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This file contains:
Paper asking that a document be delivered to Strachan. Author unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Haldeman to RN RE: a useful memorandum. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], no date
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: RN's image during the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: thoughts on presidential posture and possible Democratic campaign strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: RN's role before and after the Republican National Convention, as well as important campaign issues. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Buchanan to RN presenting analyses of the 1960 and 1968 elections. Graphs included. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: advice in response to a previous memo. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign suggestions. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's previous memo asking for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Safire to Haldeman RE: campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Finch to Haldeman RE: RN's posture as president and important campaign issues. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the possibility of Jackson becoming a presidential candidate. Handwritten note added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/25/1971
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WHSF: Contested, 20-16
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WHSF: Contested, 20-16
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This file contains:
Paper asking that a document be delivered to Strachan. Author unknown. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Haldeman to RN RE: a useful memorandum. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], no date
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: RN's image during the campaign. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: thoughts on presidential posture and possible Democratic campaign strategies. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: RN's role before and after the Republican National Convention, as well as important campaign issues. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Buchanan to RN presenting analyses of the 1960 and 1968 elections. Graphs included. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/5/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: advice in response to a previous memo. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign suggestions. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's previous memo asking for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Safire to Haldeman RE: campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Finch to Haldeman RE: RN's posture as president and important campaign issues. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Buchanan to RN RE: the possibility of Jackson becoming a presidential candidate. Handwritten note added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/25/1971
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
16
>
White House Staff
Other Document
Paper asking that a document be delivered to
Strachan. Author unknown. 1 pg.
20
16
White House Staff
Memo
From Haldeman to RN RE: a useful
memorandum. 1 pg.
20
16
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harlow to Haldeman RE: RN's image
during the campaign. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20
16
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haig to Haldeman RE: thoughts on
presidential posture and possible Democratic
campaign strategies. 4 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
16
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: RN's role
before and after the Republican National
Convention, as well as important campaign
issues. 5 pgs.
20
16
7/5/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN presenting analyses of
the 1960 and 1968 elections. Graphs
included. 8 pgs.
20
16
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: advice in
response to a previous memo. 4 pgs.
20
16
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dent to Haldeman RE: campaign
suggestions. 5 pgs.
20
16
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: Haldeman's
previous memo asking for campaign advice.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
16
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman RE: campaign
advice. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 3 pgs.
20
16
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Finch to Haldeman RE: RN's posture
as president and important campaign issues.
4 pgs.
20
16
6/25/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: the possibility of
Jackson becoming a presidential candidate.
Handwritten note added by unknown. 4 pgs.
Friday, April 29, 2011
Page 3 of 3
Hand cany to Gorden
Stracham
plse.
xx
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eyes only
DATE:
FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BOB HALDEMAN
Herewith the
most useful of
the strategy memos
H.
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Assistant to The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
Dear Bob:
There is no chance at all for me to offer any novel or enlightened
insights in responding to your June 21 memo, because I no longer
share the authoritative political intelligence that you get right
along from polls and professional politicians. So I really believe
that, at least at this point in time, I should not respond at all,
knowing you will get really useful information from associates
with access to the current state of things across the country.
But I do have some general notions and submit them for whatever
they are worth.
First -- and quite obviously -- no political planning right now
on image and issue can be worth much of a damn until after the
Democratic Convention has picked its ticket and written its plat-
form. After all, the Convention is only three weeks away. Between
now and then any political judgments have to be no better than
sheer speculation.
Second, I think just about everybody in the country, not only our
people but also a large proportion of the Democrats, would have to
concede that the President is doing spectacularly well, as is borne
out by the polls. I see two dominant reasons for this -- first,
the miracles the President has wrought abroad, which at last have
convinced the nation that Richard Nixon is the most effective achiever
for a stable world order that the country has had in God knows how
long -- this, plus the resurging confidence throughout the economy;
and, second, but not unimportant, the remarkable disarray of the
Democratic Party and its superbly uninspired leadership for the
upcoming campaign. The simple fact appears to be that the President
has been steadily building confidence in himself across the country,
- 2 -
these past 18 months particularly, while national confidence in
the Democratic candidates has plummeted. I think the ingredients
are present in the President's achievements for a victory of land-
slide proportions.
Now, second, I think one of the main reasons for the President's
enviable political status right now is the deepening public belief
that he is preoccupied, not with political maneuvering and expe-
diency, but with paramount national concerns. I think this public
assessment is the President's political Fort Knox, because his
traditional vulnerability has been the accusation over the years
that he is politician first and statesman second. He is well on
his way to reversing this concept, and in the process is in fact
being regarded now as President of all the people rather than as
a strident leader of a negativistic minority called the Republican
Party. I would greatly regret any move so to elevate politicking
between now and, say, October 1 as would reawaken the notion that
the President would rather be a domestic party leader than a world
statesman. In other words, please help fight off the pols who would
pander to the President's extraordinarily refined and sensitive
political instincts; let him continue to be, as long as possible,
one hell of a good President determined to dispel the greatest fears
of the American people. That's the best politics there could pos-
sibly be.
Third, and in keeping with the above, I suggest it is inappropriate
to compartmentalize White House thinking in the manner suggested
by your memo. I see no need for a change of any kind in Presidential
stance from now until actual campaigning begins in late September
or October 1. I see no need whatever for him to function any dif-
ferently between the conventions than he is right now, nor should
he do anything differently after the Republican Convention until
he is forced to the hustings about October 1. And even then, when
campaigning gets underway, I would pray that the shrillness and
ad hominem stuff, and the direct parrying of opposition thrusts,
would be left to the President's running mate and John Mitchell's
minions, leaving the President as free as possible to be Presidential
far more than political -- again, on the premise that a Presidential
stance will prove to be the best politics I naturally assume,
in addition to the foregoing, that his campaigning will be inter-
larded with stints at the White House to make clear to the American
people that the President is President first and only reluctantly,
and temporarily, doing the domestic political thing.
