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This file contains:
From J. Curtis Herge to David N. Parker. Propsed Appearance By Sen. Scott At World Affairs Council Meetings. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Handwritten Note. This document discusses a meeting with Jeb Magruder. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Malek's Analysis of the Campaign Organization. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Mitchell Political Meeting -- June 7, 1972. 8 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Women/Volunteer Program. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/9/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses Ed Nixon's Appearance at the Quadrennial Conference of African Methodist Episcopal Churches. 6 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Campaign Organization. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Dwight Chapin. This document includes a articles: "Ike Greets 500 Top GOP Leaders at Farm," and "Ike Opens Campaign at Gettysburg Farm Rally." In addition "Republican Campaign 'Kick-Off." 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Chuck Colson to Fred Malek. This document discusses budget and advertising during campaign geared toward Catholics. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Alexander P. Butterfield to Rose Mary Woods. RE: Conversations with Taft Schreiber. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Charles Colson to Jeb Magruder. This document discusses telegrams, letters, and travel and the costs. 4 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/16/1972
Wall Street Journal: "Uneasy Alliance: Now Organized Labor Faces Dilemma: What To Do About McGovern," by Byron E. Calame. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newsletter], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: New York Primary Returns. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Further Study of Slogan "President Nixon. Now More Than Ever." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: New York Primary. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses an "interesting letter from Mundt's former assistant Bob McCaughey." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Robert McCaughey to Harry S. Dent. This document discusses Senator McGovern and the primaries. 4 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], 5/26/1972
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Thoughts on Anti-McGovern Strategy. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. "I thought you would be interested in the attached McGovern delegate count. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Projected Democratic Delegate Count. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Ken Khachigan to Gordon Strachan. This document discusses questions for the Proxmire hearings. 9 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From L. Higby. This is a handwritten adminstrative memo. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Evening Star. "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Analysis of Calfornia Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey pm Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Richard Moore. This document discusses a field poll and the results. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: Predications vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE: Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic Presidential Primary in California. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
The Washington Post. "Survey of California Voting- McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
The New York Times. "Times Survey: Defections in Party Face McGovern." 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/9/1972
From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses a field poll and McGovern and Humphrey. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145986
label
WHSF: Contested, 33-3
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145986
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 33-3
description
This file contains:
From J. Curtis Herge to David N. Parker. Propsed Appearance By Sen. Scott At World Affairs Council Meetings. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Handwritten Note. This document discusses a meeting with Jeb Magruder. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Malek's Analysis of the Campaign Organization. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/10/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Mitchell Political Meeting -- June 7, 1972. 8 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Women/Volunteer Program. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/9/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses Ed Nixon's Appearance at the Quadrennial Conference of African Methodist Episcopal Churches. 6 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Campaign Organization. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Dwight Chapin. This document includes a articles: "Ike Greets 500 Top GOP Leaders at Farm," and "Ike Opens Campaign at Gettysburg Farm Rally." In addition "Republican Campaign 'Kick-Off." 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Chuck Colson to Fred Malek. This document discusses budget and advertising during campaign geared toward Catholics. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Alexander P. Butterfield to Rose Mary Woods. RE: Conversations with Taft Schreiber. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/19/1972
From Charles Colson to Jeb Magruder. This document discusses telegrams, letters, and travel and the costs. 4 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/16/1972
Wall Street Journal: "Uneasy Alliance: Now Organized Labor Faces Dilemma: What To Do About McGovern," by Byron E. Calame. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newsletter], 6/20/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: New York Primary Returns. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Further Study of Slogan "President Nixon. Now More Than Ever." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: New York Primary. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/21/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses an "interesting letter from Mundt's former assistant Bob McCaughey." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Robert McCaughey to Harry S. Dent. This document discusses Senator McGovern and the primaries. 4 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Letter], 5/26/1972
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Thoughts on Anti-McGovern Strategy. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. "I thought you would be interested in the attached McGovern delegate count. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Projected Democratic Delegate Count. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Ken Khachigan to Gordon Strachan. This document discusses questions for the Proxmire hearings. 9 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
From L. Higby. This is a handwritten adminstrative memo. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/12/1972
Evening Star. "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Analysis of Calfornia Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey pm Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Richard Moore. This document discusses a field poll and the results. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: Predications vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE: Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic Presidential Primary in California. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
The Washington Post. "Survey of California Voting- McGovern: New Constituency." 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
The New York Times. "Times Survey: Defections in Party Face McGovern." 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/9/1972
From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses a field poll and McGovern and Humphrey. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From J. Curtis Herge to David N. Parker.
Propsed Appearance By Sen. Scott At World
Affairs Council Meetings. 1 pg.
33
3
6/10/1972
White House Staff
Other Document
Handwritten Note. This document discusses
a meeting with Jeb Magruder. 1 pg.
33
3
6/10/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Malek's Analysis of the Campaign
Organization. 8 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Mitchell Political Meeting -- June 7,
1972. 8 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 1 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/9/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Women/Volunteer Program. 1 pg.
33
3
6/26/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
This document discusses Ed Nixon's
Appearance at the Quadrennial Conference
of African Methodist Episcopal Churches. 6
pgs.
33
3
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Campaign Organization. 1 pg.
33
3
White House Staff
Newspaper
From Dwight Chapin. This document
includes a articles: "Ike Greets 500 Top GOP
Leaders at Farm," and "Ike Opens Campaign
at Gettysburg Farm Rally." In addition
"Republican Campaign 'Kick-Off." 5 pgs.
33
3
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chuck Colson to Fred Malek. This
document discusses budget and advertising
during campaign geared toward Catholics. 1
pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 2 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/19/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Alexander P. Butterfield to Rose Mary
Woods. RE: Conversations with Taft
Schreiber. 1 pg.
33
3
6/16/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Charles Colson to Jeb Magruder. This
document discusses telegrams, letters, and
travel and the costs. 4 pgs.
33
3
6/20/1972
Campaign
Newsletter
Wall Street Journal: "Uneasy Alliance: Now
Organized Labor Faces Dilemma: What To
Do About McGovern," by Byron E. Calame.
1 pg.
33
3
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: New York Primary Returns. 2 pgs.
33
3
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Further Study of Slogan "President
Nixon. Now More Than Ever." 4 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 3 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE:
New York Primary. 2 pgs.
33
3
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
This document discusses an "interesting
letter from Mundt's former assistant Bob
McCaughey." 1 pg.
33
3
5/26/1972
White House Staff
Letter
From Robert McCaughey to Harry S. Dent.
This document discusses Senator McGovern
and the primaries. 4 pgs.
33
3
6/15/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From L. Higby to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Thoughts on Anti-McGovern Strategy. 3 pgs.
33
3
6/13/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Fred Malek to Bob Haldeman. "I
thought you would be interested in the
attached McGovern delegate count. 1 pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 4 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Marik through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Projected
Democratic Delegate Count. 3 pgs.
33
3
6/15/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Ken Khachigan to Gordon Strachan.
This document discusses questions for the
Proxmire hearings. 9 pgs.
33
3
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the
Democratic Primary Results in California. 9
pgs.
33
3
6/12/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From L. Higby. This is a handwritten
adminstrative memo. 1 pg.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
Evening Star. "McGovern 'Weakness'
Located in Voter Poll." 1 pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 5 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3
pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE:
Analysis of Calfornia Primary. 3 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey
pm Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates
on the California Primary. 4 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: California Primary. 3 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 6 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/8/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Richard Moore. This document
discusses a field poll and the results. 2 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE:
Predications vs. Results in the California
Democratic Primary. 4 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE:
Impact of the "Debates" on the Democratic
Presidential Primary in California. 3 pgs.
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
The Washington Post. "Survey of California
Voting- McGovern: New Constituency." 4
pgs.
33
3
6/9/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
The New York Times. "Times Survey:
Defections in Party Face McGovern." 2 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 7 of 8
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
3
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This
document discusses a field poll and
McGovern and Humphrey. 1 pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 8 of 8
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number:
313
Folder:
Campaign 22 Part II June 15-29, 1972 [Folder 1]
Document
Disposition
59
Return
Private/Political memo, Herge to Parker, 6-12-72
60
Return
Private/Political notes, "Pol posturing... 6-10-[72]
61
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-10-72
62
Retain
Open
63
Return
Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-8-72
64
Return
Private/Political memo, Malek to HRH, 6-9-72
65
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to HRH, 6-26-72
66
Return
Private/Political memo, Higby to HRH, 6-14-72
67
Return
Private/Political note, Chapin to H [HRH], n.d.
68
Retain
Open
69
Retain
Open
70
Return
Private/Political Memo, Colson to Malek, 6-16-72
71
Return
Private/Political Memo, Butterfield to Woods, 6-19-72
72
Return
Private/Political memo, Colson to Magruder, 6-16-72
73
Return
Private/Political Clipping, Uneasu Alliance, 6-20-72
74
Retain
Open
75
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-20-72
76
Return
Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-20-72
77
Return
Private/Political Memo, Teeter to HRN, 6-20-72
78
Return
Private/Political Memo, Dent to the President, 6-21-72
79
Return
Private/Political note, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-[72]
80
Return
Private/Political Memo, Higby to HRH, 6-15-72
81
Return
Private/Political note, malek to HRH, 6-13-72
82
Return
Private/Political memo, Khachigian to Strachan, 6-15-72
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 313
83
Return Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-72
Committee for the Re-election of the President
EMORANDUM
June 12, 1972
1072 JUN B M. 7 53
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. DAVID N. PARKER
FROM:
J. CURTIS HERGE
Curt
SUBJECT:
Proposed Appearances by Sen. Scott
at World Affairs Council Meetings
In your memorandum of April 22, 1972, you reported that it has been
strongly suggested that attention be paid to insuring that Senator
Scott be scheduled to appear at various World Affairs Council
Meetings.
Following the receipt of your memorandum, we determined the avail-
able dates of meetings in Los Angeles, New York and Chicago. The
Senator would not accept any of our proposals, however, explaining
that he would prefer to stay in the District until after the Senate
adjourns at the end of June. There are no World Affairs Council
meetings in July or August.
We are now working on the possibility of appearances by the Senator
in September.
TODS
X
6/10
Pol posturing of P- génl will by
WHS Raise at H.
wants to meet el JVN; set mtg w/H
H has
AS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Malek's Analysis of the
Campaign Organization
Weless discusses the campaign's serious organizational prob
lems in tough, readable language. His comments on the
disastrous field organization (Flemming, Mardian, et al)
will not come as a surprise to you. Nor will the criticism
of the surrogates operation be a surprise, I agree with
Malek that the direct mail, telephone and canvassing problems
may be solvable because Bob Marik and Bob Morgan are
basically capable managers.
The real problem, which Malek discusses at length in the
Overall Direction and Priorities sections, is for a
tough, hard-driving, ass-kicking manager. This may be
the role Flanigan served in 1968. Colson is filling this
void in some way on particular projects, but this is a
structurally unsound arrangement. If there is a plan to
shift Flanigan or equally senior, tough manager to the
campaign, it should be done quickly. If there is no
such plan, consider Malek. The Voter Bloc groups have
been planned, staffed and can be run with little of
Malek's time by Chuck Shearer. Occasional revisions
(e.g. older voters) can be handled directly by Malek. I
believe Malek has developed Mitchell's confidence and has
the respect of the rest of the campaign organization.
There will be obvious positioning problems by Magruder, Mardian,
La Rue and others, but these problems will be nothing com-
pared to the country's if McGovern wins.
Malek wants the job.
Howdo
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Malek's Analysis of the
Campaign Organization
Malek discusses the campaigns serious organizational prob-
lems in tough, readable language. His comments on the
disastrous field organization (Flemming, Mardian, et al)
will not come as a surprise to you. Nor will the criticism
of the surrogates operation be a surprime. I agree with
Malek that the direct mail, telephone and canvassing problems
may be solvable because Bob Marik and Bob Morgan are
basically capable managers.
The real problem, which Malek discusses at length in the
Overall Direction and Priorities sections, is for a
tough, hard-driving, ass-licking manager. This may be
the role Flanigan served in 1968. Colson is filling this
void in some way on particular projects, but this is a
structurally unsound arrangement. If there is a plan to
shift Flanigan or equally senior, tough manager to the
campaign, it should be done quickly. If there is no
such plan, consider Malek. The Voter Bloc groups have
been planned, staffed and can be run with little of
Malek's time by Chuck Shearer. Occasional revisions
(e.g. older voters) can be handled directly by Malek. I
believe Malek had developed Mitchell's confidence and has
the respect of the rest of the campaign organization.
There will be obvious positioning problems by Magruder, Mardian,
La Rue and others, but these problems will be nothing com-
pared to the country's if McGovern wins.
Malek wants the job.
GS:car
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMAND TO BE AN
WASHINGTON
ADMI KING
E.O. 120+6, is 1102 6-102
By ER
Date
4-1-82
CONFIDENTIAL
GONI IDENTIAL
June 9, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK 7m
SUBJECT:
Campaign Organization
Per our discussion yesterday, attached is a paper on
Campaign Organization. These are somewhat random,
general, and hastily drawn; and I do not always propose
solutions. Nevertheless, I believe the observations are
valid.
Attachment
V
TO BE AN
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
By
Ep
Copy 1 of 2
CAMPAIGN ORGANIZATION PROBLEMS
This paper responds to your request for general problems I perceive in
the campaign organization. It is divided into four sections: (a) Overall
Direction, (b) Priorities, (c) Political Coordinators, and (d) Programs.
OVERALL DIRECTION
To my mind, the greatest problem we are experiencing at 1701 is that we
lack firm direction and consequently do not have a sense of urgency. There
seems to be great complacency -- with many key people spending their time
developing multitudes of programs, thinking about organization, and worst
of all, plotting to improve their own positions. All the while, precious little
is being done to actually put together the strongest possible organization in
the States and get it mobilized in a constructive fashion. This is in marked
contrast to the McGovern campaign to date which is full of young, energetic,
results-oriented people who are focusing totally on organization matters,
with considerable success.
