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This file contains:
From Patrick J. Buchanan to The President. RE: A discussion of problem areas in the President's campaign that could lessen his lead over McGovern. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/9/1972
From Bruce Kehrli to Haldeman. RE: A message which reads: "For your political meeting. No copies have been distributed." 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 10/10/1972
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The overall positive reaction in response to President Nixon's campaign trips. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The Nixon "trips", and the media's coverage of "technique" rather than "substance." 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Message that states: "At Chapin and Higby's suggestion, I asked several people for their impressions of the P's campaign swing, etc." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
Indecipherable handwritten note dealing with "key impressions." 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
An opinion based report from Ambassador George Bush that details his impressions of the President's 2-day visit to New York and California. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Critique of the First Campaign Swing. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to The Honorable Clark MacGregor. RE: The President's Trip to New York and California. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: "RN's Campaigning in New York and California." 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
A brief account of John Sears' experience on the first week of Nixon's campaign for reelection. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The concern over Nixon's "inconsistency" in his speeches, and how the American public views Nixon's handeling of foreign affairs. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: The reaction to the President's trip to New York and California, based on accounts from the New York Times and Washington Post. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The New York-California trips, and the media's focus on the "techniques" of the campaign, both with regards to Nixon and McGovern. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The assessment of the President's trip to both New York and California as having neither gained nor lost ground. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From Daniel P. Moynihan to Haldeman. RE: The President's trip to New York and California, and Moynihan's conclusion that while the President demonstrated his campaigning skills, his misstatements could come back to haunt him. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: Several reasons why Nixon's political trip cannot be considered a political winner. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: Nixon's trips to Texas, New York, and California, and their overall successes. 2 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Message that reads: "The balance of isolated issues and thoughts…are described on two additional pages." 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 8/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Message that reads: "The 4 best/4 worst strategy memoranda are tallied in the attached." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 8/9/1972
A detailed report entitled: "President Nixon- Senator McGovern Strong/Weak Issues." 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The possible weak points of Nixon's campaign that McGovern could potentially utilize as a means to discredit his bid for reelection. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
A report detailing the four best issues for Nixon and the four worst issues for McGovern. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Campaign Issues, including Nixon's best (peace, domestic tranquility, balance, and a solid economy), and McGovern's worst (the candidate himself, socializing America, etc). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE: The campaign strategy that highlights Nixon's best issues, and McGovern's best and worst issues. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: Issues for the fall campaign from both the McGovern and Nixon points of view. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE: "The response to August 7, 1972, Issue Memorandum." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: Issues in the campaign that include discussions of Nixon's best positive and best negative issues. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: "Issues--Positive and Negative." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
From Len Garment to Bob Haldeman. RE: Nixon's best issues that include: The "Nixon Doctrine", the SALT breakthrough, reduced defense expenditures and draft calls, and the honorable withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
Len Garment's "Notes on the Acceptance Speech", which details assumptions made about McGovern's strategies and tactics that he'll likely use against Nixon. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From B. Harlow to Haldeman. RE: Answers to the August 7 memorandum concerning the positives and negatives of McGovern and Nixon as presidential candidates. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Dick Moore to Larry Higby. RE: A detailed explanation of Nixon's four key issues, and McGovern's four key issues. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: Whitaker's thoughts on the four issues raised in Larry Higby's memo on August 7. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: 1972, and the four best and worst issues that Nixon faces in his bid for reelection. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to Haldeman. RE: Nixon/McGovern Strong/Weak Issues. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
DEX-Information Sheet listing: The origionators location, addreses location, etc. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: Four Crow Points and Four Attack Points for RN and McGovern. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: Issues in the fall campaign, including Sargent Shriver's possible candidacy as McGovern's running mate. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Bill Safire to Larry Higby. RE: The best and worst campaign issues for Nixon and McGovern. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/9/1972
From Larry Higby to Mr. Sears. RE: Nixon's four best and worst issues facing him in the upcoming campaign against McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry Higby's memo of July 19 concerning what role Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie would play in the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Al Haig to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry Higby's request of July 19 that there be more of a focus on domestic issues in the campaign. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Addendum to the Memorandum of July 20. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: The television coverage of the convention, and the possibility of violence in the streets afterward. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: Campaign strategies that include: Targeting McGovern, not the Democrats, appealing to dissident Democrats, and creating non-partisan forums. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
An outline for the Keynote Presentation regarding the film, "The Nixon Years." 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], 7/16/1972
Notes on the Keynote Outline, and on the Invitation that include: Structure, advantages, convention follow-up, and TV coverage. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 7/16/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The First Family Scheduling. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman and John. D. Ehrlichman. RE: Nixon's campaign strategy, and how he should proceed in the campaign from now until November. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Larry Higby to John Whitaker. RE: A request by Higby to forward Nixon's campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/19/1972
From Dwight L. Chapin to Larry Higby. RE: Comments made about the July 19 memorandum concerning campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The update on the June 16 campaign memo. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: The update on Nixon's campaign strategy (In light of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From John Scali to Haldeman. RE: The Election Strategy Addendum. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Bryce Harlow to Larry Higby. RE: Follow-up on the campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE: Nixon's campaign strategy, and the need for the surrogates and the government apparatus to involve themselves in the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145842
label
WHSF: Contested, 21-3
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145842
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 21-3
description
This file contains:
From Patrick J. Buchanan to The President. RE: A discussion of problem areas in the President's campaign that could lessen his lead over McGovern. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/9/1972
From Bruce Kehrli to Haldeman. RE: A message which reads: "For your political meeting. No copies have been distributed." 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 10/10/1972
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The overall positive reaction in response to President Nixon's campaign trips. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The Nixon "trips", and the media's coverage of "technique" rather than "substance." 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE: Message that states: "At Chapin and Higby's suggestion, I asked several people for their impressions of the P's campaign swing, etc." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
Indecipherable handwritten note dealing with "key impressions." 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
An opinion based report from Ambassador George Bush that details his impressions of the President's 2-day visit to New York and California. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Critique of the First Campaign Swing. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to The Honorable Clark MacGregor. RE: The President's Trip to New York and California. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: "RN's Campaigning in New York and California." 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
A brief account of John Sears' experience on the first week of Nixon's campaign for reelection. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The concern over Nixon's "inconsistency" in his speeches, and how the American public views Nixon's handeling of foreign affairs. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: The reaction to the President's trip to New York and California, based on accounts from the New York Times and Washington Post. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The New York-California trips, and the media's focus on the "techniques" of the campaign, both with regards to Nixon and McGovern. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The assessment of the President's trip to both New York and California as having neither gained nor lost ground. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/28/1972
From Daniel P. Moynihan to Haldeman. RE: The President's trip to New York and California, and Moynihan's conclusion that while the President demonstrated his campaigning skills, his misstatements could come back to haunt him. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: Several reasons why Nixon's political trip cannot be considered a political winner. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: Nixon's trips to Texas, New York, and California, and their overall successes. 2 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/29/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Message that reads: "The balance of isolated issues and thoughts…are described on two additional pages." 2 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 8/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE: Message that reads: "The 4 best/4 worst strategy memoranda are tallied in the attached." 1 pg. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Memo], 8/9/1972
A detailed report entitled: "President Nixon- Senator McGovern Strong/Weak Issues." 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The possible weak points of Nixon's campaign that McGovern could potentially utilize as a means to discredit his bid for reelection. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
A report detailing the four best issues for Nixon and the four worst issues for McGovern. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: 1972 Campaign Issues, including Nixon's best (peace, domestic tranquility, balance, and a solid economy), and McGovern's worst (the candidate himself, socializing America, etc). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE: The campaign strategy that highlights Nixon's best issues, and McGovern's best and worst issues. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: Issues for the fall campaign from both the McGovern and Nixon points of view. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE: "The response to August 7, 1972, Issue Memorandum." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: Issues in the campaign that include discussions of Nixon's best positive and best negative issues. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: "Issues--Positive and Negative." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
From Len Garment to Bob Haldeman. RE: Nixon's best issues that include: The "Nixon Doctrine", the SALT breakthrough, reduced defense expenditures and draft calls, and the honorable withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
Len Garment's "Notes on the Acceptance Speech", which details assumptions made about McGovern's strategies and tactics that he'll likely use against Nixon. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From B. Harlow to Haldeman. RE: Answers to the August 7 memorandum concerning the positives and negatives of McGovern and Nixon as presidential candidates. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Dick Moore to Larry Higby. RE: A detailed explanation of Nixon's four key issues, and McGovern's four key issues. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE: Whitaker's thoughts on the four issues raised in Larry Higby's memo on August 7. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: 1972, and the four best and worst issues that Nixon faces in his bid for reelection. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to Haldeman. RE: Nixon/McGovern Strong/Weak Issues. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
DEX-Information Sheet listing: The origionators location, addreses location, etc. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE: Four Crow Points and Four Attack Points for RN and McGovern. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: Issues in the fall campaign, including Sargent Shriver's possible candidacy as McGovern's running mate. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/8/1972
From Bill Safire to Larry Higby. RE: The best and worst campaign issues for Nixon and McGovern. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/9/1972
From Larry Higby to Mr. Sears. RE: Nixon's four best and worst issues facing him in the upcoming campaign against McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/7/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry Higby's memo of July 19 concerning what role Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie would play in the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Al Haig to Haldeman. RE: Campaign Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry Higby's request of July 19 that there be more of a focus on domestic issues in the campaign. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Addendum to the Memorandum of July 20. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: The television coverage of the convention, and the possibility of violence in the streets afterward. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: Campaign strategies that include: Targeting McGovern, not the Democrats, appealing to dissident Democrats, and creating non-partisan forums. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
An outline for the Keynote Presentation regarding the film, "The Nixon Years." 3 pgs. [Subject: Domestic Policy] [Other Document], 7/16/1972
Notes on the Keynote Outline, and on the Invitation that include: Structure, advantages, convention follow-up, and TV coverage. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 7/16/1972
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The First Family Scheduling. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman and John. D. Ehrlichman. RE: Nixon's campaign strategy, and how he should proceed in the campaign from now until November. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Larry Higby to John Whitaker. RE: A request by Higby to forward Nixon's campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/19/1972
From Dwight L. Chapin to Larry Higby. RE: Comments made about the July 19 memorandum concerning campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The update on the June 16 campaign memo. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: The update on Nixon's campaign strategy (In light of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From John Scali to Haldeman. RE: The Election Strategy Addendum. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Bryce Harlow to Larry Higby. RE: Follow-up on the campaign strategy. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE: Nixon's campaign strategy, and the need for the surrogates and the government apparatus to involve themselves in the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
10/9/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Patrick J. Buchanan to The President.
RE: A discussion of problem areas in the
President's campaign that could lessen his
lead over McGovern. 3 pgs.
21
3
10/10/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Bruce Kehrli to Haldeman. RE: A
message which reads: "For your political
meeting. No copies have been distributed." 1
pg.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The
overall positive reaction in response to
President Nixon's campaign trips. 2 pgs.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The
Nixon "trips", and the media's coverage of
"technique" rather than "substance." 2 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 1 of 12
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Haldeman. RE:
Message that states: "At Chapin and Higby's
suggestion, I asked several people for their
impressions of the P's campaign swing, etc."
1 pg.
21
3
White House Staff
Other Document
Indecipherable handwritten note dealing with
"key impressions." 1 pg.
21
3
Campaign
Report
An opinion based report from Ambassador
George Bush that details his impressions of
the President's 2-day visit to New York and
California. 1 pg.
21
3
9/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: Critique
of the First Campaign Swing. 2 pgs.
21
3
9/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert M. Teeter to The Honorable
Clark MacGregor. RE: The President's Trip
to New York and California. 2 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 2 of 12
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
9/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE:
"RN's Campaigning in New York and
California." 3 pgs.
21
3
Campaign
Other Document
A brief account of John Sears' experience on
the first week of Nixon's campaign for
reelection. 1 pg.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Len Garment to Haldeman. RE: The
concern over Nixon's "inconsistency" in his
speeches, and how the American public
views Nixon's handeling of foreign affairs. 1
pg.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: The
reaction to the President's trip to New York
and California, based on accounts from the
New York Times and Washington Post. 1 pg.
21
3
9/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The New
York-California trips, and the media's focus
on the "techniques" of the campaign, both
with regards to Nixon and McGovern. 3 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 3 of 12
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
9/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE: The
assessment of the President's trip to both
New York and California as having neither
gained nor lost ground. 3 pgs.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Daniel P. Moynihan to Haldeman. RE:
The President's trip to New York and
California, and Moynihan's conclusion that
while the President demonstrated his
campaigning skills, his misstatements could
come back to haunt him. 1 pg.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE:
Several reasons why Nixon's political trip
cannot be considered a political winner. 2
pgs.
21
3
9/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE:
Nixon's trips to Texas, New York, and
California, and their overall successes. 2 pg.
21
3
8/10/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE:
Message that reads: "The balance of isolated
issues and thoughts are described on two
additional pages." 2 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 4 of 12
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
8/9/1972
Domestic Policy
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to Larry Higby. RE:
Message that reads: "The 4 best/4 worst
strategy memoranda are tallied in the
attached." 1 pg.
21
3
Campaign
Report
A detailed report entitled: "President Nixon-
Senator McGovern Strong/Weak Issues." 8
pgs.
21
3
8/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Pat Buchanan to Haldeman. RE: The
possible weak points of Nixon's campaign
that McGovern could potentially utilize as a
means to discredit his bid for reelection. 3
pgs.
21
3
Campaign
Report
A report detailing the four best issues for
Nixon and the four worst issues for
McGovern. 5 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: 1972
Campaign Issues, including Nixon's best
(peace, domestic tranquility, balance, and a
solid economy), and McGovern's worst (the
candidate himself, socializing America, etc).
2 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 5 of 12
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE:
The campaign strategy that highlights
Nixon's best issues, and McGovern's best and
worst issues. 3 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ken Cole to Haldeman. RE: Issues for
the fall campaign from both the McGovern
and Nixon points of view. 2 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Dwight L. Chapin to Haldeman. RE:
"The response to August 7, 1972, Issue
Memorandum." 2 pgs.
21
3
8/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Charles Colson to Haldeman. RE:
Issues in the campaign that include
discussions of Nixon's best positive and best
negative issues. 3 pgs.
21
3
8/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE:
"Issues--Positive and Negative." 4 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 6 of 12
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Len Garment to Bob Haldeman. RE:
Nixon's best issues that include: The "Nixon
Doctrine", the SALT breakthrough, reduced
defense expenditures and draft calls, and the
honorable withdrawal of the U.S. from
Vietnam. 3 pgs.
21
3
Campaign
Other Document
Len Garment's "Notes on the Acceptance
Speech", which details assumptions made
about McGovern's strategies and tactics that
he'll likely use against Nixon. 3 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From B. Harlow to Haldeman. RE: Answers
to the August 7 memorandum concerning the
positives and negatives of McGovern and
Nixon as presidential candidates. 2 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dick Moore to Larry Higby. RE: A
detailed explanation of Nixon's four key
issues, and McGovern's four key issues. 3
pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman. RE:
Whitaker's thoughts on the four issues raised
in Larry Higby's memo on August 7.3 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
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3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: 1972, and
the four best and worst issues that Nixon
faces in his bid for reelection. 4 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert M. Teeter to Haldeman. RE:
Nixon/McGovern Strong/Weak Issues. 4 pgs.
21
3
White House Staff
Other Document
DEX-Information Sheet listing: The
origionators location, addreses location, etc.
1 pg.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John McLaughlin to Haldeman. RE:
Four Crow Points and Four Attack Points for
RN and McGovern. 4 pgs.
21
3
8/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE:
Issues in the fall campaign, including Sargent
Shriver's possible candidacy as McGovern's
running mate. 2 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
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3
8/9/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bill Safire to Larry Higby. RE: The
best and worst campaign issues for Nixon
and McGovern. 2 pgs.
21
3
8/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Larry Higby to Mr. Sears. RE: Nixon's
four best and worst issues facing him in the
upcoming campaign against McGovern. 1 pg.
21
3
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry
Higby's memo of July 19 concerning what
role Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie would play
in the campaign. 2 pgs.
21
3
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Al Haig to Haldeman. RE: Campaign
Strategy Recommendations. 4 pgs.
21
3
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE: Larry
Higby's request of July 19 that there be more
of a focus on domestic issues in the
campaign. 5 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
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7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman. RE:
Addendum to the Memorandum of July 20. 1
pg.
21
3
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bill Safire to Haldeman. RE: The
television coverage of the convention, and
the possibility of violence in the streets
afterward. 1 pg.
21
3
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: Campaign
strategies that include: Targeting McGovern,
not the Democrats, appealing to dissident
Democrats, and creating non-partisan
forums. 2 pgs.
21
3
7/16/1972
Domestic Policy
Other Document
An outline for the Keynote Presentation
regarding the film, "The Nixon Years." 3 pgs.
21
3
7/16/1972
Campaign
Other Document
Notes on the Keynote Outline, and on the
Invitation that include: Structure, advantages,
convention follow-up, and TV coverage. 3
pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
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7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ray Price to Haldeman. RE: The First
Family Scheduling. 2 pgs.
21
3
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John C. Whitaker to Haldeman and
John. D. Ehrlichman. RE: Nixon's campaign
strategy, and how he should proceed in the
campaign from now until November. 8 pgs.
21
3
7/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Larry Higby to John Whitaker. RE: A
request by Higby to forward Nixon's
campaign strategy. 1 pg.
21
3
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Dwight L. Chapin to Larry Higby. RE:
Comments made about the July 19
memorandum concerning campaign strategy.
1 pg.
21
3
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to Haldeman. RE: The
update on the June 16 campaign memo. 1 pg.
Monday, April 04, 2011
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7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Finch to Haldeman. RE: The
update on Nixon's campaign strategy (In light
of the Democratic Convention). 2 pgs.
21
3
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John Scali to Haldeman. RE: The
Election Strategy Addendum. 2 pgs.
21
3
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bryce Harlow to Larry Higby. RE:
Follow-up on the campaign strategy. 1 pg.
21
3
7/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ken W. Clawson to Haldeman. RE:
Nixon's campaign strategy, and the need for
the surrogates and the government apparatus
to involve themselves in the campaign. 2 pgs.
Monday, April 04, 2011
Page 12 of 12
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1972
POLITICAL MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
With four weeks to go the political situation seems to have stabilized.
With McGovern not moving as dramatically as necessary; indeed hardly
moving at all, according to Harris.
The following are what I see as potential problem areas for us politically,
which could cause a rapid dissipation of the present lead.
1)
Sam Ervin & the Watergate. Should a Congressional hearing be
called the focus of the campaign could be turned off of the "negatives" of
McGovern onto our "negatives." Given the present disposition of the
national media the major domos are disappointed in the lack of a contest
and enraged and frustrated by RN's above-the-battle tactics -- the hearings
would be the most celebrated since Army-McCarthy.
2)
The McGovern anti-Nixon Commercials. McGovern's people
seem finallyto have come to the conclusion that their best hope lies not so
much in resurrecting their candidate's image -- they don't have the time
but in tearing down our man. My guess is that they will be extremely rough,
and if they are not overdone, fairly effective.
My personal view is that we ought to, now, go on a crash program for some
more anti-McGovern commericals to keep in stock.
Beyond that, the latest poll is certain to put pressure on McGovern; and
given the fact that his three most sensitive points seem to be Vietnam,
(he is proud of his "consistency) Eagleton and "credibility," maybe we ought
to begin moving, with some of our surrogates, in a more direct way.
If we can get him talking and arguing about these -- we do well. Frankly,
I would like to see the entire Eagleton business, which is such a loser for
McGovern, re-elevated by some of our people.
-2-
Back to the commercials momentarily HHH's anti-Nixon commercials
were brutal in my judgment, but effective and we should expect that
McGovern's will go after the "scandal", "corrupt" issues and if they
are smart they will not use their principal, McGovern, as they have
mistakenly in the past, to act as the Prosecutor.
3)
A sharp McGovern movement upward in the polls could conceivably
cause a reverse leverage on the "analyses" and "polls" and "local statements¹
which are right now so damaging to him. Every time a newspaper or survey
goes out they come in with startling negative returns for McGovern. And
every time a local pol speaks off the record it seems, he raps George.
This has to hurt in community after community if McGovern starts up,
however, this will reverse and one will find poll after poll saying "McGovern
closing the gap. 11 While the possibility recedes with each week, the
possibility remains of the "comeback" theme catching with the press and
public.
4)
The apathetic electorate and the low turnout. Though the liberal
press has egg on its face now, for its earlier discussion of aroused and
alienated electorate looking for McGovern's kind of politics, there seems to
be some truth in the possibility of a low turnout, over-confident Republicans,
and a McGovern-hard-core maximizing his vote, while we minimize ours.
We ought to be giving this problem serious consideration although I do
not believe it at all calls for RN to hit the stump at this point in time.
5)
The media hostility. One has to have seen Agronsky & Co. to
visualize it. Since the Broder column there has been piece after piece,
taking up the theme that RN has "outwitted" the press, that he is using the
enormous resources of the White House to such effect that it is no contest;
that McGovern is at an unfair disadvantage; that the President is ignoring the
i ssues, playing above-the-battle, refusing to "engage" in campaign debate,
even by long distance, and to top it all appears headed for a landslide
which the press can do nothing about. If one took a poll of the press corps,
I would guess that ninety-five to one hundred percent want to see the gap
closed.
Recognizing that they are negatively disposed to our campaign at this point,
<
and anxious to leap on any embarrassment perhaps we should give
consideration to an offensive media strategy to feed the animals, so they
aren't chewing on us the rest of the campaign.
Dont' know what we have of substance coming down the pike but the more
of that the better. One notes that RN's Texas visit which had some substance
to it was played extremely well and the NY to LA jaunt was played equally
badly. We should be thinking of something to give these fellows to write and
talk about rather than bemoaning our "lack" of a campaign.
-3-
THOUGHTS & SUGGESTIONS:
A)
We ought to have adopted in advance a strategy for the McGovern
ads, whether to ignore them -- or attack them as "smear" -- hopefully
they will be so bad that they will indict themselves. But it would be serious
for us, I think, if McGovern's ads succeeded in moving the focus off of
McGovern's screw-ups and incompetence and his radicalism -- which should
be the last four weeks of this campaign.
B)
We should be planning now -- not locking in, however -- some
election eve, Saturday, Sunday, Monday type drills, which are certain to
C reate massive national interest and participation in the election -- by our
folks. We do need to have our troops excited more out there -- they do need
to get stirred up -- and given the Presidential podium, one can get the
national attention with relative ease.
