than by
responding to a series of charges and by taking steps to do so at once
rather than waiting for the attack to surface.
1.
The charge of detachment from concerns of the electorate cannot
be allowed to set in; we must not lose the ability of people to
relate comfortably to the man in the office. It is important that
he be seen not as someone seeking power -- he already has the
power others are seeking -- but that it be understood this power
is being used well.
2.
We cannot run the risk that people won't know our domestic
achievements in the economy, health, nutrition, education, and
the other areas of expansion and improvement. These must be
demonstrated and greater focus placed on them, and on the
unwillingness of Congress to act on many of his initiatives.
And all of this must be done from a position of self confidence and in such
a way as to convey our positive posture.
The Advocate's Role
Attention to our positions needs to be drawn not just through travel but
through the President's words. What he says in forums about the nation's
problems and our solutions will demonstrate action and initiative (focus on)
and his words will have to be reported and those reports, coming from
periodical press conferences, meetings, appearances, receptions, will
get people talking about what he has to say. As the President is an advocate
of his programs, his spokesmen and surrogates will gain increasing atten-
tion and copy.
In facing a Democrat attempt to portray the Presidency as unconcerned or
aloof, Congressional leaders can be called in with greater frequency so that
the President can be noted and quoted on what he has put forth.
Receptions for an increased variety of publics and groups can give an oppor-
tunity for him to tell them directly his concerns, and again be quoted.
Page 3
A Cumulative Effect
These need not always be page one or the television lead; they will have a
cumulative effect which will force the press to report the actions he has
taken and the inaction of Congress in responding in many cases. The
forcing of attention should begin now, before Congress adjourns and before
activities can be colored as part of the campaign.
None of this suggests that we should not organize ourselves and our state-
ments to achieve news leads nor that activities should not be planned and
organized. But they must not appear to be part of a campaign nor an
attempt to gain time or space. Presidential activity is not candidate
campaigning. (On this point also, it would be helpful for the party-rally
and fund-raising kind of events to be started as late as possible.)
Focus on Activism
Without discussion, for the moment, of press bias, we should be aware that
the press, seeing the President in his activities, observing not necessarily
questioning -- him will force them to focus the activism and concern taking
place. We should be led to conclusions rather than being presented with
them, note what we are doing rather than hear what we say we are doing,
hear the President put forth his views instead of others putting them forth
on his behalf.
Drawing attention to the Presidential force behind positions and people should
not lead to a process of cluttering the President's schedule; periods of 3 -
4 hours, twice a week, begun soon can accomplish this.
Painting the White House Grey
Another strategy which should be undercut is one which the opposition will
use to paint the White House a shady grey.
Every appearance of conflict of interest, favoritism or misconduct will be
seized upon. Because opponents will have so little to grab onto in foreign
policy and domestic activity, and because there is an attitude on the part
of much of the press that we are the guys in black hats, it will be extremely
difficult to disassociate the President from clumsiness or failures in any
of the lower forms of campaign techniques which perhaps must be used.
Page 4
We should reassess our whole approach to the campaign apparatus in this
light.
Do we have adequate controls and checks to prevent
blotches from occurring?
Should we have in the White House and EOB the political
activists who work with special interest groups or should
some of these be transferred to 1701?
I am not advocating these, but I do advocate rigorous examination of these
kinds of questions in light of what we can lose through inuendo and guilt by
association.
We have been faced with this time and time again, being brought down from
a high crest achieved through hard work and true leadership, because of
clumsy efforts on matters of secondary importance. I don't know how it
happens; only that it must not.
Avoiding Clumsiness
I am not worried about the President's posture and am not presumptuous
enough to say what it is or should be. But I am concerned that as an organ-
ization, including the campaign structure, we clearly be seen as positive
and aggressive, and not as negative or deceptive.
The most counter-productive activities we could undertake are those which
would give the Democrats another ITT, or to have them uncover some kind
of GOP intelligence operation in their convention as the nation watches.
This is not to say we should be overcautious or that we shouldn't be aggres-
sive and tough. But there are some kinds of activities in which only minimal
skill has been shown. Worse, there has been a particularly acute ineptness
which invariably leads to linking these activities to the Presidency.
Note on Convention Period
As for the President's activities during the Democratic convention, it should
be business as usual, not especially active, but not hibernating; not pre-
occupied by what's happening at Miami, but at least mildly interested in
the outcome.
