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This file contains:
From Bucahanan to RN RE: strategies for the 1972 campaign, including thoughts on the media, Congress, and presidential travel. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
From Garment for Haldeman RE: thoughts on the 1972 election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/11/1970
From Harlow to RN RE: previous campaign strategies and how to improve on them in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Rumsfeld to RN RE: attached thoughts on the 1972 campaign. Advice on key topics provided in attachment. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970
From Nofziger to RN responding to Haldeman's request for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/10/1970
From Timmons to RN RE: thoughts on RN's use of Agnew, relations with Congress, and other topics, as well as their relevance to the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Allin to Higby RE: media election predictions. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/7/1970
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WHSF: Contested, 20-19
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WHSF: Contested, 20-19
description
This file contains:
From Bucahanan to RN RE: strategies for the 1972 campaign, including thoughts on the media, Congress, and presidential travel. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
From Garment for Haldeman RE: thoughts on the 1972 election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/11/1970
From Harlow to RN RE: previous campaign strategies and how to improve on them in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Rumsfeld to RN RE: attached thoughts on the 1972 campaign. Advice on key topics provided in attachment. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970
From Nofziger to RN responding to Haldeman's request for campaign advice. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/10/1970
From Timmons to RN RE: thoughts on RN's use of Agnew, relations with Congress, and other topics, as well as their relevance to the election. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Allin to Higby RE: media election predictions. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/7/1970
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
19
11/18/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Bucahanan to RN RE: strategies for the
1972 campaign, including thoughts on the
media, Congress, and presidential travel.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 9 pgs.
20
19
11/11/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Garment for Haldeman RE: thoughts
on the 1972 election. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 2 pgs.
20
19
Campaign
Memo
From Harlow to RN RE: previous campaign
strategies and how to improve on them in
1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown.
8 pgs.
20
19
11/12/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Rumsfeld to RN RE: attached thoughts
on the 1972 campaign. Advice on key topics
provided in attachment. Handwritten notes
added by unknown. 6 pgs.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Page 1 of 2
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
20
19
11/10/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Nofziger to RN responding to
Haldeman's request for campaign advice.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 5 pgs.
20
19
Campaign
Memo
From Timmons to RN RE: thoughts on RN's
use of Agnew, relations with Congress, and
other topics, as well as their relevance to the
election. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 3 pgs.
20
19
11/7/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Allin to Higby RE: media election
predictions. 9 pgs.
Friday, May 06, 2011
Page 2 of 2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
(1) The President already has my analysis of the election results.
Would reiterate several points.
First, where our operation was far ahead of the field in assessing
the impact of the mass media in the 1968 elections in the length
and intensity of the 1970 campaign we did not take into proper ac-
count the enormously enhanced power the Vice President, but
especially the President have to dominate the media as incumbents.
In past years, it took weeks and months to hammer home a single
issue. The same can now be accomplished in days. The 1972 cam-
paign should be thought out on the same kind of basis the President
thought out his entire 1966-1968 political profile. Now is our time
fox
a "political moratorium" Further, the fall campaign of 1972
should be SO constituted as to emphasize various and changing themes,
saving the strongest pitch for possibly the last week (or two). We
should not underestimate our ability to make a case, our ability to
focus national attention on a single theme or the capacity of the pub-
lic for being turned off by "overkill. 11
Second, reexamine the instruments of campaigning. Frankly, to
what degree, if any, does campaigning enhance an incumbent's
stature in the public mind? Is a rally with a cheering crowd and
an effective cheer line by the President on night TV as good a forum
for taking RN's case to the country as a nine p.m. press conference
telling the nation why RN needs these men. Will the nation respond
in better political terms to Nixon the campaigner, or to Nixon the
President making his campaign speeches quietly and forcefully in
prime time from the Oval Office? Has the day of the front-porch
campaign or its modern counterpart returned?
If I were to make a shotgun judgment now as to what kind of cam-
paign the President should run in 1972 I would recommend that
he wrap himself in the trappings of his office
give once a week
major address on nationwide television at night and make not
C
more than a handful of separate campaign appearances at noon to
Preservation Copy
2
show the nation, via networks, the President has the confidence of
the people in the provinces he is their man.
But the President clear ly needs an intensive analysis on the effects
of campaigning per se. The team we have put together is by general
judgments the best campaign team in history. Even our media
adversaries say they wish we could run the government as well as we
can run a campaign. The danger that lurks is that we shall become
so enamoured of our success at managing the techniques of campaigning,
1968 style, that we may lose sight of the fact that they may now be
irrelevant or worse, counter-productive for a sitting President
in 1972.
Third, there are states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Florida
essential to victory in 1972, where the Party has been mangled. We
have to begin now to move to resolve differences and bring these
parties together, or else begin almost at once organizing our own
political machinery for the elections of 1972. John Sears told me that
if the President were interested, he would draft a political memorandum
with his thoughts on what should be done now and in the coming year,
both on an organization basis and a strategy basis with regard to
downgrading Muskie, and perhaps building up Humphrey as our
opponent, on countering Wallace and strengthening our political
machinery in the swing states. If the President is interested
will tell him to move on it right away.
(2)
Posture of the President through 1970 and into 1971.
The immediate necessity is to put politics and the campaign of 1970
behind us. Nothing we can do or way further is going to alter
judgments, already made, abo ut whether or not 1970 was a success
or a failure. Our case has been presented -- the other side has
presented its version of the results and the commentators and
columnists have by and large already staked out their positions.
Anything more is overkill.
This is consistent with my strong view that the timefor Nixon the
politician campaigning for his party is over the time is now for
the President to represent himself to the nation as the elected
President of the American people above the political wars now
certain to ensue within the Democratic Party.
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3
Through its gross distortion of the kind of campaign the President
conducted, the media has driven home the impression of Nixon the
partisan of the United States. We must not play into their hands
with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of 1970 or
the prospects for 1972 in either party. We must get back exclu-
sively to the business of governing and leading the nation.
The election-eve impression left of RN the strident partisan and
Muskie the national conciliator can be reversed in a matter of weeks.
My strong recommendation is that at the President's first press con-
ference, following the election which will be a bear baiting exercise
he demonstrathumor, a relaxed attitude, exude confidence and
speak in terms of politics being behind us and now moving forward to
work together on the nation's business at hand. Speak of the national
need -- in calm reasoned terms for what the President has request-
ed for the defense of friendly nations; speak of the need for action in
areas where action has been delayed and people have unnecessarily
suffered for that delay. (Unless I hear otherwise, this would be the
kind of mood I would try to put into the Q. and A. for the next ap-
pearance.)
(With regard to Muskie, he suffers from the fact that he is not con-
sidered an outspoken leader by the ideological wing of his party
he is likely, as McGovern is doing now, to begin taking potshots at us,
which will be clearly political. We ought to simply dismiss them as
political not engage in head-to-head and let him go about destroy-
ing his media image by himself, which he may well be forced to do to
win the hearts of the ideologues that dominate the left wing of his
party.)
Looking at further horizons, I see a need for the President to move
back toward the role of national reconciliator symbolic
gestures
toward the black majority should be made (not to win votes; we can't)
but to indicate to the great middle that the President is attempting to
answer the crucial needs of the entire nation
none excluded.
We also need to have something positive and appealing for the work-
ing people of this country in the way of tangible major domestic
programs Since, in any choice between a counterfeit liberal and
the real McCoy, the country will take the real McCoy we ought to
have some domestic initiatives of our own with the Nixon brand
clearly on them. Regrettably, we are now pouring billions into pro-
grams like OEO, Model Cities, Urban Renewal, etc. for which we
get no credit whatsoever.
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4
My thought would have been to terminate or diminish as many of their
programs as possible in order to shift the considerable amount of dol-
lars into Nixon programs which would have a visible impact by 1972.
To this degree, I concur with Phillips: To put together a new majority
in American politics, we are going to have to provide the working men
and women, white and blue collar, with more than rhetoric; we have to
bring home the bacon; whether in the form of parochaid, or what.
