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This file contains:
Document on potential presidential running mates for the 1972 election. From RHF to Haldeman. Statistics table with data on prominent Republicans attached. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 9/9/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: an article on the 1972 Senate races. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/10/1971
Advance copy of an article authored by Kevin P. Phillips on the 1972 Senate races. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], no date
From Magruder and James W. McLane to Finch RE: staffing plans for the 1972 election. List of potential campaign staffers attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/31/1970
From Tom Charles Huston to Haldeman RE: Jim Buckley's campaign for New York Senator in 1970 and its relevance for the 1972 campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/15/1970
From Arthur J. Finkelstein to Huston RE: thoughts on the 1970 New York Senate race. Analysis of RN's 1972 re-election campaign included. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/7/1970
From Buchanan to RN RE: an attached memo relating to the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/11/1970
From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972 campaign, including data on key states and George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/9/1970
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: an attached document from Jim Connor. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/22/1970
Jim Connor's thoughts on important facets of the 1972 presidential race, including key voter demographics and campaign issues. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 11 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Moore to Haldeman RE: public relations advice with regard to RN's 1972 campaign. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/20/1970
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26145832
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WHSF: Contested, 20-17
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document
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1
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26145832
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WHSF: Contested, 20-17
description
This file contains:
Document on potential presidential running mates for the 1972 election. From RHF to Haldeman. Statistics table with data on prominent Republicans attached. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 9/9/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: an article on the 1972 Senate races. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/10/1971
Advance copy of an article authored by Kevin P. Phillips on the 1972 Senate races. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], no date
From Magruder and James W. McLane to Finch RE: staffing plans for the 1972 election. List of potential campaign staffers attached. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/31/1970
From Tom Charles Huston to Haldeman RE: Jim Buckley's campaign for New York Senator in 1970 and its relevance for the 1972 campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/15/1970
From Arthur J. Finkelstein to Huston RE: thoughts on the 1970 New York Senate race. Analysis of RN's 1972 re-election campaign included. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/7/1970
From Buchanan to RN RE: an attached memo relating to the campaign. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/11/1970
From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972 campaign, including data on key states and George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/9/1970
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: an attached document from Jim Connor. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 12/22/1970
Jim Connor's thoughts on important facets of the 1972 presidential race, including key voter demographics and campaign issues. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 11 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Moore to Haldeman RE: public relations advice with regard to RN's 1972 campaign. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/20/1970
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
17
9/9/1971
Campaign
Other Document
Document on potential presidential running
mates for the 1972 election. From RHF to
Haldeman. Statistics table with data on
prominent Republicans attached. 3 pgs.
20
17
9/10/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: an article
on the 1972 Senate races. 1 pg.
20
17
>
Campaign
Newspaper
Advance copy of an article authored by
Kevin P. Phillips on the 1972 Senate races.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 4 pgs.
20
17
12/31/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Magruder and James W. McLane to
Finch RE: staffing plans for the 1972
election. List of potential campaign staffers
attached. 8 pgs.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
17
12/15/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Tom Charles Huston to Haldeman RE:
Jim Buckley's campaign for New York
Senator in 1970 and its relevance for the
1972 campaign. 1 pg.
20
17
12/7/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Arthur J. Finkelstein to Huston RE:
thoughts on the 1970 New York Senate race.
Analysis of RN's 1972 re-election campaign
included. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 9 pgs.
20
17
12/11/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to RN RE: an attached
memo relating to the campaign. 1 pg.
20
17
12/9/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972
campaign, including data on key states and
George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs.
20
17
12/22/1970
White House Staff
Memo
From Rumsfeld to Haldeman RE: an attached
document from Jim Connor. 1 pg.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
17
Campaign
Report
Jim Connor's thoughts on important facets of
the 1972 presidential race, including key
voter demographics and campaign issues.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 11
pgs.
20
17
12/20/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Moore to Haldeman RE: public
relations advice with regard to RN's 1972
campaign. 13 pgs.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Page 3 of 3
Released 9/9/71
CHOICE OF NIXON'S RUNNING MATE
JHRH
RHF
Some of the questions facing Richard Nixon as he contemplates
who might be his Vice Presidential running mate next year are:
Should he keep controversial Sprio Agnew on the ticket? Should
he make a move to strengthen his position on the politically
ideologically right by getting Governor Ronald Reagan to run
with him? Should he run the risk of a defection from his
more conservative supporters by trying to get a man considered
to be politically instituted, such as New York Republican
Governor Nelson Rockefeller or Democrat John Connolly, his
recently appointed secretary of the Treasury?
On a survey completed last month, California polls touched
some measures on this subject. In California, Vice President
Agnew would be more of a drag than a boost to Mr. Nixon's
chances. While Agnew has strong appeal to conservative
California Republicans, he has little appeal to other Republicans
and Democrats. Perhaps surprisingly in California Reagan
appears to be an even poorer choice for Vice President than
Agnew. Reagan does not rank high as a Vice Presidential choige
among Republicans and apparently repels a sizeable portion
of Democrats. Of four choice Vice Presidential candidates
Nelson Rockefeller appears to add the most strength to the
Republican ticket in California. John Connolly appears also
to be a stronger Vice Presidential candidate than either
Agnew or Reagan, especially since he has gained additional
visibility since this survey was made as a supporter for
Nixon's new economic policy. The question on this subject put
to a representative statewide, cross-section of potential
voters in next year's election were:
"These men have been mentioned as possible Vice Presidential
candidates to run with President Nixon next year, assuming that
Nixon decides to run for re-election, which one would you be more
likely to vote for if he appeared as the Vice Presidential
candidate along with President Nixon on the Republican ticket?
"Which one would you be least likely to vote for if he appeared
as the Vice Presidential candidate?"
With Ronald Reagan as the Vice Presidential candidate behind
Richard Nixon, 35% of all voters say they would be least
likely to vote the GOP ticket where just 15% would be most
likely to vote for Nixon--Reagan. By a margin of 24% to 22%
potential voters say they would be least inclined rather than
more inclined to vote for Mr. Nixon if Agnew were the Vice
Presidential candidate. With John Connolly as the Vice Presidential
Page 2
candidate, the trade off was on the plus side for the GOP
ticket. 19% most likely to 14% less likely. Rockefeller as
Mr. Nixon running mate would appear to gain the most voters
for the GOP ticket. 32% most likely VS. 17% less likely.
QUESTION: GOP Vice President most likely to vote for:
Statewide
Candidates
All Voters
Rep.
Dem,
Nelson Rockefeller
32%
olo
26%
37%
Spiro Agnew
22%
36%
11%
John Connally
19% %
15%
22%
Ronald Reagan
15%
olo
20%
12%
None of these
7%
1%
11%
Don't know
5%
2%
7%
QUESTION: GOP Vice President least likely to vote for:
Candidates
All Voters
Rep.
Dem.
Ronald Reagan
35%
010
18%
50%
Spiro Agnew
24%
22%
26%
Nelson Rockefeller
17%
27%
10%
John Connally
14%
26%
6%
None of these
2%
1%
3%
Don't know
8%
6%
5%
Bak- WHITE HOUSE
FVI
WASHINGTON
Date 9-10-71
NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
This advance copy of Kevin Phillips
column is the best summary of the
Senate race situation in 1972.
FILE
YORK,
K.Y.
10017
FOR UNIONDED, SEPTEMBER 11, OR SONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1971
("IT" CHARS)
THE PHILLIPS SURVEY
BY KEVIN P. PHILLIPS
THE 1972 SENATE ELECTIONS
If you would like to know which states are going to have the vital
U.S. Senate contests of 1972, much of the information 1s already
available.
United States Senators are powerful politicians well positioned
to make a lot of friends and do a lot for their states. Once elected,
they are difficult to displace. Thus, few U.S. Senators go down to
defeat in November without warning. Almost inveriably, new Senators win
election only under the following circumstances:
1) The incumbent has retired;
2) The incumbent 18 so old that people believe he should have
retired;
3) The incumbent 1s only an appointee to fill an unexpired
term, not a man or woman who has actually been elected;
4) The incumbent has been bedly weakened or defeated in a
divisive party primary;
5) A najor third party has distorted previous voting patterns.
Since 1965, in three elections for the U.S. Senate, very few U.S.
Senate seats have changed hands except where one of the above criteria
existed. The exception 1s Oklahoma's like Monroney, who lost in 1968
principally because he was too liberal for his state.
Obviously, these criteria can only be a general guide. They do not
pinpoint the men who will lose. They simply delineate the ranks from
which most of the losers will come. Therefore, it 1s the following
seats that are most likely to have new occupants in January, 1973:
1. Seats Being Vacated: As of September, 1971, the list of expected
retirees 1s as follows: Margaret Chase Smith (Republican of Maine); Karl
Mundt (Republican of South Dakota); John Sherman Cooper (Republican of
Kentucky); Len Jordan (Republican of Idaho); Clinton Anderson (Demo-
crat of New Mexico); Fred Harris (Democrat of Oklahoma), and possibly
B. . Everett Jordan (Democrat of North Carolina).
All of these seats could conceivably change party hands, but the
shift 18 more likely in some than in others.
The seat of Maine's Senator Margaret Chase Smith could very well
flip to the Democrats. Such & switch would be especially likely if Haine's
Senator Edmund Muckie is the party's Presidcntial-nominee. In 1970,
his coattails helped a week Democratic gubernatorial candidate to beat
a popular Republican opponent.
(MORE)
1/12,
1971
PAGE 2
xx opponent.
scontor muncit's South Dakota seat is also potential Democratic
In. 1970. the Democrats von the governorship, the Senate race, and
the state's uwo.Congressional contests. Party strength appears to be
growing.
Kentucky Governor Louie Nunn may hold Senator Cooper's seat for the
Republicans. If Kentucky elects a GOP governor in November to succeed
Nunn, Cooper may resign so that Hunn can be appointed to the Senate and
campaign 8.8 an incumbent.
Idaho's Senator Jordan has just announced his retirement, and the
state GOP picture is unclear. The Republicans are generally expected
to hold the seat.
With Senator Anderson retiring, the New Mexico Senate seat could
go cither way. In 1968, when President Nixon won a surprisingly large
New Mexico plurality, he helped elect two new Republican Congressmen.
The Presidential race could make the difference again in 1972.
Until unpopular, liberal Senator Fred Harris announced his re-
tirement, Oklahoma was expected to replace him with a Republican in
1972. But now the likely Democratic nominee, middle-roading Congress-
man Ed Edmondson, has a chance to hold the seat for his party.
If North Carolina's Senator Jordan retires, the probable Demo-
cratic nominee will be Governor Robert Scott. The Republicans would
have a chance of defenting Scott and a better chance of defeating the
aging Jordan. In any event, the race will be considerably affected by
the respective strength of President Nixon, the Democratic nominee,
and George Wallace.
2. Aged incumbents: Most of the older Senators likely to stand for
re-election are Democrats from Southern and Border states. Besides
Senator Jordan of North Carolina (who will be 76 next November), they
include Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana (aged 82 next year), Sena-
tor John Sparkman of Alabama (72), Senator John McClellan of Arkansas
(76), and Senator Johnings Randolph of West Virginia (70).
Senator Ellender is expected to run again, and should be an over-
whelming favorite.
Senator McClellon, a conservative, faces the prospect of a primary
fight with a younger, more moderate Democrat -- Congressman David Pryor
or perhaps even Governor Dale Bumpers. If McClellan survives the pri-
mary, he should win rc-election handily. Even the primary scars of. his
defeat would be unlikely to create a Republican opening.
