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This file contains:
From Strachan to Magruder RE: suggestions from George Grassmuck. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/27/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Citizens/ White House Telephone Board. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 8/3/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 11 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/17/1971
Handwritten noteson meetings over the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
Handwritten notes on the campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Flanigan and Magruder to Haldeman RE: Simulation in the 1972 campaign. 12 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to LR RE: ACC should be sent to Mel, Stephens, and this returned to me. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to LR RE: Memo sent by Strachan to Odle on Schollander. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Chapin to Magruder RE: Master Political Calendar. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex- Governors for Nixon. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman and Mitchell RE: Polling '72 Campaign. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Strachan to Higby RE: Jeb Magruder's interest and plans for Schollander. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's Projects. 33 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: A check with John Dean that the Citizen use of Bill Horton would casue no legal problem because "it is an isolated example." 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/9/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Democractic Contenders - RNC/Citizens Activities. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/4/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: White House Staff Involvement in Citizens. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/4/1971
From Strachan to Higby RE: Per Your Request. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to Higby RE: Magruder follow-up on Schollander. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
From Strachan to Bruce RE: Colson's awareness of his respobsibility vis a vis ethnics. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to Kehrli RE: A recent followup with Magruder on the ethnic situatuion at the RNC and at the Citizens. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1971
From Strachan to Kehrli RE: A recent followup with Magruder on the ethnic situatuion at the RNC and at the Citizens. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Political planning and mock conventions on college and high school campuses. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/28/1971
From Strachan to Higby RE: Information and Strachen's attendence at meetings. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Higby to G. RE: How will advise Buchanan. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Magruder to the Attorney General RE: Bryce Harlow reported sources indicateing Congressman Mills' running for the Presidency. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/28/1971
From Finch to the President RE: California Strategy (Action Memo P1214). 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1971
From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman RE: Polling Plan. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
From Magruder to the Attorney General RE: Compass Systems, Inc.. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/28/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: the Attorney General just called Magruder about the CSI-Finch matter. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/27/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Finch's Arrangment with Compass Systems, Inc.. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1971
From Higby to Magruder RE: Porter and Inadequate report on mock conventions. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
From Porter to Strachan RE: Mock Conventions on College and High School Campuses. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/19/1971
From Porter to Magruder RE: Meeting with Len Garment. 15 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/7/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's forwarded attached memo on the CSI -- Bob Finch matter. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/27/1971
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: California and cutting from the Right." 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/24/1971
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145892
label
WHSF: Contested, 25-3
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
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Source metadata
id
26145892
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 25-3
description
This file contains:
From Strachan to Magruder RE: suggestions from George Grassmuck. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/27/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Citizens/ White House Telephone Board. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 8/3/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Gavin Memorandum on Political Moods. 11 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/17/1971
Handwritten noteson meetings over the campaign. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
Handwritten notes on the campaign. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date
From Flanigan and Magruder to Haldeman RE: Simulation in the 1972 campaign. 12 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to LR RE: ACC should be sent to Mel, Stephens, and this returned to me. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to LR RE: Memo sent by Strachan to Odle on Schollander. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Chapin to Magruder RE: Master Political Calendar. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Lee Nunn Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex- Governors for Nixon. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman and Mitchell RE: Polling '72 Campaign. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/23/1971
From Strachan to Higby RE: Jeb Magruder's interest and plans for Schollander. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's Projects. 33 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: A check with John Dean that the Citizen use of Bill Horton would casue no legal problem because "it is an isolated example." 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/9/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Democractic Contenders - RNC/Citizens Activities. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/4/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: White House Staff Involvement in Citizens. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/4/1971
From Strachan to Higby RE: Per Your Request. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to Higby RE: Magruder follow-up on Schollander. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
From Strachan to Bruce RE: Colson's awareness of his respobsibility vis a vis ethnics. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Strachan to Kehrli RE: A recent followup with Magruder on the ethnic situatuion at the RNC and at the Citizens. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1971
From Strachan to Kehrli RE: A recent followup with Magruder on the ethnic situatuion at the RNC and at the Citizens. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Political planning and mock conventions on college and high school campuses. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/28/1971
From Strachan to Higby RE: Information and Strachen's attendence at meetings. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Higby to G. RE: How will advise Buchanan. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Magruder to the Attorney General RE: Bryce Harlow reported sources indicateing Congressman Mills' running for the Presidency. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/28/1971
From Finch to the President RE: California Strategy (Action Memo P1214). 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1971
From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman RE: Polling Plan. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
From Magruder to the Attorney General RE: Compass Systems, Inc.. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/28/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: the Attorney General just called Magruder about the CSI-Finch matter. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/27/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Finch's Arrangment with Compass Systems, Inc.. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1971
From Higby to Magruder RE: Porter and Inadequate report on mock conventions. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
From Porter to Strachan RE: Mock Conventions on College and High School Campuses. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/19/1971
From Porter to Magruder RE: Meeting with Len Garment. 15 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/7/1971
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's forwarded attached memo on the CSI -- Bob Finch matter. 6 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/27/1971
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: California and cutting from the Right." 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/24/1971
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
7/27/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Magruder RE: suggestions
from George Grassmuck. 3 pgs.
25
3
8/3/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Citizens/
White House Telephone Board. 2 pgs.
25
3
7/17/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Gavin
Memorandum on Political Moods. 11 pgs.
25
3
>
Campaign
Other Document
Handwritten noteson meetings over the
campaign. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 1 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
Campaign
Other Document
Handwritten notes on the campaign. 3 pgs.
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Flanigan and Magruder to Haldeman
RE: Simulation in the 1972 campaign. 12 pgs.
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to LR RE: ACC should be
sent to Mel, Stephens, and this returned to
me. 4 pgs.
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to LR RE: Memo sent by
Strachan to Odle on Schollander. 3 pgs.
25
3
6/28/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Magruder RE: Master
Political Calendar. 1 pg.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 2 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
6/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Lee Nunn
Organization of Ex-Senators and Ex-
Governors for Nixon. 6 pgs.
25
3
6/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman and
Mitchell RE: Polling '72 Campaign. 5 pgs.
25
3
>
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Higby RE: Jeb Magruder's
interest and plans for Schollander. 3 pgs.
25
3
6/29/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's
Projects. 33 pgs.
25
3
6/9/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: A check
with John Dean that the Citizen use of Bill
Horton would casue no legal problem
because "it is an isolated example." 2 pgs.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 3 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
6/4/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE:
Democractic Contenders - RNC/Citizens
Activities. 1 pg.
25
3
6/4/1971
White House Staff
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: White
House Staff Involvement in Citizens. 1 pg.
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Higby RE: Per Your
Request. 3 pgs.
25
3
Campaign
Newsletter
"The Ordeal of the President or Will Richard
Nixon Find True Happiness in 1972 by
Jefferey Bell. 5 pgs.
25
3
5/26/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Higby RE: Magruder
follow-up on Schollander. 1 pg.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 4 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Bruce RE: Colson's
awareness of his respobsibility vis a vis
ethnics. 1 pg.
25
3
5/25/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Kehrli RE: A recent follow-
up with Magruder on the ethnic situatuion at
the RNC and at the Citizens. 6 pgs.
25
3
5/25/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Kehrli RE: A recent follow-
up with Magruder on the ethnic situatuion at
the RNC and at the Citizens. 5 pgs.
25
3
4/28/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Political
planning and mock conventions on college
and high school campuses. 1 pg.
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Higby RE: Information and
Strachen's attendence at meetings. 2 pgs.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 5 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
>
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to G. RE: How will advise
Buchanan. 5 pgs.
25
3
5/28/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Magruder to the Attorney General RE:
Bryce Harlow reported sources indicateing
Congressman Mills' running for the
Presidency. 1 pg.
25
3
6/1/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Finch to the President RE: California
Strategy (Action Memo P1214). 8 pgs.
25
3
5/26/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Magruder and Higby to Haldeman RE:
Polling Plan. 8 pgs.
25
3
5/28/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Magruder to the Attorney General RE:
Compass Systems, Inc.. 1 pg.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 6 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
5/27/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: the
Attorney General just called Magruder about
the CSI-Finch matter. 9 pgs.
25
3
5/25/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Finch's
Arrangment with Compass Systems, Inc.. 2
pgs.
25
3
5/26/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Higby to Magruder RE: Porter and
Inadequate report on mock conventions. 1 pg.
25
3
5/19/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Porter to Strachan RE: Mock
Conventions on College and High School
Campuses. 3 pgs.
25
3
5/7/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Porter to Magruder RE: Meeting with
Len Garment. 15 pgs.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 7 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
25
3
5/27/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Magruder's
forwarded attached memo on the CSI -- Bob
Finch matter. 6 pgs.
25
3
5/24/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: California
and "cutting from the Right." 3 pgs.
25
3
5/7/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Hoopes ro Strachan RE: Roger Ailes
TV Consulting March 1971 Bill Payment. 32
pgs.
25
3
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to LR RE: reply to Mr.
O'Leary and his letter. 1 pg.
25
3
4/30/1971
Campaign
Memo
Betty - keep copy of attached notes and all. 5
pgs.
Wednesday, May 20, 2015
Page 8 of 8
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 304
Folder:
3 Campaign-June 29, 1971
Document
Disposition
77
Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Magnider, 7-27-71
78
Return Private/Political notes, Beverly Cole..." " 8-13-[71]
79
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-17-71
80
Return
Private/Political
notes, "Jsm, L, G..." 6-30-[7.]
81
Return
Private/Political notes, "Alex- $ for ..." [7-21-71]
82
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 7-19-71
83
Return
Private/Political Memo, Flanigan & Magruder to the AG !
HRH, 7-15-[7']
84
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to L.R, 7-2-[7.]
85
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to L.R., n.d.
86
Return
Private/Political Memo, chapin to Magruder, 6-28-71
87
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-23-71
88
Return
Private/Political Memo, Magnider & Higby to Mitchall &
HRH, 6-23-71
89
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to Higby, 6-4-[7']
90
Return Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-71
91
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to HRH, 6-9-71
92
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-4-71
93
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-4-71
94
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to Higby, 6-17-[7.]
95
Return
Private/Political "The Ordeal of the President," by Bell, n.d
96
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Higby, 5-26-71
97
Return
Private/Political Note, Strachan to Bruce, 6-4-[71]
98
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to Kehrli, 5-25-71
99
Return
Private/Political Memo, HRH to Strachan, 4-28-71
100
Return Private/Political Note, Strachan to Higby, 5-25-[71]
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 304
101
Return Private/Political Note, Higby to G [Strachan], n.d.
102
Return
Private/Political Memo, Magruder to the A.G., 5-28-71
103
Return
Private/Political Memo, Finch to the President, 6-1-71
104
Return
Private/Political Memo, Magruder & Higby to the A.G.E
HRH, 5-26-71
105
Return
Private/Political Memo, Magruden to the A.G., 5-28-71
106
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 5-27-71
107
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 5-25-71
108
Return
Private/Political Note, Higby to Magruder, 5-26-71
109
Return
Private/Political Memo, Parter to Magnider, 5-7-71
110
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 5-27-71
111
Return
Private/Political Memo, Buchanan to HRH, 5-24-71
112
Return
Private/Political Memo, Hoopes to Strachan, 5-7-71
113
Return Private/Political Note to G.S. 5-24- [71]
Time.
28
July 27, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
The attached suggestion from George Grassmuck is
really within your bailiwick.
The idea about "US-A-1" looks rather good to me,
but of course, that is because I have no experience
in the area.
Mr. Haldeman has not seen this suggestion, so would
you let me know what you plan to do with it before
you leave on Thursday.
Jg 29 ey odle - mems
GS:lm
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
Here is a 1972 RN campaign theme
as my junior high daughter sees it.
When you think about it, and recall
"Nixon's the One," this identifi-
cation of President with Quality
Country can well be hammered.
Please dispose as you wish.
George alg Grassmuck
7.23.71
NIXON
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Administratively Confidential
August 3, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Citizens/White House
Telephone Board
The White House operators report that approximately two-
dozen calls are received each day asking for individuals
who transferred from the White House Staff to Citizens.
The group includes Jeb Magruder, Harry Flemming, Hugh Sloan,
Rob Odle, and Bart Porter. The White House operators refer
these calls by saying: "Mr.
can be reached at
333-0920".
Approximately one-dozen calls a day are placed by White
House operators for the entire group at Citizens. The
operators do not announce "White House" and just dial on
the trunk lines.
Jeb Magruder has his old extension (2831) at his 1701 office.
That extension is never released to incoming callers but
White House Staff and Magruder use it to reach other other.
You will recall that you specifically directed Magruder and
Odle to relinquish their "page-boys".
Recommendations:
1) That the White House operators continue to refer calls
from the White House telephone board to the Citizens' number.
Approve H L Disapprove
Comment
G
may
5/5
2) That the White House operators stop placing calls for
Burns
the Citizens', operation.
Approve H Disapprove
Comment
3) That the Magruder four-digit White House lines be removed
from the Citizens offices and from Magruder's home.
Approve H Disapprove
L
Comment
Immediately
G
Haynes 8/5
today
69 Reverly Cole re Senior Prin"
for numbers, etc. Calmet 0 lite.
- calls at night, numbers, L'D
Done in J8M
presence 8/13
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Gavin Memorandum on
Political Moods
Frank Shakespeare forwarded Bill Gavin's very interesting
memorandum on political moods. To summarize:
1) The New York Times - McNamara papers controversy
will hurt the Nixon Administration because the
public doesn't distinguish LBJ's duplicity from
the wheeling and dealing of any Administration.
2) A politician has three things to work with:
reason, passion, and imagination.
3) In the public's mind Nixon is eminently reasonable
and reasoning: only Muskie among the Democrats is
close in this, our si rongest attribute. Although
the public wants the to be thought through
reason is politically dull.
4) Agnew represents passion (energy, comment, waves-making
regardless of content). With Agnew, no one (including
Wallace) can "out-passion" us. The problem is that
the public is confused by Agnew as passion and Nixon
as reason. The result is that the Administration
doesn't project a definite image. This is to be
contrasted with 1968 when the Republicans were a
bit dull but solid. This confused image is a bad
sign.
5) This Administration is wholly without imagination.
There is no Peace Corps or Great Society, and even
the six great goals of the New American Revolution
are solid, reasonable, and prudent, but imimaginative.
Only Kennedy has imagination.
6) Nixon will be re-elected if Kennedy doesn't run.
Agnew shouldn't be replaced because his passion
pluses and minuses are already engraved on the
public's mind.
-2-
7) The Administration should not try to build an image
that appeals to hhe imagination because no one
will believe it. Rather the Nixon Administration
should run on stark, statistical appeals to reason.
Television and other media appeals to reason.
Television and other media should not be exciting
as in 1968 or arty, "cinema-verite." Charts and
figures not gimicky media should be the Camppign
72 approach (Shakespeare agrees with this Gavin
argument).
8) Approach youth as Americans not young Americans,
because the Democrats already have the "youth
issues" locked.
9) Gavin concludes: "Wouldn't it be ironic if the
Nixon Administration was defeated because the
Democrats were able to state that while they
were for sane defense spending, they never
meant we should be in second place as far as
missile defense is concerned?"
Recommendation:
That Bill Gavin's memorandum be forwarded by you to:
The Attorney General
6/28- dea Magrader
John Ehrlichman
6/287 Hullin
Dwight Chapin
6/28
Pat Buchanan
6/28
Ray Price
6/28
GS:elr
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON
DIRECTOR
June 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Honorable
H. R. Haldeman
The White House
These observations by Bill Gavin on political moods
in the United States are worth noting.
I am inclined to agree with Bill's thoughts on
television spot advertising in the 1972 campaign.
Had Frank Shakespeare
EYES ONLY
June 15, 1971
Covering Note
I wrote this memo before the disclosures in the Times. My
feeling is that in the final analysis, the President will not benefit
from these disclosures. I think the public will identify any
Administration with the kind of wheeling-dealing that has been
disclosed. I think Teddy will benefit, not because of any rational
reason, but because people can project their fantasies of 1000%
purity in government and a thousand-year peace unto Teddy. Our
Administration and all respect for authority has been terribly
damaged by these disclosures. Anyone who thinks this will be a
partisan issue ("see what LBJ did? ") is missing the point: the
Times wants Americans to think that anyone connected with this
war in any way is bad.
I know there is an argument that says we look better than the
Democrats because LBJ has been caught in a lie. I don't agree. The
public won't make the distinction. If I were LBJ, I'd go on nation-
wide television and make my case.
B.
Bill Gavin
EYES ONLY
EYES ONLY
June 14, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Shakespeare
Some Thoughts on 1972
What, ultimately, does any politician have to work with?
Three things: reason, passion and imagination. Even if he
successfully mixes these three it won't assure him political
success because events might go against him. But without
these qualities, even events can't save him.
Looking coldbloodedly at 1972, how will the President
appear to the voters insofar as these three qualities are
concerned? And how will his opponent shape up?
1. Reason. It seems to me that this is our strong point.
Nixon is in the public mind an eminently reasonable and reasoning
man (two different attributes). There is not a Democrat who
can match Nixon's reputation for thinking things through, sorting
things out, balancing all things. Muskie comes close but there
is nothing in his record that shows he can appeal to the voters
as the candidate of pure reason.
Now this is all to the good. Contrary to what the pundits
say, there is great comfort to be taken by the electorate from
knowing that they can count on a certain kind of familiar--if dull--
rational process in decision making. Nixon is perhaps the best
example of the "reason-candidate. 11 LBJ had everyone on the
point of a nervous breakdown because no one knew what he was
going to do next, i.e., everyone began to doubt his capacity for
thinking things through.
EYES ONLY
-2-
EYES ONLY
But reason, politically speaking, is dull. It is good, but good
only in that way that medicine is good. Reason is appreciated only
when things are going wrong (JFKs much publicized discussions with
wise men during the missile crisis proved to be as much help to him
as the ultimate decision did; people knew things were "being thought
through" and had confidence in Kennedy.)
The Nixon Administration has been marked by this: we are
reasonable (we set reasonable goals reorganization- and go about
them in reasonable ways) but dull. Yet no one quite knows whether
this is good or bad, as far as sizing up our chances for 1972. For
the moment lets content ourselves with the facts: we are the first
Administration in ten years to be almost universally thought of as
one in which "thinking things through" is taken for granted. This
quality of course works against us also: we are accused of balancing
too many things, of trying to be too rational, of attempting to avoid
needed risks, etc. But in any event, we are associated in the public
mind with reason.
2. Passion. Passion, in this Administration means Agnew and
Agnew means passion. The documentation of his arguments, the
precise nature of his claims, the moderate speaking style with which
he made them all of these are as dust compared to the one single
fact about the Vice President: he represents passion in this
Administration.
Like all passion, the passion represented by Agnew is pure
energy, i. e., in the public mind the content of his passion has become
almost unimportant (even to his friends); what counts is that he is
what he is, breaking the rules of political decorum, saying things,
making waves, in short, making a passionate appeal to the passions
of the public. Not to put too fine an edge on this thing, it can be said
in a very real sense that Agnew's appeal is the appeal of the lover: it
is direct, forceful, open, full of energy and rather unfocused.
Does anyone "out-passion" us? I think not. No one running for
President can afford to take the chances Agnew has. He is the single
most passionately discussed, admired, hated politician alive today,
including Old George Corley Wallace.
-3-
But passion is too much for most people. Most of us can take it
only in bits and pieces and Agnew has in three years made a mini-
career out of it. He has, as they say, enflamed the hearts of the
faithful.
Many questions arise: does the public distinguish the passionate
politics of Agnew from the rational politics of Nixon? Does Agnew's
style hurt or help or really have no affect on Nixon's image? It is
difficult to say but my guess is that something entirely unexpected has
happened: the public has become confused by the Agnew style in
contrast with Nixon's style. The public simply doesn't know what to
think. I'm not saying the public disagrees with his content; I'm saying
it has completely forgotten his content. All they'll remember in 1972
about Agnew is a big cliche in which sound and fury make up the
greatest part.
Thus, I think we are going into 1972 (no matter who is on the ticket
as Vice President for us) with a paradoxical, but very real problem:
the very quality lacked by Nixon in the eyes of most people is precisely
that which Agnew has, but in such a way that people are not certain
what to make of it all. Is Agnew, Nixon? Is Nixon, Agnew? This
uncertainity about the image of the ticket is, in my mind, a danger. In
1968 everyone knew what the Republican ticket was: a bit dull, but solid.
But now? Solidity of image (I'm not talking about programs) is gone.
A bad sign.
3. Imagination. Here we have an Administration that has called
for a revolution, that has called for revolutionary new systems of
welfare, revenue sharing, etc. But in the public's mind it is an
Administration wholly without imagination. I don't know why this should
be so but I'm positive it is so. And here is where the danger lies. In
order to win in 1972 a candidate is going to have to be reasonable, have
mini-passion but also appeal to the imagination of the voters. We
simply don't do that and we never have. Voters voted for us in 1968
not because they imagined what we were going to do but because they
knew what we are going to do. After five years of LBJ, intellectual
certainity became almost politically sexy. But now after four years
of dull reason with eruptions of (Agnevian) passion few if any
appeals to the imagination (the Peace Corps was such an appeal, 80
in it's way was the Great Society) have been made. Even the six
great goals have been sold as well-thought-out goals that can be
reached through reason and prudence.
-4-
We are going into 1972 with absolutely no appeal to the imagination
and there is, as far as I can see, no way out of it. No gimmick will
suffice. Either you have it or you don't and we don't as far as
imaginative appeal goes.
Now what does all this add up to? It means that we are in very
big trouble as far as image is concerned. We will be the party of
peace--but people expect peace.
The great strength we have, however, is that there is only one
possible candidate who could appeal to the imagination of the voters,
sweep through the words, add the logic and the record and hit them
in the gut: Teddy. And he ain't running. If he does run, we are in
a fight for our political future. No other Democrat has even the
slightest chance of appealing to the fancies and fantasies of the public
as does Teddy. We will win if he doesn't run. * Not because we are
going to overwhelm the voters with our record or our charm (they are
not really interested in either) but because we can out-reason all of
them and none of them has that much more going for him as far as
imagination is concerned. Passion could well be our undoing. But if
this is so, it is already a political fact simply waiting to be recorded
in November 1972. Thus, any attempt to remove Agnew in order to
"clean-up" the ticket is fruitless. His pluses and minuses have already
been engraved on the public's mind and have been associated with the
entire "Administration-image. 11 Replacing Agnew would, I think, solve
nothing and probably harm our chances on the right.
What does this all add up to?
1. We should not attempt to build some kind of image that appeals to
the imagination for the simple reason that no one will believe it. Any
energy used during the campaign to make us look "exciting" is, to me,
a waste. Thus television and other media should be used in a different
way from 1968. Instead of the fast-moving, exciting "cinema-verite"
technique in spots, we should make stark, statistical appeals based on
documented facts. At first glance this seems to be disastrous, but I
think our hope lies in sticking to what we do best (reason) and what we
are identified with in the public mind. We can't turn our back on four
years of reasoned, prudent progress and try to excite people with dreams
of grandeur or majestic sweeping visions. An explanation of what I
mean: the numbers of Americans that were in Vietnam when we came
We can, of course, win if he does run, providing two things occur:
(1) Chappaquiddick is engraved in the hearts of the voters and (2) the
voters don't want fantasies. Both seem unlikely to occur.
-5-
in and numbers of how many there are when the campaign takes place:
stark, unadorned, repeated over and over and over--this kind of thing
will do more than a thousand arty camera angles.
2. Quite literally everything depends on the public mood. If the public
is looking for excitement after four years of reasoned progress, than it
is my feeling we are in big trouble and that there is little if anything
we can do about it as far as a media campaign is concerned. They
voted for us because they thought we were solid; we have been solid;
we must run once more as the solid party.
3. Gimmicky media appeals to the youth vote simply are a waste of
time. Our appeal to youth must be an appeal to their concerns as
Americans, not as young Americans and I think the President should
say this. The Democrats are starting out with a wide spread in youth
registration and we can't get them by appealing to the "youth issues"
that the Democrats already have tied up. Let the Democrats cozy up
to "youth"; we will treat the new voters as Americans first, i. e., we
will take them as seriously as they take themselves.
A final--and to me, frightening--point. History has been known
to deal in ironies before. Wouldn't it be ironic if the Nixon Administration
was defted because the Democrats were able to state that while they
were for sane defense spending, they never meant we should belin second
place as far as missile defense is concerned? And wouldn't it be ironic
if the Democrats said that they could do better than we could in our
own programs vis-a-vis China?
Ghastly thoughts.
Bill
Bill Gavin
FU
MEMORANDUM
7/5
THE WHITE HOUSE
J8M
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1971
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINIS
MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12000, Section 3-23-82 6-102
By
OP
-
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
VIA:
FROM:
MR. GORDON STRACHAN of
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Gordon Strachan asked that I put together my thoughts for you on Bill Gavin's
memorandum of June 14. I think that Gavin has put together an interesting,
intellectual piece on some of the ramifications of Administration activity to date
and the prospects for the 1972 election. However, I sense that he is a little
paranoid over Agnew. I do not know how hard his reasoning is on all of this;
however, I think that the assumptions are, perhaps, a little simplistic.
I do not question that we have the President in a relatively good position in terms
of the criteria of his being "reasonable". The quality of reason is at least a point
where we can always build a very good case for President Nixon.
Regarding passion, I am not sure that the Administration does out-passion everyone.
I think the passion of the Peace Movement or of the new left - let alone of the
right - has the zeal that an Agnew does. Perhaps we have been wrong (I would
imagine Gavin would agree) in letting Agnew out so far front and getting so
controversial and diluting the passion which he could hold in constructive areas.
On the other hand, who is to say that Agnew has not served his purpose. Gavin
states that Agnew cannot be replaced since his replacement would probably
harm our chances for a victory. I am not sure that this is true. To say that
Agnew's pluses and minuses have already been engraved in the public's mind is
a problem, but on the other hand, in the age of quick imagery, Agnew can be
tempered quite a lot in the next several months or at least we can alter those
causes on which he goes out front. This may be necessary, anyway, if Gavin's
statement is true, when he says, "I am not saying the public disagrees with his
content; I am saying it has completely forgotten his content". I think we can
get around the problem of Agnew's becoming a big cliche rather than being
effective on key issues. He just needs to be programmed against the big
issues, as do others here - as well as the President.
2.
In terms of imagination, I would have to concur with a lot of what Gavin says. We
have done a poor job of illustrating how imaginative the President has been even on
those occasions when he has either shown by action or through policy a sense of
imagination. I think that we are starting into 1972 with a lack of being able to
communicate imagination but not necessarily an absolute lack of imaginative appeal.
In other words, we have it if we can figure out how to exploit it without doing so in
a gimmicky way.
I do agree that Teddy has the imaginative appeal and that if he runs, that will be a
problem. However, I also believe that Kennedy can be beat. (I do not think that
we should assume that we can beat all others since Teddy is the only Democrat with
imagination and the other contenders lack it.)
I tend to agree with the conclusion offered by Gavin in terms of how we try to
illustrate imagination. It can be done in a documentary sense and it can be done --
a lot of it - by film. We can also use the forthcoming State of the Union and the
other natural forms which will be coming along. We can remain solid and present
ourselves as a solid Party perpetuating a solid country. It doesn't have to be
gimmicky. We can hook into a transfer from a wartime to a peace time situation
and make that exciting. We can talk about how the dollars that were spent on defense
are going to be spent domestically. We can do it as a sound, reasoned and exciting way.
All in all, what I am saying is Gavin has sounded an alarm which we should be
cognizant of if we are not already and those people determining positions and working
on the selling of our programs should give some thought to what he says but not
necessarily over-react.
6/30
JSM, L, G
Mrs. Vencent hombardi - 5 m to
1
approach next ues.
Frank murphy - L suggest - doesn't
see how
West wast media, FMC Der
JSM
AG se Lombardi/Murpay
2
Pol mtg - AG 3 wells not held
Replaced
- then GS to attened
primeries +
I
H raise
peo oras.
J8M to take notes
select sit
after 3wlls
camn
- JSM doubts AG will shoot G deen
6J8M problem w/ Flemming who
wants 0 deal directly w/AG
so mana JSM can't feel G a/stinfo
- a problem beclanti - WH
Flemming close te mardian l Windienst
4
Bolong - Sr man - theendienat? Flemmeng# 2
then w/4 regeoned men. Rumafeld
-
5
H + AG to meet Friz cover polling ?
6
I
Petersmeyer - probs - Macil-ete
- Black + Elderly Vote/ meg hest-carc
- middle am a proe
8
Grantsmandip - Horton has completed
- Gifford poe uses of budget
- Malex to FUsel Gifford?
OFail? all TFs Report
Ф
Horten - PERT- - cheet - Fri
10
Except women's - ag I
RNC- - WH not regus squared accer
Cet com- okw/RnC
AG sees Evans prequently
cuc/hyn - conflict
Budget
what can Rne do- - all?,
H - Poe any
he can consider
Fund Roising
at time be
RNC Roll
has
whe WH w paying for RF tripstocal
- check Acentomen
- Hendwels
- Re-program RF + Program Rums
3/4 in Hay
alex - $ Per duch denner & Blocent
$ for How Uesper Service
sloon, - $ Ril Cits for actuity
Huga + Debey.
G
alex - covered in DC merno> H?
7/21
G
It re J8m AG last
night that H to cover
w/ Dole that no chance
"I want t assured that
the cen is to be in SO. "
"I " want H te male seere
Dole doesnt do anything
other than what AGunatuited
to do (eg pick SO).
=
whe H or AG to call Dole
J8m, calle +) Flemming -> Denver
Recen for RAC tonight.
mtgs w/poe leaders.
memo re Mcllihorter
Rums - to be poe man.
AGuery
L. to raise w/ H since
confortable
w/ Rums
A G has no prols w/ Runns
L to check 3 ad men w/
Daley, Scott,
Rum doing well onTF
RF not "
"
cwc will not move " or convene.
- G Porter
Put hurmore - waffle
"still Wiley company proposal take on 65
ASI-
screwed up" RFoff RF
AG concerned
look
TSM => check but ? E can't tell
Plan - Polling + Simult 1st 1 Flan
Hany L Flemming + 58m scheme
to be replaced ey Rums?
"workman like joe at 2nd level spot"
J8rn corre ned about Flem in Denver
similar te Sears + Ellscorth #
Senior pol to cut deals in the 8Cs
all deces paper - JSM directed to move
except in non recorcrable area.
i waller. - 2 J8m + sloan?
Is Sue lover Movison translating?
J8m
Buc - scrategy + Implem,
no move-
J8M
Bills - hard to justify
&
AG
cashen + cuc - Tall It t than
¿G have H sign off as legit.
WH sunction
G check
cwc on his own or
Cashen w/ H approval
"Send to m "- AG decision
or wH(H) approval.
July 19, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Dole's Meeting with the
President - July 20, 1971
Magruder met with Senator Dole today to discuss the RNC Pre-
Convention Committees. During the discussion Dole's interest
in Chigago or Miami Beach as the convention site surfaced.
Magruder is concerned that tomorrow the President may say
"What city do you prefer?" Whereupon Dole will say Miami
Beach and the carefully developed scenario to program San
Diego as the RNC's choice will fall apart; add the President
will be forced to push San Diego.
Concerning the Pre-Convention Committees, Dole, Magruder,
Timmons and Odle reviewed the names. All names were cleared
with Harry Dent, Lee Nunn, and Harry Flemming before being
offered to Dole. The final set of recommendations is as
follows:
Arrangements Committee
Chairman, Bob Dole, Kansas
Vice-Chairman, Dick Herman, Nebraska
Secretary, Mrs. Mildred K. Perkins, New Hampshire
Treasurer, Mrs. J. Willard Marriott, District of Columbia
General Counsel, Fred C. Scribner, Maine
Advisor to the Committee on Arrangements, Ray Bliss, Ohio
Two problems exist. First, Dole wants McDill Boyd as Vice=
Chairman instead of Dick Herman. Dole may try to appeal the
decision to the Attorney General tomorrow. The second problem
concerns Fred Scribner as General Counsel. Your reservation about
him was relayed to the Attorney General by Magruder. Timmons
was also advised. However, Scribner is ex-officio general
counsel of the Arrangements Committee by virtue of his role as
general counsel of the RNC. The only way not to have him as
counsel of the Arrangements Committee would be to remove him
as counsel of the RNC, which no one appears ready to do at this
2
time. Other Committee offices are:
Subcommittee on Badges and Tickets: Harry Rosensweig, Arizona
Subcommittee on Housing: Bo Callaway, Georgia
Subcommittee on News Media Operations: McDill Boyd, Kansas
Subcommittee on Program Planning: Robert Flanigan, Colorado
Subcommittee on Transportation: L.E. Thomas, Florida
Ed Middleton of Kentucky is to be Chairman of the Contests
Committee, and William Cramer of Florida is to be Chairman
of the Rules Committee.
