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This file contains:
Sheet of notes relating to various 1972 election topics. Author unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Garment to Haldeman RE: thoughts on campaign issues. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Garment to Price RE: notes for the 1972 Republican National Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/10/1972
From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a secret memo. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: campaign advice from White House officials. Handwritten notes added by Higby and unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From Haldeman to unknown RE: potential political themes and campaign strategies for 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a White House memo. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
List of White House officials and the progress of their responses to a Haldeman memo. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Sheet of notes on a "Suggested Order," listing numerous White House officials. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
Order of Memos which lists numerous White House figures. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Whitaker to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign following McGovern's nomination, including ideas on key demographics. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/17/1972
A "Wall Street Journal" article titled "McGovern Won't Alter His Successful Formula As He Turns to Nixon" by Norman C. Miller. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 7/12/1972
From Malek to Haldeman RE: an attached memo concerning McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Rietz to Magruder RE: McGovern's campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: an Evans- Novak Forum on the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1972
From Teeter to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 6/29/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Khachigian to Buchanan presenting interpretations of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. Polling figures attached. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Kehrli to Strachan RE: an attached document sent to Butterfield. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 7/6/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the political lessons of 1960 and 1968. Campaign polling graphs attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: thoughts on presidential posture and key campaign issues. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman answering questions presented in a previous memorandum on the election. Handwritten note added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From McLaughlin to Haldeman RE: strategies for RN to use when giving a speech. Handwritten note added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145826
label
WHSF: Contested, 20-14
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145826
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 20-14
description
This file contains:
Sheet of notes relating to various 1972 election topics. Author unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Garment to Haldeman RE: thoughts on campaign issues. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Garment to Price RE: notes for the 1972 Republican National Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/10/1972
From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a secret memo. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: campaign advice from White House officials. Handwritten notes added by Higby and unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From Haldeman to unknown RE: potential political themes and campaign strategies for 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/18/1972
From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a White House memo. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
List of White House officials and the progress of their responses to a Haldeman memo. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Sheet of notes on a "Suggested Order," listing numerous White House officials. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
Order of Memos which lists numerous White House figures. Handwritten note added by unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Whitaker to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign following McGovern's nomination, including ideas on key demographics. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/17/1972
A "Wall Street Journal" article titled "McGovern Won't Alter His Successful Formula As He Turns to Nixon" by Norman C. Miller. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 7/12/1972
From Malek to Haldeman RE: an attached memo concerning McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Rietz to Magruder RE: McGovern's campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: an Evans- Novak Forum on the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1972
From Teeter to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 6/29/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's role in the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Khachigian to Buchanan presenting interpretations of the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. Polling figures attached. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Kehrli to Strachan RE: an attached document sent to Butterfield. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 7/6/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the political lessons of 1960 and 1968. Campaign polling graphs attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: thoughts on presidential posture and key campaign issues. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/22/1972
From Chapin to Haldeman answering questions presented in a previous memorandum on the election. Handwritten note added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From McLaughlin to Haldeman RE: strategies for RN to use when giving a speech. Handwritten note added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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1
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
14
Campaign
Other Document
Sheet of notes relating to various 1972
election topics. Author unknown. 1 pg.
20
14
6/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Garment to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
campaign issues. 1 pg.
20
14
7/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Garment to Price RE: notes for the
1972 Republican National Convention. 3 pgs.
20
14
6/12/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a
secret memo. 1 pg.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 1 of 6
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
14
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to multiple White House
officials asking for their ideas on the 1972
presidential campaign. 1 pg.
20
14
5/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: campaign
advice from White House officials.
Handwritten notes added by Higby and
unknown. 1 pg.
20
14
5/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to unknown RE: potential
political themes and campaign strategies for
1972. 1 pg.
20
14
6/12/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Higby to Chapin RE: recipients of a
White House memo. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 1 pg.
20
14
White House Staff
Other Document
List of White House officials and the
progress of their responses to a Haldeman
memo. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 1 pg.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 2 of 6
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
14
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to multiple White House
officials asking for their ideas on the 1972
presidential campaign. 1 pg.
20
14
White House Staff
Other Document
Sheet of notes on a "Suggested Order,"
listing numerous White House officials. 1 pg.
20
14
White House Staff
Other Document
"Order of Memos" which lists numerous
White House figures. Handwritten note
added by unknown. 1 pg.
20
14
7/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Whitaker to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
the campaign following McGovern's
nomination, including ideas on key
demographics. 2 pgs.
20
14
7/12/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
A "Wall Street Journal" article titled
"McGovern Won't Alter His Successful
Formula As He Turns to Nixon" by Norman
C. Miller. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 3 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 3 of 6
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
14
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Malek to Haldeman RE: an attached
memo concerning McGovern. 1 pg.
20
14
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Rietz to Magruder RE: McGovern's
campaign. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 3 pgs.
20
14
6/23/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dent to Haldeman RE: an Evans-
Novak Forum on the election. Handwritten
notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
20
14
6/29/1972
Campaign
Report
From Teeter to Haldeman RE: RN's role in
the 1960 and 1968 presidential elections.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20
14
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: RN's role in
the 1960 and 1968 campaigns. 5 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 4 of 6
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
14
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Khachigian to Haldeman RE: the 1960
and 1968 presidential elections. 1 pg.
20
14
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Khachigian to Buchanan presenting
interpretations of the 1960 and 1968
campaigns. Polling figures attached. 7 pgs.
20
14
7/6/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Kehrli to Strachan RE: an attached
document sent to Butterfield. 1 pg.
20
14
7/5/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: the political
lessons of 1960 and 1968. Campaign polling
graphs attached. 8 pgs.
20
14
6/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
presidential posture and key campaign
issues. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 10 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 5 of 6
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
14
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman answering
questions presented in a previous
memorandum on the election. Handwritten
note added by unknown. 10 pgs.
20
14
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From McLaughlin to Haldeman RE:
strategies for RN to use when giving a
speech. Handwritten note added by
unknown. 2 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 6 of 6
meet w/ 58m daily - 630?
Pollie me Cord - all Seen news
Pol- Comp 72 Memos
-
This to ad types - interface
w/polls.
a Out is any comp activity bet
Convention?
- Worl in DO-WH or travel
in US - "non poe"
To
each
3
FC memos fel H on "How"
partic wents + sugge
4
JM- - cc's of memos ?
5
C David session -this wind?
6
Run on Strengths
For Pal - Rumo + Price
1
mention of keep It Gerry, foe be done?
me G- sun 6/18 State - Econ - main issue of camp
8
any response to Big Bus change?
agneu ?
- How to get w/lettel guy -
G
9
Fold memos in w/ chapin
planning Schol
10
FC u/ safere on Dem Oppos
in "couple of wells"
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
LEONARD GARMENT
I wasn't around to respond to your earlier request for campaign sug-
gestions. From the look of things my contribution wasn't missed.
Attached are some rough notes on the convention that I prepared today
for Ray Price (see particularly paragraph 4). I am going to try to
develop the argument that there is need for a clearer exposition of the
domestic payoff from the President's foreign policy initiatives - to
bring areas of demonstrable Presidential strength into line with
popular priorities. I also believe the weight of the convention and the
campaign should be toward projecting the details of the second term,
rather than mixing it up with McGovern. People should be made to
feel that the very thought of repudiating the President and derailing
all his meticulously-prepared work in progress is slightly silly and
somewhat embarrassing (see, e.g., NEWSWEEK's article "The World
Votes for Mr. Nixon").
ug
attachment
1
July 10, 1972
FOR RAY PRICE
FROM:
LEN GARMENT
CONVENTION NOTES
A brief summary of the points I discussed with you on the phone Saturday -
plus a few others.
1. The only thing that emerges with sharpness from the collection of essays
on convention themes is Bakshian's phrase: "A Better Future For All. 11
The conventional, and correct perception, is that for the voter what's done
is done and the past is relevant only as a prologue to the future. The
convention themes should therefore be future-oriented, and pointedly SO.
While this is hardly a revolutionary idea, it's important to have it in mind
when executing things like Jack McDonald's platform presentation. The
function of parts 1 and 2 of his outline are to reinforce belief in the
President's special capability to carry out part 3 ("The Unfinished Agenda"),
and, as a general guideline, more weight should go to the last than to the
first two.
2. I doubt that there's any single theme that will do a great deal for the
convention or the campaign. The important thing (and this relates not only
to themes, but to everything else in the convention and campaign) is to
do appropriate things, and not to charge off in wrong directions, striking
strident notes, overstating the case for the President against the Democrats,
stretching credibility, straining nerves, and, in the process, alienating
independent support.
3. The cross-pressured complexity of the contemporary U.S. scene not
only makes it risky to put too many eggs in any one thematic basket, but
peculiarily difficult to define that basket. There are very few rallying
points td a positive nature these days. The "President as Peacemaker"
is one, of course, but beyond that the going gets uncertain - and even the
President's foreign policy accomplishments have to be tied to domestic
concerns - to jobs, to inflation, to the availability of resources to deal
with domestic needs, etc., and not merely to "abstract" issues (for today's
U.S. electorate) like national security and the U.S. "role" in the world.
2
As Irving Kristol points out, one of the main qualities of populism is
that it is paranoid and therefore simplistic, xenophobic, and anti-
bureaucratic. McGovern is therefore building his appeal to a coalition
of these feelings rather than to conventional issues and groups. The
intense personal feelings Kristol identifies are the McGovern target.
An understanding of these feelings and sympathy for the specific grievances
they represent should be reflected in the convention and campaign themes
and materials. (It occurs to me that on the whole basic subject of Presidential
accomplishments the foreign policy/domestic policy dichotomy is not only
a false one but a harmful one, and a deliberate effort should be made to
overcome it. I think we should talk about this/little bit of detail.)
4. A good theme (like a good slogan) should convey the feelings of an
equation. It should be logical, simple, unambiguous, non-verbal in its
thrust. It should not invite argument. It should have an apparent quality
of inevitability, and therefore capable of producing the widest immediate
concurrence. That was the value of "Nixon's The One" and "Reelect the
President. 11 Compare, "Trust Muskie" (all wrong) and McGovern's
"Demand the Truth" (very sound). The problem with "Now More Than
Ever" ds that it is ambiguous (and on the negative side), slightly mysterious,
slightly threatening, sets up a debate, etc. All of which is to say that
"A Better Future For All" strikes me as/appropriate convention theme,
just as "Reelect the President" strikes me as an effective campaign-slogan.
But none of this is of crucial importance. In fact, it might be best - given
the lack of a rallying issue - to float several slogans around the convention.
They might work together in a helpful way.
5. The tone of the convention materials should be crisp rather than emotional,
confident without being smug or complacent, lively and factual rather than
grandiloquent and self-serving. We should demonstrate not only a grasp of
the kind of concerns for the future that are widely shared, but should also
make clear that there are specific programs under way to deal with each
of these concerns. We've talked about a structural metaphor: The
President designed the Nixon Doctrine to build a new foreign policy structure
in order to create safer conditions in the world so that life will be better
in the United States. Payoff examples of this comprehensive Presidential
design are beginning to emerge. The Soviet Summit has produced a market
for $750 million in U.S. grain. The China meetings have led to the sale of
jet transports. Trade and currency negotiations similarly translate into
dollars and jobs for Americans. And 80 on. These links are matters best
handled by explanation, not by exhortation. The role of the Republican
Convention is basically to report on an Administration very much at work,
s
not to prepare for a political fight with the Democrats. Whatever conveys
this sense of continuity, of work in progress, of a professional President
assisted by a highly professional Administration, of quiet long-range
planning that is now surfacing results, will serve to highlight the "better
future" theme. (Max Ways has an interesting essay in FORTUNE about the
new international economic complexities, i.e., a profoundly important
shift has taken place from a world preoccupied with military issues to one
focussing on economic competition and this promising change is the
proximate result of the President's first-term diplomacy.)