In Alabama, Senator John Sparkman is favored to defeat his pro-
bable COP opponent, Postmaster General Winton Blount.
West Virginia's Senator Randolph, Chairman of the Senate Public
Works Committee, occupies a position of no small importance to pork-
barrel hungry West Virginia. However, he may confront a serious chal-
lenge from Republican Governor Arch O. Moore.
(MORE)
1971
PAGE 3
XX Moore.
Dropping to men who addl be between the ages of 65 and 70 in
1972 one Findsa lone Democrat
Cenator
Jomes
of
Mississippi (07) -- and a tric of Republicans: Senator Carl Curtis of
Nebraska (67), Senator Strom Thurs:ond of South Carolina (69), and Senator
Clifford Case of New Jersey (68). Eastland i3 not expected to have
trouble at the polls, and neither 18 New Jersey's Case. However, Thur-
mond is expected to face & tough fight, and Curtis, although favored,
could have a rough race in farm-troubled Nebraska.
3. Senators lihe Dave Been Amointed Rather Than Elected: Democratic
Senator David Cambrell of Georgia is the only present member of this
group. A moderate appointed in January by Governor Jimmy Carter to
replace deceased Senator Richard Russell, Gambrell can expect conserva-
tive primary opposition, conceivably from the colorful Lieutenant-Governor
(for Governor) Lester Maddox. Either Gambrell or another primary victor
will probably face a determined Republican challenge in November.
4. Incumbents Who Boar Bad Primary Scars or Candidates Who Have
Defeated Incumbents in Divisive Primaries: Besides the Arkansas and
Georgia situations already mentioned, some rough primaries may be shaping
up elsewhere.
First on the list is Oregon, where liberal Republican Senator
Mark Hatfield lags badly in the polls and 1s likely to retire or be
replaced -- after a primary -- by COP Governor Tom McCall. As for
general election prospects, Hatfield 1s rated a likely loser, while
McCall, as the Republican notinee, would be a solid favorite.
Another potential primary state 1s Kansas, where GOP Senator James
Pearson, an unprodictable moderate, may draw conservative opposition.
Such a contest could help pave the way for D. Democratic upset.
In Virginia, moderate Democratic Senator William Spong is likely
to. face primary opposition, perhaps from both ends -- conservative and
liberal -- of the political spectrum. Here the Republicans may have a
chance to profit from the ideological split in the Virginia Democratic
Party.
Rhode Island's routinely liboral Democratic Senator Clairborne
Pell is given only a SO-50 chance of re-election, and may draw oppo-
sition from another Democrat who feels better able to take advantage
of the state's heavy Democratic bias. Whatever happens, there is a good
chance that the next Senator from Rhode Island will be Republican Havy
Secretary John Chafee.
5. Prospects of Third Party Interference: Conservative third
parties are becoming a new force in U.S. Scnate elections, mostly in
protest against local situations where the two major parties espouse
similar liberal outlooks.
In 1970, such a third party actually elccted James Buckley to the
Senate from New York. However, the conservative third parties that will
be on the ballot this year are not well enough positioned to be able to
elect anyone. Still, they may play an important role in determining
major party winners.
(MORE)
SPTURDAY/COIDAY, SEPTEMBER 11/12, 1971
PAGE 4
THE PRIQUIN DURVEY
xx winners.
Liberal Republican Sanator Edward Brooke or Massachusetts faces local
Conservative Party opposition, but it is not expected to endanger his
re-election. Michigan GOP Senator Robert Griffin confronts a greater
menace. Although Griffin is a moderate, he may be opposed -- and done
in -- by & candidate of a new Conservative Party which aims at forcing
the liberal-run Michigan GOP to need conservative sentiment.
Other third party situations could develop in the South, but none
of any great significance .are presently on the horizon.
***
If the patterns of the recent past continue to hold, these criteria
pinpoint nearly all of the states which may elect new U.S. Senators
next year. The list does not include some men like Senators Lee Met-
calf of Montana, John Tower of Texas, Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire
and Jack Miller of Iowa, who are generally expected to face tough races.
Unless new circumstances develop, the 1966-1970 record suggests that
incumbency should re-clect most of these legislators.
In partisan terms, the criteria listed above hint that the Demo-
crats should gain a few Senate seats in 1972. The "dark horse" GOP
opportunity is in the South and Border areas. Ten of the eleven Con-
federate states have Senate seats up this year, as do West Virginia,
Kentucky, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. Whereas several years ago, the Re-
publicans could have anticipated major Dixie gains, their opportunity
has now been lessened by President Nixon's erratic stand on busing and
related issues. If the GOP does not pick up several Southern seats in
1972, Northern gains should register a slight increase in the existing
Democratic Senate majority.
Copyright, 1971, by King Features Syndicate, Inc.
(JPN)
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVE RKING
E.O. 120co, Section 6-102
By
Ep
Date 3-12-82
December 31, 1970
GONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROBERT H. FINCH
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
JAMES W. McLANE
SUBJECT:
Campaign '72 Planning
This memorandum summarizes our understanding of your views
on the need to begin thinking about and planning for the 1972
campaign. We have outlined our understanding of the objectives
to be reached, the proposed action steps to achieve these ob-
jectives, and a plan of implementation which we intend to follow.
We have also attached a list of potential candidates for required
positions.
Objectives
The purpose of our immediate effort is to lay the groundwork
for the '72 campaign by:
developing a small, low-visibility national organi-
zational framework, giving priority first to primary
States and then to key electoral States, and,
developing an appropriate network of functional
and logistical support for the campaign effort in
1972, including the appropriate communication
networks, information systems, and computer
flexibility.
Action Steps
Several action steps will have to be taken in the next few weeks
to begin moving toward these objectives. These steps, in
order of priority, include:
1. Recruitment of "outside" regional coordinators, with
2
priority given first to areas where there are early
primaries and then to key electoral States. This step
will include field visits to key locations to open lines
of communication and show the flag.
2. Recruitment of 1 "in-house" (located either here at
the White House or at the Republican National Committee)
desk man.
3. Recruitment of an "in-house" computer and soft-
ware specialist to develop the necessary computer
capability. This individual would compliment and
supplement the activities the RNC is engaged in at the
present time.
4. Recruitment of an "in-house" research specialist to
monitor the opposition, both Democrat and Republican,
to develop the necessary statistical foundation for cam-
paign decisions, and to pull together appropriate State-
by-State analyses of issues, voter behavior, and the like.
The individuals recruited will begin:
(1) Inventorying and cataloging all existing resources
for use in the '72 campaign, resources available in the
White House, National Committee, Congressional Com-
mittee, State Committees, 1968 campaign records, etc.
(2) Developing a detailed "game plan" for necessary
activities between now and the start of the actual campaign.
Plan of Implementation
Person(s)
Targeted Com-
Activity
Responsible
pletion Date
Recruit "outside" Regional coordinators
visits to key areas (up to 10)
Finch/McLane
2/15/71
screening of candidates
Finch/McLane/
3/1/71
Magruder
selection of team
Finch
3/15/71
3
Recruit a regional desk man, a
computer specialist, and a research
coordinator
identifying candidates (see Attach- Magruder/McLane 12/31/70
ments A, B
initial screen of candidates
Magruder/McLane 1/22/71
final screen of top candidates
Finch
2/1/71
selection of team
Finch
2/5/71
Inventory and catalogue resources
Magruder/
2/15/71
McLane
Develop detailed "game plans"
Magruder/
3/1/71
McLane
The attached lists of potential candidates for positions include
Bart "Porter" and Mike Schrauth. Both are working now with Chapin/
Walker and should be given consideration for the first two spots.
Attachments
Attachment B
GENERAL - GOVERNMENT
Name
Position & Dept.
GS
Age Specialty/Comments
Robert Barth
Asst. to the Comm.
16
31
Legal
IRS - Treasury
Paul R. Beach
Asst. to the Sec. -
Treasury
16
31
Organization
Donald Bliss
Asst. to the Sec.
14
28
Organization
George Carneal,
Jr.
Chief Counsel FAA
Spec.
35
Legal
John Clarke
Exec. Asst. to the
Assoc. Dir. - OEO
15
Organization
Samuel Hale,
Operations Research
15
28
Management
Jr.
Analyst, Mgmt. Systems
HEW
Anthony Jurich
Spec. Asst. to the
Sec. for Nat'l Security
Affairs - Treasury
18
44
Policy Research
E. Grey Lewis
Exec. Asst. to Asst.
AG - Justice
16
32
Legal
William Marumoto
Consultant to the WH
15
35
Public Affairs
on Executive Manpower-
WH
C. March Miller,
Spec. Asst. to the Sec.
II
for Personnel - HUD
15
33
Organization
Bert Rein
Dept. Asst. Sec. for
FRSI
28
Organization
Telecommunications -
State
Larry Roush
Asst. Comm. Operations
16
31
Management
Programs Public Bldg.
Services
Attachment B - continued
Name
Position & Dept.
GS
Age
Specialty/Comments
Donald Webster
Deputy Asst. Sec. for
18
40
Organization and
International Affairs -
Public Affairs
Treasury
Vincent DeCain
Deputy Asst. PMG, Post
Office (1968 Advanceman)
Robert Henry
Confidential Assistant to
Assistant PMG, POD
T. William (Bill)
Director of Information,
Swinford
Civil Aeronautics Board
(Worked for Rumsfeld in
13th District, Illinois)
Webster Todd, Jr.
Exec. Asst. to the Chair-
man, CAB (Father is former
New Jersey State Chairman)
Harold S. (Ted)
..
Assistant Administrator,
Trimmer
GSA
Henry Boe
Post Office
29
Lawyer
Jim Holland
Post Office, Public
Information Office
30
Bill Dunlap
Special Asst., Post Office
30
Bill Rhatican
Advertising
34
Campaign
Organization
assigned to
Walker/Magruder
Bruce Ladd
Fleming's office
30
Public Relations
Work
Jim Lynn
Dept. of Commerce
33
Gen. Counsel
Mike Schrauth
Public Information
36
assigned to Chapin/
Walker
Max
Acting Assoc. Dir. for
Friedersdorf
Congressional Relations, OEO
Attachment B - continued
Name
Position & Dept.
GS
Age Specialty/Comments
Bill Sawyer
Public Information
31
good administrator
Office, OEO
Dan Todd
Special Asst. to the
Chairman, CAB
31
Richard Mastrangelo Asst. to Sec. HEW
33
Richard Dunnells
Acting Deputy Asst
32
Sec. Urban Renewal
HUD
Attachment A
POTENTIAL CANDIDATES FOR THE
'72 CAMPAIGN PLANNING STAFF
Name
Approximate Age
Current Activity
GENERAL - NON-GOVERNMENT
J. Curtis Herge
31
Lawyer-Mudge, Rose
Guthrie & Alexandria, N. Y.
Advance work for the Pres.
and First Family during
Campaign '70. Strong on
finances, detail, personal
contact.
Tom Northcote
29
Lawyer-Investment
Banker (Kuhn, Loeb), N.Y.
Southern Cal - Harvard
Law; does special projects
for us on request. Strong
salesman, good organiza-
tion, access to financial
information, very bright.
Donald Segretti
30
Lawyer-Army Captain,
available upon discharge -
June 1971. Organization,
detail, salesman, deal
developer.