You will notice that Robert Stuart and Bud Wilkinson have
been deleted from the list of assignments pursuant to your
suggestion.
GS:dg
DRAFT
7/15
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PETER FLANIGAN
JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: SIMULATION IN THE 1972 CAMPAIGN
On Thursday, June 24, Mr. Gene Lindstrom discussed a proposal for the two-
stage development of a simulation model for the 1972 Presidential campaign. The
discussion was attended by Bob Finch, Peter Flanigan, Dave Derge, Jeb Magruder,
Ed DeBolt (RNC), Gordon Strachan, Lance Tarrance (Census) and Bob Marik. The
purpose of this memo is to summarize pertinent information relevant to simulation
and to recommend a decision on Mr. Lindstrom's proposal.
Background - The Nature of Simulation
A simulation model is no more than a logical, detailed analysis of the
electoral impact of voter opinions, as determined by survey polls. It links the
attitudes of voter blocs to their size and geographical location and estimates
what the outcome will be if the candidates are viewed in the light of certain
major issues. When a campaign strategist evaluates the results of an issue poll,
he is, in effect, performing a mental simulation. It is difficult, however, for
the human mind to keep all of the pertinent data in the proper perspective.
For example, in a recent meeting of very knowledgeable, political people,
about half felt that EMK would be the easiest Democrat to beat in 1972. The other
half were more concerned about facing him than any other possible opponent. These
people are all loyal to the President, see the same polls, the same news headlines,
same (limited) grassroots feedback, but they came up with opposite results in a
"mental election simulation". The computer simulation model would give an answer,
one way or the other, that would be based on a logical step-by-step analysis of
the data. One could take issue with the conclusions of the simulation model and
be able to determine the exact point in the logical analysis where the difference
-2-
For example, in 1960, assuming that the religious issue was second to party
affiliation in determining the vote, a Catholic Democrat had no trouble de-
ciding which candidate to support. A Catholic Republican, on the other hand,
felt some cross-pressures and would have been expected to break his traditional
voting pattern in some proportion of cases. On the other hand, if a Protestant
Democrat had run, instead of JFK, entirely different groups would have become
the voters under cross-pressure.
It is possible, by the use of the high-speed capabilities of the computer, to
estimate by calculation what the election outcome would be under a certain set
of assumptions concerning the sensitive issues. The interesting capability of
simulation, according to the 1960 experience, is that it can project reasonably
well what the ambivalent voter will do, based on past patterns of attitude and
behavior. Head-to-head polls early in the campaign merely measure this voter
at various stages of indecision, and therefore only converge upon the eventual
outcome as the election nears. They do not project, and do not claim to do
so. Neither do they indicate the number of voters under cross-pressures.
In 1960, the simulation "synthesized" individual states by assigning appropriate
proportions of various voter categories from regional samples. This was done
because there were not enough individuals polled in any one state to yield a
sample of adequate size for statistical reliability. Thus, it was assumed that
an upper-income Jewish urban Democrat in Boston was statistically similar in
attitude and voter behavior to his counterpart in New York City, Philadelphia,
Buffalo, etc. That assumption was good enough to allow the simulation model
to predict electoral vote outcome about as accurately as it predicted total na-
tional popular vote, which was close enough to be useful.
In 1960, the simulation model told Kennedy that the religious issue would not
hurt him; that the pro-JFK effect in the close industrial states would more than
offset the anti-JFK effect in the Bible Belt and Deep South, where the Democrats
frequently had a large margin to begin with. That turned out to be the case.
Post-election analysis suggests that the net effect of the religious issue was
to give Nixon 1.5 million added votes, but to give Kennedy 10 additional electoral
votes.
Another interesting application, done after the election, showed a very different
result if the campaign had centered on foreign policy rather than religion. ?olls
showed that the voters had substantially higher confidence in Nixon than in Ken-
nedy for the conduct of foreign affairs. If Mixon had advocated a tough line
toward Moscow, and if Kennedy had advocated a more conciliatory, negotiation-
oriented approach (which was essentially the case with Quemoy-Matsu), and if for-
eign policy had become the dominant issue, the simulation showed Nixon receiving
54% of the popular vote, and winning every state outside of the South.
In 1964, the Democrats did not use the simulation group, but the group ran an
election prediction on their own. On the basis of three key issues:civil rights,
nuclear responsibility and social welfare, they predicted the L3J landslide cuite
well, both nationally and state-by-state.
SIMULATION--3
Analysis of Costs
Any cost estimate for a major project such as campaign simulation must be
considered as approximate, at best. There is often a tendency to find that more
effort is required to reach the objective than originally planned. However,
there are also some considerations which may reduce the cash outlay indicated
in Tabs B and C. If computer time can be made available, it would save $7,000
in Stage I and $80,000 in Stage II. The RNC is developing an adequate data base
for other campaign requirements and will be able to provide the same to the sim-
ulation model at a savings of $ 50,000. If Stage II is developed by a small,
reliable group working together, rather than as isolated segments for security
reasons, then the consultant effort to coordinate the project can be reduced by
$30,000. The net effect of all the reductions in projected cash expenditures
above is:
Original
Adjusted Proposal as
Proposal
Described Above
Phase I
$ 35,000
$ 28,000
Phase II
350,000
190,000
Total
$385,000
$218,000
Qualifications of the Key Personnel
Gene Lindstrom was one of the pioneers in TV network vote projection analysis.
His work came to Kennedy's attention in 1960, and the Pool group asked him to join
them in their simulation effort at that time, but he declined. He seems to be
politically reliable and has kept abreast of developments in voter behavior analysis
through the years. He has known Dave Derge since they were in graduate school to-
gether. A resume of Mr. Lindstrom's background is given in Tab D.
Dave-Derge, who has recommended consideration of simulation for some time,
might be required as the polling consultant to assure that survey designs are com-
patible with the model, as well as serving the major campaign strategy requirements.
SIMULATION 4
Very little, if any, increase in polling costs would be expected, but proper
design would be required by someone who understood the simulation model.
Important Considerations
There are two conditions which must be met before even the best simulation
model would be of any use in the campaign. (1) The top decision makers must be
disposed to use its analysis as one input in their formulation of strategy. Sim-
ulation connot be justified at any other level. (2) The cost, which might run
between $250,000 and $400,000, must be acceptable to achieve the capabilities
described in this memo.
Recommendation
It is recommended that Stage I be funded at a cost of $28,000 to $35,000
to provide a model to illustrate the capabilities of simulation. This is rec-
ommended only on the condition that it would provide you with useful new infor-
mation to further clarify the ultimate decision on developing the full scale
three-person model for the campaign. If it is almost certain that a simulation
model would not be used by the top campaign strategists no matter how well
demonstrated, then Stage I should not be funded.
Fund Stage I for $28,000 to $35,000.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
A
Summary of the
Simulation Model Used by Kennedy in 1960
The following is a brief description of the concepts applied in the simulation
model developed by Poll and associates for Kennedy in 1960. 1
At the outset, the voters are categorized into a matrix, or groupings, accord-
ing to demographics and past voting behavior. For example,
Other
Catholic
Protestant
(Black, Jewish, etc.)
D* R* I*
D R I
D.
R
I
For each
Urban
of five
in
Suburban
regions
Rural
Democrat, Republican, Independent)
Figure 1
The matrix in Figure 1 establishes 135 categories: 3 ethnic/religious cate-
gories X 3 political affiliations X 3 demographic patterns x 5 geographic re-
gions.
For each voter category, attitudes on a wide range of issues are determined
from past public opinion polls. For example, in the limited matrix of Figure 1,
Northeastern urban Catholic Republicans may favor a hard line toward Moscow by
55% to 30%, with 15% undecided. That may have been determined from the results
of fifteen different but related questions on several different polls carried
out over the past few years. Basic attitudes do not seem to change drastically
over time unless some polarizing event has occurred which puts the issue into
new perspective.
The behavior of the voting population for a given campaign is determined by an
analysis of cross-pressures on voters. That is, the ambivalent voter is defined
as the one whose normal voting loyalties are in conflict with the perceived
issues or candidate images of the particular campaign. It is the bahavior of
this voter who decides the outcome.
1
Ithiel de Sola ?001, Robert ?. Abelson and Samuel Popkin, Candidates,
Issues and Strateries: : Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential
Elections, (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1965)
3.
Budget
Stage One
Model design and questionnaire development
15,000.00
Programming
10,000.00
*
Computer time
7,000.00
Travel
3,000.00
Total
$ 35,000.00
Stage One
Model design and questionnaire development
$15,000.00
This includes generation of the logic, functional relationship
of the components, and programming specifications of the test
vehicle proposed for Stage One. The questions and question-
naire to be used in this test case will also be selected and
framed. A minimum effort to accomplish this is twenty man
weeks of professional effort.
Programming
$10,000.00
Flow charting, coding, debugging and documentation of the
Stage One model will produce a running test vehicle of approxi-
mately 2000 computer instructions. Normal industry output
suggests that this is estimated to be a 200 man day effort.
Computer Time
$ 7,000.00
Large scale computer time costs about $600.00 per hour, and
the Stage One model will require not more than 10 hours of
computer time to produce results. An additional expense of
approximately $1000. 00 for line charges, terminal costs, and
other supplies is estimated.
Travel
$ 3,000.00
All technical work for Stage One will be executed in California,
but six trips to the East have been budgeted at $500. 00 per
trip. This includes the demonstration at the conclusion of
Stage One.
May not require cash outlay (See text memorandum)
Stage Two
Pre-campaign costs
Generalization of model
50,000.00
Data base design and construction
50,000.00
Programming
75,000.00
Machine time and supplies
50,000.00
Consultants
15,000.00
Travel
20,000.00
Campaign costs
Consulting advice on use of the model
20,000.00
Machine time and supplies
30,000.00
Travel
25,000.00
Consultants
15,000.00
Total
$ 350,000.00
Stage Two
Pre-campaign costs
Generalization of Model
$50,000.00
The generalization of Stage One will require the testing of
alternative solutions and the subsequent rejection of many
hypotheses. This will include the redrafting of the questionnaire
and periodic updating of the input system. Minimum professional
effort spread over the time period between the end of Stage One
and the beginning of the campaign will be sixty six man weeks.
Data base design and construction
$50,000.00
Data base design and construction is divided into two parts.
The first, covering file organization and data structure within
the data base will demand the greater part of the effort (and
more than two-thirds of the cost). Once set, this skeleton will
accept the accumulation of intelligence and information
*May not require cash outlay (See text of memorandum)
-2-
necessary for reconstruction of the data base. Forty five man
weeks of professional talent will be expended in this task spread
between Stage One and the beginning of the campaign.
The second part, data base construction, will be performed by
clerical and sub-professional people. This can be contained to
less than three man years of work and will include library
searching, census abstracting, encoding of information, and other
clerical tasks associated with data collection.
Programming
$75,000.00
The final collection of programs and sub-programs combined
together in the Stage Two simulation system will contain
approximately 15,000 computer instructions. Based upon normal
industry output for applications of this type, an estimate of
1500 man days of programming will be required for Stage Two,
Machine time and supplies
$50,000.00
Seventy five hours of computer time at $600.00 per hour and
$5,000.00 of other costs such as terminal charges, line costs
and other charges and supplies associated with machine usage
will be required to support Stage Two development.
Consultants
$15,000.00
The use of consultants during the pre-campaign period will
permit security surrounding the use and development of the
model to be maintained within a small number of implementers
and users. By segmenting the logic into functional blocks, ex-
perts with unique talents may complete specific tasks without
exposure to the intent and form oi the simulator. Seventy five
professional days have been budgeted for this purpose.
Travel
$20,000.00
One major transcontinental trip per week between the end of
Stage One and the start of the campaign has been budgeted.
These trips include extensive travel to the field, meetings in
Washington, training and demonstration sessions for the user,
and other travel associated with the integration of the data base
and model.
Campaign Costs
Consulting advice on use of the model
$20,000.00
From the convention through the election complete professional
direction of the simulator and its use will be maintained. This
-3-
will include necessary modifications and updating the data base.
Twenty five man weeks is budgeted for this purpose.
*
Machine time and supplies
$30,000.00
Fifty hours of computer time is estimated for this period.
Travel
$25,000.00
Immediate liaison will be provided during the campaign by
travel where necessary and upon demand. It is presumed that
frequent field trips will be useful in maintaining the efficacy of
the data base.
*
Consultants
$15,000.00
Depending upon the changes to the Stage Two simulation system
during the campaign, it may be necessary for the consultants
who contributed logical modules to be recalled for modification
of their work. Seventy five man days have been budgeted for
this purpose.
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
Gordon:
Attached is the resume of Gene Lindstrom,
who proposed the simulation model. Sub-
sequent investigation strongly suggests
that his price is high. Alan Greenspan,
for example, thinks that such a model
should cost no more than $50,000 -
$100,000.
Bob Marik
advised of Menul
1.2-2 milt
doesn't thenk
Simulation worth it
EUGENE EMIL LINDSTROM
BORN: October 18, 1926, Seattle, Washington
MARITAL STATUS: Married Joyce Card September 8, 1951. Two
children - Meredith Anne born August 31, 1956 and
Jon Eric born September 12, 1959.
SCHOOLS: Educated in Seattle Public Schools through high
school.
Seattle Pacific College 1947-1950, B.A.
University of Washington 1950-1952, M.A.
Stanford University 1952-1955, Ph.D.
MILITARY SERVICE: U.S. Army 1945-1947. Honorable discharge.
PROFESSIONAL CAREER: Joined IBM in July 1955 and am present y
employed with this company. During 1955 I received
training as a programmer.
- In 1956 was responsible for the prediction of the
Presidential and other national elections on television.
Developed the statistical model for prediction and
directed six other programmers in the syatems design
and execution of the model on election night.
- Between 1957 and 1959 employed as a programmer for
IBM in San Francisco. There I developed a computing
program for locating ships at sea for the search and
rescue mission of the Western Sea Frontier (U.S. Navy).
During this period I also consulted on several statis
tical problems involving the use of large scale digital
computers.
- In 1960 returned to New York to direct the Election
Coverage program for IBM. In addition to the normal
vote count and prediction, I helped to develop the use
of a computer for the simulation of an electoral
campaign. This work was judged sufficiently interesting
to result in my being invited to Menton, France to
participate in a UNESCO conference on the contributions
of Mathematics to the Social Sciences. I also intro-
duced the use of special precincts for early trend
analysis during that election night coverage - called
Voter Precinct Analysis (VPA) in the 1964 election
coverage.
- In 1961 I returned to the General Products Division
Laboratory in San Jose, California to form the
Scientific Computing Department. For the next three
2.
years as manager of that group, we worked on problems
of laboratory interest. By the time J accepted, my next
assignment the group had grown to about 100 people.
-
In 1964 I became the manager of the Programming
Center in the Systems Development Division at San Jose.
That work totally involved systems rather than
applications programming. During the height of the
effort I directed more than 200 people. We produced
the basic software for the IBM 1130 and 1800 computers
as well as all of the IBM 360 Assemblers and Report
Generators. The Assembler mission was founded during
this period.
- In 1968 I took a sabbatical to re-establish my
technical abilities. During this year I did research
on problems of storage hierarchy and systems performance,
syntactic structures, and integrated data base systems.
I was also the Technical Chairman for the Annual
Programming Symposium for IBM. This meeting brings
together the 500 most expert programmers in IBM for
a conference on the computing sciences.
- Currently I am the manager of the Computer Science
Department of the Advanced Systems Development Division
of IBM in Los Gatos, California.
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON
Date: 7/2
Date:
TO: LR
TO: LR
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
acc should
made a copy
be sent to
of this so that
mel Stephenst
I can forward
think to is mes
it itto Stephenst
send original
in colsons office
to Bure DONE
SENT
CC To Stephens
?
who
JJ42
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
MS
June 29, 1971
SUITE 272
170: PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2000G
(202) 333.0920
have a .comg
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
BART PORTER
SUBJECT
Mal Stepbern
then
Action Items and Follow-up
Add
or June 25, 1971, a meeting was held in Counsellor Finch's office
to discuss the 18-21 Year Old Vote. The following persons were
present: Robert Finch, Bart Porter (Citizens Committee), Ken
Rietz (Citizens Committee), Gordon Strachan (White House), Mort
Allin (White House), Jon Rose (White House) , Fred Slight
(Republican National Committee), Michael Dively (Michigan Legis-
lator), Bonnie Bradbeer (White House), T. Harding Jones (White
House), David Keene (Vice President's Office).
Listed below are the items discussed together with the person
responsible for follow-up and due dates:
1) Fred Slight agreed to find out how many states provide bounty
payments for voter registration.
Due date: July 2
2) Harding Jones or Bonnie Bradbeer should investigate the
possibility of having appropriate spokesmen meet with various
youth groups coming through the White House with the hope of
identifying those young persons who would be willing to work
for the President in 1972.
Due date for implementation plan: July 6
3) Harding Jones agreed to check on the status of the number of
states ratifying the 18 Year Old Vote Amendment.
Due date: Immediately
4) Counsellor Finch requested that a survey be made to determine
which states have legalized the 18 Year old Vote and, of those,
which have included the "Age of Majority" as a part of their
program. Responsibility: Finch Staff
Due date: July 6
-2-
Counsellor Finch recommended a think session on the
Presidential role in youth vote effort and recommendations on
"Age of Majority" issue.
Responsibility for developing session: Finch Staff
Due date for Plan: July 2
6)
Counsellor Finch directed his staff to have weekly sessions,
of no more than twelve at a time, to bring in both RNC and White
waite
House Interns for review. Ken Rietz and Fred Slight would parti-
cipate and attempt to draw out and identify those interns who
would be willing to work for the President in 1972.
Responsibility: Finch Staff
Due date for Plan: July 6
7) A general discussion was held regarding the Summer Interns in
Washington and the best method of identifying potential workers
for the campaign. Fred Slight agreed to identify in writing
the seventeen Interns at the RNC and the Republican Summer
Interns on Capitol Hill.
Harding Jones agreed to identify in writing the sixteen White
House Interns and the 350 Summer Interns in the various
departments and agencies.
Bonnie Bradbeer agreed to identify in writing the five staff
holdovers from the White House Council on Youth.
Due date for all names to be submitted to Mr. Finch's office:
July 9
8) Counsellor Finch directed that all Interns be identified and
the above identification process be done but said to hold up on
the Capitol Hill group for the present time. Fred Slight agreed
to begin planning for a late summer reception by the RNC where
all Interns would be invited and then given an opportunity to
sign up for the 1972 campaign.
Due date for Plan: July 9
9)
Ken Rietz delivered a memo on Mock Elections.
10) Ken Rietz delivered a memo on Voter Registration.
11) Ken Rietz delivered a memo on organization of Young Voters for
Nixon.
-3-
12)
Bonnie Bradbeer agreed to begin identifying groups such as
the YMCA Youth Conference of Governors, Boys and Girls
Nations, etc., to find out when these Youth groups were meet-
ing, insuring that Administration speakers were in attendance,
and obtaining names of the groups' officers and leaders for us
to contact. This, according to Mort Allin, was a successful
part of the 1968 election campaign.
Due date: July 9
13) Counsellor Finch discussed the possible use of the President
on radio discussions during the summer. Mr. Finch expressed a
desire to get together with several young Republican office
holders, and Michael Dively said that he would send Mr. Finch
a list of twelve legislators under twenty-five. Mr. Finch
stated he was going to write a memo to the President suggest-
ing his possible participation in these radio discussions.
All reports, plans, and lists are to be sent directly to Robert H.
Finch, Counsellor to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
TO: L R
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
I sent a memo
Schollander to odle on
Vita thigtocked
give t time
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 30, 1971
3:00 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROB ODLE
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
SUBJECT:
Don Schollander
Obviously I was pleased to be able to spend a few minutes with
Don Schollander the other day. I came away with the feeling
that he would not be the right person to head any of our youth
efforts. I do think he would be good in the young marrieds
area and should be tied into some program at some point.
He is interested in his association with a new company and
the prospects that that holds for him.
Don is not politically oriented. However, he is interested and
undoubtedly over the next several months, his interest will grow.
I do not question in any way his loyalty to the President. However,
I am concerned over his inability to articulate precisely why he
is for President Nixon. Further, I was a little distressed when
he said something to the effect that if he weren't for President Nixon
he would probably be a McCloskey supporter.
The whole problem with Schollander is that we picked up on him
through Jon Rose, he was a hot name because we know that he's
a former youth celebrity and, therefore, we immediately rushed
to the conclusion that we had a great front man for the youth field.
I think that notion should be dispelled.
cc:
Gordon Strachan
June 29, 1971
POINT
robert C. ODLE, JR.
GORDON STRACHAN
Son Schollender as a possible
Minn
Because
with delt only half an hour yesterday,
20 personalis,
Thite House State I.
to
ability, but Lines
firent
man
SINC
856
of
problem.
only Concern in his Involve 3 the President. On that, I
Code:
Come
has known or 102 many
GS:lm
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
When we met in the Roosevelt Room a couple of months ago, the subject of
a master political calendar was discussed. It would be most helpful if I could
get from you a copy of the master calendar which you have prepared.
Obviously, in terms of coordination and general planning the calendar would
be extremely helpful in terms of coordinating the President's calendar.
ec:
Mr. Strachan
June 23, 1971
IMMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
NOM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon
Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Loe Hunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Numn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Dourke Nickonlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Loe Hunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Covernors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organization.
GS:1m
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
CHUCK COLSON
FROM:
HARRY DENT
Lee Nunn is taking over the project of organizing a committee
of ex-senators for the President. He would like to make former
Senator Bourke Hickenlooper the chairman. He says he has plenty
of time on his hands and is in the Washington area all the time.
He also suggests we get together a committee of former governors.
Also, he is going to increase the list of former senators to include
a number of others not mentioned in the memo.
If we want the ex-governors committee formed, we need to let
him know that also.
CC: Bob Haldeman
DETERMINAD TO BE AN
ADMI
KING
E.U.
11.0
6-102
By
to
3-23-82
Personal & Confidential
June 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM
FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN MITCHELL
FROM:
LEE NUNN
SUBJECT:
FORMER SENATORS, FORMER GOVERNORS FOR THE PRESIDENT
It has been suggested by the White House that the political
apparatus should be visiting with former senators who could
perhaps form a Senators for Nixon Re-election Committee.
This could be done if you feel it advisable. It should be
possible to form a similar committee of ex-governors.
Senator Hickenlooper would be a prospective organizer of
the senators. Then, too, his former Director of the
Republican Policy Committee, Fred Rhodes, No. 2 man at
the Veterans Administration, might be helpful to such a
project.
If you approve, what would be your thoughts on timing and
organization?
June 23, 1071
FOR:
H.R.
UNIT:
COMBON CERRONAL
STATES
Lee Hunn Currination
of and
IN-Governor: for linen
053 = mild D to to condition first a list of ex-Senators
DAM 1.00 to the President.
1 to fullice over the project and sent a report
to Collion, attached at Tab A.
welcould the tark and to advicing the Attorney
Control by the attached at Tab B. Humn sur rests
the are Final Rhodes (number two man at
the Vehiclens Alcinintration) should head up the ox-Senations
UNITED
Inc Them has not Logun working on the group of ex-Covernors
Litt brow the Accorney Ceneral for his thoughts on timing
and ouganisation.
C3:In
June 23, 1971
HEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Munn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Mixon
Colson asked Dent to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Lee Hunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Bourke Hickenlooper and Fred Rhodes (number two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Lee Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organization.
GS:1m
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lee Nunn Organization
of Ex-Senators and
Ex-Governors for Nixon
Colson asked Dont to consider developing a list of ex-Senators
and ex-Governors who support the President.
Dent asked Lee Nunn to take over the project and sent a report
to Colson, attached at Tab A.
Lee Nunn welcomed the task and is advising the Attorney
General by the memorandum attached at Tab B. Nunn suggests
that Bourke Mickenlooser and Fred Rhodes (nunber two man at
the Veterans Administration) should head up the ex-Senators
group.
Loe Nunn has not begun working on the group of ex-Governors
but has asked the Attorney General for his thoughts on timing
and organisation.
GS:1m
VTOAS
FYI
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JOHN N. MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JEB MAGRUDER
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Polling -- '72 Campaign
While activities are taking place on several fronts
with regard to polling in the '72 Campaign, it is
clear to us that no complete and comprehensive program
is yet underway. Basically today, four separate or
somewhat detached polling operations are in existence:
1. The White House -- The White House has been
conducting polling for the last two years for
the President and has stockpiled a significant
amount of information primarily from telephone
polls but also from some field polls. In
addition, it has been talking to Dave Derge and
Opinion Research Corporation about possible
polling plans for 1972 -- both plans have now
been submitted. While they update slightly the
!68 plan, they basically recommended the
activities we had during that time.
2. Domestic Council -- The Domestic Council is
now starting to do polling on its own on Domestic
Issues. It did a Domestic Issues poll two months
ago and is nearing completion of a final draft
for a second poll on Family problems.
3. The Republican National Committee -- The
National Committee has been exploring several
polling alternatives and research proposals.
2
Somewhat in conjunction with the Citizen's
Committee it is currently conducting a forty
thousand dollar study in Delaware. In addition,
at the request of the White House it worked with
Dave Derge on a vendor's survey that determined
the five most suitable pollsters for the '72
Campaign.
4. Citizen's Committee -- While it has
directly sponsored no polls, it has joined with
the RNC at looking at the potential results of
the Delaware Study as a basis for proposing some
new polling techniques for '72.
It is clear to us the first priority or need with regard_
to setting up our '72 polling operation is to establish
some mechanism that can function as a focal point and
clearing house for all polling operations now going on
and as a respository for additional information that will
be coming in probably independently from key states, etc.,
as we approach the Campaign.
It is our understanding that in discussions between
Mr. Haldeman and the Attorney General -- general agreement
has been reached that a three-man polling strategy board
should be set up consisting of Haldeman, Mitchell and
Flanigan. We recommend that this group be instituted
immediately and that under it be established a working
group (a modified version of the task force) to under-
take the necessary tasks of control and coordination
of -all the various things that are being done and to
produce an agreed upon plan for '72.
The working group would be Chaired by Peter Flanigan
and have as its members Bob Marik and Jeb Magruder of
the Citizen's Committee, Ed Harper, Ken Cole of the
Domestic Council, Gordon Strachan and Larry Higby of
the White House, and Ed Debolt of the RNC. This group
would be charged with doing the following things in the
order listed below:
3
a. Coordinate all polling activities
now and in the future.
b. Develop a preliminary polling plan
for 1972.
C. Select a pollster.
d. Devise an overall polling plan based
on the selection of a final pollster,
that includes coordinating the various
elements of polling available.
e. Select a consultant.
f. Decide whether or not a simulation
project is worth pursuing for 1972.
This group would work at coordinating all polling
activities currently underway and contribute where
feasible to the formulation of any future polls. It
would be clearly understood, however, that distribution
of any results, including distribution to the group,
would be determined by the President or the Strategy
Committee.
DISCUSSION:
As mentioned, a basic polling plan has already been
devised through consultation with Dave Derge and Tom
Benham of ORC, but there are several approaches and
pollsters that still should be explored before any
final decisions are reached.
In addition, the Citizen's Committee is in the process
of developing a concept of key state polling with the
idea of reaching on an individual basis, exclusively
the "ambivalent" voter and the Republican voter determining
his preference and reaching him through direct mail,
precinct work, etc. Each of the major firms that would
be asked to participate in bidding for our polling contract
would be asked to explore the basic plans presented and
determine whether or not it is cost-effective to pursue
this concept.
4
As a by product of discussions with individual
pollsters and the eventual final selection of a
pollster, we will have talked to a number of
independent operators as well as polling firms.
This should give us a fair sampling of the field
and enable us to select a consultant or polling
staff man for 1972.
SIMULATION:
While very much in everybody's mind is still a
questionable practice according to explanations
we have received so far; therefore, high on the
list of priorities of the working group would be
to determine through consultation with various
experts and professionals whether or not simulation
can be a profitable undertaking for the '72 Campaign.
ACTION STEPS:
In order for this activity to get underway immediately,
the working group should be convened this week with
Peter Flanigan as Chairman. Agreement will need to
be obtained for this from the Attorney General, H. R.
Haldeman, John Ehrlichman and Tom Evans or Bob Dole at
the RNC. As soon as the group is set up it should
undertake the following tasks:
1. Determine a basic polling plan.
2, Interview top five vendors as determined
by recent RNC/Derge Vendor survey of all large
firms in the country.
3. During the process of interviewing pollsters
and reviewing proposals, try to
a. Select a consultant
b. Explore thoroughly and prepare a
recommendation simulation.
5
4. Draw up a final polling plan recommendation
using all coordinated resources available from
the White House, Domestic Council, RNC and
Citizen's Committee and costs to meet this plan.
5. Continue to review all polls before they
are done to make sure that they meet if possible,
parts of the plan as outlined.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the concept as outlined in this
report and that we proceed immediately to initiate
those action steps as outlined.
Approve
Disapprove
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 6/4
TO: lany Highy
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
- Jeb mentioned his
interest in and plans
for Schollunder this
- attached morning. are copiesof
his letter and memo
to the A G on the
subject
June 2, 1971
Dear Don:
We were sorry you were unable to attend last week S meeting of
our Citizens Committee, and I hope we will have another chance
soon to get the Committee members together so that all of you
will have an opportunity to get to know each other.
We would very much like you to come back here and visit with
us at your convenience. I could fill you in on the Committee's
activities, and there are a number of people here I would like
you to meet and talk with. If it would facilitate arrangements,
you could bring your wife along with you and maybe you will both
get an opportunity to do some sightseeing.
Please give me a call at your earliest convenience so that we
can make the necessary arrangements.
Sincerely,
JEB S. MAGRUDER
Mr. Donald A. Schollander
Director of Student Employment
Lewis & Clark College
Portland, Oregon 97219
bcc: Mr. Grodon Strachan
June 2, 1971
Determined TO BE AMKING AN
ADMI
6-102
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O.
120
3-23-82
By
eve
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
As you know, Don Schollander is spoken of very highly as
an articulate young man. He was unable to attend our
first Citizens Committee meeting and, consequently, I
have asked him to come to Washington so that we can visit
with him and get to know him.
Because of his youth and athletic background, he would be
a tremendous asset to the campaign. Therefore, while he
is here, I would hope that you would be able to see him.
Set up an appointment when he is in town.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
JEB S. MAGRUDER
bcc: Mr. Gordon Strachan
CONFIDENTIAL
June 29, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Magruder's Projects
The Attorney General has been pressing Magruder for action by
the task forces. The result is a series of memoranda for the
Attorney General which are attached as tabs and summarized:
1. The Place of Women in the 1972 Campaign
Rita Hauser argues that there is a new social and political
awareness among women that will have to be tapped carefully
to assure their support for the President. The recom-
mendation, which the Attorney General has not acted upon,
is that a separate women's organization within the campaign
should not be created, but rather that a woman be appointed
at the Deputy Campaign Manager level to carry the respon-
sibilities justified by experience and ability regardless
of gender (memorandum attached at Tab A).
Tom Benham of ORC reviewed the polling material available
on "Women's Lib" and concluded that there is no political
significance to the movement per se. He suggests directing
the appeal to equal job opportunities rather than to the
movement itself (memorandum attached at Tab B).
2. Voter Registration
You asked Magruder to reconsider the decision about non-
involvement with registration drives. (Memorandum attached
at Tab C.) Magruder's response is the plan developed by
Senator Brock and Ken Rietz. The plan, which the Attorney
General approved Friday, suggests that the current Republican
voter drives are of little value; that the Youth for Nixon
Organization (Ken Riets) will have to control our registration
drive, and that after thorough planning the registration drive
(First Voters for Nixon) will concentrate on target indi-
viduals in key states. The First Voters for Nixon would seek
some publicity during the next four months while the organ-
isation work is being done. Brock and Riets believe that
any mass registration drive would work to the President's
disadvantage.
On a closely related subject, it is Counsellor Finch's view
-2-
that the President should take a highly publicised stand
on the Vote-at-18 Amendment, which is expected to be
ratified in the next two weeks.
3. Target Voter Strategy
The Delaware test of the target voter strategy is part
of a Magruder memorandum on Research (Tab D) which has been
submitted to the Attorney General. No decision by the
Attorney General has been relayed to Magruder. The Research
memorandum draws heavily on the RNC priority states list,
which you reviewed in the key states memorandum of June 23rd.
Additional points made include descriptions of successful
examples of "rifle-shot communication with target voters
to augment the mass-media campaign". Magruder requests
authority from the Attorney General to (p)roceed with detailed
development of the target voter strategy".