- 3 -
Fourth, I have no way to lay out a proposed itinerary for the cam-
paign at this time. I would assume that this would be governed
by detailed political intelligence garnered from polls and political
leaders in the various states and areas. Surely, however, the Pres-
ident will not be postured as a frantic candidate racing about the
country desperately trying to corral votes -- and surely also, he
will not be so scheduled as to flit wildly from coast to coast
trying to visit every state.
I would anticipate a far more leisurely campaign directed at spe-
cific major voting blocs the ethnics, Catholics, Jews, agricul-
ture, etc. -- and directed at specific geographical regions, using
key states as the focal points of this kind of regional campaign-
ing. I hope someone there agrees with me that we have tended of
late to underestimate the enormous nationwide impact of a Presi-
dential appearance, no matter whether he is speaking in Maine or
Southern California. The national TV coverage of a Presidential
appearance, wherever he speaks, makes every speech a national appear-
ance, and I think it is awfully easy to overdo this. This is why
I suggest that a short campaign will be more productive than the
traditional two-month effort, and it is why I also envision a re-
gional effort rather than a state-by-state kind of campaign of the
1960 style.
Fifth, as to the President's issues, I hardly see how these can
change much from now through Election Day, though I must again con-
fess that I lack authoritative data from polls and so on to gauge
this accurately. It seems to me that we are back into the 1956
cycle, in which peace, prosperity and progress are the dominant
concerns, and each of these is trending today in the President's
favor. I recognize that there are sub-themes which your polls
isolate, such as school busing, aid to parochial schools, environ-
mentalism and such, but the controlling themes are now and ought
to continue to be those three golden words of 1956 peace, pros-
perity and progress.
Finally, I suspect that the President has so defused most of the
key issues either with actual achievements as in the foreign arena
or with programs recommended to Congress that the opposition will
be driven, in desperation, to a campaign of vilification that by
election time will have degenerated into character assassination.
I think the President should ignore all such vituperation, leaving
it to his running mate and others to respond in kind; but it would
be mere prudence, I should think, and as we discussed on Thursday,
to conjure up a few explicit actions to demonstrate to the country
- 4 -
that the President and his Administration are plainly not captives
of big business and that skullduggery, such as alleged about ITT,
is merely a political slur and not in fact true. I am deeply con-
vinced, especially if the opposition candidate is McGovern, that
his major political overlay will be the charge of big business
corruptly controlling the Administration at the expense of the
average guy -- and in this time of disillusionment with government
and almost everything else, that kind of campaigning can seduce
lots of people.
But back to Square A. While I anticipate that this campaign will
be very dirty before it is over, namely because the other side
is devoid of viable issues, I believe that maintaining a Presidential
stance throughout, and the conducting of a dignified and thoughtful
campaign which will confirm the public judgment that the President
is determined above all else to do only the right things for America,
will turn out to be the road not only to victory in November, but
also the road to a landslide.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
@
Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised
in your memorandum of June 12:
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Conven-
tion and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the
ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture
it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is
best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally
consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to
his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance
in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive
attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were
masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests
are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has
consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally
associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the
solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has
captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking
and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the
development of a "Mr. & Mrs. " team image which would not have been
possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.
Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of
a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the
campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a
Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organiza-
tional arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of
accomplishment.
I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions
about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are
taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-2-
This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet
meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in
favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic
Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor,
Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate
of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously
threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning
must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which
would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning?
How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type
of activities should he engage in?
Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full
cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions,
I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that
of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political
campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should
be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid
over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe
we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one
adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced
and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken.
That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's
attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived
ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and
excessive campaign energy.
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the
campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should
therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern
posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which
I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is
McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we
emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage
the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent
on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we
should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's
strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing,
aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
--3-
Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-
McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase
of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in
the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more
than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes
can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also
have themes in reserve which can be used-on a contingency basis to counter-
balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns
between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern
vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we
do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most
importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which
can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or
domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis
should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be
tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be
tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather
than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to
develop compensatory neutralization programs.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the
following:
(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc.
The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront
Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by
our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some
break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our
policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will
therefore become moot.
(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT
agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President
has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a
qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight
factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.
(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously
try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound
by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily
blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
-4-
Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of
improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen
setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be
counted as a strong continuing asset.
(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international
economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization
and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords
the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful
assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to inter-
national trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will
flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international
monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that
statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm
that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve
some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps
have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.
(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism
but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly
strong popular base.
On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments
in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his
statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.
EYES ONLY
DETERMISLD TO BE AN
ADMI. MARKING
E.U. 12065, L. tion 3-12-82 6-102
By Ep
THE WHITE HOUSE
CONFIDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT:
'72 CAMPAIGN
BETWEEN CONVENTIONS
The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above
the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his
innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met
with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this
very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party
platform planks for ammunition -- althought never publicly
identified as such -- the President should focus on his
compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why
they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates
as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should
draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats
have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused
to pass.
I think the President can remain above the partisanship
involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related
events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen
responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress
during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.
POST GOP CONVENTION
I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period,
the President should, as much as is politically possible,
maintain the posture of the professional, business-
like Chief Executive going about his very important duties;
and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain
this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at
no time should the President drop to the level of the
contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.
-2-
I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can
lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him,
that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.
That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of
the President be maintained regardless of how much or how
little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition.
That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought
to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function
that would be politically desirable.
