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This file contains:
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: RN's campaign posture and strategies to use against his Democratic opponent. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman answering election questions previously posed by Haldeman. Original Haldeman memo attached. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Safire to Haldeman laying out general campaign strategies. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Price to Haldeman laying out critical campaign issues and general strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Finch to Haldeman presenting an analysis of the Democratic opposition and RN's presidential posture during the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: major campaign themes, including RN's professional posture, key issues, and opposition strategies. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: substantial campaign strategies. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Klein to Haldeman RE: campaign strategies, including presidential posture and voter perception of the candidates. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's image during the 1972 campaign and how to prepare for the opposition. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: RN's image as president and how to overcome difficulties during the 1972 election season. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's visibility in 1972 and critical campaign strategies. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 20-13
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WHSF: Contested, 20-13
description
This file contains:
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: RN's campaign posture and strategies to use against his Democratic opponent. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman answering election questions previously posed by Haldeman. Original Haldeman memo attached. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Safire to Haldeman laying out general campaign strategies. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Price to Haldeman laying out critical campaign issues and general strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Finch to Haldeman presenting an analysis of the Democratic opposition and RN's presidential posture during the campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: major campaign themes, including RN's professional posture, key issues, and opposition strategies. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: substantial campaign strategies. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Klein to Haldeman RE: campaign strategies, including presidential posture and voter perception of the candidates. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's image during the 1972 campaign and how to prepare for the opposition. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: RN's image as president and how to overcome difficulties during the 1972 election season. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's visibility in 1972 and critical campaign strategies. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
13
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: RN's
campaign posture and strategies to use
against his Democratic opponent. 6 pgs.
20
13
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman answering
election questions previously posed by
Haldeman. Original Haldeman memo
attached. 4 pgs.
20
13
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman laying out general
campaign strategies. 3 pgs.
20
13
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman laying out critical
campaign issues and general strategies. 4 pgs.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
13
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Finch to Haldeman presenting an
analysis of the Democratic opposition and
RN's presidential posture during the
campaign. 4 pgs.
20
13
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: major
campaign themes, including RN's
professional posture, key issues, and
opposition strategies. 5 pgs.
20
13
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: substantial
campaign strategies. 2 pgs.
20
13
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Klein to Haldeman RE: campaign
strategies, including presidential posture and
voter perception of the candidates. 4 pgs.
20
13
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dent to Haldeman RE: RN's image
during the 1972 campaign and how to
prepare for the opposition. 5 pgs.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
13
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: RN's
image as president and how to overcome
difficulties during the 1972 election season.
3 pgs.
20
13
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's
visibility in 1972 and critical campaign
strategies. 5 pgs.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Page 3 of 3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DONALD RUMSFELD
SUBJECT:
Response to your Memo of June 12th
on the President and the Campaign.
1. The President's posture between the Conventions
The President should:
-- Be Presidential;
-- Not engage in partisan activities;
-- Use the platform and power of the office
to show a President governing--let the
distinction be drawn between a partisan
Democratic office seeker versus an
incumbent President governing;
-- Travel only under the mantle of "official
business";
-- As suitable occasions are developed, be
photographed with prominent non partisan
citizens (Democrats, citizens, etc.)
-- Keep his options open. It will be a tough
election. Maintain a moderately active
profile, unless spectacular opportunities
for greater visibility occur.
Page 2
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention
to the Election -
--This will depend somewhat on who the Democratic
nominee is and who the Vice-Presidential nominees
are, as well as the situation in Viet Nam.
--In general, and importantly, the President should
remain Presidential. Richard Nixon, the President
of the United States, is a winner. Richard Nixon,
campaigning as another office seeker, would create
unnecessary problems.
To the extent possible, the President should be
involved in campaign travel as part of some
"official business". To the extent that a cam-
paign event is secondary on a trip he could travel
as early as six or eight weeks before the election.
--However, travel throughout the election should be
moderate. Avoid the impression of a frantic, hectic
three or four campaign-stop pace on a given day.
The target states, and enough others to show breadth,
need to be visited and appropriate events can be
developed for such visits.
3. Strategy for the President's campaign -
The theme, "Re-Elect the President", is sound.
If the campaign is consistent with that theme
we should avoid conjuring up the image of
Richard Nixon the office seeker. Activities
where he is functioning as President should be
highlighted. A great deal will turn on how
accurately the President is portrayed as a
competent, and bold, forward-looking and effective
President. Enhance the President's advantage of
incumbency by finding ways to contrast his
Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric.