Tom Banks
26
Lawyer (own firm), L.A.
Southern Cal - on Walker's
advance list; personal
contacts in LA, conscientious
on detail.
Peter Miller
28
Lawyer-(Sullivan & Cromwel
John Foster Dulles), N.Y.
Stanford - Harvard; N. Y;
good research, writer,
bright.
ATTACHMENT A - GENERAL - NON-GOVERNMENT
-2-
Rich Guggenheim
30
Lawyer (Heller, Ehrman-
Cap Weinberger), San Francisco.
Stanford-Harvard; personal
contacts, organization,
party worker.
Carl Vogt
33
Lawyer-Atlanta. Williams-
Boalt. Tremendous leader,
good organizational back-
ground.
Joel S. Wachs
31
Lawyer - L.A.
Charles Stevens
32
United Student Alliance,
group organizer
Jerry Speers
28
Was campaign manager for
father's Congressional race
in Maine
Bruce Farrell
31
Mass. Governor's planning
staff; research coordinator
for Mass. Gubernatorial
campaign in 1970.
Allan Shea
39
Director, National Alliance of
Businessmen, New England
Philip Richer
37
Marketing Manager, New
England Telephone Company
MEMORANDUM
72
THE WHITE HOUSE
polit
WASHINGTON
file
December 15, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
TOM CHARLES HUSTON
SUBJECT:
Analysis of Buckley Senate Race
I am attaching a memorandum on the New York Senate race and
its implications for 1972 prepared at my request by a young fellow
who was Jim Buckley's elections analyst. This fellow is quite
highly regarded by Cliff White and others and I think his observations
are quite interesting. I might point out that not all his conclusions
are beyond dispute, but most are worthy of consideration.
Finkelstein works for the NBC unit that does the Vote Profile
Analysis and, while lacking Phillips' precision, is nevertheless a
promising fellow. I think he could be helpful to us in providing an
additional perspective on some of the problems we will face as we
move into 1972 and his grasp of voting and demographic data is quite
good. Moreover, he has a feel for the New York situation which only
one similarly situated could have.
TA
Attachment
TO:
Tom Huston
SUBJ: Election Review and Thoughts
FROM: Arthur J. Finkelstein
DATE: December 7, 1970
As an attempt at coherence, this report is segmented into five
divisions. Segment one deals with the New York State Senate race ---
assumptions made -- issues slated. The second division is simply
a sketchy and not final attempt at evaluation of the election results
of that Senate race. The third segment just lists some thoughts
dealing with the national results and some suggestions for analysis.
The fourth area is an attempt to explore the president's chances vis-
a-vis the four major aspirants for the Democratic nomination. Finally,
the fifth division is a summary division wherein I allow my mind to
wander where it may.
New York State Senate Race
Running as a third party, and conservative third party at that,
in New York State is an act of heresy. Buckley's 1968 performánce
suggested that there were indeed many votes to be had as a third party
candidate. Unfortunately, it did not at first appear that there were
enough votes to make Buckley a winner.
Several conditions were present in 1970 that were not present in
1968. Among them were:
1. Money - Jim had virtually no real dollars to spend in 1968;
2. Clif White - It cannot be overestimated the importance of
truly professional leadership;
3. Goodell - Is not and was not Javits;
4. Right-ward Shift - Fully 1/3 of all New Yorkers considered
themselves conservatives by July, 1970.
Rather quickly, we determined that Ottinger, not Goodell, was the
one to beat, however, to win we needed the Republican votes that Goodell
had by virtue of his place on the Republican ticket. Effectively then,
the voters were asked to vote for James Buckley as an alternative to
the liberal twins or for Richard Ottinger as an alternative to the
Republican twins. Throughout the campaign we exploited our alternative
more effectively than Ottinger did.
We needed to emphasize our Republican credentials and we did.
Every Republican endorsement was played to the hilt from Congressmen
to County Leaders. Early in the campaign, the allusion, if not the
reality, of James Buckley being the Republican choice was established.
To this end, Goodell's later assertions that he had a more Republican
voting record than Barry Goldwater was scoffed at.
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However, a simple majority of Republicans would have left us far
short - we needed that middle-income traditional Democratic vote that
Kevin Phillips talks about. We went after the Italian and Irish voter
hard. Mario Proccacino and John Marchi were used continuously around
the state. Proccacino because of his Democratic background and be-
cause of the constituency he represents was a particularly significant
factor. Agnew's pronouncements here was very helpful. I, however,
believe that his rhetoric was too harsh over too long a time, SO that
it is possible that not only Liberal Democrats moved to Goodell in
sympathy, but also Line-Republicans who felt that statements such as
the "Christine Jorgensen" analogy were unfair. Yet on balance the
Vice-President had a positive affect on the outcome of the election.
Perhaps most importantly the Vice-President completely eclipsed Richard
Ottinger from the media and drew to Buckley that hard-hat labor vote
which we ultimately received.
Therefore, the initial strategy to ignore Black and Jewish voters
and to concentrate on the middle and upper-income wasp and ethnic
groupings was carried forth. Though we determined early which voters
to pursue there was one major obstacle we had to deal with - that being
the question of credibility. Unwillingly, I'm sure, the New York Times
gave us a boast here.
Very early in the campaign, Anthony Lewis and another columnist,
whose name slips my mind at the moment, wrote articles stating that
Buckley could win and that he was a sincere, able man. These articles
coupled with early endorsements from some papers around the state and
our early sole presence on television, helped establish Buckley as
viable. The Daily News poll which showed us leading toward the end,
kept our voters in line.
In terms of issues, we determined from an intensity survey in
Rochester that drugs, crime, inflation, environment, campus unrest,
and Vietname were the major issues. We played to each of these issues
through realizing early that the environment and Vietnam issues were
not cutting but useful from a broadening-of-the-candidate point of view.
In this regard, we did a good job. Buckley was acknowledged by the
electorate as the man most able to deal with drugs, crime, etc.
However, inflation and whole economics area cut against us. Fortunately,
it was not until the final three days of the campaign that Ottinger
began an all out crusade on Economics. Until that point he was fighting
it out with us on drugs and losing.
One issue which we did not perceive early was school-bussing. I
threw a question on bussing into one of the very amatuerish surveys I
was taking around the state and found unusually srtong and overwhelming
distaste for school bussing. We needed some help in Buffalo (the
Polish community is one of the few ethnic groups which unfathomably is
not being moved Ala Kevin Phillips) where we determined early would be
our hardest nut to crack. We knew we needed over 25% of the vote there
and throughout the campaign that looked dubious. Nixon in a two-way
race received only 40% in Erie county. We kept sending Jim to Buffalo
and we enlarged our media campaign in that area, then we used our
bussing issue. It worked. Final figures are not yet in officially
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but it looks like we received 28% of the Erie County vote. I suspect
mostly from the large Italian and German population in that area.
The Polish community is still not moved to a large extent.
Summing up this section, it can be said we geared the campaign
to go after suburban and upstate Republicans, urban Democrats, middle-
income Blue Collar Irish - Italian - German -- Polish, upper-income
Wasp, whites, and those individuals who in turn would be moved by the
Sca-mon-Wattenberg social issue. Finally, we realized we had un-
doubtedly the best candidate and we were not affraid to go anywhere
with him. Clif White ran an almost flawless campaign and he had the
money and talent to make it all happen.
New York State Election Evaluation
Goodell received about 1/3 of the High S.E.S. group, about 1/5
of middle S.E.S., and slightly more than 1/4 of the low S.E.S. He
received almost 1/3 of the Black vote but slightly less than 1/5 of
the White vote. He received about 30% of the Jewish vote, 25% of the
Latin American vote and a little less than 1/4 of the Italian vote.
He received slightly more than 1/5 of the Blue Collar vote. He did
not win a plurality of any of these groups.
Goodell received 20% of the New York City vote, 22% of the N.Y.C.
suburbs and slightly less than 1/3 of the rest of the state.
Ottinger garnered about 1/4 of the High S.E.S. vote, 1/3 of the
middle S.E.S. vote, and more than 50% of the low S.E.S. vote. He
received 2/3 of the Black and Latin American vote, and less than 40%
of the white vote. He received under 40% of the Italian vote and
Blue-collar vote. He received about 55% of the Jewish vote. Ottinger
won a plurality among the low S.E.S., Blacks, Latin Americans, and
Jews. He and Buckley received virtually the same vote out of the
Italian community.
Ottinger received 44% in the city, 32% in the suburbs, 38% in the
three cities, and 31% in the rest of the state.
Buckley received about 45% of the vote from the High S.E.S.,
middle S.E.S., white and Blue-Collar voters. He received only slightly
more than 10% of the low S.E.S. voters, about 15% among Jewish voters.
He received less than 10% of the vote among Latin Americans and Blacks.
Among Italians he got under 40%. Buckley won a plurality among the
high S.E.S., middle S.E.S., whites and Blue-collar voters. He received
about the same vote as Ottinger among Italians.
Buckley received 36% in New York City, 46% in the city's suburbs,
30% in the three cities of Rochester, Syracuse and Buffalo and 37% in
the rest of the state.
The contention that Buckley won because of a Liberal split I
think is clearly reputed by these numbers. Goodell did very poorly
in the city where Liberal sentiment is greatest and did best in those
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sections of the state where Republican sentiment is greatest. Those
numbers also give some validity to my earlier contention about the
Agnew play.
Most importantly these numbers give mild hope to building a
lasting Republican coalition in the state. However, since blacks
and Jews constitute about 25% of the total vote in the state, and with
the ever-inoreasing Latin American population making the dissident
coalition nearly 30% of this coalition can only be described as pre-
carious at best. If a permanent coalition is to be developed in
New York States Jews, at least, must be included to some significant
degree.
Also the Polish bloc, for which I have no real break-out yet,
must be catered to and harnassed. Nixon cannot win with 40% of Erie
County again, which seems likely to happen if some hard work is done
early in the Polish groups around Buffalo.
Surprisingly, Jim received about 5% of the Black vote and in fact
ran better than Nixon did in some of our key district samplings taken
election night. This is all the more surprising when one remembers
Buckley was on Row C. In Black areas, even more so than elsewhere,
drugs was the issue. A late endorsement from a local Black leader
helped. Considering the Black strive for autonomy recently Conservative/
Republican ideology perhaps can be used to wedge in. I am not sug-
gesting that we will be able to carry Black areas in the forseeable
future, but we can significantly add to that 5% with an effort to show
understanding of the real social issues affecting that community.
Finally, it cannot be overstated the importance of James L. Buckley
as a candidate. After watching Jim campaign, smiling - gesturing-
reasoning, one is prone to disbelieve the ogre theory. He confronted
the electorate as the citizen-Politician, who was concerned with those
issues that concerned all citizens. He approached them with reason
and moderation. More on moderation later.
National Trends
In a general sense, I agree with Scammon that elections are won
by finding the political middle and moving towards it. I would, however,
make one major modification to that general statement; find the cutting
political middle and strive towards it. For exa-ple, environment was
a middle-issue but very few voted for or against ecology. On the other
hand, drugs, race, inflation cut. One should then try to polarize the
election around that issue which cuts best in your direction, i.e.,
drugs, crime, race in New York State. When the opponent seizes the
polarization initiative, then you're in trouble.
