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This file contains:
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: A response to the question, "How should the President run?" Whitaker argues the Nixon should run as the president and not as a candidate. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
From Patrick J. Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Strategy sessions, and disussions concerning the media approach to the campaign of '72. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/30/1971
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The President's posture in the 1972 Campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
From Lee Huebner to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Approaches for 1972, which contain both suggestions as well as thoughts on how to maximize campaign efforts. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The need for a "well-informed, high morale operation", in Nixon's campaign for reelection in '72. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Robert Nisbet to Leonard Garment. RE: Mr. Nisbet's offer to assist in Nixon's campaign for reelection in any available capacity. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 10/31/1971
From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE: Campaign strategies for Nixon in 1972 that must represent the the type of president most Americans (Democrat and Republican) want him to be. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Ray Price to The President. RE: The Campaign of '72, and the main approach to victory centering on the issue of incumbency. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: "The President as a Candidate", which deals with the supposed focus of the campaign which is, "The art of incumbancy." 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
A detailed schedule concerning the "Public Appearances and Speeches by Franklin D. Roosevelt during 1936." 4 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], 11/4/1971
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: The President's Presentation of Self in 1972. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
Unknown sender to Haldeman. RE: The reelection campaign, and discussions of the tone and/or theme of the election. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1971
From Herbert G. Klein to The President. RE: The tone and style of the '72 as crucial components to ensuring Nixon's reelection. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
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26145838
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WHSF: Contested, 21-1
core
doc
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document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
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id
26145838
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document
title
WHSF: Contested, 21-1
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This file contains:
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: A response to the question, "How should the President run?" Whitaker argues the Nixon should run as the president and not as a candidate. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
From Patrick J. Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Strategy sessions, and disussions concerning the media approach to the campaign of '72. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/30/1971
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The President's posture in the 1972 Campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
From Lee Huebner to Haldeman. RE: The Campaign Approaches for 1972, which contain both suggestions as well as thoughts on how to maximize campaign efforts. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The need for a "well-informed, high morale operation", in Nixon's campaign for reelection in '72. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Robert Nisbet to Leonard Garment. RE: Mr. Nisbet's offer to assist in Nixon's campaign for reelection in any available capacity. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 10/31/1971
From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE: Campaign strategies for Nixon in 1972 that must represent the the type of president most Americans (Democrat and Republican) want him to be. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Ray Price to The President. RE: The Campaign of '72, and the main approach to victory centering on the issue of incumbency. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: "The President as a Candidate", which deals with the supposed focus of the campaign which is, "The art of incumbancy." 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
A detailed schedule concerning the "Public Appearances and Speeches by Franklin D. Roosevelt during 1936." 4 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], 11/4/1971
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: The President's Presentation of Self in 1972. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/4/1971
Unknown sender to Haldeman. RE: The reelection campaign, and discussions of the tone and/or theme of the election. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1971
From Herbert G. Klein to The President. RE: The tone and style of the '72 as crucial components to ensuring Nixon's reelection. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/5/1971
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
1
11/4/1971
Campaign
Memo
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: A
response to the question, "How should the
President run?" Whitaker argues the Nixon
should run as the president and not as a
candidate. 3 pgs.
21
1
11/30/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Patrick J. Buchanan to Haldeman. RE:
The Campaign Strategy sessions, and
disussions concerning the media approach to
the campaign of '72. 4 pgs.
21
1
11/4/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The
President's posture in the 1972 Campaign. 4
pgs.
21
1
11/5/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Lee Huebner to Haldeman. RE: The
Campaign Approaches for 1972, which
contain both suggestions as well as thoughts
on how to maximize campaign efforts. 6 pgs.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Page 1 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
1
11/5/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The
need for a "well-informed, high morale
operation", in Nixon's campaign for
reelection in '72. 3 pgs.
21
1
10/31/1971
Campaign
Letter
From Robert Nisbet to Leonard Garment.
RE: Mr. Nisbet's offer to assist in Nixon's
campaign for reelection in any available
capacity. 4 pgs.
21
1
11/5/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE:
Campaign strategies for Nixon in 1972 that
must represent the the type of president most
Americans (Democrat and Republican) want
him to be. 4 pgs.
21
1
11/5/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Ray Price to The President. RE: The
Campaign of '72, and the main approach to
victory centering on the issue of incumbency.
5 pgs.
21
1
11/5/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Dick Moore to Haldeman. RE: "The
President as a Candidate", which deals with
the supposed focus of the campaign which is,
"The art of incumbancy." 5 pgs.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Page 2 of 3
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
1
11/4/1971
Domestic Policy
Other Document
A detailed schedule concerning the "Public
Appearances and Speeches by Franklin D.
Roosevelt during 1936." 4 pgs.
21
1
11/4/1971
Campaign
Memo
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE:
The President's Presentation of Self in 1972.
4 pgs.
21
1
11/6/1971
Campaign
Memo
Unknown sender to Haldeman. RE: The
reelection campaign, and discussions of the
tone and/or theme of the election. 9 pgs.
21
1
11/5/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Herbert G. Klein to The President. RE:
The tone and style of the '72 as crucial
components to ensuring Nixon's reelection. 5
pgs.
Wednesday, March 23, 2011
Page 3 of 3
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 299
Folder:
HRH Political Strategy Memos
Document
Disposition
1
Return
Private/Political Memo Whitaker to HRH 11/4/71
2
Return
Private/Political memo Bucharan 10 HRH 11/30/71
3
Return
Private/Political menco Color to HRH 11/4/71
4
Return
Private/Political memo Hucbner is HRH 11/5/71
5
Return
Private/Political memo Greement 19 HRH 11/5/71
6
Return
Private/Political memo Chapen to HRH 11/5/71
7
Return
Private/Political Memo Price to the President 11/5/71
8
Return
Private/Political memo Moore to HR# 11/5/71
9
Return
Private/Political memo inclaughlen to HRH 11/4/71
10
Return
Private/Political merio JDE to HRH 11/6/71
11
Return
Private/Political memo Kleir 0 the President 11/5/71
12
Return
Private/Political memo Magruder to Highy 11/4/71
13
Return
Private/Political memo Dont in HRH 11/5/71
14
Return
Private/Political memo Colson to the President 1/6/77
15
Return
Private/Politicalm memo Hallett to Colson 1/3/72
16
Return
Private/Political article witen "Nixy Polition: IND
17
Return
Private/Politicalarhl( Barties "Niss it feeling of lost 10/23/7
18
Return
Private/Politicalurhle Chicago Daily New Dec 18-1-1 1171
19
Retain
Open
20
Return
Private/Politicalw news Hen notes Lessons from FDR "ND
21
Return
Private/Political memo Howard to Colson 9/27/72
22
Return
Private/Political memo Colson to HRH 9/25/12
23
Retain
Open
24
Return
Private/Political unticle Resist's "Thinkers Things over"
**
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 299
25
Retain Open
26
Return
Private/Political Memo Safire to HRH 9/28/78
27
Return
Private/Political Memo Colso. 10 HRH 9/28/97
28
Return
Private/Political notes TabB "Tentitue list of States ND "
29
Return
Private/Politicalorh& "Nixen leasungall Democrati" 1/10/78
30
Return Private/Politicalhanlwaf notes 1. ND
31
Return Private/Politicalaphce anticle, "Niron Meves Out to - " Temes 10/2/78
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TO BE AN
November 4, 1971
E.O.
1.3
By ER
6-102
3.15.82
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H.
FROM:
John C.
Whitaker R. HALDEMAN John e. Whilater
You requested a response to the question, "How should the President
run. 11 Answer - besides the obvious - "As President and not as a
candidate, " my thoughts follow:
1. Resist the set speech. I know the President believes it is
axiomatic that you just hit the big issues over and over again -- "Korea,
Corruption, and Communism" of 1952 and in '72, "a full generation of
peace. "
2. I think instead, the campaign should be more about what he
does than a repetition of the set speech.
a. Motorcade (and get the wire photo shots), but not to
auditoriums for the set speech, but to issue-oriented events, They are
very hard to construct, but they can be done. A meeting on rural
development -- a regional session with police on law enforcement --
top drug rehabilitation people with Jaffe -- with bankers on reducing
interest rates -- to a home for the aged -- to inspect pollution on Lake
Erie, etc., etc.
b. Now not even the President can be smart enough to be
knowledgeable at all these issue-oriented stops, so lets use the same
method we have been using, i. e., drop a prepared statement on the
issue Since little is written by the press about the prepared statement,
it is essential that the TV news hit (1) the crowds in the motorcade, and
(2) the substance (at the conference table, looking at Lake Erie, talking
to a police chief, etc.)
- 2 -
3. But the key to the above proposal is that the statements not
all have a bragging connotation of what he has accomplished, but also
we can do more even what he intends in the years ahead. Avoid
the "if-I'm-re-elected-I'll-do-etc. II lead in, but instead just "next
year, I plan, etc., etc." To just brag about the record has a
"he-doth-protest-too-much" connotation.
4. I sense in the '70 campaign there was a basic decision not
to travel much -- then the President reversed this decision (when his
private polls showed the "ideological majority Senators were going
down the tube), and the result was the set speech at airports and in
rally halls. The point is there was not time to consider the issue-
good
oriented events. There is time now to make the schedule staff work
with the Domestic Council staff and rack up lots of issue-oriented
events in the key states, SO when the President makes his decision
(do I stay home and run the country or hit the road intensely), he at
least has the option to hit the road with issue-oriented events.
5. With Peking and Moscow out of the way by June, it seems
to me he has mid-June until the convention to be a "listening President"
this is a very good time to have Cabinet road show meetings -- get
Governors, mayors, state legislatures involved before the Labor Day
campaign season starts to get so political its hard to do this. In other
words, he can use Democratic Governors, mayors, etc. as a backdrop
in the summer, but they will come out of these meetings in the fall and
shoot at him in front of the press and that will get the lead. I like the
"listening President" style it implies learning more for the future
after he is re-elected.
6. As to television:
a. The same forces are at play -- in the summer, he can
address state legislatures, he could do a simple Q&A at a plain old
mid-America Kiwanis club and get state-wide TV no such luck after
Labor Day. Once into the campaign, I still like the man in the arena
TV format he used in '68 in the key states -- let the press call the
panels fixed and phoney it never catches up with the TV impact.
- 3 -
b. What ever happened to the head-to-head with NBC and
CBS after the Howard K. Smith interview? Smith was a bore -- 2/3 of
his time on Vietnam. Still the President is so good if he gets an
intelligent interviewer, I think he should do NBC and CBS before Labor
Day.
C. I'm for avoiding a TV debate with the Democratic
nominee at all cost by just using the old gambit about accidental slips
on national security. Let them call him chicken.
7. I think the "think piece" radio addresses of '68 were
terrific -- they give the liberal press something to write about. He
should do more on what else he intends to do by 1976.
Above all -- avoid the partisan, defend-the-record, give-them-hell,
campaign. Its easier to get a new President than get a new Congress.
There just aren't enough Republicans to ape Harry Truman and pull it
off.
This strategy will probably not appeal to the President's instincts -- he
will fear that it is too scattered and he must focus on peace and the
economy. I guress I'm saying it a different way. We will or won't have
peace and a good economy next summer and fall. There isn't much to
say about it -- so you nibble at the marginal issues (besides peace and
the pocket book) by concentrating on issue-oriented dropbys -- these
issues are ranked in the latest Domestic Council poll by Lou Harris:
(1) Race, (2) Drugs, (3) Pollution, (4) Crime and (5) Welfare and
Spending. The ranking changes a bit from poll to poll, but these five
hang in there.
Conclusion: The President should do issue-oriented stops repeatedly
on these five issues.
cc: John D. Ehrlichman
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 30, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
Within the Campaign Strategy sessions, we have begun the discussion of
theme andform, media and approach. One has a sense of deja vu, as the
old dichotomy is there again between those of us who would emphasize
the achievement of President Nixon and those who would focus upon the
personality traits.
In the 1972 campaign, an d for 1972, it seems to me imperative that the
Achievement School win out over the Personality School in terms of
advertising and campaign emphasis.
These are the reasons, simply:
a) Our likely opposition -- McCloskey and Muskie -- will make the
personality of the President, the need for a new kind of leader their
battleground. And why not? If one is asked which is the more attractive
personality, Pete McCloskey or Richard Nixon, McCloskey will come off
infinitely better than if one posed the question -- which of these two men
is best qualified to be President of the United States in 1972. The area
of statesmanship, competence, ability, these are the long suits for the
President as they have been throughout the career. They, too, are personality
b) Secondly, in times of domestic calm and interna factor tional peace, the
argument for the election of Richard Nixon is simply not to me a convincing
one to the majority of the American people. In such times, millions will
want to "dare" a little bit, to take a flyer with a "New Frontier," to turn
to a fresh, exciting new face. Though some of the finest political minds
in the nation have labored thousands of hours in the process, they have not
succeeded, in candor, in making Richard Nixon a stylistic exciting "figure"
in the Kennedy sense of the word.
