Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
From Robert Odle, Jr. through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This document discusses office space near 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/7/1972
From Robert C. Odle, Jr. through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This document discusses direct mail, sign-up cards, leaving expansion to Finance Division, committees, and Nixon's re-election. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/24/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Monthly Surveys of Voter Groups. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/29/1972
From L. Robert Morgan through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Reassessment of the Direct Mail Operations. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Planning Sessions. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Richard L. Fore through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Memo for the Committee for the Re-election of the President Campaign Organization. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Robert H. Marik to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political Coordinators Meetings, Tuesday, May 30, 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political Coordinators' Meeting, June 2, 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/4/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Training Sessions in the States. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From L. Higby to Jeb Magruder. RE: Democratic National Convention Plan. This document includes an attachment. 6 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/21/1972
News from the Committee for the Reelection of the President. Title: Special Assistant Named. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newsletter], 6/21/1972
From E.D. Failor through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Committee for the Reelection Activities in Miami During the Democratic Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
Title: As Iowa Goes…? Democrats' New Rules For Picking Delegates Add to '72 Uncertainty: Test in Midwest Indicates That Apathy and Confustion Could Bar Effectiveness Infiltrating Local Caucus. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 1/19/1972
Handwritten Note. This document discusses the Republican National Convention. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/27/1972
From Fred Malek to Paul Jones and Ed Sexton. RE: Black Vote Field Operation. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Fred Malek to Rob Odle. RE: Expansion of the Committee. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1972
From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. RE: Spanish Speaking Vote. This document includes analysis of influential cities with high "Spanish-American" blocs. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Voter Bloc Preparations for the Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Handwritten Note. This document disucsses unreturned phone calls, field operators, and organizing. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Bruce Kehrli to H.R. Haldeman. RE: The Attached Reports. Subjects include: Issue Management and Political Strategy. 37 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/2/1972
From the President to Bob Haldeman. This document discusses a strategy session and reccommendations. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Ed Harper to John Ehrlichman. RE: Issue Publications. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From L. Higby to Gordon Strachan. This document discusses McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses committees and programs, includes a political strategy paper, and possible advisory group. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145984
label
WHSF: Contested, 33-2
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145984
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 33-2
description
This file contains:
From Robert Odle, Jr. through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This document discusses office space near 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/7/1972
From Robert C. Odle, Jr. through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This document discusses direct mail, sign-up cards, leaving expansion to Finance Division, committees, and Nixon's re-election. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/24/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Monthly Surveys of Voter Groups. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/29/1972
From L. Robert Morgan through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Reassessment of the Direct Mail Operations. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Planning Sessions. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Richard L. Fore through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Memo for the Committee for the Re-election of the President Campaign Organization. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Robert H. Marik to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political Coordinators Meetings, Tuesday, May 30, 1972. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/1/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political Coordinators' Meeting, June 2, 1972. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/4/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Training Sessions in the States. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From L. Higby to Jeb Magruder. RE: Democratic National Convention Plan. This document includes an attachment. 6 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/21/1972
News from the Committee for the Reelection of the President. Title: Special Assistant Named. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newsletter], 6/21/1972
From E.D. Failor through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Committee for the Reelection Activities in Miami During the Democratic Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
Title: As Iowa Goes…? Democrats' New Rules For Picking Delegates Add to '72 Uncertainty: Test in Midwest Indicates That Apathy and Confustion Could Bar Effectiveness Infiltrating Local Caucus. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 1/19/1972
Handwritten Note. This document discusses the Republican National Convention. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/27/1972
From Fred Malek to Paul Jones and Ed Sexton. RE: Black Vote Field Operation. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Fred Malek to Rob Odle. RE: Expansion of the Committee. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/25/1972
From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. RE: Spanish Speaking Vote. This document includes analysis of influential cities with high "Spanish-American" blocs. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Voter Bloc Preparations for the Convention. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Handwritten Note. This document disucsses unreturned phone calls, field operators, and organizing. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Bruce Kehrli to H.R. Haldeman. RE: The Attached Reports. Subjects include: Issue Management and Political Strategy. 37 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/2/1972
From the President to Bob Haldeman. This document discusses a strategy session and reccommendations. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Ed Harper to John Ehrlichman. RE: Issue Publications. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From L. Higby to Gordon Strachan. This document discusses McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses committees and programs, includes a political strategy paper, and possible advisory group. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26145984
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
84379fad5629afed
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
2
6/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert Odle, Jr. through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This
document discusses office space near 1730
Pennsylvania Avenue. 3 pgs.
33
2
5/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert C. Odle, Jr. through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. This
document discusses direct mail, sign-up
cards, leaving expansion to Finance Division,
committees, and Nixon's re-election. 10 pgs.
33
2
5/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Monthly
Surveys of Voter Groups. 3 pgs.
33
2
6/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From L. Robert Morgan through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE:
Reassessment of the Direct Mail Operations.
3 pgs.
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Page 1 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
2
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Planning
Sessions. 5 pgs.
33
2
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Richard L. Fore through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Memo
for the Committee for the Re-election of the
President Campaign Organization. 5 pgs.
33
2
6/1/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Marik to John N. Mitchell.
RE: Political Coordinators Meetings,
Tuesday, May 30, 1972. 1 pg.
33
2
6/4/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Political
Coordinators' Meeting, June 2, 1972. 2 pgs.
33
2
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Training
Sessions in the States. 3 pgs.
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Page 2 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
2
6/21/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From L. Higby to Jeb Magruder. RE:
Democratic National Convention Plan. This
document includes an attachment. 6 pgs.
33
2
6/21/1972
Campaign
Newsletter
News from the Committee for the Re-
election of the President. Title: Special
Assistant Named. 2 pgs.
33
2
6/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From E.D. Failor through Jeb S. Magruder to
John N. Mitchell. RE: Committee for the Re-
election Activities in Miami During the
Democratic Convention. 3 pgs.
33
2
1/19/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
Title: As Iowa Goes ? Democrats' New
Rules For Picking Delegates Add to '72
Uncertainty: Test in Midwest Indicates That
Apathy and Confustion Could Bar
Effectiveness Infiltrating Local Caucus. 2
pgs.
33
2
6/27/1972
White House Staff
Other Document
Handwritten Note. This document discusses
the Republican National Convention. 2 pgs.
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Page 3 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
2
6/28/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Fred Malek to Paul Jones and Ed
Sexton. RE: Black Vote Field Operation. 3
pgs.
33
2
5/25/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Fred Malek to Rob Odle. RE:
Expansion of the Committee. 2 pgs.
33
2
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. RE:
Spanish Speaking Vote. This document
includes analysis of influential cities with
high "Spanish-American" blocs. 3 pgs.
33
2
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Voter Bloc Preparations for the Convention.
3 pgs.
33
2
White House Staff
Other Document
Handwritten Note. This document disucsses
unreturned phone calls, field operators, and
organizing. 1 pg.
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Page 4 of 5
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
2
6/2/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Bruce Kehrli to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
The Attached Reports. Subjects include:
Issue Management and Political Strategy. 37
pgs.
33
2
6/12/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From the President to Bob Haldeman. This
document discusses a strategy session and
reccommendations. 1 pg.
33
2
6/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ed Harper to John Ehrlichman. RE:
Issue Publications. 2 pgs.
33
2
6/13/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From L. Higby to Gordon Strachan. This
document discusses McGovern. 1 pg.
33
2
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. This
document discusses committees and
programs, includes a political strategy paper,
and possible advisory group. 4 pgs.
Thursday, August 25, 2011
Page 5 of 5
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 313
Folder:
[Campaign 22 Part I June 15-29, 1972 Folder 2]
Document
Disposition
24
Return Private/Political memo, Odle to mitchell, 6-7-72
25
Return
Private/Political & Private/Personal Memo, Odle to
mitchell, 5-24-72
26
Retain
Open
27
Return
Private/Political memo, Marik to Mitchell, 5-29-72
28
Return
Private/Political memo, Morgan to Mitchell, 6-10-72
29
Return
Private/Political Memo, Marik to mitchell, 6-15-72
30
Return
Private/Political Memo, Fore to Mitchell, 6-12-72
31
Return
Private/Political Memo, Marik to Mitchell, 6-1-72
32
Return
Private/Political Memo, marik to Mitchell, 6-4-72
33
Return
Private/Political Memo, Marik to Mitchell, 6-12-72
34
Return
Private/Political Memo, Higby to Magruder, 6-21-72
35
Return
Private/Political Memo, Shumway, Moore to Mitchell,
Magruder, 6-14-72
36
Return
Private/Political CREEP Press Release #6-63, 6-21-72
37
Retain
Open
38
Return
Private/Political Memo, Failor to Mitchell, 6-26-72
39
Retain
Open
40
Retain
Open
41
Retain
Open
42
Return
Private/Political Clipping, "As lowa Goes...?, 1-19-72
43
Retain
Open
44
Retain
Open
45
Return
Private/Political notes, "La Rue- plane?" 6-27-[72]
46
Return
Private/Political memo, Malek to Jones 5 Sexton, 6-28-72
47
Retain
Open
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 313
48
Return
Private/Political memo, Malek to Odle, 5-25-72
49
Return
Private/Political note, Malek to HRH, 6-14-72
50
Retain
Open
51
Return
Private/Political memo, Malck to HRH, 6-12-72
52
Return
Private/Political notes, Dent "
n.d.
53
Return
Private/Political memo, Kehrli to HRH, 6-2-72
54
Return
Private/Political memo, President to HRH, 6-12-72
55
Return
Private/Political memo, Harper to JDE, 6-13-72
56
Return
Private/Political Memo, Higby to Strachan, 6-13-72
57
Retain
Open
58
Return
Private/Political note, Higby to HRH, 6-12-72
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 7, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.
It is proposed that we lease office space across the street from
this building at 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue in the new Oliver Carr
building in order to (1) provided needed office space for the re-
maining five months of the campaign; and (2) establish a national
storefront ground floor campaign headquarters.
First, we would lease the rear half of the third floor at 1730.
This space consists of 10,593 square feet and through the use of
temporary metal partitions we would create 25 semi-private of-
fices and room for 45 secretaries and assistants. Tentatively,
we feel the space should house all the various groups in Fred
Malek's area with the exception of Agriculture, which should stay
at 1701 because of its relationship to Yeutter and his relation-
ship to the political group, Pat Hutar's women's operation which
should stay here because of its dealings with the political group
and Bob Marik, and Chuck Shearer's overall citizens operation
which will expand to take over our small fifth floor suite here
at 1701.
All the other groups would go to 1730 Pennsylvania Avenue: labor,
business, blacks, ethnics, veterans, lawyers, youth, Jewish,
elderly, Spanish speaking, and physicians. Any additional hori-
zontal groups or voter bloc groups would also be housed at 1730.
The 4,327 square feet of ground floor office space opening onto
Pennsylvania Avenue and G Street would be used as our national
volunteer headquarters. Signs would be erected on Pennsylvania
Avenue and G Street advertising the fact that this was the loca-
tion of the National Committee for the Re-election of the Presi-
dent. In addition, it has been suggested that the headquarters
of the District of Columbia Committee for the Re-election of the
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
-2-
President be housed in this space on the ground floor and there
would be enough room to accomplish this. We would move most of our
volunteer operations to this space and all of the D.C. volunteer
operations would be housed here as well. It would make a most at-
tractive setting for our national headquarters, and from a security
standpoint would also be beneficial since it would attract "citizens"
and "street" traffic which otherwise would come here. In addition,
should there ever be violence in the campaign, it would most likely
be directed against the storefront as opposed to offices in this
building at 1701. Incidentally, the building at 1730 is on the site
of the two story building at 1726 Pennsylvania Avenue which was the
original national headquarters of the Nixon for President Committee
in 1968.
Rental for the 10,593 square feet on the third floor would be at
the rate of $8.50 per square foot per year, which would be $37,516.
This is an extremely good rate, since $8.50 is the going rate in this
area of Washington. for leases of several years duration. However, we
would be getting this rate for a lease of only a few short months.
It is, therefore, recommended that we lease this space immediately.
The proposed lease is now being examined by Jim Eichberg, a local
realtor who is helping us in the negotiations, our Committee counsel,
and the Finance Committee's counsel, in addition to our friends who
own 1701.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
The 4,327 square feet on the ground floor which opens on to Pennsyl-
vania Avenue and G Street would be leased to us at the rate of $12
per square foot per year. This is also a very favorable rate for
ground floor space on Pennsylvania Avenue. However, all the space
on the ground floor facing Pennsylvania Avenue was leased well over
a year ago, and in order to take the space, the Carr Company will
have to buy out the lease at the sum of $30,000 which we will then
have to pay. Thus, the total price for the ground floor space will
be $51,635. Although this is high, there are a number of factors
which compensate for this price -- such as convenience, location, and
the public image which will result from having the national headquar-
ters of the Committee for the Re-Election of the President housed in
'clean, modern office building a half block from the White House on
Pennsylvania Avenue, and on the site of the original Nixon Headquar-
ters in 1968. Therefore, it is recommended that this be approved as
well.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
-3-
As is the case with most political committees, we would be asked to
pay half of the rent at the execution of the lease and half of the
rent on July 31. The Finance Division has assured me that this is
no problem. Additionally, we would have to invest $10,000 in an
air conditioning system for the ground floor storefront and $10,000
in temporary partitions on the ground floor and the third floor.
However, these items would be resold at the termination of the lease,
and we do not expect that we would lose but two or three thousand
dollars in this area.
This new space would be totally operational by July 1 at the latest.
A modern telephone system, roughly comparable to that which we have
here at 1701, would be installed and functioning by July 1. Although
staff members at 1730 would have different outside telephone numbers
because the building is in another telephone company district, staff
members at 1701 would be able to reach anyone at 1730 by dialing his
four-digit extension, and vice versa. Thus, good communications
would be preserved between staff members at both locations. A sep-
arate telephone operator would be cn duty at 1730, however, to take
outside calls coming into 1730 and to relieve the burden on our
single telephone operator here at 1701.
bcc: Mr Frederic V. Malek
Mr. Gordon C. Strachan
Mr. Fred LaRue
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 24, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH: JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM: ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.
Following your request for a proposal with respect to the possible
expansion of the nine-member Frank Dale committee, a number of
individuals at 1701 and in government were contacted for their
views as to how this might be best accomplished. A number of inputs
were made by such persons as Mr. Stans, Dick Moore, Fred Malek,
Chuck Shearer, Bob Mardian, Harry Flemming, Lee Nunn, and Bob Marik.
We have waited until we received Mr. Stans thinking on the matter to
put this paper together since an expansion of. the Committee would be
so closely tied in with his fund raising efforts.
We believe there are three basic courses of action open to us: (1)
initiate a large scale direct mail effort aimed at recruiting mem-
bers; (2) do no direct mail but place sign-up cards at GOP and Nixon
offices throughout the country; and (3) leave expansion of the Com-
mittee to the Finance Division which has already undertaken programs
in this connection. These alternatives will be discussed below:
1. Direct mail.
If the goal of 'an expanded Committee is the public relations value
of being able to state that there are one or two million members
of the Committee for the Re-election of the President, then the
only way (we feel) to get this number is through a direct mail soli-
citation. Several million persons would be sent a one-page letter
asking them to join the Committee in return for their membership
fee of 50c or $1. They would receive a wallet card similar to the
one at Tab A.
The advantage of this alternative is obvious: we could quickly put
together a national committee of several hundred thousand people
and perhaps a million or more. There would be a great value of
being able to talk about this publicly during the rest of the cam-
paign.
GONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
The disadvantages of this course of action are, unfortunately, just
as obvious: (1) the program could not be plugged into any of Bob
Morgan's programs since they will begin too late for this purpose --
consequently the program would cost us a great deal of money that
might be better spent on Morgan's targeted direct mail or some other
aspect of the campaign; (2) it would infringe on the Finance Divi-
sion's programs which will be discussed under #3 below.
