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From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972 campaign, including data on key states and George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/9/1970
From Keogh to RN analyzing the successes and shortcomings of RN's 1968 campaign. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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This file contains:
From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972 campaign, including data on key states and George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/9/1970
From Keogh to RN analyzing the successes and shortcomings of RN's 1968 campaign. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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20
18
12/9/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Sears to RN RE: thoughts on the 1972
campaign, including data on key states and
George Wallace's national support. 10 pgs.
20
18
11/13/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Keogh to RN analyzing the successes
and shortcomings of RN's 1968 campaign. 7
pgs.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Page 1 of 1
December 9, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
John Sears
I. 1972
If a President seeking re-election has kept the peace and
presided over a prosperous economy, the conventional wisdom
says that he is unbeatable. The reason people have made this
assertion so readily over the last 30 years is that, with the
single exception of Eisenhower, we have had Democratic incum-
bents -- members of the majority party -- seeking re-election.
All they had to do was show a certain degree of unity in their own
ranks and they could carry a majority of the nation. Eisenhower's
personal popularity could have won him re-election without a party
designation.
1972, however, will be the first year since 1916 in which a
President who is a member of the minority party will seek re-
election. (Republicans were the minority by the time Hoover came
up for re-election in 1932.) Although Wilson had done an excellent
job of domestic reform and "keeping us out of war, 11 he was nearly
beaten and probably could have been beaten. My belief is that
no matter how well the Administration is regarded nationally in
1972 and, within bounds, whoever the Democratic nominee may be,
the election will be damned close.
Statistically, let us examine some possible situations:
(1) If George Wallace were to decide not to run for
President in 1972 and we were able to win the 45 electoral votes he
received, and also take Texas (25) away from the Democratic nominee,
the Democrats could still defeat us if they merely held the states they
carried in 1968 and carried four others (California, Illinois, Ohio and
New Jersey.) Our present position in Ohio is anemic; we lost Senate
seats in Illinois and California; we failed to pick up one in New Jersey.
Also we did not carry a single one of these states comfortably in
1968. The scenarios break down as follows:
2
AFTER REDISTRICTING
RN
Democratic Nominee
29 states (exclusive of
13 states carried by
Calif., N..J., Ill. and
Humphrey, exclusive
Ohio)
191 votes
of Texas
162
5 states carried by
Wallace
45
Calif., N.J., Ill.,
and Ohio
114
Texas
26
262
276
(2) If Wallace enters the race, he must be conceded
Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. This would subtract 27
votes from the Nixon above total. It would then mean that RN
would have to carry California, or any combination of two of the
remaining three large states (Illinois, Ohio and New Jersey )--
or the election would go to the House. If Wallace repeated his
performance of 1968 and carried Georgia and Arkansas in
addition to Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana, then RN
would have to carry California and one out of Illinois, Ohio and
New Jersey, or all three of the other large states (Illinois, Ohio
and New Jersey.)
RN
Wallace
29 states, (exclusive of
Mississippi, Alabama
27
Calif., N.J., Ill., and
Louisiana
Ohio)
191
Texas
26
Georgia and Arkansas
18
235
Undecideds
Democratic Nominee
California
46
Ohio
25
13 states carried by
Illinois
25
Humphrey (exclusive
New Jersey
18
of Texas)
162
114
3
RN
29 states (exclusive of
Calif., N.J., Ill., and
Ohio
191
Texas
26
217
Democratic Nominee
13 states carried by
Humphrey, exclusive of
Texas
162
Undecideds
California
46
Ohio
25
Illinois
25
New Jersey
18
114
Wallace
5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968
45
(3) If Wallace picks up 45 electoral votes and we fail
to carry Texas, RN would have to carry California plus two
out of the remaining three large states. If RN failed to carry
California but did carry Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, the
election would still go to the House.
RN
29 states (exclusive
of Calif., N.J., Ill.,
and Ohio
191
Democratic Nominee
13 states carried by
Humphrey (exclusive
of Texas)
162
4
Wallace
5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968
45
Undecideds
California
46
Ohio
25
Illinois
25
New Jersey
18
114
(4) In 1972 it may be difficult to hold either Missouri or
Wisconsin. If Wallace runs and captures 45 electoral votes, the
Democratic nominee wins in Texas and we lost Missouri and Wis-
consin, it would then be necessary for RN to carry all four of
the large States he carried in 1968. Failure to carry California
plus one of the other three would result in a Democratic victory;
to carry 3 out of 4 would put the election in the House.