Nationally, the Republican party went overboard on the social issue
and virtually ignored economics. (I must point out that our very first
set of television commercials discussed inflation, taxes, etc.) The
electorate must not only agree with the cutting political-middle
position on stakes out they must all believe that the candidate can
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provide the proper temperment to deal with the problem. Once again,
moderation is called forth, and moderation is what was missing in
Indiana, California, Florida and other states from what I have gathered
from the media. Texas seemed to have been a major exception to this
rule, but it does not negate the need for moderation.
The election results proved virtually nothing. We did witness
perhaps a half-step to the right in the Senate. The Democrats surely
made strides in the statehouses, elsewhere Little Movement. It seems
to me that local issues moved this election more than normally
(normally off-year elections tend to be locally oriented anyway) and
yet some light I think can be shed.
Intuitively, I feel that this election was an election of negativism.
I recommend that an analysis of referendums, bond issues, etc. be
undertaken if one has not yet been done which I feel will point forth
that negativism. In my opinion, only an immoderate negative campaign
in Indiana could have allowed Harthe to hold his Senate seat. Stevenson's
flag pin campaign seems to be the perfect campaign for a Democrat to
run. A campaign that diffuses the social issue and polarizes around the
economic issue is a tough parlay to beat. Most importantly it allowed
Stevenson to be the anti-hero, the Messiah of negativism.
The administration's rhetoric, I felt, was too strident, particular-
ly the rhetoric of the Vice President. However, the Vice President cer-
tainly helped move the Blue Collar ethnic vote and he should help enor--
mously in the south and border states in 1972. Texas, for example,
I believe will go G.O.P. in 1972 on the basis of the Vice President alone.
If the right-ward shift of the electorate continues and the economic
situation is in-land then it might be possible to play to new social
issues with the stridentness of 1970 and not be immoderate but the
rhetoric should not be employed solely on the basis of its academic
delightfulness.
The Radical-Liberal campaign failed dismally mainly because of its
disarray. You simply can't call virtually every Democrat a Radical-
Liberal and be believed by large segments of the population. Smear
campaign work but they must be concentrated, not universal.
Presidential 1972
The 1970 elections, if they taught anything at all, showed that the
Scammon social issue is not a "tidal wave", at least not yet. Vietnam
is not a negative or cutting issue any longer and economics could rule
the roost.
The social issue was approached in 1970 in an umbrella attack
where everything from Blacks to students, Radicals to Liberals, porno-
graphy, youth, draft dodgers, crime, drugs, and hippies were confronted.
I suggest the social issue can work effectively if one concentrates on
and defines for the electorate who is the culprit. On this score, I
would define the culprit as those "Radical Left Extremists", not Liberals
too many people classify themselves as Liberals (old coalition) and
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resent being told that they are the enemies of society. More pre-
cisely, the culprit should be limited to a maximum of three groups.
At least one of those groups should be a group which "good Liberals"
like Kennedy could not repudiate. One group should be bizzare (i.e.
Weathermen, Yippies, etc.) which links directly to all the youth
fear inherent in the social issue. The third group must be Black
oriented (Panthers?) to exploit the race issue. I do not recommend
attacking the A.D.A. It doesn't work and forget balancing the group
with the K.K.K. The danger must be presented as coming from the left.
I suggest this group be finalized no earlier than January, 1972, but
that the phrase "Radical Left Extremist" be employed as early and
consistently as possible applying it to every anti-social leftist
terrorist act such as shooting of policemen, campus riots, riots in
general, bombings, etc. The emphasis on the social issue should be
placed in inverse relationship to the economic issue.
The economic issue can only cut against us so if as is projected
mid-1971 will show a drop off in unemployment numbers, the president
should go on television telling the country that he has stemmed the
recession in record time with the least hardship possible; thank the
American people for their cooperation in this effort and announce
that this again proves that when the American people are faced with a
crisis they respond in great measure and that this could only have
been accomplished by the president because of the people's over-
whelming support of his economic policies.
This would have the triple effect of dealing with the economic
issue early and diffusing it; allowing the electorate to feel that it
aided the president in dealing with the problem and joining them with
him; and allow the president to take credit for handling the economic
situation in expert manner and mobile enough to shift the blame for
the recession and inflation on the Democrats in the electorate's mind.
If there is no turn around in the recession and in the inflation
until 1972, this will place the president in a precarious position.
If there is no turn around at all it may place the president in a
fatal position. In any event, the economic strategy must be considered
of prime importance.
On Vietnam the president should be thoroughly positive on his
actions. A dove opponent, or even a former dove, would be extremely
vulnerable to a patriotic approach. But again, I don't think this
will be cutting. Yet Vietnam and the draft show the President to be
a man of peace, competancy, and action. If another Cambodian-type
invasion or military assault is to be attempted, it should be attempted
as soon as possible, no later than January, 1972. A successful P.O.W.
raid attempt would be enormously important and positive in building
the president's image.
Of course, in all three issue areas mentioned and any other areas
that may develop over the course of the next two years, consideration
must be given to changes in circumstances which must inevitably occur.
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The president, above all, must find the political middle and
move towards it and with it during the next two years. The president
must also continue to display himself as a man of moderation never
calling forth for harsher measures beyond that which the political
middle would call forth on its own.
The presidents present political image is that of a moderate
Conservative. This is perfect in terms of the electorate and fine
in terms of his perspective political opponents - Muskie, Kennedy,
Lindsay, McGovern.
Let's for a moment, assume George Wallace does not run in 1972.
Also, let's assume that the economic issue develops as previously
suggested. Then the president stands to lose only (in major states)
New Jersey and Pennsylvania to the first three men listed, none to
McGovern while picking up the South including Texas and a couple of
midwestern states that Humphrey carried. If these assumptions hold
then there would be little to fear.
Assume now that Wallace does run and the second assumption remains
the same. Then the president would probably still hold Texas against
all four. With Agnew on the ticket still hold the border states against
all four. Muskie would seriously challenge the president in New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois. The president would then be forced
to either move right or attempt to move Muskie left. It would be far
better to try to move Muskie away from the political middle then move
from the political middle himself. The social issue then becomes a
major tactic and consideration and should be employed.
Under the same set of assumptions, Kennedy would be a bit easier
though Kennedy would have to be given an edge in New Jersey; Pennsyl-
vania would still be up for grabs; while Ohio and Illinois would be
easier for Nixon. Texas and the border states would be stronger for
Nixon, while the president would find California a lot less stable.
Lindsay and McGovern (particularly McGovern) look like political
misfits to me who would be SO far away from the political middle that
only a strange set of circumstances would a) allow them to get the
nomination (i.e. it wasn't worth anything) or b) allow them to win the
Presidency (i.e. depression, war, etc.). Since points a and b are
mutually exclusive, the likelihood of either occurring seem problem-
atically impossible.
If Wallace runs and there is an economic collapse, then Muskie would
be virtually a shoo-in. The South and border states and perhaps even
Texas would go to Wallace. Michigan, California, New Jersey, Ohio,
and Illinois would go to Muskie, who would then be the anti-hero man of
the middle. His style perfect for that occurance. Kennedy would fare
perhaps even better holding on to Democrat votes in the Northeast
reviving the old coalition so that he could pull off some border states
and maybe Texas. He would then be able to have California, Michigan, Ohio,
Illinois, etc.
-8-
Lastly, if Wallace does not run and there is an economic
collapse, then the president would find Kennedy easier than Muskie
but would probably lose to either man.
In other words at all costs (politically) an economic collapse
must be avoided. However, a total collapse seems improbable. If
the economy is sour but not excessively so, then Muskie would be the
most serious challenger perhaps having the edge in those areas
hardest hit by the sour economy California, Ohio, Michigan, perhaps
New Jersey. Kennedy would be less secure in these states under
that condition.
Frankly though, the most important thing about 1972 is that it
is two years away and that little can be suggested about issues or
candidates at this time with any real degree of reliability. In my
judgment, the president is in excellent shape, stronger now than in
November, 1968 and all things being equal should be reasonable
assured of being reelected in 1972. Unfortunately, all things may
not be equal.
I have purposely excluded New York State from this analysis.
I will disucss it below.
Random Thoughts
It appears that there has yet to be perceived in absolute terms
a reliable working system to determine the future course of voting
behavior. There is great truth in all the recent deluge of books
but non, to my complete satisfaction, has defined a fully accurate
working model.
No doubt a new coalition is forming. Yet the Polish, in New
York State at least, has not followed the script. The social issue
is cutting, but economics cut more deeply in 1970. So trends are
emerging but the full extent of change is not yet really perceptible.
1. The economic issue looms at present as the major issue of
1972. It can only hurt national Republican chances.
2. The social issue is changing, students are no longer in-
herent to the social issue. Race continues to be cutting.
Left wing extremists continues to be cutting. Education
should be looked into more thoroughly as a grand issue
rather than a narrow one.
3. Vietnam is now positive and can be used effectively against
the likes of Lindsay.
4. Negativism generally is more cutting than positivism. The
amendment, referendum/bond issue, etc. votes should be
studied.
5. Environment is important as a broadening factor. It is not
yet cutting, though it may if economics does not rear itself.
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6. I do not feel that Muskie will get the nomination, rather
I see a Dark Horse Shriver, Bayh, etc. getting the nod.
7. Lindsay must try to get the Democratic Vice Presidential
nomination and use a fourth party play as leverage.
8. Nixon cannot be seriously challenged within the Republican
party.
9. Moderation and the political middle must be synonomous.
10. Agnew must not be dropped from the ticket. He means too
much in the border states and Texas. However, he has
proven his Conservative credentials he must moderate his
rhetoric or face a possible backlash in the North and Mid-
west.
11. No real effort should be made to get the Black vote.
12. New York State cannot be won against either Keqnedy or Muskie.
Ottinger is Jewish and thereby added nothing to his coalition,
Kennedy and Muskie are not Jewish and thereby will. New
York has not yet proven itself willing to move right-of-middle
it has at least moved to the middle.
13. If Wallace does not run, it will be possible to move consider-
ably to the left in campaign allusion.
14. Labor leaders should be continuously courted. Nixon will
probably not get their support and will get sizable amounts
of Blue-Collar support all the same.
15. The president should use television sparsely over the next
12 months; a great deal afterwards.
16. Something dramatic must be done about California vis a vis
its economic plight. The president may be in trouble there.
17. Texas should be courted strongly.
18. Issues like the volunteer army should be publicized to
broaden the president's image.
19. The Conservative party in New York has had its swan song,
though it will certainly have some major affect in 1972.
The rapidity with which this has been assembled is my only real
excuse for its lack of thoroughness. I would be extremely pleased to
answer any questions you have concerning this sketchy report either by
letter or in Washington, if you wish. Further, I can only hope that
this is the type of report you desired, if not, I'm still rather young.
X.J.F.
Political-1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
fate
December 11, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan PAB
While I disagree with facets of this memo,
particularly relating to issues, I strongly
concur that its going to be a hot election
and the enormous importance of work in
the five crucial states.
December 9, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
John Sears
I. 1972
If a President seeking re-election has kept the peace and
presided over a prosperous economy, the conventional wisdom
says that he is unbeatable. The reason people have made this
assertion so readily over the last 30 years is that, with the
single exception of Eisenhower, we have had Democratic incum-
bents -- members of the majority party -- seeking re-election.
All they had to do was show a certain degree of unity in their own
ranks and they could carry a majority of the nation. Eisenhower's
personal popularity could have won him re-election without a party
designation.