Page 5
About the Press
On the matter of press, my experience as Press Secretary over three
years of day-in and day-out dealings with the press corps gives me little
doubt that on the whole the press is philosophically untuned to us, biased
in their copy and approaches, and often better to work around than through.
Our success in dealing with the press has come from keeping them off
balance, proving them wrong when they are, and not permitting them to
feel we are on the defensive. There should be no lack of understanding of
their motives or attitudes. We have not changed their views entirely nor
their methods of operating at all; but they have been kept on the defensive
and we have maintained a working relationship.
Righting Wrongs
They should continue to be called when they are wrong. Prompt, fact-filled,
firm responses should continue to follow every distortion. The process
should be improved in view of the fast-firing developments of campaigns,
and our response should not be scattered or fractionalized as has been the
case too often in the past. We dilute the effect of our response to media
mistakes and distortions when media get called one day by a Scali, next
day a Colson, then a Ziegler, Clawson, Snyder, Klein, Shumway and virtually
anybody else.
The responses should be sharpened so that the Press Secretary can deal
with distortions or ommissions concerning the President in the most effective
way; the Director of Communications can do so for the Administration.
I am not saying thatDole or Mitchell cannot make a point now and then; I
am describing what the White House posture should be for maximum results.
Avoiding Uptightness
The scattered approach suggests to the media an uptight, overly sensitive
image which is contrary to the posture of confidence required; thus we
find ourselves dealing from a position of weakness rather than strength in
these situations. The President is known as a man who understands the
press and the realities of the media. He is not affected by their bias -- is
more interested in doing a good job. This is what they say and know. That
is what will affect the election.
Page 6
Just as we should give the Democrats no advantage, we should not give
an advantage to a press corps which is largely sympathetic to it. We
could easily solidify the situation if we were to take on an overt attack on
the press as a whole.
Discussing this, there seems to be broad agreement to the above point.
Yet a consensus is developing among the press that discrediting the Ameri-
can press is a pillar of our campaign effort. It creates the thought that we
are uptight about them and that we can talk about only the press and not the
issues. Key advisors often focus more on press than on accomplishments
of the President.
This approach would make us look anything but confident; frightened instead
of bold; reluctant to be observed rather than proud of demonstrating what
we are doing and have done.
We would divert energies which should be used against the opponent rather
than against those writing about him. We should be aware of press failings --
weakness, vanity, selfishness, the herd instinct but should use these to
our advantage rather than simply denouncing them. Any appearance of an
organized overt anti-press campaign would help strengthen the press bias,
portray ourselves poorly and draw energies off into secondary battles at
the expense of the primary objective.
It would invite the press to throw off caution and give the justification it
now lacks for being self-righteous.
The media now expect an offensive of this kind; we would appear weak to
give it to them.
Who Loves Whom?
If McGovern is the Democratic candidate, I am not at all convinced that the
bulk of the press will have a love-feast with him. Should this prove to be
wrong, we will have to reassess our position and approach. But it is
entirely possible that much of the press will not be smitten and we should
be open to that possibility in our thinking and strategy.
SUMMARY
Summing up, we move in an atmosphere of confidence and power to drama-
tize real accomplishments by drawing attention to Presidential action in
such a way as to undercut opposition strategies without appearing artificial
Page 7
or campaign-oriented. The spotlight on what the President does and
says should not be pulled away from him and his accomplishment -- onto
clumsiness or appearances which permit the opposition and a largely
unsympathetic press to portray whatever characteristics would be least
useful to us and least attractive to voters.
Attitude toward the press should reflect the President's own concern on
getting the job done rather than what's being said by media. To do other-
wise would place those around him and therefore the Presidency itself in
a defensive overly sensitive position. Press weaknesses are more to be
used than labelled and press distortions should be responded to in a precise
and effective manner. Presumptions of widespread press affection for the
opposition candidate may be premature.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
EYES ONLY
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE H. R. HALDEMAN
Subject: June 12 request for views on the President's
campaign this summer and fall
During and immediately after the Democratic Convention,
the papers will naturally be filled to overflowing with
news columns, analyses, background material, pictures,
etc., etc., about the convention proceedings and the
candidate's platform and material of that kind.
I do not believe it desirable, or for that matter even
possible, to compete with that sort of coverage. There-
fore, I believe the President, for the first few days
after the convention, should say nothing about the results
or the platform, unless there is some major surprise at
the Democratic Convention, such as the nomination of some
candidate other than McGovern or the adoption of some
particularly wild platform planks, in which case the
situation should be newly assessed.