Finally, to counter the impression being pushed by the media that this
is an Administration concerned only with cold statistics, an Admin-
istration long on public relations gimmickry and short on substance
and vision I feel the President should seek out occasions to demon-
strate "humanity" and "heart" spontaneous occasions, not planned
meetings to demonstrate a symbolic affinity with, and concern for the
unemployed and the less fortunate
The old Republican nemesis is the national image of the party of the
bankers, party of business, the party that doesn't really give a damn
about people. The Democrats are going to use this in 1972 as they
have in every election since 1932 and we need to consciously con-
sider words, deeds, symbolic acts that will give the lie to this charge
before it is made by the National Democratic Party in earnest.
(3)
Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media
The networks are not with us. NBC is openly hostile. The national
press is in an ugly mood over both the lack of press conferences,
and the feeling that we are B. S-ing them about the election returns.
Given their natural affinity for a political fight, given their ideologi-
cal pre-disposition, given their normal enthusiasm for the challenger,
the underdog our situation here is not good.
On the plus side, it has never really been that good the hostility of
the liberal media was always one element we had to consider. What
to do.
We are never going to be loved by the national press corps that is a
given fact. Any transparent attempts to become buddies will fool no
one; will succeed nowhere. What our specific focuses should be, I be-
lieve are these:
(a) Go over the heads of the national press to the nation on more
televised press conferences. Where we run into a problem
of over-exposure, do them in the morning or at noon. Have
the national press in for more of the Presidential, non-tele-
vised press conferences. These carry risks but this
Preservation Copy
5
instrument is among our most effective; we are extremely good
at it; invariably the President scores with the people, if not with
the press.
(b) While our differences with the national media remain irreconcilable
we should take the initiative to ease tensions a bit. While there is
much psychologically satisfying in roasting them with regularity,
there is not much political profit in this. We have garnered much
of that already. If we intend to take them on and hard we
ought to first re-establish good relations, and wait until the fall
of 1970.
Any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots - at NBC
for a specific abuse and not be perceived in such a way as
that we are roasting the entire corps. This tends to leave some
of them so browned off they make a special effort to gut us at
every opportunity.
Our best hope for a fair shake lies now with the Reasoner-Smith
team at ABC. We ought to give them our best leaks provide
them with the best breaks. If we have to pick one network to do
some major special on clearly it should be this one.
In attacking and supporting, we should as mentioned above, be
selective a Herb Kaplow who will do something fair for us
on the worst network, should not be slighted while Chancellors
and Vanocurs should get nothing And if we move on the attack,
it should similarly be selective.
4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet
Like the President but to a far greater degree the Vice Presi
dent should shift over from the political offensive to the policy of-
fensive The time for combativeness, for political in-fighting, is
clearly over for now. In my view, the Vice President should be
given a good slice of the domestic franchise to oversee, an issue or
issues, a program or programs, to demonstrate the other side of
the man the capable and competent executive working to get things
done. His role as the President's Terrible Swift Sword should be
minimized; he should be used in this assignment only when necessary;
the President should utilize Cabinet Members and White House Staf-
fers with good liberal credentials to start carrying the fight. They
have capital in the bank to do it; the Vice President needs to re-
plenish capital.
Preservation Copy
6
The Vice President makes an effective low-key presentation on
television; when he is provided a new franchise, he should take
to the networks to argue his case. He should be shown fighting
for something not just against somebody. It would enhance
his stature if he were given a foreign assignment of some dura-
tion this would broaden his image with the public; he might
well make a campus appearance or appearances; he might well
make a surprise visit for a A. and A. session with black leaders:
he should be given the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities
other than as simply campaigner; he should be provided the op-
-portunity to show the many other facets to his personality other than
fierce partisan.
The Veep is the most loyal of the President's soldiers; he took more
wounds and scored more direct hits in the campaign than any other
of the President's men this was his job. But, to continue to do
that job effectively, he needs to retire temporarily a political glad-
iator to show the nation that he is something other than the War
Lover of American Politics.
Whenever, there is a new program to be announced that the Presi-
dent is not going to announce the Vice President should be the
one before the cameras. Whenever RN is about ready to let some-
thing go of significance in the domestic arena the Vice President
might well be the one who gets the headlines by giving an inkling of
the new progressive direction of the Administration.
(The Cabinet)
Unless specifically asked, I would feel it presumptous to recommend
changes in the President's highest appointed body. But my views
briefly are these: The President's commitment to clean up the
Department of State has manifestly not been carried out by those
given the franchise the President's men are not the men domina-
ting that body the career service historically hostile to the
President has too many positions of power and we are going to
suffer damaging leaks in the 1972 campaign unless we do something
about it. The Secretary of the Interior does this President no good
and a great deal of harm with his transparent attempts to ingratiate
himself with the liberal media. While I continue to admire Secretary
Romney's tenacity and guts, he is a committed believer in the com-
pulsory integration of American society to solve the race problem.
My feeling is that this is socially dangerous at this time and politically
disasterous and we spend too damn much time and effort trying to
change peoples minds to change their policy to accord with the
President. We might attempt changing the men rather than the minds.
Finally, in the area of the economy, a mortal danger for 1972, we need
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7
a man at Treasury who can articulate the President's policies, a
staunch loyalist, who has both credentials and capability in the
economic and political areas.
(5)
Relations with Congress
With regard to the regular Republicans, we are still in good shape.
As for the "Baker's dozen", they are going to make their own de-
cisions as to what to do depending on their own political hides;
they care as little about ours as we do about theirs. For example,
Hatfield a True Believer can be expected to depart little from
his former path. Percy, the Opportunist, who is up in 1972, is
already making friendly noises. My view is that we ought not to
wage war with them but to treat them in accord with the degree
of support they give us and not lean upon them. Where we can
find areas of agreement, exploit them; and see if we can convince
them in their and the party's interests to minimize the de-
gree of Goodellism that goes on.
As for the Democrats, as one of our aides put it, we are going to
be "walking through a vat of acid, 11 for the next two years. In the
Senate half a dozen have their eye on the President and all
their decisions, actions, statements, attacks and support are go-
ing to be on that basis. There is nothing at all we are going to be
able to do with them. We should have our Cabinet and White House
staffers programmed to answer their charges to deal with them
on the political warfare level.
As for our own Congressional Relations in my view Bill Timmons
is not only absolutely loyal but also the most hard-working of the
President's men in the least enviable of Presidential assignments.
I think he needs more manpower over there; I think he needs more
visible identification as the President's man for Congressional re-
lations; I think he needs more access to the President himself and
his inner councils; I think he needs to be given more credibility for
his job on the Hill by the President's visible demonstration that
he is our man on Capitol Hill.
Finally, the President should place the onus for starting the political
war on the Democratic Party in Congress by letting them fire the
first few shots. Perhaps, when this Congress fails to act, as it will,
and goes home for Christmas the President could, more in sor-
row than anger, go on the nation's networks or lead off a press con-
ference with a doleful recounting of its failures to act in the national
interest - and the President's hopes that the new Congress will
C
serve the nation a little better.
Preservation/Orgy
8
(6)
Presidential Travel
Abroad: The exigencies of foreign policy will dictate if the President
must go abroad to advance the national interest. From the standpoint of
RN's political posture, I strongly recommend against any "Grand Tour"
trips ala the recent sojourn to Europe and the Mediterranean. The
President is generally conceded high marks for his handling of foreign
policy. The nation via television has already seen the President moving
through countless cheering throngs abroad. Repeat performances will
be redundant: they will be written off in the media as the last trip
was by some traveling reporters as politically motivated. We have
drawn down our balance in this account there is not much capital
left in foreign visits over the next six months. Lest we be charged,
as we have been charged, of going abroad in search of crowds while
the gnawing domestic problems remain unsolved, I recommend against.
Also, by not going abroad in the near future, the President will have
positioned himself well for a major foreign visit in early of mid-1972
when it would be perceived as something of a far greater interest, and
when it could more effectively underscore the President's successes
overseas in time for the 1972 elections.
At Home: Consistent with the view that the President must put the
partisan image back of himself, reflect the "humanity and heart" of
the Administration, reassume the posture of President of all the
American people, I would recommend spontaneous visits, stop-offs
to areas of social depression in the country whether of unemployed
prior
whites or rural blacks.
Because of the appreciable amount of negative reportage we are
receiving for "staging" events -- these would necessarily have to be
truly spontaneous; symbolic of the President's personal concerns
for the people he leads. Democrats have consistently been superior
to Republicans with this sort of communication and given our party's
hereditary image as the Party of Big Business this is a woeful weakness.