After the Convention, it seems to me that the President
ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting
with key national, regional and local Party officials to
give them his personal marching orders. This should be
done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate
the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely
about what is going on, thereby providing for our own
Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may
be in the wind.
Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest
that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of
interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick
to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated
and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions.
However, I still think that as much as possible, the image
of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained
as long as possible.
To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the
President should be highly selective of the activities
involving himself and that they should have a broader
gauged raison d'etre other than partisan politics for as
long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates
and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most
intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.
-3-
CAMPAIGN ISSUES
Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there
is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats
will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment.
The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and
even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason
to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional
stress on the economic issue.
I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last
six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving
although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that
this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling
the concept that economic conditions in this country are
good and that the economy will actually be better than our
ability to convince the public of this fact.
I propose that we seriously create an almost separate,
well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will
be solely to create an image of economic well-being in
this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising
of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it
be done.
Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that
this government has itself caught in a position where
mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on
a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling
on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly
career civil servants. This routine economic reporting
is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that
the economy is better than it seems to them.
As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought
to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are
better off economically at this particular time than at any
other time in their lives. I think 'our surrogates should
ask their audiences to look inward and make their own
judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer
to that question is that indeed most people are better
off now than ever before.
-4-
If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must
subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny.
With the resources of this government, there is no excuse
for there existing a single miniscule detail about George
McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff
and/or his mistress escaping us.
I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators
who have already compiled everything there is to know about
George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate.
If there isn't, one should be established immediately.
There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout
the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson
in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value
in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish
areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should
be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we
should do everything within our power to woe the American
trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany
that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on
congressional, state and local campaigns and should not
be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is
not even ideologically compatible with the principles of
trade unionism.
To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its
manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election.
I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support
from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly
disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise
to see him deny labor's resources.
OPPOSITION STRATEGY
It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets:
(1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an
instinctive support from the liberal news media.
With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused
by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend
it all in every area.
Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major
effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability
of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions
-5-
just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore
ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going
to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard,
I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee
should be established to hold regular press conferences
and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.
We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel
who commit documentable instances of being McGovern
"sweethearts." I don't think the broad gauged attack is
productive, but every time we can prove media bias or
inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should
be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very
specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the
specific error or article to which we are addressing.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
(Per HRH)
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.
First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial
decline during the campaign. (If there is a single hallmark of RN's
runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the
Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not
so much lose votes fro m August to November of 1968 as we lost a
historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to
it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed
a 13 paint gap. What were the reasons for this?
A)
Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate,
if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some
of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention,
but not a Nixon voter at heart.
B)
We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North,
who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This
return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably
partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to
our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the
Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our
opportunity is renewed.)
The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise
correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls.
Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which
surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide"
that might have been.
-2-
But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings
in 1968. Basically, they were these:
a)
A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed
it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that
we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The
hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and
unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.
Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should
have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force
back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and
the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were
yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By 50 doing,
he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.
On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges,
to attract interest.
b)
The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the
identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press.
Teddy White testifics to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition,
I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types
who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at
election time.
What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut
down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where
we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuver
into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two
leading candidates. We did not devlate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-
Arona-Handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or
interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story,
The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio
Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two.
Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the
campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of
liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through
late in the game.
-3-
c)
But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may
or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of
the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well
counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate
those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 -- based on the
campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What wo face in my
view is:
THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964
If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:
1)
We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not
let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we
did this for the first three weeks -- then either HHH "got well" on
Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order, 11 and our issue
hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep
him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it
out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
2)
We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in
1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning
is essential; plans are worthless. " We should have a mapped-out
game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the
Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be
a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at
least once a week.
3)
While we should rule out the President -- for the time being -- on
the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the
country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
4)
We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the
press and media between now and November. In my view, we have
discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years --
indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the dedine. But
should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press
corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to
carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-
McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in
time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc --
because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why
RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national
polls by a single cubit.
-4-
5)
We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and
personality which won him 60% of the vote -- it was the portrayal
of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.
In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the
smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better
than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united
party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate
who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with
their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent,
we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.
Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern
is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear
victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this
in mind.
To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues," "
clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should
deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the
record to hang the guy -- what we have to avoid at all costs are such
media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Caper, which
they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues
and his positions- and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."
6)
One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of
McGovern, if nominated, being case into the role of "under-dog"
"anti-Establishment, " "come-from-behind" candidate -- whose campaign
will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human
interest than ours.
We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall -- to
attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but
unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average
Man agains the Establishment and the Radical Chic.
Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign
shortcomings -- and through the media. Again, how the media handles
this will determine much. The medi a could treat McGovern like
Goldwater, or they could make him into an incpt, but good "under-dog"
like HHH in which event, they could make a run out of it.
-5-
7)
As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I
would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning. 11 However
Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in
action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon
addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a
contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as
President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.
8)
Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN
into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities,
Knights of Golumbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is
only -- at most 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not
who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that
20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make
appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the
ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of
the North we never carried before.
9)
Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum
importance is that wo not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-
on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with
his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that
from the Democrats. Regretiably, the media does not allow us the same
latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged
the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.
Buchanan
50
45
RN
40
35
HHH
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Gallup Poll - 1968
RN
HHH
Wallace
April
43%
34%
9%
10
Lato May
36
42
14
July
40
38
16
Aug. 21
45
29
18
Late Sept.
43
28
21
Early Oct.
44
29
20
5
Mid Oct.
43
31
20
Oct. 27
44
36
15
Nov. 4
42
40
14
April
WE uLate
July
Aug. 21
Late
Early
Mid Oct.
Oct. 27
No
May
Sept.
Oct.
60
Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und.
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
55
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50
RN
45
40
35
141. Marly
Late
July
August
Sept.