1972, however, will be the first year since 1916 in which a
President who is a member of the minority party will seek re-
election. (Republicans were the minority by the time Hoover came
up for re-election in 1932.) Although Wilson had done an excellent
job of domestic reform and "keeping us out of war, 11 he was nearly
beaten and probably could have been beaten. My belief is that
no matter how well the Administration is regarded nationally in
1972 and, within bounds, whoever the Democratic nominee may be,
the election will be damned close.
Statistically, let us examine some possible situations:
(1) If George Wallace were to decide not to run for
President in 1972 and we were able to win the 45 electoral votes he
received, and also take Texas (25) away from the Democratic nominee,
the Democrats could still defeat us if they merely held the states they
carried in 1968 and carried four others (California, Illinois, Ohio and
New Jersey.) Our present position in Ohio is anemic; we lost Senate
seats in Illinois and California; we failed to pick up one in New Jersey.
Also we did not carry a single one of these states comfortably in
1968. The scenarios break down as follows:
2
AFTER REDISTRICTING
RN
Democratic Nominee
29 states (exclusive of
13 states carried by
Calif., N..J., Ill. and
Humphrey, exclusive
Ohio)
191 votes
of Texas
162
5 states carried by
Wallace
45
Calif., N.J., Ill.,
and Ohio
114
Texas
26
262
276
(2) If Wallace enters the race, he must be conceded
Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. This would subtract 27
votes from the Nixon above total. It would then mean that RN
would have to carry California, or any combination of two of the
remaining three large states (Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey )--
or the election would go to the House. If Wallace repeated his
performance of 1968 and carried Georgia, and Arkansas in
addition to Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, then RN
would have to carry California and one out of Illinois, Ohio and
New Jersey, or all three of the other large states (Illinois, Ohio
and New Jersey.)
RN
Wallace
29 states, (exclusive of
Mississippi, Alabama
27
Calif., N.J., Ill., and
Louisiana
Ohio)
191
Texas
26
Georgia and Arkansas
18
235
Undecideds
Democratic Nominee
California
46
Ohio
25
13 states carried by
Illinois
25
Humphrey (exclusive
New Jersey
18
of Texas)
162
114
3
RN
29 states (exclusive of
Calif., N. J., Ill., and
Ohio
191
Texas
26
217
Democratic Nominee
13 states carried by
Humphrey, exclusive of
Texas
162
Undecideds
California
46
Ohio
25
Illinois
25
New Jersey
18
114
Wallace
5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968
45
(3) If Wallace picks up 45 electoral votes and we fail
to carry Texas, RN would have to carry California plus two
out of the remaining three large states. If RN failed to carry
California but did carry Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, the
election would still go to the House.
RN
29 states (exclusive
of Calif., N.J., Ill.,
and Ohio
191
Democratic Nominee
13 states carried by
Humphrey (exclusive
of Texas)
162
4
Wallace
5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968
45
Undecideds
California
46
Ohio
25
Illinois
25
New Jersey
18
114
(4) In 1972 it may be difficult to hold either Missouri or
Wisconsin. If Wallace runs and captures 45 electoral votes, the
Democratic nominee wins in Texas and we lost Missouri and Wis-
consin, it would then be necessary for RN to carry all four of
the large States he carried in 1968. Failure to carry California
plus one of the other three would result in a Democratic victory;
to carry 3 out of 4 would put the election in the House.
RN
29 states
191
less Missouri and
Wisconsin
-24
167
Democratic Nominee
13 states carried by
Humphrey, exclusive
of Texas
162
Missouri & Wisconsin
24
Texas
26
212
5
Wallace
5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968
45
Undecideds
California
46
Ohio
25
Illinois
25
New Jersey
18
114
Obviously, whatever becomes of George Wallace, RN's
fate is deeply tied to the outcome in 5 large states:
(1) TEXAS -- the Party is in disarray -- O' Donnell should
probably step down, but won't. RN has never been able to carry
the state even when there has been a split in Democratic ranks
(1960, due to Kennedy's religion; 1968, due to a division between
liberal and conservative Democrats.) If Ben Barnes runs for
the Senate, or the Governorship, and happens to get along with
the national Democratic ticket, we will be running against a
unified Democratic Party for the first time. Barnes is anxious
to deliver Texas to the Democrats in view of his future
ambitions.
(2) OHIO -- RN carried the state twice -- but in both
instances we had a unified party. Today, the party is horribly
split over both philosophy and personalities. The White House
should either act immediately to elect a new state chairman
who will be loyal only to RN - or prepare to organize the
state independent of the party. The Democrats will be assisted
considerably by control of the Governorship.
(3) ILLINOIS -- in 1968 we benefitted from a superior, unified
and balanced ticket, together with a certain indifference on the part
of Mayor Daley. In 1972, Percy is headed for a bitter primary;
Ogilvie is growing less popular by the day (31% job approval in the
latest poll) and Mayor Daley cannot be counted upon to sit on his hands
again. RN must win the state by doing exceptionally well in the
6
downstate counties; both Percy and Ogilvie must do exceptionally
well in Cook County since neither is a downstate darling. There
is also a strong possibility that Ogilvie will have a primary.
We cannot allow the present disruption to get any worse.
It will take two full years of sharp politicking to put Illinois back
together.
(4) NEW JERSEY -- Again, there is developing factionalism
in the party in the wake of Gross' defeat. The party is suffering
some ill-effects from controlling the Governorship at a time when
taxes must be raised, and is further hotly divided between liberals
and conservatives. Clifford Case will be up in 1972 and it is too
much to hope that he will be singing the Administration's praises.
(5) CALIFORNIA -- Reagen's popularity can be counted upon
to wane over the next two years. As ever, the liberal-conservative
split continues in the Party. The Democrats, meanwhile, having
freed themselves of the yoke of Brown and Unruh, are not as
factionalized as they have been in past years. Reagen would not
mind seeing RN embarrassed. The President must begin
immediately to look out for his own neck there or local interests
will use it for a tug-of-war.
II. Democratic Situation
Our major political endeavor must be aimed at promoting
a split among the Democrats. This will be difficult because :
(1) they now feel the loss of being out of the Presidency and
thus will be more careful about controlling internal disputes;
(2) the out party can create a measure of unity by merely attacking
the "in" President; (3) they now have some patronage in a number
of states which can be used to control local disputes and ; (4) as a
result of their success in the Gubernatorial elections there is
now a group of people in the Democratic Party with the power
to make it easier for a prospective Presidential nominee to go
through the nominating process without being cut up inside
his Party.
7
Given these facts, I would suggest:
(1) Muskie Muskie is not an accomplished national
politician. He will make mistakes as long as we do not make his
road easier by making derogatory remarks about him. Every time
we answer him or take him on, it unifies a few more Democrats
behind him. Ignore him and he won't be able to hack it.
Muskie has serious difficulty in making a negative issue;
he prefers to play Lincolnesque roles, the above-the-battle man
who says nothing unfair or partisan. He would prefer to talk about
how well everybody gets along in Maine. As long as we don' t apply
the missing element by responding to him he will either (a) lose
his momentum or (b) -- sensing that he is not doing as well as
he anticipated exhibit a misdirected temper at us and the press
which we can use to our advantage. The game is to get him
rattled; the best way to do it is to get at his monstrous ego by
ignoring him.
(2) Humphrey -- we should help build Humphrey into a
candidate. Shortly after the opening of the new Congressional
session, he will predictably move to become spokesman for his
party in Congress. He is aware of the current void there and
will seek to fill it. If H umphrey wishes to attack us, we should
be more than willing to hit back at him since this builds him up in
the eyes of his party. We should, in effect, create a New
Humphrey -- for awhile.
There is an element of danger in building up Humphrey
since (1) he might be able to unify the Democrats if he got going
too fast and (2) he might disdain the nomination and use the
influence we create for him on behalf of another candidate. I
do not believe either thing will happen since (1) he symbolizes and
epitomizes the split which occurred in 1968 and thus his ascending
prominence will create strong tensions in the Party among the more
liberal elements and the youth; (2) Muskie and Kennedy will not
wish to see him move up and will do what they can to undercut him;
(3) the academics detest him; (4) he can be embarrassed in the
primaries if he gets going too fast.
8
Given the lure by us, he will bite. As his stock rises this
will put pressure on Muskie and Kennedy, as well as re-engender the
Democratic split on which our fortunes depend.
(3) Kennedy -- Kennedy must wait for Muskie to fall before
he can become very active. To do otherwise is to subject himself to
the same kind of problem his brother encountered with McCarthy.
We should not respond to Kennedy's candidacy either; our line of
defense against him is a reconstructed Humphrey. If Humphrey is a
viable enough candidate by the time Muskie fades, Kennedy will
be unable to take full advantage of the situation. Humphrey and
Kennedy will then be locked in a life or death struggle, from
which we can derive great benefit.
(4) Other candidates McGovern, Hughes, Bayh, etc.
should be totally ignored. To the txtent that any of them makes
a mark, they will further complicate the plans of the above
three contenders. At this juncture, none of them can be nominated.
Steadfastly resist all opportunities to discuss possible
Democratic opponents. Humphrey is the only individual we
should mention and this should only be done artfully to the
objective of building his candidacy.
III. Wallace
The important thing is to draw a clear line delineating
how far we will go to fight his candidacy and then religiously
adhere to it. He senses that he has us in a bind since (1) if we
chase him too far in an effort to hold onto Southern votes, we lost
support in the rest of the country; (2) if we don't chase him far
enough he might hurt us more in the South than he did the last
time. In either case there would be more of a chance that the
election would wind up in the House than was true in 1968.
Look for Wallace to run a strictly S outhern campaign
this time since (1) it costs less money (2) he can focus his pos itions
better and (3) he will feel this is the best way to get us to chase
him.
9
We have gone as far as we can on the race-school-crime-
law and order issue. For a fair amount of time we should keep
quiet about this. A fair number of people in the Middle and Far
West are beginning to wonder whether we aren't a little too
Southern in our view of the "social issue" to fit local prejudices.
Talk of a "Southern Strategy, 11 appointment of Southern judges
to the Supreme Court and compacts with Southern politicians in
Congress only add credence to assertions made against
us in the Middle and Far West.
If Wallace finds a successful issue to use against us this
time, it will be populism, not race. Improving the economy as
it relates to the white lower-to-middle class American will do
more to defuse Wallace's impact than anything further on race.
IV. General Views
I have seen all of the books written psychoanalyzing the
American voter. Suffice it to say that none offers any meaningful
assistance in preparing for 1972. Only two general observations
can easily be made about the electorate in 1972: (1) the growing
and deeply felt confusion will be even more intensely felt and
(2) the people will believe less and less about more and more.
Under these conditions political philosophies become an
enigma. We have already seen what this confused cynicism has
done to the former liberal movement making extreme radicals
of some, and establishmentarians of the rest. Among conservatives,
the same force is starting to erode the quantum of what conservatives
have been interested in conserving.
Against this background, polls are of less and less value
since they can tell a politician very little about how he can be
believed even though they may adequately measure the intensity
of feeling on issues. Television was proven almost useless in
many campaigns this fall and probably will be even less useful
in the 1972 campaign. This is mainly because television is losing
its credibility as a conduit of honest impressions of a politician.
10
In 1972, confusion-cynicism will operate intensely against
the incumbent, but the same force will operate to some degree
also on the Democratic nominee. The key to victory lies
in whether we can isolate and understand this force as it exists
from group to group and thereby ascertain what is required to be
credible. The precise stand on issues will be less relevant
than ever before.