The problem may well lie in our campaign leadership. Starting at the
top, John Mitchell is a superb political strategist and a man of consistently
sound and unflapable judgment. Moreover, he is a strong, firm, and ob-
jective decision-maker. However, he is not a charismatic, fast-moving
ass-kicking, general manager who first gives firm direction and then pushes
people relentlessly in that direction. Jeb Magruder, while a good program
manager and organizer, is also not the hard-driving, fast-mover that is
needed. In addition, the Political Coordinators are a mixed group and, as
is outlined further below, do not provide the kind of leadership that is needed.
What 1701 really needs is a field management group or campaign manager
under Mitchell who will for the most part forget about developing programs
and concentrate their total efforts on field organization, starting with voter
identification and registration. We need people who will travel the States,
ask the tough questions, impact and energize the State Chairmen, kick them
in their asses if needed, and make sure they are really moving on the right
track. This kind of firm direction and operating leadership simply does not
seem to be present.
The result is that each State Chairman is kind of doing his own thing,
is resentful of direction from Washington, and is more or less building his
own empire -- which may or may not be the best approach. The one thing
that I am sure of, however, is that we are not organized or fast moving,
V
- 2 -
and are losing ground on registration and are incredibly weak in the field
when compared with the McGovern organization.
This problem has in part been perceived, and we are now embarking on
a major new registration drive which will be the top priority of the entire
campaign organization. We intend to impart a real sense of urgency on this
to try to shake people out of their complacency, and will attempt to mobilize
our entire national and field organization for this registration drive. I
think this will have a positive effect, but I wonder whether it is the only
answer or whether it is enough to correct the major problems outlined
above.
OVERALL PRIORITIES
I sense that the campaign organization is failing to act according to
priorities. This is a feeling on my part, and not as crisply defined as are
problems in the political or program areas; but it could be an extremely
important weakness.
Priorities seem to be well enough delineated in strategic terms -- the
key states, constituent groups, etc. -- but the priorities do not appear to
carry over into how people spend their time, or where energies are placed.
For example, everyone agrees that McGovern will be the opposition's
candidate, and has shown surprising strength. However, we do not seem
to be devoting sufficient resources to analyzing his strengths and weaknesses,
and exploring his areas of vulnerability. One would think that this would be
a top priority project - but all that has surfaced thus far is a rather obvious
one-page "analysis" that could have been prepared from reading the news=
paper.
Another example is the State Chairman situation. We go to the trouble of
carefully selecting the key states -- then several of them sit without activity
for months becuase we do not follow through and name State Chairmen.
Part of the problem is that everyone seems to be going in 50 directions
rather than selecting what is really important and pushing like hell on it.
This is aggravated by the previously described lack of urgency at 1701. The
attitude is that we have plenty of time, so there is no reason to hurry, work
long hours, or otherwise extend ourselves. Consequently, there is no follow
through on priorities -- no urgency to make things happen quickly.
V
- 3 -
POLITICAL COORDINATORS
The principal motivators of action in the field should be the five political
coordinators. However, as was mentioned above, they are at best a mixed
group.
Harry Flemming, in my opinion, is very weak. The slow progress in the
development of the organization in the States is largely attributable to his
poor performance when he was the sole head of the political division.
Although his sphere of influence has been narrowed to the Southern States
(plus New York), he remains a negative force on the overall campaign.
Many persons still look to him as the "senior" political coordinator, and so
his bad judgment affects more than just the Southern States (as if that were
not enough). He seems to spend most of his time scheming and plotting on
how to improve his position with Mitchell. He spends almost no time in
the field.
Bob Mardian, who has the Western States, has proved a big disappoint-
ment. Our twice-weekly meetings with Mitchell and the political coordinators
have become virtually non-productive, with Mardian and Flemming taking
up the entire time with irrelevant verbal battles. Mardian seems intent on
having the last word on every point, no matter how inane. Frankly, I do
not see how Mitchell stands it. At least Mitchell has stopped Mardian
from telling us "how we did it in Arizona in 1964
11 Mardian does
not seem to be a clear thinker or good manager. If you are concerned about
Nofziger in California, I am doubly concerned about Mardian supervising
Nofziger.
Don Mosiman has not really said or done enough for me to draw any firm
conclusions about his performance at the campaign. However, he has been
cooperative and industrious in his approach, and he appears adequate at
this point. He has a really heavy load, being entrusted with key states like
Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.
A1 Kaupinen (New England) and Clayton Yeutter (Farm States) seem adequate
enough for their present assignments, but I do not think they should be given
any additional responsibilities.
To sum up, then, it is a pretty grim picture -- two out of the five political
coordinators with over half the States are inadequate, in my opinion. As a
result, the campaign has been woefully slow in naming State Chairmen -
V
- 4 -
key States such as Texas are still without Chairmen. In addition, there is
no orderly flow of information to and from the States. Communications in
the field are so fouled up that the Citizens Group Directors cannot even find
out the background of the delegates to the Convention.
I really think that the best solution to this problem is the tough one --
fire Flemming and Mardian, and replace them with outstanding political
managers if they can be found. Obviously, this has to be done as quickly
as possible, but even at this late date it would be preferable to the alterna-
tive of letting them stay on and screw things up even more. I do not have
any instant ideas of who could replace Flemming and Mardian, but my bet is
that this could be solved inside of two weeks.
One more thought about the political division should be mentioned --
Mitchell seems to be relying increasingly on Fred La Rue for advice on how
to handle the political coordinators. I think Fred is very astute politically,
and is a good advisor to Mitchell. However, I think it would be a mistake to
assume that the problems in the political divison could be solved by moving
La Rue in over the existing political coordinators. Fred is a good advisor,
but I do not think anyone could manage that crew.
PROGRAMS
In my recent progress report on campaign activities, I concentrated on
the problems in the Citizens area, and outlined what I planned to do about
them. I also stated that I thought that Jeb was doing a good job, and I do.
However, I have concerns about three of his areas: national voter contact
programs, surrogates, and public relations. I discussed the understaffing
of 1701 PR in the progress report, and it is being taken care of. The other
two areas of concern are discussed briefly below.
1. National Voter Contact Programs. The national voter contact programs
include direct mail, telephone operations, and door-to-door voter canvassing,
all of which are based on computerized voter lists. If the computer tapes
containing the various lists necessary for these programs are not accurate
and are not received on time, none of these critical programs can be
executed properly. In the test run in the California Primary, the computer
tapes were neither completely accurate nor on time with resulting delays
in the start up of the telephone banks, and delivery of the direct mail (up
to three weeks late). While these deficiencies could be coped with in
California, we could not expect to overcome similar problems in eleven
key states simultaneously in October.
V
- 5 -
As a result of the poor showing of the national voter contact programs in
the California primary, Bob Marik and Bob Morgan have undertaken an
extensive review of their efforts. In the last week, they ha ve changed the
entire concept of the computer system from a single, centralized computer
in Illinois to a decentralized system with a number of regional computer
centers. They have also substantially redesigned the paper flow system
in an attempt to make their information usable by the door-to-door canvas-
sers, as well as by the telephone and direct mail programs. Finally, they
have selected several new vendors to supply the lists to the computer
centers.
These actions represent a fundamental change in the entire approach to
the national voter contact programs. I agree with these changes, however,
if the redesigned program does not work, we will not get another chance.
In view of past performance, I continue to be concerned about this critical
area. By the end of next week, Marik and Morgan should have a final
revised program. I intend to analyze it carefully, and make further recom-
mendations at that time.
2. Surrogates. As you know, the surrogate program has been unsatis-
factory in several respects. The principal problem is that Bart Porter is
weak, overly defensive, and in my opinion abrasive to work with. More-
over, he does not seem to be creative or a good planner, as shown by the
fact that he has not yet pulled together a long-range plan, including identi-
fication of key media areas, which surrogates should be in these areas,
with what frequency, etc. Some of the Citizens Group Directors have done
this for their own surrogates, so there is no excuse for Porter not doing
it for the major surrogates. John Whitaker is moving in on this situation
now, and I am hopeful that he will be able to straighten it out.
*
*
*
I realize that this paper has been long on problems and short on specific
solutions. However, if we can agree on the problems, I would think we
will be able to find soluti ons.
V
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Mitchell Political Meeting --
June 7, 1972
Mitchell met with Magruder, Malek, LaRue, Marik, and
Teeter to discuss the political situation in light of
McGovern's victories and situation June 6, 1972. Subjects
discussed were:
1) Mitchell mentioned he just had had lunch with the
Wednesday Senate Group (Percy and other liberal Republican
Senators). Scott and Griffin attended. According to
Mitchell there was general euphoria about a possible
McGovern candidacy. Most believe McGovern at the top of
the Democratic ticket could be very helpful to Republicans
running for House and Senate seats.
This view was confirmed by Senator "Fritz" Hollings
(D-S.C.) who is advising all candidates to run their own
campaigns and to avoid McGovern. Mitchell is concerned
about resulting complacency in the state organizations,
as well as White House Staffers.
2) Mitchell asked the group to develop a political
line emphasizing that either the Democratic Party or
McGovern will have to modify policy positions; that Humphrey
made a remarkable recovery; and that the election would be
close because Republicans are a minority party. The state-
ment is attached at Tab A and has been distributed pursuant
to Mitchell's directions, to the White House Staff by Dent,
the campaign committee by Magruder, and the Administration
spokesmen by Bart Porter.
3) Mitchell is having a detailed precinct analysis of
the Jewish, black, and chicano vote prepared by the cam-
paign's demographer, Art Finkelstein;
- 2 -
4) Mitchell is directing a covert, well-financed
program, headed by Democrats, to explain McGovern's
"extreme positions" to labor, veterans, and Jewish voters.
The goal is to keep the Democrats fighting for the nomi-
nation, though realizing McGovern has it, and hopefully
acquiring these voting blocs in November;
5) Mitchell believes the substantive issue spokes-
men (e.g. Laird and Rogers) can appropriately comment on
Why
?
the differences between the Administration's stands and
McGovern's. However, he directed Magruder and Miller to
meet with Tom Wilck and John Lofton to assure that Monday
only comments on the Democrats, not on McGovern or Humphrey
6) Mitchell directed the campaign to focus on McGovern
on the big issues (national defense, welfare, and taxes).
Mitchell believes
the 3 A's of Scott (acid, amnesty, and
abortion) can be marginally effective in certain areas and
wrong
among certain groups only.
I reviewed with Bob Marik the three previous meetings held
before I was invited. They covered the Teeter First Wave
polling analysis submitted to you on May 11, 1972. Marik
had prepared a summary of the comments, which is attached
at Tab B.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
TO:
WHITE HOUSE STAFF
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
Attached for your information is
an assessment of the situation at
the conclusion of the Presidential
primaries. This statement should
serve as your guidance for the
campaign between now and the time
that the Democrat nominee is
finally selected or some new
position develops.
ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AT THE CONCLUSION OF PRIMARIES
BY JOHN N. MITCHELL, NATIONAL CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
The Democrat Party appears to be approaching a crossroads. Although
it is not certain that Sen. George McGovern will be the Democrat Party's
Presidential nominee this year, the choices available to the National
Convention are rapidly narrowing.
And if Senator McGovern is the nominee, one of two things is going
to have to OCCU : either the Democrat Party is going to have to accept
Senator McGovern's views on domestic, defense and foreign policy --- views
which many Democrats find extreme -- or Senator McGovern is going to have
to modify his views to conform with the mainstream of his party.
The seriousness with which many Democrats look upon Senator
McGovern's positions is reflected in Senator Humphrey's strong finish in
the California Primary. In the space of one week, Senator Humphrey reduced
the McGovern lead from the 20 percent shown in a widely-read public opinion
poll just a few days ago to the 5 percent which actually separated the
two men when the votes were counted. If the primary had been held two or
three days later, Senator Humphrey may well have won.
Again, although Senator McGovern ran an extememly expensive media
campaign, a majority of California Democrats voted for someone else. Thus,
the Democrat presidential nomination has by no means been decided.
In any case, no matter who the eventual nominee is, the Committee for
the Re-election of the President is preparing a maximum effort on behalf of
the President this fall. We must never lose sight of the fact that the
Republican Party is a minority party and that a coalition of Republicans,
Democrats and Independents will be needed to re-elect President Nixon in
the general election, a goal we will reach.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 24, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ROBERT TEETER
FROM:
BOB MARIK
SUBJECT:
Comments on the First Wave Analysis
This memorandum summarizes the important comments made by the Strategy
Group in their discussion of your analysis of the first wave of polling.
Although your mathematical analysis showed past party voting behavior
to be a stronger variable than demographic grouping, it was still felt
that the campaign strategy should be oriented to some degree around
the important voter blocs. In particular, the idea was raised of
seeking an appropriate sample of pivotal voter groups and tracking the
attitudes of that group by monthly surveys up to the election. This
information would be used to augment the state-by-state data which
would be developed through the existing polling plan. Two groups
which should be tracked in this manner are urban ethnics (potential
shift to Nixon), and upper income White suburbanites (potential shift
to McGovern).
In the statistical analysis, the Group also commented on the substantial
variation of important factors among the states. For example, Party
Type had 21% influence in California and only 6% in Ohio. The question
was raised as to whether the nation-wide analysis is useful for strategy
development or whether it would have to be approached state by state.
The Group was concerned that the questionnaire be framed in such a way
that the important issues could be identified and their intensity measured
perhaps more sharply in the first wave. In particular, the question was
raised as to whether the apparent importance of busing in Florida and
Michigan was accurately reflected in the first wave results. The analysis
recommended that issues such as crime, drugs and unemployment should not
be emphasized except to particular audiences and when we had an impressive
story to tell. We will want to get into that strategy more deeply when
the advertising program is developed in detail.
The feeling of the group was that the President's support among young
voters might well be higher than was implied in your memo. This can
be checked with the second wave results.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
There was agreement that the ticket-splitter analysis should be done
and would be useful as a tool to guide campaign strategy. There was
disagreement with the statement that no special effort needs to be
made to register older voters. Newly retired people are often transient
and may well represent a fertile area for registration canvassing
activities.
