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This file contains:
From Haig to Haldeman RE: a previous memo asking for campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Scali to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the presidential posture during the campaign and general election strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From MacGregor to Haldeman RE: presidential posture and campaign attack strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Cole to Haldeman RE: thoughts on RN's posture during the campaign and useful election strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Timmons to Haldmean RE: answers to a previous memo sent by Haldeman on the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Weinberger to Haldeman RE: thoughts on RN and the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: advice for RN on the subject of the 1972 election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: presidential posture and strategies for the election season. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Safire to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the presidential campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: 1972 campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Finch to Haldeman RE: strategies for the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies and presidential posture. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: attack strategies and presidential posture suggestions for the 1972 campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Klein to Haldeman RE: election campaign strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign strategies and RN's image during the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's previous memo asking for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: key election tactics for the 1972 campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
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26145828
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WHSF: Contested, 20-15
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document
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pageCount
1
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id
26145828
sourceUrl
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document
title
WHSF: Contested, 20-15
description
This file contains:
From Haig to Haldeman RE: a previous memo asking for campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Scali to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the presidential posture during the campaign and general election strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From MacGregor to Haldeman RE: presidential posture and campaign attack strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Cole to Haldeman RE: thoughts on RN's posture during the campaign and useful election strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Timmons to Haldmean RE: answers to a previous memo sent by Haldeman on the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Weinberger to Haldeman RE: thoughts on RN and the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: advice for RN on the subject of the 1972 election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: presidential posture and strategies for the election season. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the campaign. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Haldeman to multiple White House officials asking for their ideas on the 1972 presidential campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Safire to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the presidential campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: 1972 campaign strategies. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Finch to Haldeman RE: strategies for the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies and presidential posture. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: attack strategies and presidential posture suggestions for the 1972 campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Klein to Haldeman RE: election campaign strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign strategies and RN's image during the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's previous memo asking for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: key election tactics for the 1972 campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
15
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haig to Haldeman RE: a previous
memo asking for campaign strategies.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20
15
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Scali to Haldeman RE: thoughts on the
presidential posture during the campaign and
general election strategies. Handwritten
notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
20
15
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From MacGregor to Haldeman RE:
presidential posture and campaign attack
strategies. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 2 pgs.
20
15
6/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Cole to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
RN's posture during the campaign and useful
election strategies. Handwritten notes added
by unknown. 4 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 1 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
15
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Timmons to Haldmean RE: answers to
a previous memo sent by Haldeman on the
campaign. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 3 pgs.
20
15
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Weinberger to Haldeman RE: thoughts
on RN and the campaign. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20
15
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: advice for
RN on the subject of the 1972 election.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20
15
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE:
presidential posture and strategies for the
election season. 3 pgs.
20
15
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: thoughts
on the campaign. 6 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 2 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
15
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to multiple White House
officials asking for their ideas on the 1972
presidential campaign. 1 pg.
20
15
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
the presidential campaign. 3 pgs.
20
15
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: 1972 campaign
strategies. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 4 pgs.
20
15
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Finch to Haldeman RE: strategies for
the campaign. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 4 pgs.
20
15
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: general
campaign strategies and presidential posture.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 3 of 4
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
15
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: attack
strategies and presidential posture
suggestions for the 1972 campaign.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs.
20
15
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Klein to Haldeman RE: election
campaign strategies. 4 pgs.
20
15
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign
strategies and RN's image during the
election. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 5 pgs.
20
15
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's
previous memo asking for campaign advice.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.
20
15
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Carruthers to Haldeman RE: key
election tactics for the 1972 campaign.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 4 of 4
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
@
Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised
in your memorandum of June 12:
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Conven-
tion and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the
ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture
it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is
best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally
consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to
his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance
in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive
attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were
masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests
are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has
consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally
associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the
solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has
captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking
and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the
development of a "Mr. & Mrs. 11 team image which would not have been
possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.
Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of
a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the
campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a
Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organiza-
tional arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of
accomplishment.
I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions
about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are
taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-2-
This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet
meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in
favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic
Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor,
Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate
of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously
EMK
threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning
must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which
would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning?
How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type
of activities should he engage in?
Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full
cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions,
I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that
of a self-confident. competent statesman who is above frantic political
Into
campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should
be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid
suings
over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe
we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one
Greads 68 spe
adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced
and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken.
That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's
attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived
ballybeo. In my view the greatest danger will be exposure and
Harlow agrees
excessive campaign energy.
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the
campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should
therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern
posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which
I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is
McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we
emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage
the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent
on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we
should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's
strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing,
aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-3-
Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-
McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase
of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in
the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more
than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes
can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also
who
have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-
balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns
between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern
vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we
do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most
importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which
can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or
domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis
should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be
tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be
tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather
than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to
develop compensatory neutralization programs.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the
following:
(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc.
The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront
Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by
our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some
break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our
policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will
therefore become moot.
(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT
agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President
has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a
qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight
factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.
(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously
try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound
by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily
blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-4-
Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of
improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen
setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be
counted as a strong continuing asset.
(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international
economics. balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization
and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords
the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful
Flan
assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to inter-
national trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will
flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international
monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that
statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm
that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve
some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps
have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.
(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism
but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly
strong popular base.
On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments
in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his
statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN SCALI
gos
SUBJECT:
Election Strategy
I am not an expert in this matter, but here are my thoughts for
what they are worth:
1.
President's Posture Between Conventions:
High-level, statesmanlike, tending to the business
of running the government without appearing worried
or nervous about whoever the Democratic nominee
is, or what he is saying. Normal flow of appointments
and movements, rather than any hyped-up schedule,
but with emphasis on efforts to build a strong military
Jonitive
defense for the nation. Vietnam peace negotiations if
developments break our way, plus attacks against the
cost of living, particularly food prices and unemployment.
stane
In the meantime, convention leaders, Governors,
Senators and Party spokesmen would be building a plat-
form, in sharp contrast to McGovern's positions, and
pledging to work for the President who would continue
to be above the battle.
2.
After the Convention:
I would favor substantial campaigning with at least two trips
to California, New York, Ohio, Michigan and Southern
Wallace states if he chooses not to run. Kick-off time for
the campaign could be about September 15.
EYES ONLY
Mr. Haldeman
- 2 -
June 29, 1972
3.
Campaign Issues and Points of Attack:
If the candidate is McGovern, he would be extremely
vulnerable on national defense welfare money
scheme, plus his incredible posture begging the
enemy or potential foes for mercy, either for
release of prisoners or creating a utopian world
where magically we could all live in peace. By
sharp contrast, the President should bear down on
how he has served the nation as a proven leader in
the "real world", dealing with Moscow and Peking
at the summit from a position of military strength,
which is the only way to build a genuine peace
instead of an illusion of harmony which betrays rather
than serves the hopes of our people. I also suspect
it would be possible to build a powerfully effective
campaign issue on McGovern's half-baked ideas of
welfare and tax reform to show that this threatens to
destroy the free enterprise system which has been the
springboard for our greatness.
4.
Opposition Strategy and Points of Attack:
A.
Nixon is an outdated political hack who favors
the status quo because it helps his rich friends.