2. Sign-up cards.
Under this theory, sign-up cards would be distributed to state and
local GOP and Nixon committees throughout the nation -- the cards
would be given out at rallies, placed in storefronts, distributed
with campaign literature, etc. The sign-up card would tell the
individual about the Committee, ask him to fill out certain informa-
tion on the card (name, address, phone, and a blank asking if he
were willing to help by telephoning, driving, etc.), and then in-
struct the individual to bring the card to his local storefront or
headquarters where it would be traded for the membership card found
at Tab A. The sign-up card would be in duplicate and possibly trip-
licate: one copy would be retained locally, one possibly sent to the
state committee, and one sent to 1701.
The advantage here is that we would create a very effective volun-
teer recruitment -- as opposed to a fund raising -- program.
The disadvantages are: (1) we would never recruit anywhere near the
number of people we would reach by direct mail -- the best estimates
are that sign-up cards would result in less than 50,000 members.
Consequently, the program would not have the public relations value
it had originally been set up for; (2) it could conflict with other
and perhaps more valuable volunteer programs in the telephone oper-
ations and direct mail fields; (3) it, too, would cut into Finance's
baliwick for the reasons outlined below.
3. Leave expansion to Finance.
Although it had not occurred to the writer before beginning this
study, 1701 already has a very ambitious program to expand the
Committee's membership and has already increased it by 60,000.
In its fund-raising letter, now being mailed to 7,000,000 people,
Finance says "a contribution of $15 or more will make you a member
of our Committee. The card enclosed, signed by you after you mail
your check, will be a keepsake
" The letter, membership card,
and "membership application" are attached at Tab B.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONF IDENTIAL
-3-
Although, technically, the appeal for membership is by the Finance
Committee for the Re-election of the President, there are few re-
cipients of the mailing who would be able to distinguish between
the Finance Committee and our Committee. In addition, Finance's
letter was signed by Frank Dale, chairman of the Committee, who no
doubt would, as chairman, sign a letter from our Committee.
Thus, in effect, a letter has already gone and is going to 7,000,000
people asking them to join the Committee. Finance believes -- and
we agree -- that to initiate a second program asking people to join
the Committee would confuse everyone and make those who joined the
Committee at $15 or more upset that others could now join it for $1
or less.
The most important objection, however, is that by making membership
in the Committee free, or easily obtained at a nominal cost of $1
(whether for PR or volunteer recruitment purposes) we would be giv-
ing away something we might later wish to sell for more than $1 --
membership in the Committee. As Mr. Stans said in Hugh Sloan's memo
to me on the subject (Tab C):
"The Finance Committee already has instituted a membership drive
through its direct mail program with membership being conditioned
on contributing. A second membership drive
would be con-
fusing.
In view of this, it is recommended that all appeals to join the
Committee be made by the Finance Committee for fund-raising
purposes -- purposes which may become increasingly more important
as we attempt to raise money under the new Federal legislation.
Thus, if Finance wishes to use membership in the Committee to
raise money, fine. But membership should not be used at this
point for any other purpose. To use even the sign-up program
would be in error, we believe, because by giving someone mem-
bership free it would prevent Finance later on from selling
memberships.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
If this recommendation is approved, we believe it would still be a
good idea to expand the Dale Committee to perhaps fifty to one
hundred geographically dispersed leaders representing all professions,
religions, races, etc. Members could include such persons as Billy
Graham, Floyd McKissick, Lee Trevino, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
-4-
The original seven members of the Dale Committee -- plus Edward
Nixon -- would then become the vice-chairmen. Such a Committee
would take the place of both 1968's United Citizens for Nixon-
Agnew and the New York based Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee.
Thus, there would be one national committee in 1972 rather than
two and its structure would be along the following lines:
- A national chairman, Francis L. Dale
- Eight national vice chairmen: the original seven
plus Edward Nixon
- Fifty to 100 members, all of whom would be commonly
known to the public
- A Finance Committee which sells memberships through
a direct mail program
- A campaign director, John N. Mitchell
- A staff based in Washington
Fred Malek, who has the responsibility for coordinating the citi-
zens activity, agrees with this (it is his preferred concept in
fact). If you approve as well, we will begin to compile a list
of the 50-100 people we would propose be invited to join the mem-
bership of the Committee.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
CC: Mr. Frederic V. Malek
DCC: Mr. Gordon C. Strachan
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A.
This is is to certify that
is a member of the
Comn Hee they #:31
of the Prosident
Kun
Chairman
TAB B.
7
1701 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington D.C. 20000
Dear Fellow American:
Now that President Nixon has announced that he will be a candidate
for re-election, we need your help to make that re-election a reality!
This is why the Finance Committee for the Re-election of President
Nixon invites you now to join its ranks--to help our country achieve
four years of peace, prosperity, law and order, under Richard M.
Nixon's continued leadership.
We need your help most urgently. We must depend on contributions
from thousands of concerned individuals like yourself.
A contribution of $15.00 or more will make you a member of our
Committee. The card enclosed, signed by you after you mail your
check, will be a keepsake you'll be proud to own for years to come.
Why do we believe that President Nixon should be re-elected? First,
because he has brought us out of a devastating war and set us on the
path to peace.
When he took office, America had more than 540,000 troops in Vietnam.
Today America's orderly withdrawal from Vietnam is rapidly reaching
completion. In his search for peace, the President is travelling around
the globe and meeting with all major world leaders. We believe that
President Nixon's re-election will help assure a whole generation of
peace for America.
Second, we believe President Nixon deserves re-election because he
has helped bring back law and order to America. The riots, demonstra-
tions, killings and flaunting of the law that harried our country under
the Democrats have been steadily reduced since President Nixon took
office.
The courts are once more concerned about the rights of law-abiding
FEB, 81972
Otizens as well as accused law-breakers. He has appointed four
members to the Supreme Court--Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun,
Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist--who can be expected to give a
MM
strict interpretation of the Constitution, and protect the interests of
A/t
the average law-abiding American.
Third, we believe President Nixon should be re-elected because he
has halted the runaway inflation he inherited from the Democrats,
and has helped return America to a sound fiscal economy, which will
mean better living for all. When he came into office, soaring prices
and faltering foreign trade were creating a ruinous cost of living,
and a high level of unemployment. The inflation has now been
reduced through his price stabilization program and the international
monetary agreement, which he put through. He has been responsible
for an increasing prosperity, with more and more jobs available, and
will continue to foster that prosperity if re-elected.
These are some of the reasons why we are supporting President Nixon
--and why we ask you to help. Membership in our Committee is open
to any American citizen who makes a contribution to the Committee of
$15.00 or more. (If you can give $25.00, $50.00, $100.00 or more,
this is the time to do it!) Every penny that you give will be used to
help re-elect President Nixon.
So please--help us set this great crusadé in motion. Send in your
contribution today! After you do so, be sure to sign the Membership
Card enclosed with this letter--and keep it as a proud reminder that
you are doing something positive to help assure President Nixon's
re-election!
Cordially,
Fravois L Dale
Frank Dale, Chairman
Finance Committee
for the Re-election of
President Nixon
P.S. The "1971 Tax Bill", which President Nixon signed into law in
December, allows up to a $50 tax credit on your Federal Income
Tax Return ($100 if you and your wife file a joint return) for
political contributions. The money that you contribute, up to
$50 ($100 for a joint return), is therefore tax deductible. We
suggest that you consider giving either $50 or $100 now. We
will send you a receipt for tax purposes.
MEMBERSHIP IDENTIFICATION CARD
FINANCE COMMITTEE FOR THE
RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT NIXON
1972
CONTRIBUTING MEMBER
PLEASE SIGN HERE TO VALIDATE
NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W. WASHINGTON, D. C.
TO REMOVE MEMBERSHIP CARD PLEASE TEAR ALONG PERFORATION
MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION
I want to help re-elect President Richard M. Nixon-to assure 4 years of peace, prosperity,
law and order, for America.
I enclose my contribution for:
$15.00
$100.00
G14
$25.00
(OTHER)
MR HW KALMBACH
550 NEWPORT CTR DR
$50.00
SUITE 900
NEWPORT BCH CA 92660
Please send me a receipt. (No corporation checks acceptable.)
J
Make check payable to: Finance Committee For The
Re-Election Of President Nixon.
TAB C.
May 23, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. ODLE, JR.
FROM:
HUGH W. SLOAN, JR. Hwl
SUBJECT:
EXPANSION OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMITTEE FOR
THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
In response to your memorandum of May 9 and our conversations
of yesterday and today, I have discussed the proposal for
expanding the membership of the Committee for the Re-election
of the President with Secretary Stans. Our conclusion is that
we would recommend against such an expansion if it involves
fund=raising.
The Finance Committee already has instituted a membership
drive through its direct mail program with membership being
conditioned on contributing. A second membership drive by
the Committee for the Re-clection of the President - particularly
if it were conducted through the mail - would be confusing. All
fund-raising should be conducted by the National and State finance
committees.
cc: Maurice H. Stans
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 29, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
FROM:
ROBERT JEB S. MAGRUDER H. MARIK RM
SUBJECT:
Monthly Surveys of Voter Groups
Per your request, this memorandum expands on the concept of monthly
surveys of attitudes within important voter groups, as discussed
at the last strategy group meeting.
The 1972 election will probably see substantial shifts from previous
voting behavior by several segments of our population, particularly
if George McGovern is the Democratic nominee. The outcome of the
election may well hinge on whether the President can attract parts
of the old New Deal coalition to his constituency, while avoiding
any substantial breakup of the traditional Republican base. There-
fore, this year, the measurement of attitude trends within voter
groups will be at least as important strategically as will be the
measurement of support by key states.
It is recommended that important groups be tracked on a monthly basis,
much as was done in Orange and Los Angeles counties in California.
Key factors to be monitored might be relative importance of key issues,
perception of the candidates, head-to-head measurements of candidate
support, and measurements to determine if our advertising themes are
getting through.
Arthur Finkelstein has developed a detailed proposal relating to the
polling of middle-income urban ethnics (Tab A). These are the Catholic
Blue Collar voters who represent a major target of opportunity for
the President. Another, equally important group, are the upper-income
White suburbanites, who may move somewhat to McGovern. These two
groups represent the most fundamental and far-reaching potential for
change in the American Electorate. Their attitudes may shift as the
issues are developed through the campaign, and they should be tracked
very carefully.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
Other important groups, such as young voters and older voters, as
well as Black, Spanish and Jewish voters are not under such funda-
mental cross-pressures in this election, and can probably be
adequately tracked through sub samples of the major waves of state
polls and published survey information.
Recommendation
That Bob Teeter be authorized to track, on a monthly basis, the
attitudes of urban ethnics and upper-income White suburbanites
during the campaign. These survey questionnaires would be designed
to be consistent with the key state polling waves, so as to augment
that data.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
X
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A
A
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 24, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
ROBERT H. MARIK and
FROM:
ARTHUR J. FINKELSTEIN
SUBJECT:
Monthly Ethnic Studies
To better understand the ethnic community on the periphery of the
major metropolitan areas, a continuing monthly survey of 800 samples
should be undertaken. The questionnaire should be designed to probe
certain social issue attitudinal biases which exist within this
Peripheral Urban Ethnic (P.U.E.) group, as well as the more general
foreign affairs and economic concerns.
It is suggested that the survey itself be undertaken in Philadelphia,
totally excluding the Black and Spanish populations. Further, the
survey should be limited to an income spread of between $6,000 and
$18,000 a year. The nationality should be determined by respondents'
self-identification rather than by Census Bureau terminology. Geo-
graphical areas within the city should be broken down as: (1) Center
city; (2) South Philadelphia; (3) West Philadelphia; (4) Northeast
Philadelphia, etc. The survey should be designed to reflect past
voting weights rather than true population weights among these groups.
Religeous break outs should be made by Catholic, Protestant and
Jewish. The Jewish group should be broken down to Orthodox,
Conservative and Reformed, Athiest and other. Finally, I would
suggest that the survey be kept to less than 40 minutes.
The tracking of this monthly survey will allow us to exploit the
dynamics both electorially and issue-attitudinally within the P.U.E.
and then to project these results upon similar P.U.E. areas through-
out the country. The specific questions and demographics other than
those aforementioned should be designed to interrelate with our ori-
ginal survey information.
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 10, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
L. ROBERT MORGAN
SUBJECT:
Reassessment of the Direct Mail Operations
It has been necessary for us to change the operation in
order to accomplish our Direct Mail and other system-
oriented goals.
On Wednesday, June 7, 1972, the representatives from the
Reuben H. Donnelley Corporation asked for a meeting regarding
the systems and procedures for the General Election. We had
been pressing them to develop more depth of management on
the taskforce. That evening we met with their Systems and
Production staff and concluded they did not have the capability
of satisfying our needs for all of the key states. The
problem is not getting hardware to satisfy our needs, but to
get seasoned and professional people to staff them. A table
showing job descriptions and people requirements to accomplish
the entire job is attached as TAB A.
We have two alternative courses of action: (1) continue
using Donnelley for all mailing and computer letter operations
and phase all of the software functions to an outside company
such as SBC, Universal Computing or Perot's operations; or
(2) separate the country into regions and have one facility
in the state of Washington, one in California, one in Texas,
one in New York and another in the east, and keep Donnelley
for Michigan, Illinois, Ohio and Pennsylvania. Although it
would be more difficult to control, we lean toward having
four or five separate regional operations. We are simultaneous-
1y analyzing both of these alternatives but not slowing down
- 2 -
in the development of the data base. We expect to have a
recommendation on your desk no later than June 26, 1972,
for the course of action.
Either of these alternatives have an immediate need of four
additional systems people. If we split the country up in
regions we will also require one additional materiel ex-
pediter.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you approve the hiring of four additional systems
people, three of which would be located in three different
regions of the country, and one in Washington, D.C. These
four people will not cost more than $25,000 additional in
salaries, plus their travel expenses from July 1 through
the election.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENTS
Attachment: TAB A
CC: Dr. Robert H. Marik
POLITICAL DIRECT MAIL WORKFORCE REQUIREMENTS
1972
6/5 6/12 6/19 6/26 7/3 7/10 7/17 7/24 7/31 8/7.8/14 8/21.8/28 9/4 9/11.9/18 9/25.10/2 10/9 10/16 10/23 10/30 NET INCREASE
JOB DESCRIPTIONS
Computer Operations Supervisor
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
Computer Shift Supervisor
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
0
6
44
-
Lead Computer Operator
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
0
Computer Operators
5
5
5
5
11
11
11
11
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
19
rinter Operators
0
0
2
2
3
3
5
6
7
8
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
36
36
36
36
36
36
Key Punch Supervisor
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
Key Punch Operator
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
6
Technical Planning
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
0
OUTSIDE CONTRACTS
Systems and Programming
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5+
Job Control Supervisor
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Quality Control Clerks
0
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
List Clerks
0
2
2
2
3
3
4
6
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
Clerk Typist
0
2
2
2
3
3
4
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
List Operator
0
2
2
2
3
3
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Scheduling and JCL
0
0
0
0
3
3
3
3
6
6
6
6
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
Tape Librarians
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
5
Init Record Operator
0
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Shipping and Receiving
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 *1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
TOTAL CURRENT PROFESSIONALS
30
TOTAL PROJECTED PROFESSIONALS
135
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 15, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT:
Planning Sessions
It has been agreed that the State Chairmen and/or Executive
Directors will be brought into Washington in small groups to
discuss the various programs outlined in the recently distri-
buted compendium. This paper (developed jointly with Fred Malek)
describes a proposed format for these meetings, a schedule, and
the steps that should be taken to arrange the meetings.
FORMAT
While the State Chairmen and/or Executive Directors would be
brought to Washington in groups, the only planned group activity
would be a short orientation session. This would be no more than
a one-hour meeting. A welcome and overview of the campaign strategy
would be given by the Campaign Director, followed by short presenta-
tions by Magruder (Programs), Malek/Shearer (Citizens), and perhaps
a political coordinator. Following the orientation meeting, the
State Chairmen and Exectuive Directors would have a series of indi-
vidual meetings with Program Directors and Citizens Group Directors
relevant to their states. These meetings would be on the order of
one-hour in length for the non-key states, and an hour and one-half
for the key states. They would be scheduled into the evenings if
necessary.