C)
In two weeks or perhaps three, the time may be ripe to be calling --
not for a mandate for RN but for a repudiation of McGovern by Democrats.
On thes grounds, we should move out the line that the McGovernites have
given up; they are interested only in a large vote to control the party
machinery -- and a Connally and Meany and Fitzsimmons and other Democrats
can all call for a national "repudiation of extremism" -- so that the Great
Democratic Party can be restored to its rightful owners, the American
people. Cast a Vote Against Extremism kind of theme -- something that
will convince Democrats that if McGovern even comes close their party is
gone from them forever.
D)
If we can contain McGovern for twenty more days even, or two
more weeks, assuredly there is a fail-safe point at which local Democrats
have to jump off and start pushing out their split-ticket sample ballots; with
sort of an every-man-for-himself philosophy taking over. That almost
but did not happen with Humphrey -- as the unions never deserted him.
But if McGovern is hanging where he was last -- two or three weeks from
now it could startwith him.
E)
The President should stay out of the attack business altogether,
as of now. This still looks good. Also, the President of all the People,
standing up for America, is something disgruntled and even anti-Nixon
Democrats can vote for -- if the rest of us can keep McGovern painted as
an incompetent and opportunistic radical -- who would do or say anything
to win. With McGovern's recent horrible charges he has diminished the
possibility of his becoming a sympathetic figure, a martyr, which leaves
us some room for toughening the attacks on him.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date 10-10-72
TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
BAd
For your political meeting. No copies
have been distributed.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMO TO:
H. R. Haldeman
FROM:
Harry S. Dent
SUBJECT:
Trip reaction
My personal assessment, and those I'm picking up in the field
on my trips, indicate the President's initial forays into Texas,
New York and California were highly effective. The only
negatives - except in Texas, as I shall detail momentarily -
seemed to be limited to technicalities.
The following evaluation on specifics is the result of conversation
with Burdell Bixby, campaign director for New York; Gordan Luce,
Vice chairman of CREP in California, and Eric Jonsson, chairman,
Texas CREP.
Positively, the highest scoring points included the Laredo trip
and its enthusiastic reception, the identification with the ethnics
through the remarks at the Statue of Liberty, and the speech
before the Cancer group in California. The common feeling was
that these events showed the President in warm settings,
graphically demonstrating his concern and being received by
"little" people. These events provided a focus apart from the
fund-raisers, which, while necessary, don't get an overwhelmingly
positive reaction from the public.
Eric Jonsson felt - and is picking up this attitude in Texas - that the
visit to the Connally ranch resulted in a negative reaction from
the general public, because the angle that came over was not
so much that the President was meeting with Democrats as with
"oil-soaked fatcats. 11 I have noted this nationally. Jonsson said
Texas Republicans have stretched to accept the Connally base,
but feel they are being written off as important to the President's
desire to win Texas.
As I indicated, the only other negatives are of a technical nature.
In New York, there was a mix-up on press credentials, and some
H.R. Haldeman
September 29, 1972
Page Two
complaints from motorists because East Side Drive was tied
up. That may have been done by the City of New York.
Bixby felt that the President came out very well on the situation
with the demonstrators, and that "he strengthened his lead in
New York. 11
California press has given particularly good play to the Cancer
speech.
So, perhaps I could summarize the conversations this way:
1. The President needs to be identified with the "average"
people on his trips. Occasionally it would be helpful for him
to see lower echelon campaign volunteers.
2. He comes across very strongly on a personal level,
and plenty of visibility in personal settings is the best rebuttal
to the McGovern charge that RN is "unloved."
3. On balance, the trips had positive impact.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Judging from national and Washington media, the trip cannot be
judged a political winner. Several reasons. First, the TV types,
Rather, Pierpoint, Jarriel, and Mackin focus either on "technique"
as opposed to substance, or see themselves as Vox Populi with
responsibility for either rebutting or questioning any statment they
feel is not precise. Last night we were not helped in the least by
Miss Mackin's arrogant piece in which she assumed the nation
was more interested in her analysis of what the President said,
than in what the President said. Further, there were too many
fund-raising records broken, which got enormous coverage, and
one wonders whether that was to our benefit. Third, the President
was seen too often in campaign environment, which is never as
effective as the Presidential environment it tends to put us on
a level with McGovern. Further, the media tries to arrange a long-
range debate, in the absence of a live one and so anything RN
says is seen as challenging or answering McGovern. If the
reporters would get out of the way of the story, and let RN
communicate directly with the people, we would have no problem
but clearly they will not, especially the television types.
Had this been 1968 we would probably have been hurt worse. What
we have going for us, however, is that the average American is
sensitized to the media bias and nit-picking, and the media's own
credibility has dropped handsomely.
Final point: If we have something of substance to say, hard news,
this can often force the TV folks to cover it directly but if it
is straight campaign rhetoric, repeating what has been said a
number of times before, we should go without. The Texas trip was
the success that this one was not -- because there was something
there of greater weight than the appearance at the Statue of Liberty.
-2-
Lastly, the best campaigning the President can do is be seen
clearly in the role of President dealing with the nation's
business in the nation and the world. The Oval Office is a far
more effective backdrop to meeting with Jewish leaders and
labor leaders than the third floor of the Waldorf Astoria -- and
we can make the front page of the LATimes from here as well
as there.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
9/29
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
at Orapin and
Higby's suggestion, 1
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theirimpressions of the
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treattached Buchanan, Chotiner,
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submit comments eatertoday.
9/28
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him
The following are Ambassador George Bush's impressions
of the President's 2-day visit to New York and California:
The Ambassador thought that the New York trip was quite
well presented in the press, but he felt the Soviet Jewry
issue was somewhat of a problem because of the press
coverage: Ambassador Bush feels that the President's
position on the issue of Soviet Jewry is good and that
the Administration should stay with it and not demagogue
this issue. The Ambassador feels it's better to improve
relations with Russia and thus be in a better position to
help correct the inequities that the Jewish community may
feel Russian Jews are suffering.
The Ambassador felt the President's remarks at the Dinner
were very effective and that the overall effect and
impression of the Dinner was very good. Having the young
people there was good. Ambassador Bush saw many Democrats
in attendance at the Dinner and thought that there was a
very good political mix of people. He was very encouraged
to see the number of Democrats that he did.
The Ambassador has no real judgment on the California trip.
His impressions are only taken from a fleeting reading of
the newspapers.
The Ambassador feels that destructive hecklers such as
those who broke the window of the Nixon Headquarters on
Madison Avenue help the President rather than hurt him.
Not mentioning McGovern's name is effective, particularly
when it's done by somebody with the stature of the President.
It's not always possible for lesser candidates to pull that
off very well.
The theme of continuity which the President stressed at the
Dinner in New York has a strong appeal to the American
people. The Ambassador thinks that talking about the
importance of continuing the job which has already been
started is very effective.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 28, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
RE:
Critique of First Campaign Swing
If we were in any sort of contest, the first two days' campaigning
would be cause for alarm.
These were the impressions a normal person would get from the
activities:
1. The President went out to raise money. The huge head-
line in the New York Daily News, no liberal bastion, was "Nixon In
Town To Raise Funds. 11 Since over 2 million copies of that headline
circulated in an area of 15 million people, it can be safely said that
the negative message got across to the greater metropolitan area.
In Washington, the Star headline was "Nixon Raises $7 Million" and
that carried also on radio and TV. On the positive side, the young
people theme at the dinner went well.
The other story in New York, the Statue of Liberty visit,
got good pictures but a bad play. The demonstrators left a bad taste.
What I saw on television was a fairly obvious message from the
President about how patriotic immigrants are -- very political, no
uplift. Looked like a cover to his fundraising appearance.
The meeting with Jewish leaders came across well, with the
"no harsh confrontation" theme predominant.
2. The President was apologizing for not campaigning. That's
for others to say; not like Nixon to apologize the way he did in San
Francisco and made the UP lead.
-2-
3. The President talked spending in San Francisco and holding
down spending in LA. This impression created by Broder story and
headline "Nixon Promises Spending, Thrift" but he influenced a
lot of other writers and broadcasters.
4. The thing wasn't in focus. Other stories dominated --
Kissinger in Paris, the POWs on the way home. Seemed like the
campaign was being conducted in Europe.
Some lessons to be drawn:
1. Fundraising appearances at this stage are a great big mistake;
the dead audience calls for an infusion of yelling kids, and the money
could have been raised with a Presidential film at the dinners. Our fat
cat image grows, and we do not appear to care. Fortunately, the other
side doesn't know how to exploit it without seeming envious.
2. High-intensity, 17-hour campaign days preceded and followed
by relative news calm make our campaign look herky-jerky. We do not
have a stride, nor are we explaining what our campaign rhythm is; as
soon as the poll difference begins to narrow, this kind of sporadic
campaigning will be interpreted as "Nixon, worried about the latest poll
showing McGovern momentum, cast aside his above-the-battle pose
and plunged into
etc."
3. We're not campaigning for anything. The "four more years"
chant is offensive. We know that people vote against, and we should
help them be against McGovern and what he stands for; but the best way
to be "Presidential" which is our best attitude -- is to carry a
positive line. Some of this was in the fundraising dinner speech,
especially toward the end, but the only way I know that is because I
asked for a text. "The" speech is not yet with us.
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMIN
\MKING
MEMORANDUM
September 28, 1972
G-102
3.15.82
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE CLARK MacGREGOR
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
RUNT
SUBJECT:
The President's Trip to New York
and California
Gordon Strachan asked for my impressions of the President's trip
this week to New York and California.
I think the trip was a success overall as he did three major
fund raisers without any significant negative comment. They were
very well surrounded and covered up by other activities.
The demonstrators issue appeared to be well handled. Our handling
of demonstrators during the last five weeks may be particularly
important in light of our slipage among young voters.
My only negative impression, which I received exclusively from
the press, is that the President is spending too large a proportion
of his time talking about national defense and not enough about
how his domestic programs are going to help the average citizen.
National defense ranks 7th, 8th, or 9th on the list of issues in
terms of importance in determining Presidential vote and a large
I
majority of voters are in favor of cutting the defense budget.
At the same time, other issues have increased as being more
important --- the economy, crime and drugs. It is also very difficult
for individual citizens to interpret the effect of a strong national
defense in terms of their daily lives. I'm not advocating that the
President stop talking about national defense as it is an area we
have a large advantage over McGovern but that our mix be a little
more oriented to the economic issue. The overexposure to national
defense might be ameliorated by discussing this issue in the future
in terms of jobs rather than in a national security context.
2
We continue to be vulnerable on the bread and butter and
pocketbook issues and these should receive more emphasis overall.
Overall, this does not change my view that personal appearances
by the President should be limited throughout the campaign.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN McLAUGHLIN
Incl
SUBJECT:
RN's Campaigning in
New York and California
1.) Statue of Liberty. The physical presence of RN with the ethnics
was politically very lucrative. Faces of ethnics on the television screen,
like the old Jewish man with the yarmulke, and their association with
the President at the scene first rate. The verbal tussle between RN
supporters ("Four More Years") and the militants ("Stop The War")
favorable to the President because of the higher decibels of the RN
supporters. The physical tussle between the two elements worked to
RN's advantage too, providing drainage to millions of Americans who
feel an irritated sense of surfeit with the demonstrators. RN's remon-
strance, by indirection, to the television producers to focus not only on
the handful of militants but on the thousand others gathered here was said
perfectly: RN smiled as he made the very clear point. This segment on
the ethnics took the edge off the wires' heavy coverage of CREP filling its
coffers, and Dan Rather's stress on the $40 million incremented by the
28 dinners. Two minor minuses: RN sounded a trifle angry when talking
about ethnics believing in hard work, not a handout. RN should avoid the
appearance of irritation. Secondly, I would have liked to have seen him
warmer with the people, as happened with the Italians and the Scalobrini
Fathers. Obiter Dicta: The "Jews For Nixon" sign on the TV screen
(two networks) priceless; Machin's comment that RN appears to have the
ethnic vote which he never had before, also very valuable.
2.) Labor Leaders. Another very remunerative sequence. There is simply
no substitute for the direct talk of Gleason and Brennan. One leader made
the point that labor supported Rockefeller, despite Rockefeller's wealth;
therefore, there's no reason why they can't support RN, since RN doesn't
have Rockefeller's wealth. This language has no substitute: It grabs the
working man where he lives. Minor Minus: In this sequence, too, RN
looked a trifle too restrained. I would like to have seen more give-and-
take with the labor leaders, more warmth.
-2-
3.) San Francisco. The BART sequence good, and reminiscent of the sight-
seeing in Peking. An imaginative piece of politicking, associating RN with
transportation innovation pictorially. Here again, however, RN would have
benefited by meshing more with the crowd, not immersing himself in the
flesh, but more contact than we saw on the screen.
4.) The Basic Strategy: For RN McGovern Doesn't Exist. Excepting
Rather's forced comment that RN had attacked McGovern by the "confiscation
of wealth" charge, the media play on New York and California left the im-
pression that for RN McGovern doesn't exist. I think this strategy is absolutely
sound and wise for this point in the campaign, and quite probably right through
to the election. In his remarks, I would like to see more blue sky from RN,
more stress on the future, more vision. On the issues, my feeling is that
RN should avoid prose and modes of presentation of self that might suggest
that he is confronting a McGovern allegation. (McGovern's single high
point in an otherwise catastrophic campaign was his timing of his statement
on drugs, creating an impression that RN was smoked out into a rebuttal.)
5.) Surrogates. The surrogate program is theoretically sound. There are
practical problems with it, however, the chief of which is diffusion. RN
can only maintain his "above-the-battle" stance, if his surrogates get media
attention, not just locally (where they are getting considerable), but nationally.
I see problems with nationally pick-up of surrogates: 1.) Mankiewicz is
leaning on the networks to restrict their surrogate coverage, since the sur-
rogate is not the candidate. 2.) Focus for the surrogate's national coverage
appears lacking, i.e., with several surrogates in the field on a given day,
the networks are given the license to select which surrogate to cover, and also
their production task is increased. If the media could be trained to expect
a prime surrogate response, we would be guaranteed that the subjects we
want addressed, will indeed be addressed, thus taking away the power of
selection from the networks. Recommendation: Provide focus for a daily
prime surrogate response by establishing one platform, preferably the
White House press briefing room. This would draw the surrogate and his
political expressions closer to the President and in so doing help ease us by
Mankiewicz's objection. Secondly, it would give us the control and national
media power to blunt any momentum that McGovern may develop. The margin
is going to shrink, as happens uniformly in Presidential races when the
trailing contender is the candidate of the majority party. This movement
/
can be contained, however, if the surrogates on national media confront,
challenge, harass McGovern daily and demonstrate how RN's program in
any given area is superior. I know that extensive discussion has taken place
-3-
on the political problems entailed in having a surrogate appear in the
White House press room itself. Doubtless there is some substance to
these concerns; nevertheless, I think we are hypersensitive in this regard.
If the WH press room is unacceptable, then CREP might serve but in my
view it would be a distinct second choice.
Conclusion: RN's campaign strategy is right on target and the visits to
New York and California were both strong gains. The mechanism of the
surrogate program needs some modulating, but its theory is excellent.
(Of Note: In a visit to Notre Dame this week, I learned that the students
straw polled as follows: 1700 RN, 1500 McGovern and about 500 undecided.
In Rhode Island, RN's 50th State in 1968, a private Becker poll (an excellent
pollster who proved to be right on target in my own race) showed RN last week
leading McG. better than 2 to 1.)
Thoughts from John Sears on first week of campaign:
Mr. Sears feels the first week went very well.
The President should do more of this; mainly, stay
cloaked in the Office and away from the political
arena.
Perhaps in the last 7-10 days it would help to become
partisan but until that time stay away from partisan-
ship remarks - you could lose Democratic votes if you
were to begin now.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
LEN GARMENT
Impressions. I don't place much stock in press talk about "remoteness"
or Broder-type (i.e., sophisticated) complaints about "inconsistency"
in the speeches. I don't think the public is unhappy about the President's
careful (and safer) campaign activities; they're apparently not paying
that much attention to the entire campaign. The basic reason; the
President's credentials are established; McGovern has settled in as an
implausible candidate and "real" news events therefore loom larger
than the campaign. There are problems - e.g., the Soviet wheat deal,
the three POWs, Soviet Jews, the'special interests" issue - but I
don't sense that the basic attitudes toward either man is as yet being
affected by them. One thing that does bother me is the absence of any
sense of hard material - programmatic or otherwise - in what the
President is saying (IMF was an exception but an esoteric one). The
little I've managed to see of the President on television in the past
few days has shown him cool and Presidential, and to good advantage
(e.g., Liberty Island). I don't think more or a different style of
campa igning is needed. I would in fact trade off some of this for a
couple of Presidential statements or speeches (and they could originate
in Washington) that are more specific about what the second term will.
have as its short and long-term objectives. I don't think people realize
how fundamentally "future-oriented" a hard-headed man like the
President is, and, on the other hand, that the passionate moralists, like
McGovern, are incapable of doing or refraining from doing the kinds
of things that go into building for the future. Why can't some of this
be said? The fund raising core of the past few days was pretty well
muffled by all the surrounding activity and news. The Soviet exit
permit issue is causing some damage. An added thought: If we can,
I think we should be much more specific and aggressive about the
positive results flowing from the Soviet Summit (e.g., withdrawals from
1
Egypt, SALT I, Soviet cooperation versus terrorists, Vietnam, collabor-
ation on environment, etc.) in countering the criticism on the Soviet
wheat deal.
6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM
KEN COLE
SUBJECT:
Reaction to President's
Trip to New York and
California
Based on network TV accounts, reports in the New York
Times and Washington Post and the news summary, my
reaction to the trip is that it was flat -- it had little
national impact either positive or negative. As far as local
impact is concerned, I can't judge.
Because the purpose was fund raising, however, I think we
came out better than I expected we would given the purpose
and opportunity for mischief by the press and the opposition.
Still, the trip did little to further enhance the image of the
President or broaden public support for his re-election.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
7002
SUBJECT:
New York-California trip
I don't really have a strong impression of the trip; such as I have
is made up from what I happened to catch on the evening news,
and read in the paper or the news summary -- thus it includes
nothing of whatever may have been the local impact.
It didn't seem to me to have a great deal of impact -- but that
fact, at this point, is not all bad. We wanted, after all, to mini-
mize the attention paid to the $1000-a-plate dinners.
One general impression I've been getting is that news coverage
of the campaign this year is inordinately -- more so than before
-- focused on the techniques of the campaign; not just in the
coverage of us, but in the coverage of McGovern as well. Reporters
seem to feel a greater compulsion than before, in reporting what
the candidate said or did, to analyze why he did it this way, how
it fits into his campaign strategy, etc. To a considerable extent,
this is legitimate and responsible reporting: after all, the tech-
niques of the campaign are an important part of the story, even
though we'd rather not have them reported on when the focus is
on us (though we like it when the focus is on McGovern). Thinking
back impressionistically rather than scientifically over the report-
ing on this trip, it seems as if a great deal of it was focused on
the busing in of crowds to provide backdrop for the cameras, the
stationing of young people to cheer, the assembling of ethnic
groups at Liberty Island, etc. ; in short, this may be the year
when, in effect, the advance man is pulled out into the spotlight.
McGovern has gotten the same treatment: there's been heavy
reporting of his staging events for the cameras, etc.
-2-
There's nothing we can do about the fact of this kind of reporting,
but it looks as though we're going to have to take it pretty cen-
trally into account in planning the rest of the campaign. One thing
it probably means is that we should lean toward less rather than
more contrivance. Another effect may be to make the White House
comparatively more desirable (as against the road show) as a place
from which to conduct the campaign, and real events more desirable
as compared with manufactured events. It may also argue for
comparatively greater emphasis on such things as written state-
ments and formal (or radio or TV) speeches.
Vermont Royster had little in the way of specific comments on the
trip; he noted that he's simply seen "bits and pieces on TV, 11 plus
what he'd read in the papers his general impression was that it
"came off okay. 11
Reflecting on his understanding that it had received pretty heavy
coverage in those places where the President was, but that the
rest of the country had gotten only "snippets in the morning paper,
or on CBS or ABC, " he said he thought we should look for one or
two occasions when he can get "a lot of public exposure all over the
country in one hunk. 11
When I talked with him, I'd already written the comments above --
and I asked whether as an old-time newsman he'd had the same
impression about the focus of coverage this year on techniques. He
leaped to it, said absolutely, and that in fact he's taking part in a
panel next month in which "that's precisely the point I'm making. 11
He plans to cite as an example the coverage of McGovern's speech
to the security analysts "the stories I saw down here all had long
stories about his appearance, about the reaction of the security
analysts, about George going into the lion's den -- but none told
me what he'd said they were all writing about the mechanics
of the campaign
I'm having a hard time keeping up with George,
with what he's saying. 11 And on the President's visit to the Statue
of Liberty "I guess he made a speech, but I don't know what he
said. Four or five people started a little furor, and all the
-3-
cameras turned on them. " So, he suggests, we've got to find a
way of getting the focus on what he's saying -- which he thinks
is one advantage of the formal speech, "the kind of thing you
force the New York Times to carry the text of. "
He also had some additional thoughts unrelated to the trip, which
I'll pass along in a separate memo.
###
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
President's Trip to New York
and California.
Per your request, my assessment of the trip is that on balance we
neither gained nor lost ground.
On the positive side, there was some excellent footage of the
President with Brennan and his boys, but only on ABC and Metro-
media that I am aware of. (You realize my prejudice; naturally
I would think this is a real plus.)
Also, on the positive side, we may have defused the criticism that
the President is unwilling to campaign. I think there was just a little
bit of this creeping into the press and perhaps the public conscious-
ness; I am not sure of the latter. At least a trip like this enables
us to show that we are not in hiding or that we are not taking the
electorate for granted. The coverage was such that everyone knows
the President was out campaigning this week.
Also on the plus side, we were able to get away with the fund-raising
dinners without having them particularly visible. In other words, we
did enough other things so that the public did not get the impression
that we were just playing to the fat cats.
Finally, on the positive side, some of the crowd shots were good and
the President directing the cameras on to the good guys on Liberty
Island was a plus. Also, again I may be somewhat jaundiced in my
opinions because I enjoyed seeing the President one-up the media.
2.
On the minus side, one line moved out of New York indicating the President
was calling for a Republican Congress. All the pollsters I talk to, along
with my political instincts, tell me that that line is counter-productive.