There was disagreement on the comment that registration drives among
young voters should be stopped as we have discussed in detail in last
week's meeting.
There was agreement with the point that we should attempt to build as
large a lead as possible between now and the national conventions. Our
activities should be geared to push McGovern to the left before he
becomes well known to the voting public. The specific tactics need
to be developed over the next few weeks.
It was mentioned that one important issue was general unrest. It would
be useful if a clearer definition could be established of what is on
the voters mind when they discuss the issue cluster of general unrest.
Finally, as we discussed over the telephone, it would be useful for us
to devote a portion of a meeting in the near future to a presentation
by you of the techniques used in the survey program and the significance
of the information that is being obtained. With that background, our
future discussions would be much more fruitful.
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
determined TO EE AN
ADMI
SKING
THE WHITE HOUSE
S.
6-102
4-1-82
FredX
WASHINGTON
By EP
CONFIDENTIAL
June 9, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK 7m
SUBJECT:
Women/Volunteer Program
In our telephone conversation yesterday you raised the fear that our
Women's organization was oriented only toward Republicans rather
than covering all women. I do not feel your point was adequately
answered and want to take this opportunity to amplify.
In each State a woman co-chairman is being named. For the most part
these women do have backgrounds of leadership in the Republican Party.
However, to supplement this we are naming a National Advisory Group
along with State Advisory Groups for women. For the most part these
groups will be comprised of the best leadership we can attract from the
various women's organizations from both the national and State levels.
Once attracted to our National and State Advisory Councils, these women
leaders will then be used to politicize, as possible, their own organiza-
tions. This would include the selection of key people from within their
organizations to work on the campaign, the recruitment of volunteers
from within their organizations, and the communication to membership
of the reasons for their support of the President. An example of the
kind of person we are after is Ann Campbell who is the National President
of the American Association of University Women. We are hoping that
she will serve on the National Advisory Council. Likewise, we would
hope to find certain State representatives from the American Association
of University Women to serve on our various State Advisory Councils.
Both the national and State Advisory Councils should be put together
within the month. I feel that this approach will enable us to go beyond
the usual Republican organization, attract women of all political back-
grounds, and utilize to the maximum possible the various women's
organizations. Please let me know if you have any further thoughts or
questions this.
There on are a lot better women's ago than
The AAUW in terms of good volunteer
activists Jr. feague, etc. I still fal in
we have a very real problem
this area
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: June 26, 1972
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
You asked for a report on the
Ed Nixon appearance at the African
Methodist-Episcopal Church on
June 21. Ed Nixon departed when
30 of the 4,000 rushed the platform.
Bob Brown and Paul Jones (1701
black director of citizens) urged
Ed Nixon to attend.
The report from Bart Porter to
Magruder is attached.
problem in turnder
of
here also- Report will beto
you on Friday. C
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
WILLIAM E. MOELLER
HERBERT L. PORTER
wey
SUBJECT:
Ed Nixon's appearance at the Quadrennial
Conference of African Methodist Episcopal
Churches on June 21, 1972 in Dallas, Texas
1)' The invitation to speak was originally sent to the
President earlier this year from Bishop Decatur Ward Nichols
of New York. Dave Parker regretted for the President in
How specerfreal
January and referred the invitation to this Committee
Enalled
2) On May 3, Curt Herge sent a note to Pat O'Donnell,
with a copy of the letter of regret, telling him that Paul
Jones believed the event was of "significant interest and
value vis-a-vis the Black Community". Herge suggested that
'Donnell refer the invitation to Bob Brown at the White
House for comment. Today, O'Donnell told me that his "office
had called Brown -- Brown said it was being handled by 1701
and we dropped it".
3) As of June 13, Ed Nixon had been scheduled to do a
Veterans Administration event in Austin, Texas. This event
was set up in conjunction with Bill Rhatican's office at the
White House. At the same time Herge was asking Sandy Cram
to handle the Austin event, he gave her two or three other
possible Texas events for Mr. Nixon's consideration. One of
these was the subject event.
4) On June 13, Sandy Cram talked to Paul Jones who said that
it would be a good event for Ed Nixon to do and recommended
it. He told Sandy to call Bob Brown at the White House for
his opinion.
5) On June 14, Sandy Cram contacted Bob Brown, while in
Minnesota, who also recommended the event for Mr. Nixon.
Page 2
6) On June 14, Sandy Cram talked to Bishop Nichols who
stated that it would be "extremely appropriate" for Ed Nixon
to deliver a message for the President at the Conference on
June 21.
7) On June 14, the Scheduling Office transmitted all pertinent
information relating to this event to the Tour Office.
8) On June 14, the Committee's Tour Office received the
transmittal memorandum from the Scheduling Office. On that
same date, the Tour Office decided that advancemen should
cover the event. Two advancemen were scheduled.
learne
9) The two advancemen, Robert Goodwin and Frank McGee, arrived
in Dallas on Monday, June 19th, and called their key contact,
Bishop Nichols.
10) On June 19, Ed Cowling, the Tour Office desk man handling
this event, saw Art Amolsch to ensure that Mr. Nixon's speech
was being prepared. Art agreed to prepare the remarks.
aborma
11) On June 20, Ed Cowling called Bob Brown to discuss Mr.
Nixon's speech. Mr. Brown was not in his office. Ed Cowling
left a message requesting him to call either Mr. Cowling or
Art Amolsch regarding the speech. Later that day, Art Amolsch
and Bob Brown discussed the speech. Bob Goodwin also spoke
with Art Amolsch about the speech, conveying Bishop Nichols'
wish that certain points be included in the speech. The
speech was prepared late in the afternoon on June 20.
12) From the time the advancemen arrived in Dallas until the
event, the lead advanceman, Bob Goodwin was in frequent
contact with both Ed Cowling and Bishop Nichols. Goodwin did
not foresee any problems with the event.
13) Mr. Nixon arrived in Dallas the evening of June 20th.
On the following morning, Mr. Nixon met with Eric Johnsson,
Chairman of the Texas Committee for the Re-election of the
President. Mr. Nixon proceeded to the event on schedule and
arrived at 11:30 a.m., escorted by Bob Goodwin. Mr. Nixon
proceeded to a holding room where he was introduced to a
number of the participating Bishops. A worship service had
been in process since 10:00 a.m.
14) At approximately 11:45 a.m. Mr. Nixon was escorted to
the dais where he was seated next to Mr. Nichols and other
clergymen. The worship service was concluding when Bishop
Nichols proceeded to the podium, at which point a group of fifteen
individuals proceeded down the aisle. They were joined by
another fifteen to twenty-five people who crowded in front of
the speaking platform. There were cries of , "No Nixon",
"Have church" The Bishop had arisen to introduce Mr. Nixon.
Page 3
Concurrently, Mr. Nixon, Bob Goodwin, Mr. Nixon's security
element, two detectives, and two uniformed policemen decided
that Mr. Nixon should leave the Conference. This was done, and
Mr. Nixon proceeded directly to the airport for a plane to
Austin.
Attached are two newspaper clippings relating to the incident,
which support Ed Nixon's feeling that the cause of the disturbance
was somehow related to the on-going church service. It is.
certainly not inconceivable, however, that the interruption
was carefully planned, staged, and well-executed by a dissident
element within the Conference to embarrass Bishop Nichols
and/or Mr. Nixon
No it is obsism
cc: Gordon Strachan
Attachment
President's Kin Booed
The Dallas Morning Name
From Conference Dais
LOCAL NEWS
Editorial
Classified
By HELEN PARMLEY
who for over xix years was president of
D
With clenched fists and cries of "No
Paul Quinn College. an AME-supported
Thursday, June 22, 1972
Nixon," "Have ehurch," about 40 delo-
school in Wace.
gates to the African Methodist Episco-
"I resent Nixon being brought here
pal General Conference stormed the
by the bishop (Nichols) who Interrupted
Dallas Memorial Auditorium platform
worship for political candidates," said
Wednesday and dented Edward Mixon
Adams who, along with Stokes, is a can-
the right to deliver a message from his
didate for election 10 the AME bishopric
brother, President Richard Nixon.
during conference elections.
The protesters should. "Worship.
Admitting he is against President
Nixon has done nothing for us," as the
Nixon's political philosophy, Adams RC-
President's brather, appearing at the
cused the prelate of Inviting R political
Invitation of the conference. departed
candidate to spenk to the conference In
from the stage without uttering a word.
order "to receive some gratuity to to
The confrontation came during the
handed out.
opening worship service of the 39th
"It is n deceration of workhip," he,
quadrennial AME Conference which
charged. "The real Issue at stake Is
will continue through July 2. About 20,-
that Nixon has made is perfectly clear
000 delegates and alternate delegates
he plans to manipulate the election
from throughout the United States. Airl-
without passion or concern for black
ca and the West Indies are attending
folks."
the sessions.
Bishop Nichols told The News It is
D. Ward Nichols, senior bishop of
not unusual for political candidates or
the denomination, told The Datis
personalities 10 appear at the AME
News. "I apologize to the President for
quadeonial meetings and he pointed
any seeming Insult this might cause
out that Sen. Hubert Humphrey and
him.
Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt had addressed
"Various people in this country think
previous sessions.
and act differently. That's why we are
"If has been our custom for years to
living in America. We cannot control
Invite the President and powernors to
people's thoughts and Ideas.
speak at our meetings," said Bishop NI-
"I regret this happened. I am sor-
chols. "It was not Nixon who was invit-
ry."
ed here. but the President of the United
Cited as leaders of the uprising were
States and his words should have been
AME pastors Richard Stokes of New
heard whether we like him or don't like
York and John Adams of Lot Angeles,
him."
Karaged delegates shout down Nizon.
Church faction prevents
talk by Nixon's brother
By MARTHA MAN
opposition centered on a political fig-
Religion Firiter
ure's interruption of a worship BeT-
vice, they also said they are against
A militant group of delegates to the
the political philosophy represented by
African Methodist Episcopal Church
Nixon
General Conference refused Wednesday
They said they object to the Nixon
to let President Nimn's brother ad-
administration's conservative politics,
dress the opening session at Memorial
including an anti-busing stand on
Auditorium.
school desegrepation. Separate but
"We resent the attempt to interrupt
equal schools, which they contend Nix-
a religious worship service with poli-
00 is promoting. have been in exist-
ties." said Willie J. Nelson of Colum-
ence "since the Dred Scott decision"
bia, S.C.
more than 100 years ago.
"The will bear from Christ first and
take our communion before Re bear
Name bad just stepped onto the
from the White House." he told The
stage prior to being introduced to dele-
Times HersH
gates. From the back of the hall a
About 35 delegates took command of
stream of predominantly younger men
the stage as soon 63 Edward Nixon
moved up the center alsie. calling out
was seated with Senior Bishop D.
Hard Nichols
"Lat's worship." They were also shout-
During the commotion Nixon 485
Ing "No Nixon"
ushered out a side door. A guard said
They stormed the platform. LJT-
he made no comment and looked "sur-
rounded Bishop Michols, and took over
prised."
the microphones.
Dr. Richard R. Stokes. a spokesman
Nam WS5 burriedly led out a side
for the militant group. said "He Te-
door.-
sem the political chicancry premulgat.
The sender bishop announced Nom
ed on Due general conference by the
would speak. But the protesters said it
senior bishop."
was not the bishop's place to set the
While the objectors said their major
program.
100
DALLAS TIMES HERALD, Wednesday, 21 June 1972
X
June 14, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
SUBJECT:
Campaign Organisation
Chuck Colsen called suggesting you, Mitchell, and Colson
get together to discuss some things that need to be done at
the Campaign organization.
Apparently he discussed more than just the union bug thing
with the President yesterday, according to our conversation
last night.
He is currently having his staff run a check of what is being
done at 1701. In addition, I am having Gerdon Strachan do
the same thing se we have a complete listing.
Should we set up a meeting?
Yes
No
(I strongly advise against
such a meeting. L.)
LH:kb
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DATE
TO:
FROM: DWIGHT H CHAPIN
FYI
PLEASE HANDLE
OTHER:
FYIV
in Big GOP Rally at Ike's Farm
a
to
de
Associated Press Wirephoto
m
RVEYS SCENE-President Eisenhower holds his chin in
tional Chairman Leonard Hall, ieft, and Vice President
Gr hand as he looks over the tent layout yesterday after-
Nixon. The event marked his campaign kick-off. The Presi-
n on his Gettysburg farm. With him are Republican Na.
dent later addressed the assembly of campaign workers.
Ike Greets 500 Top
GOP Leaders at Farm
Campaign Kicked Off at Skull Session
On Techniques in a Huge Brown Tent
By INGRID JEWELL
Post-Gazette Staff Writer
GETTYSBURG, Pa., Sept. 12 - Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Republican, today launched his campaign for re-
election as President of the United States in the pleas-
ant rolling pasture beside his white brick farm house
near the Civil War battlefield.
Dressed in brown tweed coat+
and whipcord trousers, he
usual bluff heartiness and paid
looked the smiling country
tribute to the President whose
squire as he greeted the 500
leadership all present believe
top party leaders at a skull
will pull their party to victory.
Senator Duff told the assem-
session on campaign tech-
blage that "just over this hill"
niques.
Abraham Lincoln delivered his
immortal address dedicating
Meeting in Huge Tent
the field as a national ceme-
The meeting was held in a
tery,
huge brown tent with its sides
He likened President Eisen-
grolled up 10 admit a bit of sun-
hower to Lincoln in that both
shine and some warm wind.
have been "emancipators of
But there the carnival atmos-
Americans."
phere ended.
He recalled that Eisenhow-
It was a work session. It
er is the only citizen of Penn-
was not a haranguing of po-
sylvania who has been a Re-
tential voters. It was a meet-
publican President of the
ing to plot a course of action
United States.
by which voters at later meet-
After the speeches, the
ings can be wooed.
crowd was treated to a fine
Present were the National
country picnic supper. Catered
Committee members from all
by a hotel in Gettysburg, the
the states, the Republican
menu included fried chicken
state chairmen and leaders of
Adams County style," cold
Citizens for Eisenhower,
roast beef, cold baked ham,
Youth for Eisenhower and
baked beans, swiss cheese, po-
Young Republican clubs.
tato salad, tomatoes, pickled
eggs and beets, ice cream and
Duff Welcomes Visitors
cake.