*****
MEMORANDUM
file
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 22, 1970
72
political
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
DONALD RUMSFELD
Attached is a memo which was given me shortly after the election
by an individual who I brought to work at OEO. Jim Connor is a
former PhD from Columbia University, Republican, and a former
White House Fellow. I thought you might find it of interest.
Attachment: Copy of paper by Jim Connor
Jim connor
- i -
The mid-term elections of 1970 have generally been described in
the media as a defeat for the Republican Party generally and the
Nixon Administration in particular. Whether such assessments are fair
is subject to debate. Most Republicans would agree, however, that
while the 1970 results hardly constituted a defeat, in the terms
normally used to describe off-year election results, the election
most certainly was a disappointment. The purpose of this paper is to
briefly describe and analyze the main currents of the 1970 campaign
strategy and offer some suggestions as to what general strategy
Republicans ought to follow in 1971 and 1972.
In the most general sense, the disappointment in the results may
be traced to two strategic emphases:
The issues Republicans stressed to the electorate were too
few in number and too narrowly drawn.
more
drawn
+
2. The Republican Party placed too great a reliance on the
mechanical aspects of the political process, largely at the
agree
expense of developing campaign themes.
The Republican Party must recognize the fact that it operates
from a severe disadvantage to the Democrats in terms of the basic
allegiance of the voters. Republicans continue to be a distinct
minority party. In addition, studies indicate that erosion in party
loyalty is increasing with the parties suffering about equally from
this trend. This problem is further complicated by the sad, but true,
fact that a substantial and influential portion of the communications
media is essentially hostile to the Republican Party and its candidates.
These handicaps must be taken into account when adopting an overall
campaign strategy. They were largely forgotten in 1970.
This year the Party became closely associated with one issue;
law and order. Leaving aside the intrinsic merits and demerits of the
issue, this single-issue strategy played into the hands of the media
for it is, no matter how it is presented, essentially a negative issue
with the media thus able to put it, and related issues, into a sim-
plistic "yea" and "nay" form. The Republicans were put in the position
of being the accusers with the Democrats parlaying this stance into an
appeal for sympathy against those who would issue blanket indictments
and "spread fear and hate across the land." The weight placed on this
issue was justified, in large measure, on the premise that it was of
such critical importance to certain segments of the electorate, that
they would break from their traditional Democratic voting habits and
vote Republican. Early analysis seems to indicate that this did not
happen to any great extent.
- 2 -
Right
The net effect of concentrating on one issue is that eventually
the opposition will find an answer to neutralize the charge and
then put the accuser on the defensive. The 1964 national election
and the 1958 California election were primarily one issue campaigns
and the Republicans lost heavily in both instances. The Democrats
were "let off the hook" on other issues where they were distinctly
vulnerable, e.g., their 1964 decision to enlarge the Vietnamese
conflict and their inability to prosecute or satisfactory end the
war. Most of the difficulties the nation faces today can be traced
directly to policies followed by the previous Democratic Admini-
stration, yet the previous Administration was rarely discussed in
the campaign. Republican accomplishment with regards to gradual
withdrawal from Vietnam, reassessment of world commitments, and in-
novative policies in the fields of welfare, economic development,
and education never enjoyed adequate exposure and explanation.
Interesty:
Republicans, being the minority party faced by an inhospitable
press, must develop a multiple-theme strategy. The goal here is
to improve the President's ability to orchestrate the thrust of
the campaign at any given moment and to make him a difficult target
for the inevitable media attack.
Secondly, the Republican Party placed too great a reliance on
the mechanical aspects of the political process. The American
electorate entertains an ambivalent attitude towards politics.
While Americans have long displayed a distrust and dislike of
politics and politicians in general, most of the American folk
heroes have been elected political leaders. Americans tend to like
their heroes to be anti-politicians who overcame great obstacles
and corrupt machines to win the election and vindication. While
this image is so much foolishness to most of the professionals in
the business of making public policy, it nonetheless is an attractive
and compelling image, one that affect peoples! attitudes about parties
and politics.
In 1970 Republican Party leadership permitted its strategy to
become public knowledge and through extensive intervention at the
state and local level by national leaders, gave the impression of
being cynical towards the issues. While the Vice President's
activity in the New York State senatorial race was highly appreciated
for its acuity, effect and by the professionals, the larger national
impact was to paint the Republican leadership as aggressive, callous,
and extremely partisan. The Republicans forgot that frequentythe
best politicians are those that do not act like politicians. It is
no accident that many of the big names of the last twenty years;
Eisenhower, Stevenson, Reagan and McCarthy, were appealing to
American voters precisely because they were able to convince many
people that they were not politicians. Because the Republican
strategy was known in detail, and the list of Democrats to beat
- 3 -
was repeatedly published, the Democrats were able to feign the role
of underdogs and gain a sympathetic hearing. In a word, the Repub-
licans were severely weakened because they appeared to be too
"Machiavellian" for the American taste in 1970.
Elections tend to be retrospective in character. That is, the
voters are known to think primarily in terms of evaluating the
performance of the incumbents, and rather less to the promises made
by the parties and candidates for the future. While there is a "swing
vote" present in all elections, most of the electorate is either con-
vinced as to which party and/or candidates it will vote for, or is
predisposed toward a party and/or candidates well before the
election. The campaign period itself is directed as much, if not
more, toward reinforcing the fervor of the faithful than in changing
the minds of the opposition.
The contest between the parties, as distinguised from the con-
test between candidates, is primarily over "predisposition." Since
partisan membership is largely a selfperception (in most states,
there are not dues or arbitary requirements) it is extremely im-
portant that the parties' have a sizeable portion of the electorate
predisposed towards its messages.
It is important, of course, to win elections but over the
long run, the winning of minds is probably even more critical. The
Republican election campaign of 1972 will stand a much greater
chance of success if the campaign for winning men's minds is
successfully initiated in 1971.
The campaign for 1972 is already underway and should be based
on a two year strategy. During 1971 the strategy calls for educating
the public and the opinion leaders. In 1972, while not ignoring the
educative process, the emphasis should shift towards developing
campaign themes, patterned for appeal to certain segments of the
electorate.
Four policies should be stressed to the public by the President,
Administration leaders, and Republican Party leaders; (1) Peace
Policy; (2) Economic Policy; (3) Social Policy; (4) Policy for the
Civic Morality. The educative effort should aim at explaining the
problem, the alternative policies with their inevitable drawbacks,
and why the Administration has chosen to pursue one policy rather
than another. The President should not shy away from intellectualizing
the problems he faces. In the odd year, 1971, the President has the
opportunity to gain a hearing as a spokesman for the Nation, not
just the party. In this capacity as Chief of Government, he has the
resources and abilities to influence, or predispose, the American
people towards his position. Let us briefly survey the four policies
suggested:
- 4 -
Peace Policy
The fact is that this Administration inherited an unpopular
war. The war is being brought to a close without any precipitous
actions which could make Southeast Asia a politically unstable area.
The war itself was conceived as an experiment by the intellectual
community, but one having convinced the Democratic leadership as
to the inevitable victory, the community rejected its own case
and became violently critical.
The Republican position with regard to world peace is
essentially sound. Peace will remain so long as would-be
aggressors find the advantages of aggression are outweighed by
its disadvantages. This does not mean, however, that American
troops must be engaged at all points around the globe to deter
aggression. The Nixon Administration has undertaken a necessary
reassessment of our political and military commitments abroad
with the goal being to make them reflective of the needs of the
1970's.
President Nixon has provided for a more stable and tranquil
world than did his Democratic predecessors. This accomplishment
must be explained to the people and to the opinion-leaders in
detail and with frequency.
Economic Policy
The President must spend the time to "talk sense to the
American people" about the economy. When Mr. Nixon took office
he inherited full employment, but it was full employment achieved
at the cost of a war economy and inflation. The simple fact is,
and this must be conveyed to the people, that you cannot have
perfect price stability at the same time you pursue a policy of
full employment. The goal of the Nixon Administration is to
achieve a tolerable mean between the two extremes.
The President should stress the difficulties which inevitably
follow during a readjustment from a "wartime" to a"peace" economy.
The realignment of defense related industries is not going to be
easy or cheap. The constant crying by the Democrats about an
economic recession may very well result in such a recession be-
coming a reality. The Democrats are flirting with the idea of
instituting a self-fulfiling prophesy.
In addition, the President must convey to the public why
wages and price controls are no answer in the short run. A
solid survey must be conducted on the nature of the unemployed;
there are probably some new categories of unemployed which have
yet to be studied.
- 5 -
Social Policy
The President and his Administrative chiefs must develop a series
of talks and position papers on the Administration's social policies.
This Administration has an approach to solving social problems which
is unique and should be explained in order to develop a constituency
among the opinion leaders.
Few, if any, social problems exist in isolation from other problems.
In the past we have instituted hundreds of new programs as we discovered
new problems. All too often little thought was given to the impact of a
particular program on related programs, with the result being that often
programs exist which accomplish results contrary to the expectations of
the sponsors. It was not the intent, for example, of those who sponsored
the Aid for Dependent Children legislation that the funds given would
actually provide an incentive for the family to disband.
The point that should be emphasized is that a number of programs
do not necessarily add up to a policy. A policy is an attitude towards
a problem which permits flexibility in approach. The Nixon Administration
has been experimenting with new concepts of welfare in an attempt to
break the cycle of poverty which infects families while at the same time
not making great numbers of persons wards of the government. These
experiments, e.g., Family Assistance Plan, are worth explaining to the
people, the Republican faithful, and the opinion leaders.
Policy for a Civic Morality
As we approach our 200th anniversary as a Nation, the President is
in a position to revive some of the notions of civic pride and morality
which animated the spirit of our Founding Fathers. Acting in his role
as President of all the people, the President should emphasize that
adherence to law is the basis of any meaningful freedom. That the con-
cept of citizenship is a noble value worth rethinking.
The Civic Moaglity is not simple "law and order," rather it is a
reaffirmation of the concept of the citizen in a free Republic. We can
understand and appreciate the social and economic problems which beset
the nation and beget antisocial behavior while still accepting the idea
that all improvement, which is not at the expense of freedom, must be
gained through law.
The point here is that the President should promote law and the
stable society but do so as the President of all the people, not the
leader of a party. It is law which will protect our diversity and
pluralism and will maintain our right to dissent. The nihilists in
our midst must be met head-on with a message that disarms them through
its intellectual strength.
-6-
Summary
The educative process is designed to make both the people and the
opinion leaders predisposed toward the Administration and the
Republican Party. The first step toward victory is to get people to
listen. The actual election campaign in 1972 is aimed at simplifying
the problems and answers which have been explained in some detail in
1971 and make them have political impact through the use of campaign
management techniques. If the educative process has done its work,
the potential audience for the electoral campaign efforts will be
much greater.
The emphasis in 1972 should shift from trying to develop favorable
predisposition among the electorate and opinion leaders into an effort
to gain support among certain target populations with appeals to these
groups based on the policies enunciated previously. Themes should be
devised which translate these rather complex policy positions into
effective campaign rhetoric. The groups noted below are not exclusive
in terms of constitutency for it is possible that any individual may
fit into one or more of the classifications. Nor are these groups to
be the subject of appeals at the expense of other groups. The
suggestion is that the Republican Party work to keep its present group
support intact and seek to become the majority party through inroads
into vulnerable populations who presently exhibit a majority of support
for the Democrats.