6. To sum up: The McGovern strategy is to unite "the dissatisfied"
across all conventional political lines and to propose fundamental change
even at the risk of social and economic convulsion. But most of t'the dis-
satisfied" want a sense of order and personal security, and are open to
a program that offers "change without chaos" - and this is what the Nixon
philosophy is all about. Whether the problem is an overactive Court,
an omnipresent bureaucracy, the ineffective rendition of costly government
services, excessive commitments and contributions to foreign countries,
etc., basic change is, in fact, taking place and without wrecking the system
upon which Americans depend for the cake which BO many now want to eat
and have as well. Getting across the details of this message is the job of
the Republican Convention and the campaign which it keynotes.
#
#
#
#
June 12, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
The following people received the Eyes Only memo you
referred to earlier:
Safire
Harlow
Timmons
Seall
Buchanan
Moore
Ehrlichman
MacLaughlin
Hallett
Haig
MaeGregor
Garment
Colson
Whitaker
Price
Cole
Dent
Ziegler
Weinberger
Chapin
Klein
Finch
Rumsfeld
Flanigan
Clawson
CC: Bill Carruthers
LH:kb
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
It has been requested that you summarize your views and
analysis on the following points:
1. What should the President's posture be
between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be
from the Republican Convention to the election?
When should he start campaigning? How much
travel should he do, where should he go, what
type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to
strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition
strategy will be and how we should meet it.
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p.m. Friday,
June 16.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Fogelit
thems
WASHINGTON
6/12
May 18, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
is
shed
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
hdl
This
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Staff Analysis of the Campaign
Last November you asked members of the staff to submit their views
on the campaign. During the Russia trip would be an excellent time
by certain staff members to submit their revised analyses. Those
who should receive the attached memorandum from you are:
Timmons
Buchanan
McLaughlin
Weinberger
MacGregor
Colson
Dent
Hallet
Harlow
Garment
Magruder
Mitchell (C4,FYZ)
Haig
Moore
Huebner
Shultz
Whitaker
Cole
Others asked for analyses last November but who will be on the Russia
trip are Safire, Chapin, Scali, and Price
cer Honorable John N. Mitchell
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 18, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
The President has requested that during the Moscow trip you prepare
a statement of your views of the key issues and what our posture
should be regarding them for the upcoming campaign. The statement
should include the issues, your recommendations for campaign
strategy, and possible Presidential activities.
Please forward your thoughts to my office by Wednesday, May 31st.
June 12, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DWIGHT CHAPIN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
The following people received the Eyes Only memo you
referred to earlier:
Safire - In
Timmons
Harlow Scall 2185
Ehrlichman Buchanan - just 6/15 back
MacLaughlin Moore 243 -out aftown 6/19
Hallett
MacGregor 706
Haig - preticy nessey
Colson
Whitaker - June 19
Garment July
Price
Dent
Ziegler Cole tacked to H
W
einberger
Chapin 2699
Mein
Finch 2888
Sumsfeld
Flanigan 2361
Clawson
Carrufiers
LH:kb
D-Good!
5:00
AT NOON Tomorrow
IN - Safire
HANDY lot me there
TALLY Based
NO PROBLEM WITH DEADLINE
ON THORN TO
Timmons
Hallett
?
/
Date.
MacGregor
Colson
THANKS
Price no
Dent ?
Bee
Weinberger
<yrs
Klein
Rumsfeld
syle
Scali Clawson - working on speech
Moore-no
Cole 7
Chapin
Finch - will try
carritiers
Buchanar
OUT OF TOWN
McLaughlin - returns 6/19
-
Carment - returns 7/1
Whitaker - returns 6/19
PROBLEMS
Ziegler - Talked to H
Haig - tied up w/Kissinger going to China and Echeverria visit
Ehrlichman - just returned to Washington 6/15
NOT SURE - To call back
Harlow - to call H
Flanigan - 7
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
It has been requested that you summarize your views and
analysis on the following points:
1. What should the President's posture be
between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be
from the Republican Convention to the election?
When should he start campaigning? How rpuch
travel should he do, where should he go, what
type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to
strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition
strategy will be and how we should meet it,
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p.m. Friday,
June 16.
HRH:LH:kb:HRH:kb
Suggested Order:
Chapin
6:30,
Rumefelel
colson
Buchanan
safere
Price
Fineh
lawson
U
Flanigan Klein
Dent
Hallett
Canuthers
Harlow
Uieenberger
Cole
Sent te
ORDER OF MEMOS
conn but
numbered not
1. CHAPIN
2. KLEIN
3. DENT
4. HALLETT
by 7/20 name on
5. CARRUTHERS
6. RUMSFELD
7. COLSON
8. "
9.
BUCHANAN
10.
11. SAFIRE
12. PRICE
13. FINCH
14. CLAWSON
15. FLANIGAN
24 25 Buch 60-68
Sears
16. HARLOW
17. Zieglen
15. mac Gega
19. Scali
20. Cole
21. Haig
22.7 virmons
23. Whitaker
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 17, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. HALDEMAN
FROM:
John
C. R. Whitaker folu Whetak
SUBJECT:
Some Post-Convention Thoughts on McGovern
We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost -- the south,
ethnic groups in the north (Jewish and Catholic in particular) and to a
lesser extent, labor.
We should push Jewish and Catholic events for the President. We should
push the tax credit for private schools farther -- beyond just endorsing
Mills' bill.
Somehow, we need to arrange substantive meetings with labor leaders
with the President:
(a) substantive so it doesn't look like the President is on the
political make;
(b) not just go after the top labor leaders on a national level, but
systematically find the local labor leaders in the 15 key states who might
go over to the President and give them royal treatment. For example,
Mayor Rizzo of Philadelphia called me about a few labor leaders in
Philadelphia who are coming out for the President. He first requested a
chance to have these leaders meet the President, then as we talked, we
felt it would be better to find a substantive excuse to meet with the
President (I passed this along to Dick Howard for Colson).
The President has won when the press was with him (1968) and lost when
it wasn't (1960 and 1962). I think he needs to spend time with them
just how, I'm not sure.
- 2 -
I know we shy from high risks when all is going so well, but I still like
the idea of press conferences in key states -- particularly, Illinois,
New York, California, Ohio and Texas. Maybe its time to do inter-
views with key pundits -- another TV press conference, maybe right
after the GOP convention.
How to handle youth at the convention. With Tuesday the prime TV night -
at least its my impression you lose considerable audience by Wednesday
night - is there any possibility of the President's acceptance speech
going on Tuesday night and turn Wednesday night into an address by the
President in some youth forum in Miami that is clean cut. Seems to me
there is an opportunity to upstage McGovern's confrontation with youth
in the Doral lobby into a message that gives the TV viewers the impression
there are millions of young people out there that "have short hair and are
very much in the system" and pro Nixon -- very tricky to pull off, i.e., a
large, young crowd meeting somewhere in Miami that the President
suddenly drops in on so the hippies don't have time to learn about it and
cause a confrontation. Its possible even to put the acceptance speech on
at 10:15 p.m. and have him speaking again by 11:15 p.m. to a youth group
the same night.
I sure don't know what you do with Wednesday night that isn't a totally
anticlimax if you move the President to Tuesday night -- but I think its
worth looking into.
The idea of him hanging around Key Biscayne even for an overnight bothers
me. Sure, we could block hippies at the Key Biscayne causeway or outside
the compound, but that's defensive tactics. One scenario could show him
leaving the south lawn Tuesday night -- maybe even a huddle with Kissinger
or Ehrlichman by the chopper on last minute state business -- fly to
Miami -- do acceptance speech and youth rally and right back to Washington
and on Wednesday stock the TV news with a well publicized substantive
event to give the impression of business as usual back at the White House
"being President. If Or do the same thing Wednesday night (and forget the
larger Tuesday night audience) with a business as usual scenario back at
the White House Thursday.
cc: John D. Ehrlichman
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Wednesday, July 12, 1972
Battle Plan
McGovern strategists think Richard Nixon
epitomizes the old politics that has created the
McGovern Won't Alter
widespread alienation they find, and they be-
lieve their essential task is to contrast Sen.
McGovern's "credibility" with Mr. Nixon's al-
His Successful Formula
leged zig-zag policies. "The average guy votes
for the man, not the issues," declares Gary
As He Turns to Nixon
Hart, the Senator's 34-year-old campaign man-
ager. "The key issue of 1972 will be: Can you
believe your leaders?"
With a "suspicious electorate," the voters'
He'll Still Stress the Issues,
lack of familiarity with Mr. McGovern relative
to President Nixon is actually an advantage,
Rely on Young Volunteers;
Mr. Caddell contends, even though it is an ini-
Big Chore: Unifying Party
tial handicap. "Starting from behind and being
largely unknown is a tremendous advantage
this year," he argues. "There's something to
be said for being the underdog when people
Money Won't Be a Problem
perceive themselves as being at the rear of the
train."
By NORMAN C. MILLER
The McGovern staff promises the Senator
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
will battle Mr. Nixon in every region, including
the conservative South. Mr. McGovern may
MIAMI BEACH - George McGovern, now
certain of winning the Democratic presidential
make a swing through the South in August to
nomination tonight, is calmly confident that he
appeal to Wallace-type voters with his own
brand of anti-establishmentism. Clearly, how-
can go on to defeat Rehard Nixon by carrying
out essentially the same battle plan that was SO
ever, the central battlegrounds will be the
Northern industrial states and California. MF.
devastatingly effective against the regulars in
Hart talks of an electoral combination that
his own party.
would combine the states Hubert Humphrey
The South Dakotan and his aides recognize
that they face enormous problems and are
carried in 1968 (which would include Texas)
with additional victories in California, Illinois
starting out as underdogs-just as they did
and either Ohio or New Jersey.
when the primaries opened in February.
But they think the phenomenal campaign
A Nixon Victory Seen
organization they developed in the primaries
Despite these hopes in the McGovern camp,
now can be expanded into a national machine
most politicians doubt the battle plan can suc-
powered by volunteers and buttressed by use of
ceed. They expect that the Democrats, badly
television and other conventional campaign
bruised by the battle for the nomination here
tools.
and in the months before. will lose in Novem-
The battle plan already is roughed out. The
ber to Richard Nixon. These prophets doubt
machinery was churning even as the Senator
that the McGovern forces can blunt the
was smashing the desperate stop-McGovern
charges of "radicalism" that the Republicans
movement here. A prime part is a. massive vot-
will keep pushing in the months ahead.
er-registration plan aimed at young people;
Mr. McGovern and his staff will put the fin-
since July 1, days before the McGovern nomi-
ishing touches on their campaign plan during a
nation was wrapped up, volunteers in many
working vacation of a couple of weeks that will
states have been setting up the registration ap-
begin Saturday at a Black Hills, S.D., retreat.
paratus. McGovern staffers will go directly
But even before their victory here, they had
from Miami Beach to take command of these
sketched out the essential components. Talks
summer-long efforts in each state.
with McGovern intimates disclose these de-
tails:
Proposals and an Image
Other ingredients of the plan:
ORGANIZATION: The voter-registration ef-
-Mobilizing armies of volunteers for door-
fort aimed primarily at the 18-to-21-year-old
to-door canvassing of voters in the fall.
new voters is slated to reach full stride across
-Seeking reconciliation with party regu-
the country by August As much as $3 million
lars, who tried so hard to stop Mr. McGovern
to $4 million may be poured into this drive to
at this convention. by offering to give them
register as many as 18 million new voters.
leadership roles within each state campaign or-
"The registration drive will give us an op-
ganization.
portunity to develop a whole new eléctorate,"
-Combating the idea that the Senator is a
says adviser Fred Dutton. "We want to in-
radical through a TV campaign that will proj-
crease the potential turnout from 72 million to
ect his mild-mannered style and attempt to es-
90 million," he says, figuring that the vast ma-
tablish an image of trustworthiness.
jority of the new youth vote would go to Mr.