We ought to be doing nothing that sharpens up the Republican-Democrat
focus. If we do our jobs right, our coattails will bring in a lot of Repub-
lican Congressmen but we mustn't make the issue a Republican Congress.
The polls show that the public want a Democrat Congress.
Also on the negative side, the wires, the New York Times and to a much
lesser extent, TV, made it appear that we were meeting McGovern head
on, that the President was attacking him and defending against the charge
that we should come out more often on the campaign trail. I think it is
imperative that in everything the President says and does, he keeps the
sharp focus on the issues that separate the candidates, but that beyond
that he not get himself into a head-to-head confrontation directly with
McGovern.
Another negative on balance was the speech on Liberty Island. On TV
it looked like a campaign stump speech and in my opinion campaign stump
speeches are losers for us. They take us right off the Presidential
pedestal. In my mind at least the President doesn't even look like the
same person he does when he is shown in the White House or doing
Presidential things. (There was a big difference in the impact of the
President visiting flood stricken families in Wilkes-Barre and standing
on the podium at Mitchellville. The President doesn't always have to
be confined in the White House to remain Presidential. He can be going
out as President to see people and to see how federal aid is working in
an area where there are clear Presidential responsibilities. That's
campaigning as President rather than as a candidate.)
Another negative was the Broder piece today, although it's impact is
probably very minimal. He got us on what appeared to be conflicting
statements. I haven't seen this turn up anywhere else; hence I would
view this one as a one-shot jab by Broder. The point is good, however;
we should be careful on the statements that we drop in the future not to
give them this opening.
Coincidentally, as we got on to the front pages campaigning, McGovern's
campaign went back with the corset ads. Some people may look upon
this as a plus; I don't. I am beginning to agree with Al Capp that the
more campaign-type publicity McGovern and Shriver get, the better.
If we shove them off the front pages, then that is not good.
3.
The demonstration issue fizzled. The press simply will not buy our
line; obviously they don't want to; it would help us. The most we
got out of this was a little play on MacGregor's charges and a little
play on the fact that we were trying to capitalize on demonstrators.
I have a gut feeling that the American people already associate
McGovern with anti-war protesters, and we don't have to spell out
the connection. A hell of a lot of people saw the scene at the Doral.
While I hate to admit defeat, I don't think the press will give us a
decent break on this one. If we continue to try, it could boomerang.
This one makes me sizzle because I think McGovern is so vulnerable,
but I just don't see how to come at it.
The trip further strengthens my conviction that the less campaigning we
have to do the better. I believe that people are bored with politics
this year and that one of George McGovern's biggest liabilities is that
his campaigning has been overexposed. Failing to show up for a vote in
the Senate this week was very damaging to him in my opinion. He
appeared to be putting politics ahead of the business of the country.
The more he does and the less we do it, the better we are.
A final point with respect to the trip: I don't think we can get the President's
whole message across to the people in any kind of campaign format. Pre-
dictably, the press focus on the trip was a great deal more on technique
rather than on substance. The media tends to blur whatever message we
are trying to get across. The President has to talk directly to the
American people by radio or TV and he not only has to ask for their
support, but tell them why they should support him. As to the latter
point, he not only has to frame the issue to put us on the right side and
McGovern on the wrong side, but he must talk about what he proposes to
do in a positive way over the next four years. At some point, this is
going to be very necessary. Right now we are asking people to vote for
us because we stand for X and McGovern stands for Y. X is good; Y is
bad. So far that is fine, but as the campaign grinds on, we have got to
hold out the promise of what we will accomplish for this country, given
another 4 years and then ask the people to give us that chance.
September 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
You asked my assessment of the President's first few
days of campaigning in New York and California.
On the whole it looked it fine and read well. The
President obviously likes to campaign, and this comes
across nicely.
It was deeply disappointing, however, to find the
President saying things that are not SO. By which
I mean misstatements of fact. His Acceptance Speech
at the Convention was riddled with such errors, and
it now appears that his stump speeches will be also.
12
This demeans the Presidency and will mar his victory.
You should hit those speechwriters hard. It is intolerable
that they should put words in the President's mouth that
are false. You are Chief of Staff for the President
of the United States. You should not let anything demean
his office or devalue Democratic discourse. Something
of true value is entrusted to your care for the next five
weeks. Be tough.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Judging from national and Washington media, the trip cannot be
judged a political winner. Several reasons. First, the TV types,
Rather, Pierpoint, Jarriel, and Mackin focus either on "technique"
as opposed to substance, or see themselves as Vox Populi with
responsibility for either rebutting or questioning any statment they
feel is not precise. Last night we were not helped in the least by
Miss Mackin's arrogant piece in which she assumed the nation
was more interested in her analysis of what the President said,
than in what the President said. Further, there were too many
fund-raising records broken, which got enormous coverage, and
one wonders whether that was to our benefit. Third, the President
was seen too often in campaign environment, which is never as
effective as the Presidential environment it tends to put us on
a level with McGovern. Further, the media tries to arrange a long-
range debate, in the absence of a. live one -- and SO anything RN
says is seen as challenging or answering McGovern. If the
reporters would get out of the way of the story, and let RN
communicate directly with the people, we would have no problem --
but clearly they will not, especially the television types.
Had this been 1968 we would probably have been hurt worse. What
we have going for us, however, is that the average American is
sensitized to the media bias and nit-picking, and the media's own
credibility has dropped handsomely.
Final point: If we have something of substance to say, hard news,
this can often force the TV folks to cover it directly but if it
is straight campaign rhetoric, repeating what has been said a
number of times before, we should go without. The Texas trip was
the success that this one was not because there was something
there of greater weight than the appearance at the Statue of Liberty.
-2-
Lastly, the best campaigning the President can do is be seen
clearly in the role of President dealing with the nation's
business in the nation and the world. The Oval Office is a far
more effective backdrop to meeting with Jewish leaders and
labor leaders than the third floor of the Waldorf Astoria -- and
we can make the front page of the LATimes from here as well
as there.
Buchanan
MEMORANDI M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGION
September 29, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMO TO:
H. R. Haldeman
FROM:
Harry S. Dent
SUBJECT:
Trip reaction
My personal assessment, and those I'm picking up in the field
on my trips, indicate the President's initial forays into Texas,
New York and California were highly effective. The only
negatives - except in Texas, as I shall detail momentarily -
seemed to be limited to technicalities.
The following evaluation on specifics is the result of conversation
with Burdell Bixby, campaign director for New York; Gordan Luce,
Vice chairman of CREP in California, and Eric Jonsson, chairman,
Texas CREP.
Positively, the highest scoring points included the Laredo trip
and its enthusiastic reception, the identification with the ethnics
through the remarks at the Statue of Liberty, and the speech
before the Cancer group in California. The common feeling was
that these events showed the President in warm settings,
graphically demonstrating his concern and being received by
"little" people. These events provided a focus apart from the
fund-raisers, which, while necessary, don't get an overwhelmingly
positive reaction from the public.
Eric Jonsson felt - and is picking up this attitude in Texas - that the
visit to the Connally ranch resulted in a negative reaction from
the general public, because the angle that came over was not
so much that the President was meeting with Democrats as with
"oil-scaked fatcats. 11 I have noted this nationally. Jonsson said
Texas Republicans have stretched to accept the Connally base,
but feel they are being written off as important to the President's
desire to win Texas.
As I indicated, the only other negatives are of a technical nature.
In New York, there was a mix-up on press credentials, and some
H.R. Haldens. 1
September 29, 1972
Page Two
complaints from motorists because East Side Drive was tied
up. That may have been done by the City of New York.
Bixby felt that the President came out very well on the situation
with the demonstrators, and that "he strengthened his lead in
New York. 11
California press has given particularly good play to the Cancer
speech.
So, perhaps I could summarize the conversations this way:
1. The President needs to be identified with the "average"
people on his trips. Occasionally it would be helpful for him
to see lower echelon campaign volunteers.
2. He comes across very strongly on a personal level,
and plenty of visibility in personal settings is the best rebuttal
to the McGovern charge that RN is "unloved 11
3. On balance, the trips had positive impact.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: August 10, 1972
TO:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHM
The balance of isolated issues
and thoughts that did not fit
within the Four Best/Four Worst
Issues tally are described on two
additional pages.
DEX - - INFORMATION SHEET
ORIGINATORS
DEX NR:
LOCATION:
WHITE HOUSE
#09
ADDRESSEES
NR OF PAGES:
LOCATION:
CAMP DAVID
7
GORDON STRACHAN
DTG:
FROM:
09/24/EDT
TO:
LARRY HIGBY
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
4 BEST/H WORST
TOT:
TOR: INITIAL
09 1241 EDT
JW 091330 EDT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: August 9, 1972
TO:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
The 4 Best/4 Worst Strategy
Memoranda are tallied in the
attached.
Some of the categories are
imprecise, but 15 authors use
different language for the same
idea.
PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN
Strong/Weak Issues
President Nixon's Best Issues
1. International Issues (China, Moscow, Peacemaker,
Vietnam)
a. Listed First by: Moore, Harlow, Clawson,
Sears, Cole, Dent, Buchanan, Hallett, Colson,
Chapin, Garment (11 of 15)
b. Listed in Top 4 by everyone
2. The Economy
a. Listed First by: None
b. Listed Second by: Moore, Marlow, Cole
C. Listed Third by: Sears, Clawson
d. Listed Fourth by: Dent, Hallett, Colson
e. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Teeter, Chapin,
Garment, Buchanan, McLaughlin
3. Domestic Tranquility
a. Listed First by: None
b. Listed Second by: McLaughlin, Sears, Dent, Colson
C. Listed Third by: Cole
d. Listed Fourth by: Teeter, Hallett
e. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Moore, Harlow,
Clawson, Chapin, Garment, Buchanan, Whitaker'
Page Two
President Nixon - Senator McGovern
Strong/Weak Issues
4. Incumbency (competence, experience, professional)
a. Listed First by: McLaughlin, Whitaker, Price,
Moore
b. Listed Second by: Clawson, Chapin
C. Listed Fourth by: Garment, Harlow
d. Not Listed as Positive Issue by: Teeter, Cole,
Sears, Dent, Hallett, Colson, Buchanan
Page Three
PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN
Strong/Weak Issues
Senator McGovern's Worst Issues -- Our Attack
1. The Candidate Himself (Inexperienced, Indecisive,
Credibility)
a. Listed First by: McLaughlin, Chapin, Garment,
Moore, Teeter, Sears, Dent, Hallett, Price
b. Listed in Top Four by: Colson, Buchanan, Cole,
Harlow, Clawson
C. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Whitaker
2. McGovern's Radicalism (Non-Specific Issues)
a. Listed First by: Buchanan, Price, Whitaker, Harlow
b. Listed in Top Four by: McLaughlin, Moore, Teeter
C. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue: Colson, Hallett,
Dent, Sears, Cole, Garment, Chapin
3. McGovern Issue Positions (National Defense, Welfare,
Socialize America)
a. Listed First by: Colson, Sears, Cole
b. Listed in Top Four by: Chapin, Dent, Hallett,
Buchanan, Price, Harlow, Teeter, Moore, Clawson,
McLaughlin
C. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Whitaker,
Garment
Page Four
PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN
Strong/Weak Issues
Senator McGovern's Worst Issues -- Our Attack
4. McGovern is Elitist
a. Listed First by: None
b. Listed in Top Four by: Price, Whitaker, Garment,
McLaughlin, Buchanan
C. Not Listed as McGovern Weak Issue by: Harlow,
Teeter, Moore, Hallett, Dent, Chapin, Sears,
Cole, Colson, Clawson
Senator McGovern's Best Issues
1. Vietnam
a. Listed First by: Garment, Cole, Hallett, Moore,
Harlow
b. Listed in Top Four by: Clawson, Colson, Chapin,
Dent, Buchanan, Whitaker, Sears, Price
C. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter,
McLaughlin
2. Personal Character, Honesty
a. Listed First by: Sears, Whitaker
b. Listed in Top Four by: McLaughlin, Garment, Cole,
Dent, Hallett, Harlow, Buchanan
C. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Toeter,
Clawson, Colson, Chapin, Moore
Page Five
PRESIDENT NIXON --- SENATOR McGOVERN
Strong/Weak Issues
Senator McGovern's Best Issues
3. The Economy
a. Listed First by: Teeter, Buchanan, McLaughlin
b. Listed in Top Four by: Cole, Hallett, Whitaker,
Moore, Chapin, Colson, Clawson
C. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue: Garment,
Harlow, Sears, Price
4. The Haves and Have-Nots
a. Listed First by: Price, Colson
b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, Sears, Dent,
Moore, Hallett, Chapin, Whitaker, McLaughlin,
Buchanan
C. Not Listed as McGovern Strong Issue by: Teeter,
Clawson, Harlow
President Nixon's Worst Issues -- McGovern Attack
1. Credibility, Trust, Ethics
a. Listed First by: Chapin, Cole, Moore, Dent,
Sears, Price
b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, McLaughlin,
Clawson, Buchanan, Hallett, Harlow, Whitaker
C. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Colson, Teeter
Page Six
PRESIDENT NINON - SENATOR McGovern
Strong/Weak Issues
2. The Economy
a. Listed First by: Teeter, Whitaker, Buchanan
b. Listed in Top Four by: Harlow, Hallett, Price,
McLaughlin, Sears, Dent, Cole, Chapin, Clawson,
Colson
C. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Garment, Moore
3. Vietnam
a. Listed First by: Harlow, Hallett, McLaughlin,
Cole, Garment
b. Listed in Top Four by: Colson, Clawson, Dent,
Sears, Price, Whitaker, Buchanan
C. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Moore, Chapin,
Teeter
4. Priorities (Defense Spending, Establishment, Change)
a. Listed First by: Colson
b. Listed in Top Four by: Garment, McLaughlin,
Ballett, Harlow, Teeter, Price, Whitaker
C. Not Listed as McGovern Attack Issue: Chapin, Cole,
Moore, Clawson, Dent, Sears, Buchanan
Miscellaneous ---- General Themes, Non-Specific Issues, Isolated
Support Issues
1. General moderation of President's proposals distinguished
from McGovern's wild projects -- Buchanan, Dent
Page Seven
PRESIDENT NIXON me SENATOR McGOVERN
Strong/Weak Issues
2. The President represents what's right with traditional
America and her values and culture -- Buchanan, Cole
3. The President's fight against pollution should be
considered one of the President's Four Best Issues --
Sears
4. The lack of big domestic legislative achievements
will be a negative issue used by McGovern against
the President according to Dent.
5. The President himself should be shown as the warm,
decent human being that he is according to Clawson.
6. McGovern's lack of Labor support should be emphasized
according to Ken Clawson.
7. Chapin believes McGovern's Vietnam undercutting of
the President risking the POW's will damage McGovern.
8. Colson and Teeter urge the use of Tax Reform as a
positive issue for President Nixon.
9. Colson urges use of the theme that "we (the Admini-
stration) have only begun".
10. The fact that McGovern favors forced busing should
be used in our attack according the Colson and
Moore.
11. Hallett and Garment urge use of returning power to
the people, anti-burcaucratio issues.
Page Eight
PRESIDENT NIXON - SENATOR McGOVERN
Strong/Weak Issues
12. Finch urges a continued assault on McGovern and
his policies in spite of the addition of Shriver.
Rumsfeld, not Agnew, should bracket Shriver's
schedule and prevent Shriver from becoming the
foreign policy expert.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
(As Requested)
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Were I counseling McGovern, on the attack phase of his campaign,
I would stress primarily these four issues:
A)
The traditional bread-and-butter attack. Economic Issue.
Under the Nixon Administration your food bills have shot up;
unemployment has hovered at five million out of work; we have had
inflation, stagnation, unemployment -- all at once. Nixonomics has
shafted the economic well-being of the common man and his family.
B)
Vietnam. Nixon failed to keep his promise to end American
involvement in that bloody endless conflict; we gave him four years;
that's enough, no more Americans dead -- get our men out, our ships
out, our prisoners out and let the North and South Vietnamese decide
their own future. We have enough troubles at home here -- to worry
about wasting away blood and treasure and prestige and honor in an
idiotic military adventure ten thousand miles away, an adventure all
but the wildest hawks have written off as a gross mistake. Let's get
our prisoners and go, man, go. (This is the leading issue for McGovern
to keep his troops fired up.)
C)
The incestuous relationship between the Nixon Administration
and the Corporate power brokers. Nixon & the Big Guys VS. McGovern &
the Little Guys. Examples: ITT, and the $10 million dollar slush fund
from fatcats (unknown) buying future favors from a government whose
door is open to the corporate heavies, but which cannot find time to
hear out concerns of common men. A Wallace-type "tax reform" thrust
here -- arguing that RN is the defender of the loopholes, and McGovern
is the friend of the Common Man, a redistribution of income downward
to "working people. 11
D)
The flawed morality and flawed integrity of the Nixon Administration
using the "credibility gap, 11 the Watergate incident especially and the
PR-oriented White House. Would contrast the "candor, sincerity, honesty
-2-
and openness" of my candidate with the secrecy, trickiness, deceptiveness
of the Nixon White House, which is hostile to first amendment rights,
to civil liberties, to a free press.
These above, I think, would be the best avenues of McGovern attack, at
this point in time -- they are all issues that move him into the middle,
into the traditional Democratic vote, which is the McGovern necessity at
this point. As for the opposition's four weakest issues, where our attack
should focus, they are:
1)
McGovern, in his positions, statements, character is an extremist
outside the mainstream of American politics, outside the center of his
party. He is a fringe candidate; he represents not the great Democratic
Party, but a hard-core ideological elite of zealots who have hijacked the
great Democratic Party and driven out liberals and moderates. He
is the most radical candidate ever proposed for President; and his philosophy
would overturn much of what we know as the American way of life.
2)
His positions on economics income distribution defense. and
foreign policy are just this side of insane. His economic proposals
would bring a collapse in the stock market and a national depression, the
end of the free enterprise system as we know it. His defense policies
would leave America naked in a dangerous world, tempt aggression, and
leave our closest friends in the most perilous condition since the rise of
Hitler in the 1930s. His welfare proposals, and income proposals are
a declaration of economic war against the American middle class. His
drastic unilateral cutbacks would not make this a safe, but more dangerous
world than we have ever known.
3)
He is a permissive pro-pot, pro-abortion-on-demand ultra-leftist
wooly head, Ramsey Clark type whose life style and beliefs are part of the
problem of America not part of the solution.
His campaign has attracted elitists and kooks and ultra-leftists and
radicals; and a victory for him would be a victory for the radical chic
and militant leftists over the values and traditions of Middle America
and the common man.
4)
In a time when ice of the cold war is breaking up, and a great new
cathedral of peace is being built, George McGovern and the men around
him simply do not have the capacity or experience or understanding to lead
the United States in the days ahead. They are not qualified by temperament
or capacity to hold the job.
-3-
OUR FOUR BEST ISSUES -- My view would be to dramatize and
underscore our "differences" with McGovern on issues, ability, etc.
Thus:
a)
The President's effort to bring peace to the world and Vietnam.
What RN has done to end the war, bring troops home, bring the
casualties down, the China opening, the Moscow summit, the SALT
agreement, etc. When this is portrayed, it should be contrasted with
McGovern who has simply dogged RN's tracks every step of the war;
who clearly is no match for RN in knowledge or experience or ability
to keep America safe in a dangerous world, to lead America into the
future.
b)
The "moderation" of RN's proposals on welfare, and domestic
spending as opposed to the wildness of McGovern. We ought to make
sure that in this campaign, he comes off as the "Super Spender'and
we come off as concerned about reduced taxes and the size of Government.
c)
RN's strong stands on crime, drugs, porno, bussing, permissiveness,
etc. -- the man who represents and defends what is right about America
and the best in its values and culture. Again, we should draw the line
with McGovern here as permissive, etc. We ought to have the strong
side of the social issue -- up and down the line -- with McGovern the
soft permissive side. Though we need not be strident, we need to be right
on these.
Lastly, we should be certain that when the voters enter the booth, they
know who represents the common man and who the elite, who speaks for
American strength and who for national weakness, who would be permissive
on social issues and who would be tough, who is interested in more
government "programs" and who wants tax cuts, who is the darling of
the purple sunglasses set, and who represents Middle America, who is
a moderate centrist and who is a exotic extremist, who is a man of the
middle and who is a man of the far left, who would disgrace us in Vietnam
and who would bring the prisoners home in honor, who would save Israel
and who would lose it, who prefers J. Edgar Hoover and who prefers
Ramsey Clark.
Buchanan
SEARS
I. Four Best Issues for Nixon -
A. International Issue (Easing of tensions with
Soviets and Chinese, winding down the Viet Nam
War, SALT talk agreement, etc.)
B. Stability at Home (No more riots, easing of racial
tensions, more conservative cast of the Supreme
Court, etc.)
C. The Success of the New Economic Policy (success of
wage and price controls, indications of economic
upturns this year, steadying of rate of inflation,
etc.)
D. Fight Against Pollution (Establishment of Environ-
lese.
mental Protection Agency, actions taken by Trans-
portation, Interior and H.E.W., etc.)
Comment:
There are a number of other issues which should be made to
particular groups -- higher farm prices for the farmers,
Social Security increases for the elderly, etc. I don't
think achievements in winding down the war in Viet Nam
should be singled out for particular emphasis but rather
should be listed at the top of a list of international
achievements and accomplishments. Of course, RN should come
across as the man who will bring peace to the world if he
is allowed four more years in office.
I think the domestic stability issue could be quite profitable,
especially in light of the McGovern candidacy. I wouldn't
-2-
be fearful of citing the change in atmosphere at the Supreme
Court as a solid achievement. The economy will be an issue
anyway and I think we should stress the positive side of
what the Administration has done as a solid achievement.
The pollution issue is another good means of stressing the
reasonable, Nixon approach to the problem solving. I don't
think bussing is as much an issue now as it was in the Spring
and thus, I don't think it should be overstressed even though
we should always loudly maintain we are against it.
II. Four Worst Issues Against McGovern
A. Credivility of His Issue Statements (How would he
cut $30 billion from the defense budget without
causing massive unemployment in some areas, how does
he intend to pay for his programs, etc.)
B. Social Reform Issue (McGovern would divide the
country by mindlessly pressing for a variety of
social changes and thus destroy its social stability
i.e., abortion, school bussing, etc.)
C. Lack of International Experience (McGovern has none
and will be hard put to cite any credentials in
this area.)
D. Indecisiveness (Recent experience with picking a
running mate shows inability to make tough decisions
in this area.)