It would not be necessary for each Citizens Group Director and
Program Director to meet with each State Chairman and Executive
Director (e.g.--The State Chairman from Vermont would not meet
with the Director of the Black Vote Division.). To coordinate
scheduling, inputs should be requested from the Citizens Group and
Program Directors on which State Chairmen they would like to see, and
from the states on which Citizens Group and Program Directors they
feel they should see, based on their exposure to the programs in the
compendium.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
The outcome of this series of meetings should be an agreement
between the Citizens Groups or Program Director and the State
Chairman on the desirable level and extent of program activity
that will take place within that state. These agreements, after
review by the appropriate political coordinator, would be the
basis for supplemental budget requests and would be a major input
to the overall State Victory Plan.
Recommendation
That you approve the format described above.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
x
SCHEDULE
States with similar interests and comparable levels of campaign
activity have been divided into groups that will meet in Washington
at the same time. (Tab A) To balance the workloads, the following
schedule is recommended:
--- Group I: June 26, 27 and 28
C
-- Group II: June 29 and 30
-- Group III: July 6, 7 and 8
--- Group IV: July 7 and 8
-- Group V: July 10 and 11
Recommendation
That you approve the above schedule for inviting the various
State Chairmen to Washington.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
NEXT STEPS
If the proposed format and schedule are satisfactory, the following
next steps are suggested:
1. The political coordinators should call the State
Chairmen in each of their states and invite them and/
or their Executive Directors to the appropriate meetings.
It is not necessary for both the State Chairmen and the
Executive Director to attend, but the objective is to
ensure that the functioning head of the State campaign
organization attends the meetings. The political coordina-
tors should also ask the State Chairman or Executive Director
which of the programs described in the compendium appear rele-
vant to his state. This will be needed no later than Tuesday,
June 19.
2. Fred Malek should obtain from the Citizens Group Directors,
and Magruder from the Program Directors, an indication of
which of the states they wish to see.
3. Dick Shriver of Marik's staff should be responsible
for. putting together the final schedule. Differences
between the requests of the State Chairmen and Program
or Citizens Directors will be resolved in favor of the
person requesting a meeting, if possible.
In addition to the visits with the Program and Citizens Group
Directors, each State Chairman should be scheduled to see the
Campaign Controller (Jerry Jones), a member of the planning staff,
and his political coordinator.
Recommendation
That you approve of the above steps for contacting the states and
for preparing for their visits.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
X
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
Following the meetings, the Program and Citizens Group Directors
will summarize the results of the discussions for each state and
review the major items with the appropriate political coordinator
for final approval and implementation.
CC: Fred Malek
Frank Herringer
CONFIDENTIAL
TAB A
A
GROUP I
GROUP IV
California
Montana
New York
Wyoming
Pennsylvania
Idaho
Illinois
Nevada
Texas
Utah
Ohio
Colorado
Michigan
New Mexico
New Jersey
Arizona
Hawaii
Alaska
GROUP II
Indiana
GROUP V
Kansas
Nebraska
Florida
South Dakota
Virginia
North Pakota
Kentucky
Minnesota
North Carolina
Iowa
South Carolina
Oklahoma
Georgia
Maine
Alabama
?
Vermont
Mississippi
New Hampshire
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Arkansas
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Delaware
District of Columbia
GROUP III
Missouri
Wisconsin
Maryland
Washington
Connecticut
Oregon
West Virginia
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 12, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
RICHARD L. FORE
SUBJECT:
Memo for the Committee for the Re-election
of the President Campaign Organization
In our discussion of the McGovern Campaign, you suggested that
we prepare a memo that would be circulated to Nixon state, county,
and precinct workers across the country. This memo would outline
McGovern's activities in California in an effort to prod out troops.
Attached is the same analysis that I am submitting to you, however,
it does not include the tabs that your copy contains. In addition,
a memo from you is attached that asks all Nixon workers to meet the
challenge of voter identification and voter turn. out.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the circulation of the attached memo and analysis.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments
X
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 12, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF
THE PRESIDENT CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION
FROM:
JOHN N. MITCHELL
SUBJECT:
Organization for Voter Identification and
Voter Turn Out
Will you be able to implement a door-to-door voter identification
and voter turn out program that will canvass over 75% of the voters
in your state and turn out all of the favorables onvelection day?
The McGovern Campaign carried out such a program in California,
a state that political pros said could never be organized. McGovern's
campaign organization defied the experts when volunteers canvassed
over 75% of the voters by knocking on doors in 19,000 of the 23,000
precincts in California.
If you cannot implement such a program in your state, we are facing
an uphill battle in re-electing the President. Senator McGovern will
use the same type of effective grassroots organization in your state
if he is the Democratic nominee.
Please read the attached analysis of the California McGovern Campaign
carefully. Then prepare to organize a voter identification and voter
turn out program in your state comparable to or better than that used
by McGovern in California.
CONFIDENTIAL
ANALYSIS OF THE McGOVERN CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION
IN THE CALIFORNIA PRIMARY
GENERAL ORGANIZATION
Many of McGovern's national campaign staff arrived in California
as early as October, 1971 to raise money, recruit volunteers, and
build an organization for the June, 1972 primary. By May of this
year, Senator George McGovern already had between 20,000 and 40,000
Volunteers working in the precincts of California.
The McGovern staff operated from three central headquarters in
California: the Southern California Headquarters in Los Angeles,
the Northern California Headquarters in San Francisco, and the
State Headquarters in Los Angeles. In addition, the McGovern
organization took their campaign to the people with 140 store
front headquarters located over the entire state Most
of the headquarters were located on an assembly district basis with
full time volunteers manning the store front operations 7 days
a week, 13 hours a day including holidays.
In most areas the store front headquarters were staffed by semi-
professional organizers (McGovern volunteers who had been through
primaries in other states and who had a firm grasp of grassroot
politics) and local California volunteers who will be the trained
organizers for the general election in November: The store front
headquarters' staff were articulate, bright, and extremely effective
organizers who placed major emphasis on canvassing.
VOTER IDENTIFICATION
The McGovern staff began their voter identification program by
securing lists of registered Democrats. These names were fed into
a computer which generated a computer print out of the registered
Democratic voters, with telephone numbers. The format of the computer
print out was such that it could be used for door-to-door canvassing
and telephoning. It was developed in precinct walking order with an
area for marking a coded response: (1) strong McGovern, (2) leaning
McGovern, (3) undecided, (4) anti or leaning against McGovern. Another
area of the print out was reserved for issues and comments.
McGovern volunteers placed each computer print out into a McGovern '72
Precinct Campaign Kit which gave instructions for door-to-door canvassers.
The general rules emphasized that all précincts should be walked, not
telephoned. Specific instructions included a canvass conversation and
coding procedure.
- 2 -
Each McGovern '72 Precinct Campaign Kit was enclosed in an envelope
with a map of the precinct attached to the outside (Tab D) The
envelope also contained McGovern literature, bumper stickers, and an
identification badge. The kits were distributed to the appropriate
assembly district store front headquarters.
For the most part, precinct captains were not designated for canvassing.
Blitz teams and individual "walk-in" volunteers were assigned precincts.
The McGovern Campaign found that while it was difficult to recruit
a precinct captain who would take full responsibility for each precinct,
it was much easier to find a volunteer who would give 4 to 6 hours to
canvass a precinct.
The McGovern staff maintained strict accountability and control over
all canvassers. Specific times were designated for returning the
McGovern '72 Precinct Campaign Kit. Control Boards were used in
store front headquarters so that the staff could determine the status
of canvassing at any time.
Volunteers also used telephone banks to canvass voters. Telephoning
did not substitute for door-to-door voter identification. Its
purpose was to supplement and often duplicate the door-to-door canvass.
Although the telephone banks were not located in the store front head-
quarters, close coordination existed with telephone banks reporting
the results of their day's work to the staff of the store front operation.
The state level staff also used a telephone bank in the Central Head-
quarters to call local headquarters across the state and check on the
status of canvassing. This served as both à check and prodding mechanism.
In addition, state field staff made regular trips to local headquarters
to assist in problem areas and provide an additional system of control
and accountability.
When the volunteers completed canvassing and returned the McGovern '72
Precinct Campaign Kit, the computer print outs that had been coded were
sent to the computer center so that "personalized" computer letters
could be mailed to those identified in the canvass as being favorable
or undecided. After all information from the canvass had been fed into
the computer, the print outs were returned to the local headquarters
within five days for recanvassing purposes. During the last days of
the campaign, headquarters' volunteers hand addressed mailings to those
who were canvassed because there was not sufficient time for computerized
letters.
Most canvassing had been completed a week before election day. The
last week of the campaign was used to recanvass "not at homes" and
undecideds.
- 3 -
GET OUT THE VOTE (VOTER TURN CUT)
Computer centers generated a second print out on the Sunday before
election day These print outs of the 1, 2, and 3's -
favorable, leaning favorable, and undecided, were enclosed in a
Democratic Presidential Primary Election Canvass Kit.
Volunteers used these kits to go door-to-door and to call voters
reminding them to vote. Volunteers offered rides to the polls
and baby sitters to those at home. Volunteers left door knob
hangers indicating the appropriate polling place to those not at
home.
ADDITIONAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
Although the McGovern staff and volunteers concentrated primarily on
voter identification and voter turn out, the following activities
were also well planned and coordinated.
RALLIES: McGovern staff and volunteers used leaflets and sound
trucks to promote McGovern speaking events, headquarters openings,
etc. well in advance of the day of the event. Because of
the importance of their assigned task, McGovern volunteers engaged
in canvassing were asked not to attend rallies.
DISTRIBUTION OF MATERIALS: McGovern volunteers followed a well planned
program for saturating the entire state with bumper stickers, posters,
and brochures which were brief and to the point
VOLUNTEER RECRUITMENT: McGovern headquarters staff was composed of
volunteers of all ages who were cordial and extremely effective in
recruiting other volunteers. Most prospective volunteers who entered
a McGovern headquarters were recruited immediately and asked to do the
most meaningful work - canvassing,
CONCLUSION
As indicated throughout this analysis, canvassing for voter identification
and get-out-the-vote was the highest priority in the McGovern campaign
in the California Primary. As a result, 20,000 to 40,000 volunteers
effectively canvassed 4 million of the 5.1 million voters in 19,000
of the 23,000 precincts in a state that was thought to be too large
to organize. Just as in other primary states, the McGovern campaign
organization has left behind a residual force of trained volunteers
in California for the general election.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 1, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
ROBERT H. MARIK
THE HONORABLE SHA JOHN N MITCHELL
SUBJECT:
Political Coordinators Meeting,
Tuesday, May 30, 1972
This meeting was devoted to a discussion of internal coordination
between the citizens groups and program efforts and the Political
Division activities in the states. The following decisions were
made:
Each Political Coordinator will be assigned liaison
responsibility with one or more programs or citizens
groups. In this role, he will act as a consultant (as
opposed to line manager) to assure that the programs and
activities being developed are consistent with the overall
campaign efforts in the states. Each Political Coordi-
nator will track with his four counterparts when appropri-
ate, so that individual program managers will not need
to meet with all five coordinators on matters of general
interest. Each coordinator will retain direct program
liaison on matters directly affecting his states. Fred
LaRue will prepare a list of all programs and the recommended
consultant for each.
The field representatives of the various citizens groups
should contact the appropriate political coordinator be-
fore visiting a state. He should also send the coordinator
a copy of the report of his visit. In addition, there should
be periodic reports from the citizens group directors to
the coordinators, on the status of the programs in the various
states. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of each coordi-
nator to remain up-to-date on all important programs operating
in their states.
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 4, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT:
Political Coordinators' Meeting,
June 2, 1972
The meeting of June 2, dealt with registration in the 1972 campaign.
Tom Evans and Ed DeBolt of the RNC were invited to attend.
It was generally agreed that registration efforts up to the present
had been ineffective. The time has come to combine the resources
of the Party and the Nixon organization in each state to achieve
meaningful results over the next several months.
It was suggested that the registration drives be divided into
two phases: Phase One between now and the convention, and Phase
Two from the convention up to the registration cut-off thirty
days before the election. We will seek to register Nixon voters,
whether they are Republicans or not. Evans and DeBolt said that
the state parties are prepared to accept those groundrules.
During Phase One in particular, it may be effective to use
spokesmen resources in a public relations program to emphasize
and sell registration, and to boost the enthusiasm of volunteers
on blitz days.
Although most states are having problems, Michigan was cited as
an example of a state where the party organization, the Nixon
organization, and in this case, the Griffin organization had
merged resources to achieve an effective program. It is that
type of coordination which will be necessary to achieve success
in all states. Toward that end, Tom Evans has agreed that the
RNC field men would be available to assist registration drives in
target areas.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
As a result of this meeting, several action steps were taken.
Ed DeBolt, Al Kaupinen and Bob Marik were appointed to be a task
force on registration. Their first objective is to prioritize the
counties within each state and to give that information to the
appropriate political coordinators. At the same time, the political
coordinators will be talking with their State Nixon Chairmen to
identify a person in each state to be responsible for registration.
They will then discuss appropriate persons to be responsible for
registration in each of the priority counties. In many cases, these
people may be from the party organization. Finally, the persons
appointed in the counties should develop recommendations on the
specific programs to be used in each location for registration.
DeBolt, Kaupinen and Marik, working with Jerry Jones, will analyze
the registration programs of three states: California, Michigan,
and a set of programs to be recommended for Illinois. This analysis
will attempt to evaluate costs and effectiveness. This will provide
the basis for further discussion by the Coordinators Group on what
programs should be recommended and what expenditure should be autho-
rized in the registration drives yet to be planned in the remaining
states.
CONFIDENTIAL
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 12, 1972
CONF IDENT TAI
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT:
Training Sessions in the States
At a recent meeting of the political coordinators, you asked for a
memo on how we would propose to conduct training sessions in the
states on the subjects covered in the State Chairman's Organization
Manual (registration, voter identification, get-out-the-vote, etc.).
The training sessions would be held in every key state, and in other
selected regions for the smaller states. A, detailed recommendation
of locations is given later in this 'memo. The attendees at the
training session would be the county and state level Nixon and Re-
publican Party leaders who will be responsible for registration,
voter identification and get-out-the-vote activities during the
campaign. Each training session would be led by the political
coordinator of the state (s) involved, the State Nixon Chair-
men and the State Republican Chairmen. The responsibility for
developing the content of each training session and preparation
of the training staff should come under one member of the Re-election
Committee in Washington. I recommend that the assignment be given
to Rick Fore of the Planning Division. The necessary staff to conduct
these training programs around the country might be provided from the
following sources:
RNC field staff (8)
Ken Reitz/ Youth Staff
Pat Hutar's field staff (if recruited at that time)
Staff of the state Republican Party
Staff of the Nixon state organization
The program would be envisioned as a one-day session. The morning
session might go from 9:30 through 12 noon; lunch from noon until
1 p.m.; afternoon session from 1 p.m. through 4 p.m. In most cases,
sessions would be held on a Saturday to allow attendance by the
appropriate state and county people. The first half hour of the
agenda would include introductory remarks by the political coordinator
- 2 -
and the State Nixon Party Chairmen. If possible, key spokesmen
or the Campaign Director might appear at' the beginning of such
a session.
The programs to be covered in the working sessions would be registration,
voter identification, get-out-the-vote, absentee ballots, ballot security
and headquarters layout and operation. The type of instruction would
be a minimum of lecturing and a maximum of demonstration of techniques
with the involvement of the trainees. For example, in a voter identi-
fication canvass, the trainees might be broken down into groups of
appropriate size and each group led through a mock precinct door-to-
door blitz. The group would be brought into a headquarters for
instruction and passing out of voter lists. The appropriate canvassing
forms would be used and the group would return to the headquarters
after the mock blitz to report on the results obtained. Useful techniques
to achieve a successful blitz would be pointed out at each step of the
way. In all cases, we would be sure to provide to the participants
detailed written material on each subject covered in the training.