Pennsylvania's Senator,
(Continued on Page 4, Col. 4)
James H. Duff, a candidate for
re-election, was the enthusias-
tic master of ceremonies. He
welcomed the visitors with his
non THE we page
CIO Ext nization. CIO made departed ENC The utive mem
reeson
Ilko Opens Campaign at Gettyr
Farm
DETROIT, MICH TIMES
Circ. D. 414,942
He Urges Crusade to Win Millions
S. 563,95:
Of Voters to mblican Banner;
SEP
Nixon and Hall Blast Democrats
(Continued from Page 1)
Adlai Caller
kick-off talk in advance of its
He said he wanted 10 answer
a question that mary people
delivery to upwards of 500
have been putting to him. and
campaign workers from all
Hoodwink
then declared:
over the United States.
"Ladies and Gentlemen, I
They included leaders of the
feel fine."
regular Republican organiza-
WASHINGTON
In calling for a new crusade
tion. groups pledged to woo
R. Milican Nation:
to lead the party 10 victory in
the independent voters, and of
Hall accused Adrai S
November, Eis n hower re-
ficials of organizations called
tryi. 15 "hoodwink"
ferred to it-- as he did in ac-
Democrats for Eisenhower and
can people with
cepting the nomination in San
Youth for Eisenhower.
tions and misstatements
Francisco as the party of the
Eisenhower. who came 10
Pall issued a SD
future. He said is best
the revival style campaign tent
reply
to
SET.
i's L
suited for the mar = not of
from his nearby country home.
in
the American Gove.
placed great emphasis on what
Demo reminee
ti:e
Get Voters Registered
he called the need for getting
Republican supporters regis-
i.
U.S.T
Eisenhower, as those
tered to vote and 10 the polls
who spoke alioad of him in
next November 6.
VERY HAPPY
reporting on the party's out-
look, placed much empliasis on
"I think our fundamental ef-
liall asserted:
need for getting voters regis-
fort." he declared. "should be
"I am extremely
tered and to the 10"s
this: every Republican, every
"We want the decision of
Independent, every discerning
Adlai Stevenson
America. not the decision of
Democrat. every thinking
recepted the phi
publican free
the minority." the President
citizen regardless of his past
or present political record can.
which the nation in prop.
declared. rapping his knowledge
against the lecter.
should, must be persuaded to
"] am "sionished. 1:
That jouched off
no:
hig
vote Republican on November
that on I'v yery dar when
6.7
government announced in
round of applai the
He added that "this year's
time record pak of Code:
men at women are VOI
entire campaign will be an ap-
1h. 1.1 Stevenson is WA
palling exercise in futility if
about times.
during its course we should
get people to the boiling point.
1. :0 WORKING
brimming with enthusiasm
"Ve, Americans
and zeal. only to find out on
in:
mor.
job.
on
election day that they cannot
1111
more
and
vote because the names are
ing of the good
not register on the polhing
life Ior themselves and them
families than ever before
Tren I.f il: "Crusaders"
history,
without ballots are like sul-
111 LP THEMSELA President and Mrs.
farm yesterday. The Pressdent spears a
"The American people are
die without bullets.
Eisenbower also unged that
Eisenhower serve themselves at a buffet
Pennsy Ivania-type pickled e.e. as Mrs. the
not its gullible as Mr. Steven-
1:0 campaign leaders "write
enhower earries her plate along the buffet
SON presumes. He won't hea.
supper which climaxed a rally under a
wink them with gl.b Cisto
:: no COMPANY DO state as
hure tent on the Fisephower Gettysburg
table. About 500 nersons attended the inlly.
tions and misstatements."
in victory is the
product of a nationwide ef
on
the
polling
more
Then I.F sit: "Crusader
ing the good Phings of
without ballots are like sid.
life for themselves and their
without beliets."
families than ever before in
10 LP and Mrs.
Ensenhower also inged that
Eigenhower serve themselves at a buffet
farm yesterday, The President spears a
campaign leaders "write
Pennsylvania-type pickled egg as Mrs. His
"The American people are
a no no State
supper which climaxed a rally under a
enhower carries her plate along the buffet
not as gullible as Mr. Steven-
Empless, victory is the
huge tent on the Fisenhower Gettysburg
son presumes. He won't hood-
product of a nationwide ef.
table. About 300 persons attended the rally.
wink them with glib
tions and misstatements.
Same
Eisenhower's farm on the
Over
historic Civil War battlefield
From until November, polities
The
Democratic
standard
is located just 40 miles from
will be the steady fare of the people continue their barnstorming tour
Harrisburg. Pa.. where Adlai
who will be called upon to make their
Wirephoto
E. Stevenson, the Democratic
the country, seeking perhaps to em
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER
presidential nominee, will
decision in the elections early in the
late the tacties of Harry Truman
Tilting soft drink bottle.
launch his campaign officially
month. The campagns are getting
his successful campaign of 1948. M.
tomorrow night. Stevenson.
campaign leaders assembled
however. has been criss-cross-
under way early.
Stevenson has disclosed that the main
here from all parts of the
ing the country for more than
President Eisenhower has launched
force of the attack will be directo
United States.
two weeks spraying criticism
Nixon told the party lead-
at both Eisenhowe and his ad-
the Republican drive with a meeting at
against Vice President Nixon, which
ers:
ministration.
his Gettysburg farm, where 500 of the
may be an unwise piece of strategy,
"I believe that the re-elec-
In calling today for a great
tion of President Eisenhower
top people in the party heard him warn
The new Constitution party. com
crusade. Eisenhower set forth
and a Republican Congress
the same campaign theme he
against complacency and indolence.
posed of those who are dissatisfic
and Senate is the business
sounded four years ago.
here before us."
He pointed out that the opposition
with the proposals of both the maior
He outlined a four-fold ob-
The Vice President then
jective for the party:
appeared to be registering more people
parties, is now holding its convention,
went into the question of
1. "To arouse in the Ameri-
than his own party and he called upon
having already selected its candidates
whether or not- and how-the
can people a consciousness of
Republicans should reply to
all that is at stake in this
the leaders to pass the word down
for President and vice president. This
Democratic campaign attacks.
election. of their responsibility
through the ranks to step up their
group favors states rights. abolition of
Correct the Record
and their ability in making
grassroots activity.
the income tax and many other pro-
"Where Democrats commit
sure we stay on the straight
distortion or misstatement"
road of prosperity, progress
Leonard Hall, Republican national
posals that have not been included in
Nixon said, "it is our responsi-
and peace."
chairman, has reintroduced the issue
the platform of either the Democratic
bility to correct the record.'
2. "To generate in them
With Mrs. Eisenhower and
(the American people) the
of loyalty in the campaign by referring
or Republican parties. Constitution
Mrs. Nixon on the platform
conviction that our party. the
to the case of Alger Hiss. This may
party leaders hope to throw the
with him, the President got
party of the future, is best
be the forerunner of the blows to be
another laugh with an allu-
fitted for the management of
presidential selection into the House
sion to the victory the Demo
our government because of
struck on behalf of the GOP cause
of Representatives and thus achieve
crats scored in the Maine elec-
its principles and record and
tion Monday.
the candidates it presents for
later, although the President himself some purpose, the nature of which is
Eisenhower said the Re-
office from village to national
has expressed his distaste at such
not exactly clear at this time.
publicans "have a great
level.'
tactics. Efforts by Hall to label any
The next few weeks will bring
party" with "people working
3. "To ignite in them a zeal
all the way from Los Anegles
to make converts among their
party as a "party of treason" is likely
some mighty electioneering and a good
to Maine."
neighbors. to be themselves
to backfire, as the President well
deal of confusion, but it is all part
Then he caught himself
active workers for the Repub-
knows.
and said with a chuckle re.
lican Party and builders of the
of the system.
garding his mention of
American future."
Maine: "That's a bad word."
4. "To fortify their deter-
Before the speaking pro-
mination that they will regis-
gram started, Eisenhower wan-
ter in time to get others to
dered happily among his
register; to vote themselves
guests, shaking many hands
and persuade others to vote."
and calling greetings to old
The President went on to
friends.
say that if the leaders do
After the speech Eisenhower
these things they can "change
was all but mobbed by the
a campaign into a crusade: a
surge of Republican workers
platform into a cause that
to the platform.
rallies millions to your stand-
The President was intro-
ard. And you won't have to
duced by Senator Duff. Re-
worry about marginal dis-
publican. Pa., who is facing al
tricts."
tough re-election battle. as
Buffet
Fried Chicken, Adams County Style
Home Baked Beans
A Pennsylvania Picnic Supper
Celery Hearts and Pickles
Cold Roast Beef
catered by
Cold Baked Hom
| Totel Gettysburg, Gettyburg, Pa.
Sweitzer Choose
Potato Salad
Coleslaw
Home Grann lomitees
Pickled Loss
Pickled Boots
G.O.P. lee Cream and Coke
Coffee
Assorted Rolls
REPUBLICAN
CAMPAIGN "KICK-OFF"
AT THE
EISENHOMER PARM.
GENYSBURG, PA.
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1056
H
EYES ONLY
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FRED MALEK
FROM:
CHUCK COLSON
Can you tell me what the budget figures are for advertising during the
campaign in Catholic and/or ethnic newspapers? I would like very much
to know how much money we have to play with here as we think about the
kinds of ads we will want to run in the Catholic press around the country.
Tom Melady has been in to talk to me and has a plan working with Lasslo
Passtor which I would like a copy of when you get it. WhatTTom is talk-
ing about fits in very well with the suggestions I talked to you about in
the outside Catholic committee which simply advertises on behalf of
Catholic issues but in the process, of course, involves where the Presi-
dent stands vis a via his opponents on those issues. I would like to know
how much latitude we have in terms of money for direct mail and what
capacity Donnelly will have to break Catholics out in the ten key states
for a major mailing during the campaign.
We should also consider in our advertising budget for Catholics the
New York Daily News which would have a special Catholics for Nixon
or Catholics for something type ad in the campaign. We should also
determine what newspapers in other major urban areas are read most
frequently by Catholics. It is clear in New York that it is the Daily News.
I am not sure in Chicago or in other areas of high Catholic concentration.
CCI Balsano
Mike:
I would like you to work with Rhatican and/or Ken Clawson and do some
checking around and find out in the 7 or 8 major metropolitan areas which
newspaper in that particular city is most widely read by Catholics. I
know that data is maintained on this and probably the ad agencies can
give it to us. I would check with the November Group across the street
first, as a matter of fact, because the Standard Rate and Data Tables
usually show demographic breakdowns of readership for the benefit of
advertisers.
CWC
DETERMAL (1) BE AN
ADMINAS
SKING
E.J. 100 6-102
By ER
Date 4-1-82 June 19, 1972
,
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MISS ROSE MARY WOODS
FROM:
ALEXANDER P. BUTTERFIELD
SUBJECT:
Conversation with Taft Schreiber
I just talked to Taft Schreiber, who reported how successful the
Saturday gathering of celebrities was. He said that Mrs. Nixon
was absolutely tremendous, that everyone had a wonderful time
and that some great photographs were taken. He went on to say --
and he wanted this relayed to you -- that the Zsa Zsa issue was
easily handled and caused no problems.
CONFIDENTIAL
H
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
You may recall at the time of the May 8th support efforts, we
sent Andre LeTendre to Chicago to run an operation there with
his key men that would generate telegrams and letters around
the country. Simply to refresh your recollection, we took Andre
off the Commerce Department payroll on one day and had him on
the Committee payroll the next.
I indicated at that time that his expenses would have to be covered,
that I could get Dave Bradshaw's law firm to pick up the tab, but
that we would have to reimburse him.
Enclosed is the first letter I have received from Dave. There will
be a subsequent one which will include the telephone call and tele-
gram bill which could run a few thousand dollars.
As I remember, I said that I thought the total tab would be somewhere
between $2, 000 and $5, 000. I mentioned this also to Haldeman in a
meeting in his office on the day that we dispatched LeTendre and Bob
indicated that that would be worth doing.
In view of the fact that Dave is Clem Stone's son-in-law, I think we
ought to handle this with some dispatch and also the ensuing bill when
it comes in. Don't worry about this one; it can very easily be gotten
back to us several times over if we need to go back to the well with
Clem Stone.
Let me know if there is any problem with this.
BRADSHAW
David E. Bredshaw
Thirtieth Floor
Carmen V. Speranze
230 North Michigan Avenue
SPERANZA
Donald J. Veverka
Chicago, Illinois 60601
(312) 372-3665
Donald J. Brumlik
VEVERKA
Edward S. Jackson
& BRUMLIK
Richard L. Welss
Washington Office
Gary H. Rieman
1700 Pannsylvania Avenue
Gary C. Pileski
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 223-5850
Of Counsel
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
William Brumik
CABLE BRADLAW
June 13, 1972
PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Charles W. Colson
Special Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Dear Chuck:
Enclosed are two bills which are self-explanatory as to
what they cover. The phone bill has not yet come in. Would
you please have a check issued to Don Brumlik and forward it
to our Chicago office, as these people are beginning to give us
a little trouble on these two bills.
It was my intention to send them all to you at one time
but I would appreciate having these two processed at this time.
Very Dave sincerely yours,
David E. Bradshaw
DEB/mk
Enclosures
NO. 14 SM. OMALL
HEBARD STORAGE WAREHOUSES, INC.
6331-33 BROADWAY
CHICAGO, ILL. 60626
TELEPHONE ROgers Park 4-0282
MR. DONALD J. BRUMLIK
MAY 18, 1972
RM. 2900 - 230 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois
60601
1972
May
8
TO Moving from 1439 S. Michigan Avenue to 230
N. Michigan Avenue -
5/8 - 7 Van 2 Men 21 Hrs. Loading & Travel Time
99
00
5/9 - 1 Van 2 Men 1-3/4 Hrs. Unloading & Travel
Time
67
00
166
00
No. 'as 9M. SMALL
HEBARD STORAGE WAREHOUSES, INC.