He is an isolated, suspicious loner who fails
to recognize the massive forces of change
sweeping our land, demanding more jobs, a
redistribution of wealth, and an end to the Nixon
inflation. It is long past time to reduce insane
military spending and devote the resources to
rebuilding our cities and providing adequate
medical and retirement care for all.
EYES ONLY
Mr. Haldeman
- 3
June 29, 1972
B.
Nixon is anti-Black, anti-poor, and an enemy
of the laboring man, particularly the union
member.
C.
The credibility gap that afflicts the Nixon
Administration has widened into a chasm. The
President relies on Madison Avenue public
relations hucksters to hide the real truth from
the American people as demonstrated by the
Pentagon papers and the India-Pakistan
documents. Actually he is a slippery politician
who is seeking to make himself a "King" by
disregarding Congress and relying on secret
diplomacy and foreign deals which he hides from
the American people.
D.
Vietnamization is a fraud, propped up by the most
ruthless bombing in history, an act bordering on
genocide. At best, he is substituting Asian bodies
for American bodies. Meanwhile, Nixon has
stubbornly resisted the act of statesmanship that
would bring this insane war to an end - withdrawal-
and relying on Hanoi to free the Amer ican
prisoners just as every foreign government has,
once the shooting stops. Instead, Nixon clings to
some fictitious "honor" and for four long years has
been responsible for the death of tens of thousands
of additional fine American boys, proving he lied
when he said he had a peace plan.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 29, 1972 -- 6:15 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CLARK MacGREGOR
Q-1.
What should the President's posture be between the Conventions?
A.
The President's posture from July 17th through August 18th should
be precisely what it has been during the past five weeks. He should
continue to perform as President, with only minimal public
visability as a candidate for re-election.
Q-2.
(I will not here repeat the question.)
A.
The President should continue his Presidential activities through
Friday, October 13th. He should not start campaigning until
Saturday, October 14th*. From mid-October until Election Day
the President should spend each Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday
in Washington as President and should campaign each Friday through
Monday. During the period October 14th-November 6th, the Presi-
dent should visit each of the top 15 or 16 electoral-vote states,
plus a representative and easily accessible number of states with
lesser electoral votes (marginal or "swing" states). The
activities should be related where possible to events or situations
associated with some aspect of his accomplishments as President -
or to his hopes for the future.
Q-3.
Any general thoughts
A.
The President's outstanding record of accomplishment on key issues
(peace, prosperity, performance) must be constantly emphasized,
and the attack must be directed to taxes, welfare, and national
security.
Q-4.
(.
opposition strategy
.
)
A.
The opposition strategy will be concentrated on domestic policy
attacks and will seek to portray Richard Nixon as the Herbert Hoover
* except, of course, for one-shot opportunities for significant addresses
such as Detroit on Labor Day.
Page 2 - Memorandum for H.R. Haldeman - June 29, 1972
of the '70's. We will hear a great deal about favoritism for the
rich and the corporate giants, insensitivity to the concerns of the
elderly and the poor. Every opportunity must be naturally
developed to demonstrate the Nixon Administration's performance
and plans for progress in aid of "the little man" and the disadvan-
taged. "The re-election of President Nixon" will guarantee a
1
"fair shake" for every American.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN COLE
This is in response to your memorandum of June 12 which
requested my views and analysis of the following points:
1. The President's posture between the Conventions.
Most people are "down" on politicians and political
campaigning. The longer the President can stay
above the battle, the better off he will be. The
President should keep being "President" just as long
as he possibly can. Therefore, he should continue
as usual at least up to the Republican Convention.
During the Convention interlude, the President should
be engaged in things that reflect favorably on him -
follow-up to the trip to Russia, further efforts at
ending the Vietnam War, events to highlight the suc-
cess of his economic program and his concern for the
still unemployed. Additionally, he should make one
last effort at urging the Congress to pass remaining
legislation proposed by this Administration. This
could best be done by a series of meetings with Senate
and House Committee Chairmen and/or concerned Committee
members. In addition, the President could meet with
supportive special interest groups.
Meetings such as these would allow the President the
opportunity to demonstrate familiarity with his domestic
legislation and to articulate the principles which
support his proposals. Each meeting should be followed
with a press briefing by John Ehrlichman and, if
desirable, the appropriate Cabinet Officer. We could,
- 2 -
if planned sufficiently in advance, arrange for network
and local TV stories which demonstrate the problem the
President is trying to correct and how his solution
would work. For instance, on the environmental issue,
we could encourage the networks and local TV stations
to get film of water pollution which could be utilized
in their reports of the President's meeting with Congres-
sional representatives to encourage them to pass his water
pollution legislation.
Most importantly, in the Cabinet meeting last Friday
we heard the President was eloquent on foreign policy
Price?
and the balance of international power. He needs to
re-articulate publicly his domestic philosophy - what
he stands for - what he's for and against domestically.
It may be that his acceptance speech at the convention
would be the best place, but he needs to set his domestic
philosophy before the public, not on a programmatic basis,
but in the overall sense he needs to state his goal for
the nation domestically and how we are going to get there.
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention to
the Election.
Here again, the longer he can stay "President" the better
off he will be. In this case, whether or not the Congress
is in session will have some bearing on what the President
Probably
is able to do. If the Congress is in session, the President
should continue the scenario outlined for the between Con-
ventions period. If it is not in session, then we must
find graphic ways for the President to demonstrate the
failure of Congress. For instance, he could make trips
to problem areas and then kick Congress for allowing a
problem to go on because of their failure to pass the
legislation the President recommended. These trips should
be "non-political"
In either event, the President should not start political
campaigning until, at the earliest, the first of October.
If Congress is still in session then, he should be out of
Washington only on weekends. This could perhaps be
stretched to include one trip during the week, although I
think it is important to convey the image of the President
being in Washington "running the country" while others are
out campaigning.
- 3 -
The President's efforts should be concentrated in key
states. He should not try to visit all 50 states, but
he might make some regional visits which would include
states otherwise missed, for instance the farm states.
He should do events which provide for some kind of
encounter with the "average man". Generally these
should be issue oriented situations. Additionally, he
should also do the standard rallies and motorcades, and
note
although many will argue that the McGinnis book discredited
the citizen TV Q&A, I think the same kind of thing which
was done in 1968 could be utilized again - assuming we
can figure out a way to avoid being accused of rigging
was
the panel.
3.
Thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
points of attack, etc.
The President should not attack anyone for anything
during the campaign. This should be left to the
surrogates. He should at all times be the statesman
who has brought peace to the world and economic stability
to our country. And, who has applied and intends to
continue to apply these same visionary attributes to
our domestic problems. The President should articulate
only positive things relative to key issue areas and key
interest groups.
The surrogates on the other hand should be on the attack
beginning with the close of the Democratic Convention.
What they should be attacking will, of course, be depen-
dent upon the candidate as each has staked out his own
positions. It seems to me though that no matter who the
candidate is there are two things which we can challenge
Row
regardless. One is the failure of the Congress, and the
second is the inability of the Federal Government to
&
produce because of bureaucracy. I don't think we should
have any qualms about attacking the Federal establishment,
even if it means pointing the finger at ourselves, although
I do believe we can be divorced from most of the goings on.
4.
The opposition's strategy and what we can do.