October
Nov.
June
June
Nov. 3
Nov. 1-2
Wallace
13%
13
16
17
21
12
13
Harris Poll - 1968
Sept.
HHH
38%
43
41
34
31
40
43
Aug.
RN
36%
36
36
40
39
42
40
HHH
WALLACE
May
June
July
Aug.
Nov. 1-2
July
Sept.
Nov. 3
RN
June
sew "If 214
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
Campaign 72
I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the
points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here
for a starter:
1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential,
statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not
to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take
the position that there's work to be done running the country, and
there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course,
will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period
he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting
back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish
the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and
McGovern the politician.
2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but
continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember
at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathet-
ically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep
campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies
are bad TV -- too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for
Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate
concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an oppor-
tunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign
itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this
pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation
to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others
-2-
carry the attack -- and make maximum use of outside organizations,
individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier
schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing
irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-
wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of govern-
ment, and -- depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign
-- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation
and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense
of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the
United States, on the world, and on the next generation.
3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc.: Assuming McGovern
to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-
wing radicalism -- but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much
on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out
reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we
should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way
that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a
matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that
his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip
tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.
McGovern of course will be more careful -- but if he does start
a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive
extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only after-
wards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not
what people want in a President.
We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical
positions -- on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he
already has begun to do. Our aim should be fourfold:
-- To cement the identification of him with positions that
are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;
-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is
backing off, not merely "clarifying;"
-3-
-- To plant the impression that he too readily embraces
schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's
not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted
with the power of the Presidency.
-- To undermine his image (which is a great part of his
strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at
least says what he thinks -- and to show him as an opportunist
who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his
principal issues: trust.
4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll
probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as calous toward
the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President,
who needlessly sacrificed 10, 000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis
on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable
-- jobs, inflation, taxes.
A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on
trust, with the theme that you can't trust RN: that he's a calculating
political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for policical purposes
first and for public purposes second; the President ofITTof secret
campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against
the little guy.
I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of
the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard
on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote
(including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California).
This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot
elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't
like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being
thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot
more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and
hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think
is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than
decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a
highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political
-4-
persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and
there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics.
If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting
issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side,
we can get in real trouble.
As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is
to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven perform-
ance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't
Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got
a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series
that can only be completed by the man who started it off -- Give
Peace a Chance -- Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust"
issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop
up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by
focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to
popular stands.
Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger re-
flection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor
Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for
President. 11 The central focus of our campaign should be on one
thing: to make people proud of their President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
HSD
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Suggestions
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
The President essentially should continue the present
strategy of being a professional President working to
solve national and international problems. From now until
the GOP convention would be a good time to show personal
emphasis on domestic programs and problems. This period
might be right for some non-political type travelling to
important states not to be visited in the campaign--appear-
ances to big and key groups such as the national Jaycees
Convention we just passed up under the post-summit strategy.
Surrogates should begin hammering away on the Demo ticket
and the issues.
2. What should the President's posture be from the
Republican Convention to the election? When should he start
campaigning? How much travel where what type
?
The President's posture from the GOP Convention through the
election should be much in the Eisenhower style as contrasted
with the Truman style. The approach should be one of
humility and dignity, with the President ignoring the enemy.
Leave him to the surrogates and others. The President
should address himself in appearances to his vision of the
- 2 -
kind of America and world he envisions for 1976 and further
down the road--the theme of which would be "don't change
horses in the middle of this dream."
Of course, the President would envision an America with a
realistic and lasting peace abroad secured by a sufficient
national security posture; domestic tranquility, based on
fairness and justice for all, and firmness in law enforce-
ment; rising prosperity and stable prices; and continued
individual freedoms. These aims could be made to contrast
with the Demo record of the past and the policies advocated
by the opponent, in the right way.
The President should begin campaigning not later than mid-
September. Our forces should emphasize our desire for a
short campaign in the public interest. We should start
this line now to put the Demos on the defensive as having
campaigned for the job too long, especially McGovern.
Travel should cover every one of the key eleven states and
at least two big rallies in each region so no area should
feel written-off or taken for granted. The regional rallies
could be in lieu of visits to some of the key states if 19
visits would be deemed too much. However, 19 or 20 visits
should be a minimum, unless the polls show a good victory.
The campaigning by the President should not be very partisan
and should avoid local ticket entanglements as much as
possible without hurting the candidates, especially key
prospects, or local party morale. Having the State-wide
and/or Congressional slate on the stage might be necessary.
Each regional rally should be regionally televised. At
these affairs, the President could be honored with key
leader testimonials and in other ways, so that the President
has to do little in the way of appearing to be a politician.
He should be depicted as the statesman building a better
and more stable USA and world.
Appearances in the key states could be varied, depending on
- 3 -
the type forums or activities available or which could be
created to fit the circumstances of the time and place.
3. General thoughts as to strategy for the campaign on
issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
All the attacking should be done by the surrogates and
others. Our strategy should be to lay the McGovern state-
ments, policies and record on the line through speakers and
advertising. We should lay out a steady stream of
McGovernisms to keep the attacks fresh, but also repetitious
enough to saturate with the points. He should be shown as
the advocate of surrender, weakness, gross welfarism, and
appeaser of lawless elements. Moreover, he and his party
leaders should be charged with undermining the President's
efforts for peace, especially the Senate Demo caucus vote
to condemn the President in a time of international crisis
(mining). We should contrast peace through strength with
peace through surrender. Also, responsibility versus
irresponsibility. Much emphasis should be placed on
stability, individual and national security, and public
safety.
The major concerns in all the polls revolve around personal
security--peace, economic security, and law and order. The
Nixon record is strong in all of these, but it needs public
saturation in every good detail.