-Financing the campaign mostly with
McGovern (who, incidentally, will mark his
small contributions and perhaps even refusing
50th birthday next week).
all gifts above $1,000.
The registration effort also will help mobi-
lize the army of volunteers the McGovern men
Carrying on with the controversial tax-re-
form, welfare and other major proposals the
3
hope to unleash next fall for door-to solici-
tation of votes. "We expect to have 25,000 to
Senator has stressed in the belief that voters
50,000 volunteers working in each of the half-
want fundamental change.
dozen major states." says Mr. Hart, who man-
At bottom, the McGovern plan for victory in
aged the hordes that helped Me McGovern in
November IS founded on a belief that an Amer-
the primaries. In the secondary states," he
ican majority is angry with established politi-
Adds, the McGovern forces will be deploying
clans, distrustful of the standard promises,
perhaps 5,000 volunteers for weekend canvass.
ready for a "political revolution" in its leader-
ing.
ship, as McGovern pollster Pat Caddell puts it.
Even some McGovern men doubt that the
ISSUES: The McGovern camp VOWS the
Senator won't back off from the basic stands
canvassing technique, which was so successful
he has taken in the primaries. Yet yesterday,
in the-primaries, can work on a broader scale.
he demonstrated some flexibility even on his
But most top McGovern aides disagree, re-
long-standing pledge to totally withdraw the
garding it as a vital part of the Senator's effort
American military presence from Southeast
to reach people alienated by shortcomings of
Asia. He told a group of wives of prisoners of
"the system."
war that he would keep forces in Thailand and
"A lot of people think no one cares about
also deploy ships near Vietnam if Hanoi re-
fused to return POWs and account for men
them any more," says Mr. Hart. "It really im.
missing in action. At the same time, he re-
presses them to have a McGovern volunteer
newed his long-standing pledge to get out of
knock on their door."
Victnam within 90 days of his inauguration as
ADVERTISING: The television, radio and
President.
print advertising will seek to establish the
The Senator's aides believe his call for an
image of popular participation in the Mc-
immediate end to the war is his biggest politi-
Govern campaign. Charles Guggenheim, the
cal plus. Similarly, they think his pledge for a
campaign's media director. contends that TV
phased $32 billion cut in defense spending is
ads showing Sen. McGovern "listening to the
basically popular. And they see no dire politi-
people" talk about their problems are espe-
cal risk in his call for sweeping tax reforms
cially effective.
that would end many tax preferences and in-
Half-hour documentary films will be shown
crease corporate taxes.
in prime TV time so that "people can get to
The Senator himself, however, acknowl-
know McGovern in depth." Mr. Guggenheim
edges that he has a political problem with his
says. These will be augmented by five-minute
plan for large-scale redistribution of income by
commercials and brief spots featuring Mr.
revamping the welfare system. A new version
McGovern on specific issues-the war, tax re-
of this plan probably will be outlined shortly,
form and "trust in government." Many will
but McGovern men stress that the basic con-
show him conversing with voters.
cept-increasing the incomes of the poor while
McGovern strategists will rely on the televi-
raising taxes of the relatively well-to-do-won't
sion campaign to dispel the notion that Sen-
be altered.
ator is a radical. The Senator's low-key style
The McGovern men maintain that his will-
will confound the anticipated GOP attack on
ingness to take specific stands on controversial
his alleged radicalism, they think. "If there's
issues is one of his strengths with voters. "It's
one word to describe George McGovern's TV
a fallacy to say that people have to agree with
impact, it's 'disarming' says Mr. Guggen-
what a man stands for on the issues to vote for
heim.
him," says Mr. Hart. "The central issue is
FINANCING: McGovern staffers say they
trust."
don't worry about raising the money to get
But Mr. McGovern is entirely willing to at-
their message across. The new campaign-
tune his positions to the concerns of big voting
spending law, for one thing, will equalize the
blocs. Yesterday, in an apparent bid to rcas-
major candidates' broadcast spending at $8.4
sure Jewish voters of his commitment to Is-
million each. Mr. Hart is confident that $20
rael's defense, he threw his support behind a
million to $25 million will be raised to finance
toughly worded plank revising the party plat-
the campais While that may equal only half
form to stress that U.S. military might would
the Nixon warchest, the campaign manager de-
remain available to deter Israel's enemies.
clares: "It will be satisfactory.
I would
Of course, Mr. McGovern has fuzzed up his
doubt we'd lose the electon on the basis of
positions on some especially emotional issues.
money."
He has backed rapidly away from identifica-
Indeed. McGovern men are considering a
tion with liberal abortion-on-demand laws. He
novel plan of almost renouncing big-money
stresses he doesn't believe in legalization of
backing and limiting individual contributions to
marijuana but just in reducing criminal penal-
$1,000 each. A flaw in this scheme is that the
ties for its possession. He stands firmly by his
McGovern men figure they'd have to accept
proposal for amnesty for draft-dodgers, but
loans of more than $1.000 from fat cats to get
now he adds that he doesn't favor blanket for-
the campaign off the ground. But they are dis-
giveness for those who deserted the armed ser-
cussing the idea of paying back the loans as
vices and became exiles in foreign countries.
the campaign progressed. with public disclo-
McGovern men say they aren't worried by
sure, so that they could emphasize that financ-
the GOP attacks they anticipate on the abor-
ing was coming basically from small contribu-
tion, amnesty, marijuana and other "radical"
tors.
issues, an attack that Spiro Agnew already is
They believe it's possible to do this. About
pressing. In fact, Mr. Hart contends the Repub-
80% of the S6 million- the Senator spent in the
licans may engage in overkill and suffer a
preconvention campaign came from "ordinary
backlash. "Every minute they let Agnew on
people," McGovern aides claim. The political
the stump will help us," he predicts.
purpose, of course, would be to promote the
As another counter to Republican attacks,
idea that Sen. McGovern is the candidate of the
the McGovern strategy is to identify the Sena-
"little guy" while President Nixon is the candi-
tor more with traditional Democratic economic
date of the "big-money interests."
issues. Thus. he will denounce high unemploy-
ment and stress his plan for a $10 billion jobs-
creating program. This approach might help
him win blue-collar ethnic voters susceptible to
Nixon appeals on busing, crime and such is.
sues.
PARTY UNITY: The breadbasket issue is
what the McGovern men hone eventually will
persuade George Meany and other reluctant
AFL-CIO chieftains to get in line behind the
South Dakotan. The federation leaders, how-
ever. seem certain w leave this convention still
embittered by the McGovern victory. Of all his
foes here, they fornte the hardest-line opposi-
tion to his nomination.
"It's going to take some time to work out
relationships" with the AFL-CIO leaders, con-
cedes Carl Wagner, the Senator's aide for labor
matters. And he acknowledges that some
unions may never support Mr. McGovern.
An early test of the McGovern men's ability
to W00 labor will come during the summer vot-
er-registraiton drive. The McGovernites would
like to mesh their volunteers with the registra-
tion organizations that unions maintain in most
states. They'll also seek to bring old-line party
people into their state organizations to help
manage summer registration efforts and fall
campaign activities.
Most of all, the McGovernites hope that
shared hostility toward the President will ulti-
mately bring the party back together again.
"There is still the great unifier-Richard
Nixon," says Frank Mankiewicz, the Senator's
top political strategist.
Even while smashing the stop-McGovern
movement here, the Senator's forces were
striving to show that they want to work with
labor and old-line party leaders, not drive them
out of the party. The most symbolic indication
came when the McGovernites forced a vote at
4:30 a.m. yesterday on a compromise motion
that would have allowed Chicago Mayor Rich-
ard Daley and his challenged group of dele-
gates to take their seats.
To be sure, the compromise motion was de-
feated-because the Daley group spurned the
offer-and the mayor lost his place in the con-
vention. Nonetheless, the McGovernites hope
the effort showed their real desire for reconcili-
ation with the old-line forces. Ye terday, the
Senator immediately began seeking meetings
with Mayor Daley and Mr. Meany to give them
assurances of his willingness to reach accom-
modations in the party-healing effort. And. evi-
dently, Edmund Muskie will lend the South
Dakotan a hand, as he promised in his conces-
sion announcement yesterday.
Yet the intra-party differences are deep.
Not only do Mr. Meany and others disagree
fundamentally with Sen. McGovern on a num-
ber of important issues, but also they are ex-
tremely antagonistic toward the new forces he
now has brought to power within the party that
was theirs to dominate for SO long.
This may create an unbridgeable gap or
else permit an alliance in name only. For, as
Mr. Dutton observes. Sen. Medovern's basic
appeal is to a "constituency of change." And
the Daleys and the Meanys are the sence of
the establishment that that constituency wants
to change.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1972
Note for Bob Haldeman -
The attached memo on McGovern
may be of interest - it has a slightly
different flavor than what I have seen
before.
Im
Fred Malek
Attachment
Fred Mark
RI
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 8, 1972
Confidential
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
KEN RIETZ
kk
SUBJECT:
The McGovern Campaign
With all things considered, McGovern should be a much easier
candidate to run against than Humphrey. The only area he
has natural support is among young people and my feeling
is that he is not as strong there as many think (separate
memo follows).
There is a danger in the McGovern candidacy, however, that
may not be immediately apparent. That danger lies in the
immediate temptation to go for the jugular. In my opinion,
this would be a real danger.
McGovern does not appear to be an evil man. He looks like
the man next door. He is neither handsome or ugly, is not
slick, and seems to talk everyone's language. He is not
well-known and that is an advantage. His biggest advantage,
however, is that he appears to be straightforward, honest,
and sincere. This is especially appealing to young people.
An immediate broadside attack against McGovern will definitely
reduce his appeal. It will level off his present steep climb
in popularity and dampen his campaign spirit. It is my feeling that
this kind of a broadside (even if carefully disguised) would
be a mistake. While we would slow his campaign, we would leave
ourselves open to the charge of "cheap Republican trick" and
the democrats would rally behind their wounded soldier. We
cannot make a martyr out of McGovern or we will have real
problems.
We should let McGovern's surge run its course. This will be a
tough thing to do because McGovern will rise in popularity. If
he is turned aside now, however, he will only rise again and
then we may not be able to stop him because we have used up all
our material.
Confidential
Confidential
Jeb Magruder
-2-
June 8, 1972
The similarity between the present situation and the 1970
Brock campaign is very real. The issues against McGovern
are very similar to those used against Gore. The timing
we used seemed to work well and should be explored this
year.
It would seem appropriate to plan the last six weeks of
the campaign from election day backward. Each week a new
issue should be discussed coming down hard on the
inconceivable and unbelievable position of McGovern.
The issues should be so drawn as to always be keeping
McGovern on the defense defending his own stand. That way
he will spend an entire week answering busing and we
will hit him the next week with abortion, prayer in schools,
etc. The key is not to destroy him but to keep him always
on the defense, explaining his position.
The important point is, these issues should not be used up
early. McGovern should not be attacked early. If we build
a startling lead early it will only dwindle and we may have
nothing in reserve. This will be a very difficult thing to
accomplish because the natural tendency is to hit him now
and hit him often. Everybody in the field (particularly
volunteers) will call for it and most people in Washington
will demand it. (In the Brock campaign, my telephone rang
off the hook with advisors who said we were losing because
we weren't hitting Gore, particularly in early September.
Our only reply was we had it planned and it would come.
And, it did.)
In addition to proper timing, style and tone are all important
in this attack. The issues should be discussed but, there
should be a common theme. I suggest that theme is believability
and sincerity -- McGovern's. We should stress his political
nature and the way he built himself into a candidate by using
the people -- young, old, black, etc. In addition, we should
stress the unbelievability of his position compared to the
view of all Americans. Time after time he should be shown
out of touch with what Americans want.