However, what are the President's truly strong suits. As source material
I give you the confidential report on the Democratic National Committee --
based on in-depth research and polls provided by Louis Harris, via
Charles Colson.
-2-
Eighty-five percent of the American people, and eighty percent of the
Democratic Party believe that:
'There is no doubt that sympathy works to the President's
advantage. Seventeen out of twenty people (85%) believe he
(the President) is doing his best in a difficult situation. As
shown in this table, there is not too great a difference of
opinion along partisan lines. Four out of five Democrats
(80%) agreed with the statement.
As long as the President can maintain this posture he rests
upon a springboard that could quickly enhance his popularity."
The specific question asked which got this incredible response was:
"HE INHERITED A LOT OF TOUGH PROBLEMS AND IS TRYING
TO SOLVE THEM THE BEST HE CAN." Agree or Disagree?
Thus, any political argument which begins with this as its premise
already has eighty-five percent of the American people in agreement,
and four of every five Democrats agreeing -- for openers.
How much better to begin our Political Argument for RN's re-election
with this wholly credible, nationally believed argument, than with an
argument that deals with the President's personality which starts --
according to the same analysis, with only one-half the American people
in agreement.
Simply stated then, what I propose is thus -- that the campaign be seen
as re-electing the President to continue to take America out of the storms,
the nightmares, which we were in -- when he assumed the helm. This
means the point of reference for 1972, is not just peace and prosperity now --
but the living hell of 1968.
There in the spring, five hundred Americans were dying a week, we lived
in a time of assassinations, when cities were burning, and campuses
being destroyed by mobs of radical students. If we can create in the
public mind That Wonderful Year, 1968" and then point to today -- the
contrast is vivid, the contrast is something that tens of millions of
Americans will agree with. The idea is to portray the President as having
assumed the helm of the Ship of State, when it appeared that the America
we knew was collapsing around us; then to move him through the times of
turmoil, de-escalation, demonstration to today, where the seas are
choppy, but beyond the storm. And then to point to the port that lies
ahead over the horizon.
-3-
Film of the horrors of 1968, with the President campaigning in the
midst of those terrible days, with something like, "He was the Man
for Those Times; He is the Man for These Times. He pulled America
back from the brink of disaster; he is the man to lead it now upward into
brighter days."
Is thisa segutir?
This has roughly stated the idea. As an attack issue against Muskie, for
use by others, and in footage -- we can tie him and HH H and Harriman
and Clifford, and the whole gang as those responsible. The Democratic
candidate is brought to you by the same people who gave you the Vietnam
War, etc. etc.
As an emotionally compelling argument, this seems to me infinitely more
appealing than, say, running on Revenue Sharing and Reorganization and
the Welfare Reform.
We can use peace in Vietnam and prosperity -- but let us be sure to
juxtapose them with 1968. Otherwise, it will be us saying we need a little
more time in Vietnam and Muskie saying, Bring the Boys Home Now.
One imagines that the kind of footage you can draw on would be outstanding.
Again, from the Deomcratic analysis, the country believes RN inherited
difficult problems and is doing his best. Let's show them graphically
just how incredible those problems were -- and the present by juxtaposition
will seem like Happy Times are Here Again.
Which brings me to the STATE OF THE UNION:
Not
From indirect information, one gathers that the Domestic Council is
pregnant and in January plans to give birth to a bouncing New American
true
Revolution in terms of programs, to be the basis for the State of the
Union. I do not argue against "targeted" political appeals which hits
groups like the aged, but let us not waste the State of the Union on "Six
New Goals," when the six old ones are languishing in the nether regions
of the Committee.
Rather, let the State of the Union Address be an address by the President
on the State of the Union. In delivering that address, he can deftly turn
the clock back three years , and talk a bit about the cooling of America,
no more burning cities or destroyed campuses, the boys who have come
home, the tasks of peace to which we are turning our minds, the era of
confrontation which we are bringing to an end, the possible, hopeful days
that lie ahead. 'Though three years is short, we have come a long way,
you and I." We have come from a time when Americans were calling one
-4-
another traitors or warmongers, to a time when our differences are over
the proper ways to save our environment. I see the State of the Union in
the terms the President saw the Acceptance Speech, his first best chance
tomake his case to the whole American people.
The domestic proposals can go by message; they are things that come off
better in the reading than the saying anyhow.
A comment in Ken Khachigian's memo to me on the SOTU is appropriate:
"If there are policy decisions or programs of political importance, I
suggest a simple message to the Hill a day or two after the SOTU address.
As for the SOTU itself, I recommend a speech that discusses the "state"
of the Union in almost a literal sense -- a thoughtful analysis of where we
stand as a Nation at this point in history. To an extent, this includes an
examination of the American culture, morale, and future.
RN could lay the stage for the campaign -- against the chronic carpers
who look for the worst in America. On the contrary, RN ought to stake
out a position not only for a belief in the richness of the national patrimony
but also a belief that the future is challenging not fearsome.
This is a time to lay bare RN as no bashful protector of the Nation and no
skeptic of the potential in the last third of the century. Articulation of
some key benchmarks of the last three years might be included; a potential
for world peace; domestic calm; social problems on the way to recovery
(e. praise for white and black in South for handling their social transition
peacefully.
In that strategy session, it was interesting. When it got to specific
achievements (someone raised the point that the President had increased
spending for civil rights enforcement by a factor of five) there is
disagreement as to whether that is something to boast about. When you
talk about welfare reform, people divide. When you talk about domestic
legislation, my friends start up the South Wall. When you talk about
turning the Court around, my friends applaud, and the other fellows are
climbing the North Wall.
But when you talk about the terrible times in 1968, and how we as a
people have pulled through them, how the residue of bitterness has been
diminished, how much better the new times are than those old times of
rancor, and bitterness and hatred then you have almost the whole nation
saying, "Yeah, things are a hell of a lot better today than those days, and
maybe, Nixon does deserve a hell of a lot of credit; maybe he is the right
guy in these times after all. "
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 4, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
The President's posture in
the 1972 Campaign
The President should carry into 1972 the ground rules he laid down
in 1971 about discussing politics and being involved in obvious political
activities only if and when necessary. We have a great opportunity in
the first six months of 1972 to portray the President as the world states-
man that he is and to bring into very sharp focus the contrast with all
of the Democratic candidates who will be cannibalizing one another
throughout primary time. The President will be the peace maker
the Journey for Peace to China, the consummation of SALT, the end
of the Vietnam involvement, the progress of the Nixon Doctrine and
the Soviet Summit. If the economy is neutralized as an issue, then
the major emphasis of the first six months should be on Nixon's world
leadership.
(The unfinished agenda in foreign policy is as important as the accom-
plishments that he brings about next year. Winston Churchill ended
World War II and the British people decided they didn't need him any
more his job was done; hence, all of the things we do in the first
six months of next year are but a prelude to the events which lie ahead,
which events can create generations of peace. In short, next year should
not be the culmination of the successful Nixon foreign policy; it must
represent a major half-way point.)
The President probably cannot get away with refusing to answer political
questions in press conferences in the coming year but, whatever he does,
he should dust them off lightly and quickly. He should show a distinct
lack of concern with politics. Whatever McCloskey does in New Hamp-
shire, it is of no consequence -- the President's mind is on bigger things.
If McCloskey does badly, let the Republican Party not the President
do the cheering. If McCloskey does relatively well, it is of no concern
to the President. There are no visible political strategy sessions at the
White House; there is no political crisis involving the President's personal
participation; there is no lack of confidence in the inner circle.
-2-
The President is on a very high plateau of leadership at the moment.
If we are successful in sustaining it and, if the foreign policy initiatives
develop as planned, he should be on that same plateau in June of next
year.
Those of us within the President's political family should be fastidi-
ously cultivating key voter blocs, promoting politically appealing
programs, maximizing favorable media exposure and organizing like
hell but it should be low profile. We shouldn't talk about it. It
shouldn't be evident or in any way visible. The President and the
men around him are concerned with the enormous progress that he
is making in achieving a more rational, peaceful world order. In
this same vein, the President should not reply to critics and should
avoid any strident attacks on any one. Let the Vice President and
the Cabinet do the hatchet work. We want a picture of a President
who is consumed with his quest for peace, restoring a peacetime
economy and pursuing vigorously and personally two or three key
domestic initiatives.
This is not to suggest that we ignore subtle political opportunities.
Speaking forums should be carefully selected for the greatest impact
they have on key voting blocs -- veterans, aging, ethnics, Catholics,
etc.
The transition next summer should be as gradual as possible. Obvious-
1y, the political fat will be in the fire after the Republican Convention
at which point the President's rhetoric shifts to the great promise
which the future holds for America in terms of peace in the world, a
strong and competitive economy, and a government responsive to the
needs of the American people (whatever our key domestic thrust is
the value added tax and school proposal, welfare reform or whatever).
It is nearly impossible to draw a projected Presidential campaign
strategy today for the period of September and October 1972. If all
goes well and we are riding high, the President must remain very
NP
Presidential, self-assured and above the battle. This would be parti-
cularly true if Kennedy is the opponent. Kennedy will be strident,
EMK
sharp, cutting and very divisive. He will have large, enthusiastic
youthful audiences and his campaign will seem to have great exuberance
but by his rhetoric and his style he will turn off one voter for every
voter he turns on. We will be sorely tempted to tangle with him.
We must ride above the battle to make the contrast as vivid as possible.
The polls next September could well dictate another strategy but if
the nominee if Kennedy, I doubt it. Our job will be to assist him in
defeating himself.
-3-
If the opponent is Muskie or another relatively non-controversial
centrist, the President's campaign strategy may well have to be
governed by the relative standing in the polls immediately following
mushie
the Convention. If we maintain the leadership plateau all year, we
should try to keep it through the campaign. If we are behind, we may
have to fight and meet our opponent head on and if the opponent happens
to be Muskie, then unlike the situation with Kennedy, it may be our
task to sharpen the issues. We may have to score on him and force
him to be fully tested in the eyes of the electorate. Depending again
on the standing in the polls, we might even need to come out swinging
with a Harry Truman 1948 style campaign.
My own guess at this time is that our opponent will be Kennedy. He
may start out relatively high in the polls but it will be all downhill for
him if we remain "above" him and demonstrate by contrast his imma-
turity against the President's leadership. If it is Muskie, I believe
we will start out well ahead in the polls and our principal concern
will be to ensure that he does not slowly creep up on us; that as the
campaign ho-hums along, he doesn't gradually rebuild the traditional
Democratic coalition. Muskie is the kind of candidate who could gain
momentum in a campaign and we might be forced, even if we start
out ahead, to take him to the mat and to sharpen the issues.
The foregoing points out how difficult it is to be specific as to Presi-
dential campaign involvement for the months of September and October.
Subject to unknown events, I feel relatively clear in my own mind as to
the strategy we should pursue up until September 1st; beyond that, it
all depends.
Assuming we have it our way, that we are ahead, that the President
is on the plateau of leadership, that we have effectively organized,
that we have developed the issues and cultivated effectively the key
voting blocs then the President should maintain his high Presidential
posture throughout the campaign. This would mean very few campaign
stump appearances or political rallies, extensive use of radio during
which the President talks about leadership, the Presidency and the
goals for America in the next four years and, indeed, for the next
generation, a few direct television appearances to the American people
building our record, and more importantly, our hopes for the future
and carefully timed Presidential news events and announcements.
The President should do just enough physical campaigning to keep the
spirit and enthusiasm of the party workers alive. If he is ahead and
riding the leadership plateau, he should not be seen going out to the
hustings. He should be seen frequently doing the job of the President
and leading the Government.
-4-
One point deserves very careful advance planning. We need in the
months of September and October to exploit fully the advantages of
incumbency but not to be obvious in doing it. We need to carefully
plan those news events which we can control, which will be positive,
appealing either to the vast majority of people or to key voting blocs
and have them ready to go in September and October. In other words,
we should store up a bag of "goodies" ready for use during the cam-
paign. Johnson's bombing halt in 1968 was about as subtle as a sledge
hammer. Obviously, it helped Humphrey but it is not the kind of thing
I am thinking of because we would have trouble with something that big
and major in the closing days of the campaign. The liberal press
would let one of their own get away with it but they would crucify us
and call it political treachery. The kind of thing I am thinking about
would be export grain shipments (for example, like the one we have
just engineered this week with the Soviets), the release of parks in
critical areas, announcements of a major work for welfare require-
ment, a significant policy decision affecting Indian lands, the release
of an Administration study calling for guaranteed annual wages for
construction workers, the announcement of increased veterans benefits,
perhaps some major defense contract announcements. Some of these
could be done without the charge of politics. The selection process
will have to be extremely judicious. We also will want to begin saving
these up through the summer,
This is, to me, one critically important project that we must undertake
regardless of our campaign style. This we can use to our advantage
no matter what the Presidential posture is at that time.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
LEE HUEBNER
SUBJECT:
Campaign Approaches: 1972
First some very specific suggestions -- then some more general
thoughts.