Presidential leadership, experience, expertise, and realism
should also be stressed. Richard Nixon--the man for these
times, based on a solid record of performance under very
adverse circumstances and against a stacked deck on Capitol
Hill (especially Presidential candidates), the press (care
here to except good guys), and as the leader of the minority
party (outnumbered 5-3). Many people still don't realize
all the obstacles in the President's path.
Timing of the attack strategy will have to depend on
developments, but the McGovern record should be aired from
- 4 -
the time of his nomination all the way through. Pat
Buchanan's compendium on his positions and statements
should be helpful in stretching out the attacks.
We must make peace through strength the No. 1 issue-that
this determines the success of everything else. The big
line of difference should be drawn on this issue.
4. Thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be and
how we should meet it.
The opposition strategy will turn on these major points:
Vietnam, tax reform, haves VS. have-nots, unemployment,
cost of living, credibility, Southern Strategy, insensi-
tivity to the needs and desires of people (anti-people).
If we do our job offensively on the peace through strength
theme, then we will have largely blunted the Vietnam
charges. Also, a conclusion there would end the debate
and the campaign.
Also, our overall offensive strategy of laying out the
President's solid record of achievements could blunt most
of the Demo attacks. For instance, on the economy, we
have the employment figures (6 million more than in 1968),
the CPI index difference, and the surging GNP figures to
positively make our case. On unemployment we must do more
to show that the higher percentage today is due to the
influx of women and youngsters into the job markets and
point up the change from a war to a peacetime economy.
With war we can get unemployment statistics down but
casualties back up (jobs VS. lives)
Southern Strategy when it does come up can be answered
with many facts--the leadership to desegregate without
bullets, blood and bitterness, full participation admin-
istration with all the black, chicano, women, et al,
appointments contrasted with previous, ending of section-
alism and bias against South, etc. Bob Brown and I can
put together a paper on this.
- 5 -
Trying to pit the have-nots VS. the haves can be made into
a positive issue for us by accusing them of class warfare--
also, they have promoted race VS. race and section VS.
section, all ended now under RN.
Tax reform can be blunted some by the class warfare attack.
Also, we can feed out to outside public conduits information
that disproves McGovern's mis-statements about some of the
loopholes and make the case that most loopholes are the
ones all Americans enjoy. We should not get ourselves in
the position of defending sensitive loopholes. Fortunately,
McGovern's extremism with his tax proposals should enable
us to discredit many of his tax reform thrusts.
Credibility can be shored up by doing some things, based
on opportunities, that further underscore the President's
credibility and get them well publicized. The record of
withdrawals in VN is a good example of keeping his word.
Platform fulfillments as Rhodes lays out can be used. In
fact, we should put together a group to work on ferreting
out examples to be highlighted and publicized. This means
also finding ways to stress the President's personal
characteristics. The same applies for the anti-sensitive
and anti-people charges. Show he has compassion through
anecdotes and publicized public demonstrations. What he
did for the new attorney general at the swearing in and
how much it meant to his family.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUGLAS HALLETT
SUBJECT:
Your Memo of June 12.
The following is in response to the four questions raised in your
June 12 memorandum:
1. The President should be visibly involved in domestic issues --
particularly the more gutsy domestic issues which give him a
change-oriented, anti-status quo image. The President's foreign
policy successes will be easy to bring to peoples' minds during
the campaign itself. His domestic policy biases will not -- and
some we will not want to bring to mind at that time so as not to
offend the more stable parts of our coalition. Between the conven-
tions, the President could address a Spanish group and even visit a
barrio, take his domestic policy staff and Cabinet team to a city like
Indianapolis for a two-day, in-depth exposure to its problems, visit
a rural, agricultural community for a day, appear at a local union
meeting and a factory, do a walking tour of a Catholic, ethnic urban
community like Bay Ridge, New York City, do a one-day health tour --
i. e. visit a hospital, an urban clinic, a medical school, make an
address on education before a prestige audience dealing with questions
like the chit system, non-public education, "free schools", busing, etc.
in a coherent, thoughtful way, tying them all together under the theme
of eliminating governmental intervention in education as much as
possible, do an address on incomes VS. services strategy before a
prestige audience of poverty types, announce something on tax reform,
sock it to some major corporations once or twice to erase ITT. The
President should also do something on the human and personal side --
perhaps my old stand-by Colorado River run or a camping trip or
something, anything to keep him out of Key Biscayne and San Clemente
and demonstrate he can relate to something other than fat-cat vacation
spas.
2.
The President has had a rather vigorous schedule in recent months.
Keeping it going will make whatever campaign-related appearances he
he wants to make seem not SO out-of-the-ordinary and non-Presiden-
tial. We can also do certain kinds of visual, theoretically govern-
mental, events now that we will not be able to do after September for
both lack of time and obvious politics. Between the conventions, then,
offers the best opportunity to assert the same sense of dynamism in
our domestic policy as we already have made clear on the foreign side.
The over-all theme which can be related to our foreign policy and the
Nixon Doctrine is that government has been too active, both at home
and abroad, and what we are doing recognizes the need to readjust the
balance, return power to the people, take it away from the pointy-headed,
sandwich-carrying bureaucrats, and reprivatize much of what government
has undertaken in the past decade. This period is also a perfect time to
look beyond the conventions and even the election by giving the President's
domestic policy a more radical, dynamic image -- in the first term it was
necessary to clean up the foreign and economic messes left by the previous
Administration; in the second Administration the people can expect a
more vigorous attention to domestic issues and one which is explicitly
anti-governmental.