The Democrats will attack the President's credibility and
his lack of concern for the average man. They will have
absolutely no regard for the accuracy or validity of their
charges and they will use the War, the economy - high food
prices and high unemployment - and other people issues
- 4 -
such as hunger, housing, crime and taxes to demonstrate
their claims. While we will be tied to specifics, the
Democrats will be able to avoid them, and they will get
a lot of help from the media in conveying their message.
The President should stay above all of this. He should
be on the offensive with issues like beace, the conomy
and the failure of Congress to legislate his domestic
reforms. As I said before, he should not attack the
Democrats for their faulty charges. Rather, this should
be left to the surrogates whose efforts should be geared,
in addition to positive statements, to disclosing the
fallacies of opposition proposals, pressuring the opposi-
tion for specifics and painting the opposition as extreme
and irresponsible. We, like the Democrats, should not be
too concerned about the substance of our charges - as long
as the President is not making them. Presidential spokes-
men will have far more flexibility for demagoguery than
will the President.
We should have our own plan as to how to win this election,
and the development of the plan should assume that the
worst charges possible are made against the President.
We should then operate against this plan, and never, once,
deviate from it. Just because the opposition makes some
false charges, the President should not be rushing out to
respond. Rather we should just let it go, or let a sur-
rogate handle it.
My rationale for all of this is that the majority of the
people of this country desire most a President who is
strong in his leadership, compassionate in his judgments
and courageous in the face of adversity. I think they
have that kind of President in President Nixon. And I
believe that this situation, thanks to the China visit,
Russia, the mining of Haiphong and the President's strong
action to bring the economy back in line is becoming
increasingly clear to the public in general. Everything
the President does between now and the election must be
geared to contribute to this image.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
WILLIAM E. TIMMONS
SUBJECT:
Your June 12th Memorandum
1.
I believe the President's posture between the Conventions should
be non-political, statesmanlike, our national leader. However, the
President can use those six weeks to set the stage for election issues
by taking positions which the public approves, but which contrast with
the opposition. He should consider built in appearances before
national conventions and regularly scheduled meetings (Jaycees, Older
Americans, Spanish-Speaking, etc.) where he can appear as President,
not candidate.
For example, if busing is a campaign issue, the President might meet
with school superintendents, hold legislative sessions on his busing
proposals, submit a Constitutional Amendment, engage in discussions
with parents and students who suffer under excessive busing, etc. In
this way, in his proper role as President, the Chief Executive would
be building on an issue to exploit in the campaign. The same could be
applied to POWs, Vietnam, defense spending, drugs, amnesty, 6th
Fleet-Israel, or other issues which may be politically attractive.
Since his opponent will come from Congress. the post DNC Convention
period should see implied criticism of the Democratic controlled Senate
for not acting on the President's substantial legislative recommendations.
Making Congress a whipping boy is always difficult but it will at least
highlight the President's initiatives.
Cabinet officers, Congressmen, Governors and other surrogates should
use this time to attack the opposition: its candidates, record and platform.
Since Party behavior is the first test of voters, one of the most important
activities would be the President's personal and private involvement in
getting Democrats to switch parties after McGovern is nominated. I
believe there is a possibility in this area and the President could negate
the party issue substantially.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-2-
2.
The President, I feel, should hold back from overt political
action until early in October, staying above the partisan fights.
x
Then I recommend an aggressive, concentrated campaign for the
final weeks.
Earlier, the President will have developed issues and the Surrogates
battered the opposition, leaving the President free to revitalize the
campaign and deliver the "knock-out" in the closing days.
I think the President should schedule a number of regional addresses
rallies, parades, news conferences, telethons, etc. in major cities
like New York, Atlanta, Chicago, Kansas City Denver, Seattle
no
Additionally, he should concentrate his time in the target states,
planning at least two appearances in each. The "quickie" swings of
1970, stopping in three or four states in one day, provide a good
format for a short campaign. Each event should be built around the
key campaign issues as they develop to mòre dramatically focus
attention on the President's positions. The President should resist
personal attacks on his opponent.
3.
Until the Democratic Convention and its platform, specific
issues are difficult to guess. Obviously, the Vietnam War will be an
issue, taxes, busing, jobs, cost of living, etc. George McGovern has
a record in Congress he must defend as well as his positions during
the campaign. Careful research will develop his weak points. I think
over-all he should be projected as an extreme radical whose wild ideas
would destroy the country. With this general strategy every issue can
be tailored to make the point. (McGovern is already in trouble over
his welfare-taxes proposal and has been backtracking on defense
spending.)
4.
"Right from the Start" McGovern is considered a one-issue candi-
date who created a good grass-roots organization to deliver delegates.
Should Vietnam be removed as an issue, McGovern would appeal only
to a few and certainly not the middle-road. At any rate, we can look
forward to the war issue and must publicize the President as the one
who is getting us out honorably and most important will never turn
his back on our POWs.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-3-
Dean
I suspect the Democrats are sitting on several potential scandals (like
ITT) in the government and will try to show the Administration as
corrupt, handling favors, pro-big business, etc. Unemployment and
food prices surely will be Democratic issues. The opposition is
certain to attempt to use the "trust" issue in an effort to show a
credibility gap.
The best defense is a good offense, and several attractive issues
should be constantly repeated to drive points home. For example,
the surrogates can talk about the President's handling of his job,
experience, ability etc.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
EYES ONLY
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE H. R. HALDEMAN
Subject: June 12 request for views on the President's
campaign this summer and fall
During and immediately after the Democratic Convention,
the papers will naturally be filled to overflowing with
news columns, analyses, background material, pictures,
etc., etc., about the convention proceedings and the
candidate's platform and material of that kind.
I do not believe it desirable, or for that matter even
possible, to compete with that sort of coverage. There-
fore, I believe the President, for the first few days
after the convention, should say nothing about the results
or the platform, unless there is some major surprise at
the Democratic Convention, such as the nomination of some
candidate other than McGovern or the adoption of some
particularly wild platform planks, in which case the
situation should be newly assessed.
Then, about a week after the convention and just before
Congress resumes, I think the President should issue a
fairly long statement, or make a talk in which he urges
Congress to return and finally get to work, cleaning up
the appropriation bills, calling attention to the fact
that his Budget has been submitted since January, urging
action on unfinished portions of his program such as
reorganization and revenue sharing (but not referring to
H.R. 1 again).
Another speech or statement could be devoted to the cur-
rent foreign situation and perhaps prodding Congress to
get on with the work of ratifying the various agreements
reached abroad and calling attention to any progress made
in trade negotiations at that time, etc.
He might consider holding a full-scale press conference
but declining to answer questions on politics or the
campaign until after the Republican Convention, as he had
previously said he would.
2
In short, I believe the direction from the White House should
be to try to pull the country's attention away from rather tire-
some, noisy political matters of which the public would have had
a surfeit shortly after the Democratic Convention. The President's
position between conventions, I believe, should be that of a calm
statesman speaking from the White House, demonstrating both domes-
tic and foreign leadership, and chiding the Democratic congressmen
with their refusal to take any action on his bills. I think he
should also criticize them for big spending bills which he may
have vetoed by then. The President might rather sadly comment
on the disrepute which such congressional conduct brings upon the
governmental process and on the legislative branch in particular.