Such visits will also blunt the inevitable charge of the 1972 elections
that Republicans are concerned only with cold statistics like 5. 5 percent
unemployment that the President doesn't give a damn about poor
people.
Similarly, however, as the nation has seen the President in cheering
throngs abroad SO also, from the campaign, has it seen streets
lined with cheering people at home. Though the motorcading through the
crowds may serve as a rejoinder to any contention the President is
not popular with the people it also would seem redundant in the after-
math of the election.
Preservation Copy
y
(7)
Final Points.
First, we are getting some nasty criticism for having exploited
the San Jose incident, and for alleged being an Administration more
interested in image than substance -- long on P.R. and short on
accomplishment. If pressed, this attack could be very damaging
and I recommend we consider drawing in our horns on the P.R.
operation side of things. The nation is one that is very keen to
and very down on P.R. -- and the last thing we want in the
world is to have the press start picking up the McGinnis theme of
hucksterism. We should have a high level review of the effectiveness
or again the word comes to mind, the possible "overkill" of this
side of the operation. At all cost we should avoid any tarnishing
of the President's image as President in the minds of the people
and these attacks bother me.
Finally, at all costs we must avoid, in the wake of the election,
and in the pressure the President is assuredly getting from the left,
any kind of transparant public move to the left. This damaged us after
Kent State and such would now be tacit admission the Restons
and Sideys were right and we were wrong on the campaign. It
would be disheartening to the bulk of our support. Rather than any
left or right move it should be a forward move away from the
partisan role of the campaign toward fulltime President again.
RRS
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
Preservation Cory
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 11, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM: LEN GARMENT
1. My basic view is that the personal position of the President
is stronger than generally supposed. The campaign was not a referen-
dum on his policies or performance. Nor do I believe the President or
the Presidency were affected by the campaign. The traumatic theory of
politics is always overdone. The President has a unique capacity to
move from combat to conciliation. Once this is done, the abrasions
from the campaign will quickly pass and be forgotten.
2. Out of the mountain of comment on the election, the only
original perception I've seen is in the attached editorial (Wall Street
Journal, November 6) which argues that the correct measure of the
President's performance is not the number or identity of candidates
who won or lost on November 3, but the distance the President has car-
ried the country since October 1969 - - when the White House was literally
preparing for a siege. In this period. the authority of the Presidency
has been restored, mass demonstrations have faded, near-agreement
has emerged on issues such as Vietnam, law and order and campus
disruption and virtually all the successful candidates -- of both parties
ran on a platform largely fashioned by the President. Under these cir-
cumstances it would seem to me that the posture of the President, at
least to begin with, should be confident, open and conciliatory, under-
taking to unite all Republicans, to work with willing Democrats and to
reduce liberal-moderate-conservative tensions to the extent possible.
3. In a symbolic sense we need this because we need to create
a sense of a new start when the post-election interlude ends. In a prac-
tical sense we need this because we need a legislative coalition to perform
effectively. In 1972 the argument that the Democrats obstructed programs
will not be as effective as a record of substantial performance. In any
event a record will have to be made. And whatever may be the problems
with the Democrats, the failure to get Republicans behind our legislative
initiatives will be even more difficult to handle. Performance is the key
concept for 1971; and performance requires a strong, unified legislative
team.
Preservation Copy
-2-
4. It is well to recognize that there are likely to be rough
edges around the peace and prosperity issues as we move through
1971 and into 1972. Thus, the maintenance of a high level of perfor-
mance in a wide range of subordinate issues could be critical to the
President. Popular programs like health care and the environment
will get their fair share of Presidential and senior staff attention. It
is also important to press ahead -- quietly but steadily - - in support
(civil rights
of traditional programs (Samuel Lubell points out that people who are
cool toward concepts of racial "justice" want racial "peace"). And
innovative initiatives which have a high political yield, like the President's
arts program, should continue to be identified and supported.
5. Resources of the Administration should be organized to
highlight substantive performance -- what we have done, propose
<
doing, who is helping, who is obstructing. The Vice President might
have a continuous role aspokesman on one or more major issues.
6. At the moment, I don't see any reason for major moves.
I think it would be useful to organize some of the staff to think about
these problems (e.g., the next campaign) on a more systematic basis.
At the moment, I don't know enough to have any strong opinions.
###
Can
Preservation Copy
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMI...
SKING
THE WHITE HOUSE
E.J. 120.
6-102
By
CP
NAKS, Date 3-12-82
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRYCE HARLOW
notion
You have already received, I am sure, far better assessments
of the elections and the rest than I can furnish, in part
because I was preoccupied with the Vice President's campaign
and therefore didn't share in your effort or watch it as
closely as I otherwise would have. So I will make my comments
as brief as I can on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's
November 7 memorandum.
1. Your election efforts:
a. To all the VP's crew, it appeared that your
campaigning did very excellently what the VP wasn't supposed
to do and couldn't do --- stir up the general public and pre-
empt both the national and local media. Assuming that the
main objects of campaigning, aside from fund-raising, are to
remind and stimulate, I believe the timing, execution and
placement of your efforts are not challengeable even in
hindsight.
b. I fear we may have been guilty of overkill in
such places as Texas (perhaps the only place) ; the heavy
involvement of both the President and Vice President may
have flushed out more opposition votes than supporters, and
I believe it was agreed from the beginning that a small vote
was desirable in Texas. Nonetheless, the Bush people have
no basis for complaint; you and the VP did precisely as his
campaign crowd asked.
C. I feel a bit lame in making this point, since I
was not in Washington to share in the decision-making and
suspect there are considerations I am unaware of -- but I have
the uncomfortable feeling that the Vice President had already
driven home, powerfully and effectively, the law and order
theme by the time you hit the trail and that he had already
Preservation Copy
2
peaked with that message to the country. So by mid-October
all of us might have been better advised to swing away at
least partially from this issue we may have already won
(even the most radical Democrats had joined us on law and
order by that time) and clobber the economic issue, plus
bragging on Administration achievements. That is a gut
feeling -- sheer smoke-shoveling -- but by the time you took
to the road we were already in worried conferences in the
VP's group on what to do about newly adverse developments in
the economy and farm areas (the announcement of low parity
in the closing days of the campaign was a disaster!) In
other words, I vaguely sense even now (as the VP did in the
last two weeks of the campaign) that we were overstressing an
issue we had already won and on which the Democrats had
covered themselves, and we failed then to modify course to
take on escalating troubles in agriculture and the economy.
Bob Haldeman may recall my distraught telephone call ten days
or SO before election about the economic problem -- which gave
rise to Bill Safire's excellent statement for our candidates
to use (and which we did use at Hartford and Tuscon) - but I
rather suspect we might well have charged on these other issues
in the closing days, or at least given them greater emphasis,
instead of sticking overlong to law and order.
d. Even if we had done what (c) above suggests, I
must concede that local candidates would have raised plu-
perfect hell on the ground that you were campaigning too
blandly; certainly everyplace the VP went, the local lust was
for raw meat. Moreover, the press was hovering about with
pencils poised, eager to charge that the campaign had been
so nasty, SO bitchy, that you and the VP had to confess
wrong-doing and turn tail and run. So even if the country
had drifted away from law and order in the closing days, had
you and the VP changed subjects or muted the attack, there's
no telling what the national reaction might have been. It
could have been a disaster for you or the VP or both. There's
no way to tell.
e. The bottom fell out in the Midwest and West.
If that area had held up as I, at least, anticipated, we
would have done excellently -- the 5 to 8 seat gain I
personally expected in the Senate. The only constants in
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3
that region that can explain this collapse, best I can
figure, are: unemployment (spotty), high interest rates
(epidemic and very basic), inflation (general), farmer
surliness (a sleeper; never once even mentioned to us by
polly
any campaign manager or candidate in the entire area), and
maybe a regional disinterest in law and order, inasmuch as
both Democrats and Republicans are law abiding and square
in that part of the country. It is easy to particularize
on the races out there and conclude that oddities in each
state account for the poor showing, but I can't buy that.