6331-33 BROADWAY
CHICAGO, ILL. 60626
TELEPHONE ROgers Park 4-0282
MR. DONALD J. BRUMLIK
May 18, 1972
RM. 2900 - 230 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60601
1972
May
18 TO Moving from 230 N. Michigan Avenue to 1439
S. Michigan Avenue -
1 Van 2 Men - 11 Hrs. Loading & Travel Time
63 DO
1 Van 2 Men - 1-3/4 Hrs. Unloading & Travel Time
91.00
154 00
WALL STREET JOURNAL
JUNE 20, 1972
Uneasy Alliance
Now Organized Labor
Faces Dilemma: What
To Do About McGovern
Unions Likely to Endorse
Senator if He Is Picked
But Won't Give Their All
'Labor Bet on Losing Horse'
At this point, AFL-CIO leaders, whose dis-
taste for the South Dakotan has been ill-con-
By BYRON E. CALAME
cealed, aren't quite conceding the nomination
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
to Sen. McGovern; some still cling to hopes
that Edward Kennedy might run and snatch
the prize away. Yet there's no evidence of any
significant AFL-CIO effort now to deny Mr.
McGovern the nomination.
WASHINGTON-Geor; McGovern's surge
Such an attempt would probably be doomed
toward the Democratic presidential nomination
anyway. For labor's traditional influence over
is bringing the AFL-CIO to an agonizing politi-
the Democratic presidential choice has clearly
cal crossroads.
evaporated this spring. "Labor will probably
have less clout in Miami than at any Demo-
If the South Dakotan wins the party prize as
cratic convention since 1932," says one union
expected, the federation could decide to team
strategist.
up with his "new politics" of youth and reform
and do its all to defeat President Nixon this
"When you get right down to it, labor bet on
a losing horse," one observer says, noting the
fall.
strong preference for Sens. Hubert Humphrey
Or the union combine could shun the Mc-
and Edmund Muskie shown by several labor
Govern drive for the White House, figuring it
leaders during the primaries. Moreover,
will fail. Labor and other old-line regulars
though the AFL-CIO set out to get up to 600
might then pick up the pieces and put the
union members elected as delegates under the
Democratic Party back in the old mold.
party's new reform rules, it is winding up with
Most likely is a choice somewhere in be-
only about 350. Few union men were on Mc-
tween. It now seems probable that the AFL-
Govern primary slates, and his campaign
CIO, plus the independent United Auto Work-
workers proved better organized to vie for del-
ers, will swallow its misgivings and endorse
egates in many nonprimary states.
Sen. McGovern if he's nominated. If he moves
A Movement Divided
toward the middle of the road, the federation
Actually, labor's leadership is far from
might also VOW a maximum effort to elect him.
united in its political leanings. The Teamsters
But the words could be little more than words.
union, which is the nation's largest union (and
In fact, the Committee on Political Education,
which is still outside the AFL-CIO), isn't likely
the AFL-CIO's political arm, is considering
to endorse any Democratic presidential candi-
pouring most of its money and manpower into
date. Secretary-Treasurer Emil Mazey and
congressional races rather than the presiden-
several other high officials of the UAW, the
tial contest. In any case, "some of us might
other big independent union, favor Sen. Mc-
just sit on our hands," warns the president of
Govern. Within the AFL-CIO, President A. F.
one major union.
Grospiron of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Yesterday, following his return from a Eu-
Workers has endorsed the South Dakotan. But
ropean trip, AFL-CIO chief George Meany
I. W. Abel, head of the Steelworkers, is report-
began huddling with strategists to ponder the
ed urging his favorite, Sen. Humphrey, to
course ahead. The formal decisions, however,
"hang tough."
won't be made till some time after the Demo-
The rank-and-file seems even more widely
cratic convention ends in mid-July. The presi-
divided. A recent Machinists Union poll showed
dents of the AFL-CIO's 117 affiliates will meet
32% of its members favored Sen. Humphrey,
Aug. 30 in Chicago to decide on endorsing the
26% Gov. George Wallace and 21% Sen. Mc-
Democratic nominee, whether he's Sen. Mc-
Govern. Pro-Wallace sentiment runs strong in
Govern or someone else.
some other unions, especially in places where
Backing the Wrong Horse
the school-busing issue is sizzling.
The path chosen by the leaders of the 13.5-
Sen. McGovern hopes to turn labor's divi-
million-member AFL-CIO could influence the
sions to his advantage, and he has begun trying
1972 elections, for labor's money and manpower
to build bridges to his critics. He attempted un-
have been essential to Democratic presidential
successfully to reach Mr. Meany by phone in
campaigns for three decades. This year COPE
Europe, and as of yesterday he was seeking to
expects to raise and spend-in behalf of labor's
line up a meeting with him before the conven-
political favorites-more money than it has
tion. The McGovern forces have made over-
ever doled out before.
tures to John Henning, the president of the Cal-
ifornia State AFL-CIO who backed Sen. Hum-
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
New York Primary Returns
The President's name is not on the New York ballot.
Democratic candidates' names do not appear on the New York
ballot. Instead, delegates which are not legally bound
to a particular candidate are selected. McGovern's
delegates are expected to win over 200 of the 248 dele-
gates available today. An additional 30 will be selected
this weekend by the State Democratic Committee.
The New York City polls are open from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m.;
polls are open in the rest of the state between 12 noon
and 9 p.m. CBS and NBC will not have announced shows on
the results. Only spot announcements are scheduled on
NBC.
Harry Dent will prepare a one page summary of the results
for the President. This summary will be on your desk at
7:45 a.m. for you to decide whether it should go to the
President.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
New York Primary Returns
The President's name is not on the New York ballot.
Democratic candidates' names do not appear on the NEW York
ballot. Instead, delegates which are not legally bound
to a particular candidate are selected. McGovern's
delegates are expected to win over 200 of the 248 dele-
gates available today. An additional 30 will be selected
this weekend by the State Democratic Committee.
The New York City polls are open from 3 p.m. to 10 p.m.,
polls are open in the rest of the state between 12 noon
and 9 p.m. CBS and NBC will not have announced shows on
the results. Only spot announcements are scheduled on
NBC.
Harry Dent Will prepare a one page summary of the results
for the President. This summary will be on your desk at
7:45 a.m. for you to decide whether it should go to the
President.
GS/jb
In the New York Primary today there are contested races
for 11 delegate slots and 10 alternate slots. These are
the 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 16th districts. In addition,
in Congressman Dowd's district there are 3 people vying for
the 2 delegate slots. These races merely reflect an intra-
party battle. To the best of our knowledge, all delegates
and alternates in New York are committed to the President.
X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Harry S. Dent Pench (bor)
SUBJECT:
New York Primary
McGovern appears to be coming out of New York with roughly 240
delegates.
UPI reports McGovern with at least 218 based on yesterday's vote,
and another 20 this Saturday when the State Party selects 30 at-
large delegates. McGovern delegates are running ahead in 215 races
tallied out of 237 in which he is entered.
New York observers report surprise at the number of McGovern
election day workers in New York City and some of the larger up-
state cities. Turnout was strong in the city and light elsewhere.
State Chairman Lanigan expects all GOP delegates for the President
with perhaps one or two exceptions.
Highlights of Congressional Primaries:
14th: Rooney, J. (winner - close)
Lowenstein, A.
Rooney, with some help from us, had too much muscle.
20th: Ryan, William (winner - 2 to 1)
Abzug, B.
Ryan, backed by regular Democrat organization and Labor,
was known to be ill (reportedly cancer). Abzug on the
attack generated sympathy vote for Ryan.
22nd: Bingham, J. (winner)
Scheuer, J.
A more respected, statesmanlike Bingham was preferred
over the brash, pushy Scheuer. Two-thirds of the district
was Bingham's from before.
page 2 - New York Primary
June 21, 1972
Celler, E.
Holtzman, E. (winner - very close)
A surprise win by young, attractive district leader (lady).
Most think age issue hurt Celler. Celler can run in
November on Liberal line.
Delaney, J. (winner - big)
Manton, T.
Delaney's strong showing in heartland of Democrats, blue-
collar country could be a good sign. Manton was backed
by McGovern Democrat County Chairman (Troy), with state-
wide influence. Delaney had GOP and Conservative endorse-
ments.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
On June 7 you asked that the suggested campaign slogan
(President Nixon - Now More Than Ever) be tested to
determine if Dent's concern -- it may be too sophisticated
for the average man -- was correct.
The results of the group sessions conducted by Teeter's
Market Opinion Research is attached. The research con-
cludes that the slogan is understandable and not too
sophisticated.
Dailey hopes to review the results with Mitchell today
and receive final approval for the slogan.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 20, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Further Study of Slogan "President
Nixon. Now more than ever."
We were requested to conduct further research on the slogan,
"President Nixon. Now more than ever." to determine whether the
slogan was understandable and not too sophisticated in the context
of other competing slogans. To study this question two group
sessions were conducted in Detroit with ticket-splitters, over 35
years of age, with middle incomes, and non-college. At each session
we discussed several slogans including those used by McGovern and
Wallace in the primaries. This memorandum will outline the results
of the research.
In both of the groups the slogan was understood to refer to unfin-
ished work in progress. The groups pictured the President's past
record and looked to the future. This slogan embodied the concept
of "help him finish the job." The slogan was not interpreted by
anyone as anti-McGovern.
The statement also contained a sense of urgency not perceived with
the other slogans. The use of the word "now" seemed to express
this urgency. Also, the slogan had a certain emotional appeal
which the other slogans did not seem to possess. In discussing the
slogans, both groups stated that the words "we need" Nixon were men-
tally added to the phrase "Now more than ever.'
Each group responded favorably to the various ways the slogan was
presented for banners, buttons, and bumper stickers except the
groups did not like the manner of execution for the outdoor bill-
board proposal. With regard to the materials, the groups readily
understood the connection between the contraction "Nixon. Now"
with the longer version. The shortness of "Nixon. Now" has very
strong appeal to lower middle class ticket-splitters. They view
it as simple, direct, and easy to understand. Regarding the outdoor
proposal, the groups did not like the use of a black background and
the reproduction of the President's picture. Apparently because of
the color and the picture the groups felt the outdoor proposal por-
trayed the President as sinister. Nevertheless, the concept of
using the slogan in the outdoor medium was readily accepted.
-2-
In general, the groups responded well to the slogan, "Now more than
ever." Every person in the group seemed to be able to give the
statement some personal meaning. The slogan did clearly communicate
its message. It is important to note that the participants generally
ranked the slogan between the other alternatives studied. Our
earlier study showed that "Now more than ever. " ranked behind the
statement, "Help him finish the job." Comparatively, however, the
slogan under consideration expressed more urgency and emotional
appeal and also clearly embodied the concept of "finish the job."
If other ideas which convey the unfinished job are merged with
"Now more than ever," the result should be a powerful communication
device. To answer the original question raised, we see no reason
to reject the slogan as not being understandable and too sophisticated.
CONFIDENTIAL
SELECTED VERBATIM COMMENTS
It has emotional appeal.
We need him more than ever.
He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better,
so we still need him.
He's been good and we still need him to finish the job.
We need him more now than we needed him before.
He's started so many things and he would like to follow through.
It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but its clear.
It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking
over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do
of his past record.
I like the word "now" because we need to take action now.
It means we need him more than ever. He ain't' going to do anything
in the next four years anyway.
I think there's more in it than "now more than ever" because there
are the things
that he's planning for the future and why
change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still
there.
We do need him if he will finish the job he started.
I think that's assuring. Its saying stick with what you know. You
don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I
think its reassuring in that way, -- that we know what we have and
can go from there.
Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name --
when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is,
what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his
name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because
the old saying "paper lies still, you can put anything on it."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
6/15
Date:
TO:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
An interesting letter from
Mundt's former assistant,
Bob McCaughey, who says from
experience, McGovern will be a
formidable opponent. Dent
gave a copy to Magruder for
Mitchell.
2405 Gaither Street
Hillcrest Heights, Md. 20031
May 26, 1972
Mr. Harry S. Dent
Special Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Harry:
'In following the papers, I note that Senator
McGovern seems close to sweeping Democrat Primaries
and seems to have the Democrat nomination within his
grasp.
I further noted in a Sunday Washington Post story
that the political advisers at the Committee to Re-Elect
the President are now picking McGovern as the Democrat
opponent for the President.
Perhaps the news story was loose with the facts but
I was disturbed by the implication that the Committee to
Re-Elect the President was gleeful at the prospect of
McGovern as an opponent for the President in the Fall.
I have also been disturbed by columnist opinion and the
editorial in the Wall Street Journal to the effect that
the nomination of McGovern would be 1964 in reverse.
Harry, I hope that is true. However, my political
intuition cautions me and my political history of knowledge
of McGovern leads me to the conclusion that McGovern can
be very formidable in the political arena.
The Republicans of South Dakota have been trying to
place McGovern in the political grave since 1954. We have
found it difficult. Only once -- 1960 -- when he challenged
Senator Mundt has he been detoured from his disciplined
formula for getting himself elected President. Even that
Mr. Harry Dent
- 2 -
May 26, 1972
defeat barely slowed him down since he came right back
in 1962 to win a United States Senate contest. In
fact, Harry, President Nixon as the candidate in 1960
carried South Dakota by over 50,000 votes and yet
Senator Mundt only defeated McGovern by a little over
15,000 votes.
McGovern is a great believer in effective organi-
zation and to me that has been his success in South
Dakota and the 1972 primaries.
He has absolutely no integrity and will say or
do anything to help him achieve his goals.
To cover the lack of integrity he wraps the mantle
of the cloth of the church around him because of the
background of a minister father and his own days as a
lay Methodist preacher. He makes it impossible to
challenge his integrity or that he has any of the weak-
nesses of man. In fact, in all the campaigns in South
Dakota, he always created the impression his opponent
was an alcoholic while he was above such activity -- and
we could not break the image, much as we tried.