What I am saying is that the issues have a twofold purpose.
The first is the issue itself, but the second and more important
is painting McGovern as someone out of touch with reality and
the American people, insincere, and a politician of the first order.
Confidential
Confidential
Jeb Magruder
-3-
June 8, 1972
While this process is going on, the President and Vice
President must stay above the battle. They should not
get involved in name calling and should remain positive --
talking about the accomplishments of the Administration
in a positive, not defensive way.
cc: Fred LaRue
Fred Malek
Confidential
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. Haldeman
FROM:
Harry S. Dent
AED
RE:
Evans-Novak Forum
The E-N Forum almost sounded like a Re-elect RN Forum.
At the end, of the 50 attendees, only three thought
McGovern could win in November. A number of Demos
were present. Invitations went to the E-N Newsletter
mailing list and cost $150 each.
Speaking were Bob Novak, Larry O'Brien, Dick Scammon,
Pat Caddell (McGovern's young pollster), and Harry Dent.
Novak began by conceding the Southern and Border states
to RN and the other conservative types. This got him
to 241 electoral votes, adding that any one of the big
ones like Ohio, California, New York, Michigan, et al,
could put RN over easily. Surprisingly, O'Brien said
this was tough to refute and that the election would be
"very, very rough." He was very concerned about what
will happen at the convention, remarking that when he
bangs the gavel that may be the last semblance of order
at the convention. He said winning is not as important
as he once thought -- that he just wanted to restore
confidence in the system.
Then O'Brien discussed the bugging incident, forecasting
\
that beginning on Monday, it would be brought out that
"elements of the government were involved." He deplored
the incident and convinced those present of sincerity.
Asked if he were getting cooperation from the White House,
Justice, and the FBI, he said "yes" only to the FBI.
Page Two
June 23, 1972
H. R. Haldeman
O'Brien left the impression that "elements of the
government" could mean the CIA or FBI, "an agency in
which we have all had confidence." He said he had
just talked to the head of an agency who had a former
employee involved.
McGovern's brain child was not impressive or persuasive
He cited polling generalities and would refer to what
one interviewee would say to prove his point. In essence,
he said people will not be voting on the issues and
that many who don't agree with McGovern will vote for
him because of the new politics -- the feeling that
McGovern is for "him" and against "them." Thus McGovern
can get by with generalities and strike home on only
one point such as tax reform to win "him" and set "him"
against "them," the establishment. Glibness and class
warfare will do the job.
Caddell said the more McGovern is exposed and campaigns,
the stronger he gets. He attributed the last-minute
setback in California to the Jewish switch over the
Israeli concern and the departure in confidence to New
Mexico. He didn't back away on ideology or the welfare
and defense issues, citing Va. Lt. Gov. Howell's state-
ment that "the middle of the road is marked by a yellow
stripe, and if you stand there, you'll get hit from
both sides.
However, he indicated their leaders and followers will
be practical and realistic, especially on convention
credential challenges. He referred several times to
sugaring everyone up during and after the convention.
I got the impression they will get more pragmatic, but
cannot now hint at any policy compromises.
Scammon took many potshots at the McGovern policies
and actions. He rated RN as a 60-40 favorite now and
listed many "ifs" that must be pulled off for the
election to be close. Wallace voters were pictured as
Page Three
June 23, 1972
H. R. Haldeman
holding the key to 1972. Scammon pointed out that
McGovern went up after Wallace was shot, indicating
he won't be getting the Wallace votes that Caddell
had claimed. The Jews were described as being tor-
tured between supporting a Democrat and protecting
Israel. The Catholic Strategy is working, he said,
adding that McGovern must find a way to cover the big
Catholic and Southern hemmorhages.
Scammon also pointed to McGovern's cross on busing,
and Caddell agreed. Any more big busing orders and
McGovern is really hurt, Scammon averred. He credited
McGovern with two advantages: his Democrat numerical
superiority and "the fact that he's not really a true
ideologue" -- he can compromise. He really lectured
Caddell on the necessity of being realistic. He cited
the homosexual plank forced in Minnesota by McGovernites
and claimed two were dancing on TV at the convention in
lavender t-shirts (let's get this).
Scammon said RN is pictured by many to represent their
concern about alienation. This, he thinks, will counter
those who feel alienated, particularly their idea of
getting the Wallace voters.
The property tax was mentioned as a concern of the
Middle American even though the young and black may not
feel this concern -- another warning to McGovern.
Caddell ruled out Mills as a running mate, but did
talk considerably about Askew. He said their ideal
running mate would be Catholic and Southern trade unionist.
Kevin White was mentioned, especially by Novak.
In concluding, Novak said McGovern will try to win an
"untainted victory" and that the "old guard" will have
little to do with the election. He also expects Demo
defections from ethnics and labor and that McGovern
can only offset this with talk of economics, which he
eschews.
O'Brien is concerned about Pennsylvania because of Rizzo's
possible defection.
Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
June 29, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
1960 and 1968 Elections
This memorandum is in reply to your request for a comparison of
the 1960 and 1968 campaigns and of the changes that occurred in
the survey data during the two campaigns. It is based on an
analysis of public polls (largely Gallup), the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center's After-Election Studies, individual Market-
Opinion statewide polls and my observations of the 1968 campaign.
I do not have the campaign polling for either 1960 or 1968, and I
was not actively involved in the 1960 campaign.
The following campaign polls taken during 1960 and 1968 indicate
great differences between the two races:
Date
Nixon
Kennedy
Undecided
(1960)
March
47%
47%
5%
June
48
46
5
Late Sept.
47
46
7
Early Oct.
45
49
6
November
48
49
3
Date
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
(1968)
April
43%
34%
9%
14%
Early May
40
36
14
10
Late May
36
42
14
8
Early June
37
42
14
7
Early Sept.
43
31
19
7
Late Sept.
44
29
20
7
Early Oct.
43
31
20
6
Late Oct.
44
36
15
6
November
42
40
14
4
It was impossible to obtain demographic breakdowns of the Gallup
vote for 1960 in the time allotted for this paper. We are,
however, making arrangements to get this information.
-2-
The 1960 election was neck and neck throughout the campaign. The
undecided vote was considerably less in 1960 than in 1968. The
undecided vote only increased from 5% to 7% following the initial
Nixon-Kennedy debates, at which time Kennedy took the lead and
eventually won the election.
chais
In April of 1968 the undecided vote was high with 14% of the voters
unable to make a choice. Nixon held a substantial early lead until
the North Vietnamese agreed to Paris as a negotiating site. Then
Humphrey surged ahead in the polls and maintained his lead until
time
after the conventions. Later, the Humphrey lead declined and there
was a corresponding increase in the Wallace strength. Apparently,
the disorder at the convention caused a swing to Wallace away from
traditional Democratic vote. In the closing days of the campaign
the Humphrey vote greatly increased. According to Gallup,
Humphrey's dramatic gains in the last days of the campaign resulted
from a decline of the Wallace strength in northern states returning
to their traditional Democratic vote.
It is significant to note that the Nixon strength remained fairly
constant between 42% to 48% after the convention in both years.
Very little switching seemed to occur to and from Nixon.
There are several significant differences between 1960 and 1968
which would make it unwise to conclude the 1960 Nixon campaign was
more effective than the 1968 campaign:
1. The 1960 election was a two-way race and the 1968 election was
a three-way race. The three-way race tended to delay the final
decision and increase switching simply because of more choices pre-
sented to the voter. This is a characteristic of all elections with
more than two candidates and we have observed this in primarv elec-
tions and in Canada. Also, this was the first time that most American
voters were confronted with such a situation and Wallace's candidacy
caused them to be ambivalent in their choice. In order to vote for
Wallace they had to break lifelong voting traditions. This explains why
more older voters returned to the Democratic column than younger voters.
2. The Catholic issue was very important in 1960 and not in 1968.
It caused a large number of voters to make up their minds on that
basis as soon as Kennedy was nominated.
3. Another' major difference is the 1968 Democratic convention which
divided the Democratic party as compared to a relatively united
party in 1960. Kennedy had the support of an active and united
party in 1960, while Humphrey had to contend with major splits on
both left and right with McCarthy and Wallace in 1968.
4. Kennedy was also a clearly more attractive and popular person-
ality in a time when the electorate was looking for a young and
dynamic leader. He also had the advantage of representing change
and running against an incumbent administration, while Humphrey
had the problem of having to separate himself from a very unpopular
-3-
administration of which he was a key part. Kennedy could blame
the Eisenhower/Nixon administration for all the problems of the
time; but, Nixon, on the other hand, was not a beneficiary of
Eisenhower's personal appeal and Eisenhower got credit for all the
successes of his administration.
5. The issue structure was very different in 1960 and 1968 in
terms of the general attitude of the country and the specific
areas of concern. The general attitude of the country was rela-
tively positive, optimistic, and hopeful in 1960, but extremely
negative and without hope in 1968. In 1960 the country was at
peace, the economy was in relatively good shape, the race, crime,
drug problems had not become critical and there was no major
environmental/consumer issue. In 1968, however, the electorate was
frustrated over the war, personally feeling the effects of inflation,
frightened over the domestic unrest, and worrying about the environ-
ment. The fact that there were more serious problems in 1968 and
that each of these were becoming worse combined to give the country
a very negative pessimistic attidude.
There are several reasons why I believe it would also be unwise to
conclude that 1972 is similar to either 1960 or 1968. First, and
most important, is that each election is to a large degree unique
in terms of the perception of the candidates, the general attitude
of the electorate, and the specific issues. Therefore, the 1972
election with the President running as an incumbent against McGovern
will not be particularly comparable to 1960 or 1968. In fact, I
suspect it may be more comparable to 1956 than 1960 or 1968. The
reason for this is the incumbency. In 1956, the last time an incum-
bent was running for re-election, voters decided how they would vote
earlier than any election in recent time. 76% of those who voted
had decided how they were going to vote by the week after the conven-
tion. Studies by the Survey Research Center of the University of
Michigan have demonstrated that in both 1960 and 1968 the percentage
deciding how to vote immediately after the convention dwindled.
George Gallup wrote in 1960 that the only time there was a major
shift in sentiment during 1948, 1952, or 1956 came as a result of
a dramatic international event. I believe we are at such a stage
now, and that most people will have made up their minds how to vote
by the time of the Republican convention unless there is an inter-
national event to change their minds.
There is one recurring problem for the President which is evident
throughout all of this data. We have a very difficult time moving
the committed vote over 50%. The job seems to become increasingly
more difficult the closer we come to the election because of the
declining number of voters who are undecided. This suggests that
we should be actively trying to increase the President's committed
vote in the next 30 to 45 days. Once voters actually decide they
are going to vote for a candidate, most of them stay committed.
-4-
Every point we can gain now will come much easier than those we
have to get in the Fall. This would have to be done largely
through the President's policies, programs, statements, surrogates
and not through the campaign. I do not think we should do anything
to lengthen the period of the actual political campaign. The
shorter the actual campaign, the better for us.
Overall, we would suggest that consideration be given to increasing
Presidential appearances during the next 45 days and also beginning
the surrogate program earlier than originally planned.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT Mild
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 27.
Your supposition that "during the 1960 campaign there was almost
no change in the polls, while in 1968 there was a substantial decline
during the campaign" is incorrect. In fact, just the reverse is
true. In 1960, the President's base of support fluctuated more than
it did in 1968 (Harris' figures reflect this better than Gallup's, but
since Harris was working for Kennedy in 1960 and complete figures
are unavailable, at least to me, I have used Gallup figures in the
attached chart). He came out of the conventions with 50 percent
support -- his first lead over Kennedy since January, declined to
47 percent with the TV debates, and rose again at the end of the
campaign with Eisenhower's intervention and the Republican TV blitz.