1. Until the political stage is clearly ours in August, the President
should not campaign -- or rather, he should campaign by being President.
Napoleon's advice is applicable: "Never interfere with the enemy when he
is in the process of destroying himself. 11
2. After the convention, there are several things the President
should not do. (A) He should not sit in Washington pretending to be above
politics or apart from politics. First, it's just not plausible -- and candor
is one of the most valuable characteristics for an incumbent President.
Secondly, it could give the impression we are taking the voters for granted,
that "we don't care enough to come. " Thirdly, it could give the impression
that, like LBJ, we are afraid to leave the White House. (B) He should not
pretend he is dedicating parks or inspecting dams as an excuse for moving
around the country. Again, the impression of candor is an extremely
precious commodity. I think we have to lean over backwards to let people
know that "this is a campaign trip; campaign funds are paying for the airplane;"
or, "this is a political telecast; it is being sponsored by the Republican
National Committee. 11 There will be a strong temptation to schedule "issue-
oriented events, 11 to show the President "at work" and "above politics. 11 I
must admit, in fact, that I started preparing some thoughts along these lines
in writing this memorandum. I have completely changed my mind on this
point, however. If the people and press will not buy a "non-political" visit
to a New Hampshire nursing home in the summer of '71, they won't buy it in
the fall of '72. We have to go out of our way to avoid the appearance that we
are playing games of any sort. The President's schedule must reek of
"legitimacy. 11 He must tend to his business when it is time to tend to business
and then when it is time to campaign he must say SO, Meanwhile, we can
generate all sorts of issue-oriented news from Washington. (C) He should
not emphasize closed gatherings of the safe, the sanitized, and the faithful.
Again, this could give the impression there is something fearful outside the
-2-
gates of the auditorium. Moreover, this approach invariably provokes
stories about strong arm tactics, stacked audiences, and contrived spon-
taneity. More importantly, it tends to depict RN as the President of
partisans and true believers rather than as President of all the people.
(D) Just as the President should not be seen as the advocate of any par-
ticular group within the society, neither should he be cast as the adver-
sary of any man or group or party. He should not debate his opponent.
He should avoid campaign themes which turn any groups into whipping
boys. The campaign should do everything it can to downplay dissent
and disagreement. I expect that the hecklers will probably be out in
force again next fall both the far left and the far right. They are
useful adversaries for some purposes, of course, but not when the
charge that we are "using" them becomes louder than their screams
as it did in 1970. Even if they could help us dramatize some themes in
1972, I fear they will cost us far more by discrediting the "peace at home"
half of our "peace abroad and peace at home" appeal. Their very presence
would be a reminder of what happened to LBJ and later to HHH in 1968,
when we should be doing everything we can to draw a contrast between
their incumbency and that of Richard Nixon. Each have Nixon appearance in
1972 should reinforce the sense that we once again secured domestic
tranquility. " Any combativeness should be left to surrogates.
3. What positive things does this leave for the President to do? As
far as formats are concerned, the following two-tier approach might be
useful. (A) Airport stops. I would suggest holding on this until the mo-
ment is right, until the country is ready and waiting. Then I would move
out with a brisk (but never frantic) schedule of "prop-stops, 11 to project
the image of a dynamic President who cares about his people and to give
the campaign a sense of excitement and motion. I like this particular
format for several reasons. It lends itself to short speeches, in which the
President can hit his main themes cleanly and clearly without cumbersome
detail and yet without seeming superficial. It gives him a good excuse to
repeat them over and over but minimizes the risk of boredom. It is a very
efficient way of touching the most bases and covering the most territory. It
allows the general public to participate, but at the same time the informal
and open air setting tends to minimize the impact of any attempted disruption.
Finally and perhaps most importantly -- there is a natural drama to this
format one that comes from sheer "motion" itself from the number of
places visited and from the color and variety of the crowds. The landing
of the airplanes, the blaring of the bands, and the mere presence of the
President arouse emotions in this setting. It is not so necessary, therefore,
for the rhetoric of the esident to set up dramatic conflicts and to arouse
strong emotions, as it must when he is trying to hold an audience in an indoor
setting over a longer time period. This means that the campaign can
- 3
have a more Presidential tone without giving up its flair and its energy
and its drama (B) Secondly, I would use television to focus public
attention on the quality of the man and on the excellence of his record, I
understand that during the last weeks of the 1964 campaign, LBJ used five
half hour slots of network time plus an additional half hour on election
eve. In this way -- through quality documentaries, through thoughtful
interviews, perhaps through fireside conversations, the nuances of the
"Presidential personality" and the details of the Nixon record can be filled
in under carefully controlled circumstances. The advantages of incumbency
include: 1) a more effective claim on people's attention (in fact, I suspect
many people are insulted by overly short spot ads when it is the Presidency
that is at stake); 2) four years worth of magnificent film footage which no
contender could begin to match; and 3) the trappings of the White House as
a setting for direct communication with the people. The campaign should
capitalize on these advantages.
***
What follows here are some of the general thoughts on which some
of these specifics were based.
1. Thanks to television, the airplane, and his extraordinarily long
career, Richard Nixon is already the best known candidate in the history
of the world (I mean that quite literally. ) There is nothing RN can do in
1972 to make himself more familiar to the American people Everybody
knows him and they know what they think about him and there is a very little
that can be done to change that. The only reason for campaigning, it seems
to me, is to influence those whose mental pictures of Nixon, while they are
complete, are still ambivalent. In the scale which sits within their heads,
there are good things on one side and bad things on the other side and
depending on which variables they focus on at any given moment -- their
overall judgment shifts from one side to the other. The important task is
not to write new lines or design new costumes or paint new scenery it's
really too late for that. The important thing now is where we point the spot-
lights. Rather than trying to create some new image for the President, we
should highlight the strengths which even his critics are willing to grant him
experience, competence, intelligence, conscientiousness, seasoned judgment
At the same time, of course, it is important to keep the spotlight off those
qualities which have created misgivings with these swing groups. For most
of them that means avoiding the appearance of any excessive concern with
political tactics.
- 4
A related point. In a way, the image of a tough and wily politician
which probably hurts the President in its simple form -- has an entirely
different impact when it is projected on the international stage. There is a
strong element in the American character which regards all dealing with
foreign countries as something mysterious and arcane and fraught with
danger. From our very beginnings, diplomacy has been seen as a very
tough and tangled and sophisticated "old-world" business and the impression
has always been very strong that young and innocent and open America will
sooner or later be taken to the cleaners. This fear is at the root of the
isolationism which has dominated most of our history and which is now
beginning to surge once again.
Fortunately for this country, however, the one judgment concerning
Richard Nixon which now draws the greatest assent from the most Americans
is that he knows how to handle himself in this difficult diplomatic arena. "They
won't pull the wool over his eyes" is one of the most frequent comments I
encounter from Republicans and Democrats in conversations about the
President. In short, the same qualities which upset people most in the lawyer
who is suing them are the very qualities they want most of all in their own
lawyer. This is all the more reason, I think, for highlighting the administra-
tion's foreign policy. If public attention is focused here, then even the most
familiar of all criticisms of the President begins to turn into a compliment.
2. Many social philosophers are writing these days that the most
powerful emotion in modern America is the "quest for community." They
mean by this that uprooted and insecure Americans are seeking above all else
the climate of stability and security, the feeling of shared risks and shared
values, the sense of participation and control, which characterized life in
simpler times and smaller communities. This theme, of course, was a use-
ful part of the Inaugural Address and the most recent State of the Union message.
My concern at the moment, however, is not with developing this theme in
positive ways but rather with avoiding anything which would defy this emotion
so that it becomes a force against us. I say this because it seems to me that
the hunger for community places special burdens and special restrictions on
an incumbent President who is seeking re-election.
Why is this true? Simply because people cannot go back to the
small town in the 1970's. They must find their sense of community instead
through participation in the national family. And the responsibility for giving
a sense of family-hood to this scattered and nervous nation of ours is largely
that of our only potential father figure: the President.
People are reminded almost hourly of the divisions and suspicions
and fears which plague our country. They depend on the President to give them
5 -
a sense of an ideal America that is united and trusting and confident. People
are sick of lots of things today but most of all, I suspect, they are sick of
bickering and contentiousness and antagonism. They want the President
to reinforce the sense of national good will, to ease the sense of national
tension. (President Nixon's success in this cause should be one of his
proudest accomplishments.)
This desire, however, also creates a terrible risk for any incum-
bent President. For the role of the campaigner, by its very nature, is some-
what inconsistent with the role of soother and healer. The campaigner is
automatically a partisan, a contender, an adversary. While all these roles
are ordinarily respectable ones, I have a feeling that an awful lot of Americans
harbor a strong, secret resentment whenever their leader, their father, their
"king, 11 if you will, comes down off his pedestal to engage in the very common
business of politics. My point here is not simply the familiar one that a
candidate can gain a great deal from being unpolitical and "Presidential."
I am saying more than that. I am arguing that, for an incumbent President,
there is a unique risk in being anything less than fully Presidential a
risk which is momentous and intolerable.
In many ways, the very fact that there is an election campaign is
going to hurt US Any man -- perceived as President -- is going to be more
popular than that same man perceived as candidate. (In this sense, the polls
at the moment are padded in our favor.) One of the things we most definitely
do not want to spotlight, therefore, is the campaign itself -- its strategy,
its personnel, its mechanisms. We do not want people talking about the
President's campaign. We want them talking about the President's record.
It was different for Truman in 1948. His record was hurting him
and he wanted the election to be a referendum on the campaigns of the two
candidates. It was and that is why he won it. The 1970 election also became
a referendum on campaign styles in some parts of the country and by and
large I do not think this fact helped the Republicans. Unless things go very
badly at home and abroad between now and next fall, however, I expect we
will very much want our record to be front and center and that means using
the campaign to spotlight that record and not to upstage it.
Anything at all that is unusual about the campaign, anything that
draws attention to the campaign and away from the record, will work to our
disadvantage. This would include a non-campaign -- that in itself would be
very distracting. I would similarly avoid anything extreme, anything with
rough edges, anything contrived or cute or gimmicky. Everything should
be extremely straightforward.
:
- 6 -
3. Almost any of our issues in the campaign can be discussed under
a three-point organization: 1) how things were in 1968; 2) how things are
today; and 3) how thi ngs will be if we are elected. There will be some
tendency, I fear, to use only the first two points to say how bad things
were under the Democrats and how good things are goday and to forget
the third one. This would be a mistake. For voters do not re-elect
Presidents simply to reward them for jobs well done. An election is not
a report card. People are not so much concerned about what has been done
for them not even about what has been done for them lately -- as they
are about what will be done for them tomorrow. The most useful thing about
the successful record of the past is that it legitimizes our projections for
the future.
Because the President has wound down the war in Vietnam, it
is reasonable to expect he will bring a full generation of peace. Because
crime rates have fallen, it is reasonable to expect they will fall further.
People are future-oriented and it is imperative that we give them a sense
that something still better is coming. As the popular song puts it: "We've
only just begun. " The President has hit his stride and this is not the time
to pull him out of the game. Things are "in the works. 11 He has had some
great surprises for us in the past and if we re-elect him, he will have some
great surprises for us in the future. This can be a way of putting the opposi-
tion on the defensive not simply by contrasting the last four years with
the eight years previous, but by using the record of the past four years to
create a sense of momentum for the future a momentum which our
opponents can never generate.
A Kennedy candidacy, of course, would reach back to the early
1960's to try to achieve this sense of momentum already underway for the
future. All the more reason for not letting our campaign get stuck in the
past and the present. Muskie would have even more difficulty matching this
sense of Nixonian momentum. I recall a recent article by a former Muskie
aide which contends that the Senator is most effective when he is attacked
or affronted or offended when he is on the defensive but that he is not
very effective when he must be on the offensive when he must do the
attacking. He is not a natural at it. He does not feel comfortable. He
often appears petulant when he takes this posture. If his opponent does him
the favor of attacking him, this analysis claims, he will outmoderate that
opponent to death. But if the opponent articulates his own dreams and visions,
then Muskie is forced into the position of saying me too or of becoming harsh
and strident.
A thoughtful new voter who is still undecided about 1972 made this
comment recently about the President. "There is no denying that he's done
a good job but it would be more fun to have someone who could get you
more excited about what is going to happen next. If only the next four years
could seem more exciting under Nixon, then I might vote for him. 11 I believe
the campaign can make the next four years look that way.
####
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
LEN GARMENT
Uy
We won't win in 1972 unless we have a well-informed, high morale operation.