After the Republican Convention, I believe the President should
embark upon a high-level type of campaigning after Labor Day,
with perhaps seven or eight half-hour set speeches (no more than
one a week), including the acceptance speech from the convention
hall, in which he contrasts the Administration accomplishments
with the various absurdities of the Democratic platform. This
may be a difficult tightrope to walk because I do not believe
the President should dwell very much on the Democratic platform
but should concentrate on the Republican accomplishments and
subtly indicate what the Democratic proposals would have led to
had the Democrats been in power. I believe some of his trips
should be in connection with specific events such as dedications
of public works or attendance at major group gatherings or orga-
nizational gatherings. Perhaps two or three could be at regular
political dinners or afternoon outdoor rallies. I think each
speech should have a dominant theme, and those on domestic issues
should point out that no domestic program can be accomplished
domes.
without our ability to live in a peaceful world, which the Presi-
dent has brought about.
I think the dominant theme throughout should be to maintain the
dignity of the presidency and not to take part in more than a
very few frankly political gatherings. These should be care-
fully organized so that the televised portion consists of the
President's talk alone with short introductory shots of arriving
motorcades, crowds, and very little else.
The point would be to try to make a major public event out of
each of these comparatively few appearances by the President in
the fall and to emphasize at all times that he is the President
with all of its trappings and dignity and majesty. The tone of
the talks should be equally high and, I believe, the only form
of attack on the opposition should be a few contrasts of their
platform and program compared with ours. I do not think the
opposition candidate should ever be named by the President. The
President should be against these proposals but for people. He
is against Democratic proposals because they will hurt the people.
Of course, much of this is subject to the type of platform
and candidate that emerge from the Democratic Convention. If
it is McGovern, with a fairly wild platform, I think that the
3
President can well emphasize what enactment of that sort of
a program would mean but always in contrast to his own
accomplishments in the first four years and the hopes that
he has engendered for the future.
Nota
I believe that at least one, and perhaps two, of the talks
could be from Washington but I do not believe the White House
should be used since I think it would be preferable to avoid
any suggestion that we are attempting to capitalize on the
presidency itself. It would seem to me that at least one
talk might well be made from the living room or similar setting
from San Clemente.
2
un
I believe the opposition will concentrate strongly on unemploy-
ment, on economic conditions, and on the desire for peace
and I believe that we can meet them on any one of these three
issues with no trouble at all.
Bearing in mind how many people are employed and the fact that
many of the unemployed are members of families where one or
two other family members are employed, it would seem to me to
be the best method for the President and his spokesmen con-
tinually to ask their audiences to examine their own economic
pees
situation and to see if, with inflation being controlled and
employment generally at all-time high levels, if they them-
selves are not far better off than they were four years ago.
The same approach can be taken to the war, with heavy emphasis
on the more than two and a quarter million men out of the Army
and several hundred thousand who are home from Vietnam and the
prospects for peace contrasted with the picture in January 1969.
The President should also emphasize the basic return of sanity
and reasonable quietness to the country contrasted with the
turmoil and the disorder of four years ago and the general
feeling of hopelessness that seemed to prevail at that time.
We can well point also to the great increase in our stature
and prestige abroad and no speech should be made without call-
ing attention to the enormously enhanced prospects for peace
in the future as a direct result of the President's personal
initiatives.
The opposition will undoubtedly try to effect a coalition of
blacks, young radicals, and middle-aged guilt-ridden liberals
and I think we should try to pick away at the pieces of this
coalition separately. I think we should show how the posture
of youth has been improved by the strengthening of our whole
4
system domestically. The recognition that Negroes have been
given by this Administration and the progress made in elimi-
nating many of the causes of racial fighting (attempts to
defuse the school busing issue and others that caused enormous
frictions and tensions) should be emphasized. We should point
out that the best thing any administration can do for Negroes
or youth is to create the atmosphere and the conditions in
which the economy can thrive and jobs can be obtained, and that
had been preeminently the result of our economic policy.
This can be contrasted strongly with the enormous spending
programs, continuation of discredited welfare, and attempts to
redistribute wealth through ruinously high taxation, which
will undoubtedly all be part of the Democratic platform.
I am sure the opposition will attack us for not spending enough
on a lot of individual programs, most of which are already dis-
credited and the sum of which would add up to enormously in-
creased taxes. I think we should constantly emphasize the
overall effect of the individual spending items the Democratic
candidates will unquestionably be sponsoring. As long as they
are allowed to talk about them on an individual basis, they
are harder to dispute. What we have to do is add up the total
and show where that would all lead us in taxation, loss of in-
come, and loss of personal freedom. I am convinced that most
Negroes, most youths, and most people desire a prosperous,
quiet life with a minimum of government intervention and a
maximum of opportunity to do what they please so long as they
have good housing, good health, and good schools, and increas-
ingly, good recreational facilities and a good environment. It
seems to me that all of the things we have done are leading
directly toward these goals and that we should emphasize con-
stantly that these are things that all people want, and that
when you talk about things that only small groups want, such
as Negroes, radicals, activists, youths, etc., you are auto-
matically denying the majority of the people the kind of life
they want.
In short, the Democrats have nothing to offer except more
divisiveness, higher taxes, more government interference with
everyone's life, and worn-out proven nonsolutions for our major
problems, to say nothing of policies that lead to war, either
hot or cold.
Caspar Pap- W. Weinberger
Director
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Bob:
There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened
insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer
share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right
Unhappy
along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe
that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all,
knowing you will get really useful information from associates
with access to the current state of things across the country.
But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever
they are worth.
First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now
on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the
Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its plat-
form. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between
now and then any political judgments have to be no better than
sheer speculation.
Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our
people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to
concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne
out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first,
the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have
convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever
for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how
long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy;
and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the
Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the
upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President
has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,
- 2 -
these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in
the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients
are present in the President's achievements for a victory of land-
slide proportions.
Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's
enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief
that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expe-
diency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public
assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his
traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years
that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on
his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact
being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as
a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican
Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking
between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that
the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world
statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would
pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive
political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible,
one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears
of the American people. That's the best politics there could pos-
sibly be.
Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate
to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested
by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential
stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September
X
or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any dif-
ferently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should
he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until
he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when
campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and
ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts,
would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's
minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential
far more than political -- again, on the premise that a Presidential
stance will prove to be the best politics. I naturally assume,
in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be inter-
larded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American
people that the President is President first and only reluctantly,
and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.
- 3 -
Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the cam-
paign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed
by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political
leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the Pres-
ident will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the
country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he
will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast
trying to visit every state.
I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at spe-
cific major voting blocs -- the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agricul-
X
ture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using
key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaign-
ing. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of
late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presi-
dential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or
Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential
appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appear-
ance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. This is why
I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the
traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a re-
gional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the
1960 style.
Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can
change much from now through Election Day, though I must again con-
fess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge
this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956
cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant
concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's
favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls
isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environ-
mentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought
to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 -- peace, pros-
X
perity and progress.
Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the
key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena
or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will
be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by
election time will have degenerated into character assassination.
I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving
it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would
be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday,
to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country
- 4 -
that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives
of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT,
is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply con-
vinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that
his major political overlay will be the charge of big business
corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the
x
average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government
and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce
lots of people.
But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will
be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side
is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential
stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful
campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President
is determined above all else to do only the right things for America,
will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but
also the road to a landslide.
Harlow
3½
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --
A)
Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between
Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal,
eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should
React?
be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That
is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the
dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana,
abortion or pro-welfare then in our substantive actions, taken by
the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again,
however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine
this.