Meanwhile, except for the last two weeks or so, Kennedy was taking
most of the undecided voters as they made up their minds about the
election. In contrast, in 1968, the President's base of support was
remarkably stable, holding around 43 percent throughout the fall.
What happened in 1968 was that the remaining 57 percent of the elec-
torate gradually coalesced behind Humphrey -- the Wallace vote
declined and the undecideds moved into the Democratic camp. Whereas
in 1960 the President's actions, both effective -- the TV blitz -- and
ineffective -- the TV debates, had a substantial impact on the
electorate, in 1968 the President's actions hardly affected his base
of support at all. He might as well have not campaigned.
In fact, he really didn't campaign in 1968. From the time of the
convention forward, the Nixon campaign was immobilized, continuing
with the same platitudinous, wishy-washiness which had been appro-
priate -- and given the situation -- effective during the preconvention
period. The President wandered lazily across the country. The TV-
media campaign was as dull as dishwater. The radio speeches, as
2.
usual, were vacuous. Humphrey, in contrast, recovered his momentum
with the Salt Lake City speech on September 30, Harry Trumaned across
the country, had better media programming when he could finally afford
it, and replied extremely effectively to the President's attempt to spur
his campaign forward in the final weeks; i. e. the "security gap" speech
and Humphrey's same-day, magnificent, reply. Had the campaign
continued another two days, Humphrey would have surely captured the
White House.
Now, the conclusion from all this is not that the 1960 campaign was
better designed than the 1968 effort. The 50-state, rally-to-rally,
approach wasted the President's energies, spoiled him for the debates,
deprived him of the advantages that should have been his with the Vice-
Presidency (advantages which should have been clear to the most obtuse
observer given the way the polls shot up after his Guildhall, Soviet and
steel strike activies in the pre-1960 period -- why more of this was not
done in early 1960 and why Kennedy was allowed to dominate the public's
attention, and thus the polls, in the first six months of 1960 is beyond me)
and ignored the opportunity for him to appear non-political, issue-oriented,
even reflective with effective media programming and better use of his
office. It was, after all, only with the beginning of the taking advantage
of his office and prestige, with the public blessings of Eisenhower and
the TV programming at the end, that the President began to gain. Before
that, he was leaving the undecided, swing voters to Kennedy and actually
losing ground within his own base. Had the President used the imaginative
media ideas which were thought up for 1960, had he paused to give
decent speeches, and had he not wasted his energy and his prestige on con-
stant campaigning, he would have been much better off. Indeed, he would
have probably won.
Nor do I want to imply that the 1968 campaign was poorly planned. The
tone of what little I have seen of your 1967 memorandum on the importance
of the tube, the columnists, and the other agents through which a candidate
is mediated to the public was right on target. So was the de-emphasis of
rallies and the institution of thoughful speeches, etc. The failure in
1968 was one of execution, not design. The mechanisms through which
the President was to be projected to the public were well-thought out;
only the product was missing. The President had nothing to say; there
were no issues; the radio speeches were generally banal and -- being
radio speeches and not visual events poorly designed to attract attention
from either the media or the public. The 1960 campaign was poorly.
3.
designed, but it was salvaged at the end by the President's happening
on to good execution of what should have been his design all along; the
1968 campaign was extremely well designed, but miserably carried
out, both by the President and the people around him.
What is the lesson for 1972? It is not that the President should blitz
the country as he did in 1960 to avoid the complacency which almost led
to Humphrey's victory in 1968. On the other hand, it is also not that
he should remain above and beyond the battle remain Presidential is
the way Ray Price would put it as he did in 1968. The first approach
would rally the opposition in its general contempt for Nixon, the cam-
paigner, and it would deprive him of the advantages which almost pulled
it out for him in 1960 and which, as President and not just Eisenhower's
Vice President, he has in even greater degree now. The second approach,
in turn, would also deprive him of his advantages of access to public
attention it would leave him victimized by whatever McGovern could
manage to do, leave him vulnerable to complacency among his electorate,
and fail to take advantage of 1972's unique opportunity to reach out to
ethnics, Catholics, and others who could form, at last, a new Republican
majority.
What is needed is a campaign approach which combines the dynamism
of the 1960 campaign, particularly in the format of the closing days,
with the strategy of 1968 magnified to take advantage of the President's
incumbency. The President should be on center stage, but he should
be on center stage as President. He should be holding down food prices,
fighting inflation, taking after a big corporation or two, working on tax
reform, solving pollution problems, bleeding a bit for the poor, and --
although not as importantly since it has already been accomplished P. R.
wise -- bringing about a new structure of peace -- and he should be doing
all these things visibly, actively and dramatically. This will involve
some travel and some speechmaking, but the travel and the speechmaking
should appear non-political and very substantive. Likewise, with the
media operation -- our ads should be like news clips and any Presidential
appearances made should be information, not rhetoric, oriented. Political
rally appearances made should be few and far between -- and the ralliech
should be so massive that it can be claimed they evidence popular, not
just Republican, support for the President. I have already made detailed
suggestions and I will not repeat them here.
4.
I suspect, from my rather distant knowledge of the President, that he is
beginning to get battle-hungry the sight of Geo rge McGovern galavanting
around the country is becoming too much to resist. He should continue to
resist. Hard-charging was not what helped the President at the end of
the 1960 campaign; it was not the failure to hard-charge which hurt him
in 1968. And, as President, as the 1970 campaign demonstrated, hard-
charging can hurt him even more than it did in the beginning of the 1960
campaign and would have had he undertaken it in 1968. As President,
we have scores of ways to answer McGovern's charges without involving
the President in direct confrontation. If McGovern charges we haven't
done anything domestically, we can blast the Congress for inaction on our
domestic program. If McGovern charges us with being in bed with
business, we can sick the Anti-Trust Division and EPA on a few cor-
porations. If McGovern charges us with a failure to care about the
environment, we can print up a few thousand more leaflets to be passed
out at national parks or do another hundred thousand mailing at govern-
ment expense. Hard-charging wasn't beneficial in the past; with the
substitute tools cited above it is clearly even less beneficial with the
President now in the White House.
The opposite strategy to a hard-charge campaign is not and should not
be taken as doing nothing. McGovern can't win this election and
I'm not even sure this time the President can lose it. But if he can
lose it assuming a rejection of the strident 1970 approach the
only way he can do so is by being complacent, by failing to take
advantage of his governmental tools, and by failing to reflect a sense
of dynamism, motion and anti-status-quoism, all of which will turn off
those Northern upper-middle class suburbanites and urban ethnics who
can either give the election to McGovern or give a new majority to the
President. If the President wants to go on the offensive, that is good.
But let him go on the offensive with the tools and prestige of his office,
not the techniques and tricks of a politician, let him go on the offensive
against thirty years of liberal Democratic statism at home and abroad,
not against George McGovern, and let him go on the offensive for a new
sense of liberty and human possibility, not for a partisan Republican
or even "ideological majority" election victory. There is a difference,
and it is a difference which has cost the President public recognition of
what he has accomplished so far, but which can still be turned to our
advantage in the election campaign now facing us.
GALLUP POLL
1960
Nixon Kennedy Undecided
Early June
48
52
Late June
48
52
July (After Convention)
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November 6
48
49
3
GALLUP POLL
1968
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
Undecided
June
35
40
16
9
July
40
38
16
6
August
45
29
18
8
September 3-7
43
31
19
7
September 20-22
43
28
21
8
September 27-30
44
29
20
7
October 3-12
43
31
20
6
October 17-21
44
36
15
5
November 1-2
42
40
14
4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN
You asked Mr. Buchanan to prepare an analysis of the 1960
and 1968 campaigns in terms of the changes in the polls and
surveys. Pat asked for my thoughts on this. Because Pat was
tied up with his efforts on the briefing book, he asked that I go
ahead and send you my memorandum as an interim report, though
not one which necessarily reflects his views.
Pat indicated that he will respond to the request as soon
as he is able.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM:
KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN the
SUBJECT:
POLLS AND THE 1960, 1968 CAMPAIGNS
Mr. Haldeman is correct in his reading of the polls in 1960 versus
those in 1968. (See attached graphs) In 1960, between June and November,
the Gallup poll was virtually unchanged. RN had in November the same
percentage he had in June, and JFK had only slightly more in June
than he did in November. In 1968, the 16 point spread we had in August
went down to the two point spread which Gallup gave us in November.
It should be noted that the Harris Poll in August, 1968, taken about
the same time as the Gallup, showed only a six point lead for RN over
HHH compared to the larger Gallup spread.
In 1960, RN only had the lead once during the campaign, and this
was immediately following the Republican National Convention after
which he jumped 6 points over JFK. In 1968, as we all remember, the
lead continued to dwindle with Humphrey taking votes right out of the
hide of George Wallace and out of the undecided voter. From the polls,
it is apparent that RN had a solid bloc of votes that stayed with him
throughout the year while HHH steadily picked up from the switches
and undecideds.
What does this all mean?
One interpretation is that RN gets a solid bloc of voters which lean
to him, and this bloc is very difficult to enlarge as well as very difficult
to diminish. If that is the case, then in a two-man race this year, the
election will be fairly close with RN winning by about four percentage
points or less. This interpretation, however, is somewhat like a
doctrine of predestination, with the assumption that events between June
and November will not change things. I'm not willing to accept that inter-
pretation totally since for the first time RN will be running as an incumbent
President and will be much more in command of the determining events.
The other way to interpret these phenomona, however, is in terms of
the manner in which the campaign is conducted, and I lean towards this
interpretation -- especially in a year where we control the levers of govern-
ment.
Page 2
In 1960 (and I confess I was still struggling through high school),
there were two types of campaigns run -- the JFK style where you
start out at virtually full steam and continue at full steam, winning by
the sheer force of momentum and the RN style where you slowly build up
steam and momentun in order to have the campaign "peak" on election
day. I don't subscribe fully to the theory that a candidate can fully "time"
his campaign to meet the standards of "game plans. 11 On the contrary,
in the heat of the campaign, there is such an intense movement of events
as to require a virtually daily requirement to alter strategy one of
the mistakes I believe we made in 1968 was to get locked in to a broad
game plan from which we were unwilling to extricate ourselves until
too late.
The 1960 campaign is not easily interpreted along the "game plan"
lines because of all the interrupting factors RN's knee injury, the
debates, etc. Thus, to an extent, the 1960 campaign handled the events
as they came.
Moreover, the 1960 campaign was a fairly classic campaign in
issues confrontation. I grant that personality played a role -- it always
does -- but JFK and RN did battle hammer and tong on a lot of damned
important issues. From the outset RN took the case to the country that things
were pretty good in America, that there was room to improve things, but
that by and large we don't need anyone knocking America around. JFK,
of course, took the position that we had to mobilize the country along his
suggested lines, and the debate was joined with the issues falling in line
with considerable distance between RN and JFK on most of them.
Consequently, in 1960 the voters knew what the choice was very
little was fuzzed up. Given this set of circumstances, it is not surprising
that the polls changed very little. Only minor twists and turns in the
campaign, plus some bizarre pieces of bad luck the heavy beard in
the debates, the arranged release of M. L. King, Jr. by the Kennedys,
the theft of votes in Texas and Illinois made the difference.
In 1968, we may have overreacted to the criticism that there was
not enough planning in the 1960 campaign, and of course the decision
was made to pick the direction in which to go and stay on course until
the end. Unfortunately, this made us unable to deal sufficiently with
the liberation of HHH at the time of his Vietnam speech and once he
was liberated, a whole new strategy was needed. I will grant that the
bombing halt overly distorted the campaign and inured overwhelmingly
to the benefit of Hubert. Nevertheless, I do not doubt for a minute that
Hubert had the momentum going for him on election day. He was on
the move.
Page 3
The thing about 1968 is that Hubert began beating us to death
over issues. Medicare, the poor, a good economy, decent jobs
these were all in the HHH attack plan, and we did not respond until
too late. He damn near made it sound like we were the "ins" and
they were the "outs. " We had the basic issues going for us but used
them insufficiently to win the greater margin which we might have.