4. Brochure
Magruder directed the RNC to prepare a brochure which could
be used to send to people who write to the White House, the
Citizens, or the RNC asking what they can do to help re-elect
the President. All who write in receive acknowledgements and
are catalogued by Anne Higgins, Rob Odle, and Ed DeBolt,
respectively. (See attachments at Tab E.)
The Attorney General quickly reviewed the brochure but deferred
to you for any comments. The brochure has not been "staffed"
to Safire, Moore, etc., because of reluctance to put White
House Staff in the position of second-guessing the Attorney
General's campaign operation. If you feel this would not be
a problem, the brochure will be staffed this week.
Recommendation:
That the brochure be staffed to Chapin, Safire, Moore, and
Klein after you have advised the Attorney General of the plan
to have a White House Staff review of the brochure.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
If you approve, a suggested talking paper is attached at Tab F.
As you may know, the Attorney General will be leaving July 7th
for three weeks in Europe. Magruder plans to have all task force
reports to you and the Attorney General before that date.
GS:1m
CONFIDENTIAL
June 23, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
RITA HAUSER
JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: THE PLACE OF WOMEN IN THE 1972 CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION
The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize recent changes in the
attitudes of many women and to recommend an organizational structure
for the 1972 campaign which will be responsive to current concerns
about their status in society.
Prior Voting Patterns
Women made up about 53% of the voting age population in 1968, and
nearly 52% of those who claimed they voted in that Presidential elec-
tion.
1
They have supported Presidential candidates in the following manner
in recent elections, according to Gallup:
Percent of the Women's Vote
Republican
Democrat
AIP
1960
51
49
-
1964
38
62
-
1968
43
45
12
(In 1968, the men supported President Nixon by a
percentage margin of 43 - 41 - 16)
Current Attitudes of Women
A new social and political awareness has been developing among women,
particularly in the last two years. Dr. Jean Spencer, Assistant to
the Vice President, has summarized it well:
1u. S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
P-20, No. 192, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November, 1968,"
U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1969.
-2-
If there is a single concept which can encompass
and express the concern of women today it is freedom of
choice. From this concept the other specific issues de-
rive: a rebellion against the assumption that the "wo-
man's role" is only that of wife, mother and housewife;
efforts to open doors now closed to women who want to or
must pursue other roles, either in addition to or instead
of the traditional role of wife and mother; efforts to
end discrimination in education, including college admis-
sions, fellowships and scholarships, admission to grad-
uate and professional schools; efforts to end discrimi-
nation in employment, advancement, equal pay, overtime,
maternity leave, day care; and efforts to end discrimi-
nation in returning to college or to work after raising
a family--the "reentry" problem for the middle. aged woman
is serious.
A recent Harris Poll (Tab A) shows that about half of the women in
America favor efforts to change the status of women in society. Be-
cause this is a relatively new issue, it is likely that the trend of
this support will increase as the concept becomes more widely publi-
cized and efforts at implementation become more organized. The sup-
port and opposition does not necessarily follow established voting
patterns. For example, Black women and women under thirty, who gave
a plurality to Humphrey in 1968, support it, as do college-educated
women, who supported Nixon in 1968. Similarly, normally Republican
categories such as White women and those over fifty do not support
it, nor do women with eighth grade or less education, who tend to
vote Democratic.
Campaign Strategy
This concern for more equal status is something which has become im-
portant enough to influence the political loyalties of many women. We
feel it would be a mistake if the 1972 campaign were conducted without
an awareness of these new sensitivities.
It was the unanimous feeling of those present at the first planning
meeting for the women's vote in 1972 that there should not be a sep-
arate women's division with a women's chairman as has been done in the
past. Women strongly desire to share responsibility side by side with
men, rather than as a part of a women's auxiliary organization. There-
fore, it was recommended that a woman be appointed at the level of
Deputy Campaign Manager and that other women be given responsibilities
within the functional staffs of the campaign organization, based on
their experience and ability. From these positions, they would be
-3-
able to effectively coordinate activities to gain the women's vote
and to supervise the organization of women volunteers.
If you approve of this organizational plan, we are prepared to submit
names of qualified women for your consideration.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
5/22/71
Women Divided
In Harris Poll
By Louis Harris
Recent efforts to change
parallels the division among
and strengthen the status of
the entire public on issues
American women, such as
such as the war in Vietnam,
women's liberation move-
non-conformity among the
ments, have deeply divided
young, and racial progress
women themselves. While
for blacks. Now the issue of
42 per cent favor such
women's role in society has
been added to the list.
moves to equalize women
In order to get at women's
with men, 43 per cent stand
attitudes in depth on the
opposed.
thrust of women's liberation
The goals and principles
and similar efforts, a series
of the organizations seeking
of six projective questions
were put to the cross SCC-
actively to redress the sex
tions:
balance are much more pop-
"Here are some state-
ular, however, than the tac-
ments people have made
tics of protest which have
about activist women's
been employed. A subston-
groups. For each, please tell
tial 58 per cent of all women
me whether you tend to
feel that "women who picket
agree or disagree."
and participate in protests
Dis- Not
Agree agree sure
are setting a bad example
%
%
:,
for children." Nonetheless. a
Leaders of women's or.
ganizations are trying to
counterbalancing 62 per
turn women into men and
cent also feel that "if
that won't work."
62
27
11
"If women con't speek
women don't speak up for
UP for themselves and
confront men on air real
themselves a nd confront
problems. notains will be
men on their real problems,
done about them."
62
29
9
""Women who picket and
nothing will be done about
participate in protects are
these problems."
setting a bod example
for children."
SS
27
13
A national cross section of
"Women are right to to
unhappy with their rule
1,600 women were probed in
in American society, but
depth about their attitudes
wrong in to WAY they're
protosting.
57
32
11
toward women and their
"II's women who have
nothing bitter to do who
problems.
are causing all the trcu-
"All in all, do you favor
ble.
47
4.)
13
"It's about time women
or oppose most of the of-
protested the real injus-
forts to strengthen and
tices they've faced for
years."
47
1)
:-
change women's status in
The results show a con
society?"
sistently close division be.
Op.
Not
Favor pose Sure
tween basic support and op-
Total Women
42 43 13 15
position to the drive to
By Marital Status
change women's status. The
Single
33 31 11
Married
40 :-) 14
opponents outnumber the
Divorced separated
63
23
9
Widowed
33
42
20
supporters of women's lib,
By Pie
but not by a large nor deci-
Under 30
43
$2
12
30-17
11
is
14
sive margin.
50 and over
07
45
17
Taken as a whole, it
By Education
3:5 groce or less
33
:
03
would appear that the re-
High School
2)
College
53 33 ', 9
14
cent outpouring of demon-
By Rode
strations and protests have
White
37 15 15
Black
02
3
struck a chord of pent-up
Clearly. the overall close
frustration among women
division among women as a
about the way they have
whole masks a much deoper
fared in American life. But
division among different
sizable numbers of women
segments of the female pop.
who are in sympathy with
ulation. Most resistant to
the objectives of the protest
changing women's status are
find it "undiumided and un-
older WORKER. those with
8
like
part
in
ac-
less education. whites. and
tivist
demonstrations.
The
married women.
for a substantial
most for
requirement
are
women, the young,
the
members
bost educated.
the
of
to
be
women into collitions
"change"
and
69011
4/26/71
MEMORANDUM: "WOMEN'S LIB" AS A POTENTIAL POLITICAL ISSUE
Thomas W. Benham
OPINION RESEARCH CORPORATION
'Women's lib" is an excellent example of how a highly vocal minority --
through astute use of the mass media -- can create the impression that
it has a broad following. All of the survey evidence (by Gallup) in-
dicates to the contrary.
The following are the ratings of 'women's lib" by a nationwide sampling
of college students using the Stapel Scalometer (a ten point rating
scale). The "highly favorable" and "highly unfavorable" votes shown
are the two extreme rankings on the ends of the scale.
Notice that as many women have a negative view of 'women's lib" as have
a favorable view. Surprisingly, 'women's lib" has more appeal to the
students in the low income groups than it does for those from the
higher income brackets.
COLLEGE STUDENT RATINGS OF 'WOMEN'S LIB"
Highly
Highly
Favorable
Unfavorable
National
15%
23%
Male
10%
23%
Female
22%
23%
18 years and under
15%
23%
19 years
14%
26%
20 years
18%
22%
21 - 23 years
14%
18%
24 years and older
20%
14%
East
17%
20%
Midwest
15%
23%
South
17%
24%
West
8%
25%
$15,000 and over
15%
23%
$10,000 - $14.999
12%
14%
$7,000 - $9,999
82
23%
Under $7,000
24%
16%
--2
Here's how 'women's lib" compares with other institutions and organiz-
ations tested.
FEMALE COLLEGE STUDENTS
Highly
Highly
Favorable
Unfavorable
FBI
32%
13%
Women's Lib
22%
23%
Democratic party
19%
7%
CIA
16%
19%
Republican party
13%
15%
SDS
6%
37%
KKK
2%
80%
Perhaps another surprising finding is that on questions on how women
are treated in this country, male and female views are more alike than
different. Following are views of the adult population 18 and over.
Who gets the best break?
"In your opinion, do women in the U.S. get as good a break
as men?"
Women
Men
Yes
65%
72%
No
35
38
Who has the easier life?
"Which do you think has the easier life in the U.S. today --
men or women?"
Women
Men
Women
46%
49%
Men
30
46
No opinion
24
5
--3
Who has the happier life?
"In general, how happy would you say you are -- very happy,
fairly happy, or not happy?"
Women
Men
Very happy
44%
42%
Fairly happy
46
49
Not happy
7
6
Don't know
3
3
Women business managers?
"Do you think women would run most businesses as well as men,
or not?"
Women
Men
Yes
55%
45%
No
40
49
No opinion
5
6
Women in the executive suite?
"If a woman has the same ability as a man, does she have as
good a chance to become the executive of a company, or not?"
Women
Men
Yes
39%
39%
No
54
56
No opinion
7
5
Women in politics?
However, women are more prejudiced against their sex as presidential
material than are men, but have the same opinion on less affairs.
"If your party nominated a woman for President, would you
vote for her if she qualified for the job?"
Women
Men
Yes
49%
58%
No
44
35
No opinion
7
7
4
"If your party nominated a woman to run for Congress from
your district, would you vote for her if she were qualified?"
Women
Men
Yes
84%
83%
No
13
13
No opinion
3
4
Among the public as a whole there has been little change in acceptance
of a woman president over the years.
Would vote for a
qualified woman
for President
1958
52%
1967
57%
1969
54%
It seems clear from this it would be a good policy to steer clear of
'women's lib" as a broad political issue. There does not seem to be
any way to win. While the majority oppose militancy in favor of 'women's
lib", coming out politically against would raise a howl from a very loud
and raucous minority. On the other hand, there does not seem to be
justification for taking any favorable stand other than that which is
consistent with civil rights legislation dealing with equal employment,
equal pay, etc. The best political posture on 'women's lib" would
seem to be strictly hands off.
June 22, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM
KEN RIETZ
SUBJECT
New Voters Registration
Lots of organizations are getting into the new voter
registration field. These include COPE, Common Cause, Youth
Citizenship Fund, etc. Most of the organizations are either
controlled by Democrats or conduct drives on a mass basis which
favors the Democrat Party. Initial indicators are that the Republican
Party is being out registered among new voters by anywhere from
2-1 to 7-1.
Several Republican organizations are presently active in the
new voter registration field. They are:
Young Republican National Federation
First voter program. A new voter committee as part of the
local YR Club conducts a program of identifying and registering new
voters who lean toward the Republican Party. New voters drives are
conducted in apartment houses and other multi-dwelling buildings where
young working people live. To go with this program several items are
available:
1) Apartment organization guide
2) A pamphlet with localized registration information
3) YR reward program which involves rewarding workers for
registering a certain number of new voters.
This program, termed "Your Responsibility" is targeted at
eight states:
Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Ohio
Florida
Indiana
Kentucky
Illinois
North Carolina
June 23, 1971
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISIRATIVE MARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By Ef
Date 3-23-82
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
As you have requested enclosed is a program on new voter
registration which was developed by Senator Brock, Ken Rietz,
Bart Porter, and Bob Finch's office.
If you approve of this approach ve will begin implementing it.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
JEB S. MAGRUDER
Enclosure
CONFIDENTIAL
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
H.R. HALDEMAN
It is my understanding that no effort is currently being
conducted to register people in the 18 to 21 year old
age bracket for the upcoming campaign.
This is an error that I think should be corrected at once.
We should be setting up and, indeed, launching our effort
now to register all of our youths in the 18 to 21 year
old age bracket - this means many people that are not on
college campuses.
Please get this decision reversed and our activity moving
forward now.
CC: The Attorney General
College Republican National Committee
Project Open Door. This program involves canvassing campus
dormitories. New voters are asked to identify themselves by party
and those stating an interest in the Republican Party are assisted
in registering to vote.
Republican Congressional Committee
Young Voters for a Republican Congress Task Force. This
program is only in the planning stages and it will be at least a
month before the plan is complete. It will be directed at target
Congressional districts.
Conclusion: The above Republican programs are a fragmented
part of overall party programs, and, as such, suffer from a lack of
emphasis and look good on paper but have little impact in the field.
In addition, they concentrate on new voters identified with the
Republican Party. This fails to take into account the thousands of
new voters who will support the President and not the Republican
Party. Registration of Republican voters is not our objective, re-
election of the President is.
If a major effort is to be made to register new voters who
will vote for the President in 1972, the Young Voters for Nixon
Committee will have to undertake it. Following are the options:
Option 1
Allow the programs to continue independently. This will give
all the organizations involved something to do but the impact on the
President's re-election campaign will be minimal.
Option 2
Allow the programs to continue but increase their funding and
give them added stature by including them in the over-all Citizens
campaign. While this might increase the active interest and prestige
of the program the impact would still be minimal due to the diffusion
of effort, coordination, and control.
Option 3
Create an over-all program within the Youth for Nixon campaign
that included these efforts, as proposed by Senator Brock and his
Congressional team. This seems the most logical and the most workable.
- 3 -
It would combine three programs which really are aimed in three
different areas under one umbrella and allow maximum targeting. And,
targeting is the key.
There is too little known about the first voter to move
rapidly. The one assumption we can make is that as the war winds down
the preference for the President among young people will increase. His
opponent in 1972, however, is a key factor that cannot be adequately
analyzed at this stage. Without thorough planning and organization, however,
too many registrants today may become opponents next year. One great
advantage provided by a carefully planned registration drive, lies in
its ability to use registration assistance as an identification and
motivation tool in gaining Nixon support.
We propose in the initial stages to confine our activity to
the following states: Indiana, Iowa, Virginia, Florida, Tennessee,
California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Ohio.
Under the Young Voters for Nixon program we would create a
"First Voters for Nixon" committee. While its main thrust would be
in those states, we would not discourage the program in any other state,
although it would be carefully controlled.
In its initial stage (next 4 months), First Voters for Nixon
(FVN) would receive publicity while the staff put the program together.
A national chairman could be announced and state chairmen in the
target states would be selected. The thrust would be "here are young
people that support the President, have never-voted for a President
before, want to vote for President Nixon, and want to help others who
feel like they do to get registered." The emphasis would not be on
changing minds but on organizing those who already support the President.
While this is going on publicly a careful analysis will be
conducted privately. This state by state analysis in the states mentioned
will show us where the pockets of potential strength are. Through
public opinion surveys we can find out what age groups, occupational
groups, education levels, etc., are most likely to support the President
in '72. A lot of careful planning is necessary and the registration
drives would not begin until this winter.
Let me repeat, we believe a mass registration drive in any given
area works to the President's disadvantage. For maximum impact, and
favorable results, a new voter registration drive must be carefully
planned and carefully targeted.
The First Voters program should be formed as part of Young
Voters for Nixon campaign. As part of the working committee now it
will utilize Senator Brock, his regional advisory committee, and the
headquarters staff to register new voters in key states. The aim will
be to register voters inclined to vote for President Nixon in 1972.
Agree
Disagree
Comment
TAB D
CONFIDENTIAL
June 17, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: DELAWARE TEST
As a first step in evaluating the proposed target voter strategy described
in an earlier memo, the RNC is preparing to launch an extensive field test
in Delaware. This memo is to describe the nature and purpose of the test
to you, in advance of its inception.
The Delaware test will demonstrate and test several target voter techniques
under controlled conditions and with careful provisions for evaluation of
effectiveness. The test will take place during the period June-September,
1971. The budgeted cost of approximately $40,000 will be borne by the RNC,
which will also be responsible for overall management of the project through
the direction of Ed DeBolt. The Citizens Committee and Mr. Haldeman's staff
will participate in the planning and maintain close liaison with the field
work as it progresses. The planned activities are designed to include the
widest possible scope of coordinated research and target voter techniques:
Past Voting Behavior. By the end of June, a statewide, precinct-by-precinct
vote profile analysis will be completed, using election data over the past
ten years. The geographic location of hard-core Republicans, Democrats, and
swing voters will be determined and displayed on maps.
Socio-Economic Data. The Census Bureau will produce the 1970 Fourth Count
(demographic) data for Delaware in June, well ahead of the scheduled publi-
cation date for the remaining states. The RNC will combine that data with
the vote profile analysis to further describe the various voting groups.
Public Opinion Surveys. Market Opinion Research (MOR) has taken quarterly
polls in Delaware for the past ten years. The most recent poll will be com-
pleted in a week or two. All of that opinion data will be made available
to the RNC, to describe the attitudes of the various voting groups.
Selection of Test Precincts. On the basis of the foregoing data, selection
will be made of five weathervane precincts (typical of the voting patterns
of the entire state), thirty test precincts (embodying a variety of specific
voter groups) and thirty control precincts (closely similar to each of the
test precincts). An in-depth canvass will commence in all 65 precincts on
July 8. Approximately one hundred interviews will be carried out in each
one (25% of total voting population). This will be done to obtain specific,
detailed data on opinions on issues and the image of the President and how
-2-
the voter can best be informed. College students will be hired to carry
out the interviews, under the supervision and training of Bob Teeter of
MOR.
Target Voter Communications. Beginning on July 20, various programs of
direct voter communication will be initiated in each of the thirty test
precincts. The earlier precinct canvass will offer some guidance as to
which types of media might be most appropriate in given areas, and which
issues should be emphasized. The techniques will include direct mail,
telephone banks, door-to-door personal visits, printed flyers, etc. Where-
ever possible, we will allow competent vendors to operate in separate pre-
cincts to demonstrate their capabilities. The purpose of the communication
will be to change voter attitudes toward Administration programs and accomp-
lishments and to improve the support for the President.
Evaluation. In September, all precincts will be re-canvassed to assess
the impact of the campaign tests. The control precincts will serve to
offset attitude changes that occur independently of the test activity.
The survey sample will once again be 100 persons in each precinct: 50
from the original sample, and 50 new ones.
The results and the final report on the test will be completed before final
plans are submitted for the 1972 campaign at the end of October.
CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT: RESEARCH
The purpose of this memorandum is to outline the general direction of our
current thinking on strategy for the 1972 campaign, for your information
and comment. We are at the point in our planning process where a broad
strategy should be agreed upon so that the specific plans can be initiated.
Target States
The national campaign can effectively be considered as 50 state campaigns,
since electoral votes are determined in that manner, and since the field
organization can best be coordinated on a state-by-state basis. Obviously,
there are certain states that we are unlikely to win, and the investment
of substantial resources there would not be productive. On the other
hand, there are several states which we virtually must win at all costs
and where we must put up the stiffest possible contest. These are the
target states. A listing of these states, based on latest considerations
of electoral size and probability of winning is given in Tab A. The top
nine target states comprise 173 of the 270 electoral votes required for
election.
Most of the target states can swing either way in a Presidential contest.
In a close election, every vote would be of paramount importance in each
state.
Target Voters
The 1972 election will be different from 1968 in at least two respects.
The President is running on his record, rather than proposed actions on
issues, and his image is well-known to the voters through extensive media
coverage during his first term. Therefore, a campaign appearance of the
President on television would not be expected to have the same impact it
did in 1968. The voters have probably already made up their minds on whether
to support or oppose the image they receive from television.
In some recent state elections, there has been evidence that certain tech-
niques of direct, targeted, "rifle-shot" communications to voters.can sub-
stantially augment a candidate's mass media image. These techniques use
past voting data, socio-economic data and public opinion surveys to locate
and identify the target voters: those voters who might vote either way,
but who could be convinced to vote for one candidate if approached speci-
fically on a certain issue. Highly refined techniques of telephone can-
vassing and targeted direct mail have proven to be very effective in influ-
encing these voters. The general public is not accustomed to being involved
-2-
in the campaign process. A telephone call to discuss a particular concern,
or a personalized, computer-typed letter discussing the candidate's stand
on an issue important to them, brings a very positive reaction when done
well. The response also allows a systematic identification of friendly
voters to be contacted on election day.
There are several recent success stories which speak well for these target
voter techniques. In California in 1970, Reagan concentrated such a program
on ethnic precincts of San Francisco County. His vote percentage increased
in that very liberal area, whereas it decreased almost everywhere else in
California as compared to 1966. (Tab B) In New York, Rockefeller used a
highly effective telephone canvassing technique to win 21 out of 29 target
assembly districts in New York City, which ranged from 2-1 to 5-1 Democratic
registration and where he was trailing by a substantial margin several months
prior to the election. Extensive use was made of polls which identified the
target, or pivotal voters. (Tab C)
In Minnesota in 1970, Humphrey refined the process to a high degree. It was
widely acknowledged that much of the success of DFL candidates that year was
due to their focus on identifying and communicating with the target voter.
(Tab D)
In New Mexico, Anderson Carter, a relatively unknown rancher and oilman, de-
feated the heavily-favored incumbent Governor David Cargo for the Republican
Senatorial nomination. The substantial shift in voter preference during the
primary campaign was largely attributed to Carter's emphasis on a professionally
managed direct mail campaign. The letters were produced by computer, addressed
to specific individuals, and contained a message on an issue which was known
to be of interest to the recipient. Cargo's mail, on the other hand, was of
a very general, mass distribution type.
Recommendation
We propose that the planning for 1972 should emphasize rifle-shot communica-
tion with target voters in target states to augment the mass-media campaign.
This will involve substantial preparation in utilizing public opinion surveys,
census data and past voting data to identify the target voters and key issues,
and in applying advanced telephone canvassing techniques and promotional di-
rect mail to influence and deliver votes. Much of the development will be
done in cooperation with the Research Division of the RNC, which has been pur-
suing similar ideas over the past several months. During the planning stage,
specific proposals would be made to demonstrate and test each concept well
before final decisions had to be made for the campaign.
Proceed with detailed development of the target voter strategy to augment the
mass media and field operations planning.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
Tab A
June 17, 1971
The following target states are the result of analysis of current
statistical, socio-economic and survey data. The electoral vote totals
of each section are noted and followed by a brief description of the
reasons for their selections.
MUST STATES - 173 electoral votes
The Must states are defined as areas that statistically and histori-
cally support Nixon/Republican nominees. It appears that without all
these states in our column, Nixon has little or no chance of being re-
elected. Ohio and California, for instance, have never failed to be in
the winning column if a Republican was victorious. The reasoning behind
the statement, "If Nixon doesn't carry all of the Must States, he won't
be elected President," is that if one of these states is not carried, there
is little chance of finding a second or third priority state which would
make up this loss more easily. Iowa is included because it is a vital
media center for all of the midwest farm belt.
SECOND PRIORITY MUST STATES - 158 electoral votes
The Second Priority Must states represent those states that statisti-
cally have less chance of moving over to Nixon, but, none the less, are
within striking distance. These states represent the next best opportuni-
ties in the large electoral category. It is necessary that some of these
be moved into the win column for Nixon. Connecticut is included because
of recent favorable election trends and because of advantageous media over-
lap with the New York-New Jersey-Pennsylvania area.
THIRD PRIORITY MUST STATES - 64 electoral votes
Third Priority Must states represent those areas that statistically
Nixon can win. These are areas with smaller electoral vote totals, but
about the same odds, as the Second Priority Must states. Nixon must win
some of these.
PLUS STATES - 44 electoral votes
The Plus states are defined as those areas that traditionally support
the Republican Party and Nixon. In 1972, given a favorable national atmos-
phere towards the President, we should do well in these states. They are
also states that tend to be more single issue oriented. For example, if
farmers are feeling fairly comfortable about Nixon and the agriculture pol-
icy of the Administration, the chances are that these areas will be in our
column. If, on the other hand, the attitude toward Nixon and the agriculture
policy is negative, there is very little that could outweigh this attitude.
The method of arriving at these target states included a ten year analysis
of Presidential elections, an analysis of 1966, 1968 and 1970 Congressional,
Senatorial, and Gubernatorial races, an analysis of polling trends of var-
ious regions in the country and state polls where available, RNC state issue
files of the past year to see if there have been any major trends or shifts
in public opinion that have been evidenced in newspapers or other publi-
cations, as well as the reports of the RNC field staff.
It should be reiterated that this is the status of state priority
selection as of June 15. This is not meant to be definitive, but only
a device to serve the needs of those who must make early resource allo-
cations on behalf of the effort to re-elect the President.
June 16, 1971
MUST
2nd PRIORITY MUST
13 Indiana
26 Texas
8 Iowa
12
Missouri
12
Virginia
10
Maryland
17
Florida
13
North Carolina
10
Tennessee
27
Pennsylvania
45 California
41
New York
26 Illinois
11
Wisconsin
17
New Jersey
8 Connecticut
25 Ohio
10 Minnesota
173
158
3rd PRIORITY MUST
PLUS
8
South Carolina
5 Nebraska
9
Washington
4 Idaho
4
New Mexico
6 Arizona
3
Vermont
3
Wyoming
4
Montana
7 Kansas
3
Nevada
4 Utah
7
Colorado
3
North Dakota
4
New Hampshire
8 Oklahoma
6 Oregon
4
South Dakota
9
Kentucky
44
3 Delaware
4 Maine
64
Comments by Vincent P. Barabba, Chairman of the Board, DMI
on Reagan campaign
NOW TO AN INTERESTING QUESTION. DID THE GOVERNOR
HAVE AN ALTERNATIVE TO MASS MEDIA? IN 1966 RONALD REAGAN
DEFEATED GOVERNOR PAT BROWN 57.6% TO 42.3%. IN 1970
GOVERNOR REAGAN DEFEATED JESS UNRUH 52.8% TO 45.1%.
IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN DROPPED FROM HIS 1966 VICTORY
MARGIN IN ALMOST EVERY COUNTY. POST ELECTION STUDIES (AND
MOST OF CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCED CAMPAIGN WATCHERS) ATTRIBUTE
A GREAT PORTION OF THIS DROP IN SUPPORT TO THE SEVERE AERO-
SPACE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY UNEMPLOYMENT THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA.
HOWEVER, SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY STANDS OUT AS AN EXCEPTION.
IN 1970 GOVERNOR REAGAN ACTUALLY INCREASED HIS PERCENTAGE
OF THE VOTE FROM 41.1% TO 43.4%, WHILE THE AVERAGE REPUBLICAN
CANDIDATE VOTE IN SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY WAS DROPPING FROM 32.4%
IN 1966 TO 29.2% IN 1970. THE GOVERNOR'S INCREASE CAN BE
EXPLAINED PARTIALLY BY A SPECIAL PRECINCT INDEX PRIORITY
PROJECT THAT WAS UNDERTAKEN BY THE LOCAL REAGAN FORCES
IN THE AREA. THE GROUP IDENTIFIED THE IRISH, ITALIAN
AND CHINESE PRECINCTS FIRST. THEN, THEY UTILIZED A SERIES
OF VOTE STATISTICS FOR PREVIOUS ELECTIONS TO IDENTIFY
THOSE ETHNIC PRECINCTS WHICH HAD, IN THE PAST, INDICATED
A PROPENSITY TO EITHER: VOTE FOR SOMETHING THE GOVERNOR
SUPPORTED; OR, VOTE AGAINST SOMETHING THE GOVERNOR OPPOSED.
THE REAGAN GROUP THEN CONCENTRATED THEIR MESSAGES ON
ALL OF THE NON-REPUBLICANS IN THE SELECTED PRIORITY PRECINCTS.
THEY SENT TWO SPECIAL MESSAGES. ONE WAS A TABLOID THAT HAD
BEEN USED THROUGHOUT CALIFORNIA. THE SECOND PIECE CONTAINED
A LETTER SIGNED BY LOCAL DEMOCRATS SUPPORTING GOVERNOR
REAGAN.
THE RESULTS SPEAK FOR THEMSELVES:
IN THE NON-PRIORITY PRECINCTS
IN THE PRIORITY PRECINCTS
GOVERNOR
REAGAN
35.3%
50.3%
AVERAGE
REPUBLICAN
VOTE
25.4%
32.0%
REAGAN OVER
AVERAGE REPUBLICAN
VOTE
9.9%
17.3%
THE TOTAL COST OF THE PROJECT (WHICH SENT OUT TWO
BULK MAILINGS TO 85,000 DEMOCRAT. HOUSEHOLDS CONTAINING
100,000 DEMOCRAT VOTERS) WAS APPROXIMATELY $12,000.00.
THAT'S A COST OF ABOUT 12¢ FOR THE TWO MESSAGES TO
EACH VOTER -- OR ABOUT 6 ¢ FOR EACH MESSAGE.
The Marketing
of Nelson Rockefeller
By Fred Powledge
"There was his incredibly competent staff, all that money, and
the willingness to engage in a little deception here and there."
There are some who would have you
not exercised on the basis of the voli-
believe that Nelson Rockefeller got him-
tion of the voters-be it by economic
self re-elected to office because he swung
threats, be it by the gun, or be it by
to the right. It's a satisfying thought for
psychological techniques used to de-
both the paranoids on the left and the
prive the voter of his free choice.
self-pitying folk on the right. For the
"I say it comes down to the same
lefties, it confirms their suspicions that
thing. And that it will very quickly un-
Rocky was an opportunistic closet fas-
dermine the free election system. Nel-
cist all the time; the rightists may revel
son Rockefeller is not a menace in and
in the belief that they've finally accu-
of himself, but his techniques are a
mulated enough megavotes to bring the
grave threat."
governor-a Rockefeller, no less—
crawling for support.
Polls, as everyone knows, are essen-
Unfortunately, like most things, it
tial to a successful political campaign.
isn't all that simple. Nelson Rockefel-
You do not hear a great deal about
ler was returned to office with a 716,-
Rockefeller's polls, just as you do not
061 plurality not because he swung to
hear much about the internal work-
the right, but because he clung to the
ings of his political life, because almost
center. (It is, perhaps, of passing his-
everybody who works for him has been
torical interest that the "center" this
there a good long time, since he first
year may very well have been the
became governor a dozen years ago,
"right" of a few years ago.) More im-
and they all know the job is to win
portantly, Rockefeller was re-elected
elections, not talk about it. Lloyd Free.
because he had the sense to determine
the governor's consultant on polls, has
what the center was and then to aim
been a friend of Rockefeller's for 30
his campaign toward it, utilizing the
years. Political writers seem to equate
most advanced hard- and software
a quiet polling operation, such as Rock-
available, and utilizing it on a scale un-
efeller's, with an extremely smooth and
precedented in a state campaign.
excellent one, and in this case they
That determination of what the cen-
were right.*
ter was, which Rockefeller made last
The Rockefeller people also knew
May when his first campaign poll came
how to not let the polls get the better
in, had a lot to do with his victory, but
of them. The candidate himself spoke.
it would have been just another poll
during the campaign, of his dependence.
without a few factors: The abysmally
not on all the technological gimmicks
poor quality, as a candidate, of his ma-
of campaigning, but on his "intuitive
jor opponent, Arthur Goldberg; the
creative thinking." Polls are nice for
built-in advantage of simply being gov-
finding out what worries people; they
ernor in the first place; a mechanical
are "guides on the emphasis that is
operation that must have been one of
placed on the solution of problems."
the smoothest in history; the incredible
mate and quite likely the only truly in-
Rockefeller said one afternoon on 2
loyalty and competence of his staff; all
teresting candidate in the whole cam-
that money, and a willingness to en-
paign, commented on this shortly be.
*Shortly after the voting machines closed
gage in a little deception here and there.
fore election day. "We used to talk
on November 5. as the Rockefeller
Curiously enough. Nelson Rockefel-
about the banana republics and how
was assembling at brother Laurance's
ler revealed very little of himself in the
they held elections," he said, "and we
dinner, Free was asked what the outcoms
campaign. It was almost all mechanical
talked about economic reprisals and
would be. Rockefeller would win 55
-and, said some of his critics, the me-
cent of the votes. he said. Someone
threats. What does Rockefeller have
on the TV set: CBS at that moment
chanics sometimes bordered on sub-
to do with this? I say the desired prod-
jected a Rockejeller win with 55 per
liminal advertising.
uct is the thing we look at, and the pur-
of the vote. The candidate actually
Basil Paterson. Goldberg's running
pose sought is to get a vote which is
in with 52.4 per cent.