The opponent will be a member of the Party
responsible for a number of the problems of this
country, and his solutions will be fuzzy and
unsound, but there are plenty of people available
to make the attack besides the President.
Page 3
Issues the President should emphasize:
- His Foreign policy leadership
- A strong America versus a weak America
- Performance versus promises (results versus
"effort", "concern", "commitment", etc.)
- Avoiding crisis versus crisis management
(Action versus reaction)
- The importance of the individual, individuality,
diversity, and pluralism versus centralization
and control.
4. The opposition's strategy -
--- If the opponent is McGovern he will try to
hold the left (his enthusiastic corps of
workers and media support) by holding to his
Viet Nam position and calling for an end to
"senseless killing." He will move to the
middle on other issues to gain labor support,
a degree of legitimacy in the south and the
support of the Democratic power men. He will
be less idealistic and more practical. Hope-
fully, the Convention struggle will dramatize
his problems in this respect.
---- He will pound the so-called bread and butter
economic issues of unemployment, hunger, poverty
and inflation. (Larry O'Brien talks about almost
nothing else.) I can hear him now:
"When Nixon came in, unemployment was
under 4 percent--after 4 years of Nixon
it is up to 6 percent."
"When Nixon came in, your dollar was
worth a dollar--after 4 years of Nixon,
it is worth 90 cents."
He will portray the President as the handmaiden of
big business and special interests.
Page 4
"Jack Kennedy did battle with big steel,
Nixon gives loans to Lockheed."
"The Democratic Party pushed for higher
Social Security benefits for the elderly
and higher minimum wages for workers, Nixon
makes deal with ITT in return for contribu-
tions."
"Democratic Presidents like Roosevelt,
Kennedy, and Johnson found jobs for millions
of unemployed Americans, Nixon freezes wages."
"Nixon means high unemployment and high
inflation -- your wages are controlled and
business profits soar and taxes, rents and
food prices climb."
How to meet the opponent's strategy:
--McGovern's weakness will be a lack of "competence".
If he is elected it will amount to "on-the-job
training" - that is risky for the country.
--We should seek some of the Wallace, McCarthy,
McGovern support that wants change, by driving
home the President's record on reform -- govern-
ment, draft, etc.
The way to do it is to take on Congress -- they
have failed the people. The laundry list of their
failures is persuasive. This will associate the
President with a desire for some change and his
hope to make things better.
-Administration spokesmen can associate McGovern
with his unpopular extreme supporters and positions,
but the President should not.
A FINAL THOUGHT -
--The President has hopes and ideals yet correctly
understands human characteristics. He knows that
to actually move the maximum distance toward those
ideals, those hopes of most human beings, you have
to be tough, pragmatic, courageous. That's what we
need as President, and we've got it. Thank God.
Page 5
--- But, as the President has said, not every
voter fully understands that. People can
be moved and persuaded by appeals to their
hopes and aspirations even though the approach
is fuzzy, impractical, even counterproductive
or dangerous.
-- The President effectively communicates his
toughness, strength and pragmatism. More can
be done to show that those qualities are necessary.
More can be done to show why the President is this
way--because that is how to move toward those
idealistic goals of peace, etc. He knows there
are damn few short cuts, that "caring", "wishing",
or "hoping" is not enough.
Further, more can be done to show that he has those
same hopes and ideals. We should seek some oppor-
tunities for him to dramatize his interest in
individual human beings, his personal concern where
personal concern is justified, his ideals, his hopes.
A chunk of the American people must have the feeling
that he personally cares about their problems, not
in general but in the specific--about them, about
the kinds of concerns they have for themselves and
their families. Only then can many be sure he is
leading where they want to go. There are such
opportunities, but they must be seized.
The President knows that feeling moves some people.
He is capable of doing it and does it well. But
our Administration does it only reluctantly.
A danger for our Administration is in its competence
we seem harsh, in our strength we seem tough, in our
pragmatism we seem goalless and idealless.
McGovern is weak and would be a disastrous President.
But his warmth, concern, decency are appealing because
people dream, hope, aspire, and want to be better
than themselves, want better for their children, and
because they have fears.
Page 6
The campaign must scrupulously avoid going "over the
line. Our "reservoir", in this respect, is shallow.
The more people "feel" and believe (as opposed to
understand) that the President has ideals, hopes
and concerns, the more they will accept his approach
based on the vital qualities of strength, courage,
brilliance and competence, because they will feel he
is going- and taking them-where they want to go,
and doing it skillfully.