Having said all this, I must warn against comparisons between
1960 and 1968. The Wallace candidacy made a great deal of difference,
I believe. Wallace made it difficult for the lines to form early in the
campaign. He was a damned nuisance who clouded things up. HHH
figured this out earlier than we did and began playing RN off against
Wallace, picking up the pieces as he went along. If Wallace is out of
the 1972 campaign, I feel the situation will be much more like 1960
(which, as you know, has been a favorite thesis of mine for some time).
The 1972 campaign will be an important "issues" campaign with
two extremely distinctive philosophies battling against each other. We
are, I believe, on the right side of the preponderance of these issues,
and it will be McGovern who tries to fuzz the issues in favor of
personality, trust, and all the other crap. Nonetheless, if we accept
the notion that issues will be fairly determinative (and by this I mean
four or five big ones not revenue sharing or the environment), then
broad planning should fall along the lines of drawing the issue differences
sharply at the outset of the campaign.
Once the differences have been drawn (and I think they almost
already have) the campaign is going to be one -- like 1960 -- of playing
that confrontation in such a way as to keep our issues out front, not
letting up on our strengths and not playing to our weaknesses. Unlike
1960, we have much more going for us in terms of differences with
McGovern; i. in terms of what the American public wants. In 1960,
there was probably a 50/50 split in terms of what the public wanted.
Our task, then, is to keep this advantage by pressing those issues and
pressing them in such a way as to keep McGovern away from the weak
links which could bring us down.
Thus, if we start in August with a 54% to 46% edge over McGovern,
my guess is that we can keep this lead right on through if we don't let
the differences slide by through a skilled McGovern campaign. Every
two or three days, we should look at how things are going and plan
accordingly -- following a basic outline; but not being so blind as to
ignore major shifts of opinion once they start to occur. If something :
works, let's keep using it; if it doesn't work, let's toss it aside and go
with something else.
Page 4
I confess that it is not easy for me to map this out with short
time and space constraints, but I think the fundamental points are
in here. I caution against too much comparison between 1960 and 1968;
the times were different; the circumstances were different; the candidate
was different. I opt more for a comparison between 1960 and 1972 and
hold the belief that much is to be gained by understanding the basic
similarity of conditions. The lesson of 1968 lies in campaign "technique,"
not in historical analogy. So let's understand what is similar between
1960 and 1972 and learn from what we did wrong in 1968, and I think we
are well on the way to four more years of keeping the rascals out.
Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und,
70%
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
September
47
48
5
60%
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50%
RN
40%
30%
20%
10%
0
early June late June July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
November 6th
PERCENT
POST-CONVENTION PRES IDENTIAL PREFERENCE
80
Nixon Humphrey Wallace
August 24
40%
34%
177
70
November 1-2
42%
40%
12%
November 3
40%
43%
13%
60
HARRIS POLL
50
NIXON
40
HUMPHREY
30
20
10
WALLACE
DATES
August 24,
November 1-2,
November 3,
1968
1968
1968
POST-CONVEUTION PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE
PERCENT
80
Nixon
Humphrey
Wallace
August 21
45%
29%
18%
70
Early Sept.
43%
31%
19%
Late Sept.
43%
28%
21%
Early Oct.
44%
29%
20%
Mid Oct.
43%
31%
20%
October 27
44%
36%
60
15%
November 4
42%
40%
14%
GALLUP POLL
50
NIXON
40
30
HUMPHREY
20
WALLACE
10
DATES Aug.21
Early
Late
Early
Mid
October
Nov. 4
(1968)
Sept.
Sept.
October
October
27
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date July 6, 1972
TO:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
BAC
FYI. A copy was dexed to San
Clemente on July 5 to Alex Butter-
field.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
(Per HRH)
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.
First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial
decline during the campaign." (If there is a single hallmark of RN's
runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the
Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not
so much lose votes from August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a
historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to
it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed
a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?
A)
Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate,
if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some
of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention,
but not a Nixon voter at heart.
B)
We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North,
who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This
return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably
partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to
our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the
Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our
opportunity is renewed.)
The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise
correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls.
Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which
surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide"
that might have been.
-2-
But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings
in 1968. Basically, they were these:
a)
A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed
it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that
we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The
hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and
unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.
Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should
have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force
back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and
the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were
yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing,
he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.
On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges,
to attract interest.
b)
The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the
identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press.
Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition,
I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types
who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at
election time.
What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut
down communication with them compared with the primaries where
we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered
into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two
leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-
Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or
interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story,
The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio
Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two.
Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the
campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of
liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through
late in the game.
-3-
c)
But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may
or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of
the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well
counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate
those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the
campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my
view is:
THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964
If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:
1)
We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not
let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we
did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on
Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order, " and our issue
hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep
him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it
out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
2)
We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in
1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning
is essential; plans are worthless. 11 We should have a mapped-out
game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the
Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be
a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at
least once a week.
3)
While we should rule out the President for the time being on
the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the
country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
4)
We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the
press and media between now and November. In my view, we have
discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years
indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But
should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press
corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to
carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-
McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in
time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc --
because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why
RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national
polls by a single cubit.
-4-
5)
We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and
personality which won him 60% of the vote it was the portrayal
of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.
In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the
smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better
than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united
party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate
who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with
their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent,
we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.
Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern
is that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear
victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this
in mind.
To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues, 11
clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should
deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the
record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such
media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Caper, which
they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues
and his positions and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."
6)
One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" of
McGovern, if nominated, being case into the role of "under-dog"
"anti-Establishment, " "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign
will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human
interest than ours.
We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall to
attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but
unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average
Man agains the Establishment and the Radical Chic.
Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign
shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles
this will determine much. The medi a could treat McGovern like
Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog"
like HHH -- in which event, they could make a run out of it.
-5-
7)
As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I
would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning. 11 However
Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in
action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon
addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a
contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as
President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.
8)
Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN
into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities,
Knights of Golumbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is
only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not
who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that
20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make
appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the
ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of
the North we never carried before.
9)
Perhaps this has been repeated before - - but again, of maximum
importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-
on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with
his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that
from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same
latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged
the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.
Buchanan
50
45
RN
40
35
HHH
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Gallup Poll - 1968
RN
HHH
Wallace
April
43%
34%
9%
10
Late May
36
42
14
July
40
38
16
Aug. 21
45
29
18
Late Sept.
43
28
21
Early Oct.
44
29
20
5
Mid Oct.
43
31
20
Oct. 27
44
36
15
Nov. 4
42
40
14
0
April
BEE
1
Late
July
Aug. 21
Late
Early
Mid Oct.
Oct. 27
Nov. 4
May
Sept.
Oct.
60
Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und.
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
55
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50
RN
45
40
35
BEE 1 Early
Late
July
August
Sept.
October
Nov.
June
June
50
45
HHH
40
35
RN
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Harris Poll - 1968
10
RN
HHH
Wallace
May
36%
38%
13%
June
36
43
13
July
36
41
16
5
Aug.
40
34
17
Sept.
39
31
21
Nov. 1-2
42
40
12
Nov. 3
40
43
13
0
BEE May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Nov. 1-2
Nov. 3
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
DA
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Memoranda
In early June, you asked several staff members to respond to a memorandum from
you concerning their views regarding the President's posture and various aspects
of the campaign, as well as the opposition strategy between now and Election Day.
It is my understanding that you have read the memoranda which has been turned in.
Further, it is my understanding that my assignment is to review the memoranda
and give you my conclusions.
One point which I should make is that the next time I handle an assignment like
this for you, I probably shoult not be requested to do a memorandum of my own
on the same subject as those on which I am going to report. It is difficult to keep
from falling into the trap of using the memoranda of other people to substantiate
my own personal feelings, as well as to be unprejudiced as I read the other material.
Bryce Harlow and Bill Safire make two points which I feel should be guidelines
for us. The key to both their points is naturally one of degree and also of timing.
But we, especially you, should keep their thoughts in mind as guidelines as we move
ahead not that they are not already there!
BRYCE HARLOW: Through the years the President has been
known as a politician first and a statesman second. The President's
"Fort Knox" is deepening public belief that he is preoccupied
not with political maneuverings and expediency but with paramount
national concerns.
Safere-
BILL SAFIRE: Nixon's greatest danger is to disappear into the high
clouds. The President should not act so Presidential so as to be
Find
out of touch. Although fascinated by mystery and distance from
a leader, people are warmed by attention and evidences of humanity.
Enemy
2.
A.
BETWEEN THE CONVENTIONS
1.
The President is on the right track now in terms of his posture and
should continue the same through the Convention period. The
general conclusion of everyone and my recommendation, which I
guess is an obvious fact, should be to keep the President on his
pedestal and non-political. Our tendency toward too great aloof-
ness can be tempered by meetings or events which are designed
to prod Congress; make positive crowd stories via trips into the
country; increase the number of official meetings - Cabinet,
Domestic Council, NSC, Quadriad, etc. - all which show the President
working against the problems of the people.
2.
With Congress in session between the Conventions, meetings
designed to highlight the President's initiatives and attempts to
pressure for legislation should be highly visible The greatest
amount of time can be placed against continuing the positive
aspects of his foreign policy - however, this should not only be
done in closed conferences with Kissinger in the office, but in ways
which can be publicly recognized. To have the public believe that
the positive foreign policy aspects of the China trip, Russia, SALT,
etc. is still in the process of being put together, can work to our
advantage.
3.
When the gavel goes down on the Democratic Convention, the
orchestrated attack on McGovern and his platform should begin.
The attack is best made by third party forces and some of our
lesser known surrogates up until the Republican Convention. A
Harper/Dom
well-orchestrated and media-oriented indictment of the McGOVERN
PLATFORM (contrasted to calling it the Democratic platform)
council
should spin out of our platform hearings the week prior to our
analysis
Convention. Television coverage of the Republican platform
hearings should be equal in time allocated to the Democratic
platform hearings. The networks must be monitored on this and
we must make sure that enough news is cranked out daily so as
to justify the equal time.
3.
B.
PRESIDENT - POST CONVENTION/KEY POINTS
The further we move the start of the campaign from mid-September
moe of. 1.
toward the first of October, the better off we will be. Obviously,
we can always start earlier if Republican Convention events so
dictate.
2.
Presidential campaign travel should escalate. Begin with long weekends -
Friday, Saturday and perhaps Monday. Next add a half-day on a
Wednesday and then at the maximum work a Wednesday evening to
Saturday noon campaign with radio or TV on Sunday. When possible,
always return to the White House over night.
3.
Keep the President from making a hard, direct attack on McGovern,
at least until late in the campaign. Be cognizant of the fact that it will
look panicky if we attack at the end of the campaign unless it is done
right. Use the Vice President as well as the surrogates for the hard
attack. (PROBLEM: Everyone is counting on the surrogate operation.
Will it work? Is it set up right? Should Whitaker be instructed to head
it?)
4.
During the campaign, attacking Congress can be one of the ways the
President vents not being able to take on McGovern. The President's
desire will be to attack so we will give him something to attack and
that is Congress. Congress should be set up to represent much of what
is wrong with McGovern.
5.
Foreign policy should be laced throughout the campaign as a positive
accomplishment as well as a reason not to change horses in the middle
of the stream. If the tie can be made that the President has the same
visionary desires in domestic policy as has been exemplified in his
foreign policy, it could be the most effective way to handle the
problem of an attack on the domestic front.
6. Serious consideration should be given to the idea of having five-
minute or fifteen-minute Oval Office addresses. We might see if a
five-minute live address could be a last minute substitute for one
4.
of our five-minute network documentary buys. This would
give us flexibility and heavy Presidential weight if needed in
a crunch. It might also be a possibility on regional buys.