2. With something along the lines of the above accomplished between the
convention, the question of when he should start campaigning will never
really have to be faced. Anything explicitly campaign-oriented can just
be woven in to what the President is already doing. Immediately after
the convention, the President might do a quickie foreign trip the 1970
one, I thought, was fairly effective. Thinking up some excuse for the
President to visit the Pope in Italy might be particularly good. When he
comes back, his campaign pa ce should not be much, if any, faster than
his between-convention pace. Two kinds of events should be undertaken.
The first would be a more limited version of what he should do between
conventions. While obviously devotion of a full day or two to something
like health or urban problems becomes impossible to arrange after the
September 1 date, what is realistic is a one-topic speech event or state-
ment tied to a visual event: i. e. addressing a conservation group and
visiting a pollution-control facility on the same day. I could foresee
perhaps 10 to 12 half-days spent like this on each of the major issues.
The second type of event would be the partisan rally. These should be
regionalized, perhaps 5 or 6 the entire campaign. They would be
scrupulously prepared SO that the President would fly into a city and be
met with no less than 200, 000 people anytime he did an explicitly partisan
event. The cities for these rallies should be picked now and planning
should be undertaken immediately. Other than these two kinds of events.
3.
the President should be actively and visibly involved in the affairs of
government here in Washington, blasting the Congress for inaction on
his domestic program and tying up the final strings on his structure of
peace. On the media front, we should have factual, issue-oriented
(one issue per message) 30-second to 2-minute spots on 10 or 12 key
issues without any involvement personally of the President, a 30-minute
"Nixon in the White House" newsy-type documentary to play over and
over, a 30-minute Nixon biography for the same purpose, and two one-
hour conversations one of the President with common people (a veteran,
a union agent, a blue-collar housewife, a black, etc. ) and one with a
group of foreign policy types. The Sunday evening before the election
the President might do a 30-minute conversation with a group of kids.
Monday afternoon Mrs. Nixon and the girls might do something on prices,
education, etc. in an informal setting with one of our women appointees
interviewing. The night before the election, the President and family
should be on for an hour -- informal issue-oriented but general conversa-
tion leading up to a very philosophical, very statesmanlike, but natural,
peroration by the President. Ethnic -- i.e. Nixon and Jews -- and
negative -- i.e. McGovern and aerospace employment -- spots should
be used by front groups in particular areas.
The oratorical tone of the President's remarks can become somewhat more
offensive after September 1. The real gut-fighting should be left to others,
but the idea that the Democratic Party, even with George McGovern, is
the party of big government, large taxes, discord, over-intervention at
home and abroad, etc. should be gotten across. The President's partisan
speeches can contrast what is the case now with what was the case in 1968.
Others should tie George McGovern to the Eastern Establishment, the
Council on Foreign Relations, the New York Times, etc. but the
President's partisan speeches -- as opposed to the 10 or 12 suggested
substantive speeches can make it absolutely crystal-clear that George
McGovern's idea of change is no different than Franklin Roosevelt's or
Harry Truman's or Lyndon Johnson's -- and that that conception of change
is now no-change at all. By doing this, the President can take from
McGovern the anti-establishment image, identify himself with the little
guy and McGovern with the furry people in the Eastern Corridor, and give
voice responsibly to people's real concerns. Foreign policy here
explicitly should support domestic policy -- Democratic bias towards
extending democracy at home and abroad has gotten this country into
grave difficulty and what President Nixon is doing is getting it out.
4.
3. and 4. The opposition will be vigorously moderating its position while main-
taining its rhetorical and image posture. Liberalscare about words more
than substance and McGovern believes he can carry them along while
expanding his base into the center but the psychological posture will
not change. Counter-acting it must be done carefully, in two directions
simultaneously. On the lower end of the spectrum is the radicalism issue
and McGovern's radical posture on a number of different issues amnesty,
defense cuts as they affect jobs, marijuana, etc. Our efforts here should
be restrained so that what McGovern says and not what we say is the
issue They should also be very carefully particularized and very care-
fully documented. One-liners in the Vice-President's speeches about
abortion can only help Mc Govern by making us seem silly for relying
on a minor issue most people are far-advanced on. Mailings, non-
national speakers, carefully-distributed pamphlets by front groups, ads
in ethnic press, etc., on the other hand, can be extremely helpful. Ditto
with Jewish voters on Israel, defense-space workers in Florida, Texas
and California, veterans groups, anti-busing types, etc. The danger
here is thinking we aren't getting our position across because we don't
read it in the Washington Post. That, really, is what we want. We
want to reach with these issues the kind of people who don't read the
Washington Post and we should be actually happy if it doesn't appear there,
nor on the nightly news shows, etc. The most extreme kinds of charges
i. e. he's a friend of Ellsberg or Abbie Hoffman, etc. -- should be even
more carefully regulated to assure maximal benefit where they help but
no disadvantage in the far more numerous areas where use of this
material will hurt. Cheap-shotting -- McGovern's $110, 000 home, etc. --
should only be in context of a mere substantive attack on his essentially
Eastern Establishment liberalism.
On the higher end of the spectrum will be the foreign policy issues,
welfare, national security, etc. Our efforts here should be equally
careful. We must remember that the only way McGovern can win is
by holding frustrated middle-class ethnics and taking upper-middle
class suburbanites and combining them with the minorities to win bare
majorities in the big industrial states like California, Illinois and New
York. McGovern knows he cannot take the South. He knows, too, that
the kind of support he gets only comes after the most intense cultivation,
through media and house-calling, and the development of an emotional-
psychological identity among his voters with him. In my view, this
means McGovern will have a firmly left-wing Northern Democratic
Vice-President and he will spend an unprecedented amount of time
campaigning in the Northeast and Mid-west and Far-west. By doing so, it
is possible that he could lose the popular vote and still win the electoral
vote count And since it is possible and since it is the only possible
way he could win we should .worry about countering McGovern's potential
5.
appeal among these Northern, more sophisticated, more change-oriented
voters, and not worry so much about other types of voters who have no
choice but to vote for us and whose support can be reinforced by the
kinds of covert operation suggested above.