RN
29 states
191
less Missouri and
Wisconsin
-24
167
Democratic Nominee
13 states carried by
Humphrey, exclusive
of Texas
162
Missouri & Wisconsin
24
Texas
26
212
5
Wallace
5 states carried by
Wallace in 1968
45
Undecideds
California
46
Ohio
25
Illinois
25
New Jersey
18
114
Obviously, whatever becomes of George Wallace, RN's
fate is deeply tied to the outcome in 5 large states:
(1) TEXAS -- the Party is in disarray -- O'Donnell should
probably step down, but won't. RN has never been able to carry
the state even when there has been a split in Democratic ranks
(1960, due to Kennedy's religion; 1968, due to a division between
liberal and conservative Democrats.) If Ben Barnes runs for
the Senate, or the Governorship, and happens to get along with
the national Democratic ticket, we will be running against a
unified Democratic Party for the first time. Barnes is anxious
to deliver Texas to the Democrats in view of his future
ambitions.
(2) OHIO -- RN carried the state twice -- but in both
instances we had a unified party. Today, the party is horribly
split over both philosophy and personalities. The White House
should either act immediately to elect a new state chairman
who will be loyal only to RN -- or prepare to organize the
state independent of the party. The Democrats will be assisted
considerably by control of the Governorship.
(3) ILLINOIS -- in 1968 we benefitted from a superior, unified
and balanced ticket, together with a certain indifference on the part
of Mayor Daley. In 1972, Percy is headed for a bitter primary;
Ogilvie is growing less popular by the day (31% job approval in the
latest poll) and Mayor Daley cannot be counted upon to sit on his hands
again. RN must win the state by doing exceptionally well in the
6
downstate counties; both Percy and Ogilvie must do exceptionally
well in Cook County since neither is a downstate darling. There
is also a strong possibility that Ogilvie will have a primary.
We cannot allow the present disruption to get any worse.
It will take two full years of sharp politicking to put Illinois back
together.
(4) NEW JERSEY -- Again, there is developing factionalism
in the party in the wake of Gross' defeat. The party is suffering
some ill-effects from controlling the Governorship at a time when
taxes must be raised, and is further hotly divided between liberals
and conservatives. Clifford Case will be up in 1972 and it is too
much to hope that he will be singing the Administration's praises.
(5) CALIFORNIA -- Reagen's popularity can be counted upon
to wane over the next two years. As ever, the liberal-conservative
split continues in the Party. The Democrats, meanwhile, having
freed themselves of the yoke of Brown and Unruh, are not as
factionalized as they have been in past years. Reagen would not
mind seeing RN embarrassed. The President must begin
immediately to look out for his own neck there or local interests
will use it for a tug-of-war.
II. Democratic Situation
Our major political endeavor must be aimed at promoting
a split among the Democrats. This will be difficult because :
(1) they now feel the loss of being out of the Presidency and
thus will be more careful about controlling internal disputes;
(2) the out party can create a measure of unity by merely attacking
the "in" President; (3) they now have some patronage in a number
of states which can be used to control local disputes and ; (4) as a
result of their success in the Gubernatorial elections there is
now a group of people in the Democratic Party with the power
to make it easier for a prospective Presidential nominee to go
through the nominating process without being cut up inside
his Party.
7
Given these facts, I would suggest:
(1) Muskie -- Muskie is not an accomplished national
politician. He will make mistakes as long as we do not make his
road easier by making derogatory remarks about him. Every time
we answer him or take him on, it unifies a few more Democrats
behind him. Ignore him and he won't be able to hack it.
Muskie has serious difficulty in making a negative issue;
he prefers to play Lincolnesque roles, the above-the-battle man
who says nothing unfair or partisan. He would prefer to talk about
how well everybody gets along in Maine. As long as we don't apply
the missing element by responding to him he will either (a) lose
his momentum or (b) -- sensing that he is not doing as well as
he anticipated exhibit a misdirected temper at us and the press
which we can use to our advantage. The game is to get him
rattled; the best way to do it is to get at his monstrous ego by
ignoring him.
(2) Humphrey -- we should help build Humphrey into a
candidate. Shortly after the opening of the new Congressional
session, he will predictably move to become spokesman for his
party in Congress. He is aware of the current void there and
will seek to fill it. If H umphrey wishes to attack us, we should
be more than willing to hit back at him since this builds him up in
the eyes of his party. We should, in effect, create a New
Humphrey -- for awhile.
There is an element of danger in building up Humphrey
since (1) he might be able to unify the Democrats if he got going
too fast and (2) he might disdain the nomination and use the
influence we create for him on behalf of another candidate. I
do not believe either thing will happen since (1) he symbolizes and
epitomizes the split which occurred in 1968 and thus his ascending
prominence will create strong tensions in the Party among the more
liberal elements and the youth; (2) Muskie and Kennedy will not
wish to see him move up and will do what they can to undercut him;
(3) the academics detest him; (4) he can be embarrassed in the
primaries if he gets going too fast.
8
Given the lure by us, he will bite. As his stock rises this
will put pressure on Muskie and Kennedy, as well as re-engender the
Democratic split on which our fortunes depend.