McGovern in every campaign always cried "smear."
He would claim it came about through his opponents'
staff, or literature, or that friends of the opponent
were starting whispering campaigns and yet he would say
his opponent was not the type of person to engage in a
smear campaign. Again, the "Mr. Nice" and "Mr. Clean"
approach.
I note he is already conditioning the voters of
California to the charge he is being smeared by Humphrey's
friends but not by Humphrey.
McGovern will take any position on any issue that
will help him in his quest for votes. He gets on both
sides of every issue and then proceeds to sell his
"positions.
"
Mr. Harry Dent
- 3 -
May 26, 1972
McGovern is ruthless. He will do anything to
win. The Methodist minister son approach is purely
a facade. If it helps him achieve a goal, he would
trample his best friend to achieve his goal.
His ideas sound kooky to you and me, but in the
changing political climate in which we live he does
seem to have reception as being different (and he is).
He is an advocate of change and that is what brought
him success in South Dakota.
Finally, Harry, he will have "instant" precinct
workers. The college supporters of his will work.
They will roam the precincts and dedicate their spare
time to his success. In South Dakota on weekends, they
would be a hundred miles or more from their campus doing
door-to-door surveys or distributing literature. When
election day came, his "volunteers" had done the job.
The Republican "volunteers" not as dedicated had only
done the average job of tabulating to get out the vote,
and he was successful. Only in 1960, when I set up
Mundt for Senate precinct workers did we turn back his
challenge.
Thus, Harry, you can hopefully understand my words
of caution on the potential dangers of McGovern as a can-
didate.
His:
(a) money from dedicated liberals;
(b) lack of basic integrity;
(c) ability to twist every issue to meet
his criteria;
(d) seemingly ability to portray himself
as the guy in the white hat;
(e) organizational ability plus those "instant"
precinct workers;
(f) mental toughness and discipline to do
whatever must be done to win;
Mr. Harry Dent
- 4 -
May 26, 1972
plus many other political attributes could make him
formidable. At the beginning of his Presidential cam-
paign effort, I was one of those who believed he would
be out of it by now -- but he isn't. For that reason,
I just felt that as one who knows McGovern; has been
involved in campaigns against him since 1954; that I
should pass along to you my assessment of the potential
of George McGovern -- if, he, in fact, becomes the Democrat
nominee at their convention.
Sincerely,
BD
Robert L. McCaughey
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINE T) EE AN
ADMISS
KING
E.U.
6-102
June 15, 1972
By
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
L. HIGBY
L
SUBJECT:
Thoughts on Anti-McGovern
Strategy
The attached would indicate strongly that we should move out in
trying to pin McGovern with his radical stance. All indications
now are that McGovern has the nomination. With "34%" of the
public still having not made up their mind's where to place
McGovern on a liberal/conservative scale, it would appear that
we have an opportunity to appropriately position him now.
I know this is one of the basic strategy decisions that you, Mitchell,
Ehrlichman, et al, are trying to resolve, but would urge that we
move now to make sure McGovern is clearly identified and tied with
his programs.
One of the primary arguments over at the Committee, as I understand
it, against this is that the Democrats will be doing a good enough job
of tearing McGovern up over the next month. I believe, however,
that the obligation falls to us to look at where the Democrats are
failing to clearly pin McGovern and move our own people on these
areas. This should be done on the specific basis that Buchanan
recommends, namely, doing the reasoned, well-constructed,
precisely thought out and factually correct argument -- not the
shrill, scathing attacks. We don't want to shoot our guns all at once,
but establish a trend or a focus. These attacks should not be done
by White House people, but other Administration spokesmen and our
Hill spokesmen.
2
Below I have listed an admittedly incomplete statement
of the pros and cons on the subject:
Pro
-- People haven't made up their minds on
McGovern -- they don't know him. (We are
trying to get the demographics here.)
-- Make clear where he stands now rather
than having to correct or discredit a more
favorable public impression, particularly after
the Convention.
-- Make him work at changing his position rather
than appearing lilly white and pure.
Con
-- Escalates the Campaign too soon.
-- Puts McGovern against the Administration
and
the Democratic party.
-- Gives him time to back off the issues.
I believe the pros outweigh the cons and would suggest that
we start programming Colson, Buchanan, and 1701 to move
as is suggested above.
The Gallup Poll
For Release: Saturday, June 17, 1972
GOP Succeeding in Pinning
'Radical' Label on McGovern?
By George Gallup
Copyright, 1972,
Field Enterprises, Inc.
PRINCETON N. J., June 16 - Well
aware that elections are won in the
evidence that Wallace has a "populist"
vital center of the political spectrum.
image in some quarters is seen in the
GOP strategists are seeking to pin the
surprising finding that three voters in
ten with views describe the Alabama
label of "radical" on Sen. George Mc-
Govern.
Governor as either "fairly liberal" or
"very liberal."
Following are the percentages of
A special nationwide survey reveals
those who are undecided:
that McGovern is viewed as some-
Details
All voters
4%
what more to the left of where the
Of Survey
McGovern
34
average voter places himself than is
A total of 1556 adults were inter-
Humphrey
14
Sen. Hubert Humphrey. one of Mc-
viewed in person in the survey, which
Muskie
25
Govern's chief rivals for the Dem-
was conducted in more than 300 sci-
Jackson
65
ocratic nomination.
entifically selected localities across the
Wallace
23
About one voter in five (18 per cent)
nation during the period April 21-24.
Nixon
10
of those who express an opinion label
Survey respondents were asked the
It is important to note that the views
McGovern as "very liberal," compared
following question about themselves
of Democrats regarding the political
to II per cent of those with views who
and six leading presidential candidates:
philosophy of the candidates tested
use this category to describe Humphrey's
How would you describe (your-
closely parallel the views of all persons
political ideology.
selfiname of candidate) - as very
reached in the survey.
Of significance, however, is the fact
conservative, fairly conservative. mid-
that, at the time of the survey, as
die-of-the-road, fairly liberal. or very
Little Change in
many as a third of all voters interview-
liberal?
Voters' Position
ed (34 per cent) had not yet made up
The political philosophy of the elec-
Following are the results, percentaged
their minds where to place McGovern
torate appears to have changed very
on the liberal-conservative scale. This
on those expressing an opinion:
little over the last 12 months, with the
proportion is more than double the
Liberal Conservative Scale
percentages in each survey leaning to
percentage of voters who had not made
the conservative side. The following
(Percentaged excluding
up their minds on how to classify Hum-
those undecided)
table (with the undecided vote includ-
phrey.
ed) shows the comparison:
Very Fair. Mid- Fair. Very
Target Group
Cons. Cons. Road Lib. Lib.
How Voters Describe
For McGovern
%
%
%
%
%
Themselves:
Obviously the large bloc of voters
McGovern
7
20
23
32
18
Spring,
Spring,
who have not crystallized their think
1971
1972
ing as to McGovern's political philos-
Humphrey
7
19
40
23
II
Very conservative
II
14
ophy are a target group for the South
Muskie
5
23
3r
31
TO
Fairly conservative
28
23
Dakota Senator in the period leading
Middle-of-road
29
Jackson
33
If
up to the convention (and later, if he
29
34
17
9
Fairly liberal
19
18
wins the nomination) - that is. if he
YOURSELF
15
24
34
19
8
Very liberal
7
8
seeks to win more votes from the poli-
No opinion
6
Wallace
34
19
16
4
I2
19
tical center of the electorare.
-
Nixon
21
35
27
II
6
The survey findings reported today
100%
100%
show Sen. Henry Jackson of the six
candidates tested to be the candi-
date whose perceived ideological pro-
Coming Sunday!
file comes closest to that of the nation's
voters. However, it is important to
bear in mind that two out of three
1972 - Year of the GOP's 'Catholic Strategy?'
voters are unable to classify Jackson.
Humphrey is positioned slightly to
the left of where the average voter
HAVE CATHOLICS MOVED
positions himself, followed by Muskie
who is still farther to the left, and then
INTO THE GOP COLUMN?
McGovern.
In 1968 GOP strategists talked about the party's "Southern strategy."
President Nixon's profile is appreci-
They are now calling 1972 the year of the "Catholic straregy."
ably more conservative than the avec-
age for all voters. a fact that could
Have Catholics responded to Nixon's statements on aid to parochial
schools and abortions?
assume significance during the election
campaign.
A majority of Catholics in every presidential election of the last two
decades including Fisenhower's sweeps in 1952 and 1956 - have voted
Three in Ten Says
the Democratic ticket.
Wallace Is Liberal
Gov. George Wallace D viewed ds
What has been the shift among Catholics - and Protestants --- since
considerably to the nght of where the
the 1968 election. as determined by recent Gallup Poll trial heats?
average voter places himself, However,
+
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 13, 1972
Note for Bob Haldeman -
I thought you would be interested
in the attached McGovern delegate
count.
70m Fred Malek
Attachment
6/13
R
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDE:
FROM:
ROBERT H. MARIK
SUBJECT:
Projected Democratic Delegate Count
Attached at (Tab A) is an updated projection of delegate strength
of the leading contenders for the Democratic nomination. For
comparison, the most recent National Observer estimate is also
attached at (Tab B). Our estimate gives McGovern 1361 delegates --
the National Observer projects 1382 1/2 delegates for him. In
either case, he looks extremely close to the required 1509 del-
egates need on the first ballot.
TAB A
PROJECTED count OF BETOCRATIC DELEGATES BY STATE
Learning or Committed to:
Delegate
Others or
States
Votes
Muskie
Humphrey McCovern
Rallace
Uncommitted
NEW ENGLAND
Maine
20
20
-
--
---
*
Versont
12
3
--
9
--
---
New Hampshire
18
13-1/2
--
4-1/2
--
--
Massaghusetts
102
---
--
102
--
--
* Rhode Island
22
-
--
22
--
--
* Connecticut
51
-
18
33
--
--
TOTAL
225
36-1/2
18
170 -1/2
0
0
MIDDLE ATLANTIC
New York
278
-
25
230
--
23
*
New Jersey
109
--
10
71
--
28
Pennsylvenia
182
28
82
58
2
12
--
Delaware
13
7
6
--
--
Maryland
53
--
6
6
41
---
West Virginia
35
-
20
7
11
5
TOTAL
670
31
150
378
43
68
SOUTH
* Virginia
53
1
4
28
--
20
North Carolina
64
---
-
-
37
27
South Carolina
32
--
---
--
-
32
Georgia
53
-
--
4
--
49
Florida
81
--
6
--
75
Alabama
37
-
--
34
3
Mississippi
25
-
--
-
--
25
Louisiana
44
22
10
12
0
-
Arkansas
27
--
--
27
Tennessee
49
--
--
--
49
--
Texas
130
--
50
35
40
5
TOTAL
595
1
82
77
247
188
PLAINS
North Dakota
14
--
3
11
--
--
South Dakota
17
--
17
--
Nebraska
24
7
15
--
--
2
Kansas
35
5
--
30
* Oklahoma
39
0
-
13
0
26
TOTAL
129
0
15
86
U
28
MIDWEST
* Kentucky
47
|
25
15
2
5
Ohio
153
79
61
-
-
13
Indiana
76
-
55
--
21
--
Illinois
170
59
--
13
-
98
Michigan
132
27
38
1
67
--
Wisconsin
67
-
13
54
--
--
Minnesota
64
--
33
19
--
12
Iowa
46
18
--
18
-
10
* Missouri
73
--
:0
12
--
61
TOTAL:
828
77
232
.
230
90
199
MOUNTAIN
* Kontana
17
-
5
12
-
--
* Cyeming
11
-
4
7
--
--
* Colorado
36
-
10
26
--
--
*
New Mexico
18
-
0
10
8
--
Arizona
25
9
1
6
--
9
*
Nevada
LI
-
3
6
---
2
*
Utah
19
--
5
14
--
--
Idaho
17
3
1
7
--
6
TOTAL
154
12
29
88
or
17
PACIFIC
Culifornia
271
--
--
271
--
--
Oregon
34
--
--
34
--
--
Washington
52
--
--
18
--
44
Alaska
10
--
-
4
--
6
Rawaii
17
--
-
4
-
13
TOTAL:
384
0
0
321
0
63
0
District of Colu in
15
--
-
--
I
15
*
Perto Rico
7
--
--
-7
|
Virgin Delands
3
--
--
--
3
Canal Zone
3
--
I
2.5
.5
|
Cunn
3
0.5
1.5
1
0
--
TOTAL
31.
0.5
1.5
10.5
C
18.3
GRAND TOTAL
3016
158
527.5
1301
300
501.5
Round Four in Observer's Democratic Delegate Count
TAB B
Leaning or Committed to:
Others or
States
Delegate
Votes McGovern Humphrey Wallace Muskie Uncommitted
NEW ENGLAND
Maine
20
-
-
-
20
-
Vermont
12
9
-
--
3
-
New Hampshire
18
4½
-
-
13½
-
Mar achidelts
--
102
102
-
-
-
-
-
Rhoo Hand
22
22
-
-
-
--
Connecticut
51
27
-
-
I
24
TOTAL
225
1641/2
0
0
36 1/2
24
MIDDLE ATLANTIC
New York
278
245
-
-
-
33
New Jersey
109
74
10
-
-
25
Pennsylvania
182
54
74
2
40
12
Delawore
13
7
-
-
-
6
Maryland
53
6
6
41
-
-
West Virginia
35
7
20
-
4
4
TOTAL
670
393
110
43
44
80
SOUTH
Virginia
53
25
10
2
4
12
North Carolina
64
/
-
37
-
27
South Carolina
32
2
16
6
3
5
Georgio
53
8
-
-
-
45
Florida
81
-
6
75
I
-
Alabama
37
5
-
29
-
3
Mississippi.