There were all kinds of problems in 1968, but there was camaraderie and
trust, a sense of common purpose, good communication and a strong team
effort. We can only get to this state of effectiveness now by thinking through
the special problems that exist this time around. One in particular will be
fitting together people like yourself and John Mitchell, veterans of three
years work at the highest level of national power and politics, with newcomers
like Pete Dailey and his staff. It is fact, not flattery, that you, John and
others are now "personages" in your own right, and the changes that have
taken place in your life and in the way you are viewed by your staffs, the
media and the public could present problems for the campaign effort if not
thought through with care. The point is of course that a campaign organization
is a collaborative enterprise which loses drive and effectiveness if the per-
sonalities don't mesh or if it is infected by power games and bureaucratic
trivia. Obvious things to guard against: Reluctance on the part of the new-
comers to speak out (particularly if they disagree with you or John Mitchell);
roundabout staffing procedures that are time-wasting and demoralizing
(government is a process; a campaign is a contest); in dealing with the
"everybody wants to get into the act" syndrome you must keep out the axe
grinders, private agendaists, hyper-excitables, manipulators, favor-curriers
and other such types. Government can "afford" them; a campaign can't.
There has to be a strong framework (i. e., organization and discipline) but
its purpose must be to maximize opportunities for flexible and creative
individual efforts. Everyone, yourself and John Mitchell. included, must
be prepared to deal "democratically" with other senior campaign staff on
dirty detail as well as grand strategy if the President is to be protected
and permitted to go about his business. Governing and campaigning are
related but distinctly separate things and this difficult separation will have
to be made quite deliberately as the campaign is planned and begins to function.
The President will have to take some personal action to shape campaign staff
attitude and morale. When, and how he should be involved I don't know but
2
probably at an early point since the effort has to be organized and pointed
in the right direction from the very outset. The campaign will be extremely
difficult. We will be under increasingly harsh and personal attack. Out-
rageous things will be said and written about the President. There will be
foul-ups and leaks. Most of this will not mean a damn, unless we waste
our energies on fits of suspicion and overreaction. What this adds up to is
not an effort to recreate the spirit of 1968 the passion of outsiders trying
to win the White House is an advantage that naturally falls to the Democrats.
Rather the effort should be to create a campaign unit that identifies closely
with the President, has a clearly-delineated set of "missions" and is given
the authority and support to carry them out.
2. The next point is the general direction of the campaign, something I
think should be developed now even as the activities of the campaign staff
begin to take shape. You don't need more generalizations about maintaining
the Presidential posture. But its hard to be concrete or sensible about
the campaign itself until we know where we're headed. Attached is a letter
from Robert Nisbet which is a useful first cut at this problem. Nisbet is
one of the most distinguished of all American sociologists, a major influence
on men like Moynihan, Kristol, Lipset, Buckley, etc., a Republican, a
conservative, a pragmatic intellectual of the first magnitude. Some of what
he says I've previously discussed with you; most is pure Nisbet. I offer his
observations not SO much for their content as for the procedure they suggest,
namely the creation of a working group of writer-intellectuals who want to
re-elect the President, are willing to give time, and have the ability to
synthesize information and articulate ideas, and would bring to the effort at
this time a freshness and perspective that cannot be supplied by distracted
insiders. Ron Berman (the new Humanities Chairman) and Pat Moynihan are
other possibilities for this group. My hunch is that out of their work,
supplementing the work of Ray Price, Pat Buchanan and others here, would
come the story of the Nixon Presidency to date, the changes (in contrast
to 1968) wrought abroad and at home, a story rooted in reality and framed in
terms that the campaign staff could safely go to work on immediately. The
product would be different from the bleak and frågmented hand-outs that
are the limit that one can ask from a hard-pressed White House communications
office. My further hunch is that in the course of explaining what a uniquely
"professional" President (Ray Price's concept) has done during his first term
in restoring peaceful conditions in the world and at home we would make
credible what the President proposes to do to build on these conditions
particularly at home during his second term. What must be avoided is a
sense that all the things we've done and said somehow don't hang together.
3
3. The purpose of this kind of preliminary effort (plus contributions from
other sources) would be to help shape the campaign philosophy and themes,
Our advertising material should be factual and explanatory, newsy not arty --
reporting on the Presidency in a provocative and interesting way, not trying
to sell something. Again the emphasis should be on what we've been doing
what has taken place. The Democratic stuff will be personal (attacks) and
promissory (but what are they going to promise?) I'd limit campaign activities
by Cabinet officers to explaining what they've been doing. They're not
persuasive spokesmen for the President. Through the Spring and Summer
we should concentrate our campaign materials on the record; obviously
the big news will be the President's trips. I don't think we will have to
push the "journey for peace" theme -- it will be all over the place if things are
going well. The problem will be to keep expectations down to avoid disap-
pointments, to make clear we're not loosening up on our defense effort or
getting starry-eyed. Under no circumstances do I visualize the President
whistle-stopping, exhausting himself, competing head-to-head with the
Democratic candidate. I don't see him in commercials at all (at this point).
We may be in a position by next Summer and Fall to have some surprise
visits at home that convey a sense of the focus of Presidential attention during
the second term (to cooler campuses, to quieter cities, to cleaner places,
etc.) Whether the "peacemaker" theme should be explicit or not, I don't
know, but, if so, it should emerge from the work and research of the next
six months and not be mandated at the outset. I'm not sure of any of the
production details. I am sure that the pre-conditions of a high-morale
staff operation and a high-level intellectual effort must be established now,
The absolutely critical thing is to know we're in for a very tough fight, to
be prepared for the worst, to stay loose -- to keep our tempers under control
and prepare for the contest
attachment
54 Belmont St.
Northampton, Mass.
October 31, 1971
Mr. Leonard Garment
White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Garment:
I enjoyed our breakfast together yestorday morning,
and am grateful to you and Ray Frice for artenging it. It is good.
to know both of you, and it goes without saying, I trust, that I wish
President Nixon and his administration the best. Whatever I can do
that falls within my talents and energies I shall be pleased to do.
You were kind enough to ask me to put down in a. letter
the comments I made at breakfast, and this I do though with due sense
of my highly limited perspective in governmental and political matters.
If there is any note of onacularity inwhat follows, do, please, disniss
it as unintended. I an simply doing what you asked: putting in type-
script remarks that flowed forth casily over coffee.
First, I think Professor Berman would be admirable in
the post you mentioned. I've not pot met him, but I have followed his
writings in some degree, I admire then, and I think they reflect a first
rate mind. Moreover friends he and I have in commmon praise him highly
as a person. J. would be more than merely willing to endorse him should
such endorsements become useful.
We discussed the forthcoming campaign, and the following
remarks, for whatever they are worth, best reprosent my views on a highly
complex matter:
1. I think it is of the utmost importance that President
Nixon run against what he inherited in 1963: the heavy concentration of
American troous in Viet Nam, the relations with Russia, China, and other
parts of the world, the economic scene in the U. 3. and the easily
demonstrable cooling effect his government has had on all aspects of
what he found when he came to office. No matter how plausible, how
magic-ridden, how lustrous his Democratic opponent may- be, no one
can wide out the fact of 1960-1963 and how much better things have
become since, in just about all respects. I an sure it will be tempting,
even alluring, now and then to try and take on Kennedy or whoever is
running for theDemocrats in an aqgument-for-argument manner. For
the President, I gather, loves campaigning. But I think it would be
courting defort to stray from the strategy of running against 1968. That
makes a powerful case. It is hard to think of anything else that could
really strengthen it.
2. I think it extremely important to support in every
possible way the black, chicano, and other minority sectors of society.
I rather doubt that many votes will cone the Republican way as the
result (though who can be sure?), but I do know that anything that
helps achievement of middle class status for blacks and others is a
long step toward creating a condition in which a two party system might
sometime prevail among them. My own experience is that nothing matters
SC much to the minorities as the economic facts of job, ownership of
home, and the kind of dignity and respectability that go with these.
You will understand that I am writing as the political conservative that
I am and have been for a long, long time. Conservation has roots only
in a. middle class; the history of labor in this country teaches that.
So does the history of the Itelians, Irish, Poles, Jews, and other
minorities---al of whom clearly are becoming more and more conservative
in their politics, the direct consequence of achievement of middle class
status at very least. In other words, and in sum, I hope the Nixon
administration will encourage every possible economic assistance to
the blacks, chicanos, and others of comparable status. Neither the
country nor the Republican party can possibly lose in the long run.
Militance and revolutionary spirit merely blunt their edges against
the well of middle class status. You can consider that a virtually
iron law of history.
3. I think thore will not be any intense college
student voting in the next election unlose come explosive issue has
been produced. It is hard to think what this could be, I assuno
we will be, for all practical purposes, out of Vict lan. With the
kind of legal, economic, and political cogard for the minorities I
mentioned above, it is difficult to think that civil rights will be
in any degree the kind of issue it was in the 1960s. The distance
between blacks and whites widens constantly in the political sphere,
and I think there is nothing the blacks want 30 much here as the
sense of being no longer dependent upon white political allies. They
seem to like to set their own goals, malto their own way, and I think
this is splendid. But it does hean that white students are less likely.
to be welcome in the future SO far as political objectives are concerned.
4. Nothing I see or hear of as I get around the
academic U. S. suggests that anything explosive will take place next
spring or any other time. What one now finds is Sencial indifference,
a renowal of "squareness", even a decline in use of drugs, and no special
interest in politics. For anyone in the Nixon administration to try to
make the 'student revolution" or any aspect of student behavior an
issue would be to create a great deal of needless trouble. Once again
the American people are overwholmin ly indulgent toward the zoung,
affectionate in general regard for them, and whereas Agnew struck
a good response a couple of years ago, that theme is now dead and should
be forgotten. The stark, unfair, historical fact is that now it is not
the student militants of th e 1960s who, in retrospect, have the
image of "trouble makers" but, rather, Attorney General Mitchell
and Vice President Agnew, For many reasons I regret this. But
I an bound to express what I sense clearly in the present atmosphere.
A position of strong, even agressive, ri thtwing "law and order" was
relevant to Middle America in 1963 It isn't now. And the best thing
to do is forget that as an issue and to take credit for having
removed it as an issue
5.
My guess is that college youth, to the degree
that it votes, will vote in heavy majority for the Democrat whoever
he is but particularly if he is Kennedy or McGovern. I would ignore
the Cach. Kennedy has an appeal that will be forever beyond my compre-
hension, but it is there, and it will grow and grow among youth. To
try to attack it would be futile and probably worse. I assume Kennedy
will do everything he possibly can to create the sense of a terrible
crisis afflicting America, the need for "leadorship", for bold and
novel action, and no doubt this will go over well with colloge youth.
But it would be asking for trouble to try to deal with it directly.
It would be, frankly, impossible. For anyone to try to make an issue
of Cha excuiddick would also be suicidal SO far as the Republican party
is concerned. I said two months after that event that within a couple
of years it would sonchow redound to his actual credit among many
groups. Call it the Gethsemane complex. Call it whatever you wish.
But my own guess is that if any Republic Ratchetnan publicly goes after
Kennedy in terms of Chappaquiddick, at least a million nore votes will
have been generated for Kennedy. And desuite some nonsense I hear now
and then, this will be jus t as true of women voters as men. In short,
forget, and give instructions to every Republican campaigner to forget,
Chapraquidlick.
6. I think, and regret the fact, that President
Nixon will have a difficult time in getting re-elected. He deserved
to be, but he has lots against him, starting with the sheer number of
Democratic registrations. To try to meet the problem through political
gamesmanship, through ginmicks, through transparent efforts to win this
OL that politions scotor, seems to Re hopeless. MIS best chance is to
be the statesman, above the battle, however interested in it he may be,
and to confine his appearances on TV strictl to incontestably governmental
matters until the very last. And this suggest\to me the following: If
it is not necessary to appear on TV, it is necessary not to appear on
TV. With Reagan in California it helped and helps. With President
Nixon it does not. I an referring, of course, to ordirary speeches,
announcenta, and the like. Sixon is extraverimarily good, it seems
to me, on a televised press conference, and I would like only to see
him just a shade more aloof less eagerly friendly (as it seems) to
the press. The point is, Nixon hasn't a chance against the televised
the powerful
advantage of being in the office, of being first and forenost the
president, not a canpaigner.
That is about what I recall of our discussion.
I can't imagine that any of it will be of either illumination or
use to you, but you asked for the written comments, and I find it
a pleasure to obey. Again may I say that I found it a high point
of my trip to Washington to meet you and Ray Price for the first
time. If I can ever be of any assistance to you, I shall be pleased
to try. All best wishes,
Sincerely,
Robert Nisbet
P. S. My best to Ray Price and my thanks for his kindness. President
Nixon is danned lucky to have you both!
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
10:45 a.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
It is my understanding that you wanted whatever preliminary thought I have regarding
how the President should go about campaigning in 1972 as well as suggested themes
which be might follow.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING
Undoubtedly if other people are putting together memoranda on the above subject
for you, they will lead off by saying we cannot have a rehash of the 1970 Con-
gressional election campaign. I would concur. My reason is not because of the
San Jose incident or the celebrated Phoenix fiasco. Rather, it is my contention that
the style of barnstorm campaigning such as the President utilized in 1970 is the
opposite of what the people are looking for in President Nixon now, just as it was
in 1970. Everyone knows that President Nixon is or can be a tough, gutty political
fighter. However, in the political arena the chemistry of that side of the President
is not compatible with the kind of President most people want him to be. (I don't
think that this is just a liberal view; conservatives feel this way, too.)