I believe that, while state peculiarities obviously in-
fluenced every race in the western reaches, so also did they
in the rest of the country where we fared far better -- SO
there are bound to be special troubles out west which did us
in. I can't help but wonder what might have happened in
North Dakota if our thrust had been not law and order, where
Burdick was immune, but on the arrogance and cynicism of the
Democrats' refusal to pass the farm law. But even there, as
you know, both the Farm Bureau and the Farmers' Union oppose
this legislation, so that, too, might have been a loser.
That tends to force me back to the desirability of the economy
argument - that you had wound down both inflation and war
while avoiding recession, and the Democrats are plainly
incompetent on both counts. It is conceivable that we might
have salvaged a race or two in the mountains and plains if
we had done that.
f. The fact remains, whatever happened, that the
whole campaign was directed toward one goal - unshackling
you in the Senate. You did precisely that -- a far better showin
than the pillar of political gold, Eisenhower, made in 1954 and
1958 - indeed, the best off-year showing of any Republican
Administration in memory. So liberal pundits notwithstanding,
your object was achieved, and the proof will be seen in 1971
and 1972 in the performance of the Senate. That is all that
matters; the rest is only hostile rationalization and yearning.
g. Finally, I reject as inane the argument that
your campaigning demeaned the Presidency and will plague you
through 1972. Never has this been so before, and unless the
media take it upon themselves to make it so (even that won't
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4
work, in my opinion) the whole orgy of 1970 will be dead
and gone except for (1) the wholesome Senate results and
(2) the gubernatorial disadvantages, by the time you deliver
your State of the Union Message. It is true, of course, that
the Phoenix film was a well-rounded disaster, but everybody
knows that, and it too is an isolated episode that soon
will pass.
2. Presidential posture for the future:
I don't think the election of 1970 influences your
future posture in any significant aspect other than (1) you
can now move more surely in national security affairs; (2) law
and order are now politically neutralized unless you wish to
test the Democratic commitment to their sudden campaign turn-
about; and (3) Party regularity is enhanced a bit by the
Goodell shafting. Otherwise, your posture, I believe, should
be just what it would otherwise have been anyway - that of a
deeply concerned President earnestly devising sensible solutions
for overriding national problems, and that will automatically
come to be as public and press attention turn to issues in the
rump session of Congress and your programs for 1971 and 1972.
For the future, I anticipate that your removal of
American ground forces from combat will be a vast political
plus in 1972 -- that a healthy economic situation will be
critical for success, for it will likely be the centerpiece
of the 1972 campaign -- and that matters of the environment,
race and the cities will be peripheral, though crucial in key
spots around the country. I needn't add, I know, that the
farm situation requires almost as much attention as the general
economy, because so much of your strength resides there, and
I would hope for tremendous emphasis on rural development plus
a greater sensitivity to farm needs (such as continuation of
the ACP, now scheduled for the axe). My hope remains that
you will "come clean' with Congress on the economy and the
fiscal situation and will brace them with the same hard
alternatives that you have had to wrestle with, making them
shoulder responsibility right along with you for inflation,
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5
deficit financing, full employment troubles and high interest
rates -- all versus sharply higher taxes plus a withered
federal establishment. I feel the country is incredibly mixed
up over all this -- insistent upon vastly costly new programs
but adamantly against the high cost of government. If next
year you can hit just two or three of the sexiest domestic
programs with all your might and main and slough off the rest,
and assure adequate financing, 1972 ought to take care of itself.
3. Changed relations with media;
a. I urge only that you handle them, as you have
sought to do, cooly, fairly and at arm's length, excepting
your obvious friends who are entitled to special care and
feeding. I would foreswear severe retaliatory attempts
against journalistic malefactors, because I think this in-
evitably backfires, and anyway reporters declared off-limits
are seen by your Administration people despite the ban. I
do press for more frequent press conferences (once a month,
on average), and far less daily concentration on this or that
critical column or article or, even, leak. I have long had a
feeling that we overreact to daily drivel and in the process
not only consume energies and time that could be fruitfully
used in other ways, but also in this way we tend to spotlight
the very problems we try to smother. Said differently, I feel
we ascribe too much importance to a columnist or commentator -
that we only flatter them and hurt ourselves when we spend
time countering their writings and broadcasts.
I do hope your regional backgrounders with the press
out in the countryside are carried forward. These, I have
felt, are the most rewarding innovation with the media that
you have hit upon since taking office.
addto
JPmus
4. Use of Vice President and Cabinet:
a. I have suggested to the Vice President that
(a) he work really diligently with minority groups, devoting
not less than two-thirds of his time on this (not only the
lacks, but also the Indians, Mexicans, etc.) ; (b) he spend
half his remaining time on youth (which ties in with the
minorities) ; and (c) he use such time as he has left for
Preserva Cassay
6
intergovernmental relations, serving as your political
(not operational) nexus with Republican governors and
your political counter-weight against the strengthened
Democratic governors. On this point, I have told him it
is important to avoid operational responsibilities because
the problems of governors range across the entire government
and require far too elaborate a staff and too much time for
him to oversee it.
None of the foregoing has his approval, and he may
reject all of it. I have urged that whatever he concludes
must have, first, your very clear-cut personal blessing -
plus, second, hard notice to the Executive Branch and White
House staff that whatever areas you agree upon are definitely
made the exclusive responsibility of the Vice President.
b. I feel the Cabinet has been insufficiently used as
such and that the Cabinet members feel isolated from you
by layers of staff. The all-important "personal relationship
with The Boss" has gone out of it. I urge at least one
conventional Cabinet meeting a month (with an Administration-
wide agenda, not a technical, specialized topic or program)
plus one or two hours set aside weekly for Cabinet officers
to visit personally and privately with you on matters of their
own choosing whether official or personal. I believe the
team-spirit values of the foregoing would well justify this
investment of your precious time.
5. Relations with Congress:
a. I suggest that a hard decision is overdue here:
ther use Bill Timmons in keeping with his offial status, or
take on someone who will be SO used. I have sensed a
reluctance to use Timmons directly with you, in connection with
the most important issues and members of Congress. He is often
left out of meetings and breakfasts, etc., on Congressional
matters in favor of others not charged with Congress -- and
contacts with Congress by the White House staff increasingly
bypass Timmons instead of going through him.
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Copy
7
No Congressional man can be worth his salt if the
Hill feels he is ineffectual with the President or lacks easy
access to the President. Therefore, I urge that Bill be SO
used, but if this can't be, a more acceptable person should
be installed in his place. Success in this area requires not
only Bill's open and frequent identification with you, but
also acceptance as a prime mover by your Staff -- for example,
his inclusion in Bob's eight o'clock staff meeting on the
same basis as Ehrlichman, Shultz et. al.
The Congressional function is so immensely important
Timels
to you. If it is kicked around, ignored, or handled as a
subordinate White House activity, the cost is excessive.
b. Some means needs also to be found to involve
the Congressional group more effectively in program formulation,
instead of being often used as clerks to cart bad news to the
Hill. A great deal of needless trouble can be avoided by the
early imput of Congressional people. While this is attempted
now, I feel it is inadequately done and intensifies your Hill
troubles. Involved here also is the instinctive reaction in
every Executive Branch activity (it is chronic in every depart-
ment as well as in the White House) that the Congressional
side of things is a confounded nuisance, therefore in time it
gets pushed into a corner. In my opinion, it should have at
least the same attention and emphasis as the press in all
areas of the White House.
6. Presidential Travel:
a. I have no competency in this area, other than to
state the obvious -- that where you will need the greatest
strength in 1972, you should manifest the greatest personal
involvement. This would include special identification with
(
agricultural regions over the next two years, adequate attention
(with the Vice President also) to the South, continued appeal
to blue collar people by open identification with them at var-
ious places in the country, an improved relationship with the
business community (speeches to business organizations here
and there in the country), and some overt actions making very
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8
old
clear your concern for the little folk and disadvantaged
in the society. Trips abroad should be, I believe, very
widely spaced, because we are entering a season in which
national concerns will probably rivet more on domestic
problems than on foreign troubles.
All in all, I believe you are entering a period in
which you will wish to keep on winding down the war as you
wind up the economy, get both shipshape not later than
August 1972 (earlier if at all possible), and devote your
other efforts to proving to the country that you are President
of all the people, whether they are for or against you and
your Administration. If the country believes you are doing
well with the war and the economy and are seeking selflessly
for sensible progress in just a few other areas of particular
concern, you will, I believe, win going away in 1972.