B)
Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a
posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention,
a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him and
he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign.
Since our strength is foreigh policy in a world where there is a deep
desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings,
high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken
contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan
argumentative campaign.
C)
RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible.
Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the
effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whefher
RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit
is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In
any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the
drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.
-2-
D)
Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised
address by the President, or V.P. stating the "differences" between
the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so
much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in
a single message -- even while our surrogates are hitting the individual
messages on the stump.
E)
Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office
fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board
of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American
people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government VS. less
Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be
candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between
the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with
my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying
the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and
McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)
F)
Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President
in campaigning should not restrict himself to GOP audiences at all.
The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience a kick-off address
in Cadillac Square something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should
be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences --
but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us.
The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters
in this election who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who
cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.
G)
One thought. Why not have the V.P. candidate, assuming that it
is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day
Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understan ds that
what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs
(we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we
stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class,
many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.
(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills
integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with
Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by
liberal bureaucrats.)
H)
On strategy for attack -- my thoughts are already largely in
hand. However, just some reminders:
1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that
as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one
charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto
the serving board.
-3-
2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of
this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press
here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of
the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign -- unless we are behind in the
polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all
our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to
New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains. 11
We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly
and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold
our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway
in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the
general election of 1968 or of 1970 the flexibility to shift
gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto
another.
OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK
Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust"
thing, McGovern is a candid, honest man whom you can believe, while
Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap -- and the character
of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to
move off their "tinkertoy proposals. 11 They don't want their man to be
in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of
them fear that worse than the radical charge.)
Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get
harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack
accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character
assassination against the President of the United States and demand
that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest
and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say
it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an
evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and
of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us
on the issues, I don't see how if they are clearly and politely and
consistently made we can lose this one.
Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to
keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular
point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning
is essential; plans are worthless.
Buchanan
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DONALD RUMSFELD
SUBJECT:
Response to your Memo of June 12th
on the President and the Campaign.
1. The President's posture between the Conventions--
The President should:
-- Be Presidential;
-- Not engage in partisan activities;
Specifies
-- Use the platform and power of the office
to show a President governing-- let the
distinction be drawn between a partisan
Democratic office seeker versus an
incumbent President governing;
Credibl
-- Travel only under the mantle of "official
?
business";
non V. Pul"
Extent
-- As suitable occasions are developed, be
-crips
photographed with prominent non partisan
pistil
citizens (Democrats, citizens, etc.)
Inds
-- Keep his options open. It will be a tough
election. Maintain a moderately active
profile, unless spectacular opportunities
for greater visibility occur.
Page 2
2. The President's posture from the Republican Convention
to the Election -
React
-This will depend somewhat on who the Democratic
nominee is and who the Vice-Presidential nominees
or
Set
are, as well as the situation in Viet Nam.
Tone ?
--In general, and importantly, the President should
remain Presidential, Richard Nixon, the President
of the United States, is a winner. Richard Nixon,
campaigning as another office seeker, would create
unnecessary problems.
--To the extent possible, the President should be
Credit
involved in campaign travel as part of some
"official business" To the extent that a cam-
"non Pol"
paign event is secondary on a trip he could travel
as early as six or eight weeks before the election.
However, travel throughout the election should be
moderate. Avoid the impression of a frantic, hectic
three or four campaign-stop pace on a given day.
The target states, and enough others to show breadth
50
need to be visited and appropriate events can be
developed for such visits.
camp
3. Strategy for the President's campaign -
The theme, "Re-Elect the President", is sound.
If the campaign is consistent with that theme
we should avoid conjuring up the image of
Richard Nixon the office seeker. Activities
where he is functioning as President should be
highlighted. A great deal will turn on how
attack
accurately the President is portrayed as a
on media-
competent, and bold, forward-looking and effective
lare
President. Enhance the President's advantage of
How?
incumbency by finding ways to contrast his
good
Presidential actions with the opponent's rhetoric.
a
Den
The opponent will be a member of the Party
responsible for a number of the problems of this
country, and his solutions will be fuzzy and
unsound, but there are plenty of people available
to make the attack besides the President.
Page 3
Issues the President should emphasize:
D
- His Foreign policy leadership
Def
2
- A strong America versus a weak America
anting
Performance versus promises (results versus
"effort", "concern", "commitment", etc.)
Avoiding crisis versus crisis management
(Action versus reaction)
- The importance of the individual, individuality,
diversity, and pluralism versus centralization
and control.
4. The opposition's strategy -
-- If the opponent is McGovern he will try to
hold the left (his enthusiastic corps of
workers and media support) by holding to his
1
Viet Nam position and calling for an end to
"senseless killing. He will move to the
middle on other issues to gain labor support,
Doeg he
a degree of legitimacy in the south and the
really
support of the Democratic power men. He will
need
be less idealistic and more practical. Hope-
Dem Pun
fully, the Convention struggle will dramatize
men
his problems in this respect.
deret?
He will pound the so-called bread and butter
2
economic issues of unemployment, hunger, poverty
and inflation. (Larry O'Brien talks about almost
nothing else.) I can hear him now:
"When Nixon came in, unemployment was
under 4 percent--after 4 years of Nixon
it is up to 6 percent."
"When Nixon came in, your dollar was
worth a dollar--after 4 years of Nixon,
it is worth 90 cents."
3
He will portray the President as the handmaiden of
big business and special interests.
attack a big bus ? - -Ford?
Page 4
"Jack Kennedy did battle with big steel,
Nixon gives loans to Lockheed."
"The Democratic Party pushed for higher
Social Security benefits for the elderly
and higher minimum wages for workers, Nixon
makes deal with ITT in return for contribu-
tions."
"Democratic Presidents like Roosevelt,
Kennedy, and Johnson found jobs for millions
of unemployed Americans, Nixon freezes wages."
"Nixon means high unemployment and high
inflation -- your wages are controlled and
business profits soar and taxes, rents and
food prices climb."
How to meet the opponent's strategy:
P.
weakness will be a lack of "competence".
it will amount to "on-the-job
training" - that is risky for the country.
How?
We should seek some of the Wallace, McCarthy,
McGovern support that wants change, by driving
home the President's record on reform -- govern-
ment, draft, etc.
Dirthing
The way to do it is to take on Congress -- they
have failed the people. The laundry list of their
failures is persuasive. This will associate the
President with a desire for some change and his
hope to make things better.
Jerry
Administration spokesmen can associate McGovern
Rabin
with his unpopular extreme supporters and positions,
but the President should not.
A FINAL THOUGHT -
The President has hopes and ideals yet correctly
understands human characteristics. He knows that
to actually move the maximum distance toward those
ideals, those hopes of most human beings, you have
to be tough, pragmatic, courageous. That's what we
need as President, and we've got it. Thank God.
Page 5
But, as the President has said, not every
voter fully understands that. People can
be moved and persuaded by appeals to their
hopes and aspirations even though the approach
is fuzzy, impractical, even counterproductive
or dangerous.
The President effectively communicates his
toughness, strength and pragmatism. More can
be done to show that those qualities are necessary.
More can be done to show why the President is this
you
way-because that is how to move toward those
idealistic goals of peace, etc. He knows there
are damn few short cuts, that "caring", "wishing",
or "hoping" is not enough.