All of the above adds up to say that the posture of the President's political campaigning
in 1972 should, in my mind, be done from the level of the Presidency and different
from any way that the President has campaigned in any of his campaigns heretofore.
He should be firm, relentless in his campaign for a Generation of Peace, calm at
home, etc. He should forge vision of the America he sees ahead in his own patriotic
style. But all of this at the highest of Presidential levels.
THE PRESIDENT'S CAMPAIGN SCHEDULE
If the President were to begin campaigning immediately after the convention, this
would give him nine weeks of campaign time prior to Election Day. It would seem
to me that after the convention which ends on Wednesday, the President would remain
in Southern California through to the weekend and then return to Washington and
2.
move immediately into the official duties of running the Government in a very
demonstrable way. Hopefully, other than perhaps one or two major speeches at
too
non-political forums, he would not begin any campaigning until the very end of
early
September. Let's have people surprised by his ability to wait it out. The Vice
Presidential candidate, our surrogates, members of the Family, members of the
Cabinet, etc. can move off and do their thing, but the President should hold tight
if possible, using perhaps only the four weeks prior to the election for cam-
paigning in the country.
I envision the President's lacing the whole campaign with the necessity of continuing
to run the Government. Perhaps this approach is naive and unbelievable to the
American people since the Press Corps would never be willing to suggest that the
President is staying away from politics and running the Government. On the other
hand, a crisis situation or an event of enough magnitude to demonstrate that the
President is deeply involved in handling the affairs of state and not campaiging
might register on the citizens - and I think register in a positive way.
In the four or five weeks which the President spends campaigning, I would see him
spending no more than four days a week at the maximum on the stump. You can
tie back to several persuasive arguments in your 1968 memorandum regarding cam-
paiging. You laid out the number of events he should have in a given day, the
way to dominate the evening news, and several of the other points which you made
which are apropos even now with his being President.
TELEVISION
The television for Presidential appearances and speeches (separate from the spots which
will be produced as well as the use of a documentary) should fall into two categories.
First, major national talks or speeches to the country or perhaps speeches to selected
parts of the society such as the aged, the laborer, etc. Since through the normal
coverage of the campaign, the President will virtually be on television or have the
opportunity to be on the television news every evening, it seems to me that his
national television appearances should be curtailed to avoid over-exposure. In the
weeks between the convention and the election, it is conceivable that he should
have no more than two nationally broadcast speeches. These two speeches would
be basically the umbrella for the national campaign (supported by our advertising
spots) in terms of the national themes which he wants to set forth. One of the
speeches could come in the first week of the campaign period, perhaps the kick-off.
The second speech would be immediately prior to the election
3.
I visualize the President's announcing that as a candidate for the Presidency, he will
visit every region of the country. This can tie to an overriding national theme of a
united country but also the realization of various regional problems which he can,
and wants to. deal with specifically when he goes on television in these regions. I
would consider breaking the country into the following regions: The Atlantic
Seaboard States including New England, the South, the Midwest, the Southwest,
the West, and Northwestern States. The President would do regional television in
each of the five areas designated. The television could take any number of forms
but the substance of the broadcasts would be to hit as hard as possible on those
issues-oriented problems directly related to the particular region as well as whatever
national themes he wants to continue to pound away on.
There is no reason why all of the television for the various regions must be stereo-
typed. It may be that in Atlanta, for the South, we would want to use a big
colosseum jammed with 100,000 people whereas in the New England Eastern Sea-
board States, he might go for a Nixon in the arena-type setup such as he had in
1968.
I do not think that it is important at this point to decide the form for the various
television appearances. Rather, what I consider important is that the President think
in terms of using television on a regional basis in order to cut down any tendency to
go for over-exposure with nationally televised speeches. Over-exposure could be our
worst mistake.
RHETORIC/THEMES
The rhetoric for the reelection campaign will undoubtedly be set in the President's
dramatic acceptance speech in San Diego. The tone and style of that speech will
probably be more important than the "I See a Day" speech from 1968.
The President is going to have to articulate what he has done abroad as well as at
home. It will be necessary to build a good case that much is left to be done which
only President Nixon can accomplish. The President, as will be clear by convention
time, has reordered the priorities of the world power blocs. Yet he must strongly
allude or say outright that the weaving of the new international fiber has just begun
and it cannot be put into the hands of amateurs or it will never be lasting.
The bomb blasts of the 1971 dramatic announcements must cease. They will have
had their effect and will still be well-remembered. I feel that the President is going
to want to move the public into a very settled period where they have a sense
of security, serenity and a realization that peace abroad and the calm at home
are not visions, but a realization made possible by President Ni xon's leadership.
:
4.
The weak area will be the President's domestic programs. Between now and Convention
time, a significant effort must be made to either push those programs which are in
Congress so as to get a feeling by the public that the Administration did offer a
revolutionary domestic program and it was Congress that failed: or we must be
ready to offer, as part of the platform, some domestic programs that will be able
to take the edge off of the opposition's criticism that the President has ignored the
country domestically.
It seems to me that domestically we are vulnerable to the argument that much has been
settled in foreign affairs and now is the time to get to our domestic work with a
domestically-oriented President. If only as a security insurance, we need to be hedging
against the domestic attack. (If I were Hubert Humphrey, I would announce that if
elected President, I would try to talk President Nixon into becoming my Secretary
of State.)
PUBLIC SUPPORT
One important realization we must have is that the President is going to want to have
contact with and be overwhelmed with acclaim and demonstrations of popular support
among the people. It is inconceivable that we can wage the campaign across the
country from television studios. The President will want events which in some ways give him
huge Presidential crowds. He is going to want crowds and we must find a way to provide
him with forums and opportunities to demonstrate the popular appeal.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
RAY PRICE
They
SUBJECT:
Campaign '72
Some thoughts:
Our approach to the campaign has to center on the fact of incumbency.
This makes it far different from '68, and also different from 1970
when the campaign was directed at turning out incumbents in Congress,
and when by the nature of our campaign -- approaching it as if we were
the "out" party -- we did lasting damage to ourselves.
People want their President to be Presidential. Further, I think the
basic underlying political reality of 1972 (apart from whatever may be
the particular issues) is that people, by and large, are fed up with
politics and "politicians. .. Part of our strategy should be to make the
other guy look "political" while we stay away from it. This, of course,
is something in which the incumbent has an enormous advantage.
As I've said before, I still think the central lesson of the 1970 election
was that it marked the first cresting of a massive backlash against
politics and politicians, and that this sweeps across the ideological
spectrum (example: Buckley and Chiles were miles apart ideologically,
but both came across as essentially "non-political" types -- and con-
servative Buckley won an upset in liberal New York, while liberal Chiles
won an upset in conservative Florida).
Therefore, I think it's vital that we resist the temptation to take cheap
political shots, to engage in transparent political ploys (and most of
them are transparent), and to appear overly eager in our political
courtships. If we appear to be panting after every gaggle of prospective
voters, we don't look Presidential even to the targets of our putative
affections.
Closely connected with this is the element of trust, which depends
heavily on voter perceptions of motive. Each thing we get caught in
- 2 -
that looks like a sacrifice of principle for politics affects that perception
-- far beyond the issue of the moment, and far more lastingly -- and
thus undermines trust. A lot of our trouble in climbing in the polls,
I'm convinced, stems from our frequent efforts to make political capital
out of a passing controversy, in ways that win quick plaudits from those
who agree with us but that do lasting damage to the essential element
of trust. When we do this, the negative is remembered long after the
positive is forgotten.
Practically every political disaster we've suffered has been the result
of an effort to make political points or score a short-term political
coup; very few of these set-backs have not been self-inflicted.
I've often felt that if we lose in 1972 it's probably going to be because
we tried too hard to win. We've got to apply to politics the same kind
of long-headedness that you've applied to foreign policy -- not letting
ourselves get SO caught up in our concern with the next day's headlines
or the next month's Gallup poll that we lose sight of the one poll that
counts -- which isn't until next November.
Our aim should be to calm passions down, not to heat them up; to bring
people together, not to drive them apart; to heal, not to inflame. Pre-
cisely because we are the Administration in power, our standing will
rise or fall with the general index of public contents and discontents.
If people are generally satisfied, they 'll be generally inclined to stick
with what they've got rather than take a chance on something new; if
they're generally dissatisfied, they'll be more likely to gamble on a
change -- regardless of whom they see as the primary architect of those
discontents.
We're going to confront strong temptations to engage in scapegoating
-- trying to rouse people in anger against some handy target, whether
the young, the radiclibs, the academic-intellectual complex, the UN
or whoever -- but even if our complaints are justified, if we yield to
these temptations we're going to end up hurting ourselves more than we
hurt our targets. Just as we did in 1970.
In part, this boomerang effect is pretty well summed up in a comment
once reported by Robert Coles, author of "The Middle Americans, " who
- 3 -
mentioned on an interview program a few months back that he'd been
told by a blue collar worker: "I don't like to hear the Vice President of
the United States sounding like I do after I've had a couple of beers. 11
But more fundamentally, the American people are tired of conflict.
They're tired of cant. They've just been through the shrill Sixties;
they're worried uncertain, confused, and a lot of them are just plain
scared; they can't always put their finger on just what it is, but they're
nagged by a sense that things are unsettled and potentially threatening.
Four years ago I argued that we should present ourselves as the ones
who best can manage change: defusing its threats and developing its
opportunities, welcoming it, but directing it in an orderly way. I still
think this is valid. This requires more of an "explainer's" role, help-
ing lead people through some of the complexities they find so difficult
to understand, and helping them see that they're not really so threatening
after all; and by so doing, getting across the idea that even if they don't
understand them, we do. We can't stuff the fears of the American people
away in a closet and shut the door; it won't stay shut. We can help deal
with those fears; we can reduce them, just as a child's fears are reduced
when the light goes on and the dark that bred them is dispersed.
In addressing ourselves to the principal groups that will be largely
against us, it's vital that we remember it's not only their votes that
count. In terms of the total impact of the campaign on the others
Mailer
on the swing voters who could go either way their attitudes, their
impressions, and the intensity of their opposition is going to be even
more important. Even if we don't change the way college kids, for exam-
ple, are going to vote, if we change the way they think about RN and the
way they talk about RN, we can greatly change the kind of influence
they're going to exert over the rest of the electorate.
In our case, this is doubly important because the groups we're talking
about tend to be the articulate, the quoted, the writers and commentators
and cartoonists -- and it makes an enormous difference whether they'
mildly opposed or vehemently opposed. We might, by analogy, think of
it in terms of knowing that a paper is going to be critical of us, but of
being able to influence the way the cartoon is drawn. This has an enor-
mous ripple effect.
- 4
It may be that there's once again an opportunity, such as the one we
lost in early 1970, to turn the tables and make the 1930 liberals look
silly. But we can only do it by meeting them on their own jousting-
field; and only by appealing to their own peer group, for the judgment
of the peer groups is the only one that really matters to them. We can't
do this by jingoism: indeed, the more we indulge in jingoism the more
we entrench them in their own collective sense of smug self-righteous-
ness. We've got to drive wedges between them, and among them; as
was beginning to be done until we began going off on our sporadic
?
anti-everybody crusades, and thus restored their alliance.
Now we have a chance to capitalize on the new perceptions of RN -- or
more accurately the shaking of the old perceptions that have followed
the China and economic initiatives. We can also capitalize on the new
mood on campus, recognizing that the relative quiet by no means indi-
cates a warming toward us, but that at least it does represent a dimi-
nution of the shrill emotionalism that provided such a solid armor against
reason. And we can capitalize, too, on the disenchantment with the other
side that's bound to set in as the presidential contenders step up the pace
and intensity of their quadrennial antics.
The onset of the political season, in fact, gives us an extraordinary
opportunity," if we seize it: for in the present national mood of disgust
with politics and politicians, we bask in the ultimate luxury of not having
to act political. We occupy the Presidency, and by using it presiden-
tially in contrast to the challengers we can make them look petty
and RN the "statesman" by contrast.
One element of our approach, therefore, should be to come forth with
a barrage of thoughtful, creative, forward-looking (which can be liberal,
conservative, both or neither) analyses and discussions, and in particular,
discussions that recognize and deal with the deep-seated fears and con-
cerns that wrack not only the man in the street, but also the man in the
book-lined study demonstrating that even though we disagree with many
of his prescriptions, we do understand and appreciate the concerns, and
we're doing our level be st to address them in new ways consonant with
the new needs and opportunities of the years just ahead.
It gives us an opportunity to posture ourselves as the serious students
of government, making use of the vast resources available to the Federal
**
- 5 -
Government -- using them creatively, imaginatively, humanely, and
consigning those still imprisoned by the old rhetoric and the old reme-
dies of the New Deal and post-New Deal era to the honored but dusty
shelf of the quaint and the dated.