"One of the big fears was that supporters would not vote, con-
fident that Rocky would win but eager to watch a rich man sweat.
flight back to the city after an upstate
A picture was emerging that would
in charge of the New York City opera-
swing. His campaign director, R. Bur-
be valuable to any candidate. especially
tion. His task was not so much to make
dell Bixby, a lawyer on leave from his
one who was inescapably joined to the
sure the Republicans got to the polls as
$25,000-a-year patronage job as head of
previous twelve years. The picture was
it was to make converts out of Demo-
the New York State Thruway Author-
sufficiently encouraging to justify a
crats and independents. Perrotta set
ity, agreed. Even a governor who reads
campaign slogan that did not try to
about getting endorsements for Rocke-
the newspapers and watches TV, Bixby
repudiate the record: Rocketeiler. He's
feller from prominent Democrats. He
said, cannot know what bothers the
done a lot. He'll do more."
picked 29 kev city assembly districts
people the most: "The polls tell us bet-
But the May poll showed something
where the registration was anywhere
ter than our instincts what it is the peo-.
else that was extremely helpful in guid-
from 2-to-1 to 5-to-1 Democratic, and
ple are concerned about," he said.
ing the strategists to the right voters. It
he unleashed a roomful of telephone
Neither Bixby nor the governor nor
picked out those who, at that point,
callers on them.
any other campaign officials who were
thought of themselves as supporters of
The poll also identified those in the
questioned seemed to have given much
Rockefeller, a group that made up only
center-not just the usual "undecided,"
thought to the notion that, theoretically
54 per cent of the total, and it told the
but the 22 per cent who were. in the
at least, you shouldn't need polls to find
strategists something about them: 96
eves of the Rockefeller people. the Piv-
out what people were thinking. The
per cent of them were white; 26 per
otals." Free devised a ladder-like affair
civics books say that's what legislatures
cent were 60 or over and only 13 per
on which those polled rated the candi-
are for. But polls were used, and used
cent were in the 21-to-29 age group; 41
dates. If a respondent placed Rockefeller
well, and used early and often, al-
per cent were Protestants, 46 per cent
at or near the top of the ladder. in Po-
though newspaper assertions that they
were Catholic, and S per cent were Jew-
sition 10, there was no problem. If he
were "almost continuous" were exag-
ish; 25 per cent were Democrats, 59 per
was on the bottom. at 1, the voter (and
gerated. Free completed his first major
cent were Republicans, and 15 per cent
those like him. whom he supposed!y
poll in early May. It measured the vot-
were independents; only a third of them
represented in the scientific survey)
ers' attitudes on practically everything:
lived in New York City, while 25 per
was not worth pursuing. But if a re-
what they said they were concerned
cent lived in the city's suburban coun-
spondent rated Rockefeller at 5 or high-
about; their feelings on taxes, abortion
ties and 44 per cent lived upstate.
er. and elsewhere in the poll did not ex-
reform, spending for education, health
Joseph H. Boyd Jr., whose title is
press himself as "tor" Rocketelier, then
and welfare; President Nixon; no-fault
special assistant to the governor, a 32-
he was considered a Pivotal. Fair game.
automobile insurance.
year-old man with wavy blond hair
The capture of the Pivotals was es-
Although the Democrats had not yet
who looks like a well-educated tent
sential if Rockefeller was to be re-elect-
picked Arthur Goldberg as their candi-
preacher without the attendant vices,
ed, his strategists reasoned. Re-election,
date, the governor's people felt Gold-
went on leave in June to direct the me-
back then in May, was not at all a sure
berg was the likely opponent, so much
chanics of the campaign outside New
thing; in fact. a question on the poll re-
of the May poll was devoted to com-
York City. One of his big jobs was to
vealed that the incumbent was 11 per-
parisons of the two men. What did they
make sure that the 34 per cent remained
centage points behind Goldberg.
think Goldberg's image was? Rockefel-
supporters of the governor. Boyd's big-
A quarter of the Pivotals were 60
ler's? How much trust and confidence
gest fear, as the campaign progressed
years old or older. About a third of
did they have in the two men? Did they
and as a Rockefeller victory seemed
them had college educations, and 45
feel that Goldberg didn't know much
more and more likely, was that the sup-
per cent had finished high school. Their
about state government? That Rocke-
porters either would not vote, out of
income levels spanned several catego-
feller had been in too long and was
apathy and a conviction that Rockefel-
ries, but the largest group was in the
tired? "The idea," said Free after the
ler was going to win anyway, or that
$10,000-and-over class. Thirty-five per
election, "was to get a basic pattern in
they would vote for Conservative Paul
cent were professional or business peo-
terms of images, trust and confidence,
Adams. confident that Rocky would
ple; 28 per cent were manual laborers.
strengths and weaknesses, of the two
win but eager to watch a rich man
A third were Protestants, a third were
guys all the way through."
sweat.
Catholics, and 27 per cent were Jewish.
The sample responded: plenty were
The poll also picked out those who
Half of the Pivotals lived in New York
angry with Rocketeller simply because
considered themselves opponents of
City, and they had lower incomes and
he had been in the job and hadn't done
Rockefeller-44 per cent of the sample
less education and were more likely to
enough, but "ther did give him credit
electorate. Ninety per cent of them
be manual laborers than were the Piv-
for trving hard and for having his heart
turned out to be white; only 19 per
otals upstate. The differences between
in it," recalled Free. They liked Gold-
cent were 60 years of age or older: 25
the city Pivotals and the country Piv-
berg. and thought he was competent.
per cent were Protestants. 49 per cent
otals, said an aide, was "a constant
but in the final analysis a lot of them
Catholics. and 17 per cent Jewish; 52
problem. A large majority of the gov-
liked Rockefeller better. Asked what
per cent were Democrats, 19 per cent
ernor's supporters were outside the city,
they thought were the governor's maior
Republicans. and 20 per cent indepen-
and half of the Pivotals, on the other
accomplishments. they listed education.
dents. Not surprisingly, 45 per cent of
hand. were in the city. So there was a
highways. roads and bridges. health
the opponents lived in New York City,
constant problem of how to handle it
care and facilities. and transportation.
while 17 per cent lived in the suburbs.
so he didn't alienate those outside the
in that order. Asked about areas in
and 58 per cent in the rest of upstate.
city in order to go after those who were
which the governor had done too little
Fioravante G, Perrotta, former New
inside."
they named narcotics first. higher taxes.
York City Finance Administrator and
Rockefeller did his best. though, and
crime, then various other categories
unsuccessful candidate for City Con-
in the process he maintained his hold
such as housing and transportation.
troller on the Lindsay ticket. was placed
on the center. For example: One day in
DESCRIPTION OF
" Committees carried the word to 31 differ-
early October, the candidate spoke at a
coffee-and-Danish reception at a coun-
ent white ethnic groups that Rocky cared.
try club in Syracuse: nicely-dressed la-
dies and gentlemen, almost all of them
white, smiling at the candidate, the can-
were known)* and the Friends of the
lion; the best bet seemed to be around
didate not only smiling back but going
Rockefeller Team (as the thousands of
$12 or $15 million.) The campaign
through his entire, and somewhat spas-
volunteers and semi-pros were called)
headquarters, an entire floor and then
tic, bit-winking, raising that eyebrow
and such groups as the Associates of
some at 575 Madison Avenue, had been
halfway off his head, winking some
the Rockefeller Team (who were, ac-
rented back in February. The floor had
more. The governor told all those nice
cording to the governor's ethnic-group
previously been inhabited by the Wells,
white folks that what we really needed
specialist, the "so-called Jewish opera-
Rich, Greene advertising agency, and it
was some radicalism. Well, modified
tion") could not just sit and wait for
was fitting that campaign director Bix-
radicalism.
the polls to come in. The record had to
by, a rather dry and straight man who
"The great challenge of the future,"
be defined and defended, and the cam-
nevertheless speaks of the "wholesale"
he said, was whether we are "willing to
paign machinery had to be tuned up.
and "retail" aspects of running a candi-
make the adjustments in our institu-
"The first phase of the campaign was
date, was to be ensconced in the office
tions, and radical adjustments, to meet
to be governor," said Alton Marshall,
that once had belonged to Mary Wells.
the problems of the day-to make our
by which he meant Rockefeller "was
The printing presses were turning,
society today, and its institutions, rele-
active in gubernatorial projects," by
and by the end of the campaign they
vant to the needs of the people." And
which he meant Rockefeller sudden-
would have poured out something like
then: "Government has got to be able
ly started letting contracts for bridges,
30 million pieces of printed matter, al-
to adapt itself to new conditions if we
highways, and other nice things. Rocke-
most all of it with the reminder that the
want to deal with these problems effec-
feller also presided at a number of en-
candidate had done a lot but was never-
tively. And if we don't, then I don't
vironmental forums and antidrug fo-
theless capable of doing more. There
think our system is going to survive."
rums, meetings throughout the state at
was a 42-page discussion of everything
He sounded like those earnest young
which citizens, largely irate ones, could
from education to agriculture; hand-
Students for a Democratic Society of
actually complain to the governor him-
some little brochures on what the gov-
about five years ago. But all he offered
self. The governor was "identifying
ernor had done for the Lower Hudson
his audience by way of radical adjust-
with good things that were happening
Valley Area, the Niagara Frontier, the
ments were the traditional solutions of
in state government," said Marshall.
Capital District, and the Central New
the right (and maybe, now, of the cen-
"During this period, in the spring, it
York-Mohawk Valley Area (but not
ter) More policemen, special courts to
was Governor, not Candidate, Rocke-
the New York City Area).
handle narcotics crimes, more judges,
feller."
Folders were printed detailing what
more prisons.
By late June, Candidate, not Gover-
Rockefeller had done for and about the
A Rockefeller aide, looking back on
nor, Rockefeller had spent more than
aging, the arts, businessmen, education,
it all, said, "I think he pursued the cen-
half a million dollars, even though he
environment, health, higher education,
trist course. And it did the trick." Free
had no primary challenge and even
labor, the mentally ill and retarded, and
conducted two other major polls-one
though his Democratic opponent was
recreation. Campaign workers in each
in early August and one in mid-Septem-
only then being selected. (Because of
of eleven regions obtained lists of fami-
ber-and three smaller, "trial heat"
loopholes in the election law, it would
lies with special interests and delivered
polls to indicate the candidate's stand-
never be known how much he really
the literature to them. (For instance, a
ing against Goldberg. And throughout
had spent by the end of the campaign.
friendly Republican on a county mental
the summer, the basic patterns stayed
Rockefeller people were projecting
health organization might get a list of
pretty much the same. The Pivotals
something like S6 or $7 million; anti-
its members; each would get copies of
shifted more and more to Rockefeller,
Rockefeller people were saying $20 mil-
"Rockefeller: He's Done a Lot. He'll
undoubtedly because Rockefeller was
Do More for the MENTALLY ILL." Spe-
shifting more and more to the Pivotals.
"It was traditional, one was assured, that
cial mailings were sent to every group
Perhaps the finest piece of shifting-
for which a list could be obtained or
the governor's sccretary, his press officer,
and one on which the intriguing details
and his counsel stay on the state payroll
manufactured: there were Travel
are missing-consisted of Rockefeller's
during a campaign for re-election. Many
Agents for Rockefeller; Chiropractors
aligning himself with the Conservative
others among the 580 permanent campaign
for Rockefeller (who were reminded
Senatorial candidate, James Buckley,
workers were normally on the state payroll
that the governor had signed a law rec-
without actually disowning his own
but took leaves of absence to work on the
ognizing the profession and enlarging
party's offering, Charles Goodell.
campaign. This raises several intriguing
"the right and opportunity of the pec-
And finally, on election day, when
questions: if those workers are as efficient
ple. of this State to consult a licensed
all the shifting was over, the Pivotals
and competent as they appear during a
and appropriate health practitioner of
and the ones who were for the gover-
campaign (and after one, too: on Novem-
ber 4, they were writing thank-you notes).
their own choice"). There were Oster
nor anyway went to the polls and
how come the state machinery is not effi-
opathic Physicians for the Rockefeller-
elected him.
cient and competent three and one-half
Wilson Team. Nurses for Rockefeller.
"We had ours," said Alton Marshall.
years out of every four? If they had been
and the Veterans Committee for the
the head of the campaign's "substantive
working for the state last summer. rather
Rockefeller-Wilson Team.
group" and not on leave from his S40,-
than the candidate. would a person apply-
There was, of course. labor for Rock-
075-a-year post as secretary to the gov-
ing for a driver's license in Brooklyn in
efeller. or l'affaire Kiamesha Lake (see
ernor, "and the other side had theirs,
fune have gotten it sooner than Septem-
New York. October 12, 1970), during
and in the middle was a big gold-field.
ber? Are the taxpayers being deprived of
which Rockefeller received the endors:-
We had to go out and mine it."
these workers' talents 10 per cent of the
time? If so, is this deprivation more than
ment of what some termed the majority
made up for by the saving on the workers'
of those present at the state AFL-CIO
The mining was hard work. of course.
salaries? Should the saving maybe be con-
convention. and after which it was dont
The Rockefeller Team (as all those pros
tinued on a permanent basis?
mon for news stories to simply say the
on or not on leave from their state jobs
By September, the timetable had him down as an canuate.
The TV commercials shifted to head-and-shoulders shots
"
he had "the backing of organized labor
senior citizens who frequented a certain
won; now we're going to make you do
in New York State." The governor had
means of transportation."
the things you ought to do. You're free
been courting the building trades for
Massolo grinned impishly. He didn't
of the political imperatives now."
years, and he frequently and proudly
want to give away the secret. "They
In August, Rockefeller became what
reported, after the convention, that he
ride in a certain way," he said. "Let's
his aides called a "combination gover-
had the endorsement of "85 unions
say a bus company. And they get a spe-
nor and candidate," and the combina-
with membership of over 1.3 million."
cial rate. And there was a list of people
tion meshed so well it was often diffi-
How the governor arrived at that figure
who do that. Well, that means that
cult to determine which one he was.
is not exactly clear.*
these are active senior citizens. They're
The television and radio campaign
The ethnic campaign was begun.
still moving around; they can vote;
started-30 separate TV ads and 15
Thirty-one different white ethnic groups
they can get to the polls. So therefore
radio messages. Phase One was known
were identified and committees were
you send them a message. We sent
to the staff as The Record, which was
formed to get the word to each of them
them one of the booklets about the
"designed to show what this man's rec-
that Governor Rockefeller cared. The
aging."
ord is, how he had been innovative;
pitch to the ethnics was straight down
One ethnic group that was not dis-
that he cared; that he was interested in
the center: Drug addiction, crime in the
cussed very much was the black New
the problems that the people were in-
streets, and education, both public and
Yorker. If you asked a Team member
terested in," according to Marshall.
private. Some additional efforts were
about this, the reply was usually some
Some of the ads were so innovative
aimed at ethnic groups which the cam-
thing like "Oh, I think Jackie Robin-
themselves that-Goldberg called them
paign staff believed had "special inter-
son's taking care of that." Some pri-
"grossly misleading." Actually, they
ests." For the Germans, the press re-
vately acknowledged that there was lit-
were probably no worse than the aver-
leases and advertisements emphasized,
tle sense in going after blacks since Basil
age TV commercial. They were, how-
in addition to the crime-dope-schools
Paterson was on the opposite ticket.
ever, noticeably devoid of recognizably
issues, Rockefeller's interest in recre-
There was, however, some support of
black actors, except for one in which a
ation and parks because, as a staffer
a more subtle nature for Rockefeller
black nurse brought a soft, pinkish new-
put it, "the Germans are very athletic
from the black community. Arthur Lo-
born baby to a soft, pinkish white lady.
and enjoy the out-of-doors."
gan, a surgeon well respected both up-
By September, Rockefeller's timetable
One group for which mailing lists
town and downtown in New York City,
had him down as "all candidate." The
were difficult to find-but which were
became one of several prominent black
TV commercials shifted from little
essential, according to the profile of the
Democrats to support the governor. Vic-
scenes of people doing great things,
Pivotals that had been developed in
tor Gotbaum, the anti-Rockefeller la-
courtesy Nelson Rockefeller, to straight-
May-where the oldsters. "Senior Citi-
bor leader, said if there was one thing
on, head-and-shoulders shots of the can-
zens was an unusual thing," said Arthur
that really got him visceral, it was the
didate, talking about what he had done.
Massolo, on leave as the governor's as-
specter of people like Dr. Logan sup-
At about this time. Fioravante Perrotta
sistant appointments officer to run the
porting the governor. "And I know
was making telephone calls all over the
ethnic and special-group show, "but
why he's supporting him," Gotbaum
kev Demberat-held assembly districts in
somebody had a list-I wouldn't want
said.
the city; it was said. by someone in the
to embarrass the company-a list of
Why?
operation. that there were about six
"He's getting the promise of a hospi-
former workers, male and female. or
*Victor Gotbaum, executive director of
tal," said Gotbaum. "He's been looking
the late Robert Kennedy in the tele
District 37, State, County. and Municipal
for a community hospital, and I'm sure
phone boiler-room at 575 Madison. but
Employees, and a supporter of Goldberg.
he's gotten a promise." He thought a
their identities were kept secret.
said there was considerable application of
moment. "Well," he added, "I guess it's
Joe Bovd was heavilv into his us-
the Rockefeller New Math and a general
counting of people twice. In one of Rocke-
legitimate."
state campaign work. Operatives in the
feller's own press releases, the candidate
Dr. Logan. asked about his support,
field were using telephones to call rez-
expressed his pleasure at receiving the sup-
said he was for Rockefeller because he
istered voters and ask them how they
port of 50,000 members of the Internation-
seemed like the better candidate. There
planned to vote. Some or them refused
al Union of Dolls, Toys, Playthings. Novel-
was another reason, he added: "There
to say. Boyd. asked how he followed
ties, and Allied Products (some of whose
are individual projects which I'm inter-
UD those voters. said: "We go back :0
members lived in the rest of the U.S. and
ested in." he said, "which the governor
them and sav we're an independent poll-
in Canada), and attached to the release
has given his support to. For instance,
ing organization."
was a statement from the union itse!f which
placed the membership at 20.000. Gotbaum
a major new health-care complex in the
Wasn't that a bit deceptive?
felt that Rockefcller executed a deliberate
West Harlem-Manhattanville area to
"Well." said Boyd, and then he
and cynical plan of catering to the needs
serve the residents there. who are now
thought a while. "I think it's fair. You
and desires of the building trades in order
without adequate facilities. I think
give a name. You say "This is Joseph
to get his "labor support." The governor.
Rockefeller is about to announce some
Bovd Canvassing' or something."
he said, "is a man with 1:0 ideology. He's
very significant financial support-as
In late September and early October.
not a guy who's turned his back on princi-
an individual," he said. "In fact, I un-
the television campaign shifted from
ple; he's never had any. This is where I
derstand it will be S2 million from the
The Record to Pledges. and the Pledges
differ with a lot of people. They talk about
Rockefeller Brothers Fund."
seemed to have a great deal to do with
going from left to right as though he was a
liberal, left-wing Republican. This is pure,
There was, said Dr. Logan. no swap.
crime in the streets. narcotics and the
arrant nonsense. Rockefeller is a tabula
no deal. The-hospital "is a factor in my
like. At about this time, the press b:-
rasa; he's a clean state. You can put any-
decision to vote for him." he said. "And
came genuinely interested in the cantr
thing on his table and if the moods of the
on Wednesday after he's re-elected I'm
paign. and every trip the governor made
times call for it, he'll ear it and digest it."
going to go see him and say, Okay, you
was watched closely by reporters, who
NEW YORK
:5
On election night, next to grinning Mario,
York. The mailings, which were labeles
"Telegram" (but which clearly wer
spoke of law and order, but not together."
not, inasmuch as they contained
typographical errors and they were 33
livered on time), said: " I NEED YOU:
orders from their assignment
signals," he said. "We've been together
HELP. UNLESS YOU VOTE THIS TUES
to leave the Goldberg campaign
a long time."
DAY THE ORGANIZED DEMOCRAT
follow Rockefeller for a few days,
Joe Canzeri, whose code name on the
OF NEW YORK CITY COULD TAKE OVER
because the accommodations
little radios was Little Caesar, was the
YOUR STATE GOVERNMENT. BUFFAIL
better and their luggage was sel-
dean of the advance men on Rocke-
[or ALBANY or WATERTOWN] VOTES
lost. There is something essen-
feller's trips out of the city. Canzeri,
VITAL. MALCOLM WILSON AND I NEE
satisfying about stepping off a
who is 40 years old and who manages
YOUR SUPPORT FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT
airplane and being handed an
the governor's estate in Pocantico Hills
GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER.
which contains the key to
during non-campaign periods, was in
hotel room, a mimeographed list
your fellow reporters' room num-
joined the Team. Any hotel should be
so lucky. He made sure everything hap-
RESULTS
Boyd's operation attempted 1.279.
the hotel management field before he
telephone calls to voters. Of that
932,470 were completed. Bovd
the address of the press room and
that each household contained
Hospitality Room, and essential
pened at the right time and happened
voters. "So we probably reached
TELEPHONE
OF
on such items as Western
well. When the governor went bowling
than 2 million voters, he said.
the location of Xerox machines,
in Buffalo one night, Canzeri made sure
the figures from a series ot neat
for room service, and the closing
-had made sure, a week before-that
on his office wall.
at the hotel bar.
the alley had a pair of bowling shoes
Perrotta's New York City campai
helped, too, that Rockefeller had
that would fit a man whose foot is 12
was similarly successful. Of
private air force-a helicopter,
inches long in shoes. (Actually, Rocke-
high-priority Democratic assemble
runiman Gulfstream 2 jet, and a
feller could have brought his own shoes,
tricts, the ones that his batteries
-engined Fairchild which held two
since he has his own bowling alley at
telephone workers assaulted. he
people and a bar, which someone
the estate.)
afterward, "We banged hell out
the decency and wisdom to open
Canzeri was wont to liken the cam-
them." Rockefeller took eight of
recisely 12:01 p.m. when the press
paign to show business. The advance
districts in Brooklyn to Goldberg's
aboard.
men create the atmosphere, he said,
four to one in the Bronx, seven to
addition to all the money, the air-
and Rockefeller runs the show. "It's
in Queens, and two to nothing in
the generally friendly press, and
a very creative thing, I think," he said.
Island. The center, the Pivotals
perquisites of office, Rockfeller also
"You're creating an event. You're cre-
22 per cent, had swung.
aided incalculably by the fact that
ating the activity. You're creating the
Joe Boyd, asked afterward what
ogistical people-the advance men,
color, the background." Canzeri's watch
gone wrong, said he couldn't think
officers, the on-the-road ad-
is set five minutes fast, like a good bar-
anything major. The successful
and the people back at 575 Mad-
room's.
date, on election night, appeared at
who manned the "anchor desk,"
Late in October, just a few days be-
Roosevelt next to the grinning
and relaying messages to the
fore the election itself, the campaign
Procaccino. He spoke of law and
lidate, no matter where he might
moved into the Attack phase. In the
order, but not in the same breath:
were probably the best anywhere.
TV commercials, the attacking was
may be the mark of the center these
carried out by defecting Democrats, not
days.
lost of them had been with the gov-
by Rockefeller; the governor did his
Alton Marshall, summarizing it
I for a long time-since the guber-
part in public speeches. "We had an
urged a visitor to ferret out and
rial campaign of 1958, in many
opponent," an aide explained, "who
the speeches Rockefeller had made
then through the campaigns of
was not susceptible to being criticized
ing the last days of the campaign.
and 1966, the Presidential attempt
as you would criticize other candidates."
weren't reported in the press, he
968, and the Latin American trip
The polls were showing Rockefeller
but if someone took the trouble to
169. The workers, especially the ad-
ahead, and it was further decided that
pare them with the speeches
e men-the people who get the
any really tough tactics might back-
feller had made at the outset.
idate from one stop to another,
fire. "However," said Alton Marshall,
would reveal a "growth of philoso:
know who should shake his hand
"you almost have to end up with some
a tendency to express concern
e, and how to keep him from hav-
question of your opponent's credibility.
social movement rather than
is picture taken with a local gang-
People wouldn't want their soap opera
highways and buildings.
-were like feisty young captains
to end without some suspense." So the
The Rockefeller Team had been
ting hard and bucking for major.
television campaign ended with a series
criticized, Marshall continued.
though they whispered surrepti-
of questions for the undecided voter
it often had been guilty of emphasizing
ly into small radios in the manner
that were designed to attack Goldberg's
the roads and bridges and not paying
le Secret Service, there was amaz-
credibility.
enough attention to humanity. and
little confusion. because they had
Then everybody started worrying.
governor's speeches at the end of
ted together so long and they had
Joe Boyd was particularly worried about
campaign represented an attempt
and complete devotion to Rocke-
the polls that were being published that
rectify that error.
Hugh Morrow, the governor's
showed a clear Rockefeller victory. He
Somehow it just didn't seem worth-
tor of communications ($58,378 a
feared the upstate Republicans would
while to dig out those speeches. A:
who occupied an office at 575
stay home or vote for Adams. On the
end of the campaign. with the
son during the campaign, was
Thursday before the election, 400.000
chinery all clicking smoothly. with
I how he kept in touch with his
simulated telegrams (actually the print-
center and the Pivotals well in
V communicators over at 22 West
out of a computer in California) began
it was easy for Rockefeller to
Street, in the governor's official
being received in Republican and inde-
a growth of philosophy. an interest
"We communicate by Mandarin
pendent mailboxes in upstate NEW
humanity. The polls were already in.
SET JOURNAL FRIDAY. DECEMBER 11. 1970
Computing Democratic Winners in
By ALAN L. OTTEN
Democratic
WASHINGTON - Many Democrats think
they have found their 1072 victory weapont
Tip: computer.
Politics
Suggisticated USC of this weapon. more and
event
and People
TOR
more party pres are convinced. can and an
computer briated out. 5:
chir. time. four or five percentage points to
DATE ..:"1 an income of unr distated vote
the imperatic vite total, whoever the nomi-
IT!!
phone nd or canvase
I
nee-and that should be enough to win.
the Culver supporter them.
Armed with dramitic examples from "ceent
COMPUTERY OF
also receptaned the governorship and several
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elections, the computer fans are out to sell it
other statewide office from the Republicate,
does to sign these people "P.
" the childre party 25 " vital tool. perhaps
up : Congres loant seal and made III:-
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TAB F
TALKING PAPER. FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RE: Citizens Brochure
Magruder forwarded the mock-up of the brochure to be sent to
people who write in offering assistance to re-elect the
President.
Mouldn't it be helpful to have Dick Moore, Herb Klein, Bill
Safire, and Dwight Chapin review the booklet?
GS:lm
June 28, 1971
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date June 9, 1971
NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
A check with John Dean indicated
that the Citizens use of Bill
Horton would cause no legal
problem because "it is an
isolated example."
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 0-102
Pv
ER
3-23-82
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 3, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK Fred Malk
SUBJECT:
Staff Assistance to the
Citizens for the Reelection
of the President
At Jeb Magruder's request, my staff has been providing assistance
in launching the Citizens for the Reelection of the President. The
executive search team is assisting in recruiting. Bill Horton is
helping in planning for the fifteen task forces and consolidating these
plans into a single document for the Attorney General.
We are pleased to provide this type of assistance on a discreet
basis. However, I wanted you to know of our involvement to keep
you informed of our activities.
June 4, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Democratic Contenders - RNC/
Citizens Activities
Pat Buchanan is the Chairman of the Democratic contender
Task Force. He reviews the work done by the RNC under
the direction of Ed De Bolt. The most recent materials
prepared by the RNC research staff are attached at Tab
A. Summaries of the activities of each of the contenders
is attached at Tab B.
The RNC group that monitors the contenders is led by Bob
Chase, who personally researches Muskie. Other members
of the RNC group are: Gary Bauer, a 25 year old third
year law student at Georgetown who covers Kennedy and
Humphrey; Jim Lexo, a Cangressman Kemp campaign aide,
who covers Wallace, Jackson, and Harris; and Diane Moore,
a Penn State graduate, who covers Bayh, Hughes, and
McGovern. On June 15 two more individuals will be added
to the staff; one has a Masters in Political Science and
the other was in charge of research in the Ohio guber-
natorial campaign in 1970.
In addition to reviewing the RNC work, Pat Buchanan has
prepared in depth strategy proposals on Muskie and
Humphrey. He is currently working on one about Kennedy.
Buchanan's task force project manager is Bob Marik. They
have committed themselves to the Attorney General to have
an in-depth proposal by the end of June.
GS:elr
June 4, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
White House Staff Involvement
in Citizens
A potentially difficult situation developed yesterday.
Ehrlichman and Whitaker had been discussing with Bob
Spitzer his role in assisting the Administration with
farmers. The discussion had reached the point where
Bryce Harlow was to call Spitzer and offer him a job
at Citizens. Unfortunately, the plan was not discussed
with the Attorney General. When Whitaker finally called
the Attorney General, at Magruder's urging, Mitchell said
that only he had authority to hire for Citizens and that
the Spitzer matter would have to be put on hold.
Recommendation:
To prevent future difficulties between the White House
Staff and the Attorney General, you should mention in the
8:15 meeting that matters concerning the Citizens should
be cleared with the Attorney General, either directly or
through Magruder.
Agree
H. L Disagree
Comment
GS:elr
G
J8m 6/7 1007
G
Tal Pap $ H 6/10
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 6/17
TO: Lany Highy
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Per your request
May 26, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Mrs. Mitchell's Scheduling
Magruder reports that after extensive discussion with
Dick Moore and the Attorney General, the decision was
reached to have Mrs. Mitchell's scheduling handled by
Jeb Magruder and Bart Porter at an office in the Citizens for
the Re-election of the President suite.
Telephone requests come through a separate line, but the risk
of discovery remains high because Magruder will be dealing
with the TV networks and other newsmen. , Also, Mrs. Mitchell
stopped by the Citizens office last Friday to discuss
several scheduling matters.
GS:1m
June 4, 1971
you are C alsolity
Dear Job:
right.
Desides all the problems we had with your scheduling Mrs. Mitchell to return on
Air Force One from Oklahoma, I discover that we now have an incident which
happened last night and is even more significant.
Evidently, you participated in setting up Mrs. Mitchell's press conference in Tulsa
today. Foust has made the arrangements you requested and has a local person
in charge of the press conference and I believe all is well.
The point is that from now on please do not contact the Advance Man direct.
You should call either me or Ron Walker. Obviously. from time to time there
are going to be special requests which we will be happy to handle for you.
However, I believe that these requests should be related only to the President and
involve only things that will make a difference to the President. 1 do not feel
that it is our responsibility to take care of arranging press setups for Mrs. Mitchell.
Since you and Burt have taken over the responsibilities of handling Mrs. Mitchell,
then I suggest you make the proper arrangements or get someone to travel with
Mrs. Mitchell who can take care of these details.
Believe me, ! am trying to be very objective about this and am anticipating requests
that you will have in the future. But our Advance Men will no longer concern
themselves with arrangements other than for the President, the First Family, or
special guests traveling with the President.
Regards.
Sincerely,
Dwight L. Chapin
Deputy Assistant
to the President
Mr. Jeb Magruder
Citizens for the Resiection of
the President
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
the ORHOOL OP БИС PROBIDENG
or
Will Richard Nixon Find True Happiness in 1972
by Jeffrey Bell
These are hard times for Richard Nixon The three
Wyoming, Nevada, and New Mexico. Reliable polls
major national pollsters - George Gallup, Louis
in North Dakota, Utah, and New Mexico showed
Harris, and Oliver Quayle - show him tied with or
Republican support dropping in the aftermath of
trailing Sen. Edmund Muskie, his likely Democratic
Nixon's visits to aid local candidates. The two states
opponent, by as much as eight per cent. The economy
which ousted Republican Senators for Democrats - -
is still sluggish. Dcubts persist on his intentions in
Illinois and California - were the same two crucial
Indochina, among both hawks and doves. His pro-
states which put Nixon over the top on Election
posals for a "new American revolution" got a week
Night 1968.
or so of good editorials, and virtually no response
This pattern was a profound break with electoral
from either the public or Congress. Closely related
history. After a detailed survey of Republican admin-
to all these matters, and yet transcending them is
istrations from Harding to Eisenhower, the late V.O.
this: you cannot go anywhere in America, to intel-
Key wrote in Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups:
lectuals, to farmers, to hard-hats, to the South, to
Republicans picked up seats at the midterm chiefly
California, to liberals or conservatives, and hear an
in states in which their presidential candidate had
enthusiastic defense of the Nixon Presidency, There
shown extremely great strength at the preceding
are no Nixonites
elections. Of the four states in which Republicans
There used to be. Nixon has never been a cult
took Senate seats from the Democrats in 1970, the
figure, but in both 1960 and 1968 there were areas-
highest 1968 Nixon showing was the 45.2 per cent
both geographical and sociological - where Nixon
he received in Ohio. The Republicans' showing of
was assured of a warm welcome and overwhelming
12 victories and 23 losses in the 1970 Senate elections
support against his Democratic opponents. Nixonite
was not an unusual performance for the party in
areas included the Farm Belt, the Ohio Valley, the
Mountain states, and Southern California. Over-
whelming Nixon constituencies included residents
of small towns, middle-income professionals, and
businessmen at virtually all levels. Nixon retains at
least some support among all of these groups, but
virtually none of the intense identification that
brought the crowds in Cincinnati and Sioux City,
and the unprecedented flood of money from ex-
ecutive suites everywhere.