Comment:
McGovern's credibility should only be attacked on the issues
and not personally. His main personal selling point is that
he's honest and if this point can be destroyed by citing his
-3-
dishonesty on the issues, he will lose some support among
those who admire his personal character. The social reform
issue is hard to express but the country is still weary of
the quick changes which occurred during the 1960's and quite
unwilling to jump off on any new, untested social directions.
Running in a race against RN's international achievements,
his lack of international experience should be quite damaging.
His failure to properly handle the Eagleton affair should
raise a lot of questions as to his ability to handle much
tougher decisions in the White House.
I think we should refrain from attacking him personally and
would be playing into McGovern's hands if we termed him as
radical or ultra-liberal.
III. Nixon's Four Worst Issues
A. Credibility and Honesty in Government (Democrats
will be trying to make much of the ITT affair, the
Democratic headquarters bugging and paint the
Administration as one of special interests and no
feeling.)
B. Tax Reform (Democrats will say that the Administration
is delinquent in not moving faster in this area.)
C. Unemployment and Inflation
D. Viet Nam
Comment:
It will be the McGovern strategy to personally attack the
President and Vice President on a wide range of matters
dealing with honesty, credibility and sensitivity. It
will be their hope that they can draw the President and Vice
-4-
President into a name calling contest which they feel can
best show off McGovern's assumed good, personal character
traits. This will also allow them to keep from talking
about some of their unpopular positions.
The tax issue arouses a lot of across the board support
among groups who otherwise would be unfriendly toward
McGovern. The unemployment and inflation issues are obvious
and Viet Nam will be cited as an example where the President
did not keep his pledge of four years ago to the American
people.
IV. McGovern's Four Best Issues
A. Honesty. Personal Character and Non-Political
(McGovern feels the country wants a non-politician
so he will stress this aspect of his candidacy.)
B. His farsightedness (He will stress his early opposi-
tion to the war as an indication that he is a far-
sighted leader and has a feel for foreign affairs.)
C. Lack of Control by Special Interests (McGovern will
stress that he is not under the control of political
bosses and special interests and thus has a free
hand to do what is good for the majority of the people.)
D. Sensitivity Toward the Have-Nots in the System
(McGovern will try to show that he is sensitive to
the wishes of not only the economically poor but
those who feel that government is not responsive to
the needs of the people.)
Comment:
Very simply, McGovern will try to show that he's a nice guy
with no strings attached who is aware and sensitive to the
-5-
needs of the people. He will hope to establish the present
Administration as insensitive, under the control of special
interests and overly political in its approach to decisions.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
DED
SUBJECT:
1972 Campaign Issues
A. RN's four best 1972 issues
1. Peace, through strength, with honor. Leader-
ship should be pushed here.
2. Domestic tranquility (law enforcement; anti-
drug abuse progress; riots, burning, looting
virtually gone; first family togetherness;
overall stability).
3. Balance, fairness, responsibility, and
moderation in appointments, running country,
speaking out, etc. End of class, race and
sectional warfare fostered by Demos.
4. Economy moving good. Take the offensive here
and sell our case. (Best defense is a good
offense.) We have the statistics to present,
and people generally feel times are good.
Let's let them know how good.
B. McGovern's four worst 1972 issues
The candidate himself. Represents radical
extremism, poor judgment, indecision,
inability to run and control a staff, and
lack of confidence abounds in his own party.
- 2 -
2. Second-class status for America. Surrender
in VN, unilateral disarmament, unrealistic
and dangerous defense cuts.
3. Soak the taxpayer and consumer with unlimited
welfare schemes and other spending programs
which would require twice the taxes and cause
uncontrollable inflation.
4. Socialize America, moving from an enter-
prising, incentive system of success to a
hand-out, socialistic society which produces
less at a time when even the USSR is coming
to recognize the values of using incentives.
C. McGovern's four best 1972 issues
1. Demos outnumber Republicans get unity as
Rally
fast as possible and address self to fellow
nem
Demos and Demo distaste for RN.
2. Haves V. have nots. Tax reform in forefront,
populism, economics, etc.
3. Peace in VN.
4. Supposed freshness and candor.
D. RN's four worst issues
Credibility
Lack of trust Demos can create over ITT,
bugging stories, special interests.
2. War still going.
3. Economic ills, which are better thank goodness.
was
4. Lack of big domestic legislative achievements.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT:
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
OUR BEST ISSUES
(1) Foreign Policy: I think we are all in agreement that
this is a long suit both in substance and in image, and I
think it essential that we get every ounce out of the subject.
(2) The President Himself: I have always felt that we could
maximize the President as a person and world leader to a
greater extent than we have done thus far. I do not agree
that the President as a human being is something that should
be hidden from the nation. Aside from his obvious leadership
qualities and his imminent qualifications to be President,
he is also, and probably as importantly, a warm, decent
human being whose personal values most people can identify
with. Especially with McGovern putting forth the image of
the honest man, I do not think we should overlook those
personal and human qualities the President exudes internally,
but which the public at large is unfamiliar and believes to
be non-existent.
(3) The Economy: Viet Nam or no, I am still convinced that
more voters will vote their pocketbooks this year than for
any other reason. We are in great danger, despite the best
professionals saying that the economy is starting to boom
and inflation is decreasing, of permitting McGovern to
convince the public that economic conditions are still bad.
He can use food prices and unemployment to bolster his case
and indeed has an opportunity to convince people that they
are actually worse off than they seem. I don't think too
d Moore
much attention can be given to exploiting the positive side
of the President's economic program.
-2-
Since the facts support an improving economy, it is our
responsibility as image makers to take McGovern head on
and try to rest from his grasp a "bad" feeling toward the
economy and replace it with a "good" feeling toward the
economy.
(4) Crime-Drugs: Without question, this Administration has
done more to address itself to the frustrating mores of
narcotics usage in the country. Drugs now reach into the
hamlets and rural countryside of the nation, and more and
more people are being touched directly and indirectly by
them. We must have a very hard-nosed attitude toward
the eradication of this problem, and our sympathies should
be directed to those innocent persons, i.e., mothers,
fathers, relatives, the community, who see the entire
morality of the country being lowered by those addicted
to drugs.
McGOVERN'S WORST ISSUES
(1) The Economy: I don't think the nation accepts the
concept that everyone who wants a job can have one. This
appears to me to be the position that McGovern will ultimately
have to make his lead economic issue since he has already
discredited the $1,000 per person concept that he initially
advanced.
(2) McGovern Waffles: I think that it is a bonifide and
exploitable issue that McGovern has already demonstrated
that he can't make up his mind on one hand, and goes through
a continuing evolution of changing his mind on everything
from personalities to issues.
(3) Labor Support: It is essential for us and for Republicans
in years to come to maximize the splitting of the trade union
vote. This is potentially one of the best methods of under-
cutting McGovern's traditional base of power.
(4) Viet Nam: I know McGovern thinks this is his best issue,
but any rational, sane person can better grasp the President's
phased approach contrasted with McGovern's surrender. I do
not believe that this country is even vet willing to accept
defeat in an armed conflict.
-3-
McGOVERN'S BEST ISSUES
(1) Nixon Government: As we did in 1968, McGovern can
legitimately exploit every faux pas committed by the Executive
Branch during the last three years and blame it on the Nixon
Administration.
(2) Democratic Bugging Incident: Because the Democrats have
control of the civil suit, they can pump this issue about
as large as they wish to and tie it to ITT to show that we
are not honest men.
(3) The Economy: He can and will accentuate the unfavorable
aspects of the economic program.
(4) Viet Nam: The fact is that the war is not over and
ultimately this may be what the question boils down to.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN COLE
This is in response to your request regarding issues for
the Fall campaign.
I.
My thoughts.
A. Our four best issues.
1. Foreign policy - the prospect of peace for
generations, a stable world, Nixon the strong
international leader, an honorable end to the
Vietnam War.
2. Economic Policy - a booming economy, a strong
economic leader, a return to real wage
increases, no higher taxes, holding down the
Federal budget.
3. A return to a stable society - crime down,
strong program to cure drug abuse, urban
riots and campus termoil stopped.
4. Stable, strong leadership for the future - the
President's personal strengths.
B. We should hit McGovern on -
1. Defense and foreign policy - reducing the U.S.
to #2 in the world and jeopardizing the chances
for peace.
2. Tax increases - a doubling of federal tax for
those in the $10,000 + bracket and even worse
for higher levels plus bigger Federal Government,
in addition a $1000 per person welfare scheme.
- 2 -
3. A permissive society - a return to the
instability of the late 60's, the incitement
of emotions throughout the country, the
promoter of what's wrong - not what's right,
more drugs, easy on criminals.
4.
Weak, uncertain leadership- can peace be
trusted to a man who would beg to our enemies.
II. If I were McGovern.
A. Best issues.
1. Getting America back on the right track - ending
the Vietnam War.
2. Unemployment - getting jobs for those who want
work.
3. Concern for the poor and down-trodden and the
middle class - a tax break (tax the rich), more
government services.
4. Credibility - I'm honest, I work in the open -
You can trust me.
B. Hit the President on -
1. You can't trust him - he promised to end the
War and didn't - he promised jobs and too many
are out of work, he's tied to big business and
the rich.
2. The President doesn't care about the little people -
health, food, welfare reform, race.
3. Taxes - the little people need tax relief -
big corporations and the rich get tax relief
at the expense of the little people.
4. Unemployment.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
High Priority
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
VIA:
MR. LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
ot
SUBJECT:
Response to August 7, 1972,
Issue Memorandum
1.
FROM THE PRESIDENT'S POINT OF VIEW
A.
OUR FOUR BEST ISSUES
1. FOREIGN POLICY/GENERATION OF PEACE
a.
China - Opening communications.
b.
Russia - SALT/Trade and economic benefits
of trip.
c.
Vietnam Troop withdrawals and POW's.
2.
A KNOWN QUALITY AS PRESIDENT
a.
Solid.
b.
Dependable.
c.
Professional President.
3. STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE
4. DRUGS
:
2.
B.
OPPOSITION'S FOUR WORST ISSUES
1.
EXECUTIVE AND DECISION-MAKING EXPERIENCE/
ABILITY. ESPECIALLY UNDER PRESSURE.
2.
WEAKENING DEFENSE STRUCTURE. INEXPERIENCE
IN WORLD AFFAIRS.
3.
HIGH COST OF McGOVERN
-
Big spender, taxes, $1,000 minimum, etc.
4.
VIETNAM UNDERCUTTING OF PRESIDENT.
-
Risk to POW's.
II.
FROM McGOVERN'S POINT OF VIEW
A.
McGOVERN'S FOUR BEST ISSUES.
1.
Big money, hidden money, questionable ethics.
2.
Unsympathetic to the Have-Nots - from the poor to
those suffering boredom on the assembly lines.
3.
Nixonomics - Unemployment, inflation and taxes.
4.
Vietnam - the high cost - end it - use the money at home.
B.
OUR FOUR WORST ISSUES
1.
Questionable acts/ethics.
-
Watergate.
-
$10 million slush fund.
2.
Inflation - unemployment - Nixonomics.
3.
Represents big business - against little man.
AND OVER-CONFIDENCE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Issues in Campaign
Our four best positive issues are:
1.
Bring peace to the world -- ending our involvement in Vietnam,
stability in the Middle East, new relationships with China and
Russia, SALT, etc.
2.
Peace at home. We have restored domestic tranquility. The
nation was virtually in civil war when Nixon was elected. We
are winning the war against crime and drugs - - and have changed
the Supreme Court.
3.
We stand four-square for no increased taxes, but for tax reform
that will simplify the tax procedures and provide greater equity.
(Right now this is not our issue, except for no higher taxes; we
have to do more to make this a viable, positive issue.)
4.
We have restored a stable economy - - increasing real take-home
pay, creating millions of new jobs and stopping the rampant
inflation that we inherited. (Today this is not a winner and may
never be, but we are obviously going to have to put our best posi-
tive case forward; the economic issue cannot be avoided.)
NB:
But, critical to all of this is the point that this is merely an un-
finished agenda. We have only begun. Our goals in each of these
areas will be realized in the next four years.
The four best negative issues are:
1.
McGovern would put half the country on welfare. His $1000-a-
person plan is totally unworkable, "pie-in-the-sky".
2.
McGovern would increase taxes particularly of the working middle
class in order to pay for the $1000 baby bonus and other unrealistic
and extravagant schemes.
2.
3.
McGovern's proposals imperil the security of the United States.
Irresponsible defense cuts would make the U.S. second best,
give Russia superiority in the world and invite aggression and
further war. He would bug out of Vietnam without our prisoner's
and grant amnesty to draft dodgers.
4.
McGovern lacks experience, competence, judgment and stability
to lead the nation. He is dangerously erratic (can you trust him?) ;
he has demonstrated a lack of accomplishment in the Senate, a lack
of decisiveness in everything he has done since being nominated.
5.
McGovern favors forced busing.
If I were running McGovern's campaign, I would build it along the following
lines:
1.
Nixon defends the status quo, big business, special interests - - is
for the big guy and against the common man.
2.
Our tax system is unjust and we need a radical set of reforms.
3.
Guarantee a job for every American, promise to end the Nixon
inflation by strong, more equitable price controls. Corporations
are making record profits and can afford to hold their profits
back.
4.
End the war. I would say that I have been assured that if elected
all prisoners will be returned before the 90 days in which our
military operations would be terminated. I would save that
bombshell, however, for mid-October.
These are the major positive and negative themes, but there are a whole
set of subsidiary issues that need to be dealt with in specific geographic
areas and with specific constituent groups. In addition to amnesty, we
have two or three selected veterans issues that are very good. With the
Catholics, of course, we have abortion and aid to parochial schools
issues. With labor, we have a good point of attack on McGovern's anti-
labor record. It's not that differen from ours, but he professed to be a
pro-labor candidate and took their money. With aging, we have a
tremendous record and can really do a positive selling job. With
retired military officers, we have a particular appeal on the recomputation
3.
issue. To the maritime interests, we have a good record; the
Democ ratic Platform was silent while we have done more than any
other Administration in history. With the Jews, of course, we have
the Middle East. A very large part of our efforts should be devoted
to these specific targets of appeal.
MEMORANDU M
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DOUG HALLETT
DSAA
RE:
Issues -- Positive and Negative
Positive
(1) Foreign Policy -- The President is the consummate foreign
policy strategist who has phased down the war, brought a new
relationship with China, negotiated SALT with the Soviet Union,
and, just as importantly if not more, needs four more years to
complete his structure of peace.
(2) Returning Power to People -- This is more a theme than an
issue, but it does embody a range of issues -- revenue-sharing,
welfare reform, governmental decentralization, etc. -- where we
have done enough to get by and which reaches into the core of
McGovern's appeal. This, too, must involve some discussion of
what is to come as well as what has happened -- deregulation,
reprivatization, etc.
(3) Concern for the Workingman -- This, again, is more a theme
than an issue, but it is a theme which can and should be used to
unite our very commendable and very unknown record in this area --
occupational health and safety, pension guarantees, social security,
tax reform, unemployment compensation, and the other Rosow
Report issues. We should press hard with the idea (tacitly) that
the Kennedy-Johnson Administration concerned itself almost ex-
clusively with the exotic (and, if we want to get racist, with the
blacks) whereas the Nixon Administration has reached out and in-
volved itself in lower-middle-income and middle-income issues.
(4) The Economy This should be pressed not because our record
is great (it is not), but because McGovern will be pressing it against
us and the best way to obscure our debits is to claim (which we can,
with some evidence) success in this area. The idea implicit in our
discussions should be that the President is the cool, tough, pragmatic
operator who can face the fact that his policy is not working, change
and adjust it, etc. -- not explicitly said like that, but implicit in what
we say.
(5) Restoration of Integrity to the System -- The President can travel
anywhere, the campuses and cities are quiet, the Supreme Court has
been turned around, our anti-crime efforts, etc. However, we must
be careful not to take an undynamic approach here -- order is not
good for its own sake and McGovern is right that people know it.
Negative
(1) McGovern is an inept, inexperienced, hyper-idealistic dreamer
who is more concerned with the problems of the exotic few than he
is with the problems of the majority of the American people. Our best
issue is McGovern himself. This has to be handled carefully. Being
heavy-handed refocuses attention on us -- and that we don't want, for
the President is not exactly everybody's idea of what a President
should be -- but a controlled, second-level attack from Democrats
like Connally and through mailings, articles, etc. can get this across.
McGovern's ties with liberal elitists, his concern for amnesty,
abortion, homosexuals, etc. all get tied up with his inexperience,
lack of toughness, etc. into an effort to make him seem incredible
as President of the U.S.
(2) National Security -- The President's strength is McGovern's
weakness. We shouldn't be quite so bombastic as Laird was, but,
without the rhetoric, we can get the idea across that McGovern has
no experience in and no knowledge of the realities of mid-twentieth
century power politics. Getting Kissinger involved -- perhaps
through an hour-long Walter Cronkite conversation or something --
would get across the real sophistication of our policy and mailings,
etc. can be used to chip away at McGovern.
(3) McGovern is more of the same at a time when we need a new
direction in domestic policy At the same time we're attacking
McGovern as a light-weight idealist, we can also get him as just
another high-spending, bureaucratic-oriented New Deal problem-
solver behind the froth of "new politics" lies the same old stuff
we've gotten for the last thirty years -- more taxes for the workingman,
no problem-solving for the poor. The "radical" tag can be put on with
certain groups, but the focus for the national strategy should be that
while Nixon is redirecting domestic policy, McGovern is just proposing
a blown-up version of the failed solutions of the past. Shriver is a
perfect point of attack for this.
(4) Specific Voter-Bloc Issues Veterans, aging, youth, Spanish-
speaking, labor, etc. etc all have their separate range of issues on
which McGovern's record can be attacked and compared with ours
unfavorably. These should not be made into national issues by and
large -- but should be pressed hard through front groups, Democratic
organizations, mailings, local speakers, local ads, etc.
From McGovern's point-of-view, all issues are necessarily
negative - - he's attacking us and his qualities are attributes only
insofar as they differentiate himself from us. He will stress:
(1) End the War Now or if it's ended why not sooner McGovern
believes that the American people, deep in their hearts, know the
Vietnam war is a moral travesty and that only pride keeps us from
ending it now. Whatever happens, he will use this issue to point
out the frontier hubris which he sees at the core of America's lack
of maturity and its failure as an international power since World
War II.
(2) The Economy -- The domestic equivalent of Vietnam is our
handling of the economy. McGovern will say we favor the rich
against the poor, the powerful against the weak that the economy
is suffering from no temporary malady, but needs to be unchained
from corporate control through anti-monopoly laws and tax reform
to allow greater competition and growth. Jobs for everybody and
holding down of prices will be the immediate foci for his attack.
(3) Openess, Credibility and Candor of Government The President
lies and when he does not lie, he does not level with the American
people. The government is out of people's reach and beyond their
control. It lies to them about bombing abroad, unemployment
statistics at home, it bugs their telephones and collects massive
data files on them, it controls their lives without being under their
control.
(4) Nixon is a low-brow, not very thoughtful, low-quality mid-1930's
Depression-influenced, out-of-date man on the make. Anybody who
can keep Bebe Rebozo, John Mitchell, Bob Haldeman, Chuck Colson,
Spiro Agnew, Billy Graham, Clement Haynsworth, and the other
people Nixon surrounds himself with is not fit to be President of the
United States in 1972. At a time when the country is searching for
new values and new directions, Nixon represents the past at its most
mediocre. Poor boy made good, he reflects all the worst aspects of
American conservatism -- a bigoted, reactionary, unfeeling, un-
humanistic make-it-or-else philosophy influenced far more by Horatio
Alger than Edmund Burke. A wooden figure ready to use people for
his own ends and then cast them off, Nixon cannot understand an
America which has no choice but to confront itself and what it is be-
coming if it does not want to fall victim to the machinery and the
psychology which has brought it to preeminence. Nixon's like a
Fourth of July speaker who doesn't believe himself what he's saying;
McGovern knows what's happening, baby. It's time to start speaking
up to people, not speaking down to them in the hyper-patriotic,
obscure-the-substance rhetoric Nixon uses.
(5) Corporate Bias -- The tax structure, ITT, the economic program,
etc. all reflect a bias towards reactionary corporate chiefs. Peter
Flanigan says the government is open to each and everyone, but, if
I called him, I couldn't get through -- why should James Roche?
(6) Redirect Priorities -- Whatever we have done, it's not enough.
The defense budget can be slashed and domestic spending must be
increased.
cc: Charles Colson
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
LEN GARMENT
A. Our best issues:
1. The "Nixon Doctrine" (a concrete and personalized way of talking
about the "peace" issue) -- i.e., RN's carefully designed framework
for the Summits, the SALT breakthrough, burden-sharing of dollars
and manpower with our allies, reduced defense expenditures and draft
calls, the orderly and honorable withdrawal of the U.S. from Vietnam,
the disorderly expulsion of the Soviets from the Middle East, etc. The
peace issue is far and away Number One, not only because of its intrinsic
strength but because it buttresses the well-developed sense of RN's
Presidential capabilities and helps extend it to the domestic area as well.
2. The "Freedom Without Coercion" issue i.e., the anti-bureaucratic,
war-on-big-government proposals, the stand against forced integration
in housing, against busing to achieve racial balance, against quotas, etc.
3. The "Social" issue -- i.e., RN's support of a system of traditional,
rational values of restraint and common sense versus the free-wheeling,
nervewracking, stability-threatening philosophy, rhetoric and experimental
life style of the counterculture. (But the specific issues -- drugs, por-
nography, amnesty, patriotism, etc., have to be handled with sophistication
and restraint).
4. The "Professionalism" issue -- i.e., the careful, orderly, effective,
and visible performance of the President and his now tested and experienced
team which has turned the country around from the crisis-ridden, planless
chaos of 1968. This covers all issues -- even those where the pace of
progress is relatively slow, as in the economic/inflation area -- and it
rests on the proposition that - as a matter of self interest - you don't take
a series of complex responsibilities and carefully planned pieces of domestic
and foreign policy work, all of which is now in professional hands and moving
forward and turn the whole kit and kaboodle over to amateurs.
-2-
B. McGovern's vulnerabilities:
1. He has no foreign policy experience, and no foreign "policy".
2. He is locked in to a powerful commitment to special issues, minority
groups and a hodgepodge of "juvenile" and ideological constituencies in a
way that signals a return to the emotionalism, division and spirit of con-
frontation of the 60's.
3. He sincerely holds to a political philosophy that spells more spending,
more government, more bureaucratic pushing around.