This is an example of using incumbency; of building on our greatest
strength, which is the fact of incumbency.
The election of 1972 will turn on the skill with which we use this greatest
asset: encumbency. If we fail to use it skillfully, it can become our
greatest liability -- fatally so, in a time of brittle discontent and wallow-
ing uncertainty.
In terms of scheduling, etc., I'd hope that political rallies could be kept
to a minimum (and that we would lock ourselves into a firm commitment
to do no rallies in the final four days of the campaign). A fair amount
of travel, but where possible in "non-political" settings; a number of
live addresses to large groups (conventions, etc), in which the speeches
would include thoughtful analyses and fresh insights; fairly extensive use
of radio, and mid-level use of television; but with the heavy emphasis
on doing the Presidential job, and on those initiatives at home and abroad
that are going to require more years of follow-through.
###
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DICK MOORE
SUBJECT: The President as a Candidate
When a President runs for re-election, the office
itself can be his greatest asset. In a close contest,
it can be the decisive factor. This memorandum deals
with the "art of incumbency" as it relates to 1972.
The ultimate advantage of the office of President,
of course, is substantive. The President has the op-
portunity to make decisions, take actions and provide
the leadership which the country needs, as we have seen
so dramatically in the last 90 days.
This memorandum, however, does not deal with sub-
stantive programs, but with the politics: How should
the President conduct himself to achieve the maximum
political advantage inherent in the office and title
of President of the United States?
I realize that many say he should "run as President"
rather than as a candidate. To an important degree, that
is probably wise, but I rather think there is room for
both, meaning that he should stand apart from political
activity and concentrate on the duties of the office.
- 2 L
Because we are talking about an art, we might start
by looking at an old master. Until now, probably no
President could match FDR in his understanding of the
political power of the presidency and how to use it. He
knew almost intuitively how far he could go, and this
helped make up politically for what he lacked in substance.
On the matter of incumbency, all the FDR campaigns are worth
reviewing, but the campaign of 1936 seems particularly in
point for 1972.
Despite the lop-sided result in 1916, there were
reasons why the Democrats were not overly confident as
the year began. FDR had captured the imagination of the
public, but he had not solved the problems he inherited,
and some of his remedies simply weren't working. There-
fore, although his campaign did not officially open until
September 29, he began his "non-political" phase early
in the year. In his capacity as President, he found
reasons to travel extensively, making speeches at dedi-
cations and taking full advantage of his well known
specialty, the "inspection trip."
The attached list of his public appearances and
speeches (TAB A) is worth looking at. FDR had no air-
plane, but he managed to get all the way to Texas and
back in June; to Virginia, New York and New England in
July; in August, he made "inspection trips" to Pennsyl-
vania, New York, Ohio, Indiana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
- 3 -
Nebraska, Wyoming, Colorado, Missouri, Iowa and Illinois.
There were a few complaints that these appearances were
"political," but essentially they were accepted, and they
worked.
Under the circumstances, it can be said that FDR
did run for re-election "as President" rather than as a
candidate at least until five weeks before election day.
Then he moved derectly into the home stretch with an
intensive cross country campaign, complete with whistle
stops.
But even in this traditional phase, he played the
role of President rather than that of candidate, in the
sense that he never allowed himself to get down to the
same level as his opponent and never mentioned Governor
Landon by name. He was always the President, and the
other fellow was a job seeker.
Today, the incumbency offers even more advantages
than it did a generation ago, and in that context, I
would make the following suggestions:
Presidential Trips: RN should continue and perhaps
expand his program of taking the Presidency to the people,
His practice of non-political visits to all regions of
the country is well established and cannot be attacked
as a political contrivance in 1972, especially if he
maintains a bi-partisan flavor as in the recent trips.
- 4.- -
As one important new feature, we should try to give
attention to special interest groups and constituencies.
The visit to the Knights of Columbus in New York was
one good example; another was the nursing home in
Manchester, N.H., which got a good play among older
people. The Presidential visit or drop-by could be
particularly effective with young people, or, for that
matter, with blue collar workers, Indians, teachers, or
conventions of professional or trade associations. In
short, let's target groups as well as places.
Don't Change Horses. During 1972, the President's
personal leadership in our foreign relations will con-
tinue to be a matter of paramount national interest.
This is one of the most valuable assets of the incum-
bency, and we should make a constant effort to portray
the President's foreign negotiations as an ongoing
program; one that requires continuity of RN's leadership
over a period of several years. We may be out of the
Vietnam war before the election campaign, but the road
to lasting peace depends upon the China initiative, the
SALT talks, and better relations with the Soviet Union.
These great projects are still in the beginning stage
and RN needs time to complete them.
If we can establish the need for continuity in
these delicate foreign relationships, we can expect to
benefit from the most powerful campaign theme of all:
- 5 1.
Don't change horses in midstream.
In the final analysis, there seems to be little
doubt that this theme was the element which overcame the
third term tradition in 1940. People felt FDR had the
knowledge, experience and the personal relationships;
on election day many were simply reluctant to turn over
the conduct of our foreign policy to a beginner. They
should feel the same way about RN.
Press Conferences. As we get closer to the
Campaign, we can expect the news media to grow more
hostile and snide, if possible. One of the greatest
advantages of the presidency is the privilege of com-
municating directly with the people, particularly in
a campaign year. I expect RN will want to use this
privilege more frequently during 1972, and I suggest
that a policy be formulated soon. I recognize the
problem of preparing for a full scale conference, but
isn't one solution the one-subject conference in the
Oval Office? In any event, the role of the press con-
ference in 1972 is a question which should be considered
carefully at this planning stage.
November 4, 1971
Public Appearances and Speeches by Franklin D. Roosevelt during 1936
January
8
Washington, D. C. - Address at Jackson Day Dinner, broad-
cast to 3, 000 similar dinners
19
Address at dedication of Theodore Roosevelt Memorial
30
Radio address for benefit of crippled children
February 22
Philadelphia - Address at Temple University (Honorary Degree)
23
Radio address on Brotherhood Day
March
23
Rollins College, Florida (Honorary Degree)
April
16
Address at dedication of new Department of Interior Building,
Washington
17
Radio address on 3rd anniversary of CCC
25
New York City - Thomas Jefferson Dinner
June 8-15
Trip to Centennial Celebrations in Arkansas and Texas.
Speeches or informal remarks at:
9
Knoxville, Tennessee - Informal talk
10
Rockport, Arkansas - Informal remarks at religious services
Little Rock, Arkansas (Major Address)
11
San Jacinto Battleground, Texas (Major Address)
Address at Alamo, San Antonio
Austin, Texas - Rear platform speech
12
Ft. Worth, Texas, Fairgrounds
Dallas, Texas - Major address at Centennial
Dallas, Texas - Remarks at unveiling of Robert E. Lee statue
Dallas, Texas - Luncheon Speech
12
Dennison, Texas - Remarks
13
Muskogee, Oklahoma - Remarks
14
Vincennes, Indiana - Major Address
Louisville, Kentucky - Remarks
Larue (County) Kentucky - Remarks at Lincoln Birthplace
15
Martinsburg, West Virginia - Remarks
27
Philadelphia - Acceptance Speech Democratic Convention
July
3
Dedication Address, Shenandoah National Park, Virginia
4
Monticello, Virginia - Address at Jefferson's Home
11
Dedication address at Triborough Bridge, New York City
11
Homecoming Celebration, Hyde Park
2
(FDR 1936 Speeches, etc. - continued)
July 15-31
FDR vacationed in Campobello, visiting Maine, New Hampshit
Vermont and Massachusetts enroute; inspecting flood areas
dams, and other sites, and conferring with the Governor ar
other officials in each state.
31
Quebec, Canada - Major Address
August 13-15
Inspection trip through flood-damaged areas of Pennsylvania
and Ohio
13
Altoona, Pennsylvania - Remarks
Johnstown, Pennsylvania - Remarks
14
Erie, Pennsylvania - Remarks
Cleveland, Ohio - -.Luncheon Address
Chautauqua, New York - Major Address ("I hate war")
(Following Chautauqua speech, made flood inspection trip
from Binghamton, New York, to Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania
with Governor Lehman and other officials)
15
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania - Remarks
Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania - Remarks
Aug 21 -Sept 5
Trip to inspect drought areas in Midwest; this included
conferences with various governors and rear platform re-
marks or other informal speeches at:
Garrett, Indiana
Gary, Indiana
Bismark, North Dakota
Jamestown, North Dakota
Pierre, South Dakota
Aberdeen, South Dakota
Huron, South Dakota
Mount Rushmore, South Dakota
Sidney, Nebraska
Cheyenne, Wyoming
Laramie, Wyoming
Julesburg, Colorado
North Platte, Nebraska
Hannibal, Missouri
Baring, Missouri
Atlantic, Iowa
Springfield, Illinois
Jacksonville, Illinois
Indianapolis, Indiana
Connersville, Indiana
3
(FDR 1936 Speeches, etc. -- continued)
September
6 Fireside Chat on Drought Inspection Trip
8-10 Visit to Asheville, Charlotte, Salisbury and Greensboro,
North Carolina (Speeches appear to be non-political)
18 Harvard University Tercentenary - Major Address
29 Syracuse University - Remarks at dedication of Medical
College
Syracuse, New York - Major Address at Democratic State
Convention ("The Opening of the Democratic Campaign")
October
1 Campaign trip through West Virginia and Pennsylvania
2 Dedication address at Medical Center, Jersey City, NJ
Remarks at ground-breaking Mid-Town Tunnel, New York City
8-17 - Intensive campaign trip:
Iowa
Minnesota
Nebraska
Wyoming
Colorado
Kansas
Missouri
Illinois
Michigan
Ohio, and
Up-state New York (This trip included major addresses at
St. Paul
Omaha
Denver
Wichita
Kansas City
Chicago
Detroit
Cleveland, and
Rochester. (There were seemingly countless rear
platform speeches)
21-22 Intensive campaign trip through:
Rhode Island
Massachusetts
Connecticut
28-29 New York City
New Jersey
Pennsylvania, and
Delaware
4
(FDR 1936 Speeches, etc. - continued)
October 30
New York City and environs
31
Madison Square Garden
November 2
Pre-Election Address from Hyde Park
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
AN
WASHINGTON
ADMI
3-15-82
November 4, 1971
By
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN McLAUGHLIN
Incl
SUBJECT:
The President's Presentation of
Self in 1972
Presidents of the United States have customarily adopted one of
three traditional styles of leadership. It may be instructive to
review these.
The Father-King. This is a favorite style of leadership. Eisenhower
used it. F.D.R. certainly used it. The Father-King settles all prob-
lems by simply the reassurance of his presence. "All shall be well,
and there is nothing to fear."
The Father-King style appears unsuitable for the President for two
principal reasons: It does not fit his manner, and the times probably
would not sustain it. RN clearly has neither the temperament nor the
"bulk" to successfully present himself as a Father-King. The times
do not need a Father-King, because we have to face squarely the prob-
lems confronting the Nation. We need to take the immensity of our
problems and their complexities, and cut them into bite-sized pieces
that can be resolved. The Father-King is not cut out for this kind of
style.
The Philosopher-King. This is the second mask of traditional leader-
ship. The Philosopher-King is primarily concerned with the articulation
of his people's values. Wilson used this style. The young F.D.R. to
some extent successfully used it.
Although there is at present a great need for articulating national
values, I frankly do not believe that the time for such an articulation
is ripe. Putting it more strongly, I do not believe that anyone can
2
presently present any values that would receive acceptance
sufficiently wide so as to make it politically desirable to do SO.
The cultural and ethical divisions in the country prohibit any
unified philosophy from being acceptable. I personally believe
that RN's own convictions that the "tried and true" values still
have a lot of life left in them. I do not believe that the so-called
counter-cultural revolution now taking place will force these values
aside, and ourbare-footed and bearded young will seize the seats of
power. We are at a bend in our cultural history, not a U-turn. More
time must elapse--perhaps a couple of years, perhaps a decade-
before our society sorts out its tensions and competing ideologies
enough so that the Philosopher-King role may be successfully used.
The No-Airs King. This is the Truman or Coolidge stance. Truman's
secret, of course, was to shuck any kingly style whatsoever. His was
the image of the indomitable loser, the blunt and earthy scrapper.
This style, I submit, would be unsuccessful today. It won Truman one
election. I doubt that it would have won him a second. The problem
with this style today is that it is too vulgarian and simpliste. The
Nation's level of sophistication and education has risen to the point
where it would find such a style at best diverting, but not persuasive,
especially in a campaign of some duration.
The Lawyer-King. This is a new style that RN has developed himself.
It consists essentially in problem solving. The Administration presents
itself as a problem-solving administration. Although problem solving
has not been the image of successful presidencies of the past, it appears
that this style is suited to the times and suited to the President.