(3) Kennedy -- Kennedy must wait for Muskie to fall before
he can become very active. To do otherwise is to subject himself to
the same kind of problem his brother encountered with McCarthy.
We should not respond to Kennedy's candidacy either; our line of
defense against him is a reconstructed Humphrey. If Humphrey is a
viable enough candidate by the time Muskie fades, Kennedy will
be unable to take full advantage of the situation. Humphrey and
Kennedy will then be locked in a life or death struggle, from
which we can derive great benefit.
(4) Other candidates -- McGovern, Hughes, Bayh, etc.
should be totally ignored. To the txtent that any of them makes
a mark, they will further complicate the plans of the above
three contenders. At this juncture, none of them can be nominated.
Steadfastly resist all opportunities to discuss possible
Democratic opponents. Humphrey is the only individual we
should mention and this should only be done artfully to the
objective of building his candidacy.
III. Wallace
The important thing is to draw a clear line delineating
how far we will go to fight his candidacy and then religiously
adhere to it. He senses that he has us in a bind since (1) if we
chase him too far in an effort to hold onto Southern votes, we lost
support in the rest of the country; (2) if we don't chase him far
enough he might hurt us more in the South than he did the last
time. In either case there would be more of a chance that the
election would wind up in the House than was true in 1968.
Look for Wallace to run a strictly Southern campaign
this time since (1) it costs less money (2) he can focus his sitions
better and (3) he will feel this is the best way to get us to chase
him.
9
We have gone as far as we can on the race-school-crime-
law and order issue. For a fair amount of time we should keep
quiet about this. A fair number of people in the Middle and Far
West are beginning to wonder whether we aren't a little too
Southern in our view of the "social issue" to fit local prejudices.
Talk of a "Southern Strategy, 11 appointment of Southern judges
to the Supreme Court and compacts with Southern politicians in
Congress only add credence to assertions made against
us in the Middle and Far West.
If Wallace finds a successful issue to use against us this
time, it will be populism, not race. Improving the economy as
it relates to the white lower-to-middle class American will do
more to defuse Wallace's impact than anything further on race.
IV. General Views
I have seen all of the books written psychoanalyzing the
American voter. Suffice it to say that none offers any meaningful
assistance in preparing for 1972. Only two general observations
can easily be made about the electorate in 1972: (1) the growing
and deeply felt confusion will be even more intensely felt and
(2) the people will believe less and less about more and more.
Under these conditions political philosophies become an
enigma. We have already seen what this confused cynicism has
done to the former liberal movement - - making extreme radicals
of some, and establishmentarians of the rest. Among conservatives,
the same force is starting to erode the quantum of what conservatives
have been interested in conserving.
Against this background, polls are of less and less value
since they can tell a politician very little about how he can be
believed even though they may adequately measure the intensity
of feeling on issues. Television was proven almost useless in
many campaigns this fall and probably will be even less useful
in the 1972 campaign. This is mainly because television is losing
its credibility as a conduit of honest impressions of a politician.
10
In 1972, confusion--cynicism will operate intensely against
the incumbent, but the same force will operate to some degree
also on the Democratic nominee. The key to victory lies
in whether we can isolate and understand this force as it exists
from group to group and thereby ascertain what is required to be
credible. The precise stand on issues will be less relevant
than ever before.
*****
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM KEOGH
In answer to the request for some post-election thoughts, I
would like to take the liberty of spinning out my personal reactions
without necessarily trying to establish their general validity.
First, I believe that the campaign schedules of the Vice
President and President were almost exactly right. It was wise to
start the Vice President early and tough and -- considering the
gravity of the situation to have the President come in with an
intensive move at the end.
Looking first at the Vice President's campaigning, it seems
to me that he came on as he should have -- hard and natural. But
then he tended to overdo it.
First and perhaps a minor point -- he piled up too much
alliteration. A little about pusillanimous pussyfooting and nattering
nabobs of negativism was fine -- it got attention -- but then he did
SO much of this that it became a joke and even many of our good
friends got to be a little embarrassed about it.
Beyond this, he seemed to be indulging in overshrill and
kill. Instead of landing a good hard punch and letting his target
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-2-
drop, he pounded and pounded. The media began dwelling on this and
eventually many of our supporters began to feel that maybe the Vice
President was hitting too hard. The Christine Jorgensen line about
Goodell is an example. By then Charlie was bloody and reeling, and
that line left the Vice President open to charges of cruelty and bad
taste that made even some of his best fans wince.
Fairly early in the campaign, we made a hard turn and in my
opinion, it was too hard a turn. At the meeting with the Cabinet on
August 19 when political matters were discussed, the President struck
what seemed to me to be a very good tone. The President said the
Salema
economy would be the most important factor in the election. Above
all, the President urged, spokesmen should take a positive position on
what the Administration is doing and is trying to do, should also be
positive about our candidates, should hit what the Congress has not
done but should beware of building up opposition candidates by attack-
ing them in a negative way.