4. He has shown no "governing" strength; he is coming across as a
minor league leader; he is a vacillator on matters of substance; he is even
an outcast in his own party -- i.e., a man without the unifying talents that
an American President must have.
C. McGovern's best issues:
1. That he was "right from the start" on Vietnam -- and had the courage
to speak out and the perseverance and political talent to win the nomination.
2. That he is an honest, open, credible and essentially anti-political
personality, determined to break with the standard tricks and devices of
conventional politicians.
3. That he offers a clear choice of fundamental issues affecting the
economic and spiritual well-being of the majority of Americans, and is deter-
mined to slice up the American pie more equitably by basic reform of tax
and income distribution systems. (Attached is a more detailed memorandum
on this point that I drafted for Ray Price's Acceptance Speech package).
4. That he genuinely cares about the "frustrations" of ordinary people --
the poor and the disadvantaged minorities, the overtaxed middle class, the
harrassed city-dweller, all the victims of high cost - low quality living --
and he's determined to do something about it, just as he was determined to
gain the Democratic nomination despite the hostility and opposition of the
political establishment at the beginning of his primary campaign. His basic
issue: that the focus of government attention must be shifted from the world
to the neighborhood.
D. McGovern's best points of attack:
1. That RN broke his pledge to end the war in Vietnam; the killing and
spending goes on, and will go on indefinitely - or be stepped up - once RN
gets past the political problem of the election.
2. That the ITT and Watergate episodes (and the $10 million of "concealed"
contributors) are merely examples of things to come in a flood in the next
-3-
term - favoritism for big business interests, the perpetuation of a swollen
arms budget, the abuse of power through invasion of privacy, secret
political deals to extend the power of the Republican party, public relations
instead of progressive leadership.
3. That RN is not tempermentally equipped to deal with the nitty-gritty
problems of the U.S. because he doesn't really care about little problems
or little guys. He travels thousands of miles to confer with important
leaders abroad but doesn't mingle with or listen to the ordinary people at
home.
4. That RN is philosophically tied to the status quo and the Establishment,
and therefore will not, nor would his important allies permit him to, push
for the kinds of basic changes in national priorities and programs that are
needed to make a recognizable difference in the lives of ordinary people
here at home; and that the well-heeled reelection campaign is, in essence,
a super-slick and smug snow job designed to gloss over the painful realities
of U.S. life and the inadequacies of the Nixon Administration in coming to
grips with them.
attachment
Written before the Eagle for fiasco.
GARMENT
Notes on the Acceptance Speech
First, some background guesses and assumptions:
1. By the end of August, the McGovern campaign to improve life for the
poor and middle class by soaking the rich, reducing the defense budget,
etc., will be getting underway. Ilis emphasis on issues of economic
"equity" will be steadily increasing.
2. McGovern will be coming across as a credible politician who means what
he says on these issues; and the media will be giving him a helping hand.
3. McGovern's pitch will be a simple and saleable one to millions of "working
class" people fed up with high prices, high taxes, shoddy goods, shabby
services, etc. They will be inclined to agree with McGovern when he says
they are, as always, getting the short end of the stick, while the rich and
powerful continue to get special privileges from "the system" and from
Republican friends in Washington.
4. The busing issue will be getting murkier as McGovern and Eagleton
make clear their lack of enthusiasm for busing. They will get considerable
running room from their black supporters on this issue. McGovern's tax,
welfare, health care and defense proposals will dominate his campaign
thoroughly, the intent being to overshadow issues like busing.
5. The argument of the Democrats on foreign policy will be designed to
reinforce this domestic focus: So RN met the Russians and Chinese. That's
to his credit. We'll do the same, and more. Vietnam goes on. We're
overcommitted elsewhere. The defense budget is going up. So are prices.
Where, in short, is the domestic pay-off from trips around the world and
expensive moonshots? Life at home is more difficult and less fair than
ever for the working man and woman. That's the issue. And that's the
way it's going to be as long as the fat cats of the military-industrial-Nixon
Administration complex run the country. "Bring America home" - and
SO on.
6. By the end of August, the Democrats will have begun sorting things out,
repairing relations, raising money, registering young voters, showing
they "care", doing interesting and tough things on paid media, offering
revised, and more generalized, substantive proposals, and, overall, be-
ginning to look sharper and more cohesive than in August 1968. Defections
2
by the extreme left will be planned, provoked and welcomed as McGovern
edges toward the center.
7. If my assumption as to as
sentially single-issue focus in the McGovern
campaign is correct, it woul: mean that one of RN's principal acceptance
speech problems would be how to contend with an unfolding national appeal
to pocketbook concerns that is simple, demagogic, effective, and difficult
to answer in a responsible fashion. Against the general feeling that McGovern
doesn't have a chance, one fact to be borne in mind is this: When people
who are badly pinched are offered money by a credible figure - and McGovern's
objective above all else has been to make himself credible - the offer is
hard to resist. And simply to attack McGovern as a "radical" will not mean
much. Quite a few people will manage to ignore the label if they come to
believe they' 11 have more in their pockets with McGovern in the White House.
8. On these assumptions, the objectives of our general campaign would be,
first, to lay out the affirmative case for RN's reelection; second, to
establish that McGovern-style government means more bureaucratic mani-
pulation and less individual freedom than ever before in U.S. history;
third, to translate into personal and specific terms the impact of McGovern-
style economics on the standard of living of most Americans; and fourth,
to create skepticism, eventually disbelief, not about McGovern's sincerity -
that's a difficult and dangerous tack to take - but about his ability to do
what he promises.
9. In this framework, the basic function of the President's acceptance
speech will be to set a certain tone, to make clear what the campaign will
be and what it will not be; and, beyond that, to accept and declare, as
central to that campaign, not an issue of personalities but one of Presidential
responsibility; to define RN's concept of the Presidential "trust"; to
account for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's assets in the
difficult years of his first term; to articulate the connection between foreign
policy achievements and domestic program capabilities; to show how the
promises of the 1968 Acceptance and the 1969 Inaugural are being achieved;
to reiterate that the reduction of the bureaucracy, the expansion of individual
freedom from coercion, and the enlargement of every individual's control
over the content and quality of his life is the essence of RN's philosophical
commitment. One message I think the Acceptance could most usefully con-
vey is the following warning set out in a New Republic editorial as an ad-
monition to McGovern:
3
"It is never salutary to fire up Utopian expectations
that are beyond any administration's power to fulfill.
However compassionate, courageous or wise it may
be, government cannot make night day. If there is a
feeling of betrayal in many hearts, it is at least in
part because so many politicans have wooed the
personal rancor and disaffection in America that can
be moderated, but no word from the White House,
no legislation, no bureaucratic efficiency can banish
it. When politicians encourage the disaffected to
demand more than government can deliver, they run
the risk of spreading disillusion. And in turn, if the
disaffected demand deliverance now through politics,
they run the risk of getting more government than
they want, more than a free society can take and still
stay free. 11
The President's plea to "lower voices" and his promise to move from
confrontation to negotiation, were the central themes of his Inaugural.
He has moved the country toward both objectives - dramatically in foreign
policy, steadily in domestic policy. The mood of his Acceptance should
be that he seeks reclection not to vindicate these efforts but to continue
them, that he is not running against a man or a party, but for the opportunity
to complete what has been begun.
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
B. HARLOW
Abiding your injunction for brevity, telescoped below are answers to your
August 7 memorandum:
1.
RN Issues:
Peace with power, prosperity, proportion, prudity.
2.
McGovern Vulnerabilities:
Radicalism at home, flab abroad, social permissiveness,
demagoguery (vacillation on issues to pander for votes).
3.
McGovern Issues:
Murder stopped in Vietnam, the privileged punished, the jobless
and underprivileged saved, and integrity restored (no ITT,
no secret contributors).
4. Nixon Vulnerabilities:
Vietnam, inflation and unemployment, bloated defense, pandering
for privilege (including $10 million "slush fund").
As asserted by the President, in this campaign the contrasts will be lively
and clear:
The 1972 Choice (Republican):
Seasoned experience VS. amateurism
Solid performance VS. buncombe
Responsibility VS. radicalism
Strength VS. weakness
Accountability VS. expediency
Middle American ethics VS. New Left extremism
Preserving America VS. disruption at home and abroad
The 1972 Choice (Democratic):
VN war stopped vs. indefinite prolongation
Defense fat pared VS. bloated militarism
The rich soaked VS. the rich enriched
The poor succored VS. the poor exploited
Idealism vs. crass materialism
Candor and honesty vs. ITT-ism and secret contributors
- 2 -
As requested, I have not enlarged on any of these notions, though the tempta-
tion is great. Nor have I mentioned the "bugging" scandal or the GAO audit
of the Re-Elect Committee. I do hope neither escalates into a dominant issue.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
DICK MOORE
Mr
I think our four best substantive issues are:
1. Nixon the Peacemaker, i.e. China, the Moscow agreements,
and bringing home the troops from Vietnam. The Vietnam
issue is fortified by the fact that the people respected
the President's courageous decision on Haiphong and his
resolute determination to get the prisoners back.
2. The Economy. The President has done things for the
economy and 1972 is indeed becoming a very good year.
(No President has been turned out with prosperity on
the upswing.) It's true that food prices are high, but
generally the President has slowed inflation and unemploy-
ment. More positively stated, he has created more jobs
through both his domestic and foreign policies, and this
is an item which should be hit.
3. Drugs and Crime. The initiative and momentum on both
fronts are with us, and we must keep it up.
4. Busing.
Special Issue. I think the best issue we have going for us
is more of a theme or underlying premise: our experienced
and capable President is making good headway -- don't rock
the boat. You will recall that the November Group survey
of slogans showed that by far, the most favored was "Help
him finish the job". This is really a variation of the
theme which is the most powerful of all, when applicable:
don't change horses in midstream.
Without using these words, we must keep hitting this theme,
namely that the President's programs are ongoing - his journey
toward peace and prosperity is proceeding very well, but it
isn't finished yet, and this is no time to try a new pilot.
Deep down, I think this is what the people feel, and we should
keep nurturing it.
- 2 -
McGovern's four worst issues.
1. The man himself is unqualified by experience or character.
He has never managed anything, and he is at worst, an un-
principled opportunist or at best, an indecisive, idealistic
dreamer who will only screw things up.
2. McGovern will strip our defenses and cause wide spread
unemployment in the process.
3. If McGovern were to be elected, we could expect a major
depression. He simply does not understand American busi-
Mc G
ness or the American economy. That is why the men who
market
make our economy tick are SO deathly afraid of him.
4. His willingness to leave our prisoners to the mercy of
Hanoi.
Special Issue. Again, in the case of McGovern, I think the
best thing we have going is an underlying premise or theme,
rather than a substantive issue, namely, that he is SO ir-
responsible that he cannot even win the confidence or support
of many loyal Democrats. The defection of SO many of his
normal constituents creates an aura of rejection and forseeable
defeat. We should nurture this.
McGovern's four best substantive issues:
1. He will end the war immediately.
2. He will close all the tax loopholes of the rich, and
reduce the taxes of the middle class and poor.
3. He will cut the excessive expenditures of the military
industrial establishment and pass the savings on to the
aged and the needy, etc.
4. This country can provide a job for everyone, and McGovern
will do it, even if the government has to be the employer.
- 3 -
Negative issues.
The four substantive issues on which McGovern will attack
us are listed above. However, in the final analysis, I think
McGovern will decide that his only chance is to make a massive
assault on the President personally, and I think the campaign
will be low and dirty. His main thrust will be the President's
alleged lack of trustworthiness and compassion: ITT, Watergate,
the "secret" 10 million, secrecy in general, plus a callous
disregard for civil rights and the poor and the black, etc.
Finally, the minute McGovern moves up a point or two in the
polls, I think we can expect a loud claim that he is on the
Dewey-Truman syndrome. This possibility could have credibility
and help generate enthusiasm in the McGovern camp where none
could otherwise exist. We must anticipate.it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
August 8, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.J. 120-3, Statuca 6-102
By EV
ito 3-15-82
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
John C. Whitaker for C.Whihlu
Here are my. thoughts on the four issues raised in Larry Higby's
memo of August 7 (Tab A):
I. Our best issues.
.
Incumbent President - - responsible, constructive job only
partly done; don't switch horses - - run as President, not as
candidate.
Mastery of foreign affairs - - cooling of cold war tensions;
building a lasting peace - - affirmative substantive results in
Russia, China and Middle East.
Competence and thoroughgoing professionalism in the ways
of government -- lifetime of experience in national leadership.
Practical results on "the social issue" -- targeted to how
it is perceived in various areas and among various voter groups - -
drugs, health, aged, environment, bussing, etc.
II. Opposition's worst issues.
.
Radicalism -- meaning however that term is perceived in
the eyes of the beholder -- e.g., welfare proposals, low defense
spending, abortion, gay plank. People are on automatic pilot on
McGovern image. It makes no difference what he says in the next
100 days, people won't listen -- like Goldwater's "big bomb" issue.
McGovern's idea of change is a break with and repudiation of the
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
CONFIDENTIAL
past. The President's brand of change is conservative in the
traditional and best sense -- building on the base of American
achievement and perfecting it, not turning our backs on our first
two hundred years.
McGovern as elitist -- chosen by a small group, not repre-
sentative despite the "most open convention" -- the old intellectual
cabal of Cadillac liberals trying to force their way in to use the
Federal Government as a crucible for social experimentation.
III. Opposition strongpoints as viewed from within.
Sincerity, believability and concern of their candidate.
Receptiveness to new ideas -- youthful, anti-establishment,
constructively iconoclastic image.
Early, vocal and easily understood opposition to Vietnam war.
Tax reform -- details don't matter, convince the majority
of voters that we ought to soak somebody else.
Deficit spending during the first Nixon term -- potentially
a good issue for McGovern, but I don't think he will use it, because
his economists are all on record as saying we need more of it.
IV. Our worst issues from opposition viewpoint.
Economy -- wage/price freeze, taxes (Feds get blamed
for increases at all levels of government), inflation, etc.
Big business image -- lack of concern for and empathy with
the little guy. This establishment image translates into anti-youth
and anti-new ideas.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
GONFIDENTIAL
Insincerity of the President -- he is just a politician --
"I don't like him, but I don't know why. 11
Vietnam -- President broke campaign "promise" to end
involvement in one term - - continues expensive (and immoral)
U.S. support operations while threatening vetoes of all domestic
spending programs as inflationary.
Conclusion
In almost all of the categories, it is easy to think of the first
two points (admittedly with a lot of specific issue examples), but
difficult to come up with a long shopping list. Thus I think the
campaign will be fought on very limited issues -- the economy,
Vietnam and a shifting mix of a social issue. The public percep-
tion will be very much on personalities and the factor of trust.
CC: John D. Ehrlichman
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
1972
Re your query on the four best - four worst:
To begin with, the election is going to turn basically on
the question: "Whom do you trust? 11 In which candidate do
you have a greater gut faith that he has your interests at
heart, that he can do the job, that he's as honest as can be
expected, that the country is safe in his hands?
Against McGovern, we've got two basic things going for
us: 1) radicalism, and 2) unreliability, which includes re-
neging on commitments, shooting from the hip, lack of
capacity, confusion -- which wrapped up together spell some-
one you don't want to entrust the Presidency to.
His radicalism -- including the takeover of the Democratic
machinery by an arrogant, elitist faction -- can be our chief
asset in prying away dissident organization Democrats, and
those concerned with the future of the Democratic party. They
can only get the party back by contributing to a resounding
McGovern defeat in November.
His unreliability is, I think, a more potent asset for us
in wooing the general public. In this regard, "1000 percent"
has the potential to be to George McGovern what "brainwash"
was to Romney and crying was to Muskie the incident that
becomes a code surfacing all the underlying doubts about his
candidacy and his capacity.
-2-
So far, it looks as though he's going to mount a hard,
slashing and essentially negative attack. This can boomerang.
True, he'll land some of his punches. But I thought that in his
speech Saturday night he sounded like a typical hack politician,
and the one thing he had going for him previously -- when he
was getting such favorable attention -- was that he came across
as an essentially good and decent guy who stood apart from the
usual political posturings. If he continues as he's begun, he's
going to continue losing this major asset.
Any selection of four best and four worst has to be some-
what arbitrary, because in public perceptions issues don't
separate themselves out into neat issue-book categories. But
here's a list:
From RN's Point of View
RN's 4 Best:
1. Capacity and competence. Experience, knowledge,
recognized world statesman, a known quantity, proven per-
formance, don't change horses.
2. Preserving values and institutions against assault
from the Leftist fringes. A force for stability, but not for
the status quo; for orderly, well-managed change, as
opposed to headlong plunges into dreamland.
3. Peace and strength. The careful orchestration and
successful achievement of major peace initiatives, Russia-
China, a generation of peace and the strength to maintain
it, not begging or crawling, never numb er 2. Bold new
initiatives that worked.
-3-
4. Don't let them take it away. More people have
more of a stake in the economy, and in not upsetting it;
major progress is being made toward peace at home,
toward healing divisions, curbing crime, cleaning up
the environment without wrecking the economy -- let's
continue this, not plunge back to ground zero.
McGovern's 4 Worst:
1.
Bumbling and double-dealing. Can't manage
the government if he can't manage his campaign, would
you want him behind you 1000 percent, doesn't think
before he acts ($1, 000, etc. ).
L.
A policy of weakness that would threaten the peace
and invite disaster.
3. Neglect of the real people in his pre-occupation
with the fashionable minorities and fashionable causes.
Under-representation of the aged, farmers, ethnics,
workers, at Miami; a fascination with the far-out-niks.
4. He'd bankrupt America. The high cost of his
give-aways, more taxes, more inflation, taking from
the worker to give to the non-worker, threatening the
economic system itself.
From McGovern's Point of View
McGovern's 4 Best:
1. The voice of the little guy. Everybody feels
put-upon, and he's the spokesman for their frustrations
and discontents -- a powerful position to be in.
Wallow
Contal
-4-
2. "Priorities." 11 We've got p' 'nty of resources,
we're just spending too much of them on bad things and
not enough on good things; we should close loopholes
and make the rich pay more, RN's the protector of the
rich and the MIC. McG will soak the rich and the MIC.
3. Conscience. We've not done right by the young,
the minorities, the environment, the poor -- we can do
better and we must do better.
4. Peace. The real way to peace is to stop the war.
RN's 4 Worst:
1. Never trust RN (Watergate caper, too clever by
half, dissimulation, too political, ITT, Carswell, campaign
contributions) and never trust a Republican.
2. The economy. Deliberate unemployment, anti-labor,
against the little guy, inflation, ITT, campaign contributions,
never trust a Republican -- and why has it taken so long?
3. The war. If RN can end it now, why not four years
and 20, 000 lives ago?
4. Abrasiveness. We've been anti-young, anti-media,
nB
needlessly rubbing salt in the Nation's wounds (and he
probably hopes that we'll do it again).
,Zust
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
DETERMINED TO BS AN
MEMORANDUM
August 8, 1972
ADMIN
KING
E.U. 120
G-102
By
3-15-82
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
RUT
SUBJECT:
Nixon/McGovern Strong/Weak Issues
As requested this memorandum summarizes my recommendations on what
I think can be the most effective issues for us in the campaign,
what are our most vulnerable areas, and McGovern's potential
strengths and weaknesses. These recommendations are based on my
interpretation of the June data and can, of course, change as the
campaign progresses.
STRONGEST NIXON ISSUES
1. Vietnam
Vietnam has been, and will probably continue to be by far the most
important national issue and the one more people say will be
important to their potential vote than any other. There is a
strong support for the President's Vietnam program and his ratings
on handling Vietnam have been and continue to be high. It is the
issue on which the President has the greatest advantage in terms
of his perceived ability to handle it. Both our waves of polling
and the focus group sessions indicated that with many voters the
President's overall approval rating is closely tied to Vietnam.
Since Vietnam has been a major national issue, there have been
several secondary issues which have risen and fallen and become
at times code words for a broader set of attitudes. It appears
now that "Amnesty" may become such an issue. There is no question
that amnesty is now seen as an integral part of the Vietnam issue
as opposed to an independent issue.
2. Peace/Foreign Affairs/National Defense
While the independent issues of foreign affairs and national
defense are not ranked particularly high in terms of importance to
voting, the President gets his highest ratings cn them. When they
are translated into ways the President is striving for peace, they
can undoubtedly be effective in the campaign. They are also a
means to take advantage of some of his greatest accomplishments,
i.e. his Russia and China trips.
-2-
I think it is particularly important that the campaign show the
breadth of the President's foreign policy accomplishments and that
they always be interpreted as furthering the cause of World Peace.
3. Drugs/Crime
Drugs is a problem that is of intense personal concern to a wide
spectrum of the electorate. It led the list in January of the issues
that were of the most concern to the individual respondents. There
is virtually no negative to anything the President might say or do
on this issue and offers a great opportunity for us. It is the one
issue where the President's ratings have increased sharply since
January, and I think we should continue to use it extensively.
Drugs are also a believable and honest solution to the crime problem
with many voters and does not get us tied up in the law and order,
repression or anti-black problem. The greatest concern on the
crime issue is personal safety and drugs are seen as a cause of it.
It is also an issue where the President can show his understanding,
compassion, and determination to solve a problem about which there
is a great deal of fear, apprehension, and lack of knowledge on
the part of most older Americans, particularly parents.
4. General Unrest
I think the President can tie many issues together under this issue
and improve his overall perception by using this theme which is
directed at restoring a more orderly way of life in the country and
decreasing the unrest. We need something to communicate the "lower
our voices" and "bring us together" themes of 1968. This is the
one area where the President can give people hope for an improvement
in their lives.
Note:
The economy, particularly inflation, was on this list in January
but is now one of our weaknesses rather than strengths. It is the
second most important issue to the voters and it undoubtedly will
become one of our strengths if the President takes further action,
particularly with regard to food prices.
WEAKEST NIXON ISSUES
1. Inflation and Food Prices
This is the second most important issue in its effect on the vote,
and the most important area where the President's ratings have
dropped severely since January. In my opinion, if we get into
trouble on this campaign, it will be on this issue. However, if
the President should take further strong action to slow rising
prices, particularly food prices, it would probably be one of our
strengths rather than weaknesses.
-3-
2. Tax Reform
Taxes and tax reform are also important issues and ones where the
President's ratings have decreased significantly. Rising taxes,
particularly property taxes, are an important element of inflation
and rising prices in general. I think the President should definitely
make a major statement proposing tax reform, particularly for the
middle income family early in September.
3. Change
The general issue of change is also one where we appear vulnerable.