Our discussions of the major issues should be on a responsonsible,
positive plane. Our point is that McGovern's proposals are either
irresponsible and counter-productive
his defense budget
or
that
they are just retreads of New Deal and Great Society programs. The
real change, the real responsible change and particularly libertarian
change, has already come from President Nixon. These points should
be made by the Vice President, our Cabinet officers, and most of our
surrogate speakers:
It would be particularly helpful if we could get liberal Republicans -- i.e.
Javits, Scranton, etc. out campaigning on these points. The tempta-
tion, I know, will be to wave the flag and reach for the punch-line, but
we must remember that the audience in front of a speaker is not nearly
so important as the columnists, news commentators, etc. through which
he is reflected to the public as a whole. In 1970, the President didn't
really go around throwing verbal bombs all the time, but because he did
a few times that was the impression which was created. We want the
tone of our national campaign as opposed to particular community
and sect efforts, to be positive -- and to keep it that way we have to be
especially cautious in view of the media's desire to see us become
negative. This is the best way, indeed the only way, to not let McGovern
have the Mr. Clean-honesty-anti-establishment, etc. type issues benefit
him among the only voters who can elect him President. We want to
embody change and we cannot do that if we are demogoguing -- the media,
McGovern's personal impression, his ability to weave out of his positions
unless they are explicitly documented, the counter-productiveness of
demogoguery among the national constituency, the resulting sacrifice
of our Presidential image and the advantages of incumbency make it
unhelpful anyway. And if we can take the change, Mr. Clean, anti-establish
ment range of issues away from McGovern, we have taken away the only
basis on which he can possibly win.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINgTÓN
3-12-82
confidential
June 14, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Campaign
You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of
the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff,
etc., and I will not belabor that point.
Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E.
Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.
1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists, "
as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-
nothing 80th Congress. 11 With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation --
in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who
greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public
interest.
If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the
villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the
campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after
us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.
2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR
tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning
hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an
anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and
fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also
warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It
is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader
should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's
greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.
-2-
For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls
should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each
involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots
stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it
is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.
I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning.
It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on
a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Con-
vention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition
looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into
"I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes. 11
We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either;
the President should begin to say now, well before the convention,
that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants
to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting
people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the
electorate for support -- by so doing, he shows respect for the
system that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take
the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to
campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-
elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.
Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:
If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take
New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews:
Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's
attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak
on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee
ever -- and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks
like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never
before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175, 000 of those
wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-
holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy
Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan,
about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half
Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on
oldtimers who have a defeati st attitude about Nixon and Jews --
this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.
-3-
We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New
York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there
is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should,
for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed
in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every
week between now and November. We tend to think of our
Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is
important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh
chance there.
I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a
Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (When-
ever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.)
The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't
gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemploy-
ment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a
smart opponent.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strateg
Point 1: What should be the President's posture between
conventions?
In my mind, there is no question but that the President
should remain "the President" not only between conventions
but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late
in the campaign as possible, the President should be a
"working President,' remain mostly in Washington attending
to the business of the nation.
From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must
be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their
platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The
tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be
ripened for Administration support. Careful use of
Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the
stage to capture these dissaffected voters.
Point 2: What should be the President's posture during
the campaign?
Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe
should be the keystone of most of the early campaign.
Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the
President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney."
The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that
President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided.
We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President
out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President
does move, it will have a heightened impact.
-2-
Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the
President's position -- up to a point. In order to
orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have
better communication with campaign headquarters and the
White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must
have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking
world events.
As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates"
should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that
will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic
nominees will be formulating their strategy during that
period and the Administration will have an opportunity to
capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups
can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three
million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will
hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter
college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin
college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher
percentage of their votes.
These early efforts should be limited to specific constituen-
cies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early,
especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type
campaign, are all too real.
With the base already established, we should use the Republican
Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's
re-election. With special mailings, highly structured
organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate
an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President,
building in momentum, until the President himself does decide
to enter the lists.
Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?
To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong
leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs
and issues sort out under these two broad headings.
The media would have us believe many Americans are totally
dissatisfied with the "old Politics." It is now the fashion
to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists.
That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are
exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment,"
i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class
-3-
Americans have obtained a standard of living that their
parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the
midst of their success many middle class (and especially
lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled
by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse,
busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health
care. For many of these voters irritation has led to
frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a
visceral reaction against the "ins."
These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or
the security of strong leadership. The President has laid
the groundwork brilliantly for this case.
An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration
achievements and proposals can advance the image of
responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans
and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education
Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the
fullest.
The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract
support. We should not be seduced into attempting a
"charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is
substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength
and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the
President accurately display the courageous and bold
qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real
results because the President bargains from strength.
Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food"and
"unemployment." The food cost affects every American family
and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we
can do about food costs except what has been done and
obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to
solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting
the voters to think about other issues.
Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy.
Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not
already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and
imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts
offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.
-4-
Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.
A McGovern candidacy W 11 cause divisions in his party that
even an attractive runding mate will not repair. The South,
for instance, will be at of reach as even members of the
McGovern organization the South will admit.
A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive
element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending
upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace
could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes
in industrial states where the election might be close. But
some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help
the re-election of the President where he does appear on
the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away
from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that
angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters
will support Wallace.
As we saw in the televised debates during the California
primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful
manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed
radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems
of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total
lack of ability to lead this nation.
Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that
makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for
example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package.