7.
The hectic campaign day should be out. I agree and most others
do on this point. Look at it this way. Take your 1968 memorandum -
advance it a notch - and everything falls into place. Our tempo is
firm, positive and rational. We can campaign four days running --
but it should be done in a new way (not like 1970). (I will work
up some sample schedules to make the point on this.)
8.
The regional campaign concept, as well as concentrating on special
voter blocs, is of the greatest importance. Hallett makes an
argument that we need to zero in on some target groups in the
Northeast since the Northeast is key to a McGovern victory.
Obviously, the Catholics, certain labor groups, the Polish com-
munity and perhaps the Jewish community, are all targets. The
problem here is that we have no specific recommendations on how
the President personally handles corraling these voters and we will
have to move to a plan on this.
9.
Bryce Harlow cautions on overexposure which I feel can also be a
problem for us. It is his contention that virtually every appearance
is a national event due to television. Again, this weighs into the
structure of any given day and what events we do that are timed
to make the evening news versus evening -type events. A key
question here is at what point do we saturate and become over-
exposed? The other question would be at what point does
McGovern become overexposed or is it impossible for him to
become overexposed? To what extent remaining fairly unknown
is McGovern helped?
Chaping
10. The campaign should obviously take the President to each region
Parter
and probably to all of our key States. A mix must be developed
for the activity so as to start off in the early campaign period by
utilizing some nonpolitical event opportunities in order to get
into key locations.
5.
C.
GENERAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY, ISSUES, TIMING AND
POINTS OF ATTACK
1.
Realizing the credibility and wisdom in playing off our strong
suit of foreign policy, I still see a need (as do several others) to
engineer a play for the domestic area. There is absolutely no
reason to let McGovern force us early on into a completely
defense posture vis-a-vis domestic affairs. Perhaps the whole key
to our domestic affairs attack is our pleading the case for getting
the economy in order and stressing the merits of the President's
economic policy and his courage in moving into his reordering
of the economy. We can tie directly to what McGovern's
policies would do to economic stability and taxation and make
our charge about the "McGovern Market.'
2.
I like Rumsfeld's idea that we find ways to contrast Presidential
FU
actions with McGovern's rhetoric. The question becomes,
"How?" We need to get some specifics here and it should be
part of the follow-up to this memorandum.
3.
I made a point in my original memorandum, and Buchanan made
the same point (others alluded to it) of the critical timing in terms
cears
of launching our various attacks. We must make certain that by
the middle of October we have some initiative left. I favor putting
a lot of stock in our ability to react quickly enough to issue
charges so as to have the public feel that we are actually on the
offensive side and that it is McGovern who is trying to defend.
As I stated before, this has got to tie in to Pete Dailey's operation,
as well as with those who are monitoring the issues for you.
4.
Safire makes the point about picking a villain to attack. This
is the same concept that Connally expressed to the senior staff
at Blair House about attacking straw enemies. We should take the
straw enemies such as the bureaucracy, big spenders. perhaps
Congress (I'm not sure on Congress), drug pushers, the abortionists,
and others and start building them as giant enemies to the general
public now. We can demagogue these enemies through our
surrogates in order to insure that when the President takes them
on in the heat of the campaign they represent more of a threat
to our constituency than they do presently.
6.
Although others did not mention it specifically, I want to re-
emphasize my point that we keep the debate on issues on the
broadest possible range. A one-issue campaign such as law and
order was in 1970 should be avoided since it does not play
to our advantage. Credibility is the real danger here. The
exception as stated before would be a foreign policy crisis.
to
6.
Virtually everyone is on the "credibility or trust" attack which is
expected. Everything we do beginning now should build credibility.
We should have a credibility desk, people who are ginning up examples
of how credible this Administration has been. We should put out
front a President and an Administration that has done everything
How
possible within our bounds. For what we have not succeeded on,
we should blame Congress, the bureaucracy and people who would
undermine what is in the best interests of the country. All the
surrogates, in particular the Convention apparatus, our advertising,
other world leaders, whatever we have should be used to build the
President's credibility.
SUGGESTED FOLLOW-UP POINTS
1.
Between the two Conventions, the case between the Democratic platform and
the Democrats' performance in Congress should be exploited. A plan should be
developed by the Congressional Liaison Staff in conjunction with the Domestic
Council Staff detailing activities designed to illustrate Congress' poor performance.
The activity should be designed for the period between the Conventions and should
assume that there will be very little Presidential time available for his participation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
MacGREGOR SHOULD GET THE ACTION
MacGREGOR AND EHRLICHMAN TO GET THE ACTION
HALDEMAN MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM
2.
The Domestic Council should be asked to come up with domestic related events during
the period between the Conventions. These activities again should be ones which can
be handled by people other than the President, as well as perhaps a couple of good
recommendations for Presidential activity. These activities should concentrate on special
voter bloc efforts, as well as key domestic efforts - in particular, taxation.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
DRAFT MEMO FOR HRH TO SEND EHRLICHMAN
SHOULD BE PRESIDENTIAL MEMO TO EHRLICHMAN
3.
Ken Cole's memorandum states that the President "needs to rearticulate publicly his
domestic philosophy - what he stands for -- what he is for and against domestically."
He states a little later, "..he needs to state his goals for the nation domestically and
how we are going to get there." I am not sure that the President knows what his
domestic philosophy is. It seems to me that we should have a paper drafted by the
Domestic Council, in particular, by Ehrlichman or Cole, which does state what our
domestic philosophy is at this time.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
OTHER
2.
4.
It is suggested that perhaps the President consider a trip to Midway if all the indicators
are right during the post-Democratic pre-Republican Conventions. The idea would be
to dramatize troop cuts and meet with President Thieu.
CHECK IDEA WITH KISSINGER
DROP IDEA
avoising
OTHER
5.
Colson has recommended that the President be in Washington between Conventions and
do one or two highly visible domestic events, perhaps a veto or calling in some
food chain retailers.
HAVE COLSON DEVELOP SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
DROP
6.
Ken Clawson has recommended that in the post-Convention period the President spend a
and
week to ten days personally meeting with key national, regional, and local Party officials
to give them marching orders. He feels it should be kept a closed affair and that we
should let the press speculate. Should this idea be checked out with other political types?
Kuncep
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
in
CHECK MITCHELL FIRST
7.
Buchanan and Haig both make the point, as well as Chapin, that we should not shoot
every one of our cannons at once. We need to dribble out our material so that
agree.
McGovern is kept on the defensive. Who is in charge of developing the release schedule
for the issue material? Is there any action which should be taken on this front or is it
under control?
and
COMMENT:
8.
Rumsfeld says we should enhance the President's advantage of incumbency by finding
ways to contrast his Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric. I would like to
ask Rumsfeld for some specific ways of doing this -- examples or techniques of how he
would go about it.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
3.
9.
Clawson raises a point which many others mention in terms of the problem of the
economy and unemployment figures. He says historically the Democrats lived from
these issues. He proposes creating an almost separate, well-staffed, well-financed
internal group whose job would be to solely create an image of economic well-
being in the country. He goes on to advocate a counterattack mechanism on the
economy to be headed by Colson in collaboration with Mitchell. Should we put
this together? Under Colson?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COLSON SHOULD CHECK MITCHELL
COLSON SHOULD COORDINATE WITH SHULTZ
DROP IT
10.
Buchanan in his original memorandum on the McGovern attack, as well as Ray Price,
suggested we nail McGovern early on his radicalism. I assume that you and the
Attorney General are signing off on the action memorandum which Buchanan sent in.
YES
NO
OTHER
11.
Colson's memorandum had several specific items regarding things that should be hit
in the domestic area and action that the President could take or meetings which could
be held, etc. It was his May 17th memorandum which was an addendum to the
memorandum which I am addressing myself to. I assume that you will act independently
on that memorandum.
YES
NO
12.
Do you agree that we should set up some villains -- bureaucracy, big spenders,
abortionists, and perhaps a couple of others and start building them as straw enemies
now? We can work up speech material and other facts which the surrogates can start
cranking into their talks.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
13.
In regard to the credibility and trust issue, do you concur that our surrogates, our
Convention apparatus, and everyone should be mobilized in order to plug continually
the credibility of the President?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DEVELOP SPECIFICS THAT CAN ACT AS SPEECH INSERTS
HAVE PRICE AND SPEECH WRITERS DEVELOP SPECIFICS
4.
14.
Clawson feels that with the media our strategy must be to discredit and to spotlight
the unworkability of almost everything McGovern proposes. The Administration
officials must ask publicly the hard questions since the media will not. Should we
agree
draft for our surrogates a series of questions which they can start asking about
McGovern currently? We can update and move it along as the campaign escalates.
Our first step would be to do questions which can be asked prior to the Democratic
Convention.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
HAVE BUCHANAN DO IT
BUCHANAN SHOULD DO IT AND MITCHELL SHOULD APPROVE
OTHER
15.
Colson advocates our contriving adverse polls to let the American people know that this
election is a real test and that Nixon does not have it won. He feels we need to clearly
find a way to scare the hell out of people at the prospect of McGovern's candidacy. He
also wants to start a "real hatchet operation".
Should Colson go ahead with this?
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
WITH MITCHELL'S APPROVAL ONLY
OTHER
DETERMINED TO BE AN
AD INISTRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
11.0. 12356, Section 1.1
By AOH NARA, Date 2/21/96
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
Response to HRH June 12 Memo
1.
What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
ANSWER
- Continue non-political approach
- Schedule 3 or 4 major announcements or actions which
serve to remind public of President Nixon's achievements
in office.
Example:
- Tricia to China
- Speech on occasion of passage of SALT
?
- Trip to Midway (maybe post-Convention)
brogslim magnanimous bings
- First week after Democrafic Convention, offer their
to not notas
candidate full briefing. Try to set it for second week.
thee to critinge
d Price
- One or two half day trips to key states, i.e. Ohio Armstrong
Museum. Make it good positive crowd event.
Remain every bit the President.
- A sign of toughness on the war might be most appropriate.
Would drive the libs crazy and solidify some of the
wa? Democratic support on our side.
- If a Vice Presidential change is made it should be structured,
if this is possible, so the least amount of political
brutality is expanded upon. A sloppy move here no matter
how well planned will have serious consequences.
-2-
2.
What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election?
ANSWER
-
He should move into and out of the Convention in a way
which helps to keep him on the highest Presidential level.
The key is not to come off our present high until absolutely
necessary. The Convention should be proclaiming their
great President. He should be aloof from the political
hog wash. He should avoid, as of now, everything except
his visionary and emotional acceptance speech appearance,
(unless he has to participate in a Vice Presidential change--
and if that is necessary maybe it can be done without his
appearing before the Convention).
After the Convention he should fight the tendency to go
good
right to California. Proceed directly from Florida to
Washington. Lock in a couple of events the week after
the Convention which only the President can handle and
that sets him apart from the Democratic candidate.
- In the second week of September, go to California, hold
the seminar and make the kick-off speech.
- Next return to Washington making one or two stops for
massive public events en route home.
- Otherwise do no politicking until the last week in
September or the first of October Then let him break
loose.
But is at P.
11-
The President will want to campaign hard and should.
best ampaigning
-
The obvious which everyone will say is, the President
should maintain his Presidential posture - but that does
not mean he can't swing hard and be his toughest self.
-3-
A. When should he start campaigning?
. All out campaigning shouldn't start until, at the
earliest, the last week of September. Jeb says the
Surrogates will start on Labor Day.
B. How much travel should he do? Where should he go?
. This really depends on the polls. I would envision
his wanting to hit at an absolute minimum each of the
four regions once. Our current key state list would
-Do polls lower
probably be the most logical list of locations. Where
he goes in those states will have to depend on our polling
data.
C. What type of activities should he engage in?
- This is probably the most important question.