On merits, I believe that the most responsible role that any President
could assume at our present historical juncture -- even if he had the
temperament and idiosyncracy to be a Father or Philosopher or Non-
King King. We do not need a Daddy because we must face squarely the
real conflicts of our time; we do not need a Philosopher because we
are not capable in our present divisions of accepting the preachments
of any philosopher, no matter how wise; we do not need a Non-King King,
because he really cannot cope with the dimension and intricacy of today's
vexations. We do need a Problem Solver, a level-headed, prudent,
executive. If he is a lawyer at the same time, so much the better.
3
Characteristics of the Lawyer-King. A good Problem-Solver is
unflappable, first, last, and always. Nothing perturbs him. He is
unperturbable because he knows. There is nothing mythic about him.
He does not radiate assurance because of some theatrical charisma;
he is assured and reassuring simply because he has done his home-
work better than anybody else. Nothing frightens him, nothing dis-
turbs him because his briefcase is full of the right memoranda.
There is never any reason for blowing one's cool.
I believe that this style is the right style for the country and for RN's
career. But it must be pursued explicitly and with some passion.
Since "cool" is so much an ingredient of this style, it is somewhat
difficult to build the necessary bulk for a fully realized, three-dimen-
sional, political presence. But RN has been working at this for some
time, wittingly or unwittingly, and so a solid foundation already exists.
The Lawyer-King does not pretend that human mysteries and the
eternal verities are his public interest or strong suit. He works out
of an unshakable faith in the American destiny, and so he believes
that our problems are only that problems. By definition, almost,
problems are solvable. Any difficulty can be overcome. Even the
Congress. Granted that RN wants a Republican Congress, whether
he gets one or not, his problem-solving ability will not be impaired.
Whatever goes wrong only adds another, but, again, a soluble dimen-
sion to any existing problem.
A second chief ingredient of the Problem-Solver is passion, a cool
passion. This is the kind of emotion that suggests reserve power,
an untapped source of strength and conviction whose magnitude is
unlimited. J.F.K. was able to suggest this. It is characterized by
a firmness, an assuredness, and it is rooted in a plenitude of knowl-
edge and information. Again, as stressed above, the Problem-Solver
owes his power to the fact that he knows more than anyone else. This
must not degenerate into smugness or pedantry.
Probably the nearest approximation of the perfect embodiment of the
Problem-Solver as a Platonic ideal in our time was Bob McNamara.
No amount of harassment could disturb a hair of his shiny head. He
presented himself uniformly as omnipotently skilled, patient, and
ahead of everyone else in the room. The trouble with McNamara was
that he appeared to be robotized, and this is the danger of the Problem-
Solver style. It can be caricatured as Halberstam actually did to
4
McNamara. He treated him as being inhumanly cold, cardboard,
two-dimensional, inhuman. I do not believe that RN is as vulnerable
to this type of caricature as McNamara was. It is clearly estab-
lished that RN has strong emotions, even though he is not generally
demonstrative. Here again the foundation that he has built serves
him in good stead.
Caveats. A successful presentation of the Problem-Solver style
requires that there be no petulance, no anxiety, no shrillness
exhibited on RN's part and on the part of any WH Staffer. If we
complain about the Congress, lamenting its inertia, we may score
a small political point, but at the same time in the eye of the beholder,
we are suggesting that Congress has the power to hurt us, to irritate
us. Whatever power the Congress or the Opposition has, is a power
that we freely give to it.
This style also requires that there be no displays of hunger. Neither
RN or the Administration should appear hungry for friendship, es-
pecially with the Press. Faulting the Press, again, may score
political points but only at the expense of telling them and the public
that the media indeed do have a measure of power over us. We cannot
look hurt. We cannot sound hurt. One who can solve all problems,
and knows he can solve all problems, cannot be hurt. So no pointing
of fingers, no shrill assigning of blame.
This is not to say that controlled and cool criticism by some WH Staffers
is undesirable. The point is that it would have to be done very profes-
sionaly and very selectively.
RN has exhibited in certain public addresses a near-perfect Problem-
Solving style as described here. His China Message was practically
flawless. Omnicompetent, restrained, unforced. His Miami accep-
tance speech showed a relaxed confidence, a maturity, a full possession
of himself, his Party, his objectives, and all the facts.
Administration personnel have also exhibited this style superbly,
notably some appearances of Elliot Richardson, John Connally. But
too often we have appeared over-earnest, wanting to be loved "don't
think it's easy to be on top, 11 resentful of and fulminating about the
Opposition. In a word, sweating it. All of this assigns power to the
adversary.
Implications. The Lawyer-King, problem-solving style would have
specific consequences for RN's platform and TV appearances. This
can be discussed.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR
BOB HALDEMAN
RE:
REELECTION CAMPAIGN
The tone or theme:
In spite of all the talk about this being an age of one-term
Presidents, I believe it is very hard for the American people
to turn out a sitting President. Therefore, obviously, the
tone or theme of the campaign must be keyed to the fact that
the President is the President, that he has done a professional
and competent job, that he has made significant accomplishments
and that there is, therefore, no reason to change.
I think people tend to vote against a candidate perhaps more
frequently than they vote for him; and certainly a Presidential
race always weighs a candidate against his opponent. An incumbent
President has an obvious advantage and President Nixon has a very
clear advantage in view of his international initiatives on the question
of "compared to what?
At the same time, the President is the national father figure, the
exemplar, the leader, and the nation's champion against other
nations. This is what the American people believe a President is
and they want him to act out these parts. They want him to evidence
compassion for the poor, even though individually they may say
and do things showing callous disregard for the poor. It is alright
for Mr. Voter to be indifferent to the poor but it is not alright, in
his eyes and mine, for his President to be indifferent to the poor. In
fact, I suspect he gets a certain amount of psychic relieve from the
knowledge that his President is being concerned about the less fortunate
even at the time that he himself is not.
-2-
father
I think it is indispensable for the President to act out these
leader
roles in the course of the next year, with feeling and sincerity,
to fulfill these expectations. To the extent that he does not we
exemplar
will find vague discontents and negative reactions expressed as
narvis
"the President has no compassion, he doesn't care, he is cold
champion
and indifferent, he has no thought for the little people, he only
cares about big business, etc. 11
Since this is role-acting, let's approach it as such. The President
has a natural antipathy for doing the phony, the unnatural and the
not-felt. But we are now not talking about making him comfortable
in what he is doing; we are talking about getting him reelected and,
in looking at that project coldly, there are some things that are
going to have to be done to do the job properly that he may not totally
like. But I am sure he and we would like the alternative even less.
Because I think the alternative is to give exposure to an Achilles
heel to which the President may be attacked mercilessly and effectively
with unknown results,
And like a tennis game, as long as you can return the ball without
mistake every time it doesn't really matter how hard you hit it.
You keep playing for the other llow's mistake. We occupy the
high ground now since the President is the incumbent and all he
has to do is go on being the incumbent. The other fellow has to
figure out how to take the high ground. Therefore, we should avoid
giving him handholds, avoid making mistakes, avoid acting rashly
or without calculation or contemplation (e.g., the re-run of the
Phoenix speech) and close as many of the doors as possible through
which the enemy might enter.
In short, I would like to see the President put in situations which would
act out his compassion, his fairness, his true concern for his inferiors,
his leadership, etc. It does almost no good at all for those of us who
know him well to tell about these things. One acting-out session will
be worth ten thousand interviews with White House staffers or members
of the Cabinet.
But he doesn't get coverage or Credit when he
does do Them unless Their follows up - which
they generally fail to do.
-3-
The President's part in the campaign
We had a good session with the Cabinet yesterday in the
President's absence, and we told them all the things that they
had to do in order to get the President reelected. But I
suspect you know, and I strongly feel, that in the last analysis
it isn't going to make much difference what the Cabinet says or
does. The President himself is going to have to do much more
than he is inclined to do, much more than he would want to do
and probably much more than his responsibilities in fact permit
him safely to do. But nevertheless I think he will have to do them.
Television and Radio
I know there is a concern that the President is over-exposing himself
on television. And yet the singular criticism which I hear as I go
around the country talking the issues to people is that the President
is not talking to them about the issues. The Cabinet is talking to them,
That
the staff is talking to them, Bob Dole is talking to them but they want
the President to talk to them. They want fireside chats. Over and over
again I receive the suggestion that the President sit down and talk to
they
the country about the issues of the time on a periodic basis. so that
they may count regularly on hearing from him not just at times of
crisis but under circumstances that will permit them to pull their
chairs up to the television and listen to him explain to them about the
problems of our aged, health problems, the problems of our youth
and our cities in terms which they can understand and react to.
They Junt dont care.
We have discussed the fireside chat format in the past and I gather
that the ten o'clock meeting or the five o'clock meeting or the Saturday
morning group or somebody doesn't think it's a very good idea. All
I know is that there is considerable consumer demand out there in the
field for this kind of thing. except Everyone the Thanks jt a good idea ?
As a variation on this, let me suggest that we think about this hunger
or market demand in terms of regions. As Ed Harper pointed out to
us in his analysis, the issue of support to parochial schools is a hot
issue in limited areas. The issue of the problems of the aged is almost
completely confined to 8 or 9 states. The farm problem is obviously
localized. Perhaps there is a regional approach to this fireside chat
idea that would prevent the President from becoming over-exposed
nationwide and would avoid whatever disadvantages are inherent in such
over-exposure. problem is that thingsare not vally that
regionalized - and its fiest as much
two
work to doce regional chatasa national
one
-4-
Something like this would have to be started before campaigning
begins in earnest and I know the equal time problem exists, but
I also know there is a very strong pull for this among people who
are thinking about the Presidency and about the nation's problems.
1/10
71%
feleshrate
Personal Appearances
Aside from the fact that it prevents the press from writing that the
President is ducking the people, I don't know that there's a great
deal of advantage in personal appearances during the campaign,
We've always been very big for rallies, crowd shots, motorcades
and balloons but I really seriously question whether they are in any
agree
way important for an incumbent President It may be that we need
some bandwagon psychology but I wouldn't think SO. There are
obvious tolerance maximums in terms of the use of television, but
I think those limitations are perhaps limitations on campaigning
generally then, since I think the idea of the President getting out
and whistle stopping or stumping the nation is doubtful.
New Hampshire
I think I would stay completely away from New Hampshire under the
circumstances. McCloskey may do better than anyone thinks at this
time simply because he is effective up close and can be expected to
make substantial inroads in the meager population of that state by
an intensive hand-shaking and coffee hour campaign. I would think
it's safer simply to take the position that New Hampshire has little or
no significance in terms of the Republican nomination. It happens
to be the first primary but somebody had to be first and it doesn't
stand for anything. We might even play up McCloskey's obvious
advantage in being able to devote unlimited time to hand-shaking in
New Hampshire while the President is busy saving the world.
Mc Closkey's absentee record might be emphasized and our chairman
up there might make the point that it's more important for the President
to be hard at work in the White House than up in New Hampshire trying
to tilt for delegates with some unknown Congressman. If we write it
off now, we don't have to apologize for any results later,
assuming we can bring it off.
-5-
Trips into the Country
I would subscribe to John Whitaker's proposal for more issue-
oriented trips and fewer rallies. I don't think I would go quite as
far as he in degree but I think he has the right idea. He forgets
to make the point that most of these issues are regional in character
and we can pretty well localize our attack on an issue with some
intelligent analysis. But he is certainly right that trips should be
taken to discuss problems.
bad idea -Cause Cerrito effect
Running as an out
up limiting effort
I think John Connally is right that the President has to run as an out,
against the status quo, rather than as a defender of the status quo.
There are simply too many unfulfilled proposals, too many unsolved
problems, too many unsatisfied needs and wants as demonstrated by
the Harris poll. People don't like the way the country is going and
the only way to respond to that discontent is to run against the conditions
which they identify. You have to advocate change under such
circumstances, rather than to run on a platform of accomplishment.
If it's skillfully done, the President can attack his Senator opponent on
the ground that he, the member of Congress, is the defender of the
status quo since the Congress wouldn't change things even though the
President wanted them to. The Senator perpetuated pollution, he
perpetuated poverty, he perpetuated the conditions in the cities which
might have been solved by revenue sharing, etc.
The Catholic Vote
We are operating under a set of assumptions about the Catholic vote
that I suspect are totally invalid. You have seen Roy Morey's
preliminary analysis and Pat Buchanan's seat-of-the-pants emotional
response. I took the position with Buchanan that Morey had made the
prima facie case and it was up to Buchanan to sustain his burden of
proof and I am afraid Pat has not done SO. He has told us with great
fervor what he, Buchanan, believes but he has no answers for the
statistics and polls which indicate the contrary. Because a strongly
pro-Catholic position on some issues costs us votes (as shown by
?
the polls) in the border states and the South, and we are relying on
those areas as part of our base of support, we had better be very
sure of the validity of our assumptions on this subject before we
go much farther.