25
14
10
-
I
1
Louisiana
44
9
-
3
-
32
Arkansas
27
-
-
I
-
27
Tennessee
49
I
I
49
-
-
Texas
130
45
20
47
I
18
TOTAL
595
108
62
248
7
170
MIDWEST
Kentucky
47
10
-
I
-
37
Ohio
153
61
79
-
-
13
Indiana
76
-
55
21
-
-
Illinois
170
15
|
-
62
93
Michigan
132
38
27
67
-
-
Wisconsin
67
54
13
--
-
-
Minnesota
64
19
33
-
-
12
lowa
46
18
-
-
IS
10
Missouri
73
12
-
-
I
61
TOTAL
820
227
207
88
00
226
PLAINS
North Dakota
14
11
3
-
-
-
South Dakoto
17
17
-
-
1
-
Nebraska
24
20
4
-
-
-
Kansas
35
13
-
-
-
22
Oklahoma
39
10
/
-
-
29
TOTAL
129
71
7
0
0
51
MOUNTAIN
Montana
17
5
6
-
6
I
Wyoming
11
4½
I
-
-
6 1/2
Colorado
36
26
1
-
I
9
New Mexico
18
10
-
8
-
I
Arizona
25
10
2
-
9
4
Nevada
11
5½
3
-
-
2 1/2
Utah
19
16
-
-
1
2
Idaho
17
10
1
-
2
4
TOTAL
154
87
13
8
18
28
PACIFIC
California
271
271
-
-
--
-
Oregon
34
34
-
-
I
I
Washington
52
8
-
-
--
44
Alaska
10
5½
4½
--
-
-
Hawan
17
2
-
-
-
15
TOTAL
384
3201/2
4½
0
0
59
OTHER
District of Columbia
15
---
-
-
-
15
Puerio Rico
7
5
-
-
-
2
Virgin Hands
3
3
--
-
--
---
Canal Lune
3
2'
- -
Guam
3
1
I
-
TOTAL
21
1111
11
(
1
17½
CRAND TOTAL
3,016
1,.
465
307
its
65526
INTERED TO NOMINATE 1,509
COMPILED BY PROCE BROBAT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
MCG Mestin
FROM:
KEN KHACHIGIAN Der
and
Here are some questions that we worked up for the
Proxmire hearings tomorrow. Congressional liaison is taking
them up. to the Hill to put them in the hands of our people.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BILL TIMMONS
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Here are the questions for the Proxmire hearings tomorrow.
We consider this an unusual opportunity to skewer McGovern on
national television.
Per our agreement, can you get these up to Percy, Conable
and Clarance Brown as soon as possible and encourage them to
take out after McGovern? We especially think that Percy would
want to get him on the Israel thing and believe he should be
encouraged by us to do SO.
The questions are in two sets -- one which is full of the
statistical information for back-up and the other which breaks
it down more rhetorically.
Thanks.
QUESTIONS FOR GEORGE MC GOVERN ON HIS DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS
-- Are you at all concerned, Senator, that your recommended cuts
in active duty force levels from 2.5 million to 1.7 million would bring
us to levels lower than the days preceding Pearl Harbor ?
-- You have proposed, and let me be specific, that we cut Naval
personnel from 605, 000 to 401, 000; that we cut American warships
by more than half -- from 700 vessels to 341; that naval air
squadrons be cut by 80% (according to Senator Humphrey); that we
cut the number of attack aircraft carriers from 15 to 6 -- and leaving
only 130 escort vessels with "no further construction. " Please
tell me what President Johnson could have done during the 1967
Six-day War in the Middle East if he had, at best, one or two attack
carriers to deploy during that crisis?
-- Senator, you plan on cutting the U.S. Marine Corps, one of
our proudest fighting arms, by more than half, from 140, 000 to
67,000. With what credibility could President Eisenhower have acted
during the 1958 Lebanese Crisis with these Marine Corps levels so
drastically low?
-- As for the Air Force, Senator, you have suggested we cut its
personnel almost in half -- from 753, 000 to 476, 000. You want to cut
the number of U.S. fighter Interceptors in half. You want to halt at
once the development of a new bomber, the B-1, for the Air Force.
You want to cut all production of the new F-14 and F-15 fighter planes.
Page 2
And finally you want to retire two-thirds of the American bomber
force, cutting it from 600 down to 200 B-52s and F-111s. What kind
of deterrence is it to let the world know that we are willing to cut
these forces unilaterally without any promise of reduction by any
other nation?
-- In your desire to cut the Defense budget by $32 billion, just
where are you going to put the millions of people who will be put out of
work? I hear that you will promise them compensation at 80% of their
previous salary during a reconversion period. Can you tell me how
many people you know who prefer 80% of their present income to 100%?
-- In Europe, I must say Senator, your suggestions would have
alarming and potentially drastic results. You advocate removing
over 50% of our European troops, from 310, 000 to 130, 000 -- from
4 1/2 to 2 divisions. No mutual force reduction would be required on
the part of the Soviet Unicn. What effect is this going to have on our
NATO allies? Are you going to simply give up all military advantage
in Western Europe? How would John F. Kennedy have dealt with the
Berlin crisis with the mere handful of forces you would plan to
provide?
-- Why do you persist in acting unilaterally? Have you decided
that we no longer have any enemies? Do you feel the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia was a benign act of a benevolent despot?
Page 3
-- As you know, the President was recently able to negotiate
an arms agreement with the Soviet Union. It is acknowledged
that he was able to do this only because he bargained from a position
of strength. Yet, you would cut crucial U.S. R. & D. from $8
billion to $5. 5 billion; you would cut the number of deliverable
strategic weapons from 5700 down to 3500; halt the deployment of
multiple warheads on American Minutemen and Polaris submarines
(MIRV); halt all development or deployment of an American missile
defense (ABM); halt all programs to modernize and protect the
Minuteman sites. You would do all this without one requirement of
quid pro quo from the Soviet Union. The Soviets would need not lift
a finger or make one concession to win this strategic reduction. I
confess, Senator, that your proposal absolutely scares the hell out of
me - - in effect you are proposing to strip our superiority in strategic
arms not down to parity but to inferiority -- to a position where we
could lie absolutely helpless in a troubled world.
I have heard you say, Senator, that you are not concerned about
these reductions because we would still have a nuclear deterrent. I
don't agree with you, but even granting that, in effect you are saying
that the next war will be fought with nuclear arms. By cutting so
drastically our conventional forces, you bring us nearer to nuclear
war. There are a number of circumstances where we could deploy
conventional weaponry (the middle east being one) without beginning a
nuclear war -- yet your actions would make a nuclear war much more
possible. Are you at all concerned about this?
Page 4
-- What do we tell our allies when they ask about America's
commitment? What do we tell Israel when they ask us if we have
a plane to combat the MIG 23? Do we say, "Don't worry, President
McGovern will provide outdated aircraft?" Do we tell our friends
in Israel that they can be taken over with the use of sophisticated
Soviet Weaponry?
QUESTIONS FOR GEORGE MC GOVERN ON HIS DEFENSE RECOMMENDATIONS
-- By drastic cuts in conventional arms in machinery and artillery,
Senator, aren't you forcing the U.S. to return to the discredited Cold
War strategy of massive retaliation in the event of Soviet thrust in the
Middle East or Berlin. Isn't that a dangerous strategy at best?
-- Would not your drastic cuts in the U.S. Sixth Fleet not only
leave bare the southern flank of NATO, but jeopardize seri ously the
security of Israel to whom we have made commitments? What I
am asking, Senator, is if you make these tremendous slashes
in both the size and strength of the Sixth Fleet, which is our
Mediterranean and Middle East deterrent, aren't you in effect, sir,
leaving the question of the future of the security of Israel almost
exclusively in the hands of the Soviet Politburo?
-- Under your proposal for the Sixth Fleet, how could Mr. Nixon
have responded to the Jordanian crisis of 1970, how could Johnson have
responded to the crisis of the six-day war, how could Eisenhower
have responded to the Lebanese crisis, especially in light of the
enormous buildup of Soviet ships and subs in the Med. since that time ?
-- Would not your unilateral cuts in American forces in Western
Europe remove any incentive for equal cuts on the part of the Soviets ?
In other words, Senator, if we agree to remove more than half our
troops without any quid pro quo from the Soviets, wouldn't this
simply alter the balance of power drastically in their favor ?
Page 2
--Senator, in recommending that we should withdraw all
forces from Thailand, are you recommending a unilateral
abrogation of our treaty commitment?
-- Senator, do you think the President could have negotiated
the SALT agreement at Moscow without the critical bargaining
chip of the ABM? What then would we have had to offer to the
Russians in exchange for controls on their offensive weapons ?
X
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR :
BRUCE KEHRLI
FROM :
LARRY HIGBY
Please make sure you follow up on those talking papers that
Haldeman discussed with the different individuals prior to
departure from here If you could, forward a report on
what' happening with regard to them in the courier.
Gordon should have a political summary prepared for
Haldeman upon return. He'll have been out of the play in
this area for a couple of weeks, and we need to bring him
up to date. Also, you should probably be brought up to date
there too.
"Go'
3
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Humphrey-McGovern Debates
and the Democratic Primary
Results in California
Question:
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey
and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from
the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's .final vote.
Conclusion:
The Hart Survey in the Post found that 53% of the Democrats
saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16%
thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's
voters thought he won and 30% of McGovern's voters thought
he won.
Finch, Colson, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter,
Buchanan, and Harper/Morey believe the debates increased
Humphrey's vote total. Moore disagrees.
Analysis:
Humphrey increased his position from 26 to 40% because the
debates enabled him to drive home his points on jobs and
McGovern's fuzzy welfare proposals and Defense cuts (Finch,
Dent, Buchanan).
The debates and resultant media coverage "scared hell out
of Jews" (Safire). Although the debates may not have had
a large audience, the California media began emphasizing
Humphrey's attack (Magruder, Dent, Buchanan).
- 2 -
The debates enabled Humphrey to shift the undecideds to
his column by hitting McGovern on his "extreme" positions.
However, the debates did not cut into McGovern's fairly
constant 45% total (Agree: Teeter, Buchanan, Safire,
Yankelovich; Disagree: Finch, Hart).
Whether the Field poll was wrong to start with was also
considered. Finch, Colson, and Moore believe Field was
wrong. Buchanan says the Field poll was not wrong and
he has reason to believe McGovern's lead may have been
larger.
A more detailed analysis is attached as well as the original
memoranda from Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter,
Buchanan, and Harper/Morey. Also attached are newspaper
reports of the Hart and Yankelovich surveys.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Humphrey-McGovern
Debates and the Democratic
Primary Results in California
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and
McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters'
projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue,
Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses
(attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in
light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at
least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey
won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and
30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart and Yankelovich
surveys are also attached.
Finch believes:
1. The Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was
patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has tradi-
tionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But,
there is no question that approximately two weeks prior to the
election, McGovern had a clear lead probably 10 points --
over Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and
a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face
value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went
over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.
2. While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
2
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain
costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme
positions taken by the S outh Dakota Senator.
3. In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing
and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be
interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air.
He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner of War
issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New
Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.
4. The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact
on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress
Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed
HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her
visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on
which Humphrey had been relying.
5. Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange
Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he
"wrang" the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and
leaned heavily on his arguments on Defense levels and California
jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics,
although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's
vulnerability in the "Three A's" Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.
Dent believes:
1. Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions,
especially welfare and Defense spending, made the Democrat
primary closer in California than expected.
2. Dent notes that the Hart Survey minimized the impact of
the HHH atacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced
more by HHH in the closing days.
3
3. Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's
positions on Defense and welfare cost him votes. One
in five found the debates important in voting, the majority
of these going to HHH. The most damaging position of
McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce Defense
spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed
disapproval here.
4. An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out
of the black vote and did even better with the chicanos.
This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout"
views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean
that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better
informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than
ever black and brown vote.
Safire believes:
1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern
won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered
Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48%
no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should
expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since
McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie
(too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or
Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is
now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 the man
who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with
the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal
opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in
his camp. In the news backwash, however -- newsmags and
columnists we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing
to his fade-out at the end.
2. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher
issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's
softness in the Middle East. I have a hunch that Jews will not
vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say
they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against
Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown.
4
3. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern
keyword. Fifteen percent of the California Democratic
voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two
weeks, when they had their first close look at him. Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions
because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's
clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected
because he backed off his positions -- that is, he's not the
purist he used to be; no longer a virgin.
Buchanan believes:
1.' The Field poll was not wrong. He has it from a source that the
Field poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was
larger than twenty points.
2. Humphrey attacks begin to pay off his attacks primarily
on Defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give
aways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey
stridency and panicky approach he must have sufficiently
frightened many people to convince 300, 000 to come his way.
This I believe explains it coupled with:
(a)
The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH,
which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks
on McGovern as a radical; and
(b)
The surfacing in the California press of increasing
numbers of national Democrats calling McGovern an
extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.
3. What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over
Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went
from 26% to 40% in a week -- so, did McGovern really lose any
votes? Or, did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats
and pick up all the undecideds as well by scaring the hell out of
them?
5
Teeter believes:
1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to
Humphrey, rather, there were a large number of
voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey
prior to the Campaign and temporarily moved into the
undecided column by the McGovern Campaign. When
they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition
to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique
and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this Campaign
was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort
than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the
undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about
the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field
poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field
poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters
would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those
positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided
voters back to Humphrey.
Colson believes:
1. The debates had a very significant effect, but both
candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and
vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost
debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect,
while Colson had thought McGovern came out better because
of his "good guy" image, Colson now believes Humphrey
scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
2. The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. McGovern
did not have a twenty point lead a week before the Primary.
He peaked early plus the fact that the debates did expose some
extreme positions. Particularly, in the third debate, McGovern
looked very weak on the POW issues and Colson suspects that
to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate,
the debates had a significant effect.
6
Magruder and LaRue believe:
1. Although neither the public nor the media ever
declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial
damage was done to McGovern. The media began to
emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then
occupied the least advantageous position in the political
arena -- that of being on the defense. He spent the next
several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey
kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians.