The great majority of voters think that we need major change in our
governmental and economic systems and see McGovern as representing
that change. More importantly, however, they see the President as
being opposed to it. It is important that we portray the President
as an innovator and advocate of responsible change in the campaign.
4. Unemployment/Jobs
Jobs is always an important issue and while we do not appear to
be losing any votes over unemployment now, neither are we getting
any votes on the jobs issue. Also the President's ratings on
unemployment are low and leaving him vulnerable to attack by McGovern.
STRONGEST McGOVERN ISSUES
McGovern's ratings on the various issues are all very similar,
which indicates that he is not identified to any great degree with
specific issues. Rather, he has a general issue handling perception
that covers most of the individual issues and is in many ways a
personal dimension attached to him. I do think there are some areas
that he will concentrate on.
1. Inflation/Food Prices
While there is no evidence in the data to indicate McGovern has any
unique strength on this issue, it is our weakest point and a traditional
Democratic issue, and one that is particularly usable by those out
of office. It also appears to me that McGovern is beginning to zero
in on this issue. He is undoubtedly looking at the same kind of
data we are.
2. Domestic Priorities
This general area could be effectively used by including defense
spending and the whole idea of spending less abroad and more at home.
I understand that there is some consideration of a "Ile cares about
this country most" type of theme for McGovern which handled properly
could be effective. There is strong support for the idea that we
need to spend a larger portion of our resources on our own domestic
problems.
-4-
3. Tax Reform
Tax reform is another area where we are vulnerable and it is an
extremely important issue. It is also related to both change and
inflation and clearly has great appeal to most middle income people.
The President is now perceived as being far from the majority of
the voters.
4. Change
This is also an issue where we are vulnerable and one on which
McGovern appears to have some impact in the primaries. At this
point he is only moderately identified with it but he seems to be
focusing in on it. It will probably be fairly easy for him to
broaden this into a concentration of power and help for the little
man issue. The change issue is also directly related to the domestic
priority issue.
5. Unemployment/Jobs
Unemployment is an issue that does not appear to be costing us
any votes now but one I would work on hard if I were McGovern,
emphasizing particularly the jobs and the need for more jobs rather
than just unemployment. Jobs has always been an effective political
issue as everyone who has a job wants a better job and everyone who
does not have a job wants to find one.
WEAKEST McGOVERN ISSUES
1. Competence
The greatest weakness of McGovern is a lack of competence and the
depth and breadth to deal with the problems of the Presidency. This
is the area where the President has the greatest advantage over him
now. It was a McGovern weakness in June and has undoubtedly been
compounded by the Eagleton affair.
2. Government Spending/Welfare/High Taxes
McGovern's weakest substantive issue may also be economic. I think
it will be fairly easy to label him as a big spender at a time when
there is great objection to increased government spending, parti-
cularly for social welfare programs. It is important that we tie
these McGovern programs to higher taxes, and prove to the voters
that he simply cannot create these new programs without higher taxes,
3. Extremism
The seeds for establishing NcGovern as an extremist and his ideas
as outside the dimensions of acceptability were evidence in the
second wave data. This idea can be set deeper as the campaign goes
on; however, can best be done by monopolizing the center and shoving
McGovern to the left on the issues without attacking him personally.
CONFIDENTIAL FEYES ONLY
DEX - INFORMATION SHEET
ORIGINATORS
DEX NR:
LOCATION:
WHITE NOUSE
001
ADDRESSEES
NR OF PAGES:
LOCATION: CAMP DAVID
4
FROM: JOHN Mc LAUGHLIN
DTG:
N.R. HALDEMAN
0819527
TO:
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
TOT:
TOR: INITIAL
U819527
0820307
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN McLAUGHLIN
Incl
SUBJECT:
Four Crow Points and
Four Attack Points for
RN and McGovern.
RN's FOUR CROW POINTS:
1.) Incumbency. RN has proven his competence. He
can handle the job: sensible, level-headed, moderate
responsibly progressive, politically astute, tough when
called to be, professional, decisive. A combination of
flexibility and steel, astringency and sentiment.
2.) Domestic Tranquility. Under RN the center held.
1968 saw division, riot, bombings, accelerating crime,
drug indulgence, run-away inflation, a bloating war,
an immobilized President. RN reduced crime, checked
drug addiction through innovative programs, slashed
inflation, turned the war around, made new court ap-
pointees. The Nation is back on the tracks.
3.) Peace Candidate. RN is the true peace candidate.
One-half million men home from SVN. We are on the
threshold of a settlement. This settlement is moral,
a McGovern bug-out would have been immoral: blood-
bath, prolongation of the war in Southeast Asia, en-
slavement (literally) for multiple generations of South
Vietnamese and, probably, Laotians and Cambodians.
War would not have stopped in Southeast Asia, moreover,
if we had so precipitously withdrawn as McGovern proposes:
millions of South Vietnamese would have continued to resist
by guerilla warfare with incalculable loss of life.
-2-
RN has restructured U.S. relationship to the international
community by lowering American profile, and at the same
time restructured the international community itself, in-
clining nations to take a larger, more proportionate share
of responsibility for their own defense. RN's historic
Peking and Moscow summitry has created a global spirit
of irenicism inclining nations to realistically compromise
long-held disputes rather than resorting to protracted
belligerency. A climate of compromise is demonstrated
by developments between North and South Korea, East and
West Germany, Japan and China, India and Pakistan, and
possibly Egypt and Israel. RN can take his share of credit
for this astonishing spirit of international detente.
4.) A Record To Build On. To prevent his gains from being
wiped out, RN must be remandated by the American people.
His stewardship has been sound and productive. It deserves
extension. Look at what remains to be done: domestic pro-
grams languishing in Congress because of obstructionists'
dilatory tactics. The next four years will bring prosperity
and peace, a quality of life that Americans have not known
before, ushering in the 200th anniversary of this country.
RN's FOUR ATTACK POINTS:
1.) McGovern Is Green. Inexperience. Incompetent. His
failures of executive control have already been demonstrated:
his staff at the convention. He does not even control his party.
2. ) McGovern Is Dangerous. $1,000 for every man, woman
and child - for breathing - at a cost of $200 billion. Welfare
floor: $6, 500, which would put one-half of the Nation on relief
and the other half working to support it. Decriminalization of
marijuana, perilous defense budget cuts, abortion on demand.
McGovern wants too much change: it would turn the Nation up-
side down.
3. ) McGovern Is Divisive. North against South, blacks against
whites, labor against management, young against old.
4.) McGovern is Indecisive. (To be stressed only after McG.
-3-
has been locked into his radical, leftist positions.) He
fudges, waffles, muddles, and weasels: abortion, private
school aid, POW's, troops in Southeast Asia. "I'm behind
Tom Eagleton 1, 000%. 11
McGOVERN'S FOUR CROW POINTS:
1.) Jobs. "I will put people to work. " Inflation can be controlled
without bleeding people of their jobs, the way Nixon has done.
2.) Trust. "You can put your trust in me. 11
3.) Populist. "I serve the people, not the fat cats. 11
4.) Open Government. "My administration will be open to
all strata of society, and my books will be open."
McGOVERN'S FOUR ATTACK POINTS:
1.) Nixon Is A Destroyer. RN bombs North Vietnam, kills
civilians, ruins dikes, mines harbors, causes refugees,
napalms children.
2.) Nixon Is A Failure. Unemployment rages, inflation soars,
streets unsafe, air dirty, water polluted, people disunited.
3.) Nixon Serves The Fat Cats. ITT, child care veto, no tax
reform, unresponsive to youth, blacks, minorities.
4.) Nixon Is Sneaky. Watergate Five. RNC $5,000 check payola.
San Diego embarrassments. (Whatever heads must roll, ought to
be rolled now, by the way.)
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:
1.) McGovern must generate within the people a (synthetic) sense
of need for major change. That sense is not present now; the
people do not want the kind or volume of change that McGovern
needs if he is to win, Our response to his effort to awaken a
sense of need for change could degenerate into a plea for prolonged
status quoism. This danger is endemic to incumbency campaigning.
-4-
Our counterpoint should be that RN has produced change -
responsible, timely, moderately progressive, and absor-
bable change. Number 4 above under RN's positive points,
therefore, should be hit hard by surrogates. The electorate
needs a vision of the future as well as a sense of stability
with the present.
2.) Don't Let The Rascals In. McGovern will assume the
offensive, namely, "Throw the rascals out. 11 RN must not
simple batten down the hatches defensively. Our offensive
strategy ought to be: "Don't let the rascals in. " If McGovern
says inflation has gone up, it is not enough for us to race to
the television screen and say afterwards, "No, inflation has
gone down. 11 It must also be stressed that if McGovern's
policies were adopted, inflation would sky-rocket. Analo-
gously, if McGovern says that RN stands for war, our offensive
response position is RN is the true peace candidate, McG. war candidate.
In other words, the danger of an incumbency candidacy is that it
assumes an exclusively defensive posture. McGovern ought not
be allowed to determine which issues are to be focused on. If
that happens, the Republicans will be made to look scared, even
panicky.
So, in an incumbency campaign, the kind of response to opposition
attacks is telling, namely, whether the attack is responded to or
not; the timing of the response; its quality of restraint or force;
and who actually does the responding. My present feeling is
that we have more to risk by overkill in responding, than by under-
kill in responding. Our energies ought to be directed more to
establishing the focus than to responding to McGovern's attack
initiatives. Without over-profiling him, we can put him on the
defensive and plot the battle grounds that we want to fight on.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Issues in the Fall Campaign
Given all circumstances, Sargent Shriver is probably
the best running mate McGovern could have picked.
First, he reassures the old New Deal power brokers
(witness Mayor Daley's enthusiastic statements) without
carrying their liabilities since he has not run for
office before, and, of course, additionally, has the
Kennedy identification.
Second, he is youthful, attractive and liberal enough
to insure favorable media coverage. Since even the
press had finally despaired of McGovern, we can predict
that Shriver will very soon have a romance going with
the media that will put the "Muskie '68" to shame.
As to what we should do tactically and issue-wise in
the face of this, I suggest the following.
1. Stay on course and sustain our assault on McGovern
and his policies. In the final analysis, voters are
comparing Nixon VS. McGovern for the Presidency so we
should not build up Shriver by attacking him and,
of course, that particularly means Agnew. We can cope
with Shriver in the media partially by having young,
attractive surrogates (e.g., Rumsfeld) bracket Shriver
on his schedule and tie him to McGovern's extreme positions.
With whatever friends we can find in the press, we must
force Shriver to agree as fully and as soon as possible
with all of McGovern's positions. Shriver must not be
allowed to fuzz his and McGovern's positions.
-2-
2. Shriver personifies the old Federal handout -
"War on Poverty" - categorical program approach. He
should be roasted on why these programs failed and asked
repeatedly where he stands on revenue sharing, etc. The
strong support the President has among mayors, for
example, who dislike the old categorical approach, should
be used to full advantage in this area.
A good many big city votes could turn on how this is
handled.
3. We must not let Shriver become a foreign policy
expert or spokesman on the thin basis of his Peace Corps
work and ambassadorship to France. Remember that McGovern
and Eagleton could not even pretend sophistication on
this score.
4. All in all, if I were in McGovern's position, I would
move Shriver out front and keep him on the road, parti-
cularly for the immediate future. McGovern is tired and
over-exposed after his primary and convention stints, and
he and his staff need to recoup and regroup.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE (dictated from London)
RE:
Campaign Issues
A. Our Best (Positive)
1. Nixon will bring peace that will last.
2. Nixon stands for the values most Americans believe in.
3. Nixon stopped the rise of crime and disorder.
4. Nixon is bringing about prosperity in peacetime.
B. Opposition's Worst (Negative)
1. That's your money they want to redistribute.
2. They would appease their way into another war.
3. They represent only the extremes and not the majority.
4. Millions of investors in stock market securities would
suffer if they won.
C. Opposition's Best (Positive)
1. The average man will get a better deal through tax reform.
2. The war would end right away.
3. A spirit of compassion would bring the country together.
4. They would change priorities to spend money on people
and not war machines.
-2-
D. Opposition's Worst (Negative)
1. Nixon the captive of special interests and fat cats.
2. Nixon's secret war chest conceals embarrassing donations.
3. Nixon broke his promises on the war and is strictly an
opportunist without principle.
4. Nixon has shown he doesn't give a damn about the cities.
HIGH PRIORITY
August 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR :
MR. SEARS
FROM :
L. HIGBY
Now that the dust has settled, the opposition Vice Presidential
candidate picked, and the opposition candidate making it clear
what his line of attack is going to be, Bob asked that you put
together a brief memo that lists your thoughts as to what our
four best issues will be for the fall campaign, and what the
opposition candidate's four worst issues are - i.e., the things
we want to hit him on.
Then, put yourself in the role of the opposition candidate and
looking at it from his point of view, list what you feel are his
four best issues and what our four worse issues are from his
viewpoint or the issues he will be hitting us on.
Please forward your thoughts by 2:00 p.m. Tuesday, August 8th.
G7 Sears 8/7
Gordon
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
HR. R. HALDEMAN Dell
DOUG HALLETT
RE:
Larry Higby's Memo of July 19
This is in response to the second part of Larry Higby's memoran-
dum of July 19, asking for my thoughts on the best use of Mrs. Nix-
on, Tricia, and Julie, during the campaign.
I have become a great fan of Mrs. Nixon's -- I think she is a great
asset and can be a very substantial addition to the campaign. She
should appear with the President quite frequently. In addition, she
should have her own schedule of appearances at volunteer projects,
hospitals, schools, etc. -- these she does fabulously well. Like
the President, her appearances should be at least theoretically gov-
ernmental. Carefully-selected TV talk shows might be another pos-
sibility -- these, however, would have to be carefully selected --
obviously Liz Drew's show would not be appropriate.
I would combine Tricia's appearances to the Deep South and joint
appearance with Mr. Cox in which he is a speaker or otherwise the
dominant performer. As part of this, she might do some Northern
talk shows in conjunction with Mr. Cox or even alone, But these
should be carefully selected. Merv Griffin's audience is appropriate
-- Dick Cavett's would not be. If anybody has to waste time appear-
ing before women's Republican lunches and I hope as little of this
as possible can be done -- Tricia is the one.
Julie is excellent before virtually all kind of audiences except the
most superheated and sophisticated liberal types. Ethnic picnics,
volunteer projects, children's hospitals, schools, etc. -- these
are the kinds of colorful, visual, and informal events at which I
think Julie does well. Since she speaks Spanish, she should be
-2-
programmed for a lot of Spanish-type appearances in New York,
New Jersey, Illinois, Texas, and especially California.
My memorandum of June 15 already suggested a Sunday evening
before-the-election family show and a Monday daytime Nixon
women show -- I reiterate these suggestions here.
CC: Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
C
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy Recommendations
I would not substantially modify my earlier recommendations on the
subject of campaign strategy but rather would reiterate the following
points:
1.
The President should maintain a posture of being generally above
the political infighting not just because he has to conduct the business
of State but, more importantly, because his overall record speaks for
itself and his "stooping to conquer" will only serve to enhance the
McGovern prestige and tend to equate two totally unequal contenders.
The President's greatest personal asset is both the image and
reality of an experienced, thoughtful, unemotional and exceptionally
competent and tough national leader. Should he succumb to classic
partisan gut-fighting, the activity would detract from this optimum
posture. The tactics employed by the President himself should involve
a careful and continuous appraisal of the need for his personal role as
November approaches. It may be that the posture I am recommending
will in the natural course of events develop the need for a fighting,
tub-thumping, one-time Presidential speech in which the President
rolls up his sleeves and takes on McGovern head on. While such a
speech should be prepared and held for contingency use, a decision
to proceed should only follow a most careful assessment that there is,
in fact, a demand. If it is determined that a demand does exist then
the speech should be given as late as possible in the campaign to
prevent gutter type rebuttals which can again only result in an escala-
tion of this kind of activity. Under no circumstances should a "tub-
thumper" of this kind be considered for the President's acceptance
speech at Miami.
2.
With respect to campaigning and travel, obviously others will
have more refined and experienced perspectives. I still, however,
-2-
continue to believe that the President should avoid over-exposure
especially in contrived purely political environments. A non-frantic,
business-of-State schedule should insure plenty of preelection exposure
but great care should be taken to develop venues which are Presidential
in character and which will enable him to talk appropriately from a
statesmanlike position with the full weight of the Presidency behind
him, i.e., not just as another candidate. Venues should focus pri-
marily on opportunities which can be nationally televized. These are
the opportunities which get impact. In this vein, nothing is of greater
importance than the timing (prime time) and substance of the President's
acceptance speech.
Themes to be exploited should cover: foreign policy, National
Defense and perhaps two or three domestic issues, such as law and
order, philosophy of government and welfare.
3.
In my view, the greatest single exploitable accomplishment of
the President is foreign policy but beyond that it is his demonstrated
willingness to make tough courageous decisions in times of national
crises, i.e., Jordan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, May 8th and South Asia.
For this reason, one of the greatest single dangers between now and
November would be a panicky posture on Vietnam. In my view, the
issue has been largely defused since American boys are not dying as
before, American youths are not being drafted and most Americans
attribute this to Presidential toughness above all else. Most Americans
sense an aroma of finality in the policies we are currently pursuing in
Vieinam. In a political sense, the benchmark for this American con-
fidence was the decision of May 8. The backdrop, however, is an accumu-
lative series of courageous decisions made all along the way which have
in large measure proven to be correct. Should we panic in the last five
minutes by accepting a compromise solution which is obviously detri-
mental to American and South Vietnamese interests there is a great
risk that much of our constituency will become disaffected.
4.
I agree completely with the theme that we should generally
posture cabinet members and advocates in the direction of not personal-
izing attacks on McGovern's radicalism but rather take him on, issue
by issue, in a repetitive fashion and being sure they credit him with his
most extreme earlier positions. A specific line should be developed
Good
and approved for each issue and be repeated and repeated until it
acquires a reality of its own which the opposition must squander all
of its resources to counter.
-3-
The overall image of McGovern that we should attempt to develop
is one of a sincere, well-meaning but totally inadequate and unqualified
Presidential candidate. We must not permit the opposition to dig out
of the extreme positions which McGovern has already placed on the
record. The opposition is already launching a major effort to do SO.
Forcing the opposition to justify or in some cases to move away from
earlier stated positions will tend to alienate their own extreme con-
stituency and keep them in a defensive posture throughout.
5.
To me, the greatest weakness of the McGovern camp is also its
greatest strength. His current image is one of a loner who is honest
and uncompromising in his desire to shatter all preconceived political,
international, defense, management and welfare patterns of the U.S.
Government. Beyond this, he is viewed as favoring a fundamental
shift in the very life style of the American people. Unfortunately,
there are many Americans, including many well-to-do intellectuals
and even bureaucrats who live in a theoretical world which permits
them to savor a whole new approach. The youth and intellectuals are
obviously most attracted to this kind of logic. For this reason,
it is essential-that we focus primarily on the impracticalities of this
approach, issue by issue and theme by theme. It is also important
that our own positive statements clearly portray the President as a
successful innovator who has himself, through skill and experience,
brought about more change than could ever be experienced be the ill-
conceived and pie-in-the-sky themes which characterize the McGovern
platform.
These are, of course, generalities which must be specifically
tailored for specific constituents. Labor, for example, must under-
stand that McGovern would suck away their hard-earned earnings
for the welfare parasite. The establishment must understand that
their hard-earned financial rewards could not be shared with their
heirs.
In the international area, the theme Secretary Rogers mentioned
at the Leadership Meeting is an especially good one, i.e., McGovern
seems to favor an extension and continuation of the large majority of
our international programs but would self defeatingly deprive the
country of the assets which have thus far made these programs succeed,
i.e., military strength and responsible international evolvement.
-4-
6.
I would again emphasize the Presidential family concept through
which the President, Mrs. Nixon and the daughters be employed at
every turn in the months between now and November. The President's
family man image and the public attractiveness of Mrs. Nixon and the
girls cannot be over-emphasized. It also contributes in an indirect
way to the great theme that President Nixon represents the personifica-
tion of valued American family traditions which dramatizes by example
the inadequacies of an off-beat zealot whose main appeal can only be
to the misfits in American society.
7.
Finally, and above all, it must be recognized that the preceding
merely confirms a strategy for exploiting existing assets. Written
strategy of this kind and generalizations about what we have going for
us are meaningless without a detailed, well organized and, above all,
disciplined machine for carrying the strategy forward in an effective
way. Bad strategy can be overcome by effective management. A
perfect strategy implemented in an ill-disciplined, poorly timed or
sloppy way can be disastrous. I am not sure that our organizational
arrangements and the detailed development of themes, scheduled
Presidential appearances, Advocate appearances, etc., are precisely
delineated or that a manned command and control mechanism is firmly
in place and properly functioning. If this has not been done, it is the
overriding task of the moment. This, you are best able to assess.
&
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Doug Youg Hallett
SUBJECT:
Larry Higby's Request of July 19.
The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and
amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memo-
randum - - you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice
you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half
a joke.)
The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may
recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good
opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful
Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.
My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier
memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a
local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt,
and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics
and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West,
and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election and
that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive
positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off
people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local,
regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should
be directing our negative issues abortion acid homsexuality our
more extreme rhetoric about national security tax reform. welfare
reform, etc. in carefully-designed well-researched. probably
printed and front group formats SO that we ourselves are not hurt by our
own efforts.
2.
To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being
contravened. In particular, our positive national material the pamphlets,
the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen is
the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968.
More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so
far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive
way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator
Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric "white flag budget" and under-
researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice
President's rhetoric "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about
Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating
posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol
Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are
all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's
extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They
undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency
while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation
to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we
know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward,
p rogressive and potentiall the middle ground to Senator McGovern.
On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem
satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be getting
irgorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's
views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues
Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national
security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings,
particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense
budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not
know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending
a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we
know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to
expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one
Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example,
that is true.
There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign so
far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going
after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary
how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use
the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division,
have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. how much was done?
3.
And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern
get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on.
the particulars of his issues how much has been done?
In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization
and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is
going to get him re-elected if only because nobody else will but
there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:
1.
Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there
may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do
the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive
duplication of effort, inter -office rivalry, competition, holding back
of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting
the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
(a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's
1701 would get lead responsibility and it would also get Colson.
Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts dinners,
funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If
they haven't, it's too late.) Now what we need is a hard-driving
organizational and political effort and that can only be done from
a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as ma ny people from
here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people,
etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would
have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
(b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with
authority to run all over the place. It needs it still.