-6-
The Environment
A somewhat kindred subject is that of the electoral effect of the
environmental issue. There is an instinctive distrust of this
issue by the President. Yet the polls tell us very clearly that it
is a highly important issue and everything that we can develop on
an objective basis tells us over and over again that it is motivating
and significant. If I read the Harris poll correctly (and it would
seem inescapable to me on the basis of this poll) people don't want
"balance" between the environment and the economy. We know that
balance is right, makes good sense from the standpoint of the future
of the country, has to be an important consideration in the things we
do around here, but it will turn off the environmentally oriented voter.
And here we are talking about broadening our base. It's the young,
the women, the middle bracket wage earner who is concerned about
thipolate
pollution in overwhelming numbers.
?
Now, whether we like it or not, and whether the President agrees
emotionally with the evidence or mt, I think we have to be realistic
about this issue and begin to act more politically about it.
On both these points, what I wish to argue is that we are making
emotional responses to these two issues. Rather, we have to be
cold, calculating and thoroughly political in our analysis of the
issues and how to treat them.
Labor
I'm of two minds on this issue and I don't quite know what to suggest.
We need to know a lot more about the situation than we do. We would
like to think that we can make inroads into the labor vote; we would
like to think we can even pick up some labor leaders at the margin wh O
will help us. But we are under heavy attack by our friends at the
moment for being soft on labor, for having sold out to labor on Phase II,
for having tolerated wage increases and strikes to the serious damage
of business and the nation and, in effect, for being "dupes" who have
been taken into camp by labor, largely on a bluff.
--7-
In a minute I am going to mention credibility. We are telling
people not to worry about the China trip and the Russia trip
because the President is tough, he's able to handle them, he
won't be taken in by them and they can't bluff him. It is being
argued that our labor record makes these assertions incredible.
The President or the politician?
To be reelected the President must attract the support of people
who are not party Republicans. The campaign must be inclusive
rather than exclusive. It must bring to him people who are attracted
by that extra ingredient rather than by the forme r Senator from
California. In other words, everyone knows that the President is
a consummate politician and frequently does things for political
reasons. They often assign political reasons to things done for non-
political reasons. There's a sort of rebuttable presumption that
everything the President does is done for political reasons.
My thesis is that he will attract additional support if his campaign is
essentially Presidential and not political. The closerwe get to election
day the harder it will be not to be political; not to say and do the purely
political thing, to drop the Presidential mantle and wade into the fray
at the level of the lowest common denominator. Yet I think that
the strategy can be that of the front runner which was so successfully
employed in the weeks just before the 1968 convention.
Credibility
In thinking about vulnerability, this has to be an avenue that we should
be concerned about. McCloskey is already playing this tune in New
Hampshire, to what effect I don't know. I think many people want to
believe that their government officials are trying to pull a fast one,
trying to slide one by them, trying to get away with something, etc.
I think each time Chuck Colson is caught at one of his escapades or
the Defense Department is nailed on a North Vietnamese pipeline
exhibit or we attempt to excuse some indefensible mistake by a
subordinate we lose some people that we otherwise could have won.
There's no doubt that we're going to be attacked as dishonest and
incredible and I think we have to lean over backward to avoid
creating grounds or even the appearance of grounds for these attacks.
-8-
I think the Bureau of Labor Statistics effort, while right, is going
to cost us in the long run on this score. We're going to have the
same trouble in punishing or firing those guilty of leaking.
Suppression of the truth comes under the general heading of
incredibility. This is a problem we're going to have to deal with
on an almost daily basis, making the best judgment calls we
can but always keeping in mind the overall problem.
Perhaps under this general heading comes the Justice Department
and some of its activities lately.
The Law and Order Issue
The nationwide crime statistics for the last three years have not
been very good. On the other hand, Washington, D. C.'s record
has been excellent, given all the problems of this place. In truth,
the difference is that we have poured an unbelieveable amount of
money into law enforcement in the District and it is governed by a
dictatorship rather than an elected Mayor and City Council. We've
been able to do a lot of things in the management of the city
government that the electorate would never have stood for if they
had had any say in it. And it's gotten results.
I'm not sure how this issue can be handled in the coming campaign.
I suppose one approach would be to point with pride at the city we
have responsibility for and say that big city Democrat Mayors could
do the same thing if they were as good as we are. And we can say
that we've been trying to send more money to the cities in the form
of revenue sharing but the Congress wouldn't let us. But all in all
it is not a good national record and we're going to be on the defensive
in this area and we'd better start laying some plans right now for
meeting the political onslaught. There is no sign that the statistics
are going to get any better in the coming year.
Drugs - key concern, key opportunity &
no headway.
-9-
Civil Rights
There is going to be a major political offensive against us in
the civil rights area and we will have a separate report coming
to the President within a couple of weeks as to the dimension
of this problem and the directions that the attacks probably will
take.
This memorandum started out to be general and ended up being
specific on certain issues. Going back to the general, I think
that the President should "declare peace11 at the start of his campaign,
say that the Vietnam war is at an end as he promised it would be,
that the country is emerging into an era of peace and prosperity
and that we have come through the dark night (please, not nightmare)
with the President's firm hand on the helm. Many, many problems
remain to be solved but now we're in a position to attack them with
the same leadership, vision and courage that has been displayed in
bringing us through the problems of war and recession.
To earn a generation of peace many international problems are yet
to be tackled and it's a very bad time to be thinking about changing
Administrations, particularly when such a good start has been made
by the incumbent President.
We don't try and defend the domestic status quo; we urge that it be
changed and we run against the failures of the Congress (the Democratic
nominee almost surely coming from that body).
I apologize for the rambling nature of the memorandum but we 'll try
and organize this subject matter better for you in succeeding notes.
Jober Ehrlichman
DETERMINED IO BE AN
STRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE
ONLY
F. 120n6, Section 6-102
By OR NAES, Date 3-15-82
SENSITIVE
THE WHITE HOUSE
EYES ONLY
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HERBERT G. KLEIN
I have been asked to give my opinion on the best tone and style of your
campaign for 1972. In this memorandam I will treat both subjects,
and I have added sections presenting some innovative ideas in specific
areas I have not gone into substance or issues because I understand
this is not the purpose of the memorandum.
TONE
The tone must not appear phony or gimmicky in any way. It should
emphasize your strength with the public and not be specifically
directed towards patching up any possible areas of image weakness.
Basically, the tone should bring forth the qualities which the public
most admires in you: the thoughtful, intelligent, bold forceful, and
understanding President who is concerned about people individually
and the world at large. This adds up to a leader who knows the people
and provides strong leadership. The tone should be such that it avoids
any sign of isolation or arrogance anywhere around the President. This
is a President who knows the people and can and does meet them and
listens to them. He is not unwilling, however, to make unpopular deci-
sions if they are in the best interests of the Nation.
You are a man who cares -- and does something about it, The rise in
the polls shows the public reacts to leadership, as particularly illus-
trated by Phase II. The tone should include continued emphasis on
visible programs which demonstrate strong leadership.
STYLE
First, I will look at timing and then examine style more specifically.
1. Primaries and pre-convention. I would recommend carrying on
the 1971 style of the Presidency, emphasizing the functions of the Nation's
leader. This would mean not going into primary States to campaign,
but would not exclude a few non-political appearances in key States
several weeks before the elections.
CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE ETRS ONLY
CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE -EYES ONLY
-2-
This presumes the obvious--that we will have no serious primary
trouble.
2. The convention. I suggest that the President arrive in
San Clemente a few days before the convention. Prior to that time,
he could spend time at Camp David meditating and working. During
the convention, it is suggested that John Mitchell stay in the fore-
front and that I handle the Nixon Headquarters press as at past con-
ventions, stirring interest and support and building news. This would
be an operation from the Nixon Headquarters Hotel--the White House
press would be in San Clemente with Ron Ziegler and working from
there. After the convention, I would suggest holding sessions in
San Clemente like those we held at Mission Bay, at least through
Labor Day. I would recommend that the President then return to
Washington to spend the next two weeks concentrating on the official
burdens of the Presidency rather than the campaign.
3. The full campaign should include a combination of seeing
the President in office and the President as an active campaigner.
I do not believe a push-button campaign would be helpful. You need to
campaign publicly DO as to negate any issue of isolation and to stir up
the public as only you can do in your campaign appearances. A cam-
paign trip coupled with some well selected side trips which illustrates
concern for the people can be a tower of strength.
In all of this, we should stress Richard Nixon as a man--a man of
peace and a leader for peace, a man who is concerned and does some-
thing about it, a strong leader who knows when and where to act and
who knows where the Nation is heading. This adds up to a unifier,
a leader, a strong man with a steady hand at the helm.
SPECIFICS
I would start in January with an emphasis on domestic concerns. This,
of course, includes the State of the Union, but I believe it should also
feature a short television speech in which the President reports on
his three years of United States leadership, his programs and their
directions.
In February, or perhaps March, I presume you will probably visit Peking,
and the Moscow trip will come in May. This will give foreign policy
impetus. Following each visit, I would strongly urge a television report,
a televised press conference, a prominent speech and possibly a reasonable
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question and answer session with local people selected from communities
in areas of importance.
Perhaps there should be two of these after each, trip emphasizing "the
Prosident answers the people's questions. =
The conventions in July and August will dominate the news.
In the Fall, as I have said earlier, I would hope that we would see a
combination of an active Presidency and a strong campaign.
Throughout the year, special attention should be given to invitations to
foreign visitors. The President needs to meet them, not only on a
policy basis, but also on the basis of those who would do most to help
with politically favorable headlines.
On a point of technique, I would opt for fewer television spots and more
5-minute visits with the President. . the President at his desk, for
example. All television use should be keyed to informality. Even at
rallies, informality should be the rule.
In the thesis that you are a President who cares and unifies, we need to
develop visible programs which bring the President together with Blacks,
with the young and with the "average man." In the minority community,
I am not sure how many votes this will gain, but I believe the idea that
you are trying will gain votes among the majority.
We know that regional impact is very important. I would include regional
television and more regional press briefings, as we have done in the last
two years. Further, a regional emphasis with selected vocal Cabinet
officers would be good.
In our stress on the Presidency, we cannot ignorethe need to also make
campaign news. Certainly, your opponent will be doing this.
We must do all possible to make certain that this again will be a quiet
summer because that is essential to the theme of unity. I wonder if we
have special people taking soundings in the inner cities and on the campuses
to ensure this.
INNOVATIONS
I believe the President will have to participate in some rallies and I think
most of these should be in the area where people live, not at the airport.
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Instead of the traditional rally speech, I would suggest experimenting
with a format which would include a brief talk (10-15 minutes) and then
feature questions from a panel of leaders for anywhere from 20-50
minutes.
If the questions are tough, (you will recall that even in appearances
such as ASNE, the answers can draw cheers, as can a speech line)
this informal format would make better television, would keep news-
men at a greater peak of interest and would be sensational with the audi-
once. I believe it would also build worker enthusiasm and admiration.
If this is to be done, occasional press conferences would also be
required to avoid the charge that you only answer the questions of
selected people. Answers to questions at the regional briefings would
serve a similar purpose.
I would renew the regional television a & A panels such as those in
1968.
Before the campaign reaches an emotional peak, I would suggest that
the President visibly meet with problem groups--farmers, Blacks,
etc. The gain here would be an impression of a President who cares,
who seeks the answers and is willing to listen.
I would suggest that the President drop in on one or two college class-
rooms during the early Spring and without prior announcement. With
pool newsmen observing, the President could answer questions from the
students. Something similar could be done with a group of non-College
students, perhaps through an organization such as DEMOLAY or possibly
even a Billy Graham youth meeting. Our opponents at that time would
be too tied up with their own fights to react quickly to this technique.
We should do all possible to utilize the religious support the President
has. Billy Graham, of course, is our greatest asset in this area, but
I believe there should be additional church services and that perhaps
we could devise a way to gain more attention for them through the
selection of particular ministers. Any minister who speaks there, of
course, has great regional news impact. I believe that the President
should concentrate his efforts in working with opinion leaders (media
groups, businessmen, industry leaders, etc. )--all should be carefully
selected.
Another major point of emphasis should be human interests, such as can
be generated by side trips during outside appearances by the President
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PROBLEMS
I hesitate to say this because, as you know, J. Edgar Hoover is a
friend of mine and certainly is a great friend of yours. I do believe,
however, that he now is in a position where he can be a political
problem. He can hurt not only the President, but can damage himself
and the FBI by staying on. I believe, as things stay quiet, that
retirement at his birthday with an announcement made well ahead
would be a fine solution. I am sure you would want him to stay on
as a consultant.
With emphasis on law and order, we cannot afford to have a continuous
FBI controversy. This also places great pressure on selecting a
successor who would not draw Carswell-type trouble.
Other potential problem areas which could turn either way of course
include most of the obvious; this summer, the economy, crime and
scandals unknown at this time.
CONCLUSION
Tone -- thoughtful, strong.
Style -- bold, innovative, the Presidency at America's proud best.
cc: H. R. Haldeman
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