White Ethnic Groups
White ethnic groups, descendants of 19th and 20th century immi-
grants, have long been the bulwark of the Democratic Party in the cities
and inner suburbs. Persons in this category, largely working and middle
class Catholics and Jews, have become increasingly restless as they
watched the loss of their political strength in the urban areas. Themes
based on the policies previously enunciated should find a receptive
hearing with this increasingly independent groups. The Civic Morality
policy, for instance, should have considerable impact, as it stresses
the individual's contributions as citizen, their essential allegiance
to the Republic, their legitimate concern for safety and tranquility,
and the validity of their family, ethnic, and religious institutions.
The media, however, must be thwarted in its efforts to translate this
theme into a simple play on "law and order."
After a long period of decline, white ethnicity has enjoyed something
of a resurgence. This resurgence is attributed, in part at least, to a
down-grading in the media of the working class and its values. A return
to the more obvious forms of ethnic allegiance has been an outlet for
these frustrations.
Emerging Salariat
Increasingly, Americans have become salaried people. The blue
collar working class and the moderate income white collar class engaged
principally in the service and knowledge industries tend to no longer
view themselves as part of the traditional working class. Their
salaries are frequently high, particularly in the building trades, and
they have become increasingly attached to their property and living
standards. They tend to seek stability and tranquillity in their
community life.
Middle Class and Working Class Blacks
Middle class and working class blacks are a special "ethnic" group,
yet they have many of the same problems and aspirations as the white
ethnic populations. The appeals based on economic and social policies
should have much the same impact on this emerging group as on the
whites. The essential similarities of these blacks to the white
ethnics should be stressed; the appeal to the two income classes should
take into account the fact that the vast majority of blacks fall within
these two economic classes. The Republican campaign should stress the
ways in which people are similar, not the ways in which they are
different.
Suburban Reformers
The outer suburbs are increasingly dominated by the ethic of social
consciousness and reform. The Republican Party's hold on the middle
income and upper middle income classes in the suburbs is being eroded
by the Democrat's appeal to this groups' social conscience and
feelings of guilt. These feelings have been engendered through con-
stant repetition by the academy, churches, and the media. To this
group of suburban social reformers the themes of Peace and the ex-
perimental nature of some aspects of this Administration's social
policy have to be emphasized.
It is especially important that a President, A image of a disin-
terested Statesman be put forward to this group. The outer suburbs are
also becoming the significant political entities of the future; stress
should be paid to Federal Government attention of their local problems
of governance. These suburbs are not merely outlying areas of central
cities but have become increasingly self-reliant entities that must
be given modern government and Federal attention. It is also this
group to which the issues of environment, consumerism, what they per-
ceive to be failures in other delivery systems (e.g., transportation),
are extremely important.
-8-
Youth
The category of "youth" should be largely neglected either as
a target for negative attack or as a special constituency to be
appealed to. However, it should be stressed that most young people
fall into a variety of categories of the citizenry, some mentioned
in this report, and hence share the same concerns as their elders.
The special constituency of youth in colleges and universities should
be largely ignored except for mention of the Adminstration's efforts
to finance higher education and helping young people gain financing
for college. The development of the peace theme should be broadly
structured with special attention paid to the benefits which winding
down Vietnam and certain changes in the draft have given young people.
The President, on the other hand, while noting the impact of the
elimination of the draft on certain classes of the young, should also
point out what the costs of such a policy are likely to be, namely
the creation of an army which is not, representative cross-section
of the populace. This distortion in representation will be most
evident and most unfortunate in the ranks of the junior officers.
Comments on the cult of alienation and the merging "youth culture"
should be kept to a minimum. Development of a positive Civic
Morality theme will indirectly criticize these phenomena, but it
should be left to the media to draw that conclusion.
Intelligentsia
It is doubtful that a significant number of the intelligentsia
will in the near future become vocal supporters of the Republican
Party. However, there is a stable and rational group of men and
women in the academy - - ranging from such conservatives as Edward
Banfield to such moderates and "old-time pluralist" liberals as
Alexander Bickel, Irving Kristol, Robert Nisbet, Richard Neustadt,
John P. Roche, Nathan Glazer, etc. -- who should be recognized for
their essential good sense and rationality. Through informal dinners
and meetings with the President and others, these men and women can
be developed into a lobby group for aspects of the Administration's
social policy. Also low posture status recognition of this group
would reinforce their efforts in fighting the ethic of irrationality
in the academy and intellectual community and possible help neutralize
in 1972 the typical support given in the academy for the Democratic
Party.
South
Appeals to the South as a region should be more carefully
handled. While status recognition of the South in e.g., appointments
to the Supreme Court, is important, that region is becoming increasingly
indistinguishable from the rest of the country. The appeals to the
above named group can have just as much impact in the South as in the
9
Northeast or on the West Coast. The similarity of the South, not its
differences, should be stressed. The so-called Southern Strategy could then
be translated into terms of merely trying to develop a two party system in
the South - a "reformist" goal that the media would be hard-put to criticize.
Democratic Party compliants about the Southern Strategy could, in addition,
then be explicitly labelled for what they are -- hypocritical in the
extreme, e.g., an attempt to protect their traditional regional vested
interests.
Mid-West
More attention also has to be paid to the Mid-West. To a large extent
the four policy thrusts have equal validity in that region. However, the
"national development" aspect, if more fully developed, of the social policy
can be made to have special impact in that part of the country and in the
Mountain states. Further, the Party should reassess it policies vis-a-vis
the farmers. Is what is being done enough, has it been adequately ex-
plained; should an attempt be made to "talk sense" about farm policy as
much as about the economy?
XXXXXXXX
Whatever set of policies, themes and target populations are isolated
for attention, it is crucial that the overall strategy be given as little
public attention as possible. It is extremely important that the
President, his Administration, and the Party not be seen as ruthlessly and
sytematically following a pre-conceived formula against which the media
can make its judgments about success and failure. The illusion of spon-
taneity should be maintained.
In addition, the President should maximize his potential image as
Chief of State and Government. In the area of foreign policy he should
come across as the disinterested statesman; in the area of domestic policy
he should cultivate the image as First Citizen of the Republic who is
attempting to wrestle with extraordinarily complex problems. It is the
President who should begin to explicate the four "policies" in 1971 and
thereby educate the public into favorable predispositions towards the
Administration. The technique of live discussions with media commentators
is an especially effective vehicle. To date the President has used his
speeches to the citizenery only to explain his efforts in Indo-China.
Thought should be given to the notion that the President should do much
the same thing in order to get across his policies on the economy, social
policy and the civic morality.
Members of the cabinet and others close to the President should be
used to expand on the President's initiatory efforts in the four areas,
speaking to opinion leaders throughout the country. As the reasonably
intellectual statements of the positions of the President and the Admini-
stration in these areas evolve, the Democrats are necessarily put on the
defensive by having to respond in the terms which the President and the
Administration have determined. Further, the media is disarmed. It
will have to also respond in the same predetermined terms; the more
multiple and intellectual the statements of positions, the more the
media is forced in communicating these positions to the public to
be something more than simplistic. As 1972 begins, it then becomes
necessary for the cabinet and others close to the President to par-
ticipate in translating these policies into themes directed at given
target populations.
Moreover, the public should be reminded, especially in the 1971
education phase, that the Democrats are largely responsible for
creating the conditions which are now being corrected - The Democrats
should be forced to bear their legitimate burdens of Vietnam, an
inflated economy (e.g., the two year lag in passing the surtax), and
a largely passive attitude in face of constant apologies for socially
unacceptable behavior.
Finally, it should be noted that the Civic Morality theme provides
a structure into which the themes of peace, sound economy and sound
social policy can be fitted. Looking to 1976, there is no reason why
the party should not begin to use a traditionalist rhetoric, evocative
of the Nation's origins - phrases like the citizen and citizenry, the
Republic and polity, the tranquil, decent and good life. This rhetoric
need not be exclusive of noting the pluralism and diversity in the
country (the richness of the various, especially ethnic, lifestyles),
but positive attention should be paid to what is common: the similar
values, needs and concerns which cross overregions, ethnic and racial
origins, most income levels, and most life styles.
Fifth Issue
The Nixon Record of "good government" actions is a positive record of
accomplishment which has been virtually ignored in the press. Relo-
cation of the major social service agency field offices into the new
ten Federal Regions with a concurrent greater delegation of decision
making authority to these offices from Washington is already bringing
the Federal Government into closer partnership with the States and
local communities. In addition, the Administration's move toward in-
creased multi-purpose block grants for States and local governments
can be used to emphasize that President Nixon has initiated positive
actions toward his stated goal of re-establishing the Federal system.
Articulation of this issue reaffirms the traditional identity of the
Republican Party as the Party of stablized management and counters
the splinter party (particularly in the South) appeal for States
Rights.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINTS
KING
E.U.
120.0, .
6-102
By EP
Date
3-12-82
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December 20, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DICK MOORE par
SUBJECT:
PR Activities
As per your request I am attaching some PR comments
and suggestions. I have approached the subject with just one
thought in mind: the reelection of the President. In that connection
a few preliminary comments seem in order.
Substantive accomplishment, of course, is.the best PR
of all. If our substantive programs go well, that could be decisive
to the point where the extra edge of PR becomes irrelevant. But
the PR group should operate on the principle that the substantive
question may be so close that many voters will make up their minds
on the basis of a wholly intangible factor -- their subjective
attitude toward the candidate personally.
It is in this area of subjective judgment that good PR
could make the difference.
The "Who" Factor
The effectiveness of any PR effort often depends on who
it is you are trying to reach, and I would like to see more attention
to the "who" factor in the months ahead.
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-2-
Using a marketing analogy, I seem to remember that
some 20 percent of the beer drinkers drink 80 percent of the
beer. The 20 percent are the brewer's most important customers,
and in this particular case it is fairly easy for him to determine
what kind of people they are and then tailor his advertising campaign
to reach them. Moreover, he can largely determine where not to
spend his money and effort.
In our case it is vital for us to reach the "movables" -
that small percentage of the voters who cross the line from
election to election, and often decide the result by a razor's edge
in some of the key states, as in 1960 and 1968. It is within this group
&
that we are most likely to find persons who are politically neutral
enough to be susceptible to the intangible factor in reaching a
decision.
If some people are moving away from us for intangible
reasons, then they are susceptible to being moved back. Therefore,
it is most essential that we do everything to learn who these people
are -- or at least what kind of people they are -- and what has
affected them. In short we need a diagnosis before we prescribe
the cure.
I know we will be told that this kind of research is difficult.
But if we try hard enough I am sure we can make some headway and
develop at least some meaningful clues. After all, Mr. Gallup
achieves at least an indication of approval and disapproval every
few weeks. Can't we devise a depth interview project that would
go further than Gallup and identify some of the subjective factors
which are affecting some people?
Such a survey should seek out persons who will acknowledge
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that they voted for Nixon in 1968, but who wouldn't vote for
him today, or are leaning away from him. If their reasons are
substantive (e. g. unemployment) they are not necessarily a PR
target. But if their reasons are subjective impressions of the
President, they are PR target number one.
Climate For Change
If we are to introduce any new patterns of operation, or
any changes in attitude, this is the perfect time to do SO. There
is something about the half way mark that creates expectancy and
&
looks with favor on new plays and new players.
The new things which we may do now will be evidence of
a positive approach and so received, whereas a few months ago
they might have been looked at as admission of a mistake or a res-
ponse to criticism. This is a plus which we should keep in mind
in considering any suggestions for change.