(c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction
to provide such support activities as are needed - - agency contact,
White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming,
etc.
(d) Writing now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and
God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief
perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No
matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy
and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that
one guy.
4.
(e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and,
in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate
pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R. -types like
Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P. R.
activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled
within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining
at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
(f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation
presumably Ed Harper would report to Colson at 1701.
(g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with
the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as
it is now as a separate Connally-Colson preserve it is
going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
(h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be
visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for
two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the
President. Starting now, the President should have a series of
afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at
least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't
believe how lax people are around here and mainly, I think,
because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal
identity with the President.
2.
Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to
remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only
Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so
response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the
McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the
President should be locked in and something attached to the
President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The
same goes for everybody else.
3.
Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our
constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of
awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything
else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign,
with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's
substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We
would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around
with a sense of humor.
5.
4.
Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know
anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available
for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been
around the President for more than one campaign.
I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.
cc: Charles W. Colson
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
21 July 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM DOUG HALLETT
RE: Addendum to Memorandum of 20 July
I note in today's paper Clark MacGregor's recommendation that the
President not campaign until the last three weeks of the campaign and then
that that period be set aside for campaigning. Because my two previous
memoranda have not been too specific on this point, I want to make my
position clear. I think it is important that the President never appear
to begin campaigning. He should phase into it after the convention.
From September 1 on there should be a mix of D. C. -based substantive
activities, substantive travel, and mass rally travel (5 or 6 at most
for the entire fall). As September flows into October, the mix should
just become more heavily weighted to substantive travel and then in the
last two weeks more weighted to mass rally travel. Thus, there might be
one mass rally on or about Labor Day, one in late September, one in
mid-October, and two during the last two weeks -- and any rally appearance
should be connected with a substantive appearance the previous or next day.
On the substantive travel side, there might be three trips in September,
three in the first two weeks of October, and four from mid-October on.
Thus, the overwhelming weight of the President's appearances would be
at least theoretically government-related -- and he would appear talking
about governmental issues. There is no law that says you have to campaign
with a bunch of goddamn balloons and Nixonettes and mouth a lot of partisan
banalities -- the President can attract attention and dominate the airways
and the issues in other, more effective -- and less destructive -- ways.
cc: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
RE:
CONVENTION
I was talking to Howard K. Smith last night about what he expects for
television coverage, and he said that all the TV people expected a
pretty dull convention with the likelihood of violence in the streets.
That's not good will associate us with violence, inability to reduce
dissent, etc.
Howard wondered if we were planning the usual lineup - - President
and Vice President acceptance speeches on the same night. He
suggested that if, for the first time, they could be on different nights,
they would be separate news events, each a must for coverage in full.
Moreover, it occurs to me, a mass audience is less likely to sit
through two long speeches practically back to back; in addition, if
the VP's speech is really good, it detracts from the President's,
and if it is no good, it loses the audience.
Therefore, why do we not do something radical in the way of political
conventions and nominate the Vice President on one night, have him
accept that night, and do the President the next night?
This would be met with a lot of cluck-clucking as anti-traditional,
but the real reason for putting them together in the past was to first
determine the Presidential nominee and have himselect the running
mate; with a sitting President who will make his choice known before
the Convention, that reason is obviated.
Thus, we could have two separate and distinct news stories, better
ratings, and a more solitaire setting for the President on his night.
Worth considering?
cc: Dick Moore
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
I've no changes in my June 16 memo, but would add a few
additional thoughts:
1. The target is McGovern, not the Democrats. I was
glad this point was made so forcefully this morning, and I think
it's essential that we stick with it. We should stress the open door
theme, and keep coming back to the argument that RN represents
the great, bi-partisan traditions of America - - the traditions not
only of Lincoln and TR and Eisenhower, but also of Wilson and FDR,
of Truman and Kennedy.
2. Whenever possible, RN should help cement this im-
pression by referring back to these traditions, and to positions
associated with them: to FDR's leadership of the free world in its
time of peril, to HST's forging of the Atlantic alliance, etc.
3. Throughout our history, there have been fringe move-
ments that were briefly and dramatically in the spotlight, then faded
back into the shadows from whence they came -- while the great
bi-partisan traditions were carried on. We should zero in on
McGovern's as the latest of these.
4. We should have a moratorium on discussion of forging
a new coalition that will make the GOP the majority party for the
next generation -- this will scare off those dispossessed Democrats
who see a resounding defeat of McGovern as the only way they can
take their party back.
-2-
5. Non-partisan forums are the best forums. The President
made this point to the surrogates; at this point it's doubly true for him,
if we're to make him the rallying-point for disaffected Democrats as
well as Republicans and Independents. To the maximum extent possible,
the forums we book him into should be ones associated with those great
bi-partisan traditions.
6. We should do our damnedest to avoid getting into situations
like the one we found ourselves in with Packwood and the Crippling
Strikes Prevention Act. This hurts us at our most vulnerable point: it
provides some of the most damaging support yet for the picture of RN
as an unprincipled politician who would sacrifice anything for electoral
support. We could use some fights on principle for unpopular causes
to offset it; or at least to resist some obvious pressures to take the
expedient course. I saw Packwood on two networks last night; it was
devastating. We shouldn't delude ourselves that we can do this sort of
thing (if we did) without getting caught at least part of the time, and being
severely hurt by it. I think Stew Alsop was right in his column when he
asked who could defeat RN in November, and concluded that only RN
could.
7. In general, I thought the presentation of strategy this
morning was right on target.
8. Attached is an outline I did last Sunday for the keynote
presentation at the convention, together with some notes explaining it.
It builds up to a direct appeal to dissident Democrats to join with us.
I think this kind of thing could also be the keynote of the campaign.
Ra81
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
Attachments
PRICE
July 16, 1972
Keynote Presentation: Outline
1. Moderator. There are discontents and dissatisfactions in the
land; Americans feel frustrated with the present, and often fed up
with government. We share these discontents and dissatisfactions,
and we too are fed up with what all too often have been the failures
of government. But we don't just complain. For three and a half
years we've been doing something about it; we've made progress;
the direction is set, the momentum is established, the players are
lined up, the openings have been made to Russia, China and others
abroad, and to new departures at home. Highlights of what we've
achieved. What we've accomplished is a beginning, and a credential;
now we're eager to get on with the job, and to finish what we've
begun. In the film you're about to see, you will see some of those
beginnings.
FILM: THE NIXON YEARS
2. Keynoter A: What we will do for you. Our plans, our goals, for
the future, as we look from now to 1976. A new prosperity without
war and without inflation; the beginnings of a full generation of peace;
a rebirth of pride in America; a fair shake for the farmer, security
for the elderly, progress on the environment, etc.
-2-
3. Keynoter B: What we will not do to you. (The attack speech.)
All the McGovern nasties -- we won't take money out of the workers'
pockets for a $1,000 dole, we won't bus your kids, we won't let
America become a second-rate power whose President has to beg,
we won't spawn a new permissiveness that collapses moral values;
we'll work with the young, but won't ignore the old; we'll turn
America around without turning it upside down. We'll respect the
student, the professor, the farmer -- and also the worker who
wears a hard hat. Note: the focus of this will be entirely on the
sins of the present Democratic nominee, not on the sins of past
Democratic administrations.
4. Keynoter C. From the party of the Open Door, an Invitation.
From the podium of this Republican convention, we address this
talk to the millions of loyal Democrats left homeless by Hurricane
McGovern. Speaking to them directly, we invite them to make
their home with us -- try it, you may like it. Think about why
you're a Democrat. Is it because the Democratic party is the party
of FDR, Truman and Kennedy? If so, then ask yourself whether
Roosevelt or Truman or Kennedy would advocate crippling our
defenses and abandoning our allies -- Roosevelt, who led the defense
-3-
of freedom in World War II; Truman, the architect of NATO and the
Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and patron at the founding
of Israel; Kennedy, who declared we would "bear any burden, 11 etc.
Is it because the Democratic party is the party of labor? -- through
a litany of why people in the past have been Democratic, and why
those same reasons should now lead them to cast their lot with us
in 1972. Its tone is one of respect for the Democratic Party as a
great national institution, and sympathy with those members who
have seen it seized by a self-appointed elite determined to convert
it into a narrow ideological faction - - of warm and open-hearted
welcome to those left on the outside at Miami a month ago, and of
common cause with them because we share their hopes, their dreams,
their concerns about America. In his acceptance speech, George
McGovern said, "Come home, America. " To millions of Demo-
crats whose ideas no longer have a hearing in the national Democratic
Party, I say tonight, "Come home, Americans -- come share our
home -- give us not only your votes, but your hands, we will give
you ours in welcome. " This is the real keynote -- and it should
be echoed throughout the rest of the convention proceedings.
#######
PRICE
July 16, 1972
Notes on the keynote outline, and on the invitation:
1. Structure. This is broken into sections not by issue area, but to
make a logical progression leading up to what I think should be the
real "keynote" of the keynote, and of the convention: an explicit,
direct appeal to disaffected Democrats to take refuge with us.
One of our real dangers has been that we'd come across as
smug and complacent. This counters that, at the outset of the con-
vention, in two ways: first, by starting off identifying ourselves with
the dissatisfactions most Americans feel in one way or another,
saying we share those, and that's why we want another four years to
complete the unfinished task of combatting them; and second, by
reaching out to the Democrats rather than merely patting ourselves
on the back. There are more of them than there are of us, so we
need them; people like to be courted, and this does so -- showing that
we care about them.
The intro establishes an audience rapport by saying we know how
you feel; it brags a bit, but without smugness, and leads logically
into the film, which shows RN grappling with the inherited troubles
and making headway against them in his first term; the film leaves
us at 1972; Keynoter A then takes us from 1972 to 1976, in terms of
our hopes and plans; Keynoter B draws the sharp distinctions be-
tween what we're offering and what the opposition is; this sets the
stage for Keynoter C to make his appeal to the traditional Democrats
to come with us.
2. Advantages. Keying off with this unusual sort of appeal to
Democrats has several distinct advantages:
a. Being unusual, it makes news.
b. It plays against the weakness of the opposition candidate,
and highlights Democratic divisions.
C. It keys off our "party of the open door" theme.
-2-
d. It sets up some possible additional convention highlights
(see notes below on this).
e. It establishes a set of explicit rationales for dissident
Democrats to join with us.
f. It adds interest to what could otherwise be a dull convention,
by introducing an element of contest and confrontation -- but making
it confrontation among Democrats rather than among Republicans.
g. It provides a theme for the commentators to talk about, with
a cast of characters.
3. Convention follow-up. I'd like to see us issue this call to Demo-
crats at the outset, and then follow it up throughout the convention
-- not only returning to it in subsequent speeches, but adding some
items to the program that would pick it up. Examples:
a. A special, spotlighted appearance by Connally, speaking
as a Democrat to his fellow Democrats.
b. On the second night, a special series of short speeches by
Democrats responding to the Republican invitation -- assuming the
right people can be rounded up. Examples: a prominent labor leader,
life-long Democrat, saying the candidate who in 1972 best represents
what labor represents is not McGovern, but RN; an attractive, artic-
ulate young voice of the New South, saying his party has left him; a
respected academic or student leader, saying he's been a Democrat
but McGovern is too much, and we need responsible leadership;
Floyd McKissick saying the real road to black progress is not the
McGovern way, but the Nixon way.
C. Release telegrams and letters from dissident Democrats
during the convention, saying they're going Republican.
d. Plug dissident Democrats into the outside-the-hall schedule.
-3-
4. TV Coverage. Perhaps the biggest payoff, if we follow a course
like this, will be in the cud-chewing of the TV reporters and commen-
tators. They desperately need something to talk about, and if we can
get them talking about how many Democrats the Republicans are going
to get, and speculating about what Democratic switch-overs we're
going to parade out next, we've achieved four crucial goals:
a. We've used our convention to condition Democratic voters,
in explicit, personal terms, to thinking about voting Republican.
b. We've established a "prior approval" factor -- that is, we've
made switching seem respectable to the TV viewer by showing him
that other good Democrats are doing it.
C. We've injected a note of drama into the convention, and
we've done it by moving the battle to the other guy's turf.
d. We've got the commentators talking about our issues.
Not to mention that we've opened our convention in an even
better way than the Democrats opened theirs -- we've made it not
just a GOP Convention, but a convention of and for the new coalition.
#####
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
First Family Scheduling
I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope
that they'd be scheduled extensively. They' ve become a first-rate
asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as
possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening
and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things,
and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans
are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about
alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters
like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus
-- especially with parents and grandparents.
Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where
I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a
chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense
of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got
to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials
to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels
Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by
visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can
remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political
visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things
for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks
ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to
Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people, " etc., that
there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap:
I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly
come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, in-
volved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous
pleasurc-secker from Camelot.
-2-
I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly.
Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous
non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were
represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular
would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.
A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could
organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as
an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that
maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in
Peoria.
RaSt
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
John C. Whitaker
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the
President might do from now through November, and Larry
Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update
of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.
First, there are a number of things that the President can do
that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President.
He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one
frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive
meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he
can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors
(McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the
stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)
The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some
problems, Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto mes-
sages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it
seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either
domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or
international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume,
have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that,
particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national
addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Demo-
cratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not
2 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-
White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me
that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements
which we traditionally handle by a 2, 000-word handout from
Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might
better be handled from now to November by the President him-
self making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's
shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity
for free reply -- and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news
which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting
event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.
At the Convention
I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of
Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of
confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best in-
telligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The
relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive
the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street
drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be,
would probably be more photogenic than the business of the
convention. Any interplay between the President and the demon-
strators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers
with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies
in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an
overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because,
even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably
be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound.
Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the
President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least
had the guts to talk to.
Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with
Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on
Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of
- 3 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing
State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence).
I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but
closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the
convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance
speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p.m. EDT people are not off the
Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately
after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unex-
pected visit to a separate location where a large, screened
youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the
President would join them. The point would be to have all
under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home
the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for
McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to
this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening
enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter
and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be
back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would
try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National
Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) - - in other words, strictly
"playing President. 11
If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday
TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show,
I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved
up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without
ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely
anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having
a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having
the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought
if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to
assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announce-
ment of the President's choice of a running mate until then? --
That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the
President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.
Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the
risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to
Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice Presi-
dent. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their
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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of
defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the
President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the
youth forum described above.
General Campaign Strategy
We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition almost -
and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and
Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should
push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace
the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just
endorsing the Mills bill. I know some Christian Scientists
who don't buy this.
Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now
about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless
that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously.
The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign
without appearing to be doing SO. Here is my list of don'ts:
Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
Don't engage in any debates.
Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press
that are advertised in advance. - - East Room format.
The
press
is
vital
The President has won when the press was
with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).
(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red
meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of ac-
cessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as
radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-
looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our
domestic problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews
with pundits would be good.
- 5 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe
2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do
quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national
scribes don't come in loaded for bear.
(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media
in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis,
Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warn-
ing. While the national press would have to be included in these,
and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer
questions from the more numerous regional reps should pre-
dominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like
these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters
in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick
his way through personally. For example, we could cover the
southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and
New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in
and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the
New England impact should be worth the aggrevation). -- Denver
for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest.
We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise
these in the particular region. The first few we might get away
with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas
where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without
having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago
for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences
in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance
buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks
if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase
the risks.
I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the
President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the
risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them
is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in
the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to
substantive events. The motorcade can stop occassionally and,
if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car
- 6
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we
must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn. ) This
will require us to develop a pithy five-minute specch, or a
series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for
rallies that he has used in past campaigns.
One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local
color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can
help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the
Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him.
I remember the success of the President's early morning visit
to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope
that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar
"unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a. m.
and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.
I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for
a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international
town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network repre-
sentatives in a number of international capitols relaying live
questions answered by the President here in Washington. This
would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even
hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers,
tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them. 11 A "foreign
heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would
love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so
much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can
get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize
with the foreign heckler a good trap.
Pace of Campaign
Before the convention I think the President should schedule one
major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be
visible going about the serious business of Government. Right
after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his re-
turn from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic
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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago
because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day,
although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important
date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event
could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with
Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although
I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-
time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes
of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should
go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John
Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but be-
cause that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need
another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor
done the same day.
As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more
than one trip a week and always substantive. The only out-of-
country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on
how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest
of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the
exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths
of being President.
The First Family
I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington
and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington
papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought
I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so
successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing
that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.
Theme of Campaign
From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made
an important start at restructuring international and domestic
affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms
- 8 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only
halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase
to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's? "Come home,
America. 11 The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that
McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokes-
man for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the
polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got
X
to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should
try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one
of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in pro-
posing basic governmental reform, in salving the American spirit
from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds
on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate
it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
HIGH PRIORITY
July 19, 1972
EYES ONLY /ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JOHN WHITAKER
FROM:
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
Bob asked that you forward to him by Friday of this week
any updated thoughts or analyses that you have regarding
his memorandum to you on "Campaign Strategy" (attached)
of June 12, 1972. There is no need to completely redo the
memo, just update or alter any of the original thoughts you
had in light of the Democratic National Convention.
He also asked that you do a separate memo forwarding your
thoughts on the best use from a scheduling standpoint of
Mrs. Nixon, Tricia, and Julie during the period between now
and the convention; and during the campaign period.
Attachmant
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
2:00 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Of
Regarding your July 19 memorandum on campaign strategy,
any alterations I would make in my original remarks are
minute. Therefore, I'll let my original memo stand as is.
Regarding a separate memo on the best scheduling use of
Mrs. Nixon, Tricia and Julie, Parker and I have a memo
on the way to Bob. It covers the President plus the ladies
and their husbands. That memo will be in to you tomorrow.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
HSD
SUBJECT:
Update on June 16 Campaign Strategy Memo
I still agree with the basic suggestions contained in my June
16 memo. I add these post-convention suggestions:
1) A special organization to enlist blue collar workers similar
to the proposed Democrats for Nixon organization.
2) Play up the snubbing of all the groups not given a quota at
Miami--like farmers, blue collars, ethnics, senior citizens,
veterans, et al. This can be done at our convention.
3) Establish McGovern's campaign emblem as the white flag--
pictures of him with the white flag behind his head.
4) Devise a PR program for Wallace people showing that RN
got "the message." Voter ID programs and polls should reveal
potential Wallace votes for us and how to get them.
5) Set up a realignment operation now to exploit switchover
possibilities while the convention is fresh and as campaign
heats up. This can be continued after the campaign to encourage
and speed switching which should be good between now and 1976.
The South is particularly ripe on this. If we don't program
and plan on this, we won't reap our potential.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
Update on Campaign 005 Strategy
SUBJECT:
(In light of the Democratic
Convention)
In addition to what was set forth in my earlier memo,
I would argue that the only way we can lose the election
is to foul up our own convention.
We must not make Miami Beach an armed camp.
We must tag those who want to embarrass and confront us
as McGovern supporters.
It must be a Party convention simply re-nominating the
President for re-election --- not a White House operation.
The Convention must not disintegrate into youth VS. the
President.
How do we accomplish this?
Let's have Republican senators (i.e. Scott, Brooke, Javits
et al) take the Senate Floor and insist that McGovern,
Eagleton (and the few avowed Democrat senators who support
their ticket) ask their supporters to refrain from violence
at Miami Beach.
MacGregor and/or Dole should lay down a firm line dis-
tinguishing protest from violence. In other words, the
Party wants discussion but will allow no disorder.
-2-
We should see to it that a large number of our young
people move among the demonstrators. A few thousand
Billy Graham Dallas-Explo types committed to non-violence
could dilute the critical mass of hot and frustrated
militants.
Cole
The Party should organize a group of young Administration
spokesmen as a "communications corps" to offer to talk to
demonstrators or be near by any television situation.
Donco
Young Administration officials and Republican office
holders who have had experience handling young, explosive
crowds can be sent out where needed to avoid dangerous
confrontations and to show the television audience that
this Administration does communicate and listen. The
group should have the proper racial, ethnic, and sex
balance as well as being able to withstand verbal and
physical abuse.
Let's have other events at the Convention which show
continuity and confidence in our system, and in our Party,
like the President meeting with former Republican
National Chairmen. This will appeal to a lot of
organization Democrats who have been badly treated and
points up the ignoring of the LBJ types so obvious at
their convention.
One final thought: Let's not indulge in overkill to the
point where McGovern becomes a sympathetic figure. We
have enough good, substantive material on the issues
without getting into personalities.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN SCALI gas
SUBJECT:
Election Strategy Addendum
I have these points to add to my Election Strategy memorandum:
1.
It is increasingly clear McGovern's main supporters,
those providing the vital thrust, will be the college-educated,
young reformers obsessed with Vietnam as an issue. We
should make a determined, skillful effort to separate from
them as a bloc, the non-college, working youth. For each
college grad already lined up behind, or inclined toward
McGovern, there are three to four young workers who labor
in the factory, the corner grocery, the farm, the office or
in retail business. There is a natural rivalry between them
which can be exploited for the President's benefit. Why not
organize a "Working Youth for Nixon" organization which
will dramatically publicize the gulf between them and the
kooky college crowd. We might think of a big convention
of the working youth, highlighting their support of the
President and their deep interest in issues that bear directly
on improved conditions for their advancement. This must
be more than just lip service and a one-shot rally. To
further wean young labor from McGovern, for example, the
President could concentrate some attention on an issue
which we have ignored: Ideas and studies to relieve the
monotony of factory assembly work. a problem which already
has caused some strikes. Presidential concern about how to
improve quality of life for factory workers, particularly,
would be welcome. This is an issue which McGovern and
which labor has ignored thus far, but one with widespread appeal.
Mr. Haldeman
- 2 -
July 21, 1972
2.
The President must devote more time and attention to
an effort to "humanize" Richard Nixon. If not, he
will come off second best by contrast to McGovern, the
humble Methodist minister's son, who will "level"
with the American people when elected President. I
think it is folly in the extreme for the President to
adopt a DeGaulle mold. He is already vulnerable to
criticism that he is a "loner", isolated from the real
America. How do we do this? In two ways (1) by
becoming gradually more accessible to the press and
by informal comments now and then which include
"I made a mistake on that one, but I have learned"
There is nothing that appeals to the fibre of Americans
than to know that even the President will admit an
occasional mistake. This will strike a responsive chord
and humanize him more in the eyes of the voters; (2)
by impromptu actions which seem unrelated to picking
up votes. I have in mind such activities as not-previously-
announced visit to a trade school where he would spend
three to four hours carefully examining how students
are taught, or a night-time visit to a police precinct
where he would spend several hours at the station house
and in a police cruiser. I would envision all of these as
events announced after the fact, tending to prove that they
are not publicity stunts. Newsmen, of course, would
complain afterward but let them. The amount of TV
reporting and print coverage would be almost as great
afterward, once newsmen reconstructed the visit. I
strongly recommend that this be tried over a period to
help dispel the belief the President is in the hands of
Madison Avenue and does not do anything which is not
carefully programmed for maximum political advantage
in advance.