This cannot be attributed wholly to the economy.
Roosevelt and Eisenhower presided over much
harder times than these, and it cost their parties
heavily in such years as 1938 and 1958. But there
was little or no diminution of enthusiasm among the
groups that had supported the two men all along.
The 1970 Elections
The 1970 Senate elections illustrate the oddness of
Nixon's present position. Republicans did well in
the Northeast, which Nixon has never carried and
where, for one reason or another, he was not the
dominant issue of the campaign. But despite many
seemingly vulnerable seats, Republicans made no
gains in states which Nixon carried overwhelmingly
in 1968, and where Republican Senate nominees
identified themselves closely with him These states
included Florida, Indiana, North Dakota, Utah,
5
power at a midterm election. What was strikingly
journalists and even some liberal politicians. But why
unusual was the party's dismal showing in states
should liberals support Nixon for re-election when
Nixon had swept two years before The same config-
by electing someone like Muskie, they can have
uration showed up in House and gubernatorial races.
these things and liberal Supreme Court appoint
Taken alone, the 1970 pattern strongly suggests
ments, precipitate withdrawal from Vietnam,
that Nixon is in danger of losing his political base.
the humiliation of a long-time foe to boot? It would
Taken with other evidence, including his mediocre
be as if conservatives, in gratitude for a hard
showing in polls against Muskie and the apathy and
Vietnam, decided en masse to support Lyndon John-
skepticism which seem to greet everything he says
son in a race with Ronald Reagan in 1968.
and does, suggestion approaches certainty: the
And yet more often than not, the Nixon Admin-
President is in danger of alienating the voters who
istration has acted as though it seriously expected
put him in office, without gaining anything in
receive the gratitude and votes of liberals in 1972
return.
In doing so, it has alienated large portions of
conservative base that nominated and elected Nixe:
A Conservative Base
in 1968 It may also have alienated anti-liberal voters
In 1960 and 1968, Richard Nixon's support base was
it once seemed certain to pick up: the most recen:
conservative. The delegates who chose him at the
Harris Survey found that a majority of the Wallace-
two Republican conventions were right of center
leaning voters it interviewed would vote for Muskie
almost to a man. In 1968, so were the major politi-
should George Wallace decline to run.
cians who supported him, not to mention the bulk
So the most urgent problem facing Nixon strat-
of his own staff. The states he carried 26 in 1960
egists is not how to expand their narrow-victor.
and 32 in 1968-are, with three or four exceptions,
base of 1968 but how to regain the enthusiasm
states in which conservative voters clearly outnum-
the base itself, and, ultimately, the full measure-
ber liberals, within the Republican Party as well as
its electoral support. Once the activist enthusiasm
statewide. Newspapers and columnists who backed
within the 1968 Nixon areas and constituencies
Nixon for nomination and election were all non-lib-
been mobilized, expansion of the base will be
eral, and most were conservative. In 1968, Sen. Mark
tively easy. The 26 electoral votes of Texas would then
Hatfield (R-Ore.) and Rep. Bradford Morse (R-Mass.)
be an inviting prize. So would the 44 electoral votes
supported him for nomination and election. These
of the 1968 Wallace states, should the Alabama Gov-
endorsements by known liberals are memorable be-
ernor decide not to run (as seems increasingly poss:-
cause they were virtually unique. With a handful of
ble). More difficult against Muskie, but still quite
exceptions, no liberals. have ever wanted Richard
possible, are the votes of conservative-trendins
Nixon to be President of the United States, It is safe
Catholics in the Northeast and Great Lakes, regis-
to say that few wish him to be re-elected now.
tered Democrats who have given overwhelming sur-
How could they wish otherwise? Nixon is an old
port to right-of-center Republicans like Sen. James
antagonist. In 1954 he made speeches associating
Buckley and Gov. Thomas Meskill of Connectic
liberal Democrats with Communism that made Ag-
Even in the liberal Northeast, the only voters
new's speeches pale by comparison. He convicted
have shown willingness to back Republican cance-
Hiss, defeated Mrs. Douglas, taunted Stevenson.
dates to the right of Javits, Lindsay, and Case are
stopped Rockefeller, and purged Goodell. More re-
cisely those who have no interest in Nixon's libe
cently, he chose Agnew, Burger, and Blackmun, for
initiatives.
the most important posts he has ever had to fill. The
By holding the states he won in 1968, and picking
liberal majority on the Supreme Court is eroding,
up the Wallace states and Texas should Wallace
and Nixon tried with all the resources of his Admin-
run, Nixon would defeat Muskie in the Elector
istration to do the same to the U.S. Senate. His do-
College by 377 to 161. This is enough of a bulge :
mestic policies have been surprisingly liberal, his
Nixon to survive the loss of 1968 Nixon states Iik
nuclear policy more dovish than Johnson's, and his
Illinois New Jersey, and Wisconsin where Muskie
appointments to positions below the Supreme Court
Catholicism might be enough to tip the scales.
more liberal than conservative. These policies and
on could lose these states, and the five Wallace state-
actions have won praise, one by one, from liberal
and still win the election.
6
But it is silly to talk in these terms, much less of
Reduced casualty rates in Vietnam, and a hard line
outside victory possibilities in New York and Con-
on law and order. The 1970 elections showed that
necticut, at a time when Nixon is in trouble in lowa
these are not enough. Electorates are notoriously
and Southern California If he does not bounce back
ungrateful to leaders who have successfully ended
in conservative areas which backed him overwhelm-
wars (cf. Churchill 1945, Truman and de Gaulle 1946
ingly even in 1960, he will not bounce back at all.
and Eisenhower 1954), and the Democrats have
One footnote: it is with the conservative voters of
proven they can move with the times on law and
the North and West that Nixon is in trouble, not
order.
those of the South. Nixon's southern policy, exem-
With the exception of these two, the Nixon Ad-
plified by the appointme: is of Haynsworth and
ministration has deprived Republicans of every
Carswell and the effort to end the pugnaciously anti-
single issue they campaigned on in 1966 and 1968.
Southern stance of the Federal Government in
Gone are the days when Republicans could excoriate
general, are the only aspects of Nixon's domestic
big Government, high taxes, unbalanced budgets,
policy that most conservatives approve without
welfare abuses, and Great Society scandal and pro-
reservation. Nixon made promises to Southern con-
fligacy If Republican candidates tried to revert to
servatives, he made unimpeachably good-faith ef-
these successful past themes now, they would be
forts to achieve them, and polls which show Nixon
laughed out of the house.
in trouble everywhere else show him with a wide
President Nixon has found this to be agonizingly
lead in the South and George Wallace fading. Mis-
true in the matter of revenue-sharing. Here is a case
sion accomplished- perhaps.
where the Administration did attempt to return to
the old themes of callous bureaucracy, big govern-
A Conservative Strategy
ment, and local control. The political result? Evans
But nothing has been more harmful to the Nixon
and Novak report that, after the first flurry of favor-
able press reaction, revenue sharing "has,
fallen
Administration than the tacit assumption that a
conservative strategy and a Southern strategy are
flat as a political balloon. Congressmen returning
identical. The idea that the South is "conservative"
home have found little appreciation of the political
and the North and West are "liberal" is a negation
impact of revenue sharing. Further, people are asking
not only of the observable facts. but of the electoral
how they can share in the revenue when there is no
revenue to share." Whatever the merits of the Presi-
arithmetic of Nixon's two national campaigns. In
both of Nixon's elections, the vast majority of his
dent's proposals, they have little political credibility
electoral votes has been made possible by non-
and are unlikely to gain much. How could it be other-
Southern conservative areas like the Farm Belt, the
wise when they were put forward in the same speech
Mountain States, the Ohio Valley and Border areas,
which boasted of a planned Federal deficit of eleven
billion dollars?
and Southern California. In most of the states which
include these areas, specifically "Southern" outlooks
To the American electorate, and not just conserv
and problems (like school integration) have had a far
tives, the Nixon Administration projects radical
less important role or none at all. These voters want
uncertainty if not outright schizophrenia. A specia.
the Supreme Court to be more conservative, but they
Nixon quirk which accentuates this impression is his
are far more interested in reducing welfare and social
tendency to clothe liberal policies in conservative
spending and the taxes that go with them. In many
rhetoric, and conservative policies in liberal rhetoric.
states, the tax revolt has even extended to the For-
Thus the Family Assistance Plan, a radical expansion
merly sacrosanct area of education. What does the
of the present welfare apparatus into a guaranteed
Republican Party, as embodied by the Nixon Ad-
annual income, is presented as "workfare." Thus at
the height of the American-backed invasion of Laos.
ministration and its congressional backers, have to
Nixon informs a New York Times interviewer that he
offer these people?
is a "Quaker pacifist" and that the United States will
1. A proposal for an unprecedented expansion
in all likelihood never again go to war. Such attempts
of the public-welfare rolls.
to please everyone in fact please no one. Opponents
2. Higher spending than ever before, with a
of the policy in question are seldom reassured, and
substantial planned deficit embraced as a
supporters begin to wonder if the Administration
virtue.
is really on their side.
3. Continuation and full funding, at least so far,
Rhetoric will not be enough to win back Nixon's
of the most unpopular of Lyndon Johnson's
1968 right-of-center base in the North and West. As
Great Society programs.
the difficulties of revenue-sharing suggest, Nixon
4. Strategic defense cutbacks, also embraced as a
is nearing the point where even a substantive pro-
virtue, which have singled out for special eco-
gram cannot help, so long as it is yoked with seem-
nomic hardship some of the most pro-Nixon
ingly contradictory ones in the spirit of "let's give
areas of past elections, including nationally
one to the conservatives."
pivotal Southern California.
The Nixon Administration must present an inte-
The Republican Party has more to say to the
grated, programmatic, and unapologetic stance to the
South than ever before. But what does it have to say
electorate. Since it is approximately 20 years too late
to the voters of the North and West who made pos-
for Nixon to present a consistent liberal stance
sible the sweeping GOP gains of 1966 and the Tm-
must present a convincing conservative one It does
pressively broad-based Presidential victory of 1968?
not have to be far-right to be successful, but it must
be clear that the Nixon focus is right of center, if he
than cash - until such time as the mother or fath
is to have any chance to regain his 1968 support base,
takes a job Also desperately needed is a law prohic-
much less expand it.
iting Federal welfare aid to states which define
"children" as those under 21 years of age. The
Available Options
has passed when New York City can justify giving
With the President likely to be seeking re-election
money under Aid to Families With Dependent
against a Left-liberal Democrat, there is an under-
dren to "dependent children" old enough to
standable tendency for Nixon strategists to assume
the Army and vote.
conservatives on election day will have nowhere
4. A Presidential pledge to veto any appre:
else to go. Perhaps, but conservative opinion makers
ations for programs to be phased out under Spe:
could well have better things to do between now and
Revenue Sharing. If the Congress wants to continue
then. It is very difficult to remember a President who
such programs as Model Cities, Urban Renewal
was re-elected with no enthusiasm or sense of com-
Job Corps, and the Appalachian Regional Commis-
mitment on the part of his own supporters per-
sion, it should be clear that this will be possible or
at the state or local level. This form of blackm
haps the last was McKinley and liberals will never
generate any enthusiasm for Richard Nixon. In the
could end in one of two desirable results: (a)
present state of affairs neither will conservatives
sage of Special Revenue Sharing; or (b) significar
businessmen, farmers, aerospace workers, or anyone
reductions in Federal spending and pay
else.
leaving open the possibility of tax reductions in
Yes, Nixon must change his image. But as the
5. In the absence of an arms-limitation agreemen
1970 elections and recent public-relations efforts
before this fall, funding for major new strate
have made clear, he can no longer change his image
weapons systems in the 1972-73 budget. The
without also changing his policies.
dent cannot wait forever to explain in detail to
It is not necessary to describe the various policy
American people the extent to which we are fa
changes that would have a chance of regaining the
seriously behind the Soviet Union in this area,
President's conservative base. But a brief list might
the dangers ahead in the 1970's and 1980's she
include:
The Conservative Program
1. Administration support for a "voucher system"
to aid parents who want to send their children to pri-
vate schools. The system would be too costly to
institute at the Federal level at this time, but there is
no reason why the President should not (a) endorse
the principle; (b) encourage states and localities to
enact voucher systems of their own; (c) introduce a
voucher plan for the District of Columbia; and (d)
funds permitting, move toward the principle of full
tuition support by giving limited aid to private-
school parents. This program would have con-
siderable appeal to both conservatives and Catholics
2. Radical simplification of the Federal income
tax structure. A plan proposed by Dr. Milton Fried-
man would provide ending of most exemptions and
loopholes, and a statutory provision that no one's
tax rate shall be more than twice as much as anyone
else's. This proposal would be a relief to everyone
who dreads April 15, amount in effect to a tax re-
duction for the beleaguered middle class, and would
end the deeply resented prevalence of very rich
people who hire clever lawyers to avoid being taxed
at all.
3. Whatever the fate of the Family Assistance
Plan, a move away from cash benefits to welfare
recipients who do not work. Under both the present
AFDC system and FAP, it is possible for non-work-
ing families to receive cash incomes roughly com-
we continue to stand still. With the problem
parable to those of working families. So long as this
stated, it is hard to imagine anything but
condition prevails, welfare payments will continue
whelming support from the American public
to skyrocket no matter how many "working poor"
possibly devastating political issue in 1972 she.
are added to the rolls. A family whose head is not
key Democrats balk.
working should receive most or all of its benefits
These policy initiatives, taken together,
through ticketed programs like Food Stamps, rather
do much to give the Nixon Administration a
tion and force which it now appears to lack, and
would probably be enough to restore identification
between the President and the predominantly right-
of-center_voters who provided most of his votes
1960 and 1968, as well as expand his support among
other key constituencies such as Catholics. However,
the President may be heading for serious trouble on
an issue Vietnam - which has proven its capability
to drown out all others.
This problem stems from the President's tendency
to couch a policy which has been in its true aim
-Communist in a dovish rhetoric of withdrawal.
If the only aim of the United States is withdrawal
and release of U.S. prisoners of war, then the in-
vasions of Cambodia and Laos cannot be justified
Many doves have said this, and a large proportion
of the American people (judging from reliable polls)
share this view. Unless rhetoric and policy are
every editorialist, columnist, and politician
brought into line, the Nixon "credibility gap" will
ing many conservatives- take up the same
continue to widen.
as indeed they should.
One way of reconciling policy with rhetoric, of
This option is closed off for the President as much
course, is to change the policy to fit the rhetoric.
as any could be. The President has no choice, mor-
Withdraw American troops at a more rapid rate,
ally or politically, but to continue in his present
without leaving behind sufficient materiel and air
course of trying to save South Vietnam. But if he is
power for the South Vietnamese to take up the slack;
to win political support for his policy, he must say
at Paris, inform Hanoi of our willingness to set a
candidly what it is that he is trying to do. For one
date for total withdrawal, contingent on return of
thing, the release of U.S. prisoners of war must cease
prisoners of war; do little to fight McGovern-Hat-
being his only. rhetorical reason for projecting a
field or similar legislation in Congress. The scenario
"residual force" of American soldiers in South Vie:-
is familiar, and something like it has long been urged
nam There is considerable sympathy for the pris-
by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.
oners, but no one seriously believes that their release
But it is too late for Nixon to exercise this option.
could not be. achieved, should the U.S. make clear
He might have gotten away with it in the first half
to Hanoi that we are willing to get completely out
of 1969, but he could not now. The reason is simple:
by a certain date.
20,000 American soldiers have died, and two risky
The President should instead make clear that.
invasions have been carried out, since Nixon took
insofar as American soldiers will be in Indochina
office. If it became absolutely clear to the American
they will be there to fulfill the pledges we have made
people that the central Nixon goal is withdrawal in
to our ally. No other justification is possible
deed as well as word, these lives will be seen as
believable. The American people will not accept the
having been squandered for nothing Here is what
logic that twenty thousand soldiers needed to die
the Democratic Presidential nominee would in-
order to ransom several hundred prisoners of war.
evitably say: "Like most Americans, I support the
Such a change in the Nixon rhetoric on Vietnam
President in his Plan X for total withdrawal from
would be severely attacked by liberals, and it would
Vietnam. This was a difficult decision for him to
by no means be greeted with delight among a
make, and he needs the support of a united country
jority of the war-weary American people. However
against the handful of superhawks here and in
the pill could be sweetened by the pledge that
Southeast Asia who are crying 'sellout.' However,
soldiers will all be volunteers, and that few will
in assessing Mr. Nixon's four-year record of han-
in infantry combat. President Eisenhower's decision
dling this war, I join with those who regard his
to leave 50,000 troops indefinitely in Korea was not
performance as a tragic failure. If as the President
a particularly popular one either, but it won at leas:
says now, his goal from the beginning has been one
the grudging acceptance of a majority of the Amer:-
of total American withdrawal, how in the name of
can people. Nixon's political problem would be more
God can Cambodia, Laos, and the losses of the past
difficult in America 1971, but two things about his
three years, be justified? If the President had done
position are clear: he cannot move toward a sellou
in 1969 what he is doing now, nearly half the Ameri-
and he cannot continue to justify his war policy
can dead in Vietnam would be alive. For his failure
the manner he is doing now.
of courage then, not the difficult course he is fol-
If Richard Nixon does all the things suggested
lowing now, he must be rejected by the people." This
by this writer, he would not be assured of a second
argument, of course, is unanswerable, and hints of
term. But the thrust of his Presidency would finall
it have already appeared in the campaign rhetoric
take on clear definition, and he would be assured of
of the only two announced candidates for President,
the enthusiasm of many whose enthusiasm he needs
Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) and Rep. Paul Mc-
At the very worst, he would be remembered as 3
Closkey (R-Cal.). If it becomes clear that the Presi-
President who believed deeply, attempted much
dent is reversing his present responsible policy,
and went down fighting.
May 26, 1971
AS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
As to your request about the Magruder follow-up on
Don Schollander, I talked with Jeb this morning.
Magruder had invited Don Schollander to attend the
private meeting of the Citizens for the Re-election
of the President to be held today at the Hay Adams
Hotel. Schollander had accepted, but John Rose
called Schollander and advised him that it probably
wasn't really necessary for him to come. Needless to
say, Magruder was alightly upset.
Magruder had planned to talk with Schollander after
his meeting with the President, but Rose squired him
away. Magruder will talk to Rose and Schollander to
centralize contact with Jeb so that Schollander is
brought into the fold correctly.
I will follow-up with Magruder weekly on this matter.
very this feet
good
on artigulate
G
J8m J 6/2
GS:1n
requesting
The question in what in
written
proposal
Magrudeir applific planfor
him
L.
1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
G
Date: 6/4
TO: Brace
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Discussion with L.
yesterday indicated that
Colson is aware of
his responsibility vis a
vis ethnics.
no estraordinary push
is required
THANKS
65 Citizens File
May 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRUCE KEHRLI
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
A recent follow-up check with Magruder on the ethnic
situation at the RNC and at the Citizens disclosed the
following:
1. Colson has been asked to take charge of ethnic
activities for the Citizens Committee. This assignment
has been cleared with the Attorney General.
2. Colson has yet to have a meeting of the Ethnic
Group Task Force, but has assured Magruder that he
will have such a meeting this week.
3. Laszlo Passtor prevailed upon Colson to get a
Presidential letter Friday which established the
permanency of the Heritage group at the RNC. This
letter was probably a mistake.
4. Magruder and Colson will keep the ethnic operation
at the Citizens group separate from Passtor's generally
unsuccessful activities at the RNC.
The net result is that pursuit of the ethnic vote has not
been put on the front burner. However, Magruder will be
periodically prodded to produce the type of recommendation
necessary for submission to the Attorney General and
Haldeman.
GS:1m
May 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT:
Ethnic Operation at the Republican
National Committee
The essence of the attached letter sent to us by
Laszlo Pasztor is that his operation is being
dismembered. While his operation has consisted
of a director, 3 assistants, 1 secretary, 6 con-
sultants, 4 special representatives on Mexican
affairs, and he had requested 1 extra person and
Good
a 20 percent increase in his budget for 1971-72,
he has been told that 75 percent of his permanent
The RNC's the
staff, all of the consultants, the complete Mexican-
American project, and the total Catholic budget
are to be eliminated.
place this to do
As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's
activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom,
and taking away his secretary. Considering his age,
effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens
and the progress we are making in coming to grips
with it, I have made a big issue of this with
Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am
thus in a difficult position to immediately take
up the cudgels on this one.
It seems to me that those who are doing the broad
political planning for the coming 18 months might
take another look at this decision.
George T. Bell
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Ethnic Operation in RNC
As you will see from the attached memo which George Bell
has sent to me, the RNC is effectively curtailing the ethnic
operation, particularly Mexican-American and Catholic.
It may be that Evans is dissatisfied with the way Laszlo
Pasztor has been running the outfit. If that is the case, he
should be replaced with someone more effective. In principle,
however, curtailing it at this point in time would seem to me
to be ill-advised. This is the time when we should be sending
organizational people and field people in to cultivate ethnic
groups.
While I recognize that most ethnics will not rally around the
Republican Party banner, it is important to have political
operatives on the Committee payroll working inside of these
groups identifying key leaders, gathering intelligence and
working with us on strategy.
One of the biggest problems we have had in ethnic areas is that
we have no good means of communication. We deal, of course,
through this office with all of the organized groups, which is
excellent from a symbolic standpoint, but that really doesn't
represent the masses. The vast majority of ethnic groups are
totally disorganized. Hence, the only real political intelligence
that we have gotten has been through Pasztor's operation and it is
our best means of communication and access.
The same function could be undertaken by the citizens committee
and if that is what is contemplated by reducing Pasztor's role,
then I should not be concerned about this. This is not a time,
however, to deemphasize the cultivating of ethnic groups. It
should be done somewhere.
2.
I recommend that you ask Evans for a full explanation of this
and we should then decide whether the operation should be
continued, where it should be continued and under whose direction.
I will be glad to see that it is properly organized from here if
you want me to. We haven't done at all badly in this area sub-
stantively, and we have done a lot of cultivating of individuals
and groups, but we need the appartus to come in for a political
kill at the right time.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT:
Ethnic Operation at the Republican
National Committee
The essence of the attached letter sent to us by
Laszlo Pasztor is that his operation is being
dismembered. While his operation has consisted
of a director, 3 assistants, 1 secretary, 6 con-
sultants, 4 special representatives on Mexican
affairs, and he had requested 1 extra person and
a 20 percent increase in his budget for 1971-72,
he has been told that 75 percent of his permanent
staff, all of the consultants, the complete Mexican-
American project, and the total Catholic budget
are to be eliminated.
As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's
activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom,
and taking away his secretary. Considering his age,
effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens
and the progress we are making in coming to grips
with it, I have made a big issue of this with
Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am
thus in a difficult position to immediately take
up the cudgels on this one.
It seems to me that those who are doing the broad
political planning for the coming 18 months might
take another look at this decision.
43
George T. Bell
CW C in J8M charge of 5/24
Ethnics per Rt Cets
I & m > Evans Evalus + agrees)
CWC no time toto meet.
Lazlow conning cwc into
get TR getter on
permyney of Aentage Gy.
So Fri. Eyons
TR letter
AG
AG going te blast cwc.
J8M
cuy CWC C Parget Laszleret
use
at Comm
AG agrees cac should
blead up Etanies operation.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRUCE KEHRLI
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
A recent follow-up check with Magruder on the ethnic
situation at the RNC and at the Citizens disclosed the
following:
1. Colson has been asked to take charge of ethnic
activities for the Citizens Committee. This assignment
has been cleared with the Attorney General.
2. Colson has yet to have a meeting of the Ethnic
Group Task Force, but has assured Magruder that he
will have such a meeting this week.
3. Laszlo Pasztor prevailed upon Colson to get a
Presidential letter Friday which established the
permanency of the Heritage group at the RNC. This
letter was probably a mistake.
4. Magruder and Colson will keep the ethnic operation
at the Citizens group separate from Pasztor's generally
unsuccessful activities at the RNC.
The net result is that pursuit of the ethnic vote has not
been put on the front burner. However, Magruder will be
periodically prodded to produce the type of recommendation
necessary for submission to the Attorney General and
Haldeman.
G
J8M 6/3 - cuc mtgs concelled zdates
no G/L
iwc re getting t going
to
cwc on topofit
May 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT:
Ethnic Operation at the Republican
National Committee
The essence of the attached letter sent to us by
Laszlo Pasztor is that his operation is being
dismembered. While his operation has consisted
of a director, 3 assistants, 1 secretary, 6 con-
sultants, 4 special representatives on Mexican
affairs, and he had requested 1 extra person and
Good
a 20 percent increase in his budget for 1971-722
he has been told that 75 percent of his permanent
The RNC's the
staff, all of the consultants, the complete Mexican
American project, and the total Catholic budget
are to be eliminated.
place -200 this to do
As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's
activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom,
and taking away his secretary. Considering his age,
effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens
and the progress we are making in coming to grips
with it, I have made a big issue of this with
Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am
thus in a difficult position to immediately take
up the cudgels of this one.
It seems to me that those who are doing the broad
political planning for the coming 18 months might
take another look at this decision.
George T. Bell
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Ethnic Operation in RNC
As you will see from the attached memo which George Bell
has sent to me, the RNC is effectively curtailing the ethnic
operation, particularly Mexican-American and Catholic.
It may be that Evans is dissatisfied with the way Laszlo
Pasztor has been running the outfit. If that is the case, he
should be replaced with someone more effective. In principle,
however, curtailing it at this point in time would seem to me
to be ill-advised. This is the time when we should be sending
organizational people and field people in to cultivate ethnic
groups.
While I recognize that most ethnics will not rally around the
Republican Party banner, it is important to have political
operatives on the Committee payroll working inside of these
groups identifying key leaders, gathering intelligence and
working with us on strategy.
One of the biggest problems we have had in ethnic areas is that
we have no good means of communication. We deal, of course,
through this office with all of the organized groups, which is
excellent from a symbolic standpoint, but that really doesn't
represent the masses. The vast majority of ethnic groups are
totally disorganized. Hence, the only real political intelligence
that we have gotten has been through Pasztor's operation and it is
our best means of communication and access.
The same function could be undertaken by the citizens committee
and if that is what is contemplated by reducing Pasztor's role,
then I should not be concerned about this. This is not a time,
however, to deemphasize the cultivating of ethnic groups. It
should be done somewhere.
2.
I recommend that you ask Evans for a full explanation of this
and we should then decide whether the operation should be
continued, where it should be continued and under whose direction.
I will be glad to see that it is properly organized from here if
you want me to. We haven't done at all badly in this area sub-
stantively, and we have done a lot of cultivating of individuals
and groups, but we need the appartus to come in for a political
kill at the right time.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 5, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES W. COLSON
SUBJECT:
Ethnic Operation at the Republican
National Committee
The essence of the attached letter sent to us by
Laszlo Pasztor is that his operation is being
dismembered. While his operation has consisted
of a director, 3 assistants, 1 secretary, 6 con-
sultants, 4 special representatives on Mexican
affairs, and he had requested 1 extra person and
a 20 percent increase in his budget for 1971-72,
he has been told that 75 percent of his permanent
staff, all of the consultants, the complete Mexican-
American project, and the total Catholic budget
are to be eliminated.
As you know, they also plan to curtail Van Rensselaer's
activities by eliminating his assistant, Ruth Groom,
and taking away his secretary. Considering his age,
effectiveness and the importance of senior citizens
and the progress we are making in coming to grips
with it, I have made a big issue of this with
Tom Evans and believe I have it reversed. I am
thus in a difficult position to immediately take
up the cudgels on this one.
It seems to me that those who are doing the broad
political planning for the coming 18 months might
take another look at this decision.
George T. Bell
DETERMANED TO BE AN
RKING
MEMORANDUM
6-102
By
Date
3-23-82
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
April 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR :
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM :
H.R. HALDEMAN
H.
In the long-range political planning be sure that they are
thinking about the mock conventions on college and high school
campuses and make sure that we are going to have a really good
JSM- -
man in charge of our activities at mock conventions. We can't
cele.
afford to lose these and it's very important that they be planned
and programmed well in advance. We should know when they are
going to be held. Some of them may even be starting this fall.
This is a long range item, but I'll be sending a number of such to
you as time goes on and I assume you'll set up a system for
stacking them up and getting them implemented at the appropriate
times.
THE WHITE HOUSE Soula
WASHINGTON
Date: 5/25
TO: Lany Highy
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
- IP I had this information
I would have included it
in my memo to H.
- Jel is very reluctant to
raise either my attendance
at these meetings or reporting
afterward with the AG.
- Should thise anywher in the
H,AG, magruder meeting ?
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINIST MARKING
E.O. 12066, Section 6-102
By
ER.
P
3-22-82
CONFIDENTIAL
May 20, 1971
Hordon
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Last night the Attorney General met with Jeb Magruder,
Harry Dent, Fred LaRue, Dick Kleindienst and Lee Nunn.
Magruder did not offer a description of the subjects covered
but did say that Don Rumsfeld and Bryce Harlow would
probably be added, and that Bob Finch would definitely not
be included.
GS:dg
d wantthe reportanthin
needing to yo toH tom
L
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
To : y
From :
L. Higby
How will advise
Backan
I
Please 01 ?
G. Telecon
Odle 6/1
Telecon Breechonan 6/2
THE WHITE HOUSE
DEPERMINED TO BE AN
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMI MARKING
May 29, 1971
E.O. 12000, 6-102
By Ep
Late 3.23.82
,
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Buchanan's Memorandum on
Conservatives
Buchanan sent the attached memorandum (tab A) on the YAF move toward
Reagan. Buchanan argues persuasively that any attack on the YAFs by
the White House is counter-productive. He does not know the source
of the attack.
The only project I know about involving our response to the YAF move
was your request of the Attorney General on May 26. He asked
Magruder to get the facts. Magruder had Rob Odle prepare a report
(tab B) on the situation. Odle's report has no more information than
Buchanan's. Both are trying to find out who in the Administration is
urging the resignations from the YAF Advisory Board.
Buchanan and Odle agree that Reagan's written attack on the YAF
move for a RR candidacy has solved the problem.
Recommendation:
That Buchanan and Odle try to get the source of the White House attack
and stop it.
Agree
H
Disagree
Comment
Buchanan also says that the allegedly White House inspired idea that the
Vice President be appointed to the Supreme Court to make room for
Reagan as Veep should be squelched. I agree.
Recommendation:
That Buchanan should be given the responsibility to contact Conservatives
and put a stop to this
Agree
H rumor. Disagree
Comment
Recommendation:
May 29, 1971
That Buchanan should be given the responsibility to contact Conservatives
thigh rumer.
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Buchanan's Memorandum on
Conservatives
Buchanan sent the attached memorandum (tab A) on the YAF move toward
Reagan. Buchanan argues persuasively that any attack on the YAFe by
the White House is counter-productive. He does not know the source
of the attack.
The only project I know about involving our response to the YAF move
was your request of the Attorney General on May 26, He asked
Magruder to get the facts. Magruder had Rob Odle prepare a report
(tab B) on the situation. Odle's report has no more information than
Buchaman's. Both are trying to find out who in the Administration is
urging the resignations from the YAF Advisory Board.
Buchanan and Odle agree that Reagan's written attack on the YAF
move for a RR candidacy has solved the problem.
Recommendation:
That Buchanan and Odle try to get the source of the White House attack
and stop it.
Agree
Disagree
Comment
Buchanan also says that the allegedly White House inspired idea that the
Vice President be appointed to the Supreme Court to make room for
Reagan as Veep should be squelched. 1 agree.