Preservation
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Attached are some thoughts on the 1970 election effort and
possible approaches for the future. I am not satisfied that
I have done enough research on either subject. I will try to
come back at this subject in the next thirty days.
2 Donald Rumsfeld
I. Analysis of President's Election Effort
A. The election was a draw, but the net impact of the
Administration was a plus. It probably increased Republican
vote totals in most states. It kept commitments to those who
agreed to run.
1. Senate Net plus. As the primary target it
got most of the resources. But it could have been better. The
best opportunity of the decade to win the Senate was lost.
2. House A draw.
3. State races Net minus. Will have an impact
on the House for a decade. Demonstrates the vulnerability of
executives and relative invulnerability of national legislators.
B. The 1970 election was not a national referendum on
much of anything. The outcome in most areas was determined
by local issues and the voters' judgment of individual candidates.
The results suggest that in some instances Party did not play a
large role -- witness the Reagan-Tunney, Mandel-Beall ticket-
splitting.
C. Areas where the Administration's performance can be
improved (offered admittedly only with the benefit of 20-20
hindsight):
1
Quality candidates are the best insurance.
Candidate selection should be more aggressive, start earlier,
and extend to Congressional and Gubernatorial candidates. Efforts
should begin immediately for 1972 to find candidates the President
will be proud to stand beside. Incumbent GOP Governors in
trouble might be offered Federal jobs to keep them from running
again and to avoid a drain on the National ticket. The National
Committee should select Congressional candidates. Senatorial
and Gubernatorial candidates should be selected by the White House.
2. In retrospect, the linkage was never fully made
between the goal (a supportive Senate) and the strategy (Democratic
candidates are wrong on the social issues). The charge was not
credible in Florida and Texas and was effectively countered in at
Page 2
least Illinois and California by the Democratic candidates.
Efforts should be made to better identify the importance of
Senatorial support for what the people want and link that to
the President's goals for the Nation i.e., the President
needs Senators of integrity and judgment to help him shape
the destiny of America -- not simply because Democrats
are soft on crime and permissiveness; he needs Senators
who will be responsive to the people, not to the President
or to the past or to the Democratic Party. In the future
opportunities should be found to show Democrats as opponents
of change and reform.
3. Election eve telecast quality left the impression
that the President was not Presidential. Muskie came off as
a Presidential-Senator.
4. Issues of personal and political integrity are
gaining importance. The loss of some candidates in 1970 may
be attributed in part to the appearance of a lack of personal or
political ethics, (examples are Dodd, Murphy, Tydings, Powell,
McKneally and the Ohio slate). The voters easingly har
critics of a man's integrity and personal ethics. State and
Congressional candidates for 1972 should be selected with this
in mind.
Extra care should be beefed up to insure that our house is in
order from an ethical standpoint.
5. Local candidates should not bill themselves
as Presidential supporters to a point where they lose their
distinctiveness. Support that is too fervent opens them to
the charge of being puppets. The people want individualists --
men they can admire.
II. Posture for the President, 1970-1971
A. Foreign Policy -- continued emphasis on the President's
role in international and foreign affairs.
Greater emphasis should
be placed on communicating success of Viet Nam policy. Provides
maximum exposure, has been highly successful to date, offers best
opportunity to garner Congressional support and the fewest opportunities
for the Democrats to thwart our policies. Success in this area is a
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for re-election.
Page 3
B. The Economy - top domestic concern. There are
two basic issues to be dealt with:
1. Substantive improvement in the economy, and
2. The perception by the public that the President
was responsible for those gains. Responsible jawboning
is called for to convey the impression of a President
who is doing everything humanly possible to halt
inflation, and to clearly identify those segments of
society responsible for economic problems. We
should press on the wage/prive issue and develop
some formal device for an incomes' policy.
C. Domestic Tranquility of continuing concern.
Problems of civil disorders and lawlessness must either be dealt
with or Congress must be successfully shown to have been uncooperative.
The pressures which turned Stevenson around in Illinois should be
used to encourage Congress to act on legislation. After four years
in office, the Administration will be held accountable if the nation
is, or appears to be, in disarray and/or ungovernable.
D. Positive themes need to be developed and communicated.
The emphasis on reform has never come through as effectively
as the call for a "Generation of Peace. 11 The nation must be
made to understand the President's visions for America his
personal dream for the future. Administration rhetoric should
be forward looking, emphasizing the hopes and aspirations of all
Americans on what is ahead, not on what has been. For good
or ill, what has been will by then be ours. Americans think of
themselves as a nation of accomplishers and achievers, not as
idealogues. The President's political philosophy must come
across. an Administration trademark must be developed, something
that incorporates those beliefs shared by all Americans.
The major problem is that the people see and sense many problems
They want someone to solve them for them, but they don't know
where to turn. The goal is, by our conduct, to help them see the
President as the solver of those basic problems, or at the minimum
making the best effort.
Another possibility would be for the President to put subjects in the
context of individual dignity and individual rights. An affirmative
statement on this is desirable and would be a useful matrix around
which commentary on other subjects can be woven.
Page 4
III. Relationships with the Media
We face a shallow reservoir of on-going confidence. Major
Presidential speeches and travel receive public approval, but
that approval can be quickly eroded by small events such as an
off-hand comment or event. The Press Corps has trained the
public to be generally suspicious of public officials and specifically
suspect of Mr. Nixon.
Press Conferences are an opportunity to demonstrate the
President's facility for crisp and informed answers. The
hour long live interview by three reporters offers a better
opportunity to display the desired qualities of wisdom. The
one such interview did much to impress people with the
President's warmth even though the reporters did a poor job.
Such interviews, on a periodic basis, and not dealing solely
with foreign affairs, could increase the public's knowledge
and feeling for the President as a person.
IV. The Vice President and the Cabinet
The Cabinet can be used to reinforce themes sounded by the
President. In many cases their backgrounds permit them
to obtain a special hearing from various publics.
The Vice President builds on a widely noticed foundation.
His past speeches were helpful in voicing the frustration of
some and in defining the field of debate prior to the President's
involvement. In his wake the President had the freedom to
discuss, with balance, topics which earlier he might have
been labeled "blasphemous" for even considering.
The Vice President has accomplished this goal. He should
maintain visibility so that people do not think he was trotted
out to do a job and then shelved. In maintaining visibility,
speeches should remain bold, but the expressions should be
carefully drawn and the subjects changed to positive domestic
needs.
Page 5
V.
Relationships with Congress
Several objectives should determine our approach to Congress.
The passage of legislation, the cementing of relations with
Members of Congress, particularly Senators who will be
important in 1972, binding up any wounds in the Republican Party,
and preparation for a 1972 appeal to the people based on Congress's
sluggish performance.
We should view Congress as a deliberative body composed of
535 foreign powers. Success depends on assembling successive
and often different coalitions. Votes are to be picked up on
a given issue, in a way that does not prejudice the ability to
pick up different votes on a future issue. Few Members are
permanently friends. Few permanently enemies. There are
no Republican Members on whom we should declare open personal
war
This is a strategy designed to secure the passage of legis-
lation and a closeness, where possible, with Republican Members
who will be important in 1972.
The Congress itself may be the object of attack in the 1972 election.
Its record of inaction may justify it. On some issues we should
talk not to the Congress, but over their heads to the people
they represent, laying a foundation for future attacks on a
sluggish, obstructionist, bickering, partisan Congress, if it
proves to be such.
VI.
Presidential Travel
Official foreign travel is useful in demonstrating the President's
personal ability at foreign affairs. It should continue, but it
should not be worn out.
Domestic travel both formal and informal can do much to
communicate the President's breadth and interest.
Formal or official travel which takes a function of Government
out of Washington and into the country is useful. The reception
of foreign leaders might be appropriately done in several
communities. It would do a great deal for the Mid-West by making
it a part of the process of diplomacy, before almost exclusively the
role of New York and Washington.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 10, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Lyn Nofziger
L
In Response to Request from H. R. Haldeman
1. The President's Election Efforts. I believe his decision to help
was 100 percent correct. I believe the average American appreciates
a fighter and a man who is loyal to those under him. Too often, loyalty
is thought of as a one-way thing -- from the troops to the leader.