The timing of the training session would be on six Saturdays between the
4th of July and the convention. It is contemplated that there would be
24 training sessions--or four conducted simultaneously each week-end
in different parts of the country. The recommended geographical loca-
tions would be as follows (listed by area of each political coordinator):
MARDIAN
Northern California (including Nevada)
Southern California (including New Mexico and Arizona)
Washington-Oregon
Rocky Mountain Region (Colorado, Utah, Idaho, Montana,
and Wyoming)
Missouri
Texas
FLEMMING
Flordia
Virginia-West Virginia (with Maryland)
Arkansas-Louisiana-Mississippi
Kentucky-Tennessee-North Carolina
Alabama-Georgia-South Carolina
New York
- 3 -
CONFIDENTIAL
MOSIMAN
New Jersey-Delaware
Pennsylvania
Maryland (with Virginia)
Ohio
Michigan
Indiana
Wisconsin (with Minnesota)
KAUPINEN
Maine-New Hampshire-Vermont
Massachusetts-Rhode Island-Connecticut
Illinois
YEUTTER
North Dakota-South Dakota
Minnesota (with Wisconsin)
Iowa-Nebraska
Kansas-Oklahoma
For each training session, the necessary advance work would be
done from Washington in conjunction with the host state. The
training staff of perhaps four or five people would converge on
the training site a day or so before the session in order to be
sure that all preparations are made.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the general concept of training sessions within
the states, as outlined above, and authorize the development of
detailed recommendations and budgets by the Planning Division,
working in consultation with the political coordinators.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment
CONFIDENTIAL
June 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
L. HIGBY
a
Bob would like to review what your final plans are
with regard to counter-attack operations for the
Democratic National Convention. How is it going
to be set up, what's been done, etc.
June 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
L. HIGBY
FROM:
JEB MAGRUDER
Attached is our most recent plan.
Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
CONFIDENTIAL
June 14, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
DEVAN L. SHUMWAY/POWELL A. MOORE
SUBJECT:
Committee for the Re-election Activities
in Miami during the Democratic National
Convention
OBJECTIVE
To take advantage of the heavy concentration of news
media at the Democratic Convention in Miami to promote the
re-election candidacy of the President and respond to attacks
by Democrats.
CONCEPT
Two or three spokesmen with a newsmaking capacity will
be based in a two room suite that has been reserved at the
Fountainbleu Hotel during the Democratic Convention to talk to
newsmen and conduct press conferences as the circumstances and
events dictate with strategic and tactical decisions coming from
Mr. Mitchell in Washington or someone speaking in his behalf.
SPOKESMEN
Recommendation - Rogers Morton as the positive spokesman
and Senators Gurney and Brock as the counter-attackers.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
CONFIDENTIAL
2.
CONFIDENTIAL
Rejected alternatives - Butz, Romney, Volpe, Richardson,
Dent, Finch, Rumsfeld, Scott, Ford, Reagan, Rockefeller, Bellman,
Baker, Cook, Goldwater and Taft.
Concur
Comments:
PERSONNEL
Recommendation - Powell Moore as press officer; Patrick
Buchanan and Art Amolsch as writers; an advanceman from Jon Foust's
office; one member of the staff of each of the spokesmen; and four
secretaries from CRP Convention headquarters in Miami and other
Miami sources to act as receptionists and man the telephones,
typewriters and telecopiers.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
Rejected alternatives - Secretarial personnel from the
CRP headquarters in Washington because room accommodations are
limited and the expense seems unnecessary.
Concur
Comments:
AUDIO
Recommendation - Tape recordings of statements by spokesmen
will be fed from Miami to Washington, where they will in turn be
fed to radio stations across the country.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
Rejected alternative - No one from our audio shop will be
needed in Miami, since the feeding operation is comparatively
simple from a technical standpoint and can be handled by personnel
that will be available there with a minimum of training. Our
audio personnel will be needed here to obtain statements from
spokesmen in Washington, as well as feed the statements that
originate in Miami.
Concur
Comments:
3.
CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY
Recommendation - Two security officers to be available at
all times. Jim McCord indicates that he can provide this service
with personnel who are already in Florida. He also said that he
will arrange to have the rooms and telephones checked for electronic
listening devices and the locks changed on the doors, so that no
one in the hotel can gain entrance with a pass key.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
*PRESS CONFERENCE TRANSCRIPTS
Recommendation - Engage a Miami-based stenographic service
to provide a court reporter and instant transcripts of press
conferences. The transcripts will be sent immediately to Washington
by telecopier for whatever use is deemed appropriate here, and they
will be available to reporters in Miami.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
Rejected alternative - A tape recording of each press
conference that would be transcribed only if there is a substantial
demand for transcripts.
Concur
Comments:
EQUIPMENT
Recommendation - Four typewriters and a Xerox machine to
be obtained from the CRP Convention headquarters in Miami for the
preparation of statements.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
4.
CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MIAMI
Recommendation - Two extra telephones with access to the
numbers limited to key CRP personnel and the CRP switchboard and
an embargo on outgoing calls from the hotel suite; and two
telecopiers at each location.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
Rejected alternative - An open line between 1701 and the
Miami suite is impractical in view of the limited duration of
the operation.
Concur
Comments:
HOSPITALITY
Recommendation - A bar with a bar attendant in the suite from
late afternoon until the conclusion of nightly activities and a
table of substantial hors d'oeuvres as appropriate.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
PUBLICITY
Recommendation - Issue a press release in Mr. Mitchell's name
that announces this operation about a week before the Convention in
order to minimize the appearance of underhandedness. The release
will call the operation the Forward Observation Post of the Committee
for the Re-election of the President.
Approve
Disapprove
Comments:
11
5.
CONFIDENTIAL
Rejected alternative - To let the public and the press
find out about this operation by chance might mean that they learn
about it on Larry O'Brien's terms rather than ours. In addition,
the operation will be pinned on Mr. Mitchell, and we have taken
every possible step to avoid having it pinned on the President.
Concur
Comments:
SUPPORT
Bill Timmons has the two room suite reserved at the Fountainbleu,
as well as enough room accommodations in other locations to meet our
requirements. He is arranging for four cars with two drivers and
office equipment from the CRP Convention headquarters in Miami
will be available for our use.
CONFIDENTIAL
News
from
the Committee
for the Re-election
of the President
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-0920
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE, JUNE 21, 1972
CONTACT: DeVan L. Shumway
(202) 333-7060
#6-63
SPECIAL ASSISTANT NAMED
WASHINGTON -- John N. Mitchell, Campaign Director of the Committee
for the Re-election of the President, today announced the appointment
of Edward D. Failor as a special assistant to work on campaign
strategy.
A former resident of Dubuque, Iowa, Mr. Failor, 44, most
recently served in the U.S. Bureau of Mines, where he worked on an
extensive reorganization of the Bureau's health and safety operations
to assure compliance with the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety
Act of 1969.
He established the Office of Assessments and Compliance
Assistance within the Bureau and was cited by the Bureau director
for his "outstanding" work on its health and safety program.
Prior to joining the Bureau of Mines, Mr. Failor engaged
in private law practice, served as municipal court judge in Dubuque,
and was vice president of the Political Division of the Fred A. Niles
Communication Centers, Inc., of Chicago.
He Was graduated from public schools in Marion and attended
the University of Wyoming while serving in the U.S. Army. He received
his undergi. Junce degree from the University of Dubuque and his law
degree with distinction from the State University of lowe.
(more)
2-2-2-2
SPECIAL ASSISTANT NAMED
He practiced law with the firm of O'Connor, , Thomas,
McDermott and Wright in Dubuque, and from 1960 through 1962 served
as vice president of Page Hotels, Inc.
Mr. Failor is married to the former Miss I. Maureen Julius
of Moorland, Iowa. They have three children and make their home
in McLean, Virginia.
-30-
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 26, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
E. D. FAILOR
SUBJECT:
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION ACTIVITIES IN
MIAMI DURING THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION
Memorandum to Key Participants
You have heretofore approved the preparation of a written memo-
randum to be given to key participants in the above event. This
document would clearly set out lines of authority and reduce
confusion.
Recommendation That the following memorandum be distributed to
key participants in the above activity.
"CONFIDENTIAL
TO:
KEY PARTICIPANTS IN MIAMI TRUTH SQUAD
FROM:
JOHN N. MITCHELL
SUBJECT:
Committee for the Re-election of the Presi-
dent Activities in Miami during the Demo-
cratic National Convention
OBJECTIVE:
The Committee for the Re-election of the President will
take advantage of the heavy concentration of news media
at the Democratic Convention in Miami to promote the
The Honorable John N. Mitchell
June 26, 1972
Page 2
re-election candidacy of the President and respond to
attacks by Democrats.
CONCEPT:
Four spokesmen with newsmaking capacity will be based in
a two room suite at the Fountainbleu Hotel during the
Democratic Convention to talk to newsmen and conduct press
conferences as circum tances and events dictate. 1701
will be in constant communication with our Miami operation.
SPOKESMEN AND STAFFS:
Rooms have been provided for each spokesman and one member
O1 his staff. We would appreciate having our spokesmen at
the Fountainbleu suite at 8 p.m. on Sunday, July 9, 1972,
for an orientation meeting.
SUPPORT:
A press officer, writers, an advanceman, secretaries,
receptionists, cars with drivers, telephones and necessary
equipment will be made available by the Committee.
I have asked E. D. Failor of my staff to act as the coor-
dinator of this activity.
STRATEGY:
The Committee will develop strategy for this period of the
campaign. We would like the statements by our Miami
spokesmen to reflect this strategy. To have a coordinated
effort, we will have an open line between Miami and 1701
to discuss the contents of the statements to be made by
our spokesmen.'
Approve
Disapprove
Comment:
The Honorable John N. Mitchell
June 26, 1972
Page 3
News Release
Recommendation--That a release be given to the media on June 30,
1972, in the name of the Campaign Director stating that a Repub-
lican "Truth Squad" will be in Miami to try to keep the Democrats
honest.
Approve
Disapprove
Comment:
Reasoning
If we announce the "Truth Squad" before we go we will have less
chance of being attacked for doing this under the table.
CONFIDENTIAL
Thus it isn't at all clear, in Iowa or else-
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
where, whether the rules changes will translate
into meaningful political changes
Wednesday, January 19, 1972
"The question is whether groups who
weren't given adequate representation before
will take advantage. of the opportunities given
them by the reforms," says Ken Bode, a for-
As Iowa Goes
?
mer staff member of the party's National Re-
form Commission, which produced the new
Democrats' New Rules
rules. "If they don't, we might as well not have
made the changes."
A Good Testing-Ground
For Picking Delegates
Iowa, although always considered a rela-
tively "clean" state, provides a good testing-
ground for the reforms. In 1968 there was con-
Add to '72 Uncertainty
siderable bitterness here among McCarthy
backers who, after sweeping many precinct
caucuses, charged that their opponents denied
Test in Midwest Indicates
them a fair share of delegates at later county
and state conventions. Now, the state party is
That Apathy and Confusion
lauded by many reformers as one that has
made an outstanding effort to insure an open
Could Bar Effectiveness
and fair delegate-selection system, and it will
be the second state (after Mississippi) to begin
selecting delegates.
Infiltrating a Local Caucus
The new national rules, adopted in reaction
to abuses exposed during the bitter 1968 infight-
ing, are designed to prevent candidates from
By NORMAN C. MILLER
locking up state delegations by making deals
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
with a few party bosses. A battery of guide-
DES MOINES-Next Monday night, at 2,600
lines requires state parties to open the dele-
precinct caucuses throughout the state, Iowa
gate-selection system to wider influence.
Democrats will start testing whether the na-
Among other things, a nonprimary state can no
tional party's highly touted reform rules really
longer have all or most of its national-conven-
will make much difference in the battle for the
tion delegates picked by a party committee or
a state convention; at least 75% of them must
presidential nomination.
be chosen °at a level no higher than congres-
Under the new rules designed to thwart
sional-district conventions. Moreover, the rules
deals by party bosses and to expand grass-
call on state parties to take "affirmative
roots influence, thousands of party members
steps" to promote the choice of more women,
will then begin the process of picking Iowa's 46
young people and blacks as delegates to the na-
delegates to the National Democratic Conven-
tional convention.
tion at Miami in July.
The guidelines already have led to some sig-
Definite judgments about the reforms' ef-
nificant changes in the nonprimary states,
fects won't be possible until the early Iowa ex-
which control 40% of the votes at the national
perience is followed in many more states. Still,
convention. For instance, the new rules have
it is clear at the outset that the new rules for
prevented state organizations from selecting
selecting convention delegates have injected
delegates before the campaign year; one-third
new uncertainty into the scramble for the par-
of the delegates to the last Democratic conven-
ty's nomination, particularly in the 28 states
tion were picked before 1968, and thus these
like Iowa where no primaries are held.
party functionaries could ignore the insurgent
One reason is simply that party stalwarts
candidacies of Eugene McCarthy, the late Rob-
are baffled by the complex rules. A few nights
ert Kennedy and George McGovern.
ago, 100 Democratic activists met here to dis-
If Iowa Democrats do pick a lot of uncom-
cuss them. After hours of confused talk, the
mitted delegates at their precinct caucuses,
group's leader summed up: "It's really very
that outcome would run against the spirit (but
simple. All you have to do is memorize five
not the letter) of the reforms. For a major pur-
pages of instructions and have a Ph.D. in
pose of the rules is to encourage party mem-
mathematics to understand them."
bers to make would-be delegates say in ad-
But Who Cares
vance where they stand.
A deeper problem in Iowa is voter apathy.
Role of Muskie and McGovern
The imminent beginning of delegate selection
A sizable uncommitted bloc of delegates
has attracted little interest despite mock cau-
would allow a lot of old-fashioned wheeling and
cuses and discussions of the rules staged by the
dealing at the county conventions next month
party and various groups in several towns. The
and perhaps at the March conventions in con-
apathy persists, despite the campaign efforts
gressional districts as well. At those latter
of the Democratic candidates, particularly
gatherings, the 3,687 Democrats elected at the
Sens. Edmund Muskie and George McGovern,
county conventions will select 34 Iowa dele-
the two who are giving the most attention to
gates to the national convention. The remain-
the state.
ing 12 at-large delegates will be elected by the
Most Democratic politicians expect the
same 3,687 people at the state convention in
turnout for the precinct caucuses to be well
May.
below the 50,000, or SO who showed up in 1968
A big uncommitted vote in the precinct cau-
when the then-lonely antiwar campaign of Eu-
causes also would embarrass both Sens. Mus-
gene McCarthy stirred interest. Indeed apathy
kie and McGovern. The McGovern forces are
now seems so great that some politicians antic-
eager to make a good showing in the early vot-
ipate that party veterans will control many
ing here, in the hope of quieting the Mc-
lightly attended caucuses and, seeking to keep
Govern-cap' talk before the primaries
their options open, will elect a large number of
start. The Muskie camp, for its part, is intent
uncommitted delegates to subsequent county
on showing that the Maine Senator's frontrun-
conventions.
ner image is real.