Then, along the way, we bought Scammon and Wattenberg. And,
in my judgment, we bought more of their theory than we should have.
The opposition soon saw what we were up to and moved toward joining
us.
In our intense concentration on the Scammon and Wattenberg
thesis, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that the economic
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-3-
issue -- fear of depression -- was cutting us to the bone in a broad
sweep across the west. The irony of this is that the President had
warned repeatedly about this issue - - the fear of what might happen
in the economic situation, not necessarily what the present situation
was. The opposition exploited this fear expertly. We did not pay
enough attention to the issue.
Despite all this, I think the President's campaigning was -
-
in the main -- close to target. Ultimately it came through the
media as too negative -- and that's a serious problem but anyone
who was really paying attention knew there was a great deal of the
positive, too. The Anaheim rally was generally fine on national
television -- a bit too much of Reagan and Murphy for national con-
sumption - - but the President was just right.
Then we made a shattering error. Putting the Phoenix rally
speech on national television the night before the elections was a
dreadful blunder. First of all, a taped rally speech is basically not
a good piece of material for national use on TV. In this instance,
the sound, the setting, the approach made the President seem angry
and harsh and almost mean. The substance was unobjectionable
but the effect was not Presidential. And the strategy gave the oppo-
sition an opportunity to put on Muskie who seemed very statesmanlike,
even if quite dull.
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-4-
It was a mistake to have the President on television at all the
night before this election. By then the people had heard enough cam-
paigning. But if the President felt it was necessary to go on, then
the format should have been a quiet chat in a studio or office setting --
the kind of presentation in which the President has proven that he has
no peer.
In the last analysis, I do not think that the Monday night mistake
had much effect on the results. But I am concerned that it was damag-
ng to the President's image in the longer term. It left the wrong tone
and opened the way to the interpretation that the whole campaign was
bitter and harsh.
Turning from the general tone to a specific area, I believe that
in retrospect it was a mistake for the Administration to be wooing the
leaders of organized labor. We throw a big Labor Day dinner for them
and they go out and bludgeon us with rhetoric and money spent for the
opposition. Besides, they are on the wrong side of a very big issue:
inflationary pressure. I realize there are other factors involved here,
but I fear that when the Administration cozies up to the labor bosses
it only tends to alienate a lot of other people who are more likely to be
on its side.
As for the future, I think the Administration must now realize
that it is "the Government in Washington, D. C. 11 From now on,
there should be intense concentration on achievement and solid
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-5-
ccentuation of the positive. It is no longer profitable to emphasize
what the Administration is against; from now on, the emphasis must
be on what the Administration is for what it has done and is doing.
I fear that with our constant feeling that we do not do a good enough
selling job we have come too close to the attitude that it doesn't
make much difference what we do SO long as we sell it right.
In terms of the Administration's relationships with the media,
I can do no better than repeat what I wrote in a memo in June:
"I believe we are relying too much on what - - to use
a crude term - I can only describe as gimmicks. We
would do ourselves more good by being more straightfor-
ward.
Too many people are spending too much time draw-
ing up too many game plans. This may make us feel better
and it may make a record on paper it seems to show
action - - but I doubt that it is getting results that are worth
all that effort.
memo to all PR staff
Let's face a few facts. Most of the working media
people are 1) against us, and 2) suspicious of us. In the
main, they are hard to fool, although they often fool them-
selves - and that usually gives them an even more negative
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stance SO far as we are concerned.
It is very difficult
for us to put anything over on them; it is practically im-
possible for us to subvert them. If they were for us we
could do these things; since they are not, we can't.
When we try a gimmick they usually are waiting
at the entrance to the alley and they wind up making us
look more devious than we are. This gives us a credi-
bility problem. The results more often turn out to be
counter-productive And the media wind up being more
suspicious of us than ever.
I think we should do what we're going to do and
Eth
present our case for it straightforwardly and not try to
be quite so cute. In the long run, this could be a big
plus with the media. They would be unbelieving at first,
then startled when they realized that we really were
playing it straight. In the end, while they might not be
any more for us, I believe they would respect us.
One tactic that I believe we should use more is the
honest-to-God calculated leak. I don't mean a contrived
leak where we are just trying to sell a line, but a factual
leak of a coming development. This is probably the best
way to get a favorable first story out in a big way. The
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-7-
reporter and editor who have the story are too anxious
to protect it to let our opposition tear it apart before
they deliver it. And a reporter or editor who knows that
he is getting a big break on some important stories is
a little less apt to be negative.
All this may seem too simple and too direct but
I believe that in the long run it would be a better approach
than trying to con a cynical media corps that has seen SO
many gimmicks for so many years. A straightforward
approach might shock them toward straight reporting. 11
###
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