- Only the President can have "Presidential press
?
conferences" so maybe that is a once a week or
once every other week activity.
way-
Some big, massive, public demonstrations or rallies
are necessary. A Chicago or Atlanta parade, the
Astrodome, and an Upstate New York rally.
- Television will be key. Maybe he does regional talks
on a network we put together. This would be in addition
to one or two national T.V. talks.
Price
Airport rallies should be kept to a minimum. Otherwise
cigree?
they will dominate, and they are degrading to the President.
- Anytime possible, the President should return to overnight
in the White House.
- His schedule when in Washington should include items
only the President can do-- and relate to issues or news
we want to hypo.
Exs'
I
Quadriad or CCEP meetings
Cabinet meeting OR a key subject
-4-
- NSC - maybe on a pending crisis situation
. An emergency meeting with another head
of state - i.e. Heath, Pompidou, Brandt,
or Golda.
Special Note: As with 1968 except even more so--
we should strictly limit his activity putting time against
only what counts. Figure our news cycles-- have one
national event per day and keep any other activity regional
oriented. In addition we should give him plenty of time
to think and realize that he is four years older than 1968.
3.
Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the campaign
on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
ANSWER
There are three general points.
- We should not launch all of our issue attack rockets
too early in the campaign. A plan should be developed
which in the public's mind keeps us in what is interpreted
as an offensive position. This will mean a great deal of flexibility
and an ability to almost instantly react (which Pete Daily
plans in the T.V. area).
Our tendency is to use the sledge nammer approach
and we should have a calculated release of issue positions
and attack so that halfway through October we still have
something new to present the people and hit McGovern on.
- We should keep the debate on Issues (if the war is not
over) on the broadest range possible. A one issue
campaign such as law and order became in 1970 should be
avoided. It does not play to our advantage. The exception
would be a foreign policy crisis.
- The one Issue which everything we do and say (beginning
now) should stress is the credibility of President Nixon.
Ouersurrogates, the dialogue in the convention, our
-5-
& "non
printed materials everything should build credibility.
pol
Over and over in different ways the McGovern documentary
tips
infers and once again directly states, "we need a
President we can believe in. The President has
credibility now. We need to keep it and build on it--
once it starts to collapse under fire it will be very
difficult to recover.
- Assuming the candidate will be McGovern, I am
for third party persons or organizations attacking him
lightly now and heavily the day the Democratic
Convention ends. He should be hit not only on issues
but also on his credibility, honesty and lack of experience
and understanding of the institution of the Presidency.
There is no reason to let the Honest George image
keep floating.
4.
Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
ANSWER
The Attack on the President
Reipty
Give him credit for the Summits and say the Hallmark
for the Nixon Presidency has been made. Now we must
move on.
- Say the war must end -- if it is about to end say It
hasn't been soon enough. Over promise- Nixon did
in 1968.
- Nixonomics haven't worked.
- Unemployment up- with analogies to Hoover. Scare people.
- Nixon is a devisive President. He wins by dividing
Americans. The people want to be brought together.
We must unite and rededicate ourselves.
- Crime has gone up.
-6-
- The most iselated President. Makes decisions alone,
doesn't consult advisors. Away from the White House
constantly no consultation with Congress.
. And over and over again, bang Nixon's credibility.
Bring up big business, ITT, the Court, his brother
Don, anything that helps to point negatives.
Response to the attack
The President never takes on McGovern by name or
directly. If he does it should be during the last days
of the campaign crunch and only if necessary.
- The Vice President and Surrogates can bang around
McGovern striking hard on the issues and his qualifications.
- Prominent conservativesDemocrats who are popular in key
states should be signed up under the table now by Mitchell.
We can use them in the State where they're popular just
at the right time. But- get them tied up today and before
McGovern moves right.
- The President should talk about what he has done, that
it is only the beginning of the beginning and where he is
headed. Aloof and above reproach. As long as it works-
under attack - he should turn the other cheek, and hold off
any heavy attack by himself until mid-October.
- The best Presidential attack is in stressing what he has
done. Get the public to decide he's done a tremendous
amount while McGovern yells not enough.
- I am not sure on the precise attack which whould be
made on McGovern. Just keep him to the left if it means
using some of our issue material and equity early. (Higby
has given me Buchanan's memo which looks like it outlines the
basis for the McGovern attack.) We must make sure our
attack does not come too heavy handed, with too much PR
and build him into a martyr.
-7-
- The best point of attack now is the Convention arena.
Walkouts, platform donnybrooks, anything which splits
and disunites should be undertaken - on a very sophisticated
level. (Jeb says this is being done - so good!)
What the opposition strategy will be and how we should
meet it.
NOTE: Assuming McGovern or Kennedy - perhaps even a
combination, we must realize they are what we are in spades.
They are organized, have good supporting people, great
merchandising talent behind them, the "Kennedy appeal,
an understanding of the power and potentials an incumbent
President has at Command, dedicated workers, a Government
in exile, and so on. Most important neither are the President-
nor are they their own man. Neither has the leadership
capabilities or intellect of the President. But, we must
recognize they have much going for themselves.
- The first most important strategy for the opposition out
of the Convention must be to unite the Party. I would
expect the Presidential candidate to either set up his
own San Clemente and bring in the leader of his party
from the key states, etc., or to go on a grand tour of
the country holding private unity meetings and striking
deals.
Response:
State by state McGovern should be hit by sign carrying
mothers (on abortion, drugs), laborers ($1000 to
everyone), middle class suburban types etc. Put a
truth squad with him state by state. Never let him up
for air from the time he leaves the convention.
- What are the odds that McGovern or his Vice President
(If Kennedy) could be dispatched on a world trip for the
Haig
?
period of the Republican Convention? Would Chou see
him, Breshnev, Golda, Heath, Pempidou?
Response:
Watch for this to happen in some form - and let other
governments know confidentially our displeasure at and
such meetings.
-8-
- Summit of the Cities. Meeting of big Democratic wheels-
Mayors, City Council types, etc., to discuss the urban
and suburban problems and the Democratic/McGovern
solutions. A united Democratic front - good media attention
and forces the President into highlighting his domestic
program. We would be very much on the defensive.
Response:
& PR gimmick. Use a special Vice President and Cabinet
task force as the counter and denounce the effort as a
stunt early in its planning.
- Major address to an evening session of Congress by the
Democratic challenger. Attack the way the President
has handled Congress, his inability to work with Congress,
the lack of consultation regarding the war. (This is a
cong stope. Reps
good idea - for them!)
Response:
Then send the Vice President? Demand equal time?
- The Liberals will launch a personal attack - they always
do (like the right wing).
Response:
Early on our surrogates - everyone - should swy -
Good
I wonder when McGovern will sink to the personal attack.
It is inevitable so we should mention it early - in a
joking way.
-
As the opposition I would love to see Nixon jump on a car,
throw some V's, make a massive error, get mad, have
his friend Mitchell or Bebe in trouble.
Response:
Pray all is o.k.
-9-
- Television is paramount. It is the single most important
element in the McGovern strategy. It won them California.
Television has made McGovern what he is. The workers,
the kids, the "mystique of the Kennedys" - to accomplish
all this T.V. has been the key.
We must assume crowds, events - everything will be
staged effectively for television. It has got to be their
feeling that the right television campaign keyed on a
regional, or state by state basis can defeat the
President.
Via television they will show:
- A Presidential candidate who listens to the public -
understands their problems, is sympathetic.
- People, all kinds, black, white, Mexican American,
you name it, rallying around one man. The one man
who really can "bring us together again" and unite the
nation.
. They will strike out for the little man. The Bobby
Kennedy and George Wallace thrust. The fight against
big government. The impersonalism of the Fed. As
they do this Nixon will become the symbol of bigness
and what is wrong.
- Issues will be fought on the emotional level and they will
avoid lengthy explanations and specifics. It will be good
solid T.V. Watch for their own Archie Bunker approach-
after all, Liberals created Archie and look at the power
Archie has with that segment now. Carroll O'Connor
doing McGovern commercials is not an impossibility.
Response:
Pete Daily has this in hand. However, I think we should
look very seriously at how we would run a T.V. campaign
against the President. This exercise on our part might
give us some specific thoughts.
-10-
- Mobilization of the key liberal lobbying forces will be a
source of much irritation for us. Everyone from Common
Cause to the garment unions to Operation Bread Basket
will be running their own campaign against the President.
I would suspect a McGovern umbrella strategy which will
coordinate all of these groups. They will point Nixon as
anti-humanitarian, against minorities, etc. etc.
Response:
Our best strategy is to counter via those lobbying groups
who are for us. Or, we should get readings on those
groups who will oppose us and assess the threat. Next
we should set up front groups playing to the same
constituency, using a similar name and launch some
Good
back-fires. (You have Common Cause - how about
Common Course to prove the nation is headed in the right
direction.)
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
quit.
FROM:
JOHN McLAUGHLIN
SUBJECT:
The President's Speech
Delivery: Extemporaneous
vs. Prepared Text.
I have your memorandum of June 12, requesting views and analysis
on various campaign matters. I regret the delay in responding to this
request (I was away) and would ask for still more time to give more
thought to these important subjects.
May I take this occasion, however, to register with you a few ideas
on why the President, in the concluding days of several of his past cam-
paigns, has "blown his lead. " Doubtless, several reasons are entailed
here, but one possible factor may have been overlooked, namely, the
President's practice of speaking before live audiences extemporaneously.
Escalbut
As a political orator, the President is naturally sensitive to the live
audience, even live audience-controlled. This is of course common to
orators of all kinds. To galvinize the live audience, the President es-
tablishes eye contact and talks directly to the listeners. To establish
this forceful contact, he is required to abandon a script and settle for
extemporaneous speaking.
Now, the strain of speaking on a variety of fresh subjects extempora-
neously is too great, so the President, as campaigner, develops a prepared
text which he uses repeatedly - a set speech. The speech is adjusted at
the beginning and the end to accomodate regional situations, with the body
held intact serving as the campaign formula presentation.
PJB
The principal shortcoming of the set speech is that the press grows
weary of it. Soon the press grows increasingly reluctant to give space
combo
to what the President has said so often before. The consequence of this
is that exposure of the candidate slackens as the election day grows closer
and momentum is lost.
eney
Coupy
My suggestion is simple: That the President's speeches during the
campaign be read. These speeches should be written with an eye to
-2-
opening issues at certain times in the campaign, building to climax,
in such a way that the closer the election day comes, the more politically
powerful the issues raised. Much of this could be programmed early, if
the set speech concept were dropped.
For the President to be willing to drop the set speech concept, he
would have to forsake his belief that audiences can be electrified only
by no-script deliveries. Live audiences can indeed be galvinized by
read speeches. The President indeed himself has demonstrated that he
can read a speech with passion and activate an audience. But he appears
reluctant to do SO. I have in mind specifically Billy Graham at the
Charlotte testimonial to him. His speech on that occasion was delivered
with great flourish and cadence, but also from beginning to end it was read.
The President, on the other hand, chose on that occasion not to read his
speech and fought his way through a fifteen-minute address, of considerable
substance and heart, but one which must have drained his energies. Clearly,
that type of oratory cannot be maintained throughout a campaign if one hopes
to raise fresh subjects at strategic times.
Ironically, the President is driven to the psychology and rigor of a
set speech because of his determination to move the live audience. The
price he pays for this effect is the relentless and somewhat mechanical
use of the set speech, leading to the loss of the mass audience, the loss of
climax and momentum, and abets the "blowing of his lead. " The other can-
didate, on the other hand, uses timely scripted materials, carefully worked,
captures the press, and peaks his campaign.
In sum, reading a speech has built-in values: 1) It can present issues
on fresh subjects to cultivate the press and to peak the campaign. 2) It
takes the strain off the candidate, permitting him the control that he needs
to speak about powerful and sensitive subjects without worrying about
accuracy of phrase, detail or statistics.