The President has made loyalty a two-way street; it will pay-off in the
long run.
I think there is some merit to some of the second-guessing. First,
instead of making Vietnam pretty much of a nonissue, it is possible
we could have made it more our issue, although, in Tennessee where
Brock did it, he didn't win so big. Secondly, everyone I have talked to
says Muskie won the Monday night TV presentations. The criticism of
our presentation has been that our production was poor technically and
that Muskie came off as the reasonable man.
Overall, however, I believe the President's campaigning was a tremendous
plus. I believe the question to be asked of the critics is: Would you
have had him do less? The fact is, if he had done less and if the Democrats
had won more, they would have been kicking him around for not having
done enough.
The image of the President now is of a fighter. That is not a bad image;
it is one that breeds respect. If we equivocate, we lose that respect.
2. The President's Posture. It has to be one of continue to fight for
the things and principles in which he believes. I do not think he needs
any change in his modus operandi. However, a sterner public stance
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2 -
toward inflationary actions by both business and labor might be helpful,
for the fact remains that most employed persons are not members of
unions.
His posture with Congress should be one of wanting to work with Congress,
but at the same time absolutely refusing to surrender to it. I believe
it is better to fight and lose than not to fight because win or lose the
buck always winds up on his desk.
3. Relations With The Media. My feeling is that the President should
have more televised press conferences.
1. He handles them well. Each one to date has been a plus.
2. The media is going to beat him over the head with this
issue, saying he is afraid to face them and/or that he is
denying the public the right to know.
3. He will eventually reach the point where, when he has a
press conference, the media will say that he knuckled
under to pressure.
4. All told, the scarcity of press conferences is creating
an anti-Nixon issue which we don't need.
5. I don't think we need one every week, but certainly once
every 4-6 weeks is not unreasonable from our point of
view. It is infrequent enough to keep the press unhappy
but frequent enough so they don't have an issue.
I like the idea of meeting with small groups of friendly columnists from
time to time. I think it should be extended to small groups of friendly
reporters who write for individual papers. For instance, Jack Jarrell
from the Omaha World Herald; Ray McHugh from Copley, Lou Hiner
from Pulliam, George Embrey from the Columbus Dispatch, and others.
I do not believe in rewarding the President's enemies in the media; it
does not make friends of them.
Use Of The Vice President And The Cabinet.
The Vice President. The Vice President, I think, has functioned
effectively. However, recognizing always that he and we are up against
a hostile media, his effectiveness can be nullified if he is used solely
as a "hatchetman" because he will be labeled as such. Obviously, we
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need a hatchetman, but he should not be exposed as the only one. The
National Chairman should carry a much larger share of this burden in
the future. At the same time, the Vice President should be given some
positive assignments during the next year to year and a half, so that
he will be more effective when he takes the stump in 1972. Considera-
tion might be given to making him the major day-to-day spokesman on
domestic affairs, thus taking some of this burden from the President.
The Cabinet. From p.r. and political standpoints, the Cabinet is a
weak one. For instance, not one has aroused enough excitement to be
considered in the press today as a possible successor to the Vice
President or a possible Presidential nominee. The only one who has
built any kind of a political name is Hickle, who did it in opposition to
the President. It is obvious that they cannot all run around getting
headlines, but we might consider arbitrarily picking two or three of
them, and set out to build their political images so they can be used
effectively in 1972 and thereafter. I do not believe we should leave
the building of strong party spokesmen to chance. The President can
build two or three Cabinet officers and half a dozen members of the
Congress, but it must be a deliberately planned and executed effort.
It must be a continuing thing.
Regardless, I believe all members of the Cabinet should continue to
be utilized on a programmed basis, and be provided with political
speaking engagements and political input. We need not only to sell
the President, but also to sell the Administration. If we minimize
the issues for the Democrats we minimize their chances, regardless
of who their candidate is.
5. Relationships With Congress. Relationships with the Congress have
gotten better as this Administration has become more familiar with the
attitudes of Congressmen of both Houses. A never-ending effort is
needed, however, to keep relations good. I believe the President al-
ready is accessible to members to about the maximum. However, we
should assure that senior staff members and Cabinet and subcabinet
should also be accessible and cooperative, especially where Republicans
are involved. I cannot see any reason to do anything drastically dif-
ferent, but I believe our people must be kept continually aware of the
need to be accessible and courteous, even if we can't do anything for
the individual Congressman at the time.
6. Presidential Travel. I believe there should be as much as possible
without it appearing that the President is neglecting his duties.
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1. It takes the government to the people and this should be
the approach.
2. It counters the "isolation" charge which may be phony
but which must be countered.
3. It builds confidence in the people when they see that the
President can move about with impunity. It is good for
the country, and if the President is doing something that is
good for the country it is good for him.
7. The New York Election. It is apparent that the Buckley victory was
a Republican victory; not a Conservative victory. The Conservative
Party was poorly structured, and there was much internal bickering.
As a result the Buckley campaign was staffed, organized and run largely
by Republicans. The Conservative vote in New York is largely a dis-
sident Republican vote. I would suggest wrapping Jim Buckley close
to this Administration, in the hopes that we can use him to build a
strong middle-of-the-road base for the New York Republican Party,
with which we can wrest the Party from the liberals four years from
now. I think we can do better by bringing the Conservatives back into
a middle-of-the-road Republican Party then we can by creating a
permanent three-party situation there.
8. The Negative Aspects Of The Next Two Years. I believe, still, that
more people vote against than vote for. I believe we must, therefore,
begin actively to collect and disseminate information that will give
people reasons to vote against Muskie, Kennedy or whoever the Democratic
nominee for President may be. I believe we must do the same thing in
the key Senatorial races.
Our perennial weaknesses have been:
1. poor research
2. poor use of research
3. failure to attack on a continuing basis; people forget easily
We must say again and again and again that Muskie is a polluter, that
he is already running for President, that he has no standing in the
Senate, etc. We must never let the public forget Chappaquidick, or that
there is insanity in Tunney's family, or that Stevenson, McGovern and
Ramsey Clark are cop-haters. We must magnify and repeat the stories
of their every California mistake and misstep.
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This will take: 1) good research; 2) a few spokesmen who are willing
to attack regardless of the cries of outrage; 3) a continuing dissemination
of this stuff to the media and through the media. We must begin now
in all areas.
Preservation Change
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
William E. Timmons
SUBJECT:
Post-election Review
1. Analysis of the President's election efforts:
The President's campaign effort was successful. Without the
major involvement of the President, Republican losses would
surely have been greater in the House and the GOP probably
would have suffered a net loss instead of making gains in
the Senate. In addition, the presidential campaign helped
build stronger party loyalty -- a point not overlooked for
1972.
Attacks on permissiveness probably diverted voter attention
from economic issues; however, the President's own popularity
may have been better transferred to candidates through an
even greater emphasis on his need for a more sympathetic
Congress to carry out his programs for a better America.
Unlike law and order, this issue could not have been neutral-
ized by the opposition. While the "majority of one" issue
was used in speeches, law and order came through as the princi-
pal rallying point.
In eleven states voters split their tickets between guberna-
torial-senatorial candidates which shows that there was no
national overriding issue.
Also, probably in no election in history has the candidate's
name been SO important: Tunney, Stevenson, Buckley, and
Kennedy benefited from famous relatives. Taft, Beall and Byrd
had fathers in the Senate; Brock had a grandfather in the upper
chamber.
Names apparently had value in House races too: Louise Day Hicks,
Jack Kemp, Ronald Dellums, Bella Abzug are among the freshmen
who have had national publicity in the past.
more
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2
The economic slowdown undoubtedly hurt many GOP candidates.
So, too, did scandals (Ohio, California), unpopular governors
(Pennsylvania, Nebraska), party splits (Florida, New Mexico),
and a host of local issues over which the Administration had
little control.
The biggest error appears, in retrospect, to have been the
rebroadcast of the Phoenix speech. Most observers would have
preferred an election eve personal appeal, similar to the
President's successful 1966 telecast.