The Anti-Nixon Axis (ANA)
Any memo on our PR will have occasion to refer to the
combination of liberal Democrats, reporters and commentators
who do such a faithful and unified job of spreading the anti-Nixon
word. For easy reference I will call them the ANA.
*****
As per your request I have read Bill Safire's excellent
memo of a year ago. Before turning to some of the items which he
discussed, I am setting forth some specific comments and
suggestions based on recent observation.
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1. The President Should Seize the Initiative on Press Communications
The President's strong performance in the December 10
press conference smothered the infrequency issue for the time
being, but I think it would be dangerous to let the issue come up
again. ANA had really done a massive job this time, and were
undoubtedly reaching some people with the impression that the
President is very reluctant to communicate with the American people.
In the next 18 months the last thing we need for an issue is
an alleged communications gap.
&
Recommendation:
The President should begin immediately to introduce new
formats, as he said he would in his answer to Kaplow. These can
be of his own design and timing. They can include one-to-one TV
interviews; press conferences in the Oval Office, scheduled or
spontaneous, general in subject matter, or limited, with or without
TV; he can do in depth TV interviews with the three networks or
press interviews with the wire services, etc.
By taking this kind of initiative the President can get
credit for leadership and innovation on communication, while fully
controlling his own news policy and the press will be in the
posture of their responding to him rather than vice versa.
Noting in the above recital should stand in the way of full
Presidential press conferences if the President is willing to do
them.
2. Don't Discount the East Room
I have assumed that one reason the President has not
done more of the East Room type is that they require enormous
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preparation and it is difficult for him to set aside that much time.
However, in terms of effectiveness, the Presidential press
conference is a magnificent campaign tool that only he has access
to. Every time he does it, he gains new support throughout the
country.
After the December 10 conference I made many phone
calls, and all reactions were favorable, including some non-supporters.
The common reaction was: "He should do these more often. He's
so good at it. "
Recommendation:
The Gallup Poll published today (Nixon 44, Muskie 43) was
based on interviews on December 5 and 6. That was 4 days before
the press conference. I suspect that the December 10 performance
won back a great many movables. Do we have a before and after
survey (matching samples) on this or other major press conferences?
If not, isn't it important to do so for guidance during the next 18
months?
3. The President's Young Lions
"Negative themes" that have been circulated by the ANA
with some effect certainly include these: The President is isolated;
most of his advisors are elderly and dull; he is not sufficiently
interested in the environment; he does not have enough compassion
for the poor.
will help dispel all of the above, at least in some degree,
As we go into the second half, I have a suggestion which may
Recommendation:
That the President take a personal interest in building up
two new, attractive, young stars on his team and prominently
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associate himself with them and their activities:
Bill Ruckelshaus (38)
He is articulate, personable and able, and in charge of
an exciting new agency. We could build him up as the champion
of environmental control, much as General Hugh Johnson was
the personification of the Blue Eagle and NRA. As the President's
"Mr. Environment" he could help the President preempt the environ-
mental issue by action and leadership, rather than words, as Muskie
and others watch helplessly.
Don Rumsfeld (38)
I don't know what Don's responsibilities are to be in his
new White House role. But if Don can have strong identification
as the President's poverty specialist, we have another good example
of the President working closely with an attractive lieutenant in
an important and sensitive area. The ANA has been somewhat
effective in selling the false impression that the President doesn't
care as much about the poor as he should and Don could certainly
help here.
4. Nip Those "Little" Lies
The damage done by small lies that get quoted and widely
repeated is quite a serious fact of life. But an alert PR effort
could kill most of them before they get into the main bloodstream
of communication, after which it is too late.
I can't tell you how many times I heard and read the bit
about the "Patton" movie. "He saw it seven times. " As I under-
stand it, the President saw it once and then later found himself
involved in a screening for staff members in the East Wing, and he
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was too polite to have the movie changed. Yet many people thought
that RN watched "Patton" several times and then moved into
Cambodia. It hurt badly. We could have scotched this one with a
factual statement as soon as it appeared.
Other examples: the motion that the President baited the
protestors in San Jose and said "This is what drives them wild. 11
If he did not say that, as I suspect is the case, we sure got
clobbered. An immediate angry denial might have taken care of it.
The distortion of the "bums" remark to apply to all
protesting students is still hurting. Had we counter-attacked with
letters or demands for equal time on every occasion when that
remark was twisted, we might have killed the impact.
Recommendation:
There may be no system that is fool proof, but responsi-
bility should be fixed with the PR committee for a constant lookout
for this kind of pernicious item which usually appears in columns,
or even in the style sections. If there is a factual answer a
correction should be given by Ziegler in the first available briefing.
And everytime it is repeated, some one should be designated to
write a correction or ask for equal time.
5. Those Young People
While it is apparently true that people under 30 don't seem
to vote in such numbers as their elders, 7 million young people will
nevertheless become 21 in the next 2 years. If the Supreme Court
upholds the new voting law another 10 million teenagers will be
eligible. If one-third of them vote, and if they should vote 60 to 40
against us, they could more than make the difference in states like
California, New Jersey, Illinois, etc. where we have no votes to
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spare. If it is 55 - 45, the margin would be 600, 000 votes. The
Nixon plurality in 1968 was 510, 000.
I realize that some people suggest that the young people
will vote in the same ratio as their elders. In that case the above
examples are pretty far out. But the fact is we don't really know
anything about the voting probabilities of kids who are now 17 or 19.
But there are a great many of them and it behooves us to find out
whatever we can.
I think that one of the most important new projects which
we must undertake in this second half is to make an agonizing
+
reappraisal of how we stand with the youngsters, and then do
what needs to be done.
Recommendation:
We should appoint a team of young staff members to study
this whole question (enlisting outside survey help if necessary).
Meanwhile, however, we should begin exploiting the very
fine assets we have in terms of youth. For example, we have a
very bright collection of young men in the White House staff. We
must give them more exposure and more public association with
the top team and even the President. The President might even spend
some time with them, perhaps at Camp David in a meeting. The
word would soon get out that he was taking this kind of interest.
Note: I would not announce any of this activity publicly.
It will get out on its own, and will be far more effective that way.
Young people are very suspicious about grandstanding.
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The Safire Memorandum, December, 1969
The following is my updated comment on the Safire memo
of a year ago where the topic seems relevant. The captions are
his.
The President's Popularity
We do not have to accept either the Harris or Gallup Poll
approval rating to know that we have had a dip. It is probably largely
due to the economy, but I would like very much to know to what extent
the ANA has gotten to the "movables" with all the negative themes
they have been selling during the past months, particularly the
allegation that the President chose to divide the country rather than
to bring it together. This is the kind of information I was referring
&
to when urging new research in my comments on Page 2 above.
Meanwhile in view of the economy and other problems, the
44 - 43 Gallup Poll does suggest that there are quite a few people
who believe in Nixon, the man a most fundamental consideration.
To cheer you up I give you Exhibit A - Miss Joan Fontana, of
Astoria, Queens, a bookkeeper. Last Wednesday she was asked
by the New York Daily News inquiring fotographer:
"Whom do you consider to be the
greatest man during your lifetime?"
Her reply was:
"Our great President, Richard Nixon.
He was one of four men defeated for
the Presidency who came back to win.
He has the greatest of problems
bringing the country together, and is
solving it. I can't think of any other
American who could do as good a job
under the circumstances. "
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The faith which the Miss Fontanas have in the President's
competence and good intentions is our most important asset.
It does not derive from the issues but is a subjective judgment
about Richard Nixon personally. Our job is to see to it that it
doesn't get undermined by a lot of ANA crap.
Positive Themes That Have Come Through
World Leader and Statesman
There is wide agreement that he is a strong and skilled
leader in foreign affairs, perhaps the number one statesman of the
world. Most Americans take pride in this. His recent Mediterrean
*
trip was particularly effective. This impression seems solid
despite the fact that we have lost ground on UN votes and despite
situations like Chile and possibly Italy and possibly more countries
in Latin America which may go further left. I think we should
prepare for possible counter attacks on these points during 1971.
We should also anticipate the possible suggestion that
the President is too interested in foreign affairs to the neglect of
domestic problems.
Professional Competence and Diligence
After two years in office even critics will acknowledge
that the President is an extraordinarily competent person in terms
of his intellect, knowledge, experience and devotion to duty. The
more enthusiastic think he's the most professionally qualified
President we have ever had.
I note a recent memo suggesting that we should get the word
out about his work schedule, but I would caution that we not over-
emphasize this angle. Somehow the average American thinks that
a real executive is a fellow who delegates work to others, leaving
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himself time to think big management thoughts. I am fearful that
we might create the impression that the President is occupied
dotting the i's and crossing the t's - - and all alone in his lonely
office, at that.
Identify With Middle America
The identity with middle America and the silent majority
was well established in the first year and has been strengthened.
During the next year, it seems to me our job is to retain this
constituency and broaden it. We must develop the idea that an
even wider consensus is moving towards President Nixon a
greater majority.
Figuratively speaking, we must keep our identification
with John Wayne and Lawrence Welk, but also find ways to
appeal to those less "square" and less old. Among other things
this means recruiting some new celebrities and other leaders who
appeal to the younger voters or others who fancy themselves as
beyond the Lawrence Welk circle.
Restoration of Dignity at the White House
This was more important in the first year when people
compared us to the previous Administration. The Nixon family has now
done this. Pressing the point any more could only be counter
productive -- maybe we should lighten things up.
Orderliness and Calm Restored
This refers to the lack of riots and assassinations. At
this point I believe it would be a mistake to try to make hay on this
point, lest any disruption or act of violence upset the applecart.
If things stay quiet until the fall of 1972 that will be the time to hit
this point.
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A Firm Attitude Toward Crime
At the federal level, the story will get better and better
from now on.
The District of Columbia crime rate should continue to
go down, and the Department of Justice is doing well against
organized crime and the drug traffic. 1971 should have good
anti-crime momentum to report.
Coming to Grips With Welfare Failure
The Family Assistance Plan needs PR help, but this should
&
be the subject of a separate study. I have the feeling that the
voters, as opposed to editorialists and other informed people, do
not really understand it. I would like to see the results of an opinion
poll which would tell us what the average person really understands
about FAP. Armed with that, we would know better how to explain
and merchandise the issue and get the bill passed. In the weeks
ahead I think the PR aspect of FAP should be the subject of major
concern and activity by the PR group. Somewhere along the line
we are not getting through.
Positive Themes That Have Not Come Through
Dealing With the Problems of the Poor
Safire said we were not getting much compassionate impact
a year ago. This is probably still true. Can we utilize Don Rumfeld's
new White House role to correct the mistaken impression that we
don't care about the poor?
The New Federalism
Revenue sharing is becoming a critical issue even though it
is not understood by most people. Every day's headlines serve to
emphasize the need for getting this story out.
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The Quality of Life
See earlier comments about Ruckelshaus.
Voluntarism.
Apparently dragging a year ago, and probably still is,
I personally can't see much pay dirt in this issue even if we
could dramatize it. I think there are more important issues to
attend to.
The American Spirit
in
1976 is fast approaching, and it strikes me we have not
zeroed in on this sufficiently. Somehow I feel that this could be
a very useful item for us in 1972, if we can find a way to romanticize
and dramatize it. I suspect that everyone is too occupied with
short range problems to really focus on this. Is it a matter of
assigning responsibility?