I am not proposing that the President suddenly become a folksy,
back-slapper. That would be out of character. But, he can
successfully soften his image as the distant leader.
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
BRYCE HARLOW
SUBJECT:
Follow-Up on Campaign
Strategy
I stand on my previous memo as amended in the
two meetings I have just attended with HRH.
(I talked with Mr. Harlow this morning and he
asked that I submit this comment.) CaR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU:
L. HIGBY
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON KC
SUBJECT:
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy
executive posture between the conventions with the single
exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of
the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I
think this exception to the generally high-level tone
the President has set was a justifiable one and really
quite valuable.
(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high
level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but
it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and,
for that matter, the whole government apparatus is
campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.
I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably
maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in
how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus
really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less
effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary
for the President to come off his best posture and to, in
effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully
into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level
surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively,
but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates
program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every
ounce of energy into the campaign.
As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it
should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target
states and specific voting blocs.
-2-
(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern
as a "minority leader of a minority constituency. " I
think we should give every indication that any "regular,
normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or
Independent, can find leadership and solice under the
Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like
"elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical"
to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every
effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal
backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and
the nation as a whole.
Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time
in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers
should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of
over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In
foreign policy, where we are, in my opinion, miles ahead,
McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel,
naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed
as an individual who is not the kind of man that world
leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed
as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without
backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who
lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to
them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida
when he indicated he would keep a residual force in
Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away
from it in the face of opposition from some of his more
radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.
(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people
will have the advantage of being able to attack every
little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch
to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and
foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted
Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner
and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the
country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability
starting now.
Kennedy, who seems bent on the ' 76 nomination for himself,
will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's
wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping
for McGovern extensively SO that he may report after McGovern
loses in November that he did everything in his power to
elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a
team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.
LDXD SC
ST49PM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
(Per HRH)
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
At HRH's request, some thoughts on 1968 and 1960.
First, it is imprecise to say that "in 1968 there was a substantial
decline during the campaign. 11 (If there is a single hallmark of RN's
runs against both JFK and HHH it is the remarkable stability of the
Nixon vote from August through November.) The President did not
so much lose votes fro m August to November of 1968 -- as we lost a
historic opportunity, the "lost landslide" as someone has referred to
it. While we failed to edge upwards in the slightest, Humphrey closed
a 13 point gap. What were the reasons for this?
A)
Some of the HHH gains were inevitable; the Democratic candidate,
if he performed reasonably well, was simply going to win back some
of the traditional Democratic vote, horrified at the Chicago convention,
but not a Nixon voter at heart.
B)
We failed utterly to pick up the Wallace defectors in the North,
who slipped away from Wallace through Nixon, back to HHH. This
return to HHH is partly due to the efforts of the AFL-CIO, probably
partly due to RN's "anti-union" image from the fifties, partly due to
our own short-comings. (Incidentally, we are in better and the
Democratic Left in worse shape with these voters than in 1968; our
opportunity is renewed.)
The startling thing about the Gallup Poll, 1968, is the almost precise
correlation between the Humphrey rise and the Wallace fall in the polls.
Wallace, too, by holding onto Southern votes and Southern states which
surely might have been ours, had a hand in preventing the "landslide"
that might have been.
-2-
But, in my judgment, our own campaign had serious short-comings
in 1968. Basically, they were these:
a)
A lack of flexibility. We established a game plan, and followed
it through, although by early October, it should have been evident that
we were losing the interest of the press and the country as well. The
hoopla campaign -- to demonstrate RN had the kind of enthusiasm and
unity HHH did not, was ideal for September. It was not for October.
Once Humphrey made his Salt Lake City speech, the President should
have, in my judgment, attacked him directly and vigorously, to force
back the split in the Democratic Party between the pro-bombing and
the anti-bombing forces who had fought at the convention and who were
yet at sword's point. We let HHH off the hook on this. By so doing,
he got off of that petard and went over onto the attack.
On the attack, he began to move, to make new and different charges,
to attract interest.
b)
The President in the fall campaign of 1968 was plagued by the
identical problem he had in the fall campaign of 1960. A Hostile Press.
Teddy White testifies to this in 1960 and Miss Efron in 1968. In addition,
I have on personal knowledge that a group of 19 Washington press types
who had divided 10-9 pro-RN in September, were 18-1 pro-HHH at
election time.
What explains the bad press? We are partly at fault I believe. We shut
down communication with them -- compared with the primaries where
we got good press. We also, because of circumstances, were maneuvered
into the upper-dog position. We were the more conservative of the two
leading candidates. We did not deviate from the set-speech-Man-in-the-
Arena-handout routine sufficiently to attract their on-going attention or
interest. They were more concerned with reporting a breaking story,
The Humphrey Comeback, which was exciting news, than the RN Radio
Speeches, which with few exceptions only got a stick of type or two.
Our personal relations with the traveling press deteriorated from the
campaign, partly due to the "size" of the corps, the natural hostility of
liberals, and our natural antipathy toward them which was coming through
late in the game.
-3-
c)
But, rather than strict comparison of 1960 and 1968, which may
or may not be useful, and rather than belabor the shortcomings of
the various campaign, which are many -- but which are as well
counter-balanced by the right decisions, let me rather enumerate
those dangers which lurk for us, in my view, in 1972 based on the
campaigns presidential of the last 12 years. What we face in my
view is:
THE DANGERS OF 1968 & THE OPPORTUNITY OF 1964
If McGovern is nominated, in my judgment:
1)
We must place him on the defensive from the outset, and not
let him off of it until November. In our 1968 and 1970 campaign, we
did this for the first three weeks then either HHH "got well" on
Vietnam, or the liberals "got well" on "law and order, " and our issue
hand had been played. Again, we have enough on McGovern to keep
him on the defensive throughout the fall -- we ought not to blast it
out of the cannon at once; our speakers should be on the attack.
2)
We have to maintain a flexibility that I do not believe existed in
1968, and from what I read did not exist in 1960. As Ike said, "planning
is essential; plans are worthless. 11 We should have a mapped-out
game plan before the campaign starts -- both for attack on the
Opposition, and for presentation of the candidate, but there should be
a "Review Committee" to look over that plan, and over our media at
least once a week.
3)
While we should rule out the President for the time being on
the Attack Role; I would not rule out a Presidential address to the
country, splitting RN off from McGovern on the issues, right now.
4)
We should have ourselves a strategy meeting on dealing with the
press and media between now and November. In my view, we have
discredited them for the bias of which they are guilty for three years --
indeed, public confidence in their performance is on the decline. But
should there be a "detente" between the White House and national press
corps between now and November? While I am more than willing to
carry my hod in a campaign to discredit the national media as pro-
McGovern, would such a campaign be in our interest, at this point in
time. This is something which should not be determined ad hoc
because in my view a hostile media is one of the prime reasons why
RN's presidential campaigns have never seen him rise in the national
polls by a single cubit.
-4-
5)
We should keep in mind that it was not LBJ's performance and
personality which won him 60% of the vote it was the portrayal
of Goldwater as an extremist, which frightened even Republicans.
In my view, given the antipathy of the national media, and the
smallness of the GOP, there is no way we could conceivably do better
than a 54-46 victory over a centrist, popular Democrat with a united
party. Against a divided Democratic Party, however, with a candidate
who is far out on the issues, with a press that is less concerned with
their antipathy toward RN than with the wild schemes of his opponent,
we could go up to 58 to 60 percent.
Thus -- it will not be how wonderful we are, but how terrible McGovern
is -- that will make the difference this fall between a respectable clear
victory, and a Nixon landslide. Seems to me vital that we keep this
in mind.
To get that good media, we should confront McGovern on the "issues, "
clearly; we should be almost generous to him personally; we should
deliberately avoid any nasty, smear attacks. We have enough on the
record to hang the guy what we have to avoid at all costs are such
media-negatives as the 1970 "ads" and the 1972 Watergate Caper, which
they are trying to hang around our necks. We should hammer the issues
and his positions and let McGovern come off as the "name-caller."
6)
One great concern of mine is the "Humphrey Phenomenon" -- of
McGovern, if nominated, being case into the role of "under-dog"
'anti-Establishment, 11 "come-from-behind" candidate - - whose campaign
will provide one hell of a good deal more media interest and human
interest than ours.
We should have some real-life "drama" in store for this fall to
attract national attention. We should, in a pleasant enough way, but
unmistakably make this the campaign of Richard Nixon and the Average
Man agains the Establishment and the Radical Chic.
Goldwater was kept on the bottom through his own and his campaign
shortcomings and through the media. Again, how the media handles
this will determine much. The medi a could treat McGovern like
Goldwater, or they could make him into an inept, but good "under-dog"
like HHH in which event, they could make a run out of it.
-5-
7)
As for the suggestion that RN go out and do more, a la 1960, I
would say, no -- if that means "political campaigning. 11 However
Richard Nixon on the move as President, yes; and Richard Nixon in
action in the White House, as President, yes, and Richard Nixon
addressing the nation -- for fifteen minutes as President, to strike a
contrast with McGovern, yes. But not the stump-speaking. RN as
President is a far more effective campaigner than RN as campaigner.
8)
Scheduling. This campaign, unlike 1968, we should schedule RN
into the "undecided" arenas, union halls, Columbus Day activities,
Knights of Columbus meetings, etc. We should keep in mind that there is
only -- at most -- 20 percent of the electorate that will decide this, not
who wins, but whether or not it is a landslide, and quite frankly, that
20 percent is not a principally Republican vote. Perhaps RN has to make
appearance at GOP rallies -- but when he does, he is not going where the
ducks are. In a McGovern race the ducks are suddenly in city areas of
the North we never carried before.
9)
Perhaps this has been repeated before -- but again, of maximum
importance is that we not convince the media to make McGovern a picked-
on under-dog, by name-calling. We have to massively confront him with
his positions, and if we need any characterization -- we can take that
from the Democrats. Regrettably, the media does not allow us the same
latitude in name-calling it will give McGovern who has already charged
the Administration with "racism" Hitler-like conduct and war-mongering.
Buchanan
50
45
RN
40
35
HHH
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Gallup Poll 1968
RN
HHH
Wallace
April
43%
34%
9%
10
Late May
36
42
14
July
40
38
16
Aug. 21
45
29
18
Late Sept.
43
28
21
Early Oct.
44
29
20
Mid Oct.
43
31
20
5
Oct. 27
44
36
15
Nov. 4
42
40
14
0
April
Late
July
Aug. 21
Late
Early
Mid Oct.
Oct. 27
Nov
May
Sept.
Oct.
60
Gallup Poll - 1960
Nixon
JFK
Und.
Early June
48%
52%
Late June
48
52
July
50
44
6
August
47
47
6
55
September
47
48
5
October
48
48
4
November
48
49
3
JFK
50
RN
45
40
35
Early
Late
July
August
Sept.
October
Nov.
June
June
50
45
HHH
40
35
RN
30
25
20
WALLACE
15
Harris Poll - 1968
10
RN
HHH
Wallace
May
36%
38%
13%
June
36
43
13
July
36
41
16
5
Aug.
40
34
17
Sept.
39
31
21
Nov. 1-2
42
40
12
Nov. 3
40
43
13
0
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Nov. 1-2
Nov. 3
:
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 7, 1972
THOUGHTS ON THE POST-CONVENTION
(Democratic)
MEMORANDUM TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
CLARK MAC GREGOR
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
KEN KHACHIGIAN
This memo deals with strategy thoughts strictly for the period
between the conventions.
DISENCHANTED DEMOCRATS
This is the first priority. No sooner should the dust have settled
from the Democratic Convention (a few days following, perhaps) than
a National Democrats for Nixon should be formed publicly to serve
as an "umbrella" for all of the less bold fence-straddlers to join.
We should move fast on the Democrats, post Miami Beach, as they
will be most vulnerable immediately following the convention. If
we have a number of Democrats already locked in, to either abandon
their ticket, or bolt the party -- we should trickle these out, state-by-
state -- not drop them all at once.
In our judgment, if we have a choice it is far better for Democrats
to stay in their party, and denounce McGovern -- than to switch parties
now.
Elitism and extremism in the Democratic Party should form the
basis of the abandonment of McGovern -- followed by support and
endorsement of RN. But, in my view, the former is the more important
news story.
Also, if a figure is immensely prominent, his departure should
be for national television. But someone like Mills Godwin should
have done it from a platform in Richmond.
Page 2
In addition, we should focus upon and publish not simply
the major names, but the minor ones -- state legislators and the
like -- and publish those names in ads in the "swing states"
especially. The purpose is to leave the impression of massive
defections, not just major ones, from the Democratic Ticket.
We should be working on these people right now all over the
various swing states.
Sometime during the campaign, this fall, we need a national
press conference, and a national mailing to all political writers
etc. listing the hundreds of Democratic party officials who have
publicly abandoned the McGovern ticket. The idea, of course,
is to create a stampede so that the fence-straddlers and others
who might want to hang in there will at the least be publicly
disassociating themselves from McGovern.
Also, in this time, GOPers running for State Legislature,
Governor, Senator, Congressmen, should be instructed to force
their opponents to take a stand for or against McGovern and his
positions. (This might well involve mailing a copy of the McGovern
Assault Book to every GOP candidate, with instructions on how to
use it).
THE SHAFTING OF WALLACE
If this is a credible argument, it should be made intensively
by our people. That Wallace who had more votes than any other
candidate, before California, was stripped of delegates and dignity
by the radicals at Miami. That the convention which was supposed
to be "democratic" ended up stealing his delegates, and denying
him the rightful claim to a voice in the platform. The Party is
highly unlikely to buy the Wallace positions as announced today
on national TV; we should go directly to these voters and the
GOP Platform should mirror some of the Governor's concerns.
On matters of defense, bussing, welfare, responsiveness of
government, etc. this should not be difficult.
1701 (RNC) should be collecting assiduously all of the negative
statements by Wallace people about their treatment at Miami and
about the Democratic Platform; we already have some excellent
ones that will go into the Briefing Book.
Page 3
CONVENTION
The theme, "If they can't unite their party, how can they
unite the country; if they can't even run an orderly convention,
how can they run the United States, " the same one used in 1968
is a natural.
THE MC GOVERN SMEAR
Again, clearly the McGovern answer to any and all attacks
will be to charge the "Old Nixon" with his "smear" tactics. The
response to Stein demonstrated this. We will have five or six of
the most egregious McGovern attacks listed -- and out to all
speakers, with a short memo by convention's end -- if McGovern is
nominated. At that point we ought to elevate all of these horrible
statements, and demand to know if McGovern intends to campaign on the
issues -- or to continue in this vein of comparing RN with Hitler,
calling his Administration "racist" etc. McGovern is still being
allowed to get away with being "the most decent man in the Senate"
and his rhetoric has been the wildest of any man in recent political
history.
THE ESTABLISHMENT THEME
We ought to set this early that McGovern is not the candidate
of the people, but of a small elite, of New Leftists, the elitist
children, etc. Again, this impression should be made early
in the campaign, before many voters have made their minds up.
McGovern theme is certain to be to make himself the "candidate of
the people" against the "candidate of the politicians, i.e. us. We
have to get in early with this elitist idea; we have to capture the
-Establishment theme early.
Again, my great concern is that McGovern may successfully
establish himself as underdog, anti-Establishment, "out" candidate.
Our speaking resources, early, should be directed to thrusting
us into the position of the candidate of the coinmon man, in the
titanic struggle with the power of the Eastern Establishment.
Page 4
THE WAFFLER
Again, another strength of McGovern's which will necessarily
be weakened post-convention is his reputation for "candor, honesty,"
"you know where he stands, 11 nonsense. He will start moving, he
already is moving on the issues right now -- and there is no
contradiction between nailing him with his $1000 giveaway program
one day, and denouncing him for "trimming" by abandoning it the
next. For McGovern, movement in and of itself can be damaging --
because his whole campaign program is "Right from the Start. 11 We
should nail every shift, every movement -- and nail that "Right from
the Start, " right from the start.
Buchanan
Note: Have read the McGovern Book in part and analyzed
his ads to a degree, and will have some followup thoughts on the
"charactor" of McGovern -- and where he is investing his resources,
what issues, what personality traits.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: McGovern Problems with Party Regulars (News Summary Note)
Cronkite is right. The McGovern camp is divided between True
Believers and Pragmatists; the former of whom would be distraught
with a McGovern "deal" to save the Daley delegation, for example.
The True Believers are notunlike the Goldwaterites in the galleries
at the Cow Palace, who gave Rocky the treatment before a national
audience, while Cliff White and the others on the floor were holding
their people to a respectful silence.
The Pragmatists in McGovern's camp, however, are themselves
divided, essentially over the question of what course to follow:
A)
Stay on his positions, with little fudging, thus running against
the President as a truthful, honest, candid, far-reaching reformer,
who does not back off what he believes. (By doing this, he will force
some Democrats to bolt).
B)
Or move to the center, right in the public glare, by "embracing"
a Democratic Platform more moderate than his own on welfare, taxes,
defense, etc.
Manckiewicz and some of the others who are pragmatists apparently
feel that the pragmatic thing to do is to stand fast -- to try to win not
on coalition politics, but win on the undiluted Prarie Populism
approach, which keeps the True Believers happy.
On the challenge at the convention, however, all of McGovern's
pragmatists wish they would go away. They don't want Dick Daley
kicked out of the Convention; they are not supporting the challenges
openly; though it is inevitably their people (Jesse Jackson & Co.) who
are carrying out purges.
The point of the matter is that right now, McGovern does not control
his delegates, the way Cliff White and the others could control the
Goldwater delegates. They are "issues" people, many of them, who
-2-
are womens lib, pro-abortion, anti-war, etc. types first, and
McGovern delegates second. They are for McGovern because of
his stand on these issues, not for the issues because McGovern
is for them. Their first loyalty is, in many cases, not to form
a coalition that can win -- but to guarantee the success of the
particular and independent causes in which they are working. Some
of them are using McGovern as a vehicle for the advancement d
their own objectives, which McGovern's best interest may or may
not dictate at this point in time.
And if McGovern tries to turn them off, they will raise hell publicly;
and if he does not -- and lets the purges and challenges run amok - -
he risks the outrage and alienation of the party regulars, because
it is his animals raising hell in the cage.
Buchanan will be astonished, and we will be in for some difficulty,
if those Gay Lib, Women's Lib, black militant, etc. types -- - all of
them camera hogs -- do not raise hell if they do not get their way
at Miami Beach. At this point, it seems to me impossible for the
Democrats to quietly reconcile the basic differences they have --
and highly improbable that the resulting internecine war can be kept
off the television cameras.
Some of the preliminary caucuses promise exciting events for Miami.
Buchanan
2105
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE STAFF SECRETARY
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Action Memorandum #P-2105
Democratic Convention
Request
It was requested in Presidential Action Memorandum P-2105 to comment
on a comment noted in the June 23 News Summary by Walter Cronkite
as to McGovern's position on the Democratic Convention.
Response
I think Cronkite's point was absolutely accurate. It is a thesis that I
have also been arguing. McGovern is in a very difficult position. The
left forgives him moving to the center; the conservative regulars in
the Democratic Party, the Meanys and the Daleys, etc., really do not
trust him and will not believe him if he does shift positions. Moreover,
he is beginning now to get some pressure from the left as he did in the
Wicker column this week, challenging his credibility and in effect
making it harder for him to shift.
The fact that he now controlsthe Platform Committee -- and that has
been made public -- puts him in an extremely difficult position. If the
platform comes out in moderate terms, he can be held accountable for
the "sell-out"; if it comes out as a radical platform, we will call it
the McGovern Platform. Either way he will try not to accept responsi-
bility for it but he should be vulnerable to one side or the other.
Most of the press analyses that suggest that McGovern will clean himself
up have been predicated on the fact that he can embrace a moderate plat-
form and that is his excuse for moving to the center. He may no longer
use that excuse, however, since he controls the Platform Committee.
2.
Indeed, as Cronkite pointed out, the rules and credential fights also
will be within his control. He can hardly avoid being held accountable
for actions of the delegates and it is almost impossible for him to avoid
taking sides himself. I don't think that Cronkite was simply trying to
build suspense; I think he was reporting one of the toughest problems
McGovern has.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 23, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. CHUCK COLSON
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
BAX
SUBJECT:
Dem Convention
The June 23 News Summary had the following note on the Democratic
Convention:
-- CBS had half-hour special (4:30-5:00) on Dem pre-
convention hearings. McG seems well on his way,
said Cronkite, but ahead lies a booby trap -- the
rules, credential, and platform hearings. If McG
extremists crowd out regulars and take extreme
position it'll confirm worst fears of his opposition,
said Walter, and it could even drive away supporters.
If he sides with his backers, he'll risk alienating
center and right, but if he backs the regulars in the
interest of party harmony, he'll risk alienating his
supporters
Referring to the above, the question was raised as to whether this
was really a possibility or just a way to keep interest up.
Please forward your response to the Office of the Staff Secretary
by close of business, Monday, June 26.
cc: H.R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield
Patrick Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
JOHN MITCHELL
¿H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Last week or so, Mills Godwin, a respected former Governor of
Virginia, announced that he could not support McGovern & Co.,
and was going for Nixon in November. That was good news, but
terrible timing. Godwin got a nice little spread in the "metro"
section of the local paper. If we have lined up, or know of,
Democrats about to bolt to RN -- they should be called upon to
hold until after the Convention, when it becomes major political
news in terms of November, and then to do so, with Maximum
Fanfare in their State Capitals. Also, this is probably being done,
but we should orchestrate them, so that they fall sequentially, one
or two major figures a week -- and then on a regular basis, the
RNC or Re-Election Committee can send out a release listing major
national Democrats who cannot support the "extremism" of McGovern.
Muskie did most things badly, but one thing he did extraordinarily
well was to drop the endorsements he had lined up with the kind of
skill that made it appear opposition to him was hopeless. The fellow
looked like he was filling up a straight, with ease, only to turn over
nothing on the last card. But the buildup was impressive; and we
should orchestrate similarly.
Buchanan