The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's
programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration
can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push
him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the
onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for
the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT:
The Odds Against Henry Jackson
That Senator Jackson is a candidate for his party's nomination -- there
is no question. That he can win it -- there appears little hope. But
Jackson has some very high cards to play which make him a strong
contender for Vice President, and a powerful force at the Democratic
National Convention.
JACKSON'S STRENGTHS
1. He has almost all the moderate and conservative columnists in the
palm of his hand. They like, admire and respect Scoop Jackson. A
cursory review of the last three months finds supportive presidential
talk about Jackson from columnists White, both Alsops, Kilpatrick,
Alexander, Cuneo, the Drummonds several times, Gould Lincoln,
Chamberlain, Wilson -- and on and on. (Evans & Novak are solicitous.
They provide him with regular backpage support in most of the papers of
the nation. Even columnists who disagree with him (Wicker, Viorst)
respect him.
2. A choice not an echo: He is the single national Democrat who stands
as a clear alternative against the crowd of Bayh, Hughes, Muskie, McGovern,
Humphrey, Kennedy crowd. He emerges thus a visible rallying point for
conservative Democrats at the '72 convention.
3. Having hired the capable adviser Ben Wattenburg, he is paralleling
the Scammon-Wattenburg thesis. His attacks on "environmental extremists, "
his denunciation of fellow Democrats for paying "homage to the radical
fringe, 11 his focus on bread-and-butter issues, the economy and jobs, his
call for Democrats to stay on the "Economic Issue, 11 not the war; his rough
terminology which is being described in liberal circles as "Agnewian"
in all these instances, Jackson is setting himself up against the trendy,
2
bell-bottomed, elite of the left wing of his party -- and with the working
man center and right of his party. On issues, he is carving out his own
independent sector within the Democratic Party.
4. His super-hawkish anti-Soviet stand in the Middle East, his
fight for SST, againstthe "environmental extremists, 11 for space and
defense, not only make him first choice of George Meany -- but guarantee
a well-financed campaign from Aerospace, from Defense Industries,
from the Jewish Community, from Big Labor.
5. He is well respected by his Senate colleagues. A Drummond Poll
of the Senate found that 18 percent of Democrats felt Jackson "most
qualified to be President" ahead of Humphrey -- second only to Muskie --
(interestingly, EMK got less than anyone, three percent or one vote
of those polled.)
6. He gets excellent press coverage.
7. His hard-line on the Soviets, and on strategic defense, wins him
publicity plaudits from the Republican Conservative Community. While
such is of little use in a run for the nomination, it might be to any
Democrat for his Vice President.
8. On Vietnam he is down-playing his support of the President, leaving
it high enough to be visibly opposed to the rest of the pack, but shading it
a bit. Domestically, he pays occasional obeisance to such myths as the
"repression" by the Administration. Enough to keep his dues up but
not nearly enough to close the sizable gap that exists between him and
the liberal left of his party.
9. He is the best vote-getter in the Senate -- winning his primary
against a Galbraithian type by 85 percent -- and beating our candidate in
the general by the same margin 85 percent of the vote in a northwestern
industrial state. This evidence of massive support across the party
lines and throughout the ideological spectrum makes him especially
attractive as a Vice Presidential nominee.
10. His strength with press was evident in a poll of editors at ASNE
who felt he would probably have nearly best chance of any Democrat of
defeating RN.
3
DEFICIENCES
1. He has almost no recognition nationally. This will force him
to raise his profile rapidly, to announce fairly early, and probably to go
the primary route -- and it is doubtful how well he can do against
Democrats like Muskie.
2. He is apparently an unexciting speaker, who often bores
even those audiences who agree with him. One friend called him a
"Barry Goldwater without charisma. 11
3. His nomination would sunder the Democratic Party. And with
left-wing strength greater at this convention than the past, difficult to see
how his nomination could be swallowed by a Democratic Convention.
(However, if a Teddy Kennedy were nominated and Democratic conservatives
sufficiently outraged -- a Kennedy-Jackson ticket might do for the party
what the Kennedy-Johnson ticket did in 1960, bring it together again.
Where Johnson had the opposition of Labor and support of the South
Jackson for Veep would have both the South and Labor in his corner.)
4. He is sixty years old, at least will be, when the Democratic
Convention is over. This is his last chance to be on a national Democratic
ticket, after three decades in the Senate.
JACKSON'S CHANCE
Having carved out an independent Churchillian Position, if you will,
on the Soviets, on the Middle East whence war is likely to come if it
comes Jackson is dependent upon circumstances. If the Vietnam war
is raging, and there is calm between East and West -- Jackson has
next to nothing going for him.
But if Vietnam is removed as an issue, and the Soviets become
belligerent in Europe or the Middle East or the Mediterranean or anywhere,
then Jackson may very well appear the man for the times. If national
focus turns upon American weakness in the face of a rapidly arming Soviet
Empire, then Jackson could generate real support among Conservative
Democrats, Meany unions and the South and even conservative
Republicans.
4
No other Democrat seems today capable of making credible a hard-line
policy against the USSR.
But in such times Jackson will have a long shot for the top position,
and an inside track for the Vice Presidency.
THE FLORIDA PRIMARY
Jackson cannot win in New Hampshire; his lack of public recognition
requires him to step out early if he is to have any hope at the Convention.
Thus he is forced, it seems into the primaries. Thus Florida -- according
to two writers which is the same day as New Hampshire - - becomes
crucial to Jackson.
If Jackson wins in Florida, and Muskie is defeated, then the Muskie
opening day becomes a flop; Muskie's candidacy is damaged; the Jackson
candidacy becomes interesting -- and the stage is set for a bitter
division at the Convention.
While we may be desirous ourselves of having a massive turnout for
RN in Florida - there may be something worth while for us in assisting
the efforts of Scoop Jackson in that State. Something we ought to keep
in mind.
Jas