Recemmendation:
That Buchanan should be given the responsibility to contact Conservatives
and put a stop to this rumer.
Agree
Disagree
Comment
GS:lm
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 28, 1971
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINIS BLAINING
CONFIDENTIAL
6-102
By Ef
3-23-82
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
S UBJECT:
CONSERVATIVES
We get reports that the White House is initiating efforts
to have the YAF Advisory Board (following their RR endorsement) --
such as Tower who dropped off -- resign from the organization.
Manuel Lujan is one such who has been approached by WH, allegedly,
and asked to resign. He contacted YAF and told them. Suggest
that we halt this operation, if it is ours and going on:
1. It is counter-productive; it makes this little organization
look like a target of WH attack; and thus boosts their anti-Nixon
credentials, and aids their fund-raising with Far Right. This is
a way to give them publicity without doing them a bit of harm.
2. In the future, if we decide to go after them -- for
attacking the President -- go after their funds; find out who their
fund-raisers are, and then we can put the heat on them, where it
hurts. But, more important:
3. Ronald Reagan has written a blistering four-page letter
to YAF attacking the organization and its leaders as pea-brains;
and threatening to call a press conference, calling them irresponsible,
if they do not withdraw their endorsement of Reagan. YAF backed
down from its Reagan endorsement one-half hour later.
CONFIDENTIAL
2
CONFIDENTIAL
The Reagan letter as I understand it, tore into the YAF
leadership, not only for endorsing Reagan, but for attacking RN's
Vietnamization policy. In any event, Reagan with or without
incitation from here -- has tramped all over the anti-Nixon
effort in the right-wing college organizations, and killed it to date.
If we did not inspire this, the President might take note of it
it is a most helpful harbinger for the future.
More important right now, the conservatives -- all four
top organizations -- had a major meeting in New York to discuss a
call for a meeting either with the President or Dr. K. they are
deeply distressed over the SALT talks, and the strategic arms
budget in 1973 (FY). They are talking in terms of formal letters,
demands for meetings, ultimata, -- and of possible public breaks
with the Administration. They have come to me about how best to
get their concerns across I don't think that anything will be done
before we talk further. But from what I gather there is a genuine
deep concern over US strategic posture.
Some one from the WH has contacted William F. Buckley
with the suggestion for a Buckley column tothe effect that
conservatives should demand the Vice President's appointment
to the Supreme Court to make room for Reagan. In strict
confidence, Buckley has let it slip that the White House someone
right next to the President apparently -- has suggested the flier.
Buckley is to suggest that if the Veep is appointed to the Court,
then that is an acceptable arrangement for conservatives.
Buckley is himself said to be convinced that the President's
re-election is contingent on the dropping of the Vice President
although I do not personally know this to be true.
In any event, if the report that the WH inspired Buckley
to approach this subject is known to me, it is probably being
bruited around conservative circles by now and could be an
embarrassment if it leaked out.
CONFIDENTIAL
May 28, 1971
DEPERMINE TO BE AN
ADMIN
STAT
ARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
1.0. 12006, Section 3-23-82 6-102
By Eff
MEHORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BEyce Harlow reported to me that very reliable sources within
Congressman Mills' committee have indicated that the Congressman is
serious in his efforts to run for the Presidency. He has committed
himself to a nationwide campaign and will try to avoid being con-
sidered a southern candidate.
He will probably announce a new health bill that will fall some-
where between our bill and Kennedy's bill in an effort to take the
initiative in that area and he is working with George Meany and will
attempt to raise the issue of trade protectionism in the fall with
full support of organized labor.
JEB S. MAGRUDER
JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Dem/Rep Contenders
CONPIBUNTIAL
fle Only went to ARH
June 1, 1971
J
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BOB FINCH
RE:
California Strategy (Action Memo P1214)
Factual Summary
1. The recent public and private polls taken in
California which I have forwarded to you show that
the Presidential race would be very close or that
we would lose the State against any major Democratic
contender at the present time. On the other hand,
McCloskey has not exceeded 9% against the President
among Republicans in any poll.
2. The California State Republican Central Committee
and County Committees are in bad disrepair with
generally a very poor quality of membership and
leadership. Good talent has been absorbed into
national and state government. Volunteer organi-
zations are equally impotent and increasingly
dominated by the far right.
3. Intense maneuvering vis-a-vis 1974 races (Governor
and Senator) is going on by Reinecke, Younger,
Flournoy in particular with a prejudicial effect
in terms of fund raising, organizing and carrying
the state for the President in 1972.
4. Against this background and the present vacuum of
activities on behalf of the President, key members
of the Governor's staff have been making contacts
among corporate heads, party officials and prominent
personalities in the following areas:
a. Seeking staff and speakers to support the Governor's
welfare reform proposals as against the Administration.
b. Holmes Tuttle (after two meetings with the Governor)
contacting prominent personalities with regard to
serving on the Delegation.
2 -
C. Calls from Bob Walker with prominent leaders
saying "the Governor's office will run the
campaign--Finch to have nothing to do with
it" and discussions on his part as to who
might be city and county chairmen in the
Presidential campaign.
(Specific examples of the above with names, places and
dates can be provided to support these contentions)
Recommendations
1. A decision should be made as soon as possible for a
Nixon Advisory Committee headed by Firestone or
someone else (clearly loyal to the President and
acceptable to Reagan) to send out the broadest
possible mailing for "Friends of Nixon" in California-
getting people signed up with their indicated areas
of interest and a chance to offer suggestions and
comments. These lists are organized and ready to
go and I believe the mailing should go forward
immediately after the wedding. The Governor should
be notified of the action just prior to the mailing
but without any option to veto. This organizing
committee should include the Governor and all appro-
priate elected Republican officials in California as
well as the key "fat cats" and "movers and shakers."
It should not include members of the White House
staff or Cabinet from California. Wives of such
key persons on the Federal payroll might be listed
on the organizing committee.
2. The Governor in his key position as Chairman of the
Delegation should be asked to submit some names he
would like to have considered for the Delegation. At
the same time, all other statewide officials should
likewide be asked to submit names, i.e., Younger,
Reinecke, Flournoy and Priest, as well as Congressmen,
Monagan, Seantor Marler, State Chairman Livermore,
Vice Chairman Luce and Ralph Rosedale, head of the
County Chairmen's organization. These names could
be considered for both Delegation and organizational
purposes.
- 3 -
3. It should be made clear to Reagan and other key
elected officials that he is not to head the
Presidential campaign in California, even in a
so-called honorary capacity. The President, in
other words, will run his own campaign in his
native state. If he is allowed to be "Honorary
Chairman," his staff will take this as having the
franchise for the whole campaign itself.
4. Movement should begin immediately following the
mailing to put in place new blood as acting
county and city Nixon chairmen, i.e. Russell Green,
Forrest Shumway, etc.
Finch Role
In connection with his general campaign assignments, it
should be made clear that Finch will have input in
political decisions and campaign personnel affecting
California. After discussion with the President, it has
been concluded that since RHF is a possible 1974 candidate,
he should not again serve as state chairman as the '74
implications would be counterproductive to the '72 effort.
There have been discussions about Finch working with or
chairing a small advisory strategy committee which I
think from the standpoint of "overview" ought to be
implemented as soon as possible. It would be antici-
pated that Finch wouldhhave a very important responsibility
in helping select city and county chairmen which are the
critical spots to be filled in carrying California.
Finch should campaign heavily and publicly, particularly
between the convention and the election in California,
as well as nationally, in those areas where he can be of
assistance among youth, minorities, etc.
Present Status in California
We have a small beachhead operation tied to the Kalmbach
law firm where John Flanigan is serving as a volunteer,
working with various groups like Waller Taylor, George
St. Johns, Fred Martin and others, in compiling lists,
but without authority to take any definitive action at
this time.
& ! I
Immediate Recommendation
There should be a meeting as soon as possible with the
President, Attorney General, H. R. Haldeman and Robert
H. Finch to discuss.
If agreement along these lines is reached, another
meeting with HRH, Kalmbach and RHF should be set for
June 11 to implement.
Firestone will be here for Patricia's wedding and, if
agreed, Mitchell could provide marching orders to
Firestone and Kalmbach at that time.
CC: Attorney General
H. R. Haldeman
RHF:bkl
Pomona, Calif.
Progress-Bulletin
(Cir. D 40,063 - S 40,742)
APR 2 8 1971
Allen's P.C.B.
Est. 1888
Reinecke Sketches
Actions as Governor
WASHINGTON (UPI)
gan who has declared he will
-California's lieutenant gov-
not seek re-election in 1974.
ernor promises frequent
The governor, he said, suf-
meetings with students if
fers from a "lack of commu-
elected to the state's top of-
nication" with students, part-
fice.
ly because of security prob-
"If I were governor, I
lems and partly because of a
would try to have period-
lack of time.
ic-perhaps once-a-month -
"The governor is a very
meetings with students," Lt.
compassionate man, even if
Gov. Ed Reinecke told a news
he doesn't read that way,"
conference this week.
Reinecke said. "I have not
"They know I am perfectly
been painted all one color, as
willing to talk about any sub-
the governor has."
ject."
Reinecke said he did not
Reinecke, 47, was picked by
differ with Reagan philosophi-
Gov. Ronald Reagan as his
cally but that he "might dif-
fer" on methods. As an ex-
Meutenant governor and has
become the Reagan Admin-
ample, he told of his acti-
istration's chief ambassador
vities on campuses.
and spokesman to California
In discussing his political
chances, Reinecke said other
youth.
Me-hopes to succeed Rea-
potential Republican guberna-
torial candidates are Houston
Flournoy, state controller;
Robert Finch, presidential ad-
viser; and Evelle Younger,
state attorney general.
He said that Younger was
the "better financed," Flour-
noy the "biggest vote getter"
and Finch the "most popu-
lar."
San Pedro, Calif.
News Pilot
(Cir. 6XW 15,514)
APR 2 7 1971
P.C.B.
Est. 1888
Reagan declines re-election
Reinecke bids for governor $ post
WASHINGTON (UPI) --- California's
Ile hopes to succeed Reagan who has
In discussing his political chances, Rsi-
licutenant governor promises frequent
declared he will not seek re-election in
necke said other potential Republican gift
meetings with students if elected to the
1974.
bernatorial candidates are Houston Floor-
state's top office.
The governor, he said, suffers from a
noy, state controller; Robert Finch, presi-
"If I were governor, I would try to have
"lack of communication" with students,
dential adviser; and Evelle Younger, state
periodic - perhaps once-a-month-meelings
partly because of security problems and
attorney general.
with students," Lt. Gov. Ed Reinecke told
partly because of a lack of time.
He said that Younger was the "better
a news conference Monday.
"The governor is a very compassionate
financed," Flournoy the "biggest vote get-
"They know I am perfectly willing to
man, even if he doesn't read that way,"
ter" and Finch the "most popular."
talk about any subject."
Reinecke said. "I have not been painted
Among Democrats, he mentioned Rep.
Reinecke, 17. was picked by Gov. Ron-
all one color, as the governor has."
Jerome R. Waldie who has announced he
ald Reagan as his lieutenant governor and
Reinecke said he did not differ with
will run.
has become the Reagan Administration's
Reagan philosophically but that he "might
"And Sam is always there," Reinscke
chief ambassador and spokesman to Cali-
differ" on methods. As an example, he told
said, referring to Mayor Sam Yorty of Les
fornia youth.
of his activities on campuses.
Angeles.
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION MEMORANDUM
WASHINGTON
LOG NO.:
P1214
Date: December 30, 1970
Time:
2:00 p.m.
-FOR ACTION:
R. Finch
CC (for information):
RHF
FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY
DUE: Date: January 5, 1971
Time: 2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT:
California Strategy
q
ACTION REQUESTED:
X For Necessary Action
For Your Recommendations
Prepare Agenda and Brief
Draft Reply
For Your Comments
Draft Remarks
REMARKS:
PLEASE ATTACH THIS COPY TO MATERIAL SUBMITTED.
If you have any questions or if you anticipate a
delay in submitting the required material, please
John R. Brown III
telephone the Staff Secretary immediately
Staff Secretary
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 30, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROBERT FINCH
FROM:
JOHN R. BROWN III JRVS
SUBJECT:
California Strategy
It was felt that your memo on California Strategy was an excellent
analysis of the situation. It is requested that you follow through on
the action items covered in your memo. In particular, it is requested
that you report back on who is to be the individual to head-up our
efforts in California.
Please submit a report on what actions are taken to comply with
the above request.
Thank you.
cc: H.R. Haldeman
A. Butterfield
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
May 26, 1971
E.U. 12065, Section 6-102
By EP
3-23-82
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
LARRY HIGBY
SUBJECT:
POLLING PLAN
Considerable attention is currently being devoted to planning for
polling in the 1972 campaign. The White House survey activities will
very soon begin to point to the campaign, the Citizens Committee has
established a planning group, several vendors and consultants have
submitted proposals, and the need for a sound, well-coordinated pro-
gram has been recognized by all parties concerned.
Current Proposals
In November, Dr. David Derge submitted a comprehensive plan (Tab A).
It has not been updated since that time. Peter Flanigan, Jeb Magruder
and Bob Marik of the planning group had arranged to meet with Derge
this week, but that was delayed by the tragic death of his wife.
Recently, Benham of ORC submitted detailed suggestions on target state
and issue polling (Tab B). The proposals thus far lean toward the basic
research plan of 1968. Some variations are offered on the "wave studies"
(updated large field interviews), the "Instant Research" capability, and
issue studies. The current ORC-telephone system for "Instant Research"
could be altered slightly to fit campaign trends and still be able to
deliver the information required. The Citizens Committee planning group
will seek to develop other alternatives as well, SO that advances in the
state-of-the-art since 1968 will not be ignored in the final decision
process.
A preliminary survey has been completed to identify the six most qual-
ified polling vendors for use in the 1972 campaign (Tab C). Comprehensive
proposals will be solicited from each of the six, both to identify alter-
native polling techniques and to have a sound basis for making the final
selection.
Domestic Council Issue Studies
The Domestic Council's current Issue Study will be completed by the first
week in June. The data will be able to be analyzed by geographical region
and urban/suburban/rural populations, but it will not be divisible into
target states. As we move closer to the campaign year, it will be in-
creasingly important to have a data base and trend information by target
state.
-2-
According to Ken Cole, two and perhaps three more in-depth studies are
planned. These could be tuned to correspond with the Derge and Ben-
ham recommendations (November 1971, and May 1972). We could suggest
that the November study cover the same basic areas that the current
study is examining, to assure adequate trend information, but be desi-
gned to allow interpretation by target states. Additional issues that
develop this summer and fall could also be included. The thrust of
the May study, however, should be to particularly emphasize the key issues
and swing voters in the battleground states. This information would be
developed from the previous two studies. The latter two studies would
then become the benchmarks to set guidelines for the campaign,
Trends of Voter Attitudes
The wave studies could be done as they were in 1968. The theory was
that after field interviewing a large initial sample, certain individuals
would be re-interviewed in a three wave series to assess the effect of
statements and actions during the campaign. These wave studies concen-
trated on the key states. Other techniques for tracking voter attitudes
over time may be evaluated during the planning phase in 1971.
The wave studies were supplemented by nationwide daily telephone surveys
during the last six weeks of the campaign. Four-day updates based on
the 1000 telephone samples flowed into campaign headquarters to reflect
instant reactions. These telephone surveys could be the concluding
series of the 12-20 "instant research" surveys mentioned earlier.
Battleground States
In the battleground states, we will be particularly interested in identi-
fying and communicating with the ambivalent voters. The Citizens Commit-
tee is evaluating the use of census data and past voting patterns to lo-
cate important concentrations of these voters. A highly targeted polling
program might then be used to supplement Domestic Council findings on
the issues and attitudes that will most strongly determine their votes.
Those findings would be the basis for campaign issue strategy as well as
individual contacts through mail, telephone or personal visits by local
campaign workers. Variations on this technique have been used effectively
in several state elections, notably Reagan in 1970 in San Francisco County,
with DMI as the vendor.
Within the next few weeks, a specific proposal will be made to test the
concept in Delaware, in conjunction with the RNC. Delaware was chosen
because it is small but contains representative urban, suburban and rural
areas. That test, if approved, would identify the ambivalent voters,
using past voting data, detailed by county or precinct, and early Fourth
Count (demographic) data from the 1970 census. A baseline opinion survey
in several selected precincts would determine voter attitudes toward the
President and toward public issues. Half of the precincts would be held
as control groups. In the other half, through various forms of direct
communication, an effort will be made to create attitudes more favorable
to the Administration. A subsequent poll would evaluate how successful
the efforts had been. All of this experience would be extremely useful
in drawing up detailed operating plans for the campaign.
-3-
Recommendations
To implement these suggestions and to clarify responsibility for further
planning, you may want to consider two ideas which have been mentioned
recently:
1. Focus all polling in one consultant, as was done with Dave Derge in
1968. He could in turn use only one vendor (ORC in 1968) or several
vendors.
During the planning phase, the consultant could work jointly with
Higby and Strachan in the White House and Magruder and Marik in the
Citizens Committee. During the campaign, he could report to the
yet-to-be-established Strategy Committee.
At the present time, information is being gathered on several new
candidates for consultant, in order to broaden our options at the
time of the final decision.
2. Concentrate the polling responsibility for the key states in the
Citizens for the Re-election of the President. Many of their activities
will have a need to know up-to-date survey data: advertising, direct
mail, research, various voter blocs, etc. We will be able to best
coordinate the design of the survey and the dissemination of the
results if the consultant can work directly with the Citizens group
on a day-to-day basis. This would include the November 1971 and
May 1972 issues polls, the wave studies and the fi six week daily
telephone surveys. The information would simultaneously be fed to
the strategy committee by the consultant.
Mr. Haldeman would retain complete control of the 12-20 "instant
research" aspect, and, of course, extract the information intended
for the President's use only. He could feed the non-Presidential
trend material to the strategy committee.
DRAFT
May 19, 1971 5/22/71
The attorney General
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
JebS Magruder
FROM:
GORDON have ISTRACHAN Hgby
simulation
SUBJECT:
Polling Plan
Before your meeting with the Attorney General, Magruder, and Strachan,
it might be helpful to summarize the suggestions on polling for the
1972 Campaign. Derge's November plan has not been updated, but
Benham at ORC submitted suggestions on May 5. Copies of the proposals
are attached at tabs A and B respectively. All of the proposals
recommend following the basic research plan of 1968 Some variations
"
studies" (repeated laws freled interviews
are offered on the wave of large scale interviews, the "Instant
Research" capability, and issue studies. The current ORC-telephone
system for "Instant Research" could be altered slightly to fit
campaign trends and still be able to deliver the information
required. So this evaluation will focus on the "issue" and "wave"
studies vendors. and suggest possible vendors a mechanism for utilizing
The Domestic Council's Issue Study will be completed by the first week
in June. According to Cole two and perhaps theee more in depth studies
are planned. These can be timed to correspond with the Derge and
Benham recommendations (November, 1971, and May 1972). I would
suggest that the November study cover the same basic areas that the
current study is examining to assure adequate trend information.
doo
-2-
Additional issues that develop this summer and fall could also be
included. The thrust of the May study, however, should concentrate
on the key issues and swing voters in the battlegroun d states.
This information would be developed from the previous two studies.
noth studies
benelmades
The May study would then become the mechanism to set guidelines for
the Campaign.
The wave studies would be done as they were in 1968. The theory is
that by field interviewsqa large initial sample certain individuals
would be re-interviewed in a three wave series to assess the effect of
statements and actions during the Eampaign. These wave studies
concentrated on the key states. Other buckniques for trading voter attitudes
over time may be the planning phase in 1971
The wave studies were supplemented by nationwide daily telephone
surveys during the last 6 weeks of the campaign. Four-day
updates based on the 1000 telephone samples flowed into campaign
headquarters to reflect instant reactions. These telephone surveys
could be the concluding series of the 12-20 "instant research" survey
suggested in paragraph
above.
are may want to consider
To implement these suggestions, you have mentioned, but may want to
were this were have mentioned recently :
give-further-thought-to
1. Focus all polling in one consultant. This would have two
advantages. First, he could intern/luse only one vendor (ORC
alone in 1968) or use several vendors. This consultant could in
turn report to the yet-to-be established Strategy Committee.
-3-
7
campaign spending legislation, for later disbursement to the vendors
as they perform.
2. Concentrate the polling responsibility for the key states in the
Citizens for the Re-election of the President. This would include
the May 1971 issues poll, the wave studies and the final 6 week
daily telephone surveys. The information would be fed to the
strategy committee by the consultant. We would retainicontrol of
Mu Now
the 12-20 "instant research" aspect, but could feed the non-
Presidential trend material to the strategy committee.
In the battleground states, we will be particularly interested
in identifying and communicating with the ambivalent vote The
planning study in the Citizens Committee is evaluating the use of
census data and past noting patterns to locate important concentrations
of these votes. A highly targeted polling program would then be
used to identify the issues and attitudes that will most strongly
determine these votes. Those findings would be the basis for
individual contacts through mail, telephone or personal visits
by local campaign workers. Variations on this technique have been
used effectively in several state elections, otably Reagan in 1970
in San Francisco County, with DMI as the vendor.
Within the next few weeks, a specific proposal will be made to
test the concept in Delaware, in conjunction with the RNC. That
test, if approved, would identify the ambivalent voters, using
past voting data, detailed by county or precinct, and early Fourth
Country (denographic) data from the 1970 census. A baseline opinion
ruling
in several selected precincts would determine voter attitudes
toward the President and toward by public issues. Half of the
precincts would be held as control groups. In the other half, through
various forms of direct communication, an effort will be made to create
attitudes more favorable to the Administration, A subsequent poll
would evaluate how successful the efforts had been. All of this will
be extremely useful in drawing up detailed operating plans for the
campaign.
2
In 1968, Dave Derge served as the professional campaign
advisor on polling . It might be appropriate to consider the same
type of arrangement for 1972. Several new candidates should be
evaluated, at the same time, we are working closely with / Derge
to review 1968 activities and develop plans for this time.
A preliminary survey has been completed to identify the six
most qualified polling vendors for use in the 1972 campaign (Tab
)
During this planning period, we intend to solicit comprehensive proposals
from each of the six, both to expand our own thinking on applicable
polling techniques and to have a sound basis for making the final
selection.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
May 28, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By EMP Date 3-23-82
COMPISSIONAL
MEMORANDOM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT:
Compass Systems, Inc.
I talked with Sam Wiley today regarding the California computer sys-
ten. He is interested in assuming the responsibility for the remain-
ing $60,000 to keep this system operational. He will use University
Computing Corp. as the legal entity on the leases but will do what-
ever we would like in signing over the rights for the system and the
base file to us. Lie indicated he would like this to be considered as
part of his campaign contribution and he has asked me to meet with
him and his associates late next week to go over this in detail to be
sure he is legally secure regarding this matter.
Having University Computing as the legal entity would tie-in very
nicoly with our computer operations at the RNC since UCC is their
hardware source for all of their programs.
JEB S. MAGRUDER
JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Computers, etc.
CONFIGNATIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 27, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
The Attorney General just called Magruder about the CSI -
Finch matter. The Attorney General directed Magruder to:
1. Inform Finch that the Citizens will not sign the
leases;
2. Pursue alternate means of financing; Magruder is
to contact Perot and Wiley directly about their
individual or joint investment in CSI;
3. Inform Tom Evans at the RNC that the leases are
not to be signed.
Magruder thinks that the Attorney General would have accepted
the system had adequate background work been done.
Magruder emphasizes that Finch is now in a real bind vis
a vis his commitment to Put Livermore. Finch will probably
be quite upset at this decision.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
10:10 p.m.
LARRY:
Jeb Magruder called - said that
the AG has not reviewed the memo.
He has not signed the leases.
P.
H
G: get toJSm
immed. + say
done 5/27
don't sign until
direct order R/AG
Joll
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
HIGH PRIORITY
May 27, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
Jeb Magruder forwarded the attached memo on the CSI -- Bob Finch
matter. The memo asked for the Attorney General's decision on
signing the leases for $60,000 that Finch had committed.
Magruder called this morning to say that Finch had talked to him
and reported that the Attorney General had given Finch the O.K.
for Magruder to sign the contract.
I know you talked to Finch on this matter this morning and thought
you might be interested in this information.
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006
May 26, 1971
(202) 333-0920
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRAT
RKING
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12065, 6-102
By
EP
NARL
3-23-82
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT:
Compass Systems, Inc. (CSI) - System for Voter Analysis
in California
THE SYSTEM
The Republicans in California have sought to prepare themselves for
the very critical reapportionment legislation in 1971 by developing
a sophisticated computer system for redistricting design and analysis.
The key element in that system is an integrated data base, consisting
of California census data and past voting behavior, both broken down
by small geographic areas.
This integrated data base can be of significant value in identifying
pro and anti-Administration voters, and particularly the ambivalent,
or swing voters in the 1972 campaign. For this reason, the overall
CSI program development is of interest to the Citizens Committee and
the RNC. In fact, the RNC has been working closely with 18 or more
target states to aid in redistricting and to compile valuable data
for 1972.
With such information it will be possible to:
1.
Rank precincts by Republican strength,
2.
Locate concentrations of ticket-splitters,
3.
Locate concentrations of voters with certain characteristics
of age, education, income, race or ethnic background, etc., for deci-
sions on how to communicate with these voters and what issues to
emphasize,
4. Make decisions on location of campaign headquarters and
branch locations, with reference to the availability of local volun-
teers, impact of organizational presences, etc., and
CONFIDENTIAL
2
5.
Better interpret the significance of state polling resources,
etc.
To have such information for target states reemphasizes the early plan-
ning concepts which are being developed in the Citizens Committee for
research activity during the campaign.
BACKGROUND
The program was originally started with state funds in the summer of
1970, while Republicans controlled the State Legislature. When the
control was lost at the end of 1970, it was continued on a more
moderate, but very adequate, scale with private funds. The primary
motivation of most state contributors, of course, was reapportionment.
Recently, the Republican State Central Committee (Putnam Livermore,
Chairman) appealed to Bob Finch for financial support to sustain the
effort and Finch committed to find the funds to pay the equipment
leases for 1971 (actually, the 10 months beginning January 1 and end-
ing October 31, 1971). Bob Finch, in turn, has asked the Citizens
Committee to sign the leases in question.
Both Bob Marik and Bart Porter think that the system can be helpful to
the President's re-election effort in California in 1972. If the deci-
sion is to assume responsibility for the equipment leases, the Citizens
Committee should obtain assurances from the California State Central
Committee, in writing, that the data and the programs will be available
for our use at any time between now and election day. Further discus-
sions should be held, prior to signing, to cut the best possible deal
for the Citizens Committee regarding the payment of fees, if any, for
the actual reports to be run off for our use.
In the event that funding is not made available after October 31, 1971,
to keep CSI afloat, the data base and the software required to run
against it will be complete and the entire system can be run on any
number of "time-shared" systems in California at a low cost. There-
fore, we need not be concerned that they will "come to the well" a
second time.
A detailed chronology of program funding is given at Tab A. A compari-
son of the CSI system to possible alternative methods of compiling a
California data base is given at Tab B.
3
QUESTION
Should the Citizens Committee sign the leases in question, thereby
incurring financial obligations of approximately $60,000, to be paid
out over five (5) months time, June through October 1971?
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
JEB S MAGRUDER
CSI SYSTEM
Summary of Funding to Date
July, 1970 to December 31, 1970
State funds were provided through the California legislature (Bob
Monagan). The amount is not known precisely, but is probably in
the range of $150,000. It was expended on computer leases, data
collection from counties, and software development.
January 1, 1971 to mid-February, 1971
Bob Monagan, California Assembly Minority Leader, provided about
$35,000 from private sources.
Mid-February, 1971 to Present
Approximately $119,000 was spent during this period, including funds
provided by the State Central Committee, Mr. Monagan, Governor Reagan,
Mr. Finch ($12,000) and the RNC ($25,000). It was spent on equipment
leases and software development, primarily.
Present Funding Requirements
Present funding requirements are approximately $70,000 in computer
hardware leases through October 31, 1971. Of that amount, Mr. Finch
is thought to have $10,000 available. Other operating costs to com-
plete the data base and software programs are projected to be $60,000.
There is a firm commitment for $20,000 from sources within the state,
and the State Central Committee is confident that they can raise the
remaining $40,000.
TAB A
CSI SYSTEM
Comparison to Other Alternatives Available to the
RNC or the Citizens' Committee
The CSI system will include an integrated data base made up of census
data at the smallest applicable geographic subdivision and past voter
performance at the precinct level.
1.
Cost
CSI: $60,000 Citizens' Committee funds, as currently proposed
by Mr. Finch.
Alternative: More than $60,000 to produce an adequate data
base without coordination with the state
organization, according to the RNC.
2. Quality
The CSI system is probably superior to any system that would be
developed through an alternative means. The CSI system will
include the voting results for important state referenda over
the past years and local races, such as mayoralty campaigns.
Statewide survey information will also be included, as well as
surveys within assembly districts.
3.
Time Schedule
It is unlikely that any new effort could achieve any sort of
data base as soon as the current CSI effort could be completed
and proofed for errors.
Display of Data in Graphical Form
The CSI system has the capability of displaying demographic and voter
data for the same geographic subdivisions in very clear, color-coded
computer maps. Alternative systems would probably use less sophisti-
cated computer mapping techniques which would yield less readable
documents. In addition, the matching of voter precincts and census
tracts would have to be done by hand. That is acceptable for smaller
states, but very difficult for a large, populous state like California.
TAB B
2
In summary, the CSI data maps would probably be found useful by cam-
paign decision-makers. Other computer maps of the state very likely
would not. These maps, when properly designed and read, can locate
the ambivalent voter and lead to decisions on how to communicate with
him.
TAB B
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Finch's Arrangements with
Compass Systems, Inc.
Last December Bart Porter went to California on Finch's behalf
to assess Compass Systems, Inc. Porter submitted a memorandum
to Finch on December 11, 1970, which recommended that $700,000
should be accumulated to take over CSI. You reviewed this proposal in
a meeting in your office with Finch and Porter. You decided that
$700,000 should not be appropriated but that Perot or Sam Wiley should
be encouraged to take over CSI. Neither did, and the project lanquished
in Finch's office for five months. Severe problems developed while
Finch was in Europe.
Jeb Magruder and Bart Porter went to Finch's office last Wednesday
to discuss the 18-20 year old vote task force. Finch instead gave
Magruder equipment leases to cover the operation of CSI from January 1
to October 31, 1971. The leases provided for the payment of $83, 000 and
were to be signed by Magruder on behalf of the Citizen's Committee.
Magruder, not suprisingly, said to let me check with the Attorney General
before signing. Magruder and Porter saw the Attorney General on Friday.
The Attorney General asked for time to "review the bidding" and this
information was relayed to Finch by Porter. Magruder is to prepare a
statement of the facts for the Attorney General on Wednesday, May 26.
This decision may be delayed until Friday, May 28, depending on the
Attorney General's schedule.
It turns out that the pressure on Finch to come up with the money is
fairly severe because:
1. Finch committed himself to Put Livermore to cover the
$83,000 for leases for January 1 to October 31, 1971.
2. Put Livermore, on the basis of this assurance, took CSI
under his wing by raising and authorizing the expenditure of
$120,000. Another $40,000 is to be raised by Livermore.
-2-
3. Put Livermore sent Darrell Wolde to Finch's office
Friday to pick up the executed leases. Wolde will apparently
wait in Washington until the leases are signed.
4. Due to John Rowe's urging the RNC put $25,000 into CSI.
The California Republican State Central Committee
now owns a CSI data base as a result of this investment. It
is unclear who authorized this expenditure but it is viewed as
part of the Finch transaction.
5. Of the original $83,000 commitment, $12,000 has been
paid ($10, 000 from Finch, source unknown; $2,000 from
Livermore). Finch apparently has another $10,000 for the
project.
The result is that the balance due is $60, 352 and Finch has stated
that whether the Attorney General authorizes the expenditure or not,
Finch will stand by his cash commitment to Livermore.
As to the merits of the system, no recommendation will be made to
the Attorney General by Magruder. Rather, Magruder will emphasize
that the system could be very helpful in California, but that its applica-
tion to a national campaign has not been evaluated. Similarly, no one
has examined the reasons why in December the System cost $700,000
whereas today $60,350 could keep it going until October 31, 1971.
RECOMMENDATION:
There has been no detailed White House evaluation of the System since
December. In that six months the cost has dropped to one-tenth of
the original proposal. Before $60,000 is appropriated, Bob Marik,
Magruder's project manager for the Research Task Force, should submit
a written description of the capabilities of CSI to you and the Attorney
General.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
THE WHITE HOUSE
THE WHITE HOUSE
Date: WASHINGTON 5/26/7
WASHINGTON
Date: 5/26
To : Magrader -
TO: Lany Highy
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
From :
L. Higby
- -This is the inadequate
what hend of
report on mack
conventions that you
gome is Poster
asked for.
playing. Thei in terribb
- Pushing Porter yielded
little because he will be
out for two weeks with
L
an operation.