And when a human being walks into the voting booth
pulls the curtain, shrugs his shoulders at the com-
plexity of the mechanism and then votes, that's
what he wants - to know and or feel, or at least
hope that that man, Richard Nixon, is leading him
where he wants to go.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture
A)
Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between
Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal,
eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should
be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That
is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the
dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana,
abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by
the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again,
however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine
this.
B)
Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a
posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention,
a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and
he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign.
Since our strength is foreigh policy in a world where there is a deep
desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings,
high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken
contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan
argumentative campaign.
C)
RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible.
Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the
effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether
RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit
is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In
any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the
drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.
-2-
D)
Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised
address by the President, or V.P. stating the "differences" between
the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so
much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in
a single message even while our surrogates are hitting the individual
messages on the stump.
E)
Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office
fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board
of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American
people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government VS. less
Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be
candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between
the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with
my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying
the same thing this time we want to put some air between us and
McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)
F)
Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President
in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all.
The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience a kick-off address
in Cadillac Square something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should
be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences
but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us.
The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters
in this election who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who
cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.
G)
One thought. Why not have the V.P. candidate, assuming that it
is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day
Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understan ds that
what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs
(we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we
stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class,
many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.
(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills
integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with
Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by
liberal bureaucrats.)
H)
On strategy for attack my thoughts are already largely in
hand. However, just some reminders:
1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that
as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one
charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto
the serving board.
-3-
2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of
this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press
here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of
the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the
polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all
our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to
New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains.' 11
We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly
and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold
our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway
in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the
general election of 1968 or of 1970 -- the flexibility to shift
gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto
another.
OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK
Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust"
thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while
Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character
of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to
move off their "tinkertoy proposals. 11 They don't want their man to be
in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of
them fear that worse than the radical charge.)
Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get
harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack --
accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character
assassination against the President of the United States and demand
that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest
and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say
it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an
evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and
of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us
on the issues, I don't see how if they are clearly and politely and
consistently made we can lose this one.
Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to
keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular
point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning
is essential; plans are worthless.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eyes Only Eyes
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAT BUCHANAN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.
It has been requested that you summarize your views and
analysis on the following points:
1, What should the President's posture be
Note
between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be
from the Republican Convention to the election?
When should he start campaigning? How much
travel should he do, where should he go, what
type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to
strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, Note
points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition
strategy will be and how we should meet it.
Note
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p.m. Friday,
June 16.
Pat:
Bob realizes that your "Assault" memorandum covered some
of the questions above. Anything you would like to add should
be included in your response to this memo.
Thank you.
Larry Higby
DETERMINED TO BE AN
THE WHITE HOUSE
1
/ RKING
WASHINGTON
E.,. 12000, Section 6-102
By
EP
NARS, Date 3-12-82
confidential
June 14, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Campaign
You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of
the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff,
etc., and I will not belabor that point.
Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E.
Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.
1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists, 11
as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-
nothing 80th Congress. 11 With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation --
in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who
greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public
interest.
If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the
villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the
campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after
us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.
2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR
tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning
hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an
anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and
fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also
warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It
is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader
should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's
greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.
-2-
For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls
should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each
involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots
stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it
is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.
I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning.
It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on
a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Con-
vention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition
looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into
"I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes. 11
We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either;
the President should begin to say now, well before the convention,
that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants
to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting
people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the
electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the
S ystem that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take
the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to
campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-
elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.
Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:
If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take
New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews:
Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's
attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak
on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee
ever -- and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks
like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never
before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175, 000 of those
wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-
holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy
Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan,
about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half
Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on
oldtimers who have a defeati st attitude about Nixon and Jews --
this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.
-3-
We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New
York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there
is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should,
for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed
in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every
week between now and November. We tend to think of our
Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is
important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh
chance there.
I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a
Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (When-
ever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.)
The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't
gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemploy-
ment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a
smart opponent.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
Rus7
SUBJECT:
Campaign 72
I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the
points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here
for a starter:
1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential,
statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not
to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take
the position that there's work to be done running the country, and
there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course,
will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period
he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting
back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish
the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and
McGovern the politician.