2. Posture the President should maintain for the period to
the end of the year and in 1971:
The President should project a non-political posture for the
immediate future, making an effort to cooperate with his
opposition, emphasizing the positive, highlighting foreign and
domestic accomplishments, and developing a meaningful domestic
program for the future. Regarding the latter, the President
should personally direct the Administration's effort to increase
employment and provide economic growth and stability. Political
fights should be left to the Vice President, GOP National Chair-
man and loyal friends in Congress.
3. Recommended changes in relationship with the media:
A plan should be devised to divide the hostile working press
Attacks on the media as a group solidify their opposition,
Consideration should be given to more informal sessions with
selected reporters. Special "breaks" for friendly television
and news magazine reporters might prove helpful as they seek
to preserve their new favored relationships. Also a greater
effort could be made by White House staff to give backgrounders
to the press corps and planned stories to friendly journalists.
4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet:
The Vice President should undertake a leadership role in those
areas where he has strength: Republican Party events (fund
raisers), the conservative South, Hard Hats, etc. Since he
commands news, the Vice President should remain the cutting
edge for the Administration, taking on controversial issues
for the President. He also can cultivate better personal
relationships with the Democratic Chairmen in the Senate
Songo
more
Preservation Copy
3
The Cabinet can best be used to make certain their
departments are operating effectively and their programs
are in accord with the President's wishes. It is
recommended that the White House continue the special
campaign Speakers Bureau to channel Cabinet members
into those states where appearances will do the most good.
5.
Relationships with Congress:
The public looks up to their President as a leader who
gets things done and feels that legislative defeats are a
reflection on the President's leadership rather than a
result of congressional politicking. Americans prefer
accomplishment, even compromise, to recurring executive-
legislative fights. Therefore, it is suggested that the
President make every effort to enter the 1972 period with
a significant legislative record. This requires new efforts
toward White House-Capitol Hill cooperation. If the Congress
is belligerent and partisan, the public may well react in
favor of the statesmanship of the Chief Executive.
There will be opportunities to pass meaningful legislation
if the President can hold together loyal Republicans while
picking up sufficient numbers of Democratic votes. Special
attention should be given to cultivating this "working
majority" through greater personal contact. This office will
make recommendations for selected meetings to accomplish this
goal.
6.
Presidential travel:
The President should consider some foreign trips in both 1971
and 1972, carefully selected to maximize advantage internationally
and domestically.
There has been some criticism of the President's trips to San
Clemente, Key Biscayne and Camp David. It might be well to
limit these trips to established vacation periods or long week-
ends as well as to give more publicity to their working nature.
There is value in the President going to the people on "non-
political" excursions. The fact he is not afraid to encounter
demonstrators shows courage. Functions and states must be
carefully selected for maximum advantage. For example, it
might be worthwhile for the President to have visited all fifty
states by the 1972 elections. States that cannot be covered
in the campaign may be visited in 1971 (Hawaii, Alaska, etc.).
Also, attention should be given to possible events in the
presidential primary states, as well as those states with
heavy electoral votes.
#####
Preservation Copy
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1970
TO:
Larry Higby
FROM:
Mort Allin
Subject:
A Representative Sampling of Election Predictions
by Press
House Predictions
Dem. Gains
Mears (AP)
12
Kirk (B Sun)
few
Apple (NYT)
6
Winters (Sun)
15-30
Sperling
Little change
Lawrence
Little change
Phillips
below 20-30
Louis Bean (Phila. Ev. Bull.)
20
Hope (Star)
+
Miller (Knight)
10-15
Averill-Foley (LAT)
Little change
Evans-Novak
5
Childs
10- 11
Thomasson
10-12
Weaver (NYT)
-3 to +10
A
Average
13- 14
Senate
GOP Gains
Mears
1-3
Kirk (Balt. Sun)
several
Hinden (Newsday)
+ few
-
Apple (NYT)
1-3 (or -1)
Winters (Balt. Sun)
2
Lawrence
+
Bean (Phila. Ev. Bull.)
2-3
Broder
+
Sperling
+
-
Hope
+
Kraft
"indents" for GOP
Perry (Nat'l. Observer)
2-4
Miller (Knight)
2-3
Senate (continued)
GOP Gains
Pearman (K. C. Star)
3
Storin (Globe)
small gain
Averill
1-2
Phillips
3-5
Childs
3-4
Evans-Novak
1
Average
2-3
Governors
Dem. Gains
Mears (AP)
4-6
Hinden (Newsday)
4-5
Apple (NYT)
5-8
Sperling (CSM)
1-7
Phillips
3-5
Averill (LAT)
5
Gilbride (AP)
4-7
Witcover
7
Average
4-6 GOP loss
Specific Key Senate Races - Consensus opinions
Victors: Chiles, Adlai Stevenson, III, Tunney, Brock, Symington,
Williams, Prouty, Cannon, Fannin, HHH.
Toss-ups: Ohio, Texas, Indiana, Conn., Utah, New York,
South Dakota, Maryland
We did better than predicted in the House, exactly as predicted in
the Senate, but lost twice as many as expected in Governorships.
Predictions 11/2
media
Week News Repub NYT Star Broder E/N Phillips K Consemers
News US New
California
0
0
O
0
?
0
0
0!
0
SINCE
Connecticut
?
+
0
?
?
?
+
?
? of
Florida
0
?
?
0
0
0
0
o?
0 =
Illinois
00
O
0
0
0
0
00
0
00
-
Indiana
?
?
?
?
+?
+?
0?
0
? +
Maryland
0 ??
o?
0
0
0
0 =
Minnesota
00
00
00
00
00
00
"
Missouri
00
???
00
0
00
Oo
0
00
=
Nevada
0 ?
00
0
00
00
00 =
New Jersey
0
??
?
0
0
00
0
?
0 =
New Mexico
0
??
O?
00
0
00
00
?
0 =
?
New York
0
0?
?
?
?
+
0
? =
North Dakota
0
??
0?
0
+
0
0
+
? +
Ohio
?
+
o?
+
+
?
0
+
? +
0
+
Tennessee
0
+
+
+
+
+?
+
&
Texas
0
+
+
+
+
+
?
-
+
0
+
Utah
0
0
?
0
o?
+
? +
Vermont
?
0
?
+
+
+
+
0
+
#
Wyoming
00 ??
00
0
00
00
00 =
0.5
Bruce Winters (11/1) Sun: At the national level, GOP chances may be
better then (tradition would suggest but unlikely to gain control of Senate.
Dem majority "may not be changed by more than a'seat or twod In the
House "the lineup may be favorably shifted 15 to 30 seats to the Dems. 11
Overall "an apprehensive electorate will deny the GOP the Senate prize
it thought it had won this spring, but it may hedge the bet by improving
prospects for a Congressional takeover in two years.
Congressional Quarterly (11/1) Sun: 10 contests too close to call. In
Md. Mandel and Tydings were favored.
Ernest Furgerson (11/1) Sun: "N.J. is about to witness 1970's most impres-
sive political comeback by a man and a party": Williams and the Dems
come back from the Cahill sweep.
Thomas O'Neill (11/1) Sun: - very critical - "The raucous mob (San Jose)
probably achieved the reelection of Murphy. If
Joe Kraft (11/1) Post: Republican tide, GOP to make indents putting GOP
in better position for future. Way station on road to better show in '72.
Failing a bad turn to economy -- or in VN hard to see how RN can be
defeated in '72.
Broder (11/1) Post: RN unlikely to get Senate. Instead RN likely to hear he
made only "minor inroads on the supposedly vulnerable Dem majority"
white Dems held or boosted margin of control in the House. Thus
seems likely to result as negative or nebulous, from RN's viewpoint, as
the campaign itself.
Paul Hope (11/1) Star: Dems to retain Senate control, continued Dem
House control by same margin. Chances are GOP will lose some gov-
ernorships.
Warren Weaver (11/1) Times: House almost certainly leave unchanged
relative strengths. Almost certainly RN would hail such a result because
ruling party usually loses 41.
2
George Meany (is quoted by David Lawrence, (10/29) Times Pic:
as predicting a shift of 3 or 4 House seats either way and maybe 2-3
Senate seats either way. Gaylord Nelson is quoted as seeing it possible
of a net gain or loss.