- I'll get back on Magruder
for something substantive
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
May 19, 1971
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006
(202) 333-0920
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
BART PORTER
B.
SUBJECT:
Mock Conventions on College and High
School Campuses
Per your memorandum to Jeb Magruder of May 6, attached is the
excerpt from Mort Allin's report which deals with mock elections.
Current thinking is to plan a mock election for someplace in New
Hampshire prior to the primary in March, 1972. This would be
followed by additional mock elections in late spring and early
summer, to build toward the convention. The final report from
the 18-20 Year Old Task Force will include a more detailed calen-
dar and strategy.
Attachment
- 3 -
III. Initial Programs
A. Mock Conventions
Intense investigation into the personnel and scenario of
five major mock conventions was begun early (Notre Dame, Purdue,
Washington and Lee, Ohio University, and Vanderbilt) and a field
trip to the first four was undertaken by the director in the first
week of February. Depending upon the state, our contacts, and the
likely publicity, all mock convention groups who contacted the youth
division (over 100 high schools and colleges in the end) were sent
Nixon speeches and biographies as well as buttons, posters and bumper
stickers. Cooperation from the Nixon for President Committee in sup-
plying literature and campaign materials helped greatly in this en-
deavor. A Mock Convention Handbook was printed and distributed upon
request. Thus, while general assistance was given to schools through-
out the country, the five mentioned were determined to be strategic
because of past reputations or anticipated news coverage.
The Washington and Lee Mock Convention sought again to be the
most realistic and authentic of the college conventions. A conscientious
effort was made by the students to reflect accurately the sentiments of
the delegates in the states they represented. Because of this, the
victory there was more significant than elsewhere. However, the Nixon
effort might still have failed had it not been for very capable students
working on RII's behalf at the convention. These students were cultivated
early and extensive supplies as well as funds ($300 direct grant) were
provided in addition to bi-weekly phone calls.
- 4 -
RECOMMENDATIONS: AS IT IS THE CUSTOM TO ALTERNATE PARTIES
OR CHOOSE THE PARTY WITH THE MOST HEAVILY-CONTESTED RACE (USUALLY
(Mock Conventions)
THE PARTY OUT OF POWER) MOST MPCs IN 172 WILL PROBABLY BE DEMOCRAT.
HOWEVER, IN THE EARLY FALL OF 1971 AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO FIND
STUDENT LEADERS AND YRs ON THOSE CAMPUSES HOLDING REPUBLICAN OR BI-
PARTISAN MOCK CONVENTIONS. HAVE THEM TAKE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR ALL DETAILS ON THEIR CAMPUS: DELEGATE SELECTION, COMMITTEE
COMPOSITION, ETC. THEY SHOULD STRIVE TO MAKE THEIR CONVENTION A
FORECAST OF THE ACTUAL PARTY CONVENTIONS RATHER THAN MERELY A TEST
OF THE STUDENTS' OWN PREFERENCES. IF THIS CAN BE DONE, CONVENTION
OUTCOMES WILL BE MORE PREDICTABLE AND CONSIDERABLE PUBLICITY VALUE
CAN BE GAINED FROM THE RESULTS. ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM USE OF LOCAL AND
STATEWIDE PUBLICITY. BE PREPARED TO SUPPLY NEEDED MATERIALS--
BALLOONS, POSTERS, LITERATURE. A STAFFER SHOULD VISIT THE MAJOR
CAMPUSES AT LEAST ONCE TO TALK WITH KEY ORGANIZERS. OFTENTIMES
THEY NEED BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT OTHER CONVENTIONS, BOTH REAL
AND MOCK, TO GENERATE IDEAS AND GIVE THEM A FIRM GRASP OF THE ACTUAL
PROCEDURES. RN SHOULD TRY TO SPEAK AT THOSE CAMPUSES WITH MAJOR
MOCK CONVENTIONS DURING THE SPRING AND FALL OF 1971 AND EARLY WINTER
OF 1972.
THE NATURAL TENDENCY WILL BE FOR THE YRs TO BE ENTIRELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE EVENTS, SINCE THEY WILL HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR
THE PARTY FOR FOUR YEARS. CARE MUST BE TAKEN TO ADD NEW PEOPLE
DEMOCRATS AND INDEPENDENTS--TO BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT AND NOT
TO BECOME TIED DOWN BY SOME YR GROUPS WHICH MAY BE INEFFECTIVE.
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
SUITE 272
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20006
May 7, 1971
(202) 333-0920
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. MAGRUDER
FROM:
BART PORTER
BP
During our meeting with Len Garment today, the following was agreed
upon:
1. Len agreed to begin thinking about advertising strategy and
together with Porter begin contacting various people on the task force.
These people are Pat Buchanan, Dwight Chapin, Cliff Miller, Dick Moore,
Ray Price, and Frank Shakespeare.
2. Porter agreed to copy Magruder's campaign file on advertising
and give to Len Garment.
3. Porter agreed to send Len Garment the information Magruder
has dealing with pending campaign reform legislation.
4.
Porter agreed to remind Magruder to call Ruth Jones.
5. Porter agreed to begin gathering up old campaign film clips
going back to the 1968 primaries. Garment suggested I contact John
Shlaes who handled advertising logistics in 1968.
6. Porter agreed to contact Dr. Ed David to discuss recent
techniques on behavioral and attitudinal research as it might relate
to upcoming campaign. Porter will ask that Dr. David contact Len
Garment directly.
7. Magruder agreed to gather together all polling information
and deliver to Garment for review.
8. Magruder agreed to begin contacting appropriate people on
the advertising task force to discuss our advertising logistics for
the campaign.
2
9.
Magruder suggested that Van Shumway be added to the task force
group.
10.
Garment suggested that Ed Morgan be added to the task force
group.
11.
Garment was given a copy of the Ailes report.
In addition, I contacted Mark Goode yesterday and inquired about the
status of the project to improve the quality of the Navy film crews
filming of the President. Mark indicated that the quality of the film
had improved dramatically over the past 2-3 months since he has been on
board. However, he admitted that he has not had much opportunity to
review the films during the last 2 months. He informed me that he has
a request in for equipment that will allow him to review films in his
office in that the facilities in the family theater are inadequate for
his, and I would presume our, purposes. These films are available for
viewing on 1 or 2 hours notice.
DETERMINED
a
BE
AN
KING
E.
CONFIDENTIAL
Section
6-102
By
&
3-23-82
May 17, 1971
TO:
FROM:
JEB BOB MARIK MAGRUDER UPOL
SUBJECT:
RESEARCH-MEETING WITH PETER FLANIGAN
At our meeting today, the following points were discussed:
1. Polling Vendors. I gave Peter a copy of Dave Derge's memo on the
first vendor survey. Peter leans strongly to the concept of one field
polling vendor and one telephone survey vendor (recommendation C in the
memo). This eliminates the necessity to manage several vendors in par-
allel operations and assures better consistency in trend data. He
feels that we should further evaluate the potential vendors by letting
them perform in battleground states (Derge's recommendation D). We
did not have a chance to discuss the recommendations that Tully Plesser
is preparing.
2. Polling Expert. Peter feels that we should definitely have an
expert in the field, such as Dave Derge, working between the campaign
Bruce
menill
organization and the survey vendors. He wants to look at other possi-
walt
bilities besides Derge before a firm commitment is made. Lance Tarrance
Devries
has given me two names which I will research further.
3. Past Polling Activities. Peter is going to set up a meeting with
Derge, to review the polling activity in 1968, as well as to discuss
plans for 1972. He has asked for a summary from Larry Higby of Haldeman's
private polling activity (not content), and I will gather the public
polling summaries.
4. Overall Research Plan. We briefly discussed the overall system which
I had drafted, as well as the RNC plans to do a pilot study in Delaware.
5/26-propool
Peter has copies of both the research plan and Dick Richards' write-up
of the Delaware project. He thought that the idea of testing some tech-
niques in Kentucky may have merit.
5. Neighbors for Nixon. I told Peter that we had talked to Dick Richards
and that you had contacted Alan Peterson for a summary of 1968 activities.
6. Next Meeting. If possible, the Derge meeting will take place next
week. If not, Peter and I will meet to discuss the overall project further,
after he has had a chance to digest the written material I left with him.
CONFIDENTIAL
DETERMINED TO BE AM
ADMT
MARKING
By
EP
6-102
3-23-82
CONEIDENTIAL
May 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
JEB BOB MAGRUDER MARIK KH
SUBJECT:
RESEARCH
I had an excellent meeting with Marty Anderson on Friday, and I thought
you might find these notes of interest.
Research Activity in 1968 - Contenders and Issues
In 1968, the research function under Marty included opposition candidates
and issue positions. Peter Flanigan and Dave Derge did the polling separately.
In opposition research, each candidate's position on the issues was deter-
mined and compared to the President. Where stands were similar, the issue
was usually down-played. The differences were emphasized, particularly where
it was clear that the opponent came down on the wrong side.
In issue research, a policy position was developed and presented to the
President for approval. When adopted, it became the basis for statements,
speeches, etc. Speechwriting was very close to issue research. Marty
Anderson, Alan Greenspan (domestic policy) and Dick Allen (foreign policy)
probably spent 80% of their time on research and 20% on speechwriting. Pat
Buchanan and Ray Price spent about 10% on research and 90% on writing. However,
those writing the speeches had been involved in the development of the issue.
Marty feels that the present separation of issue/policy development and
speech writing has led to some rather sterile, boiler-plate speeches, and
that we should guard against that in the campaign.
Issue Research in 1972
Although many issues and programs have been established through the Administration
record of the first term, there should be an effort to develop new issues
and policies for the campaign. We should not be solely limited to defending
existing programs.
Polls
A weak point in 1968 was that the results of the polls were tightly held. There
was almost no interaction--either in terms of question input or opinion results--
between the polling people and those developing the issues. Our current efforts
in this regard are obviously in the right direction, and it is very important
that they succeed.
Network of Experts
In 1968, Marty set up a network of outside experts who could be reached at
any time for a reaction or input on a given subject. In 1970, the network
was mainly of people inside the government. We need to set up a similar
network for '72, but not too early because people might have been shifted
to different responsibilities by the time the campaign is in full gear.
The quality of the people in the network of experts and the research staff
is all-important, because success depends on being able to react quickly and
effectively to unexpected events. There will, for example, most likely be
instances where people in the bureaucracy tip the opposition candidate or
the press on some subtle flaw in Administration legislation.
The Director of Research must have a small group of people who know exactly
whom to call in the network in case of any fast-breaking : issue. To call the
wrong person is sometimes worse than not reacting at all. The research staff
must also be able to understand very quickly what constitutes a hot issue,
SO that reaction and response are properly triggered.
We must avoid the appearance that the White House staff is running the
campaign, as well as any other indication that it is being supported in part
at government expense.
Communications to the Field
In communicating with the campaign party in the field, one often does not
realize how hectic things are on the plane. Marty solved the research liaison
problem when he traveled with the campaign party by setting a high priority
on keeping in contact with his cohorts back at the headquarters. If someone
on the plane does not make time for it, it is almost impossible to keep the
research information flowing to and from the field.
The 1970 Campaign
In 1970 on the campaign with Agnew, the major problem was knowing the person-
alities, issues, and other conditions in each state SO that the speech content
would be appropriate. The advance information could have been better. This
time, it would be advisable to compile data from the states: polls, issues,
personalities, etc.
They had a very good communications system to the plane which enabled them to
get important information several hours ahead of the accompanying press corps,
who generally had to wait until landing.
Documenting Past Experience
The experience of past campaigns will be invaluable in '72. Some straightforward
logistical items will almost certainly be done incorrectly at first if the new
people are given no guidance. Apparently the Advance Men, under Ehrlichman,
is the only area for which past experience has been written up in detail. It
would require, in most cases, a major effort on the part of the key people in
'68 to record their successful procedures and organizations. Adequate motivation
would only come if Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Mitchell were to contact each one and
ask him to prepare a notebook as a part of a compilation of the total '68
campaign, for planning in '72. One or two isolated notebooks would be of
little value in the absence of the others.
Computers
Computers have not been used effectively in past campaigns. In terms of
issues and contenders, the important thing is the content of current speeches
and statements, rather than instant retrieval of past records. The time
lag in finding a past reference is rarely a decisive factor, whereas bad
judgment during the campaign often is.
Computers may have been used to process data from polls, but apparently
not for processing democraphic data. It is usually too hectic during the
campaign to make a sophisticated computer program work effectively. However,
if a couple of knowledgeable people could be left alone to do it, and if
the decision makers in the campaign were disposed to use the output material,
it might be worthwhile to do. Kevin Phillips did some good things in '68.
Organization Structure
Marty sees a great danger in isolating various aspects of the campaign in
individual organizational "cells". In '68 they were all together in one
building in New York. When they expanded beyond that, they went across
the street. He is apprehensive of the apparent trend in '72 to keep the
nucleus small and have the functioning units spread around town. The
enthusiasm of the campaign workers is not as great and they do not work so
hard.
It is very important to achieve maximum integration of all the functions.
In '68 there were about 40-50 people in the "main body" of the campaign.
He anticipates more in '72, if only because of the complexity of having a
President travel around the country.
General
When the '72 campaign plans have been drafted, they should be reviewed by the
appropriate people from the '68 and '70 campaigns SO that past errors are not
designed in again. General plans are very important, but most critical is
to get the right people to staff the organization.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 10, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
PETER FLANIGAN
As the campaign progresses you will soon
want to form a Businessmen's Committee for the
Re-election of the President. Don Kendall would,
in my mind, be the ideal individual to form this
committee. He's young, vigorous, deeply committed
to the President and part of the top business
community.
I checked this idea with John Mitchell
who agrees Kendall is the proper guy to be head
of the Businessmen's Committee. Kendall is ready,
willing and able. So unless I hear differently from
you I will assume that when the time comes you will
go to Kendall.
May 21, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
JEB BOB MARIK MAGRUDER PILL
SUBJECT:
THE ELDERLY VOTE
Following our conversation with Len Garment on Wednesday, I met with Bernard
Van Rensselaer at the RNC to initiate work on the position paper that we are
to develop. Our extended conversation covered the following major points.
Senior citizens are becoming increasingly politically active as a means of
influencing public policy in areas of their concern. There are at present
four major lobby groups for senior citizens which claim a membership of sev-
eral million people. These groups are staffed by very capable people and
issue regular newsletters to their members to keep them informed of govern-
ment activity on pertinent issues.
For the first two years of this administration very little was done to curry
the favor of these voters. For example, the President had promised in 1968,
to appoint an advisor on aging to the White House staff. That has not been
done. The top contact in the Executive branch is the Administration on Aging
(AOA), which is an agency buried deep within HEW. Recently, several events
have taken place reversing this trend.
(1) Earlier budget cuts for AOA were restored, and additional funds
added beyond that. This prevented the closing of many Old Age Centers very
important to the elderly.
(2) A task force was appointed by the Secretary of HEW to consider
raising AOA within HEW.
(3) Last Friday the President met for an hour with representatives of
the four groups of senior citizens. They had an opportunity to exchange views
on important issues. Indications are that the President created considerable
good will even among those who do not completely subscribe to his policies.
Van has been working with Len Garment and George Bell in developing recommend-
ations for the White House. He feels that two additional things need to be
done within the next few weeks to consolidate the President's position with
these voters. One, the White House should issue a major position paper on
programs for the aging. This is a matter which now rests between OMB and Len
Garment. Two, the President should make a major address to a large gathering
of senior citizens. One possibility would be a meeting in Chicago of the
National Association of Retired Persons, in late June.
-2-
With regard to the Citizens Committee, Van suggested that a qualified person
be designated soon to head the campaign activity for senior citizens. He
recommends Howard Webber in Pompano Beach, Florida. Howard is a retired exe-
cutive of Kaiser Industries and before that was an executive in General Tire
and Rubber. He is in his mid-60's and in excellent health, although he has
recently undergone a successful double cateract operation. He has a great deal
of energy, is very articulate, has good political instincts, and has done
organizational work before. In 1969 and 1970, he was chairman of the senior
citizens section of the Florida State Republican Committee. He did a good
job in coordinating with the leaders of senior citizens in that state. He
also, incidently, works well with Van. I suggest that we call him and ask
him to come up to Washington at our expense for a planning meeting on the
elderly voters as a means to get to know him. He might continue to work in
the planning phase and then take over direction of the effort during the
campaign. If he turned out to be the right man, it would be useful for him
to begin early to establish a network of contacts and campaign workers within
the four major groups and within important geographical areas. A man like
this would undoubtedly be able and willing to devote a great deal of time to
the effort, and the results could be a great benefit.
As the next step in developing the position paper for our campaign planning,
Van's office will schedule a meeting to include him, Brad Patterson, George
Bell, and myself for early next week. In the meantime they are compiling
some useful documents which will bring me up to date on issues involving the
elderly.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE ARKING
E.O. 120
By W
6-102
3-23-82
May 20, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attached is a report on each of the Presidential candidates'
Washington offices.
This brings up the question as to whether it would be appropri-
ate for us to have an organized system of contact with these
individual offices. If you feel it would be appropriate, I am
sure we can arrange this activity.
JEB S. MAGRUDER
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL
JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Demo/Rep Contenders
McCLOSKEY HEADQUARTERS - 328 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
This is a "storefront" operation, in an older
three-storied building that was formerly a real
estate office.
There are no signs other than a few bumper
stickers and photos taped to the inside of
the store window.
Casual visitor can't tell whether upper two
floors are being used for McCloskey operation.
Ground floor is one large open area. No
switchboard in sight. Old desks and tables.
Three young men (20-25) and one middle-aged
(45) woman in sight.
Have bumper stickers, buttons, some literature
available. Handing out form asking for volunteer
help.
A few bumper stickers and photos of McCloskey
are taped to the walls, but the most prominent
wall decor is a colorful cartoon poster of
the President, captioned "He Kept our Boys
Out of Northern Ireland."
Really a rather seedy looking setup.
McGOVERN HEADQUARTERS - 410 First Street, SE
Headquarters is on the ground floor of a two-story building
just one block from the Republican National Committee. The
building is either new or newly remodeled. There are no
windows facing the street, and no signs other than bumper
stickers on the front door.
The second floor is occupied by the stenographic reporting
firm of Ward and Paul, who also seem to use part of the
ground floor, probably for printing and mailing services
that will be shared by the McGovern people.
The inner door, leading from a tiny entryway into the
McGovern offices, has elaborate anti-burgular devices
attached.
The casual visitor finds an older woman processing some
incoming mail (checks attached) at a receptionist's desk.
No PBX is evident, but there's a small Callmaster unit
on her desk.
The receptionist's area opens onto another, larger room
(about 20 X 30') that appears ready to be used for vol-
unteers in stuffing, mailing, etc. A couple of large
McGovern banners, and a big American flag, are prominently
displayed.
A hallway runs from the receptionist's area towards the
rear of the building, but there's no way of seeing what's
back there.
Bumper stickers and buttons (in red, white, or blue) are
offered at the receptionist's desk.
Overall impression is of neatness and businesslike.
HUGHES HEADQUARTERS - 41 Ivy Street, SE
This operation is in a detached brick three-story house
directly opposite the Rotunda Restaurant. The house is
typically Capitol Hill smallish, somewhat run down.
The casual visitor finds three or four young people (25
or thereabouts) working amid organized confusion in what
used to be the living room. This is the only room to be
seen without going upstairs or through a doorway that
enters the back of the house.
Several desks and card tables. A rack holding bumper
stickers and pins (for sale at 30¢ and 20c each) and
a variety of literature. No PBX in view. Six button
phones only.
Several large banners offer "Hughes, the man to consider
in '72." Prominently displayed is a poster-sized photo
of President Nixon with his lips pursed. The poster's
caption reads "War is Heck."
There is no real sign on the outside of the building.
A couple of Hughes bumber stickers are posted on the
windows.
This operation seems informal, somewhat ricky-ticky,
but gives an impression of organization.
BAYH HEADQUARTERS - 1225 - 19th Street, NW
The offices are in suite 502 of this building, which used
to house the International Club on the ground floor. The
defunct National Communications Club was here, too, in the
same space.
The "International Institute for Environmental Affairs" is
in the office next door to the Bayh Committee, and a Dana
Orwick and Thomas W. Wilson Jr. are listed in Suite 501.
The Bayh Committee is listed on the building directory,
and a couple of bumper stickers and "have a nice day"
posters decorate the clear-glass entryway to the fifth
floor offices.
The reception area is smallish ... about 10 X 15'.
A young woman mans a newer vertical-type switchboard,
and visitors are asked to wait on a couple of sofas.
Magazines and lamps give the reception area an atmosphere
like a doctor's office. There is virtually nothing to
see from this office.
Bumper stickers are available, but a request brought only
one, and that one had to be brought out by another worker.
The overall impression is "spare, but not bare." It's
a businesslike atmosphere.
Interesting to note: Suite 706 is listed to a Ken Reitz,
who is probably ex of the RNC.
MUSKIE HEADQUARTERS - 1660 L Street, NW
The Muskie operation is in suites 1004-5 of this office
building in downtown Washington. The "Muskie Committee"
is listed on the building directory, but not on the door
into the tenth-floor office.
The casual visitor finds a bare reception room manned
by a young (20ish) girl at an old-style switchboard.
This room is shared by a couple of cabinets of telephone
gear, a teleprinter (news ticker), a few boxes of books
and assorted junk. A picket sign, crudely hand-lettered
"Muskie Staff for Peace" rests against one wall. The
room is about 12 X 22' in size. A hallway leads towards
offices to the rear.
A couple of "Muskie/72" and "Muskie/Maine" bumper stickers
are on the news ticker, but the visitor is told that these
are manufacturers' samples only, and that stickers and
buttons haven't been ordered yet. "Probably, as soon as
the Senator announces."
The feeling is one of tooling-up.
Circumstances prevented checking the building directory
for possibly interesting firm and individual names.
HIGH PRIORITY
May 27, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Job Magruder forwarded the attached meme on the CSI -- Bob Finch
matter. The memo asked for the Attorney General's decision on
signing the leases for $60,000 that Finch had committed.
Magruder called this morning to say that Finch had talked to him
and reported that the Attorney General had given Finch the O.K.
for Magruder to sign the contract.
I know you talked to Finch on this matter this morning and thought
you might be interested in this information.
GS:lm
May 25, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Finch's Arrangements with
Compass Systems. Inc.
Last December Bart Porter went to California on Finch's behalf
to assess Compass Systems, Inc. Porter submitted a memorandem
to Finch on December 11, 1970, which recommended that $700,000
should be accumulated to take over CSI. Youreviewed this proposal in
a meeting in your office with Finch and Forter. You decided that
$700,000 should bet be appropriated but that Perot or Sam Wiley should
be encouraged to take over CSI. Neither did, and the project lanquished
in Finch's office for five menths. Severe problems developed while
Finch was is Europe.
Job Magrader and Bart Porter went to Finch's office last Wednesday
to discuss the 18-20 year old vote task force. Flach instead gave
Magruder squipment leases to cover the operation of CSI from January &
to October 31, 1971. The leases provided for the payment of $63,000 and
were to be signed by Magruder on behalf of the Citizens Committee.
Magrader, not suprisingly, said to let me check with the Attorney General
before signing. Magruder and Porter saw the Attorney General on Friday.
The Attorney General naked for time to "review the bidding" and this
information was relayed to Fisch by Porter. Magruder is to prepare a
statement of the (acts for the Attorney General on Wednesday, May 26.
This decision may be delayed until Friday, May 28, depending on the
Attorney General's schedule.
It turns out that the pressure on Finch to come up with the money is
fairly severe because:
to Finch committed himself to Pat Livermore to cover the
$83,000 for leases for January I to October 31, 1971.
2. Put Livermore, on the basis of this assurance, took CSI
under his wing by raising and authorising the expenditure of
$120,000. Another $40,000 is to be ralsed by Livermore.
-2-
3. Put Livermore sent Darrell Wolde to Fineh's office
Friday to pick up the executed leases. Wolde will apparently
walt is Washington until the leases are signed,
4. Due to John Rowe's urging the RNC put $25,000 into CSI.
The California Republican State Central Committee
now owns a CSI data base as a result of this investment. It
# unclear who authorised this expenditure but it is viewed as
part of the Finch transaction.
5. Of the original $83,000 commitment, $12,000 has been
paid ($10,000 from Finch, source unknown; $2,000 from
Livermore). Finch apparently has another $10,000 for the
project.
The result is that the balance due is $60, 352 and Flach has stated
that whether the Attorney General authorises the expenditure or not,
Finch will stand by his cash commitment to Livermore.
As to the merits of the system, BO recommendation will be made to
the Attorney General by Magruder. Rather, Magruder will emphasise
that the system could be very helpful in California, but that its applica-
tion to a national campaign has not been evaluated. Similarly, no one
has examined the reasons why in December the System cost $700,000
whereas today $60,000 could keep it going until October 31, 1971.
RECOMMENDATION:
There has been no detailed White House evaluation of the System since
December. In that six months the cost has dropped to one-tenth of
the original proposal. Before $60,000 is appropriated, Bob Marik,
Magruder's project manager for the Research Task Force, should submit
a written description of the capabilities of CSI to you and the Attorney
General.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
GS:kb
HLP 5/24
Dec - HLP
Cal for Funch, ded
report one on compass Systems
12/11/70 HLP
Find
11 fund funds
H - cc?
2 2 appt comn
2 take overcsI
HLP
H's office H + Finch
wree 200, 000
H
we don't have " or
how about Perot + Sam
e iley te nuest incsi
Finea
wiley + Porter meets
ucom Unie Comp Company
Ian e they
wash + Finelis off,
but back away
HLP - out of t til last 5/19
HLP+58m
F anch re 18-21yrd
Finch twels about Cal pere
Put Libermere, cam Cal Rep Party
tallen CSI under wing +
contril
- resed 120, spent its
raise 40 + into CSI
Finih
Livermore - "Ill commit
to Equip $ Leases bet. Jan 1>
83,000
10/31
of 83, 12 paid; 10 by RF+
2 by Put beveimore + RF
has 10 more from undnown
of! avances
60, 352 left
RF on Then - leases
ULP, se
let comm con sign
RF
J8M + says talled to AG,
who knew mada,
J8M + HLP
AG on Fui +
AG
" heview brilding"
58m - Porta + marik,
Ed De Bolt the
to get facts en men.
ALP-Fri
Grassmuck & Finea
Finch buys review.
whe AG decides or
not, RF made commit
+ he will pul it up.
Danell w olde bad Prl License
5/24 mark, Re Polt, John Rowe,
(to pick pleases; at imtg
2 2 ass. Gransmark, wolde
lled morning HC Pt mail will prepare
pacts + paper for AG Ogreat
meret te system Brecommently system
RNC
John Rowe $25,000 Rncin
cal Per completed data base
murd file in CSI, Rep ST Cen Com
in cal owns data lase pile.
Livermore upset w/RF beel of It commit
G Heopes on 10G last Fi
G
J8M 234 cc mem re Pol consal
Recommend - signil value for
Rn to get cal
60,000-60 -
Bavobs broke when RF in Emopex
Grossmuck almts he dropped ball
Grassmuck - Brown (John)
Funih
me confid "it los been noted that;"
things we disurssed should
be FU
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 24, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Whoever is running California for us should
take a look into this lady and whatever outfit
she is with. This kind of cutting from the
Right, can do the same kind of damage to
the President in '72 that the Shell defections
did in 1962.
Concerned
Californians
2301 PACIFIC AVENUE, SUITE 6
SAN FRANCISCO. CALIFORNIA
Against
Nixon
April 12, 1971
Richard M. Nixon
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Nixon:
Public opinion polls show your popularity to be waning. We
submit that this is not due to your conduct of the Vietnam war--
although there are probably a great many people who are dis-
heartened by this no-win war--but because of your politically
unnecessary "turn to the left", which is evidenced by your
"keynesian" deficit budget, welfare expansion, national health
insurance proposal, and other welfarist actions.
Enclosed are a few samples of the first in a series of
election materials which will soon be widely distributed in
California to help insure that this state's electoral votes do
not go to you in 1972. While this may indeed result in the
election of a Democrat president (barring the emergence of a
conservative Republican candidate), we feel that the long range
good of the two-party system in general, and the Republican
party in particular, will be well served by your retirement
from office for the following reasons:
1) A clearly conservative majority of Democrats and Republi-
cans elected you in 1968 on the basis of your clearly conservative
election platform. You have betrayed this majority with the
result that conservatives of both parties will be reluctant to
vote for real Republicans in the future.
2) The presence of a Republican neo-socialist in the White
House is having a paralyzing effect upon many conservatives such
as Barry Goldwater and others who would ordinarily oppose in
principle welfarist schemes such as yours, had they been proposed
by a Democrat. You, as a fellow Republican, have preempted their
commitment to principle by appealing to "party loyalty".
3) The fact that you have cloaked your liberal/socialist
proposals in conservative rhetoric clearly indicates that you
yourself recognize that the majority of the electorate is in
fact conservative. This therefore indicates that your turn to
the left is not based upon "pragmatic" political expediency, but
instead on a self-serving desire to earn for yourself a niche
in the history books as a "social reformer" in the tradition of
FDR. This desire will have to be satisfied at your own expense,
not at that of the taxpayers.
Once the Republican Party is reaffirmed as the logical
political vehicle for conservatives the two-party system of the
United States will once again become meaningful. To this end
STOP SOCIALISM
DUMP NIXON '72
MEMORANDUM
FU
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
5/19
May 7, 1971
Has
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
DAVID C. HOOPES
A
orig
FROM:
RE:
Roger Ailes TV Consulting
March 1971 Bill Payment
You asked whether payment had been made to Roger Ailes for television
consulting during March 1971.
We are advised that a check for $378.25 was made payable on April 9,
1971 to R.E.A. Productions, Inc. for television research and consulting
performed during March 1971 by Roger Ailes, representing $250.00 in
fees and $128.25 25 in expenses.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
NOTE TO: B H. R. HALDEMAN
Date
5/14
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
- ailes prepared the
attached report on the
use of TV by LBJ
- The report is weak
but interesting passages
have been marked
- Magruder has not
received any comments
from the AG on the report.
TO:
ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROGER E. AILES
DATE:
MARCH 1, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
CONTENTS
Page
1. Introduction
1
2. Chronology of TV Appearances
2
3. F.C.C. Equal Time
6
4. Johnson Staff
8
5. Anti Goldwater Campaign
9
6. Pro Johnson Campaign
10
7. Johnson Statement on Campaign Tactics
10
8. Courting the Press
11
9. The Advertising Agency
12
10. Fear as a Campaign Tool
14
11. Goldwater Counter Attack
15
12. The Debate
17
13. Television Costs
18
14. Summary
20
15. Bibliography
23
16. Books About Lyndon B. Johnson
25
17. Books About Television & Politics
26
INTRODUCTION
Richard Nixon will be the second President to run
for re-election since television became the primary
means of communication with the electorate. This re-
port ignores Eisenhower's use of TV; although it could
be argued that he was faced with a similar problem.
The Nixon-Kennedy debates really were the turning point
of political TV.
A President today has a unique problem. He cannot
afford not to use TV but it seems if he uses it too
much or in the wrong way it will work against him.
This report is confined to the Johnson television
appearances between November, 1963 and November, 1964.
It represents a compilation of articles from several
newspapers, and magazines during that period. It also
includes major books from the Johnson era and "facts/
feelings" from conversations with people who were
involved and remembered the 1964 Presidential election.
-1-
The following is a chronological list of the
televised appearances of Lyndon B. Johnson made be-
tween November, 1963 and November, 1964. For the
first two months in office, the President made ten
appearances: 5 each month. There was no regularity
in his appearances. In his first ten months in office
no month had more than five televised appearances,
some months he appeared only twice, and some not at
all. In October of 1964, just before the election,
however, the number of appearances increased to
eleven and three of these announcements were campaign
oriented. The other eight were news events where
the President thought he could cash in on some free
publicity. With the exception of two or three, the
rest seem inane and unnecassary as news events but very
pertinent to the campaign strategy--the theory seemed
to be "the President is hard at work", and if you don't
believe it just turn on your television and see him.