2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but
continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember
at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathet-
ically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep
campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies
are bad TV -- too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for
Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate
concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an oppor-
tunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign
itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this
pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation
to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others
-2-
carry the attack -- and make maximum use of outside organizations,
individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier
schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing
irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-
wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of govern-
ment, and -- depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign
-- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation
and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense
of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the
United States, on the world, and on the next generation.
3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc. : Assuming McGovern
to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-
wing radicalism -- but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much
on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out
reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we
should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way
that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a
matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that
his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip
tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.
McGovern of course will be more careful -- but if he does start
a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive
extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only after-
wards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not
what people want in a President.
We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical
positions -- on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he
already has begun to do. Our aim should be fourfold:
-- To cement the identification of him with positions that
are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;
-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is
backing off, not merely "clarifying;"
-3-
-- To plant the impression that he too readily embraces
schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's
not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted
with the power of the Presidency.
-- To undermine his image (which is a great part of his
strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at
least says what he thinks and to show him as an opportunist
who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his
principal issues: trust.
4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll
probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as calous toward
the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President,
who needlessly sacrificed 10, 000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis
on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable
-- jobs, inflation, taxes.
A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on
trust, with the theme that you can't trust RN: that he's a calculating
political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for policical purposes
first and for public purposes second; the President ofITTof secret
campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against
the little guy.
I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of
the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard
on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote
(including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California).
This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot
elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't
like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being
thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot
more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and
hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think
is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than
decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a
highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political
-4-
persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and
there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics.
If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting
issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side,
we can get in real trouble.
As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is
to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven perform-
ance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't
Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got
a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series
that can only be completed by the man who started it off -- Give
Peace a Chance -- Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust"
issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop
up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by
focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to
popular stands.
Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger re-
flection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor
Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for
President. 11 The central focus of our campaign should be on one
thing: to make people proud of their President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Campaign Strategy of
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Point 1: What should be the President's posture between
conventions?
In my mind, there is no question but that the President
should remain "the President" not only between conventions
but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late
in the campaign as possible, the President should be a
"working President," remain mostly in Washington attending
to the business of the nation.
From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must
be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their
platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The
tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be
ripened for Administration support. Careful use of
Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the
stage to capture these dissaffected voters.
Point 2: What should be the President's posture during
the campaign?
Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe
should be the keystone of most of the early campaign.
Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the
President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney."
The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that
President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided.
We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President
out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President
does move, it will have a heightened impact.
-2-
Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the
President's position -- up to a point. In order to
orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have
better communication with campaign headquarters and the
White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must
have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking
world events.
As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates"
should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that
will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic
nominees will be formulating their strategy during that
period and the Administration will have an opportunity to
capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups
can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three
million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will
hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter
college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin
college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher
percentage of their votes.
These early efforts should be limited to specific constituen-
cies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early,
especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type
campaign, are all too real.
With the base already established, we should use the Republican
Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's
re-election. With special mailings, highly structured
organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate
an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President,
building in momentum, until the President himself does decide
to enter the lists.
Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?
To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong
leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs
and issues sort out under these two broad headings.
The media would have us believe many Americans are totally
dissatisfied with the "old Politics." It is now the fashion
to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists.
That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are
exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment,"
i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class
-3-
Americans have obtained a standard of living that their
parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the
midst of their success many middle class (and especially
lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled
by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse,
busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health
care. For many of these voters irritation has led to
frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a
visceral reaction against the "ins."
These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or
the security of strong leadership. The President has laid
the groundwork brilliantly for this case.
An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration
achievements and proposals can advance the image of
responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans
and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education
Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the
fullest.
The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract
support. We should not be seduced into attempting a
"charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is
substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength
and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the
President accurately display the courageous and bold
qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real
results because the President bargains from strength.
Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food"and
"unemployment." The food cost affects every American family
and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we
can do about food costs except what has been done and
obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to
solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting
the voters to think about other issues.
Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy.
Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not
already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and
imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts
offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.
-4-
Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.
A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that
even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South,
for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the
McGovern organization in the South will admit.
A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive
element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending
upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace
could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes
in industrial states where the election might be close. But
some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help
the re-election of the President where he does appear on
the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away
from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that
angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters
will support Wallace.
As we saw in the televised debates during the California
primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful
manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed
radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems
of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total
lack of ability to lead this nation.
Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that
makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for
example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package.