Then, about a week after the convention and just before
Congress resumes, I think the President should issue a
fairly long statement, or make a talk in which he urges
Congress to return and finally get to work, cleaning up
the appropriation bills, calling attention to the fact
that his Budget has been submitted since January, urging
action on unfinished portions of his program such as
reorganization and revenue sharing (but not referring to
H.R. 1 again).
Another speech or statement could be devoted to the cur-
rent foreign situation and perhaps prodding Congress to
get on with the work of ratifying the various agreements
reached abroad and calling attention to any progress made
in trade negotiations at that time, etc.
He might consider holding a full-scale press conference
but declining to answer questions on politics or the
campaign until after the Republican Convention, as he had
previously said he would.
2
In short, I believe the direction from the White House should
be to try to pull the country's attention away from rather tire-
some, noisy political matters of which the public would have had
a surfeit shortly after the Democratic Convention. The President's
position between conventions, I believe, should be that of a calm
statesman speaking from the White House, demonstrating both domes-
tic and foreign leadership, and chiding the Democratic congressmen
with their refusal to take any action on his bills. I think he
should also criticize them for big spending bills which he may
have vetoed by then. The President might rather sadly comment
on the disrepute which such congressional conduct brings upon the
governmental process and on the legislative branch in particular.
After the Republican Convention, I believe the President should
embark upon a high-level type of campaigning after Labor Day,
with perhaps seven or eight half-hour set speeches (no more than
one a week), including the acceptance speech from the convention
hall, in which he contrasts the Administration accomplishments
with the various absurdities of the Democratic platform. This
may be a difficult tightrope to walk because I do not believe
the President should dwell very much on the Democratic platform
but should concentrate on the Republican accomplishments and
subtly indicate what the Democratic proposals would have led to
had the Democrats been in power. I believe some of his trips
should be in connection with specific events such as dedications
of public works or attendance at major group gatherings or orga-
nizational gatherings. Perhaps two or three could be at regular
political dinners or afternoon outdoor rallies. I think each
speech should have a dominant theme, and those on domestic issues
should point out that no domestic program can be accomplished
without our ability to live in a peaceful world, which the Presi-
dent has brought about.
I think the dominant theme throughout should be to maintain the
dignity of the presidency and not to take part in more than a
very few frankly political gatherings. These should be care-
fully organized so that the televised portion consists of the
President's talk alone with short introductory shots of arriving
motorcades, crowds, and very little else.
The point would be to try to make a major public event out of
each of these comparatively few appearances by the President in
the fall and to emphasize at all times that he is the President
with all of its trappings and dignity and majesty. The tone of
the talks should be equally high and, I believe, the only form
of attack on the opposition should be a few contrasts of their
platform and program compared with ours. I do not think the
opposition candidate should ever be named by the President. The
President should be against these proposals but for people. He
is against Democratic proposals because they will hurt the people.
Of course, much of this is subject to the type of platform
and candidate that emerge from the Democratic Convention. If
it is McGovern, with a fairly wild platform, I think that the
3
President can well emphasize what enactment of that sort of
a program would mean but always in contrast to his own
accomplishments in the first four years and the hopes that
he has engendered for the future.
I believe that at least one, and perhaps two, of the talks
could be from Washington but I do not believe the White House
should be used since I think it would be preferable to avoid
any suggestion that we are attempting to capitalize on the
presidency itself. It would seem to me that at least one
talk might well be made from the living room or similar setting
from San Clemente.
I believe the opposition will concentrate strongly on unemploy-
ment, on economic conditions, and on the desire for peace,
and I believe that we can meet them on any one of these three
issues with no trouble at all.
Bearing in mind how many people are employed and the fact that
many of the unemployed are members of families where one or
two other family members are employed, it would seem to me to
be the best method for the President and his spokesmen con-
tinually to ask their audiences to examine their own economic
situation and to see if, with inflation being controlled and
employment generally at all-time high levels, if they them-
selves are not far better off than they were four years ago.
The same approach can be taken to the war, with heavy emphasis
on the more than two and a quarter million men out of the Army
and several hundred thousand who are home from Vietnam and the
prospects for peace contrasted with the picture in January 1969.
The President should also emphasize the basic return of sanity
and reasonable quietness to the country contrasted with the
turmoil and the disorder of four years ago and the general
feeling of hopelessness that seemed to prevail at that time.