Further, more can be done to show that he has those
same hopes and ideals. We should seek some oppor-
tunities for him to dramatize his interest in
individual human beings, his personal concern where
personal concern is justified, his ideals, his hopes.
specifics
A chunk of the American people must have the feeling
that he personally cares about their problems, not
in general but in the specific--about them, about
the kinds of concerns they have for themselves and
their families. Only then can many be sure he is
leading where they want to go. There are such
opportunities, but they must be seized.
The President knows that feeling moves some people.
He is capable of doing it and does it well. But
our Administration does it only reluctantly.
Right
A danger for our Administration is in its competence
we seem harsh, in our strength we seem tough, in our
pragmatism we seem goalless and idealless.
McGovern is weak and would be a disastrous President.
But his warmth, concern, decency are appealing because
people dream, hope, aspire, and want to be better
than themselves, want better for their children, and
because they have fears.
Page 6
The campaign must scrupulously avoid going "over the
line. Our "reservoir", in this respect, is shallow.
The more people "feel" and believe (as opposed to
understand) that the President has ideals, hopes
and concerns, the more they will accept his approach
based on the vital qualities of strength, courage,
brilliance and competence, because they will feel he
is going- and taking them-where they want to go,
and doing it skillfully.
And when a human being walks into the voting booth
pulls the curtain, shrugs his shoulders at the com-
plexity of the mechanism and then votes, that's
what he wants - to know and or feel, or at least
hope that that man, Richard Nixon, is leading him
where he wants to go.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eyes Only
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAT BUCHANAN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.
It has been requested that you summarize your views and
analysis on the following points:
1. What should the President's posture be
Note
between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be
from the Republican Convention to the election?
When should he start campaigning? How much
travel should he do, where should he go, what
type of activities should he engage in?
3, Any general thoughts you have as to
strategy for the campaign on issues, timing, Note
points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition
strategy will be and how we should meet it.
Note
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p.m. Friday,
June 16.
Pat:
Bob realizes that your "Assault" memorandum covered some
of the questions above. Anything you would like to add should
be included in your response to this memo.
Thank you.
Larry Higby
4
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
confidential
ADMINISTRATIVE ARKING
June 14, 1972.
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By ER
NARS, Date 3-12-82
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Campaign
You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom
the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sher
etc., and I will not belabor that point.
Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E.
Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.
agree
1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists
as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do
nothing 80th Congress. 11 With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation
in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who
greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the publi
interest.
If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the
villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the
campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after
us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him hard
2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FD:
tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning
hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is
a
anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and
fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are als
warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity.
is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader
should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's
greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.
-2-
For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls
should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each
involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots
stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it
is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.
I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning.
It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on
a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Con-
vention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition
looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into
"I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes. "
We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either;
the President should begin to say now, well before the convention,
that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants
to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting
people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the
electorate for support by SO doing, he shows respect for the
system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take
the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to
campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-
elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.
Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:
If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take
New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews:
Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's
attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak
on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee
ever and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks
like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never
before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175, 000 of those
wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-
holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy
Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan,
about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half
Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on
oldtimers who have a defeati st attitude about Nixon and Jews
this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.
-3-
We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New
York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there
is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should,
for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed
in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every
week between now and November. We tend to think of our
Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is
important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh
chance there.
I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a
Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (When-
ever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.)
The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't
gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemploy-
ment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a
smart opponent.
5
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
BOB HALDEMAN RuSI
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
Campaign 72
I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the
points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here
for a starter:
1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential,
statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not
to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take
the position that there's work to be done running the country, and
there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course,
will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period
he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting
back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish
the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and
McGovern the politician.
2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but
continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember
at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathet-
ically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep
campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies
are bad TV -- too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for
Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate
concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an oppor-
tunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign
itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this
pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation
to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others
-2- -
carry the attack and make maximum use of outside organizations,
individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier
schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing
irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-
wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of govern-
ment, and -- depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign
-- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation
and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense
of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the
United States, on the world, and on the next generation.
3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc. : Assuming McGovern
to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-
wing radicalism but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much
on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out
reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we
should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way
that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a
matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that
his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip
tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.
McGovern of course will be more careful but if he does start
a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive
extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only after-
wards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not
what people want in a President.
We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical
X
positions on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he
already has begun to do. Our aim should be fourfold:
-- To cement the identification of him with positions that
1
are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;
-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is
2
backing off, not merely "clarifying;"
-3-
To plant the impression that he too readily embraces
schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's
not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted
with the power of the Presidency.
To undermine his image (which is a great part of his
strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at
least says what he thinks -- and to show him as an opportunist
who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his
principal issues: trust.
4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll
probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as calous toward
the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President,
who needlessly sacrificed 10, 000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis
on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable
- jobs, inflation, taxes.
A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on
trust, with the theme that you can't trust RN: that he's a calculating
political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for policical purposes
first and for public purposes second; the President of of secret
campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against
the little guy.
I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of
the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard
on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote
(including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California).
This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot
elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't
like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being
thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot
more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and
hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think
is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than
decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a
highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political
-4-
persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and
there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics.
If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting
issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side,
we can get in real trouble.
As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is
to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven perform-
ance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't
Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got
a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series
that can only be completed by the man who started it off -- Give
Peace a Chance -- Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust"
issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop
How
up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by
focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to
popular stands.
Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger re-
flection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor
Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for
President. 11 The central focus of our campaign should be on one
thing: to make people proud of their President.
scared of
a apmiG
6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
Point 1: What should be the President's posture between
conventions?
In my mind, there is no question but that the President
should remain "the President" not only between conventions
but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late
in the campaign as possible, the President should be a
Chapin
"working President,' remain mostly in Washington attending
to the business of the nation.
From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must
be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their
platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The
tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be
ripened for Administration support. Careful use of
Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the
stage to capture these dissaffected voters.
Point 2: What should be the President's posture during
the campaign?
Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe
should be the keystone of most of the early campaign.
Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the
President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney." "
The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that
President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided.
We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President
out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President
does move, it will have a heightened impact.
-2-
Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the
President's position -- up to a point. In order to
orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have
better communication with campaign headquarters and the
White House, The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must
have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking
wanty
world events.
As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates"
should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that
will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic
nominees will be formulating their strategy during that
period and the Administration will have an opportunity to
capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups
can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three
million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will
hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter
college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin
college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher
percentage of their votes.
These early efforts should be limited to specific constituen-
cies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early,
especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type
campaign, are all too real.
With the base already established, we should use the Republican
Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's
re-election. With special mailings, highly structured
organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate
an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President,
building in momentum, until the President himself does decide
to enter the lists.
Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?
To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong
leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs
and issues sort out under these two broad headings.
The media would have us believe many Americans are totally
dissatisfied with the "old Politics. It is now the fashion
to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists.
That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are
exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment,'
i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class
-3-
Americans have obtained a standard of living that their
parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the
midst of their success many middle class (and especially
lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled
by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse,
busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health
care. For many of these voters irritation has led to
frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a
visceral reaction against the "ins."
These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or
the security of strong leadership. The President has laid
the groundwork brilliantly for this case.
An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration
achievements and proposals can advance the image of
responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans
and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education
Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the
fullest.
The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract
support. We should not be seduced into attempting a
"charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is
substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength
and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the
President accurately display the courageous and bold
qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real
results because the President bargains from strength.
Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food and
Frege.
"unemployment. The food cost affects every American family
Unempl
and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we
can do about food costs except what has been done and
?
obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to
solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting
coone
the voters to think about other issues.
Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy.
Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not
already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and
imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts
offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.
-4-
Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.
A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that
even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South,
for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the
McGovern organization in the South will admit.
A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive
element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending
upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace
could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes
in industrial states where the election might be close. But
Pall
some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help
the re-election of the President where he does appear on
the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away
from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that
angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters
will support Wallace.
As we saw in the televised debates during the California
primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful
manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed
radical. Yet his simple answers to the complex problems
1
of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total
lack of ability to lead this nation.
Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that
makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for
example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package.
The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's
programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration
can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push
him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the
onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for
the President.
6r2
THE WHITE HOUSE
CONPIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADDINISTRATIVE MARKING
EYES ONLY
June 17, 1972
E. 12065, Section 3-12-82 6-102
By
Ep
NARS, Date
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT:
'72 CAMPAIGN
BETWEEN CONVENTIONS
The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above
the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his
innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met
with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this
very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party
platform planks for ammunition -- althought never publicly
identified as such -- the President should focus on his
compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why
they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates
as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should
draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats
have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused
to pass.
I think the President can remain above the partisanship
involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related
events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen
responsible for actually focusing on a lethargi Congress
during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.
POST GOP CONVENTION
I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period,
the President should, as much as is politically possible,
maintain the posture of the professional, business-
like Chief Executive going about his very important duties;
and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain
this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at
no time should the President drop to the level of the
contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.
-2-
I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can
lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him,
that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.
That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of
the President be maintained regardless of how much or how
little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition.
That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought
to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function
that would be politically desirable.
After the Convention, it seems to me that the President
ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting
with key national, regional and local Party officials to
give them his personal marching orders. This should be
done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate
the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely
about what is going on, thereby providing for our own
Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may
be in the wind.
Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest
that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of
interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick
to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated
and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions.
However, I still think that as much as possible, the image
of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained
as long as possible.
To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the
President should be highly selective of the activities
involving himself and that they should have a broader
gauged raison d'etre other than partisan politics for as
long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates
and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most
intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.
-3-
CAMPAIGN ISSUES
Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there
is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats
will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment.
The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and
even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason
to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional
stress on the economic issue.
I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last
six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving
although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that
this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling
the concept that economic conditions in this country are
good and that the economy will actually be better than our
ability to convince the public of this fact.
I propose that we seriously create an almost separate,
well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will
good
be solely to create an image of economic well-being in
this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising
of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it
be done.
Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that
this government has itself caught in a position where
mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on
a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling
on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly
career civil servants. This routine economic reporting
is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that
the economy is better than it seems to them.
As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought
to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are
better off economically at this particular time than at any
other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should
ask their audiences to look inward and make their own
judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer
to that question is that indeed most people are better
off now than ever before.
-4-
If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must
subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny.
With the resources of this government, there is no excuse
for there existing a single miniscule detail about George
McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff
and/or his mistress escaping us.
I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators
who have already compiled everything there is to know about
George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate.
If there isn't, one should be established immediately.
There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout
the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson
in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value
in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish
areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should
be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we
should do everything within our power to woe the American
trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany
that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on
congressional, state and local campaigns and should not
be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is
not even ideologically compatible with the principles of
trade unionism.
To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its
manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election.
I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support
from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly
disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise
to see him deny labor's resources.
OPPOSITION STRATEGY
It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets:
(1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an
instinctive support from the liberal news media.
With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused
by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend
it all in every area.
Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major
effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability
of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions
-5-
just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore
ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going
to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard,
I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee
should be established to hold regular press conferences
and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.
We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel
who commit documentable instances of being McGovern
"sweethearts. " I don't think the broad gauged attack is
productive, but every time we can prove media bias or
inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should
be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very
specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the
specific error or article to which we are addressing.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
7
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PETER FLANICAN Pho
This memo is in response to your request for my views as
follows:
1. The President' posture between the conventions should
be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy
a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that
period.
To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection
of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians",
political activity by the President would be a negative. To the
extent that he casts himself as the country's leader and an experienced
statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the
Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican
Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a
positive.
2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to
some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid.
Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to
get on with the business of politicking. This President, however,
can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive
saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary,
Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried
to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law
and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage
of time dedicated to campaigning:
-- From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the
President's time.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have
it include a very substantial amount Of travel Given the ease of
movement available to a President, as well as the national and
regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily
on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign
I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political"
activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent
Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will
recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The
1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when
48
they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate
rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for
the incumbent.
3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack
will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign
developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam
continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues
to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover,
I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record
against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments
in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the
frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the
Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes
1970?
right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through
to the end.
4. The opposition will of course attempt to attach Vietnam
Demo
and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the
matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the
general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the
voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility
3
of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will
have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This
might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into
relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and
are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to
How?
create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take
these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt
to move to the middle.
7 v 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 17, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HERBERT G. KLEIN
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
RE:
Campaign 1972
E.O. 12085, Section 3-12-82 6-102
By
Ep
NARS, Date
Between Conventions
1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President
concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will
be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build
on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will
be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform
and the Democratic performance in Congress.
I would suggest one excursion out of town. This would be
an ideal time to emphasize the President S concern for the
Good
environment and to point up his legacy of parks program
while people vacation. The trip should include a stop
in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to
inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer
to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national
parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events
where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer
facilities, see some animals, etc.
Post Convention
2. After the convention and into the fall the President
should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly
on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly
so as not to give the impression of overconfidence which
might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should
maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a
fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis
on rallies and quiet talk on television.
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
- 2 -
I would use the week after the convention for meetings
with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This
could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would
give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong
Presidential interest. I believe the President should
Complaing
launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity
in key states during the first week in September. This
would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder
of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington,
invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only.
We also have the fund raiser on September 26.
In early October I would step up the President's campaign
activities to travel one or two days during the week and
then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I
think this should lead up to intensive travel and
campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to
campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should
be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it
won't appear to be last minute panic.
Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but
particularly in September, it should emphasize places
which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble.
Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close
by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some
time in California, Texas and Illinois.
Some of the first week of September activities should be
rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the
President will be leading in the polls. We have the
early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some
events to tours of facilities such as high trade manu-
facturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't
done this. He should have one or more events each
emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some
way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 3 -
avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout
the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities,
particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice
President should work these areas hard, also.
General Thoughts
3. I would hope that the President personally would use
informal television considerably, interspersed with short,
direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most
rally television even on a state basis. If the President
is to answer questions on television, either regionally
by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize
more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge
that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the
other programs.
I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by
the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses
should be of high tone-the Presidency and the record. A
contrast should be built between professionalism, calm
competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism,
uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when
the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some
examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you
didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream.
A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.
4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the
economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes
and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done
more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank
new face which is credible. They will try to focus on
distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.
One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership
meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the
nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an
idea I had: After this was printed without attribution,
several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this
has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 4 -
In a more major way, I believe the President should spend
most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader
and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying
above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken
at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if
Q and A television is used, the President could do this
to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter
battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion
by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional
candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they
are organized.