Accordingly, both the Muskie and Mc-
continued
A's Iowa Goes
? New Delegate Rutes
Of Democrats Add to Uncertainty
Continued From Page One
Govern organizations are giving Iowa more at-
Some Things Never Change
And, rules notwithstanding, there are ways
tention than its relatively few national-conven-
An effort by some politicians to elect
for wily veterans to outmaneuver political in-
tion votes might otherwise warrant. Both can-
"draft-Kennedy" delegates also appears, in ef
nocents. A Humphrey man explains: "Suppose
didates have dispatched crews of full-time or-
fect, to be an effort to keep a.bloc of delegates
20 people I've never seen before come into my
ganizers to help their local supporters. Sen.
uncommitted. The draft movement was genu-
caucus, and they're going to vote for Mc-
McGovern spent two days touring the state last
ine when it emerged several weeks ago, but the
Govern. Well, I'll just take three or four of my
week, and Sen. Muskie followed with a visit
Massachusetts Senator asked that it be called
people and join their group. Chances are they
yesterday. (Eugene McCarthy also is making a
off, and many of his long-time supporters in
won't know each other and won't understand
late bid to rekindle his 1968 support with ap-
the state withheld their backing. Now, con-
the rules too well. I'll let them flounder around
pearances this weekend.)
cedes one participant, "being for Kennedy is
for awhile, and then I'll get up and get things
By most appraisals, Sen. McGovern has the
tantamount to being uncommitted, but it gives
organized. And you can bet they'l end up elect-
most effective organization in Iowa, mainly as
you a better chance of winning in precinct cau-
ing me as a delegate."
a result of an early start. And, with less than
cuses."
The phony McGovern delegate then would
5% of the state's Democrats expected to partic-
Finally, apathy works in favor of those who
be free to switch his vote to Sen. Humphrey (or
ipate in the precinct caucuses, a well-organized
want to remain uncommitted. James Walter, a
anyone else) at the county convention, for no
effort to turn out a candidate's hard-core sup-
truck driver and precinct committeeman in a
Melegate elected in the precinct meetings will
port is very important. "The caucus system
blue-collar Des Moines neighborhood, explains
be bound by any commitments he makes.
works to the advantage of the best-organized
"My wife and I are uncommitted, and we'll be
Seeing the possibility of such: maneuvering,
campaign, and we think we've got it here,"
elected delegates like always, because we're
some people have soured on the reforms even
says Lou Lamberty, the Iowa coordinator of
the only ones who are willing to do any work,
before they've been tested.
the McGovern campaign.
"I was enthusiastic about the reforms at
The Muskie side, seeking to offset the or-
and that's sure not going to change."
first, but I'm not any more," says Edris
ganizing edge they concede to the McGovern
Whatever the outcome of precinct elections,
Soapy) Owens, state political director of the
camp, countered on Monday by persuading
state Democratic officials say the new rules in-
United Auto Workers. "It appears to me that
Sen. Harold Hughes, by far the most popular
you're still going to have the same old people
Democrat in the state, to endorse Sen. Muskie.
sure that procedures will be fair. The state
and the same old power plays under this sys-
Until then, the Iowa Senator (who was briefly a
party is issuing five pages of step-by-step in-1
'tem.''
presidential candidate himself last year) had
structions that precinct committeemen are to
A good number of politicians, however,
been saying he was going to run as an uncom-
follow in conducting caucuses. The rules at-
think the reforms will have a significant im-
mitted delegate himself-though it was widely
tempt to insure that each candidate's backers,
pact. "The rules are forcing many people who
believed he was closest philosophically to Sen.
and any uncommitted group, will be allotted a
want to be delegates to declare themselves,
McGovern. Now, many Hughes backers may
share of the precinct's delegates in strict pro-
and I think the commitments they make in
follow him into the Muskie camp.
portion to their representation in a caucus.
caucuses will be kept even though they' not
Seeking to offset Sen. Hughes' action, Sen.
Each precinct, with a population of up to 3,500,
binding," says one veteran Democrat. "It's
McGovern promptly reminded Iowans that the
elects from one to several delegates, depending
going to be very hard to switch your vote later
new party rules are supposed to make sure
on its Democratic voting strength in past elec-
and explain it to the people who elected you."
that delegates are selected "free of the taint of
tions.
bossism." The South Dakota Senator said yes-
The proportional-representation rule is a
terday that he hoped for "significant" support
change designed to eliminate past complaints,
in Iowa "as the candidate who has chosen to
about candidates winning bare majorities in
take his campaign to the grass roots and to
the caucuses and grabbing all the delegates.
seek the support of the independent citizen."
Under the new rules, the number of delegates
The Theory
given each camp should be automatic. Say that
In theory, at least, the reform rules should
20 people show up at a precinct caucus electing
help the candidates' efforts to elect committed
six delegates, and that nine are for Sen. Mus-
kie, seven are for Sen. McGovern and four are
delegates at the precinct caucuses. "If you go
to a caucus and want to be elected a delegate,
uncommitted; the apportionment charts issued
people are going to want to know who you're
by the state party would show that Sen. Mus-
for," says Clif Larson, the Democratic state
kie's group can elect three delegates, the Mc-
chairman here. "So I don't think the incom-
Govern people can elect two and the uncom-
mitted vote is going to be very big: I think
mitted group can elect one.
we're going to know which candidate has won
While the formulas undoubtedly are fair,
Iowa after the caucuses."
some politicians foresee a lot of wrangling
Others note, however, that many would-be
among people who don't understand the mathe-
delegates. are honestly undecided and that
matics. "There's going to be chaos in some of
some groups are urging them to stay uncom-
these precinct meetings," says James Brick,
mitted. The state AFL-CIO is one such group.
the Polk County (Des Moines) Democratic
"Our objective is to make sure that labor's in-
chairman. "With all these rules changes that
terest is represented at the (later) conven-
nobody understands, you just know that some-
tions," says Don Rowen, a Des Moines AFL.
one is going to say he has been cheated."
CIO leader. "We're encouraging our people to
"A Lot of Cheating" Expected
remain uncommitted because if they split their
Suspicions of foul play already are being
votes among candidates our strength will be
voiced. "I expect there's going to be a lot of
watered down."
cheating," says Glenn Buhr, a prominent Mc-
Sen. Hubert Humphrey's agents also are
Govern supporter in Iowa. 'I'm sure there'll
urging his old allies to back uncommitted dele-
be efforts in'some precincts to give the leading
gates at the precinct meetings. Having started
candidate all the delegates if they can get
to organize well after the McGovern and Mus-
away with it."
kie forces, the Humphrey people reason they
have little chance at this point to beat their ri-
vals in a head-to-head contest. So they're
trying to keep things fluid by denying anyone a
clear victory in the precinct balloting.
X
ha Rue - plane? .
6/27
Mardian, Magruder, Failor, Maril, Miller, ha Rue
Mty Then on Cal Budget - Mardian, nop,
10a Story Schrieler, Steen, Fcrestone, here, Tuttle
must devel sched fr now to convention,
bet conventions, post RNC convention
Decision 6/23 agreed to take gloves off
on me G's poortions, esp
welfare bealthis he will waffle
- Use Richardown + facits
- Weinberger's analysis of MeG's
welfare position - J8M + Failer Plan
II
Dem Convention - Miami
Truth Squad -lines, preas,2 rooms
Morten + have spokes,
scott may term deren
-use Sam steiger? nota foor leasers.
"Mon"- begins across bd use of
Rnc - Dems states ag/McG
Dems for RN - Week after Convention,
Founding could be brulton
ITH types, etc.
Possib - amn of Dems haRn, Thes ofter love
MCG accep Spe Then night-
Have haba types blast either at
Convention or short after or
thrtful types (conn, etc)
-Het FU, Comm of Dems, big dubble
Whe P will meet ul Dems fo RN
bet conven's.
-(1) -(2) 2 1 Issues -1 per well by issue by
-
Dems for P. + Intell's Your Suns
-
3
nail Mc G on 3-.4 issues
RNC Conven ends 8/24-9/14
P ona moratoriam, P kid off
hr/ S. Deego u/ 7 weeks of P.
- Must go Sep 14
1
what to do bet 8/24+ 9/14/
2
7 well by we coold of P, Sunst do
Es - 1 we owlf - Posit & reg
8/24-9/14
Failer - organize, road shows,
Picnico-conien to Laba Day
Jy 4- whe P.
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAUL JONES
ED SEXTON
FROM:
FRED MALEK
SUBJECT:
Black Vote Field Operation
As we discussed, we need to greatly intensify our efforts in the field in order
to obtain substantial numbers of Black voters for the President. To accom-
plish this task, I feel that you need to immediately take the following steps:
1. Get an acceptable field organization on board and function-
ing under Sexton.
2. Develop a detailed plan of action for the field operation with
specific objectives, a program for accomplishing the objectives,
and target dates for completion. I would like to see your proposal
by July 6th.
To assist you in getting started, I have developed some general ideas for the
field operation. While these ideas are general, they should prove helpful in
building your detailed plans, objectives, and organizations.
Attached at Tab A is an organisation chart breaking the field operation down
into critical segments.
1. Field Operations Manager (Ed Sexton). Ed is responsible for
developing and implementing all programs and plans for field operations. He
should travel to the key states and cities assisting in setting up the field organi-
sation in all areas. (See Tab B for an initial suggested list of key cities and
states.) He should be assisted by Paul Jones, Bob Brown, the State Black
Chairmen, and other Nixon oriented Black leaders in recruiting and setting
up the Black leadership committees in each city. He should also assist in the
recruiting and training of volunteers at all levels who would disseminate infor-
mation, identify voters, and get out the vote. Finally, he will be held account-
able for the success or failure of the field operation and report to Jones.
2. Two Field Coordinators, Sexton, Jones, and Brown should immed-
intely recommend two Field Coordinators. I will want to review these as soon
as possible. These men should have had excellent political experience and be
skilled at organizing and directing the activities of others. Sexton and the
Field Coordinators should each be assigned certain key states and cities. They
- 2 -
would work directly with the State Black Vote Chairmen in their areas and
the other members of the Nixon Campaign team in setting up the organization,
recruiting and training of volunteers and implementing plans, programs,
and projects. The Coordinators are to be responsible to Sexton and they
can employ special consultants on an as needed basis with my approval.
3. State Black Vote Chairmen and Black Advisory Committees. State
Black Vote Chairmen for the key states should be selected as soon as possible
by Jomes, Sexton, and the Field Coordinators, with my approval. The Nixon
State Campaign Managers should not be asked to do the recruiting: however,
the selections should be cleared with them and report to them on a day-to-day
basis. All State Black Vote Chairmen will be volunteers; however, some
key states will have paid Executive Directors.
In the South, State Black Vote Chairmen should be appointed, and each
should seldct an active committee of State Black Leaders to assist him through-
out the state. The members should be highly visible and respected Black
leaders and charged with the responsibility for reaching the Black voters. I
visualize these committees as critically important only in the South since we
have no plans, at present, to establish a formal organisation below the state
level.
4. City Coordinators and Black Leaders Committees. The main focus
of our campaign will be in the large cities of our key states. Each key city
should have a coordinator jointly selected by the State Black Vote Chairman,
his Field Coordinator, and the Nixon Campaign Chairman. He would be
responsible for generally supervising all activities in his city by closely
coordinating with the Nixon City Chairman. Each City Coordinator must,
in conjunction with his superiors, select active committees of Black leaders
to assist him in each major Black area of his city. For example - in Chicago,
a committee could be established of leaders from the Southside and one from
the Westside. These committees would be responsible for recruiting volun-
teers in their area, establishing an organization of workers throughout their
area, implementing plans and programs, and generally reaching the Black
voters throughout the city.
These committee members should be prime movers in their communities
and would have direct responsibility for establishing credible local headquarters,
reaching the voters through speakers, literature, polling and canvassing, tele-
phoning, and all the techniques of door-to-door and people-to-people cam-
paining. All of the above activities must be closely coordinated with other
members of the Nixon Campaign team at the State, City, and Local levels.
- 3 -
My preliminary analysis shows a need for twenty-three City Coordi-
mators in the Tab B cities. This number could change as more up-to-date
polling becomes available. The number of cominittees depends upon the
Black vote concentrations in each city. In some cities, like Hartford,
Connecticut, one would be sufficient. In a city like New York, perhaps
we would need three or four.
5. Programs, A program should be developed that spells out exactly
what will be done in each city - the type of organization needed, the activities
expected, timetables, and the like. This should be the type of document that
can be left with the City Chairman, and serve as a fairly precise guide for
his activities.
In addition to setting up a strong functioning field organization, it is critically
important that you both work closely with Bob Brown regarding Special Projects
and State Scott for Public Relations and Speakers Bureau. As you know, Bob
and Stan have been doing a lot of work in these areas but more direct and
closer coordination is needed. Your detailed plans should clearly state how
closer coordination is to be obtained, and I suggest you meet with Bob and
Stan as soon as possible.
Finally, coordination and cooperation between all levels of the Black organi-
sation and the rest of the Nixon team is essential to success. If coordination
breaks down at any level, the effectiveness of the effort will be significantly
reduced.
Please have your specific plans ready for review by July 6th.
Attachments
A
May 25, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROB ODLE
FROM:
FRED MALEK
SUBJECT:
Expansion of the Committee
I have reviewed your memo and fundamentally agree with your conclusion
that we should not solicit memberships to the Committee through direct
mail or sign-up cards. I also tend to agree that we should simply turn
over to Finance the responsibilities for expanding the Committee in com-
nection with their fund-raising efforts.
However, I feel your draft memo to Mitchell leaves one issue unanswered
which is deserving of some focus. That issue is whether or not it would
be advantàgeous to have an expanded Committee consisting of anywhere
from 20 to 100 geographically dispersed leaders representing all professions,
religious, and races. In my opinion it would be valuable from a public
relations point of view and also to represent the wide-spread support of
the President to form such a Committee with members that might include
Billy Graham, Floyd McKissick, Lee Trevine, etc. To do this we have
several options:
1. Let the Finance Committee continue to sell memberships
as they are doing in their Committee, but expand the Dale Com-
mittee to the 20 to 100 leaders. Existing members of the Dale
Committee could be made Vice Chairmen.
2. Let the Finance Committee expand membership of the Dale
Committee through their fund-raising efforts, again making
existing Dale Committee members Vice Chairmen.
3. Have the new contributors become members of the Finance
Committee. Instead of expanding the Dale Committee to demon-
strate the wide-spread support, leave the Dale Committee as
the overall governing body but form a new Citizens Committee
that would include the wide-spread leaders referred to above,
My preference is 1. above. There is no sense in proliferating our Com-
mittees, yet the Dale Committee certainly needs expansion to be more
broadly representative,
- 2 .
It seemits me that something along these lines might be included in the
memo to Mr. Mitchell in order to completely answer the question he has
raised. As it stands now, your memo leaves open the question of whether
the Dale Committee and the Einance Committee group should be one in the
same, and also leaves open the question of expansion of the Dale Committee.
If, on the other hand, you and Job prefer not to address the Dale Committee
expansion in your memo, you should then at least refer to the fact that this
remains an important issue to resolve and that Jeb and I will be forwarding
a separate memo of recommendations in this regard.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
+
June 14, 1972
Note for Bob Haldeman -
The attached brief analysis of
the Spanish-Speaking vote may be of
interest. We have recently completed
(through OEO) a comprehensive study
of the Mexican Americans and we will
forward a summarized analysis in about
a week.
ЭММ
Fred Malek
Attachment
6/13
RI
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 12, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Spanish-American Bloc
A question has been raised as to how we determined that there is a
high potential for improving the Nixon vote among Spanish-Americans.
Our first wave polling found that while the President was not
attracting a high percentage of Spanish-American voters, he did
run somewhat better than Republicans in the past. More importantly,
both his ratings on the issues and personality scales were quite
favorable. If we accept the idea that switching a person's vote
is the last step in a series of attitude changes, it would appear
that a significant number of Spanish-American voters are well on
their way to completing this attitude change.
Another recent study of Spanish-American voters in four cities shows
a great variance in Nixon's rate of approval for his handling the
job as President.
Los Angeles
San Antonio
Chicago
New York
Approval
29%
42%
31%
25%
Disapproval
71
57
69
75
The above results would tend to indicate that the attitudes of
Spanish-Americans toward the President are flexible.