Lawrence himself says 11 a gain by the GOP would be regarded as a
surprise, and a maintenance of the present margins in both Houses is
more or less expected by leaders in the two camps. 11
Robert Pearman (10/29) Kansas City Star: guesses the GOP would win
in Conn., Ohio, Indiana, Tenn., New Mex., and California. The Dems
would take Fla., N. Dakota, Texas and Utah. (Overall a net gain of 3
GOP scats.)
JDN (1028): Holmes Alexander predicted any surprises would be of candidates
to the right of center. "In this atmosphere Barry Goldwater could win
national election in a walk. "
Ray McHugh (Copley Wash Bureau) in the 10/29 Jackson Daily News
predicted GOP wins in Ohio, Fla. Senate seats.
UPI - - Raymond Lahr in (10/28) Arizona Republic "knowledgeable political
strategists of both parties agreed the GOP stands a good chance of coming
close to RN's goal of seizing the Senate. 11 Not to win political control but
ide@logical control.
Louis Bean (In 10/31) Phil. Evening Bulletin: predicted a Dem gain of
20 seats in the House and a loss of 2-3 in the Senate.
Milton Viorst (10/29) Star: From the polls "it seems clear that enough of
them (RN's favorites) will be defeated to confirm that the majority of voters
in the nation have not swung to conservative Republicanism. " 13 too close
to call, 243-179 without the 13.
Richard Reeves (11/1) Times main forecast: More than most the elections
are coming to an end in a blaze of uncertainty. Dems seem sure to pick
up Governorships. Some GOP cling to belief gain party control. Dems
though's might add seat or 2. A bad showing for GOP particularly where
Veep turned up could make RN think twice about the '72 ticket. If 1970
3
proves a "bust for the social issue and the Southern strategy, RN has
shown he can guickly adapt himself to new realities as well as old
myths. "
Times: Brock in Tenn.
Burdick in N. Dakota
Taft in Ohio
Indiana - ?
Utah close
Roth - 10/28 Rocky by -- 17 -- according to polls.
Miami Herald poll: 61-39 Chiles.
Deakin - 10/25: "If Dems retain control Sen., add to their present House
contingent and gain some gov'ships, RN's prestige will suffer a sharp
blow that inevitably will increase his leg. diffs. 11
Deakin - 10/16: Col. Dispatch -- 48.4% -- Metz - 43% Taft.
Doyle - 10/28: Wisc. GOP in trouble.
Thimmesch - 10/3: RN figured he could tip enough races that he'd have
a GOP Senate and a friendlier House. Thus there'd be a mandate in
the Nixon direction. Doubtful he succeeded and he lost some prestige
on VN and Mideast - did so well there that neither was issue.
Neil Gilbride - 11/3 (AP): Dems appeared likely to recapture governorships
from the GOP in a fear of the nation's 10 most populous states. Their
best chances are in Ohio, Fla., Penn., and to retain Texas. The GOP
seems certain to hold Calif., probably NY, Michigan, and Massachusetts.
Dems are also likely to take governorship in Ark. , N. Mex. and S.
Dakota - while losing Conn. and Tenn.
(CSM) Sperling - 10/13: The GOP may lose at least one, and perhaps as
many as 5 governorships. GOP losses in Ohio and Arkansas could be
nearly cancelled out by a GOP victory in Conn. But GOP losses in
4
Ala., Fla., Nebraska, N. Mex. - would be more significant. The
GOP has 2 major disadvantages -- GOP incumbents hold all but 11
of 30 seats -- thus they are vulnerable and 2, there is unhappiness
over local issues. Hence if the GOP holds its governorships it
would be a major GOP victory.
10/26 Columbus Dispatch: Two incumbent GOP Congressmen who repre-
sent central Ohio still hold commanding leads in the second C.D.
poll. But Devine's lead over Goodrich has shrunk from 37. 4% to
26. 1.
10/27 Cleveland Plain-Dealer: The Ohio Senate race is as close as a
poll can show with both candidates holding 40%. But a breakdown
shows Taft may hold an ever-so-slight edge on Metzenbaum. The
poll also showed 1. 4% for Kay and 18. 3% undecided.
10/28 Gallup poll (Chic. Sun-Times): Dems are holding their lead in the
race for House seats: in early Oct. Dems would receive 50% of the
vote for House seats, 44% for the GOP with 6% undecided.
10/25 Chic. Sun-Times: A state-wide poll shows Byrd with 42%, Rawlings
38% and Garland 20%.
10/25 Chic. Sun-Times: St. Clair county prefers Stevenson 2 to 1;
64. 9% with 35. 1% for Smith.
10/27 Miami Herald: Chiles 60% -.. Gramer 30%.
Stevenson 58% --
Smith 42%.
HHH 56% -- MacGregor 43%.
10/12 L.A. Times: GOP have the odds against them in what could be
their last big opportunity to capture the Senate. Bentsen is even
better financed than Bush and at the moment is rated a slight
favorite. The GOPers regarded-as shoo-ins for re-election are
Hruska, Scott, Stevens, and Roth. Va. 's Byrd is rated the favorite
over his two challengers. Chances for a Gross victory are less
than 50-50.
5
10/18 Philip Carter Wash. Post: With the help of the WH, Thurmond and
a plurality of white voters Watson has a chance of winning.
10/27 J. J. Kilpatrick: Cramer will make it to the Senate.
10/26 Harry Bodine: Sen. Harold Hughes predicted a repeat of the 1958 mid-
term Dem upset. During that election VP Nixon delivered a slashing
attack on the opposition much the way VP Agnew has been doing. in
1958, the WH toned RN down, but it didn't help the GOP, it sustained
one of the heaviest mid-term losses in US politics.
10/29 Evans & Novak: quotes a Goldberg aide who said: "Arthur's such
a bad candidate that if he wins it'll be the sympathy vote that does it. 11
10/25 Iowa poll in Des Moines Register: RN still leads 4 possible Dem
contenders by margins of 14 to 24% points.
RN 46% EMK 32% -- Wallace 4%.
RN 48% HHH 25% - Wallace 6%.
RN 45% Muskie 29% -- Wallace 6%.
RN 47% Lindsay 23% Wallace 5%.
In approval ratings RN's popularity has changed little since May. Ap-
proval of RN's job handling in Sept. ; 57%; May 59%. Disapproval
rating in Sept. 30%; May 32%.
10/28 Richmond News Leader, John Farmer: says in an ordinary year
Metzerabaum couldn't beat Taft but this year it may be possible.
10/24 David Broder: Ifi Minnesota voters reject HHH the candidate instead
of endorsing HHH the institution it will be the upset of the year.
Kilpo 10/27 Texas Sen. too close to call. -- Some mild gains for con-
servative Republicans but not much.
Means 11/3 -- Both sides can claim victory GOP - 1 to 3 in Senate
Dems upwards of dozen in House -- plus 6 State Houses "If GOP
gains even just one Senate seat, they have won a symbolic victory in
reversing the trad'l pattern, although this involves ignoring fact that
they fell far short of their origin expectors. But if Dems add to House
6
numbers, they won't suffer defeat -- Local variables the key this
year -- Mismatch no clear guidelines likely
White 10/24: Campaign is "a national referendum on the foreign and
military policy leadership of RN.
Meaningful dove losses (4)
would amount to a presidential vindication. 11
Bryce Nelson LA Times 10/28: Symington now ahead by 7-8.
R. Wilson 10/24: Only w/ the greatest of luck and the presence of an
as yet undetected landslide can RN win the 6 or 7 needed doesn't
look good. Everything has to break his way. RN can't win much but
could lose a lot.
Clymer, Baltimore Sun 10/24: Lowenstein leads despite leftist label --
but close.
Beckman CT - 10/22: WH optimistic about Taft and Brock good chance
for Kleppe; Rowdy close. Also feel Prouty and Weicker will do it. RN
visit to California hoped to pull Murphy through.
Stanley Hinden -- in a Newsday Analysis (10/29) -- sees close Senate races,
and "indications are that there will be little change. 11 He also foresaw a net
loss of 4-5 governorships.
Wm. S. White said (Oct 23, Birmingham News) that if the GOP picked up
four seats, RN's efforts would have been worthwhile. If no net gain the
whole campaign would have been a disaster for RN, perhaps even deeper
than that suffered by Truman in 146.
Thomas O'Neill (10/28 Sun): says indicators show "only a limited shifting
of party strength on each side. "