My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate
to me that at this moment, the people are interested more
in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown
in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction
of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates
(particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on
personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.)
and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even
three months ago.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
8
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT HSD
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Suggestions
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
The President essentially should continue the present
strategy of being a professional President working to
solve national and international problems. From now until
the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal
emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period
might be right for some non-political type travelling to
important states not to be visited in the campaign--appear-
ances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees
Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.
Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket
and the issues.
2. What should the President's posture be from the
Republican Convention to the election? When should he start
campaigning? How much travel
where
what type
?
The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the
election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted
with the Truman style. The approach should be one of
humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy.
Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President
should address himself in appearances to his vision of the
- 2 -
kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further
Dent-
down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change
horses in the middle of this dream."
Of course, the President would envision an America with a
realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient
national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on
fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforce-
ment; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued
individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast
with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated
by the opponent, in the right way.
The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-
September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a
short campaign in the public interest. We should start
this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having
campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.
Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and
at least two big rallies in each region so no area should
feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies
could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19
visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits
should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.
The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan
and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as
possible without hurting the candidates, especially key
prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide
and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.
Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At
these affairs, the President could be honored with key
leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President
has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician.
He should be depicted as the statesman building a better
and more stable USA and world.
Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on
- 3 -
the type forums or activities available or which could be
created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.
3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on
issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and
others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern state-
ments, policies and record on the line through speakers and
advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of
McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious
enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as
the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and
appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party
leaders should be charged with undermining the President's
efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote
to condemn the President in a time of international crisis
(mining) We should contrast peace through strength with
peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus
irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on
stability, individual and national security, and public
safety.
The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal
security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The
Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public
saturation in every good detail.
Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism
should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these
Bonothing
times, based on a solid record of performance under very
adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol
Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care
here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority
party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize
all the obstacles in the President's path.
Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on
developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from
- 4 -
attast
the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat
Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements
should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.
We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue--that
this determines the success of everything else. The big
line of difference should be drawn on this issue.
4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and
how we should meet it.
The opposition strategy will turn on these major points:
Vietnam, tax reform, haves vs. have-nots, unemployment,
cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensi-
tivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).
If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength
theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam
charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate
and the campaign.
Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the
President's solid record of achievements could blunt most
Pablic
of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we
have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968),
Understand
the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to
positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more
to show that the higher percentage today is due to the
influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and
point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy.
Good
With war we can get unemployment statistics down but
casualties back up (jobs VS. lives).
hine
Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered
with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without
bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation admin-
istration with all the black, chicano, women, et al,
appointments contrasted with previous, ending of section-
alism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can
put together a paper on this.
- 5 -
Trying to pit the have-nots VS. the haves can be made into
a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare--
also, they have promoted race VS. race and section VS.
section, all ended now under RN.
Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack.
Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information
that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the
loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the
ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in
the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately,
McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable
us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.
Ex
.J
Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based
on opportunities, that further underscore the President's
credibility and get them well publicized. The record of
withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word.
Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In
fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting
out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means
also finding ways to stress the President's personal
characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive
and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through
anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he
did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and
how much it meant to his family.
9
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS LLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented. anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
no,net
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
16y
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
onlo
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
Top
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes VS. services strategy before a
Excellent Ford what's that?
prestige audience of poverty types announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
Too Kennedy
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not SO out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign ce should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i.e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared SO that the President would fly into a city and be
Sure!
met with no less than 200, 000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events,
3.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc. ) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices,
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews -- and
negative i. e. McGovern and aerospace employment spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches -- can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues amnesty,
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue. They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
Good
abortion can only help Mc Govern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges
i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbic Hoffman, etc. should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc.
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
True?
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count. And since it is possible and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should worry about countering McGovern's potential
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive his defense budget or that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers:
<It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans i. e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. -- out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing -- the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish-
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.
10
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL CARRUTHER
From the first of July until the evening of the 22nd of August
when the President is asked to appear at the Republican
National Convention, in Miami, to accept his party's
nomination, he should maintain his Presidential posture.
In his role as a world leader performing the duties of the
most complex and awesome office in the history of mankind,
he is operating at a level that obscures the counter efforts
of the Democratic candidate. He must maintain the tremendous
momentum that he has created in the area of foreign affairs and
focus on generating an equal momentum on the domestic side.
In order to generate this "domestic momentum", I recommend
that we create a series of substantive Presidential events
in the key political states. The justification for these events
must be to attend to the domestic needs of the people in these
areas.
In the period between the Democratic and Republican National
Conventions, the President should hold a series of domestic
summits at the White House dealing with the key issues and
they should be, obviously, widely publicized. Consequently,
in his role as the President, he sets the stage for his domestic
trips, which should begin shortly after the Labor Day weekend.
The sooner we begin to publicize these domestic summits at
the White House, the better.
If we create considerable media interest in the domestic
summits, we will accomplish the two most important things:
1. We will increase the exposure of these summits
between the conventions and, therefore, steal
the lead from the Democrats.
2. We will provide credibility to the President's
domestic trips following the Republican Convention.
- 2 -
I recommend that we create a media campaign
around each of these domestic events. We
should provide day-to-day media input to the
television and radio stations and major newspapers
in these areas each day leading up to, during and
following the event. By creating our own regional
network in each of these key political areas, we
will totally dominate media coverage for a
concentrated period of time. Our goal, of course,
is to leave a lasting impression with the voter
that Richard Nixon is responding to the domestic
needs of the people at their level. These trips
beginning in early September should continue
through the month of October. Each of these
major domestic events should be supported with
side trips and human interest type drop bys.
The President should avoid attacking the opposition between the
conventions. However, that does not prevent the other members
of his political family from doing SO.
d Cal
The Democrats will dominate the media during the first two weeks
in July. It will be most difficult to steal the spotlight from them,
but we should try. One or two dynamic events or announcements
vacation
could have a devastating effect on the Democrats, i.e., while the
Democrats are fighting it out on the convention floor, Richard
Nixon continues to implement his far-reaching and inventive
foreign and domestic programs.
If we can gain this domestic momentum and maintain our foreign
posture, we leave the Democrats with very little to talk about
except themselves, and in that respect, no matter who their
candidate is, there is no contest.
Our major area of concern is our lack of ability to communicate
the President's interest in, and compassion for the people.
Richard Nixon has approached the office of the Presidency with
great dignity and formality and, in many cases, his Presidential
posture has been misconstrued as being abstract, private and
secretive. While these aspects of his personality create a certain
intrigue around the office of the Presidency, we are being
criticized for being out of touch with the people.
- 3
I feel that the November Group's media campaign and the
Wolper documentaries will do a great deal to offset this
thinking, but I also think that it is our responsibility to
persuade the voters that Richard Nixon is not out of touch
with the people and that he does care for each and every
citizen and that he has great compassion for his fellow man.
In addition, whatever hostility the voters have toward their
government, they translate it through the incumbent as
opposed to the challenger. I believe that the main reason
that Hubert Humphrey lost the California primary is because
he was construed by the California voter as the incumbent
and a representative of the establishment, while George
McGovern was clearly cast as the voice of the people and
the challenger.
I think the American public wants to get to know their President
better and that we have the obligation to provide that contact.