All of our data would seem to suggest that the President has much
to gain from any overtures made to this voter bloc. With the up-
coming state dinner for President Escheveria, it might be an appro-
priate time for the President to accept an invitation to visit
Mexico in the near future. In the meantime, however, we should
make every effort to publicize the state dinner to Spanish-Americans,
particularly in California and Texas. Also, a presidential appear-
ance in an area of large Spanish-American population would be
helpful.
-2-
Appearances will be more productive if made now before the Democrat
nominee is selected. As with most groups, every voter we can get
committed now is one less that will be available to McGovern once
he gets the nomination.
While we did not attempt to measure anti-Mexican bias, I am confi-
dent we can make some positive overtures without alienating others
who might otherwise vote for the President.
CONFIDENTIAL
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK
SUBJECT:
Voter Bloc Preparations
For the Convention
The purpose of this memorandum is to fill you in on the preparatory
work and planning now under way by the Voter Bloc Directors for
their constituencies' participation at the convention.
INTRODUCTION
The convention period will provide a tremendous opportunity to show
the support of the various voter bloc groups for the President. In
addition, this period will afford us an opportunity to further publicize
the activities of the various voter bloc groups and in that way draw
additional support to their activities for the fall campaign. Stan
Andersen of my staff is coordinating voter bloc convention activities,
and we have been working closely with Bill Timmons on convention
planning. I will personally direct all of the voter bloc activity at
the convention.
CURRENT PLANNING
1 have asked each Voter Bloc Director to prepare a comprehensive plan
outlining the activities for their constituencies at the convention. These
planning efforts divide themselves into the following areas:
1) Identify substantive issues which are of critical importance
to each of the voter blocs. We will then prepare a memoran-
dum for Ed Harper who has indicated that he would be very
interested in the views of the Voter Bloc Directors prior to
the finalisation of some of his work on the Platform.
FM/SA/vo
- 2 -
2) Identify several loyal members of each voter bloc group
to testify before the Platform Committee. We will ensure
that the testimony of these voter bloc representativew will
receive full publicity within the various voter bloc consti-
tuencies. This will be especially effective within the Spanish
Speaking, Elderly, and Ethnic constituencies.
3) Contact each delegate or alternate who is a member of
a voter bloc group before the convention by letter and, in
most cases, also by telephone. The Voter Bloc Director
will be responsible for ascertaining the hotel room and
telephone numbers in Miami Beach of each of "his" dele-
gates and alternates. The Voter Bloc Director will act
as a supplemental liaison with these delegates and alter-
nates and will be prepared to assist the political coordinators
in dealing with these delegates or alternates as the need arises.
4) ,Develop a plan to use the free periods between convention
sessions for campaign organizational work with the delegates
and alternates. These sessions will be used to organise and
train the delegates for campaign activity after the convention.
a) Develop a comprehensive press and public relations plan
for the convention period. Emphasis will be placed on
activities for Youth, Spanish Speaking, the Elderly and
Blacks. All voter blocs will, however, have some activi-
ties during the convention period. We are planning press
conferences for leading members of most of the voter bloc
groups, a series of large-scale Youth events during each
day and might of the convention, and a number of rallies
and other "events" for most of the other voter bloc groups.
The purpose of each activity will be to dramatise and draw
attention to the support of that voter bloc for the President.
We will also plan to identify key veter bloc delegates to be
selected for spot interviews by the press on the floor of
the convention during slow program periods. Our aim is
to provide & maximum of activity to help draw attention away
from coverage of the demonstrations outside the Hall.
- 3 -
FOLLOW-UP
All of this planning activity is well under way and our final plans will
be complete by June 23. 1 will provide you with a copy of our final
plans that are submitted to John Mitchell in late June. These plans
and activities will then be integrated into the master convention
schedule which Bill Timmons is now putting together. I will then
continue to monitor the implementation of these plans to ensure
that we have a top flight program in Miami.
Dent - -helpless, Flem not even
return calls
- -tabled w/malea
- wonders who respons for Soath
- Black field operators
- wong ween so + Western 80
to Flem
-Flem a desaster in western
"Lord help us"
big charter
"a Damn dioaster." "
- must get someone in to grab
the organis poe
1
"Worriel; mumbling + gremeles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 2, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BRUCE KEHRLI
SUBJECT:
The attached Reports
The two books attached are the reports that John Ehrlichman
mentioned in his cable to you this week. The first --
Selling our line on domestic issues: An Interim Report --
contains a lot of fluff and some articles' that I doubt the
President needs to read. Suggest that Tabs A and B (both
sets) be removed.
The report does, however, mention on page 4 that action plans
will be ready for the President's review next week if he
wishes. Provided you concur, we will follow up to get these
for the President's review.
Recommend that the second book -- Current status of domestic
issues: An Interim Report -- go in as is.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 19, 1972
DETERMINE
TO BE AN
ADMINIS
RKING
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
E.
6-102
By EP
4-1-82
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
H.
The President asked today where the action plans were
for the key issues that he had requested in his memorandum
. of April 9th. In checking back, I find that he had asked for
these to be ready when he returned from Canada. When we
met on this subject in your office with Cole, Colson and
Malek, it was my understanding that we were going to have
this matter settled in a week or two. In the meantime, I
asked Colson and Malek to come up with what they felt the
framework should be for this project. I have attached their
efforts. While I do not agree with or endorse all that they
have said, their papers are a starting point and might be
helpful in getting this thing pulled together.
One thing that I do agree with them on is the need to get
the basic strategy settled and an apparatus set up to get
activity in these areas. They are ready to go and would
appreciate any guidance you could give them.
Incidentally, the President has asked that the action plans
be ready for his review when he returns from Russia.
Attachments
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Issue Management
The following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you
regarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with
the Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is
not setting up new organizational structures; it is in having some-
one, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to
the issues we need to pursue, how we are going to pursue them
and then let the troops execute.
One major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has
to be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks
very dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we
have to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all
results would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens
to be hot in October because it may or may not be "ours". I am
also excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues
or questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image.
The whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't
be dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the "bottom line"
of how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's
personal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of
the gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close
the gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on
the trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum;
it is really determined by how the public perceives the President in
handling the tough issues.
The following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on
the substantive follow-through we need.
2.
A. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls
right now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the
Democrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment
with government -- i.e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:
1.
We are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard
to shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we
can take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to
you of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we
can start coming forward with some of these initiatives and
sharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our
pension program which we have totally neglected) then we
might be able to slide away from the big business label
somewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible
association with big business or establishment-type events
should be considered for the President.
2.
There is no way politically that we can defend the present
tax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern
will attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of
their position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can
be exploited very effectively by the "outs"; we are the "ins"
and the fact that the Congress has created the present tax
structure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my
memo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million home-
owners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should
be ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an
unsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property
tax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the
Union, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.
Bryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't
going to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite
candidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient,
inequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are
on middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-
free without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the
most regressive and onerous of all.
3.
We can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change
the tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the
Congress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim
it the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlich-
man got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if
it is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps,
the briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all
John will be interpreted to have said is "let's wait until next
year". That is not good enough. We should insist that the
ACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President.
The President should adopt the recommendation that property
taxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should
then, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the
preparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific
objectives and there should be subsequent announcements by
various Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas
of responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the
architect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the
President can direct a simplification of tax forms and proce-
dures. By July 1, we will be able to announce that one essen-
tail underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a
minimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short
the rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in
1969 and were defeated -- it will not hurt our "fat cats"; they
aren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the
public should have gotten a very good firm understanding of
four or five key elements of the tax package that we will pro-
pose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the
President should have been seen visibly involved in managing
a major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach.
In fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar
as the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts,
Treasury officials, etc. etc.
What I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series
of substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set
of principles that will govern whatever we propose next year
(and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground
out from under the demogogic arguments of McGovern and
Humphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting
defensively through the months of September and October.
4.
3.
Particularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign
against the establishment and the unresponsiveness of
Government. This is an issue Wallace has used very
effectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred
with that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put
some day light between the President and the bureaucracy.
We have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will
use it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect plat-
form to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and
issue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done
this a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but
need to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster,
the President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps
fire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough
orders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective
for us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it
in talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody
understands reorganization; they do understand cutting back
on bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things
management-wise; now it is time to do a few demogogic things
which will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful
President cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to
the heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the
people.
B.
Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is
that it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against
busing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing
plans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see
the courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the
gap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area
and I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.
In part our program is not understood because the moratorium is
in fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the
North, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the
South) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If
Congress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute,
then we will have something to run on in those areas affected but
we still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we
5.
have got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major
effort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the
President should consider calling for a constitutional amendment
making it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing
plans can be undone.
Our whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly under-
stood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign
on it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key
areas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is
clearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular
areas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up
with anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing,
but can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday,
which I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here
as to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).
C. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless.
People do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly
important to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price
of Ford Pintos by $30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity
that people buy every day food. Food prices have been rising so
long that people think they are rising even when they are not. They
are relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we canhhope
for is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand,
if they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can
have. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action,
perhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I
happen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a
significant political upheaval building in the country over this one
issue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic
action if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider
possible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can
crow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import
quotas).
All of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion
either cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing
things to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either
6.
going to be there or they are not. The President should obviously
be postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot
substantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense
spending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the
opponent.
In short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not
much that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that
we can doanything about).
D. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from
the Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If
we can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would
urge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger inso-
far as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is
later upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem.
The President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds
to welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards,
(a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded
Presidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will
revolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it
and it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric
if it were done under the proper circumstances in September.
The President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to
do something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore
taking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in
the welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot
programs in New York and California as we have done to curb
excesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to
the folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which
would highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the
same time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I
watched something very similar to this on the state level turn a
gubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons
why we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how
we can if we want to.
E. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional sub-
stantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of
the very best minds we have to develop additional substantive
initiatives in this area.
7.
P.R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by
building Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the
final analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is
much more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned
a helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits
to treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.
F. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will
be decided by the over $15, 000 a year, upper middle-class, white
suburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to
promote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions
that this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good,
rather appealing little package that could be used especially with
certain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because
none of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we
need do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for
exploitation of the good record we have made.
G. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper
issue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particu-
larly in those states where it has either come into effect or has
been debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like
property taxes, everybody feels they are being cheated. The
Democrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There
is still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can
take over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the
big business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we
really have no position.
Key Voter Blocs
In the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and
Harlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining
what will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we
will never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should
come to some subjective consensus.
I can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of
May 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the
8.
self interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same
opportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class,
Catholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have
a wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other
area and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal.
For example:
1.
We can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan
cosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have
children in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited
to a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7
or 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is
one hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic
hierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational
effort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial
schools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this
issue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are
immense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly
exploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.
2.
We can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for
the building trades. All of the staff work has been done on this
within the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes
the need for something substantive in this area. It will happen
in the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue
now, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas
where it too can be a cutting issue.
3.
Finally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney
in place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous
political dividends.
The second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically
established that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without
a solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much
mush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern
to poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not
the aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in
this area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that
the Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security
9.
benefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in
the Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign
issue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could
lift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of
H.R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this
one good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property
tax issue is also hig with the old folks. We are badly treading water
in this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will
be in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really
hurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.
In my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the
over-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics
(including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking we are doing well
in this area ) these two blocs could be decisive.
As a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a
list of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day
in September and October things like maritime contracts, parks being
returned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc.
Some of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation,
and will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum
impact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become
ready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be
used during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving
the President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears
blatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the
President go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to
do another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political
or not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to re-
mind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe
that we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the
other side can do is promise.
May 21, 1971
SUBJECT:
Political Strategy
This is in response to the President's request for "some free
thinking" on how to make our programs more meaningful to the
people. This can only be done effectively in the context of the
overall campaign strategy; hence this analysis attempts to
broaden the question somewhat -- and to examine several ways
In which the President's base of political support can be
strengthened for 1972.
The primary emphasis here is on domestic issues; we obviously
have the greatest control in this area and there is more certainty
in the political effect of what we do. This by no means suggests
that international issues may not be declsive -- they very well
could be -- but with international conditions as volatile as they
are it would be foolhardy to predicate a total strategy on them.
The following is an effort to identify some of the major factors
that have proven decisive in prior elections, 23605S where we
stand today in relation to those factors and suggest certain
strategic considerations for 1972.
A. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
At the risk of oversimplifying history, successful Presidential
politics in modern times have been generally belt on
combination) of four dominant factors.
1. Personal Image - Charisma: Kr
S th
example. Despite a mediocre Admit
undistinguished record in foreign atf
legislative tally, he might well have
in 1964; if so it would probably have been largely due
to the successful mystique be created (with the help of
2. friendly press). The fact that he was able to main-
tain 2 substantial base of political support a year before
the election would suggest that even 1 relatively inef-
fectual President can support himself on personality
alone.
2. Respect for Lendership: Clearly FDR was the master in
this category. A large majority of the people were con-
vinced that FDR was the Nation's only salvation; it was
irrelevant that most New Deal programs didn't work and
that we were so preoccupied at home that we watched the
world drift into the most dangerous war in history.
Roosevelt's gift was the believable promise -- setting
the great goals which he would inspire the Nation ( a very
important point which you made in our meeting). The
1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, for example, became the
national credo; young and old alike knew what the four
freedoms were. (Even though it was 30 years ago I can
still remember the Four Freedoms Saturday Evening Post
cover.) With a few well chosen phrases he was able to
rally enduring support through difficult times. 1
3. Success on the Big Issues: There were at least two elections
in modern times decided principally on the grounds that times
were good, the President had done a satisfactory job of
running the country and there was no great public demand
for 2. change; the big issues of the day were well in hand.
The first was Coolidge's election in 1924; the second, Ike's
in 1936. The Peace, I regress and F rosperity slogan clearly
reflected the public mood in 1956. Lke had the big issues
well under control; he had restored the country to a period
of normaley. He was obviously also greatly helped by his
powerful "Father image". Ike fit the times and the times fit
Ike.
¹ₜₜ was all the more remarkable in that the "Four Freedoms"
were enunciated by Roosevelt, after he had been in office for eight
years, at the tag end of a speech in which he outlined the dismal
state that the world was then in, that we were at war or would be
soon, that creat sacrifices were necessary. that our defense pro-
duction program was 3 disaster, that we weren't equipped to fight
the war and that All hell ..... Breaking loose.
The Connally thesis in this respect is absolutely
valid. Those who know the President and work with
him 10 we do, recognize bis brilliant, extraordin-
arily retentive and perceptive mind, his long-range
strategic view of problems, his high purpose and we,
in turn, come to have enormous confidence in him.
We must try to get this across; the electorate can
develop some of the same confidence if the story is
told correctly. The obvious handicap in developing
the Connally thesis is that it will almost invariably
be filtered out, discounted and at times rd diculed by
a very hostile press. The press have painted 80 many
negative images over the years that even if we do the
most superb job in the world, I doubt that we can shift
enough opinion in the next 13 months to make this the
decisive factor in the election. Whatever we can do,
however, will help and is important.
The great goals approach is perhaps the toughest.
Roosevelt's speech caught the public imagination at
a time when the country was uniting in the face of a
common danger. The President has used some truly
great phrases a "Generation of Peace" etc. Maybe
because of the press or because the country has be-
come excessively blase, these haven't become national
rallying themes. Between now and next year's State of
the Union, we should study in depth those things the
people of the Nation most desire and the way in which
we can state the goals for the country that will, in fact,
inspire and gain confidence. None of us should shoot
from the hip in this area. We must know the public
mood, not just what the polls report, but by examining
it in depth. If there is any one thing peculiar to our
times it is the extreme volatility of public attitudes,
caused more than anything else by the constant impact
of the electronic media which can cause very dramatic
almost overnight shifts in attitudes.
3.
4. The Veters' Self Interest: On certain occasions in
modern times the people have been moved to vote
primarily according to their cwn economic self-interest.