We can well point also to the great increase in our stature
and prestige abroad and no speech should be made without call-
ing attention to the enormously enhanced prospects for peace
in the future as a direct result of the President's personal
initiatives.
The opposition will undoubtedly try to effect a coalition of
blacks, young radicals, and middle-aged guilt-ridden liberals
and I think we should try to pick away at the pieces of this
coalition separately. I think we should show how the posture
of youth has been improved by the strengthening of our whole
4
system domestically. The recognition that Negroes have been
given by this Administration and the progress made in elimi-
nating many of the causes of racial fighting (attempts to
defuse the school busing issue and others that caused enormous
frictions and tensions) should be emphasized. We should point
out that the best thing any administration can do for Negroes
or youth is to create the atmosphere and the conditions in
which the economy can thrive and jobs can be obtained, and that
had been preeminently the result of our economic policy.
This can be contrasted strongly with the enormous spending
programs, continuation of discredited welfare, and attempts to
redistribute wealth through ruinously high taxation, which
will undoubtedly all be part of the Democratic platform.
I am sure the opposition will attack us for not spending enough
on a lot of individual programs, most of which are already dis-
credited and the sum of which would add up to enormously in-
creased taxes. I think we should constantly emphasize the
overall effect of the individual spending items the Democratic
candidates will unquestionably be sponsoring. As long as they
are allowed to talk about them on an individual basis, they
are harder to dispute. What we have to do is add up the total
and show where that would all lead us in taxation, loss of in-
come, and loss of personal freedom. I am convinced that most
Negroes, most youths, and most people desire a prosperous,
quiet life with a minimum of government intervention and a
maximum of opportunity to do what they please so long as they
have good housing, good health, and good schools, and increas-
ingly, good recreational facilities and a good environment. It
seems to me that all of the things we have done are leading
directly toward these goals and that we should emphasize con-
stantly that these are things that all people want, and that
when you talk about things that only small groups want, such
as Negroes, radicals, activists, youths, etc., you are auto-
matically denying the majority of the people the kind of life
they want.
In short, the Democrats have nothing to offer except more
divisiveness, higher taxes, more government interference with
everyone's life, and worn-out proven nonsolutions for our major
problems, to say nothing of policies that lead to war, either
hot or cold.
Caspar W. Weinberger
Director
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Bob:
There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened
insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer
share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right
along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe
that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all,
knowing you will get really useful information from associates
with access to the current state of things across the country.
But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever
they are worth.
First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now
on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the
Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its plat-
form. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between
now and then any political judgments have to be no better than
sheer speculation.
Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our
people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to
concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne
out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first,
the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have
convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever
for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how
long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy;
and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the
Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the
upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President
has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,
- 2 -
these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in
the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients
are present in the President's achievements for a victory of land-
slide proportions.
Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's
enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief
that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expe-
diency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public
assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his
traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years
that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on
his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact
being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as
a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican
Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking
between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that
the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world
statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would
pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive
political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible,
one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears
of the American people. That's the best politics there could pos-
sibly be.
Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate
to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested
by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential
stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September
or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any dif-
ferently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should
he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until
he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when
campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and
ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts,
would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's
minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential
far more than political -- again, on the premise that a Presidential
stance will prove to be the best politics. I naturally assume,
in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be inter-
larded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American
people that the President is President first and only reluctantly,
and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.
- 3 -
Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the cam-
paign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed
by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political
leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the Pres-
ident will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the
country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he
will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast
trying to visit every state.
I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at spe-
cific major voting blocs -- the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agricul-
ture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using
key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaign-
ing. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of
late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presi-
dential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or
Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential
appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appear-
ance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. This is why
I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the
traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a re-
gional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the
1960 style.
Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can
change much from now through Election Day, though I must again con-
fess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge
this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956
cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant
concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's
favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls
isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environ-
mentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought
to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 -- peace, pros-
perity and progress.
Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the
key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena
or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will
be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by
election time will have degenerated into character assassination.
I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving
it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would
be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday,
to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country
- 4 -
that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives
of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT,
is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply con-
vinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that
his major political overlay will be the charge of big business
corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the
average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government
and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce
lots of people.
But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will
be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side
is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential
stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful
campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President
is determined above all else to do only the right things for America,
will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but
also the road to a landslide.
(
Harlow