The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's
programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration
can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push
him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the
onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for
the President.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMIN. MATIVE MEKING
E.U. 12: section 6-102
By
CT
2-12-82
THE WHITE HOUSE
Date
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT:
'72 CAMPAIGN
BETWEEN CONVENTIONS
The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above
the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his
innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met
with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this
very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party
platform planks for ammunition -- althought never publicly
identified as such -- the President should focus on his
compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why
they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates
as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should
draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats
have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused
to pass.
I think the President can remain above the partisanship
involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related
events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen
responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress
during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.
POST GOP CONVENTION
I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period,
the President should, as much as is politically possible,
maintain the posture of the professional, business-
like Chief Executive going about his very important duties;
and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain
this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at
no time should the President drop to the level of the
contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.
-2-
I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can
lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him,
that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.
That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of
the President be maintained regardless of how much or how
little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition.
That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought
to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function
that would be politically desirable.
After the Convention, it seems to me that the President
ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting
with key national, regional and local Party officials to
give them his personal marching orders. This should be
done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate
the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely
about what is going on, thereby providing for our own
Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may
be in the wind.
Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest
that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of
interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick
to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated
and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions.
However, I still think that as much as possible, the image
of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained
as long as possible.
To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the
President should be highly selective of the activities
involving himself and that they should have a broader
gauged raison d'etre other than partisan politics for as
long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates
and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most
intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.
-3-
CAMPAIGN ISSUES
Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there
is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats
will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment.
The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and
even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason
to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional
stress on the economic issue.
I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last
six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving
although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that
this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling
the concept that economic conditions in this country are
good and that the economy will actually be better than our
ability to convince the public of this fact.
I propose that we seriously create an almost separate,
well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will
be solely to create an image of economic well-being in
this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising
of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it
be done.
Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that
this government has itself caught in a position where
mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on
a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling
on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly
career civil servants. This routine economic reporting
is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that
the economy is better than it seems to them.
As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought
to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are
better off economically at this particular time than at any
other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should
ask their audiences to look inward and make their own
judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer
to that question is that indeed most people are better
off now than ever before.
-4-
If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must
subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny.
With the resources of this government, there is no excuse
for there existing a single miniscule detail about George
McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff
and/or his mistress escaping us.
I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators
who have already compiled everything there is to know about
George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate.
If there isn't, one should be established immediately.
There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout
the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson
in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value
in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish
areas --- where the President could beat himself -- and should
be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we
should do everything within our power to woe the American
trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany
that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on
congressional, state and local campaigns and should not
be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is
not even ideologically compatible with the principles of
trade unionism.
To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its
manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election.
I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support
from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly
disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise
to see him deny labor's resources.
OPPOSITION STRATEGY
It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets:
(1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an
instinctive support from the liberal news media.
With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused
by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend
it all in every area.
Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major
effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability
of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions
-5-
just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore
ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going
to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard,
I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee
should be established to hold regular press conferences
and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.
We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel
who commit documentable instances of being McGovern
"sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is
productive, but every time we can prove media bias or
inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should
be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very
specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the
specific error or article to which we are addressing.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PETER FLANICAN Phd
This memo is in response to your request for my views as
follows:
1. The President's posture between the conventions should
be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy
a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that
period.
To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection
of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians",
political activity by the President would be a negative. To the
extent that he casts himself as the country's leader and an experienced
statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the
Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican
Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a
positive.
2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to
some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid.
Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to
get on with the business of politicking. This President, however,
can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive
saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary.
Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried
to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law
and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage
of time dedicated to campaigning:
-- From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
-- From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
-- From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the
President's time.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have
it include a very substantial amount of travel. Given the ease of
movement available to a President, as well as the national and
regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily
on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign
I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political"
activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent
Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will
recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The
1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when
they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate
rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for
the incumbent.
3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack
will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign
developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam
continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues
to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover,
I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record
against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments
in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the
frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the
Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes
right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through
to the end.
4. The opposition will of course attempt to attach Vietnam
and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the
matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the
general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the
voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility
of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will
have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This
might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into
relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and
are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to
create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take
these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt
to move to the middle.
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTATIVE MARKING
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By-Es
NAKS, Date 3-12-82
June 17, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HERBERT G. KLEIN
RE:
Campaign 1972
Between Conventions
1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President
concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will
be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build
on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will
be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform
and the Democratic performance in Congress.