1948 is the classic example. Certainly President Truman
had little charisma (at least at the time); the times were
not that good and there was a strong sentiment for
change in the country. Although Truman was a strong,
tough individual, it can hardly be said that in 1948 there
was widespread public respect for his leadership as
there had been for Roosevelt's. Yet he won -- largely
because he made his own re-election important to the
economic interest of large segments of the voting popula-
tion. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson succeeded in appealing to
the economic interests of key groups and in frightening
the electorate as to the economic (and international)
consequences of electing his opponent.
B. WHERE WE STAND
Those four categories give us some yardstick -- albeit arbitary --
to examine where we stand and our opportunities.
1. Image-Charisma: We cannot and should not try to make
the President something he isn't. (I gather this is the
point of Buchanan's memo, as it was the point made in
the Fierson column.) It would be foolish and counter pro-
ductive to try to build a Kennedy-type mystique -- there
isn't time, the press would never let us get away with it
nor is it necessarily a very reliable source of political
strength. A President doesn't have to be likeable, have
a sense of humor or even love children. It is important
only that his personal qualities engender confidence.
2. Respect for I endership: There is an important distinction
between this and the image point above (a distinction we
haven't clearly made). We can and we should make people
better understand the President -- why he is the strong,
determined, disciplined and self-confident leader that he is.
5.
What people may want more than anything else is to
have their confidence in the future re-established and
our constituency at least wants to believe in America
and in what they regard as fundamental values. They
are tired of constantly being told what is wrong with
society and of having their consciences wracked with
continuous recrimination. We are on the right side of
this issue but the real question is how to lift 200 million
people out of their seats.
In short, I believe that this is a terribly important area
for us. We must work to develop public confidence in
the President personally, to gain respect for him as a
leader and to give the nation an uplift; the obstacles are,
however, very great and this, therefore, should be but
one of several strategies.
3. The Big Issues: Obviously the war (foreign policy
generally) and the economy are the two big ones; our
domestic program next.
a. The War. Even if we are virtually out of Vietnam the
Democrats will cynically argue that we could have ended it
much sooner, that we dragged it out to no avail and that we
got out only because the Doves in the Congress forced us
out. A war weary people are likely to want to turn their
attention to other things and forget Southeast Asia. What
they will be more concerned with is who can best keep the
peace. It is obvious to us that by remaining strong, by
getting out of Vietnam on a responsible basis, by preserving
the credibility of the United States we are doing 2 better
job of building a lasting peace. On the other hand n an
cra of growing isolationism, people might well feel that
our firmness and our resolve to do those things necessary
(Laos and Cambodia) run a greater risk of getting us into
another war than the head-in-the-sand Dove line. We can
be vulnerable to demagoguery on this issue.
Moreover the war is, in a sense, a negative issue.
We ale badly hurt if we don't end it but we may not
gain = great deal of credit if we do. 2
Obviously if major events -- SALT, Disarmament,
a summit, Vietnam, China -- go our way there could
be such an overwhelming positive reaction in the
foreign policy area that the President would be un-
beatable regardless of anything else. While we are
hoping this happens, we should not rely on it since SO
much of this :S beyond our control.
b. The Economy. Even if the economy is back in full
swing by next year, as I personally expect it will be, the
Democrats will argue that we still have inflation and we
had more unemployment through the Nixon years than
under the Democrats. The Democrats will traffic heavily
on the public's traditional suspicions about economics.
In almost every issue poll the Democrats outscore us in
public confidence with respect to handling of the economy
and thus this is at best always an uphill issue. Whether
we win on this will depend on whether we are able to allay
fears about the future, convince people that unemployment
will not again rise and that prices can remain relatively
stable.
C. The Domestic Program. This may well be our biggest
problem at the moment but, at the same time, our biggest
opportunity. Cur domestic programs are "managerial
oriented" not "people oriented". In my view this is both a
PR and 2 substantive problem with = much heavier emphasis
on the latter. As you pointed out, there is very little "what's
in it for me" in our domestic program.
2 It is very much like the recent demonstrations. Had there been
a disaster, we would have been hurt; we handled it beautffully and gained
little not because the people don't associate the President with the
handling of the demonstrations (because they did) but rather because
it is a negative issue and there is little profit in what the public regards
as something basically unpleasant. Two pollsters have told me that even
though the public overwhelmingly agreed with our stand on the demonstra-
tions entirely and even though people associated the President with the
demonstrations, that this does not translate into a positive response with
respect to the President.
Our domestic program is, on the merits, excellent;
the six greet goals are strong. Reform, change, local
decision making -- those are our strong points but it is
hard to make a plausible, understandable case of what
they do for the pocketbook. Revenue sharing, for
example, could be made appealing 28 a way to stop
rising property taxes but it is not being sold that way,
probably now can't be sold that way and is a very
indirect and obtuse argument as long as it S structured
the way it is in our proposal.
We have 3 fantastically good record in the area of
governmental reform but this too is managerial, not
economic, and once again it is what people expect of us;
that 5, Republicans run the Government better but
Democrats do things for people.
A second deficiency in our domestic program has been
our apparent vacillation. The public never gets one,
clearly perceived consistent image of the Administration,
There is no real substance to the allegation that we have
been expedient, but from a PR standpoint, we do in fact
often give legitimacy to the charge perhaps because we
ourselves are still seeking that central thrust that, in
fact, will capture the public imagination.
In trying to orient our efforts more to people and economic
issues we may be able to develop the thrust that it seems
to me we have been groping for.
It is possible -- there is time -- to reorient our domestic
pfforts and to capture the high ground. This leads directly
into the fourth category.
4. The Voters' Self-Interest: It is not hard to draw the profile
of what comprises the average individual's economic self-
interest today. Obviously jobs and employment rank on
the top of the list. High also on the list are taxes --
particularly real property taxes; this is now a nation of
homeowners -- 66 million. Moreover, most Americans
8.
work hard in the hopes that they will be able to educate
their children. The desire for education is strongest
among those adults who did not obtain a higher education
themselves; and they represent perhaps our most signi-
ficant political potential. Most Americans who work
resent those who do not and especially resent paying
higher taxes for loafers who abuse the welfare system.
Finally most middle class Americans fear a catastrophic
illness which can wipe out their savings and security.
Middle-aged people worry about their retirement; older
people worry about their ability to live on their retire-
ment and rising prices. The farmers have a set of
economic problems all their own. 3 There are things we
can do at this point to position ourselves and our programs
on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues that
such a profile suggests. For example:
a. Revenue Sharing. Most people today look at general
revenue sharing as simply another "hand out" from the
Federal Treasury to local politicians. If the public has
a poor attitude toward Federal bureaucrats, it has a
worse perception of local politicians.
Unfortunately our revenue sharing does not have any
tangible, economic meaning to the individual. We haven't
made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax
burden.
We had the choice originally of proposing what would have
been the purest form of revenue sharing, i.e. individual
tax credits by individual taxpayers for a portion of local
income, sales or real property taxes. After a very
extensive study. the Domestic Council and the Treasury
concluded that general revenue sharing involving grants
from the Federal government to states and local com-
munities was more equitable, more efficient and would
3
The social issues are perhaps equally important -- race, crime
ininthe streets and narcotics -- but these aren't economic and are
essentially negative. We are also postured correctly on these.
9.
provide the financial assistance needed more quickly.
It was clearly = better solution on the merits, but It
ran headlong into the opposition of Byrnes and Mills
who over the years had devored the credit approach;
it also ran counter to the traditional Republican philo-
sophy of revenue sharing, first advanced by Mel Laird
in the Fifties and subsequently endorsed by various
Republican Policy papers through the Sixties. Most
importantly it missed the political mark (a point Clark
MacGregor and I vainly tried to make before the final
decision was made).
A credit arrangement would give the opportunity (also the
burden) to state and local communities to increase their
levels of taxation. (The majority of which are now con-
trolled by the Democrats)
It is not too late to do this, although we would need an
excuse to shift our position -- perhaps if Mills scuttles
our bill or perhaps whenever we propose a value added
tax. With 2 new source of Federal revenue we could
couple with it a tax credit revenue sharing arrangement
arguing that the value added tax permits a much larger
(and different form of) revenue sharing.
It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the
present Congress (it could pass since Syrnes and Mills
are committed to this approach) -- SO that next April 15
every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his
Form 1040 and receive a federal credit refund a direct
abatement for local taxes. We could argue that we - - the
Nixon Administration -- had brought tax relief to home-
owners and taxpayers all across the country.
b. Tax Credits for Education. Ferhaps coupled with revenue
sharing tax credits we could include some tax credit or
deduction for educational expenses. Costs of higher
education are becoming nearly prohibitive for middle income
families, the group which offers us the greatest opportunity
10.
for political gain. For years there have been proposals
in the Congress to provide some tax credit or deduction
arrangement. The issue is there for the taking. Indeed
it is expensive, but once again, if it were coupled with
a substitute tax arrangement we could do it and still be
fiscally responsible. This is clearly a prime "what's in
it for me" issue.
C. Lifting the Ceiling of Tarnings of Social Security
Recipients. What is better Republican philosophy than
to encourage Social Security recipients to earn more than
the current $1800 ceiling ? We worry about all the little
things we can do to improve upon HEW's programs to
benefit the aging. These get us absolutely nothing
politically and really appeal only to the professional
senior citizens' lobby. The vast majority of retired citizens
couldn't care less about pilot programs for feeding the
elderly in Chicago. What they reall care about is making
ends meet when they retire. Lifting the ceiling. for
example to $3000. would be expensive and would probably
also have to be tied to something like the value added tax
to give US the fiscal rationale. The fact is, however, that
it is a very powerful "what's in it for me" economic issue
and particularly potent with a constituency whose support
is vital to us (remember too that the retired vote can be
decisive in California and probably is decisive in Florida).
d. Medical Frogram. Our present medical program is so
complicated that as you point out few of us ever know what
is in it, let alone the vast majority of the American people.
We should seize upon one or two salient points like cata-
strophic health insurance, more doctors, and initiatives
like the cancer cure and then demagogue these points to death.
We mainly want to neutralize this issue because we can't
win on it; the Democrats can always offer more in the way
of national health insurance than we can responsibly accept.
The fact remains however that we can talk about it and
continually should the need for curing dread diseases,
better medical services and our health insurance program.
The key to this one is to keep it simple and understandable
and relate it always to the individual's economic (and health)
interest.
5. Welfare Reform. We own this issue presently; we must
keep on histing it, constantly. People simply don't like
to pay taxes to support lonfers. The tougher we are in
tightening the work requirements, the more the political
gain. It is indirectly, therefore, a "what's in it for me"
economic issue.
6. Special Interest Cultivation -- 1948 Example. In developing
those issues which appeal to the voters' economic self-
interest it is particularly instructive to examine the
Truman election of 1948. There are some interesting
political similarities with our own situation. Truman was
derided and scoffed at by the sophisticated opinion makers,
as we often are. He faced a hostile Congress, = we do.
Based on results of the 1946 election, he could not count
on his party being in the majority. He was faced with a
third party threat. He had been forced to do unpopular
things in the international field and he had inherited the
difficult economic problems of converting from war to peace.
While Dewey went into the 1948 campaign talking about
national unity, peace and the need to make government more
effective, Truman devoted all of his resources to the bread
and butter gut issues.
A recent column by Henry Owen (attached 38 Tab A) makes
the very perceptive point that Truman won the election because
people thought he would better protect their bread and butter
interests "pocketbook politics had carried the day, dignity
and efficiency came in a poor second. 11 The Owen column
interestingly enough makes the point that the same issues
that elected Truman are perhaps even more important today.
If, indeed, there is a valid lesson from the 1948 election, it
is that we can build the same kind of a political base to make
the President's re-election important to the economic self-
interests of large segments of the voting population and we
4
According to Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dowey
and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution,
which had SO captivated the eastern electorate in the post war years,
would captivate the rest of the country as well. 11
12.
must eucape the Republican managerial syndrome.
For emmple (these are only examples] a very
comprehensive analysis should be prepared to pick
our best targets and best issues):
a. Labor and Puilding Trades: We are on the verge of
being irreparably damaged with the "hard hats" even
though 6 months ago this represented one of our most
fertile fields for political gain. We had to crack them
hard on the wage issue and we did. We are not, however,
intensifying the minority hiring campaign in the building
trades. While most people view this as a racial question
it is, plain and simple, a pocketbook issue with the "hard
bate"; they interpret our efforts as an attempt to break
down the existing union structure, to destroy the appren-
ticeship program and to climinate their job security.
There are approximately 3. 8 million building tradesmen
in the United States: at the moment they feel that we are
threatening not only wages but, more important, job
security.
As with so many issues, this requires a tough political
choice. Do we play to the blacks, which in my opinion
will get us nothing, or do we play to the "hard hats",
a large percentage of whom we got in 1968 and as to
whom we had been making enormous political progress.
This is a natural "new" constituency, newly emerging
middle-class Americans, most of them homeowners
living in the suburbs, becoming increasingly conservative
on social, international and racial issues. The combination
of wage stabilization, Davis-Bacon and minority hiring
will make it impossible for any of their leaders to support
us or to make gains with the rank and file.
We have another opportunity with the building trades. Most
building tradesmen have discovered that their hourly wage
increases have been largely offset by the fact that they are
working less and less throughout the course of a year: the
higher their hourly wages, the greater the incentive
for labor saving devices and hence the less labor hours
available. Many of them are beginning to seek annual
contracts, rather than hourly wage increases. It is
argued that hourly wages could be significantly reduced
by annual contract negotiations, thereby benefiting
both the worker and the cost of construction. We don't
have to endorse this; wer merely have to recognize the
problem which we have not done. If we were merely
to announce a study of the feasibility of annual contracts
in the building trades, asking the Construction Industry
Collective Bargaining Council to come up with recom-
,
mendations, the political impact could be huge.
This is the kind of issue that we need with labor generally.
One of the recommendations that the Rosow Report made
was that we provide for vesting of pension plans after
perhaps 10 or 15 years. Every blue collar employee
has a direct economic stake in this. While it is a tough
issue with business it is one that could help US make real
inroads with the rank and file of labor. All we need are
a couple of major items like this, which represent very
direct pocketbook benefit to the Individual worker and
regardless of what Al Barken and Cope do next year we
will make important gains with the rank and file.
b. Business Community. While the business community's
political clout is minimal it is a source of support we cannot
overlook; the attitude of business leaders has an impact on
the white collar, professional category as to which Muskie
has shown surprising strength in the polls.
This has been the most activist Administration in history
in the field of anti-trust, the environment and consumer
issues. Tie can argue that had the Democrats been in power
5
Such studies have beencconducted over the years in the
Department of Labor; merely recognizing them and grabbing the
issue is all that is required.
14.
they would have been worse, but that is a tough case
to make with politically naive businessmen. All we have
to Co to help business in the pocketbook is to begin to
slow down dramatically in the anti-trust field, gradually
in the other two.
C. The Farm Vote. In 1968 we kicked hell out of the
Democrats on the issue of carity. It was 74; today
it is slightly below 70. Hardin tells us that there is no
way between now and next November to get back up to
the 1968 level. (This is in the nature of the parity
formula). This one fact alone tells us with certainty
that this will be a 1972 issue.
We can, however, get farm prices up: farmers have
been in a very severe price/cost squeeze. Farm prices
have to improve by the Fall of 1972 (regardless of the
impact on the wholesale price index) If we are to regain
our traditional support in the farm belt. It can be done
on a commodity by commodity basis as we know from
our experience with milk. We can further aid the farmer
by programs such as REA, home ownership loans, etc.
As to these, we have been acting as good Republican
managers, consistently cutting back on the farm budget;
the time is now at hand to begin increasing it.