-2-
PRESIDENTIAL APPEARANCES TELEVISED 1963-1964
11-22-63
On assasination of J. F. Kennedy
11-23-63
Proclamation #3561 National Day of
Mourning
11-26-63
Remarks on the Alliance For Progress
11-27-63
Address Before Joint Session of Congress
11-28-63
President's Thanksgiving Day Address to
Nation
12-4-63
Remarks at a meeting with AFL-CIO
Executive Council
12-17-63
Address before U.N. General Assembly
12-20-63
Remarks upon signing the Radification of
the Chamizal Convention
12-22-63
Remarks at a Candlelight Memorial Service
for J. F. Kennedy
12-22-63
Remarks at the Lighting of the National
Xmas Tree
1-8-64
Annual State of the Union Message
1-21-64
Radio and television remarks on Reopening
the Geneva Disarmament Conference
1-28-64
Remarks on introducing Attorney General to
press following his return from Asia and
London
3-1-64
Remark recorded for opening of Red Cross
Campaign
3-16-64
Interview with major broadcasters
4-3-64
Remarks on 15th Annual Anniversary of NATO
4-3-64
Appointment of Robert B. Anderson
4-9-64
Radio-television statement announcing a
Moratorium in the Labor Dispute
-3-
4-22-64
Opening the World's Fair
4-22-64
Remarks at the American Pavillion
7-2-64
Radio-TV remarks upon signing Civil Rights
Act
7-30-64
Selection of a Vice Presidential Candidate
8-4-64
Radio-TV report following renewed
aggression in the Gulf of Tonkin
8-5-64
Dedication of Communications Center
8-26-64
Before National Convention recommending
Hubert H. Humphrey as Vice President
8-27-64
National Committee upon accepting nomination
9-18-64
Remarks to the President's Advisory Council
on Federal Reports
9-18-64
Remarks to members of the NATO Parliamentarians
Conference
10-7-64
Statement by the President at the beginning
of a campaign trip (The choice is yours...)
10-15-64
Report on Test Ban Treaty
10-16-64
Report after meeting Russian Ambassador
10-18-64
Radio-TV report of recent events in Russia,
China, and Great Britain
10-20-64
Remarks following Cabinet meeting
10-23-64
Remarks after further study of the Report
of the Council on Pennsylvania Avenue
10-23-64
Congratulating U.S. Olympic Team
10-23-64
Remarks on the U.N.'s 19th Anniversary
11-2-64
Radio-TV remarks on Election Eve
11-4-64
Radio-TV remark at close of Election Day--
Election Victory
-4-
SPECIFIC CAMPAIGN ANNOUNCEMENTS TELEVISED 1963-64
8-26-64
Choice of Hubert Humphrey as running-mate
10-7-64
Remarks in Cadillac Square, Detroit
10-24-64
Remarks on River Front, Memphis Airport
Rally
11-2-64
Remarks at Rally at Houston, Sam Houston
High School, Pasadena, Texas
-5-
A unique situation appeared in 1964. It was the
first year in which a President in office could use
television as a campaign tool and only the second time
TV was used to at least part of it's potential. The
facts were not only evident to the Democrats and to the
Republicans but the broadcasters as well.
Frank Stanton of CBS approached the F.C.C. with
the question of Presidential News conferences during the
campaign. Would he have to give equal time to the other
candidates if the President has a press conference? The
F.C.C. voted yes by a 4-3 margin. They consider a
Presidential news conference neither a bona fide news
interview nor an on-the-spot news event so far as the
equal time law is concerned. The networks asked for a
suspension of Section 315 for the duration of the cam-
paign which was denied by the commission. The ruling
doesn't apply to the re-broadcast of portions of news
conferences in regularly scheduled news programs. The
criteria for a bona fide news conference is that it be
regularly scheduled, arranged and controlled by the
networks or individual stations. The commission feels
that the press could cover speeches and news conferences
without showing them in whole and bring the equal time
factor into play.
On October 18, the President made a network
appearance and the F.C.C. denied Senator Goldwater's
appeal for equal time. The attorneys for Mr. Goldwater
took the Commission to court and the court also ruled
against them. The F.C.C. considered the President's
address "an act of office", which was exempt from the
315 Section. Their ruling went back to a 1956 precedent
when Eisenhower held a conference on the Suez crisis.
In answer to Goldwater's demands to the networks
for equal time, ABC vice-president, Mortimer Weinback,
said the essence of the Fairness Doctrine is for the
public to be informed, "Not the right of the candidate or
his spokesman to be heard".
NBC's vice-president for news, William R. McAndrew,
noted that the network had already given Dean Burch
(GOP National Chairman) time to reply to Johnson. NBC
gave Mr. Burch 15 minutes "in the spirit of Fairness"
after it had denied Senator Goldwater's initial request
for equal time.
The whole matter of Section 315 is rather ambiguous.
The F.C.C., despite their bona fide double talk, judged
each Presidential news appearance by its content. Today
there is more of a tendency to discount content and
consider the amount of exposure the President receives.
-6-
Section 315 was also the cause of an increase in
campaign costs. The candidates, not having the canon
suspended as in 1960, did not have free coverage and
had to buy almost all their time. President Johnson
received some as President. The campaign spending for
network time in 1964 is almost double that in 1960.
This is partly attributable to Section 315 and partly due
to the medium coming into its own as a campaign device.
Don Meany, presently Vice President of News for
NBC indicated to our researcher that "everything Nixon
does" on TV will probably be subject to equal time
once the Democrats endorse a candidate for 1972.
-7-
The Johnson administration was one of the most
secretive in the history of the office. The White House
was unwilling to give numbers on the size of its staff
and exact head counts were difficult to obtain since
many of the lower level aides were paid by another
agency while working exclusively for the White House.
A good guess is that Johnson had ten special assistants
with about 30 men helping them. Often these younger
aides were very able men, chosen on political ability.
When Johnson took office he kept many of Kennedy's
key men besides massing a staff of aides from his home
state. Apparently, Bill Moyers was the organizer of
the 1964 campaign, and architect of the brutal tele-
vision attack on Goldwater. Moyers directed all
campaign speechwriting efforts, such as hiring writers
and making assignments. He also helped shape the
campaign issues. He, Richard Goodman, Horace Busby,
Douglas Cater and Willard Wirtz (although kept secret
because of fear of bad publicity from the press) were the
inside government speech writers. Mr. Johnson also had
a standby staff of speech writers outside the government.
James Reston and Walter Lippman were sought out at
times for advice.
Larry O 'Brien, veteran from the Kennedy administra-
tion, acted as a high level political agent. He would
arrange confidential meetings in which he could take
measure of the political situation.
Moyers was given a free hand in the television
offensive because both he and the President had the
same goal--not only defeating Goldwater, but to destroy
him and everything he stood for.
-8-
An anti-campaign staff was composed of Myer Feldman,
Daniel P. Moynihan, Lenard Marks, Tyler Able, James
Sudquist, Hyman Bookbinder, D. B. Hardeman, Myer Rashish,
Tom Finney and John Sharon--whose job it was to embarrass
the Republicans and get under Goldwater's skin.
Part of this movement was to make sure that wherever
and whenever Goldwater spoke he was bracketed by anti-
Goldwater speakers. They also used letter columns in
local newspapers written by a Republican for Johnson who
was usually a prominent business man in that town. These
letters were calculated to be published the day the
Goldwater caravan came to town.
This practice was also used to some extent by the
GOP in the scheduling of their television spots.
Director of the Republican advertising and public relations,
L. Richard Guylay, would not comment on reports that the
GOP planned to buy time around Johnson programs and spots,
other than to say that it was under study and they will
"if they can". 1 Goldwater had an effective way of
receiving information on such things as when Johnson
bought time. Both campaigns appeared to have good
intelligence within the enemv camp.
* In early February 1971, Ailes contacted Moynihan at
Harvard. He told Professor Moynihan he was doing some
research on "the Presidential use of TV in 1964" and
"how it might apply in the future". Moynihan told Ailes,
"Yes," he would cooperate but would need a few days to
think back over events. Moynihan promised to contact Ailes
on the succeeding Monday. This never happened and at the
time this report was completed Ailes has been unsuccessful
in recontacting Moynihan, although several phone calls have
been placed.
1. Broadcasting Magazine, August 24, 1964.
-9-
The anti-campaign (toward Goldwater) was accom-
panied by the campaign for Johnson. This campaign, or
what seemed to be the lack of one, is summed up in the
steady stream of advice that poured in from *John
Connally in Texas. Johnson should sit tight in Wash-
ington making periodic TV shots to remind the voters
that the man behind the big desk was taking good care
of the country. The plans would be a President too
busy being President to go out and shake hands.
Although Johnson was secretive about any and all
campaign plans, he made this statement on September
5, 1964.
"We have a job to do here and we are going
to try to do that first. When, as, and if we
can, we will make as many appearances as we
think we can without neglecting the interests
of the Nation But just where I will be at
some certain day in October I can't determine
and I don't want to announce because then you 11
have me cancelling and adjusting my plans,
things of that kind. That makes more of a
story than my appearance would 1 make, or maybe
what I had to say would make".
* Ailes made no attempt to contact Connally but this
might be helpful.
1. The Exercize of Power, Robert Novak and Rowland Evans.
-10-
Johnson did poorly at formal press conferences.
He tried everything from contact lens, make-up to
electronic prompters. Nothing worked except not to
hold them at all. Pierre Salinger's departure on
March 18, 1964, to run for Senator, increased Johnson's
freedom to attempt to manipulate the press corps as
though it were a commodity for sale with personal
favors in return for favorable stories.
"The important corollary of the pro-
position was that Johnson could generate
favorable stories by the simpled expedient
of courting influential reporters and feeding
appropriately pro-Johnson I tidbits and back-
ground information".
This plan failed. Still the stories about the
man who drives 90 mph while drinking beer appeared.
This bad publicity hurt and angered Johnson. The
press was not going to sacrifice their integrity for
walks around the Ranch and refreshments at the end of
the walks. Johnson liked news men around him. He en-
joyed the feeling of being followed about but intense-
ly disliked any criticism by the press and showd it. The
public became as aware of his sensitivity as the actual
bad publicity.
On January 19, 1964, in reply to the accusation by
Edward F. Ryan, President of the Radio Television News
Directors Association that there was not one formal
news conference since he took office Mr. Johnson said:
"You may be sure that we will make full
use of television in the months ahead and
television will be permitted to cover some
of our press conferences. We would be inter-
ested in any suggestions you have in making
2
more effective use of television and radio".
But still we should realize that any adjustments
would first have to suit Johnson before they could
benefit anyone else. Lacking the charisma that Kennedy
had, Johnson never mastered the press or the press
conference.
1. The Exercize of Power, Robert Novak and Rowland Evans.
2. New York Times, January 19, 1964.
-11-
Bill Moyers hired Doyle, Dane and Burnbach to
develop the TV campaign and prepare specific presenta-
tions for him to accept or reject. The Democrats'
$4 million TV offensive was divided into three phases.
First, they took Goldwater's weakest stand. knocked
him down and kept him there. This was done with "the
daisy girl' and the threat of nuclear war. Moyers
wanted, as he once put it, to put the noose of nuclear
irresponsibility around Goldwater's neck. He did just
that. The spot was only used once despite Republican
claims that it ran throughout the campaign. It only
needed to run once and it's impact ran for the rest of
the campaign-- not counting the free publicity it
received. (Moyers said later, that he never showed it
to Johnson before it was aired; if it did backfire
Johnson could have disclaimed it and Moyers was pre-
pared to take the rap for it.)
Next came another little girl eating an ice cream
cone while her mother explains about fallout, atomic
bombs, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. She says that
ice cream cones used to be poisoned with strontium-90
but weren't anymore, that they had better elect
President Johnson, because "there's a man who wants to
be President and if he's elected they might start testing
all over again".
The use of the title "President" Johnson is an
interesting point here. By giving him that title it
gives the feeling of greatness that Goldwater doesn't
have. It puts Johnson in the same category as
Washington, Lincoln and Kennedy.
Another of the 1964 TV spots pictured a social
security card being torn in two while an announcer says,
"Goldwater (Note that no title is given him.) has said
he would change the system. Even his running mate admits
that the voluntary plan would wreck your social security".
Here, too, we can see the subtle influence in the phrase
"wreck your social security". Movers also stressed re-
gional use of TV spots. More effective use of TV spots was
made in another commercial based on a Goldwater remark. He
once said that it might be just as well if the eastern
seaboard were sawed off and allowed to float out to sea.
They filmed a plywood map being sawed in half and floating
out to sea. It was as if Goldwater had written the copy.
Moyers liked this spot SO much that he authorized it to
be shown once nationally.
In one spot intended for the South, there was an
auctioneer on top of a dam-selling the TVA, as Goldwater
once suggested.
-12-
One proposed spot was to show a klansman saying "I
like Barry Goldwater, I like the way he thinks". There
was no evidence that this spot was ever shown on network or
local television.
Bill Moyers achieved his goal; Goldwater was on the
run and spent much of the rest of the campaign trying to
deny the heavy accusations placed on him. Johnson joined
the honored ranks of Avis, Volkswagen and Cracker Jacks-
diamonds in the advertising setting.
A last point should be noted when viewing the
Democratic campaign spots. Nowhere is there a mention of
Hubert Humphrey. When questioned about this notable
omission, Doyle, Dane and Burnbach account executive,
James Graham, said, "We just don't feel that people vote
for Vice-Presidential candidates. We're selling the
President of the United States."
In reaction to the anti-Goldwater spots Thurston B
Morton complained bitterly. to the Senate. He said that
Johnson was trying to win the election by scaring the wits
out of children in order to pressure their parents into
voting for him.
Many formal complaints were filed with the Fair
Campaign Practices Committee by Republicans and Democrats
alike. The Democratic National Committee removed the
objectionable spots (The Daisy Girl and The Ice Cream Cone)
but never publicly acknowledged doing SO.
-13-
Both candidates used fear as a means of carrying
the issues home. Johnson used the fear of nuclear war,
fallout from testing and loss of social security as
his weapon. Goldwater used the fear of a totally
immoral society as his tool against the Democratic
Administration. A film called "Choice" was produced
by the Mothers For a Moral America--an outgrowth of
Citizens For Goldwater-Miller--expressly for this
purpose. They commissioned a Los Angeles advertising
agency to make it for $65,000, in addition to $35,000
paid to NBC for time on a Friday afternoon when it was
to be shown to millions of housewives. The film
stressed juvenile delinauency, crime, moral degeneration,
narcotics; and the facts that women are afraid to walk
on the streets at night, parents fearful for their
children's safety, husbands for their wives. Russell
Walton, a Goldwater aide, said,
"Arouse them, take this latent anger
and concern which now exists, build it up,
and subtly turn and focus it on the man
who drives 90 miles an hour with a beer
can in his hands and pulls the ears of
beagles, and leave them charged up to the
point where they will want to go out and
do something about it". 1
Vote for Goldwater.
But the film never hit the air. About two weeks
before the election Dick Tuck, a Johnson spy, got a
print of the film and showed it to the press, as well
as Democratic leaders. So much clamor was raised
that the Fair Campaign Practices Committee challenged
the GOP to avow the film or scrap it. Goldwater saw
it and at the last minute repudiated it as "racist".
-14-
The GOP hired Erwin, Wasey Ruthrauff and Ryan to
handle their advertising. Edward Nellor, Director of
Radio and Television for the GOP National Committee
wanted spots longer, fewer, and directed to more specific
audiences. Their aim was to hit a predominately female
group and generally older, small town audiences. They
planned to stress Goldwater's strong facial characteris-
tics in their TV ads.
Director of GOP advertising and public relations,
L. Richard Guylay, wanted to rely very heavily on TV
because it is Goldwater's medium. "We think it isn't
Johnson's that's our premise". He was correct and
Johnson knew it. Johnson's face never appeared in any
of his campaign spots. Although he was shown in some,
he always appeared in the midst of a cheering throng or
giving a speech to thousands at a rally.
Since Johnson was not going to come out of his
protective shell, the GOP was going to bait, buy, scare,
dare and shame him out. Everyone1 was for a network
debate except Johnson and his staff Network head,
Frank Stanton, made his desire for a debate evident
through speeches and articles. In one article published
in the Times Magazine on January 19, 1964 he said that
he doesn't believe that television can make or break a
candidate, but that it can just "unmask" a synthetic
person. He went on to say,
"It has been said that President Johnson
may suffer unfavorably in comparison with
Mr. Kennedy's debate appearances in 1960.
His advisers have been reported as urging
him not to give his lesser-known opponent the
opportunity to debate with him".
Johnson's stand was evident eight months before the
primary would not debate. Johnson would hedge
whenever the topic of televised debate was mentioned.
His answer was always a very vague "We'll cross that
bridge when we come to it". Experienced politicians
regard it as the height of folly for a political figure,
holding a national office, to build up an opponent by
agreeing to debate. The established official can only 2
lose according to this view and has nothing to gain.
1. Gallup indicated that 71% of the American people
were in favor of debates, compared with 20% against.
2. U. S. News and World Report, September 21, 1964.
-15-
This was obvious to both candidates. Goldwater tried
to shame Johnson in to debating by offering to pay all
production and air costs--about $500,000. In this
move, Mr. Goldwater won if he accepted and won if he
declined, but Johnson did not budge from the foot of
his debate bridge.
In final desperation, Goldwater published a series
of pamphlets called "The Debate That Never Was".
Printed like a railroad schedule, it gave quotes on
specific issues from each candiatee.
Although the GOP was highly critical of Johnson's
refraining from debating, there was no mention of
Goldwater's earlier refusal to debate Rockefeller and
Scranton.
-16-
Goldwater did not want any old debate--he wanted
HIS TYPE OF DEBATE. Knowing what happened to Nixon in
1960, Goldwater issued this statement,
"There might be some risk in exposing the
President to public debate. His office is
the world's most powerful and most responsible
and some slip on his part could have an important
bearing on our relations with other nations.
But this consideration must be balanced against
the people's need, and the President's own
responsibility in the area of public information.
Sensible ground rules should be adopted. Pre-
taping is one possibility and prior agreement
on the subjects to be discussed is another."
Although he reversed the order of his stipulations
the inference is still clear; if a unsuitable topic is
mentioned it would be edited from the tape.
In 1960, the FCC suspended Section 315 on the
recommendation of the Senate. This suspension promoted
the debates since there was no equal time factor in-
volved with the networks. There is some thought that
Johnson had the Senate vote against the suspension in
1964 to not only hinder the debates but practically
eliminate them as a campaign tool.
-17-
Sometime between 10:50 and 11:00pm on Monday,
September 7, 1964 the first television spot for the 1964
campaign was aired. The cost was $30,000, but before
election night the political parties will have spent
$35 million including both nominating and general
election campaigns. During the general election period,
total network and station charges were $24.6 million.
This constituted an increase of 73% over 1960 and 150%
over 1956; of course, basic rates in network and station
during this period were increased some. In 1964, 73%
of charges by television stations were for spots.
Network charges for Presidential political broadcasts were
$3.25 million in 1 1956, $3. million in 1960, and $3.925
million in 1964. Each party spent about $1. million in
4 weeks before the election. In a last attempt to draw
votes the Democrats contacted sales managers of 4,400
local radio stations to sell Election Day spots to local
Democratic groups. Each manager received
a tape with an hourly countdown with the time left to
vote for Democratic candidates. The networks estimated
as of the week before the election the GOP invested
20% more on the three TV networks than the Democrats.
The final totals on network time published by Broadcasting
Magazine on November 9, 1964 are as follows:
Democrats
$1,901,800
for
13 hours
25 mins
Republicans
$2,145,000
for
17 hours
5 mins
The Republicans spent the majority of their money
in daytime programming and thus received more time for
their money but probably lower ratings and less male
voters.
1. The drop in cost in 1960 due to the Great Debate.
-18-
GOP
Democrats
CBS--$650,000 4 hrs 10 mins
$820,000 4 hrs 35 mins
ABC--$380,000 2 hrs 45 mins
$586,000 4 hrs 55 mins
NBC--$1,115,000 10 hrs 10 mins
$495,000
3
hrs
55
mins
Republicans stressed longer TV announcements than
Democrats. They featured at least five prime time
network half hours in addition to scattering 32 five-
minute spots all over network schedules. No network
:60's were planned, but the party was in at least 131 selected
markets with spot TV promotion of both national and local
tickets. The Democrats, on the other hand, mixed spots
and five-minute segments on the networks but held off
scheduling longer buys except for an hour on Election Eve
(NBC). Spots were used locally as well. Most of
Goldwater's half hours were bought for 9:30pm EST. There
were no live network appearances by Goldwater. When a
spokesman was asked why the Senator was allowed to appear
live statewide but not nationally he said it was thought
that it would not be good for Mr. Goldwater's image in the
Northeast if he appeared in "an arm-waving rally-type" of
format. 1
Both parties tailored their approach to the needs of
specific areas. Johnson used his Civil Rights Bill as a
vote-getter in the North, while feeling secure in the
South and Southwest. Johnson opened his tent and let
everyone in. Although a Democrat, he wooed business.
Although a Southerner, he wooed Blacks, liberals and
civil rights groups. Although a business executive him-
self, he wooed labor. He 'tried to have something for
everybody--he was indeed the politician's politician.
1. Broadcasting Magazine, October 5, 1964.
-19-
SUMMARY
In 1964 there was little doubt in anyone's mind
that Johnson would win the election. He had a full
house with aces and he played the hand well. His
hand-picked staff was good and more importantly,
they were dedicated and loyal to Johnson: Apparently,
they would take the rap for him whenever he would ask.
He felt, and likely so, that it is practically impossible
to unseat a President in a time of prosperity.
As President he had all the "built-in" campaign
advantages, and as President he had the power to make
news and shape events. Goldwater had none of these
advantages. He also was riding on the sympathy from
Kennedy's assassination. Goldwater had to manage his
campaign single-handedly. The GOP was sharply divided
in support of its own candidate. The press lined up
early and strongly behind Johnson. In fact, Goldwater
claimed that reporters who travelled with him were the
only ones who were fair, that the commentators and
columnists were responsible for ruthless and unbased
attacks on him. 1 Whether it was because they sin-
cerely disliked Goldwater or because of the hostility
reporters received at the GOP convention is unknown.
2
In any event, Goldwater did not get favorable or even
fair press.
The President through acts such as increasing
government income by reducing the income tax, generated
approval of the people. In a survey published in
Newsweek on August 31, 1964, Johnson led JFK in public
approval in most key areas polled. Of course, that was
just two months prior to Johnson's election in 1964. The
Johnson Plan was evident long before the primary. It
would be a stay-at-home campaign. For a while there
seemed to be two rival groups of Presidential aides.
One group favored exposure
1. Broadcasting Magazine, November 2, 1964.
2. Saturdav Review, August 3, 1964, Robert Lewis Shayon
reported how there was an air of hostility towards
newsmen at the GOP convention. Pro-Goldwater
delegates made unfriendly remarks to reporters and
jostled them.
-20-
of the President, the other containment of public
exposure. Advisers counselling containment hypothesized
that Johnson, so much bigger than life, simply could not
be digested whole by the American public. He had to be
dispersed in small pieces--at generally formal occasions
with carefully written speeches, carefully rehearsed
television appearances and rare press conferences. The
opposing group believed that Johnson's charm and ex-
huberance must be brought to the public. They wanted
to keep the gentle down-home image but lose the beer-
drinking, fast-driving Texan image. Both groups had
one thing in common and that was the style of baloney
they fed the President about his public appearances. In
fact, "Johnson was not bigger than life and simply could
not be digested" but his television image was so bad
that when he appeared before the public the entire staff
was upset about it. As for charm and exhuberance, he had
none, at least none that could be transmitted on airwaves.
Looking back we see that he followed the theory of
containment primarily.
Johnson rode in on a wave of horror of the November
22 pent-up emotions from the assassination. These emotions
were released with the Johnson campaign. The American
people suddenly let loose with a love of Presidents which
happened to be Johnson. This was no reflection on him,
he just happened to be in the right place at the right time.
The public, filled with shame and guilt, wanted to soothe
their ailing consciences by putting someone close to their
loved-one in the White House. 1964 was a bumper year for
JFK pens, half-dollars, persian rugs, throw pillows,
memorial libraries, streets space centers and schools,
Finally, the public achieved their goal, the JFK memorial
President, Lyndon B. Johnson.
Johnson wielded the Presidential power effectively;
he managed to postpone the Bobby Baker issue until after
the election. When the Senate was voting on Section 315
and Johnson didn't want to appear in a TV debate the
Senate voted not to suspend the rule. No one could
defeat Johnson in 1964. The last factor must be consi-
dered in why Johnson had to be elected. It is the
question of whether televised election predictions
effected the voter turn-out or in fact, whether the
predictions very close to the election effected the
turn-out. Did more people vote for Johnson because they
wanted to be on a winning team? Did fewer people vote
for Goldwater--the lost cause? The answers to both questions
-21-
are probably yes to some extent. How much is not known,
but certainly they are a factor in the Johnson landslide.
The following are some composite thoughts on the approach
to the 1972 election by President Nixon:
1. A secret media committee should be put to-
gether very early to discuss and determine strategy
for the 1972 elections. An assessment of our media
strength in individual states should be made early
also.
2. Hopefully it will be possible to put
President Nixon's opponent on the defensive quickly.
This is generally tough for an incumbent President
and some careful thought has to be given to this.
3. A documentary film of Nixon's accomplish-
ments which can be fed to news and possibly aired
as a special to signal the kick-off of the campaign
might be very useful. A strategy for handling the
debate challenge should be determined, outlined and
stuck to.
4. It would be helpful to get some information
within enemy camps early and set up feeds of
information.
-22-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Radio, Television and American Politics, Edward W.
Chester, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1969.
Politics Battle Plan, Herbert M. Baus and William B.
Ross, MacMillian, New York, 1968.
The President's Men, Patrick Anderson, Doubleday,
New York, 1968.
Dirty Politics, Bruce L. Felknor, W. W. Norton and Co.,
New York, 1966.
The Image Candidates, Gene Wyckoff, MacMillan, New
York, 1968.
L.B.J.: The Exercize of Power, Robert Novak and
Rowland Evans,
-23-
Periodicals:
Broadcasting Magazine:
April 24, 1964
July 20, 1964
August 24, 1964
September 7, 1964
October 5, 1964
October 26,, 1964
November 2, 1964
November 9, 1964
New York Times:
January 19, 1964
January 28, 1964
February 9, 1964
April 8, 1964
April 18, 1964
October 2, 1964
October 25, 1964
October 26, 1964
U. S. News and World Report:
April 20, 1964
September 21, 1964
September 28, 1964
October 12, 1964
October 16, 1964
November 2, 1964
Reporter:
September 10, 1964
Saturday Review:
April 11, 1964
Harper's Magazine:
March, 1964
Newsweek:
August 31, 1964
February 17, 1964
October 19, 1964
-24-
BOOKS ABOUT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
This Awesome Challenge, Michael Amrine
A Time For Action, Lyndon B. Johnson
The Choices We Face, Lynson B. Johnson
L.B.J.'s Inner Circle, Charles W. Roberts
Lyndon's Legacy, Frank Kluckhorn
The Johnson Treatment, Jack Bell
The Inside on L. B. J., Frank Kluckhorn
Lyndon B. Johnson: A Biography, Harry Provence
A White House Diary, Lady Bird Johnson
A Dav in the Life of President Johnson, Jim Bishop
Ruffles and Flourishes, Liz Carpenter
Lyndon B. Johnson, Roland B. Evans
Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, Phillip L. Geyelin
The Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson, Eric Frederick Goldman
No Hail, No Farewell, Louis Heren
My Brother Lyndon, Sam Houston, Johnson
A Very Personal Presidency, Hugh Sidney
Sam Johnson's Boy, Alfred Steinberg
J.F.K. and L.B.J., Tom Wicker
The Accidental President, Robert Sherrill
Twilight of Presidency, George E. Reedy
The Public Papers of L.B.J. --- All speeches, public letters
and documents. Not listed as which were televised.
L.B.J.: The Exercize of Power, Robert Novak
(Traces his career from freshman senator to
President, good campaign material, light on
television, good tactics.)
-25-
BOOKS ON TELEVISION & POLITICS
The National Election 1964, Milton Cummings
The Making of a President, Theodore White
Polling For a Presidential Candidate, Thomas W. Benham
Politicians Saturate TV Schedule, Thomas W. Benham
Cost of Television Campaigns, Hyman H. Goldin
TV As a Political Weapon, Hyman H. Goldin
Politics in the United States, Henry Turner
Presidential Election: Strategies of American
Electoral Politics, Nelson W. Polsby and Arron B. Wildavsky
Dirty Politics, Bruce L. Felkner
Presidents on Television: Their Live Records
What Lies Outside Camera Range, Wm. S. White
Some Values to the Broadcaster of Election Campaign
Broadcasting, Richard D. Porter
Radio, Television and American Politics, Edward W.
Chester, N. Y., Sheed & Ward.
The Great Debates, Sidney Kraus, Ind. Univ. Press, 1962.
Selling of the President, Joseph McGinness
The Half-Shut Eye, John Whale, MacMillan.
Reader in Public Opinion & Communication, Berelson &
Janowitz
Television Programs Relating to Law and the Legislative
Process, (Pub: Television Information Office)
Television and Politics, Kurt Lang, Quadrangle, 1968.
Equal Time: the Private Broadcaster and the
Public Interest, Newton Minow, Antheneum, 1964.
The Image Candidates, Gene Wyckoff, MacMillan, 1968.
The People Machine, Robert MacNeil, Harper & Row, 1968.
-26-
MEMORANDUM
FU
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
91/9
April 3, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
Will you please follow-up on the attached note from
Ailes. I talked to Bob and he indicated that this project
should be paid for by John Mitchell, so if an invoice
comes in to Huntsman or someone, make sure it is
forwarded over to Mitchell for payment.
Attachment
Tilecon
Auntsman $/5 - sent to
Caroon Howell's of will be
pulled & sent to magrader
5/4 - J8M - he will FU w/ Huntsmon
magrader advised 4/5
5/
RAA
ROGER AILES & ASSOCIATES, INC. 888 Eighth Avenue. Suite 7F New York, New York 10019
212-765-3022
March 25, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
TING
E.O.
100
6-102
By EP
3-23-82
Mr. H. R. Haldeman
Chief of Staff
White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Bob:
This is just to let you know that I submitted the research
project requested by John Mitchell. The report is rather
lengthy and covers the Presidential use of television in
the 1964 election. As I explained, I had to hire some out-
side research help to keep my name out of it as much as
possible.
My Company has submitted an invoice this week covering
that research and some of my time compiling it. The in-
voice just states "TV Research Project for H. R. Haldeman".
I did not know who sees the invoices or whether you would
want anyone to know I had done a report specifically for
the Attorney General. This way if anybody asks, you will
know what it's all about.
Best regards,
ROGER Rogen E. AILES
President
REA:hjs
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
TO: L R
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
magruder sent
a copy of their
letter to mr. O'heary
to us. Pls attach
it to this packager
file
/
5-24
GS:
Do you have the O'Leary letter to be filed
with this?? yes
Betty -keep
copy Mattall
notest all
FU we
apr. 30,1971
KU
5/10
FU
5/11 $117
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
4/23
TO: feb Magueler
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
- -Someone seeking
a compaign
stall joe
- will you contact
him on H's behalf
and see what
you think?
-Thank you
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date:
TO: G.S.
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
WHAT Do we do WITH
THE?
Please D noft Appropriate
reponse.
B
Mr. Stephen E. O'Leary
134-25 Franklin Avenue #606
Flushing, New York 11355
April 20, 1971
Mr. R. H. Haldeman
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. Haldeman:
Please let me re-introduce myself by refreshing your memory
of when and where we met. It was in Los Angeles in March of
1968, and I was applying for a summer job with JWT. Unfor-
tunately, nothing worked out at that time; but I did end up
with JWT in New York, where I have been working since July
of 1969.
I am writing to you because I would like to work on President
Nixon's campaign staff for 1972. I have a great deal of respect
for President Nixon as an individual, and I admire his deter-
mination and conviction. For these reasons, I would like to
see him re-elected in 1972. However, I sincerely feel that
he and his programs are severely misunderstood by most young
people today; and I would personally like to work to see this
corrected.
Beyond this, I have always had a desire to be involved in
politics, but my real feelings go deeper than that. I really
want to do something for mankind, to feel that I have personally
contributed to helping people. I realize this can't be achieved
by wishing hard, but that it takes commitment and lots of it
to get anything worthwhile accomplished. I see politics as the
best channel for these commitments because government is and
will continue to be the focal point of decisions directly
affecting all people.
These two statements summarize my reasons for wanting a position
on the campaign staff. I would like very much to pursue this with
you in person, and I would appreciate an opportunity to speak
with you in Washington if at all possible.
Sincerely,
Stephen Flyhen
Mr. Stephen E. O'Leary
134-25 Franklin Avenue #606
Flushing, New York 11355
S
20
1071
Mr. R. H. Haldeman
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500