I would suggest one excursion out of town. This would be
an ideal time to emphasize the President's concern for the
environment and to point up his legacy of parks program
while people vacation. The trip should include a stop
in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to
inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer
to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national
parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events
where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer
facilities, see some animals, etc.
Post Convention
2. After the convention and into the fall the President
should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly
on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly
so as not to give the impression of overconfidence which
might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should
maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a
fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis
on rallies and quiet talk on television.
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
- 2 -
I would use the week after the convention for meetings
with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This
could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would
give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong
Presidential interest. I believe the President should
launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity
in key states during the first week in September. This
would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder
of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington,
invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only.
We also have the fund raiser on September 26.
In early October I would step up the President's campaign
activities to travel one or two days during the week and
then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I
think this should lead up to intensive travel and
campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to
campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should
be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it
won't appear to be last minute panic.
Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but
particularly in September, it should emphasize places
which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble.
Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close
by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some
time in California, Texas and Illinois.
Some of the first week of September activities should be
rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the
President will be leading in the polls. We have the
early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some
events to tours of facilities such as high trade manu-
facturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't
done this. He should have one or more events each
emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some
way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 3 -
avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout
the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities,
particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice
President should work these areas hard, also.
General Thoughts
3. I would hope that the President personally would use
informal television considerably, interspersed with short,
direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most
rally television even on a state basis. If the President
is to answer questions on television, either regionally
by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize
more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge
that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the
other programs.
I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by
the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses
should be of high tone-the Presidency and the record. A
contrast should be built between professionalism, calm
competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism,
uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when
the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some
examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you
didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream.
A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.
4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the
economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes
and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done
more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank
new face which is credible. They will try to focus on
distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.
One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership
meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the
nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an
idea I had: After this was printed without attribution,
several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this
has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 4 -
In a more major way, I believe the President should spend
most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader
and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying
above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken
at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if
Q and A television is used, the President could do this
to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter
battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion
by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional
candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they
are organized.
My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate
to me that at this moment, the people are interested more
in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown
in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction
of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates
(particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on
personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.)
and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even
three months ago.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
HSD
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Suggestions
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
The President essentially should continue the present
strategy of being a professional President working to
solve national and international problems. From now until
the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal
emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period
might be right for some non-political type travelling to
important states not to be visited in the campaign--appear-
ances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees
Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.
Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket
and the issues.
2. What should the President's posture be from the
Republican Convention to the election? When should he start
campaigning? How much travel where what type
?
The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the
election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted
with the Truman style. The approach should be one of
humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy.
Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President
should address himself in appearances to his vision of the
- 2 -
kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further
down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change
horses in the middle of this dream."
Of course, the President would envision an America with a
realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient
national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on
fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforce-
ment; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued
individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast
with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated
by the opponent, in the right way.
The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-
September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a
short campaign in the public interest. We should start
this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having
campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.
Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and
at least two big rallies in each region SO no area should
feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies
could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19
visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits
should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.
The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan
and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as
possible without hurting the candidates, especially key
prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide
and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.
Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At
these affairs, the President could be honored with key
leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President
has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician.
He should be depicted as the statesman building a better
and more stable USA and world.
Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on
- 3 -
the type forums or activities available or which could be
created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.
3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on
issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and
others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern state-
ments, policies and record on the line through speakers and
advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of
McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious
enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as
the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and
appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party
leaders should be charged with undermining the President's
efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote
to condemn the President in a time of international crisis
(mining). We should contrast peace through strength with
peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus
irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on
stability, individual and national security, and public
safety.
The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal
security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The
Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public
saturation in every good detail.
Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism
should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these
times, based on a solid record of performance under very
adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol
Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care
here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority
party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize
all the obstacles in the President's path.
Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on
developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from
- 4 -
the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat
Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements
should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.
We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue--that
this determines the success of everything else. The big
line of difference should be drawn on this issue.
4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and
how we should meet it.
The opposition strategy will turn on these major points:
Vietnam, tax reform, haves VS. have-nots, unemployment,
cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensi-
tivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).
If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength
theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam
charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate
and the campaign.
Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the
President's solid record of achievements could blunt most
of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we
have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968),
the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to
positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more
to show that the higher percentage today is due to the
influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and
point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy.
With war we can get unemployment statistics down but
casualties back up (jobs VS. lives).
Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered
with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without
bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation admin-
istration with all the black, chicano, women, et al,
appointments contrasted with previous, ending of section-
alism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can
put together a paper on this.
- 5 -
Trying to pit the have-nots VS. the haves can be made into
a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare--
also, they have promoted race VS. race and section VS.
section, all ended now under RN.
Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack.
Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information
that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the
loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the
ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in
the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately,
McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable
us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.
Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based
on opportunities, that further underscore the President's
credibility and get them well publicized. The record of
withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word.
Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In
fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting
out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means
also finding ways to stress the President's personal
characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive
and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through
anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he
did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and
how much it meant to his family.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL CARRUTHER
From the first of July until the evening of the 22nd of August
when the President is asked to appear at the Republican
National Convention, in Miami, to accept his party's
nomination, he should maintain his Presidential posture.
In his role as a world leader performing the duties of the
most complex and awesome office in the history of mankind,
he is operating at a level that obscures the counter efforts
of the Democratic candidate. He must maintain the tremendous
momentum that he has created in the area of foreign affairs and
focus on generating an equal momentum on the domestic side.
In order to generate this "domestic momentum", I recommend
that we create a series of substantive Presidential events
in the key political states. The justification for these events
must be to attend to the domestic needs of the people in these
areas.
In the period between the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions, the President should hold a series of domestic
summits at the White House dealing with the key issues and
they should be, obviously, widely publicized. Consequently,
in his role as the President, he sets the stage for his domestic
trips, which should begin shortly after the Labor Day weekend.
The sooner we begin to publicize these domestic summits at
the White House, the better.
If we create considerable media interest in the domestic
summits, we will accomplish the two most important things:
1. We will increase the exposure of these summits
between the conventions and, therefore, steal
the lead from the Democrats.
2. We will provide credibility to the President's
domestic trips following the Republican Convention.
- 2 -
I recommend that we create a media campaign
around each of these domestic events. We
should provide day-to-day media input to the
television and radio stations and major newspapers
in these areas each day leading up to, during and
following the event. By creating our own regional
network in each of these key political areas, we
will totally dominate media coverage for a
concentrated period of time. Our goal, of course,
is to leave a lasting impression with the voter
that Richard Nixon is responding to the domestic
needs of the people at their level. These trips
beginning in early September should continue
through the month of October. Each of these
major domestic events should be supported with
side trips and human interest type drop bys.
The President should avoid attacking the opposition between the
conventions. However, that does not prevent the other members
of his political family from doing SO.
The Democrats will dominate the media during the first two weeks
in July. It will be most difficult to steal the spotlight from them,
but we should try. One or two dynamic events or announcements
could have a devastating effect on the Democrats, i.e., while the
Democrats are fighting it out on the convention floor, Richard
Nixon continues to implement his far-reaching and inventive
foreign and domestic programs.
If we can gain this domestic momentum and maintain our foreign
posture, we leave the Democrats with very little to talk about
except themselves, and in that respect, no matter who their
candidate is, there is no contest.
Our major area of concern is our lack of ability to communicate
the President's interest in, and compassion for the people.
Richard Nixon has approached the office of the Presidency with
great dignity and formality and, in many cases, his Presidential
posture has been misconstrued as being abstract, private and
secretive. While these aspects of his personality create a certain
intrigue around the office of the Presidency, we are being
criticized for being out of touch with the people.
- 3
I feel that the November Group's media campaign and the
Wolper documentaries will do a great deal to offset this
thinking, but I also think that it is our responsibility to
persuade the voters that Richard Nixon is not out of touch
with the people and that he does care for each and every
citizen and that he has great compassion for his fellow man.
In addition, whatever hostility the voters have toward their
government, they translate it through the incumbent as
opposed to the challenger. I believe that the main reason
that Hubert Humphrey lost the California primary is because
he was construed by the California voter as the incumbent
and a representative of the establishment, while George
McGovern was clearly cast as the voice of the people and
the challenger.
I think the American public wants to get to know their President
better and that we have the obligation to provide that contact.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues --
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time SO as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour --
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes VS. services strategy before a
prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not so out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine -- is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign pa ce should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i.e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared so that the President would fly into a city and be
met with no less than 200, 000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
3.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations -- one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc. ) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices,
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews and
negative i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues amnesty,
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
abortion can only help Ic Govern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges
i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc.
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count. And since it is possible and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should worry about countering McGovern's potential
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry SO much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive his defense budget -- or that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers.
It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans i. e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing -- the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish-
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.