C. The Retired Vote. In addition to the obvious -- an
increase in the earnings' ceiling of social security recl-
pients and cost of living social security increases --
there are special resired groups we can appeal to: for
example the 850, 000 retired military personnel, a large
number of whom live in Florida (62, 000) and California
(145, 000). In 1968 we promised to support recomputation
of military pay; we have not. Finally we have underway
a study which will lead to some recomputation recommenda-
tions; it will be very modest but a step forward, correcting
some of the gross inquities in the present military retirement
15.
system. This is a roal pocketbook issue. When the
recommendations come from the study committee in
July (approximate cost 1150 million 2. year) there will
be strong opposition from OMB. If we want to practice
pocketbook politics, this is a very good place to start.
e. Veterans Groups: I have had a running battle for
months over outs made by OMB in the VA hospital care
budget. The amount cut was slightly in excess of $100
million. Two months ago a head count of the Veterans
Affairs Committees in the House and the Senate revealed
that we would be rolled in both committees; it was clear
that not only would these funds be respred but the Congress
would probably add substantially to our bodget requests
and would, moreover, attach a mandatory spending clause.
Had we been willing to restore the $100 million cut, we
could have gotten the agreement of the veterans organizations
to stick with our budget figures; we would have avoided a
confrontation with the Congress and we then simply could
have withheld funds during FY 1972. As it is now. we
will probably be forced to spend the money and will have
lost on a gut economic issue with the veterans organization
whose membership totals over 6 million. Their recent
publications point up theludicrous situation we find ourselves
in: on one page they strongly support us for our foreign
policy and on the next tear us apart for cutting health care
for the veterans. What's more, we gave Teague, Hartke and
Albert a marvelous issue you may recall two weeks ago
they were all on national TV networks blasting the
Administration for being "anti-veteran. 11
My sole point is that we can do a much better job in
appealing to the economic self-interest of large groups of
citizens than we have done. We have to be just a little less
concerned about managerial efficiency and a little more
concerned about "people politics".
In this area we cannot ascribe fault to our public relations
effort; nor really can publicarelations help us. In some
cases it is downright dangerous to make a major FR effort
when substantively we have serious problems. Salute to
10,
Agriculture is a very good case in point. The public
believes that most politicians are phoney and we only
give OUT critics an opportunity to exploit this when we
launch major PR efforts in an attempt to cover up a basic
economic or political problem.
The other side of this coin is equally valid. If we have
made the right political decisions, the public relations
effort is relatively painless. For example, if we were
to do something in the building trades area, we would
have no difficulty in getting our story told and getting the
credit. Through mailings, trade journals and speeches
every builling tradesmen would very soon know what we
had done.
C. CONCLUSION
After two and a half years the die is farily well cast on the big
issues. Elther we have or we have not done the things necessary
for those issues to be working for us next year.
We do have, however, two areas which we can most effectively exploit --
and there is time to do it. Revemping our domestic program to make
it more people oriented and making a major effort to cultivate the
economic interest of those voting bloks that either have represented
our traditional constituency or should be part of our emerging new
constituency. These are identifiable. They ways to reach them
politcally are ro mystery and we have all the equipment -- the
advantage of incumbency -- with which to exploit them.
I am especially impressed. 23 you may have gathered, by some of the
fascinating parallels with the Truman re-clection in 1948. Truman
rejected the advice that he try to reform his image or that he mount
2 major sales cflort. What he did instead, based on the Clark Clifford
menio of November 1947, was to analyze cynically, coldly and
shrewdly the rag-tag assortment of special interest groups and
minorities that FDR had welded together into a majority coalition;
he determined what political and economic favors were necessary
to retain or reqain their loyalties and then met them head on. As
a result Truman devoced all of his resources to the subject which
most Americans cared most about then (and perhaps still do): How
to make a living.
17.
While I have emphasized the similarities with 1948, I, of course.
recognize that the circumstances then were quite different than
they are now. In April bf 19.13 Truman had a 36% approval rating
in the Gallup Poll and for him, therefore, this was 2 last ditch
desperato effort. We are certainly not in that condition.
Nonetheless in formulating our strategy for 1972, there is the
political gain of explaining To the fullesithe advantages of incumbency --
which on the issues we have not done as well 29 we could.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 12, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BLARKING
CONFIDENTIAL
E.J. 12036, Section 6-102
By
EP
NAME
Date 4-1-82
,
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK 7um
SUBJECT:
Issue Management
The attached paper outlines operating procedures for management of
issues. It is a revised version of the paper you approved in late
January.
I have discussed the lack of action in this area with Chuck Colson, and
we are in agreement that the only way we are going to get the Domestic
Council moving is to have the President issue a clear directive to
Ehrlichman to get this job done.
We would suggest that before leaving for Moscow, the President call
John in and tell him that when he returns, he wants on his desk the
following:
(1)
A refined list of the key issues, including an appropriate
posture and communications theme for each.
(2)
A list of who is to be assigned responsibility for each
issue.
(3)
A commitment to have completed plans for each issue by
mid-June.
We also recommend the President telling John that given the President's
plans for using John, Cole should be assigned day-to-day responsibility
for the project. You may then want to follow up with John by going over
the attached paper, saying it might be of help in getting started.
- 2 -
Chuck and I feel this is preferable to merely sending the paper to
John as this could simply dig his heels in deeper. If the President
does not want to meet with John on this, then we recommend you
talk to John on the President's behalf covering the same points.
Attachment
ACTION PLAN FOR DOMESTIC ISSUE MANAGEMENT
The purpose of this paper is to outline a proposed program to ensure
that the President's positions on key demostic issues are property
developed and effectively communicated.
The first priority in the issue management program should be for
John Ehrlishman, our Political people and the Domestic Council to
refine the list of significant issues and develop the appropriate yes-
ture and communications objective for each, Then, assignments
should be made for managing each lease, a comprehensive game plan
developed on each, and a means of follow-up installed.
The remainder of this paper discusses (1) a suggested organisation for
the issue management effort; (2) the plans that need to be developed along
with follow-up procedures; and (3) implementation steps with a time table.
ORGANIZATION
Overall Direction
Since the President has asked John Ehrilchman to devote his time to
overall policy and spekesman activities (which will likely increase as
the campaign progresses), it might be legical to delegate day-te-day
operating responsibility for this project to Ken Cole.
Project Teams
For each key issue, a project manager should be named with overall
responsibility and accountability for success with that issue. Im addition,
a team should be formed around him consisting of individuals with sub-
stantive communications, and Congressional relations responsibilities.
Suggested management and team assignments are given at Tab A. For
purposes of illustration, we have selected those Issues highlighted in the
Domestic Council's analysis of a Harris Poll and mentioned in the
President's notes on demestic issues.
Each project manager should be responsible for establishing an attainable
goal for his Issue and ensuring that everything possible is done to achieve
that goal. The goals generally would be to gain as much voter support
approaches to communicating effectively, such as a Jaffe/Ambress
"read show" on drug abuse. The communications team member would be
responsible for a program to feed favorable information on these events
and other aspects of the issue to the general and special interest media,
schedule Administration spokesmen Into appropriate forume, work
through organized groups to generate support for the President, and plan
other major news events to fecus public attention on Administration
achievements. One preminent forum for explaining our posture would
obviously be the Congress. The Congressional relations team member
would be responsible for developing a legislative strategy, responding
to attacks made on the floor of the Senate or House, and recruiting a
strong and well-respected advocate from the Senate and the House to
organize Congressional support.
When all aspects of the plan are completed, it should be reviewed by the
Pelitical Group and reviewed as necessary before being implemented.
Follow-Up
To miniter results, each project manager should submit a brief monthly
memorandum to the President reporting progress against plan, evaluating
the President's general position on the issue, and outlining action planned
for the next meath.
If an issue turns out to be particularly critical, Presidential meetings
with the project team should be considered as a way of keeping the pres-
sure on.
IMPLEMENTATION
The direct involvement of the President would help to launch this program
effectively. As seen as practicable, a meeting should be held with the
President, attended by Ehrlichman, Cole, MaeGreger, and Celsen, and
the project managers, At this meeting, the President should indicate
his Interest in the program, ensure everyone's full cooperation, and per-
haps make a few comments about each of the issues. As can be seen by
the following schedule, time is short, and we must move fast if we are
to have any impact before the elections.
The following schedule should be adhered to:
Action
Responsibility
Date
1. Identify key issues and develop
Demestic Council/Pelitical
appropriate posture on each
Group
May 31
2. Presidential Review of Issues
Demestic Conneil/Political
Group
June 7
3.
Develop plans
Project Managers
June 17
4. First progress reports
Project Managers
July 1
Attachments
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
May 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
DEVERTMENT AN
FROM:
DIKING
FRED MALEK 70m
6-102
SUBJECT: / EP 4-1-82 Colson Memo on Issue Management
I do not feel there is any inconsistency between Chuck's memo and my
memo of May 12th on Issue Management - the two papers merely address
different aspects of the subject.
In the second paragraph of my paper, I stated that:
"The first priority in the issue management program should
be for John Ehrlichman and the Domestic Council to refine
the list of significant issues and develop the appropriate
posture and communications objective for each. "
Chuck's paper is concerned solely with this "first priority" - he suggests
what the issues are, and what we should be doing about them from a sub-
stantive and communications standpoint.
I, of course, did not attempt to decide what the issues should be - that is
a matter for John and/or Chuck to consider. The purpose of my paper
was to describe what happens after the issues are defined - what Chuck
rather airly dismisses as "letting the troops execute. 11 I think you would
agree that it is in "execution" that we often seem to screw up.
I feel Chuck has suggested some highly astute and imaginative ideas on
how to proceed on these issues. My only comments are:
-- Some of the trade-offs involved are terribly complex,
and I feel John Ehrlichman and the Domestic Council staff
would be in a better position to weigh these trade-offs before
we proceed (e.g., busing, and the tax program, and the
aging proposals).
-- My own ordering of priority issues would be 1) Inflation;
2) The New Populism; 3) General Unrest; 4) Busing;
- 2 -
5) Drugs; and 6) Environment/Pollution. This is based
on the Harris Poll, Teeter's polls and analysis, and recent
election results.
In sum, I recommend that we proceed according to the plan laid down in
my paper, adding only that Chuck's memo would be a good starting point
for John and Ken Cole as they attempt to identify key issues and develop
appropriate postures on each by the due date of May 31st.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 12, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
E.U.
6-102
By
EP
H-1-82
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK 7um
SUBJECT:
Issue Management
The attached paper outlines operating procedures for management of
issues. It is a revised version of the paper you approved in late
January.
I have discussed the lack of action in this area with Chuck Colson, and
we are in agreement that the only way we are going to get the Domestic
Council moving is to have the President issue a clear directive to
Ehrlichman to get this job done.
We would suggest that before leaving for Moscow, the President call
John in and tell him that when he returns, he wants on his desk the
following:
(1)
A refined list of the key issues, including an appropriate
posture and communications theme for each.
(2)
A list of who is to be assigned responsibility for each
issue.
(3)
A commitment to have completed plans for each issue by
wid
June.
Return from Moncow
We also recommend the President telling John that given the President's
plans for using John, Cole should be assigned day-to-day responsibility
for the project. You may then want to follow up with John by going over
the attached paper, saying it might be of help in getting started.
- 2 -
Chuck and I feel this is preferable to merely sending the paper to
John as this could simply dig his heels in deeper. If the President
does not want to meet with John on this, then we recommend you
talk to John on the President's behalf covering the same points.
Attachment
THENWHITE B HOUSE
bet the
witter stuff first
WASHINGTON
then have Mitchell
June 12, 1972
hold strategy ression
the weekend wego to
Calef. Also Pendd
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN review the witten matural.
FROM THE PRESIDENT Dru Cover with Mitchell
in / your anty Them
Would it not be well for Mitchell to have a two-day strategy
session, including not just the top four but perhaps expanding
it to include various work groups like Price, Garment, etc.
I think it might be well over this next weekend to have a strategy
session so that recommendations could be made which I could
look over as to what we do between now and the Convention
and thereafter. The Buchanan memorandum is a very good
document from which to start and then we could make some
decisions as to where we go from here.
JUN 14 1072
HRH
Ful
June 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
ED HARPER &
SUBJECT:
Issue Publications
The following issue-oriented materials have either been produced
or are in the final stages of production.
WHITE HOUSE
Issues and Answers
Speakers' Kit
Speech Inserts
RN Quotes
Fact Sheets
Key Fact Sheets
Key Issue Paragraphs
Speech Inserts and Fact Sheets (Colson)
Speech Inserts and Fact Sheets (Klein)
THE COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
Campaign '72
Fact Sheets
RN Quotes
3 Comprehensive Speeches
The Nixon Years ("The Lift of Richard Nixon")
Voter Bloc Materials - Youth, Blacks, Businessmen
Speeches
Fact Sheets
General Purpose Speeches
- 2 -
1701/THE NOVEMBER GROUP INC.
Nixon Years Film
General Advertising Materials
FINANCE COMMITTEE SUBSTANTIVE DOCUMENTS (2 Brochures
for Businessmen)
THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1972 Campaign Factbook
Issue Chapters
Issue Brochures (individual brochures on 14 separate issues)
Promises VS. Performance
56-page version with pictures
9-page reduced size version without pictures
Facts: Election 1972
Pocket Facts: Election 1972
Q & A notebook on issues of greatest concern to youth
(to be used by the Friends of Richard Nixon)
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMMITTEE
The Republican Platform
Convention Program (including a major section on
"The Nixon Years")
As these and other related materials become available in final
form, they will be sent to you.
cc: Ken Cole
Lew Engman
John Evans
Bud Krogh
Ed Morgan
John Whitaker
John Lehman
ELH:PAM:arl
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 13, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
We need to work out a series of tests on what we think the 1701
Committee is doing versus what they are actually doing.
This stems out of the fact that we were originally told that
the Committee was having a man follow McGovern and
Humphrey all the time and getting all their statements.
In fact, what was happening was that a man was following
Humphrey and McGovern whenever he possibly could -- so
we missed some of the McGovern statements.
There are probably other situations like this where we are
being told stuff is being done over there when in fact it is
not being done. You should start devising tests to periodically
probe into these areas, not in a vindictive way, but merely
to get these people on their toes.
Rename
THE
WASHINGTON WHITE HOUSE 10 days
DATE: 6/12/72
X
TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: L. HIGBY
1) Have Flanigan get into the contact
area. Also possibly Chaitner. lohon in thin should
2). Regarding Aertion at C.D. or Blain
dog more of thin Getsome chairmen monting mean
Home. AfterH.mtg of Mitchell- Have
Stracheen, Chapin, and Magruder
work out basic program.
No I'll handle
POLITICAL STRATEGY PAPER
We should probably have a strategy meeting, or retreat, going for
a couple of days to get down to some basic decisions, both from the
standpoint of therapy and ideas.
There should be a bigger advisory group putting in some thinking time
such as the Committee of 100 and the Committee of 9, who thought they
were trunning the Campaign, and were actually helpful for ideas and in
enlisting loyalty.
We may be missing some smart people, such as some key Senators and
Congressmen, or some Governors.
We are overlooking some of the old hands on our staff such as Price,
Garment, Safire, Finch, Deat, Buchanan, Chotiner, Rumsfeld and
Weinberger.
The great danger is for two or three people to think that they are the
found of all wisdom. of course, the other side of this coin is also worse,
which is to try and run a campaign with a dosen or a hundred people. We
need to get better organised on the process of touching bases, however.
We must avoid getting too ingrown in terms of political strategy decisions.
2
We should follow the pattern at the retreat of the August 15 Camp David
meeting with sub-groups working on specific areas and then reporting
to a small executive group of two or three.
HRH:pm
6/12/72
MS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Add tother
June 12, 1972
of Ht Matchell
talk paper
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT On
my
Cover
You might discuss with John Mitchell some time the possibility
of setting up a rather broad advisory group of maybe a dozen
city
Information
people or twenty, supplementing the hard-core small group
which we already have. This gets more players into the act and
it also may get us some ideas that we otherwise might fail to
get on our own.
-E, - cwc, macG,
- odd
G, 58m, chopin + malel
- Graise later
az day program up at CD.
- Receive a memos - analyze
- Oren to CA on 6/24-25
on 6/16