Humphrey had little, if any, paid commercials at this point
while McGovern had begun saturation.
2: The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey
in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept
questioning the economic impact the McGovern Defense cut
would have on the working man of California. Again the
results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave
maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.
3. The Yankelovich survey reveals that one out of five voters
considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote.
The majority of those who relied on the debates favored
Humphrey. More voters voted against McGovern than against
Humphrey. One-fourth of the voters preferred their candidate
because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey
received one-half of these votes while Senator McGovern received
one-third. The survey also states that 40% of Humphrey's vote
would go to the President on November 7, while 40% would shift
to McGovern and 20% is undecided.
Moore believes:
1. The debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting
for the difference between the Field poll and the final results.
2. Other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:
(a) The Field poll itself generated over-confidence
by McGovern workers and greater effort by
Humphrey workers.
(b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure
for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously
7
indicating over-confidence and taking
California for granted.
(c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey
has a knack for a strong finish. On the last
two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously
up and down the state with good T.V. coverage,
while McGovern was absent.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
All believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. The old
rule if ahead, don't debate - - applies. As to specific recommen-
dations:
1. Finch urges no attempt to label McGovern a "flaming
radical", rather argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-spoken
T.V. manner will destroy the label;
2. Dent suggests a "drip, drip" campaign on McGovern's stands
without Presidential involvement;
3. Safire suggests a general appeal to Jews and a specific
attack on McGovern's honesty by distributing his WALL STREET
JOURNAL ad to students;
4. Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and
scare the hell out of the voters;
In addition to the debates, the other reasons for the Humphrey/McGovern
results are:
1. McGovern peaked too soon and left California for New Mexico
and Houston indicating he took California for granted;
2. Polls gave Humphrey sympathy and hard-working labor types;
3. Proposition 9's (environment) two-one loss brought out
Humphrey voters.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 6/12
To As_
From :
L. Higby
The she should become
an ferlow of
theoring not people- -
How may bauin viewpoke
are there?
L.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern
drop of fifteen points:
a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a
source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread,
which was larger than twenty points.
b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on
defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of
McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency,
and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently frightened many
people to convince 300, 000 to come his way. This I believe explains
it coupled with:
1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended
to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical;
and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers
of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a guy who
will sink the whole ticket, etc.
What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George
McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at
least, two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they
are not firm impressions.
What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey
got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40%
in a week - - So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH
simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the
undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of them.
Buchanan
McGovern
'Weakness'
Located in Voter Poll
By JACK ROSENTHAL
The debates appeared to be
New York Times News Service
unimportant, however, com-
LOS ANGELES-Substan-
pared with the substance. And
tial voter displeasure with his
positions on defense spending
the single most damaging sub-
reductions and welfare re-
stantive point for McGovern,
form appeared to have cut
according to the survey, was
deeply into Sen. George Mc-
his proposal to recalculate-
Govern's margin of victory
and sharply reduce-the na-
in Tuesday's California presi-
tion's defense budget.
dential primary.
Among all voters, more than
This was the major conclu-
sion of a survey of 570 Dem-
a third expressed strong dis-
ocratic voters as they left the
agreement with this proposal.
Among those who voted for
polls in 11 counties. The sur-
candidates other than McGov-
vey was conducted by the
New York Times and Daniel
ern, the disapproval rate rose
to two-thirds.
Yankelovich, Inc., a major
social and market research
concern.
The McGovern positions be-
came a focus of attack from
his principal rival, Sen. Hu-
bert H. Humphrey of Minne-
sota, notably in three na-
tionally televised debates be-
fore the election.
EVENING STAR 6/8/72
Proposal Ridiculed
In those debates, Humphrey
sharply assailed his South
Dakota opponent's call for a
reduction in defense spending
to $55 billion and ridiculed
his proposal to grant a $1,000
allowance to every needy
American.
As the debates began, the
statewide California poll con-
ducted by Mervin D. Field
reported that McGovern held
a 20-point margin over Hum-
phrey. In the final election
returns, McGovern came out
5 points ahead, totaling 45
percent of the Democratic
vote.
Field blamed "voter volatil-
ity" yesterday for the discre-
pancy. He told United Press
International the undecided
voters, who were listed at 13
percent in the poll a week be-
fore the primary, probably
had decided on Humphrey.
Field also said the poll,
taken a week before the pri-
mary, "created an unprece-
dented impact on the cam-
paign itself. We have not wit-
nessed in the 26 years we have
been polling in this state any-
thing like the attention it re-
ceived in the media."
One in Five
The Times-Yankelovich sur-
vey suggested that one voter
in five found the debates im-
portant in deciding which can-
didate to vote for. The major-
ity of these voters turned to
Humphrey. This appears to
have raised the Minnesotan's
proportion of the vote by sev-
eral percentage points.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Some Lessons of the California Primary
1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGoverr won
by far less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New
Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern.
Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner
help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters
than, say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously
charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly,
McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 --
the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press.
Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel,
Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash,
however newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his
momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.
2. Shirley Chisholm turned out to be Humphrey's spoiler.
Her 5% could have made the difference for Humphrey. HHH broke
even with the blacks who did not vote for Shirley, but I think he would
have gotten most of hers.
3. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here
probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Mideast.
We should study closely what HHH did with the Jews in California the
last two weeks; I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate
because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote
against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately
would be weak in a showdown. This could be enormously significant
in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in
vote patterns, and is a subject we should do a lot of thinking about. A
-2-
survey of the Jewish vote in the California primary -- depth stuff --
would be money well spent.
4. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern key-
word. Fifteen per cent of the California Democratic voters became
disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had
their first close look at him. Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because
of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that.
One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his
positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a
virgin.
I would like us to exploit both these leads. Our tendency will be to
neglect the latter, figuring the radicals will never vote for us, and
concentrate on showing the centrist Democrat that he's in the hands of
leftists. This would be missing a good bet, because a large part of
his enthusiasm comes from the kids, and a large part of his basic
appeal comes from "honesty" if we can dramatize and ridicule the
McGovern Shift, we can erode both enthusiasm and honesty.
One specific way right now: Have the Youth Division of the Commitee
for the Re-Election of the President prepare this cheap flyer: a full-
sized reprint of the May 22 Wall Street Journal McGovern ad, in
which he shows he's not really a threat to free enterprise and says
that besides, Congress would never pass his proposals. Fold it in
quarters and headline it: "Here is McGovern's Special Message to
Wall Street: Not to Worry. " Then, in the margins around the re-
printed ad, write in the McGovern quotes that sharply conflict with
what is said in the ad, complete with red arrows between the two.
Message on the back: "Maybe now Wall Street will trust McGovern --
but now, can you trust him?" Distribute heavily on campus and in
areas where the Democratic left is strongest. Best, of course,
would be to have some other Democratic candidate do this, but that
is unlikely to happen, and it is too good a shot to miss.
Then we could use something like this to illustrate the point about
"disenchantment" (that's a liberal vogue word, associated with
F. Scott Fitzgerald, and can hang around McGovern's neck like an
-3-
albatross) -- with something to peg it to, the media will go for it
in a big way, because it is perfect for the next swing of the pendulum:
the story about maybe George ain't the man he's cracked up to be.
We could help that along, taking the offensive on "credibility."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT
ASD
SUBJECT:
Analysis of California Primary
Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially
welfare and defense spending, appear to have made the Democrat
primary results closer in California than projected by polls
and writers. This conclusion is based on contacts with Cali-
fornia leaders, newsmen, and a review of polls in The New York
Times (Yankelovich) and the Washington Post (Hart) and a tele-
phone poll (attached) taken by the RNC.
Most feel the Field Poll has never been too accurate. It
showed a 20-point lead. McGovern claimed his poll showed 16.
Field himself told UPI his poll caused HHH to "get off his
dime and hit harder." He thinks the 13% undecided went for HHH.
The RNC poll of 112 Democrats concluded the debates had a mini-
mal impact for HHH, but those who were undecided tended to go
more for HHH.
The Hart poll minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but
pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the
closing days. One of 3 voters said they decided on their candi-
date in the last 3 weeks. HHH carried these 5-4.
Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates.
They split on who won--16% HHH, 17% McGovern, and 20% said
even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won
and of McGovern's, 30% said he won.
Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense
and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important
- 2 -
in voting, the majority of these going for HHH. Yankelovich
says this raised HHH's vote by several points.
The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drasti-
cally reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than
1/3 expressed disapproval here. Among those voting for someone
other than McGovern, the disapproval rate rose to 2/3.
HHH hit heavy with full page newspaper ads the last week. Put
Livermore thought these attacks were effective. Tom Reed and
Lyn Nofziger agree, especially Nofziger.
Newsmen who feel HHH hurt McGovern are Kevin Phillips, Bob
Novak, and Bob Semple.
An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the
black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could
mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through
the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the
more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed,
since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black
and brown vote.
Novak suggested at the Governors' Conference that the GOP begin
a steady "drip, drip" campaign against McGovern's extremism and
keep it going til election day.
Contacts with other Californians confirm the view that HHH's
attacks helped.
The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap.
Here are other factors:
1) McGovern peaked too soon.
2) Polls gave sympathy to HHH and caused labor and others to
work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than
McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and
- 3 -
talked like the President.
4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to
leftist extremism.
5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.
6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on
Monday.
RECOMMENDATION: That we begin to have surrogates, et al, begin
the "drip, drip" plan suggested by Novak, without Presidential
involvement. The first TV debate film should be properly edited
and used.
Republican
National
Committee.
June 8, 1972
To:
Harry Dent
From:
Ed DeBolt
Re:
Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern
Debates on the California Primary
As you requested this morning, the RNC Political/Research Division
has attempted to measure the effect of the tactics employed by
Hubert Humphrey in the televised McGovern-Humphrey debates.
During the day several hundred homes in the San Gabriel, San Fer-
nando Valley area around Los Angeles were selected at random and
contacted. The results were as follows:
Number of registered Democrats contacted
112
Number voting
77
Number that did not view at least one debate
51
Number influenced by debates
3
Due to the time factor the questionnaire had to be brief and the
sample selected at random. However, in general our survey indicated
that most voters had made their decisions prior to the debates and
that the debates by themselves had little impact on the outcomes.
Undertaking a project of this magnitude required the virtual shutdown
of the Research/Political Division for the entire workday.
The results of the survey and an analysis follow.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican Center: 310 First Street Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20003. (202) 484-6500.
RNC RESEARCH DIVISION
JUNE 8, 1972
DEBATE SURVEY: ANALYSIS
A special telephone survey of Los Angeles County voters conducted
on June 8, 1972, revealed the Humphrey-McGovern debates had a minimal
effect upon the vote preferences of those surveyed. Results of the
poll indicated that only 61 of thosc surveyed even watched any of the
debates and of those that did only 3 said these debates influenced
their final choice. (These results are hardly surprising considering
that Neilsen ratings showed that a Marcus Welby rerun and Cannon outdrew
the second debate among television viewers. As a campaign worker
stated after one of the debates, "The loudest noise in California
tonight was the clicking of television sets to other channels.")
In a survey taken by the Field Corporation at the end of May, Humphrey
was trailing McGovern by 20% (McGovern had 46% to Humphrey's 26%).
If the. debates did not significantly contribute to Humphrey's gain in
the last week of the campaign, then one must ask what factors did con-
tribute to the Minnesota Senator's late surge. First, some overcon-
fidence among the McGovern forces was evident during the latter days of
the campaign. McGovern left California for two days during this period
to make visits to New Mexico (which held its primary on the same day as
California) and Houston, Texas, where he met with several Democratic
governors. Second, Humphrey probably picked up approximately an addi-
tional 2% of the vote through Mayor Yorty's endorsement (whose final vote
was about 2% below his showing in the Field poll). HHH may also have
been aided by the complicated write-in procedure of the California
primary, thus driving a few Wallace voters into the Humphrey camp.
Finally, if the Field poll is accurate, the bulk of Humphrey's gain in
the final days of the campaign must have come from undecided voters.
According to the Field survey, many of these undecideds were elderly and
black -- groups where Humphrey has traditionally enjoyed strong support.
Their final decision to vote for Humphrey appears to be more a product
of their traditional loyalties than of the influence of Humphrey's cam-
paign, particularly his strong attacks against George McGovern. (Nor
does our survey indicate that Humphrey's blasts at McGovern played a
decisive role in securing the votes of our respondents who voted for
Humphrey, since many of them (29) had decided to vote for him early
in the campaign before the initiation of Humphrey's attack strategy).
As is so often the case, many of the undecided voters appear to have
gone with their traditional favorite (Humphrey) on election day, after
having experienced some doubt over their choice when confronted with
McGovern's relatively "new" face and, perhaps, Humphrey's aggressive
attacks upon the South Dakota Senator.
CONCLUSION
The television debates were viewed by a relatively small percentage of
the Democrat voters in the state and even fewer have cited it as a
decisive factor in their final decision. It is more likely that other
factors i.e. overconfidence by McGovern forces, a cut-back on spending
in the closing days by the McGoverr campaign, etc., resulted in Humphrey
gaining ground while McGovern held the 45% attributed to him by the Field
Corporation poll a week before the election.
RNC RESEARCH DIVISION
JUNE 8, 1972
DEBATE SURVEY RESULT
Date of Survey: June 8, 1972
Actual Democratic turnout: 72%
True percentage of Democrats in L.A. County (excluding city) = 57%
I.
Question: Are you a registered Democrat?
Yes
No
Total
112 (53%)
98 (47%)
( If a registered Democrat, ask following question )
II.
Question: Did you vote in the recent California Democratic primary?
Yes
No
Total
77 (68%)
35 (32%)
( If answer is yes, ask following questions)
III.
Question: For whom did you vote in the Democratic primary?
Total
Humphrey
33
McGovern
29
Wallace
5
Other
10
IV.
Question: When did you make up your mind to vote for the Democrat
candidate of your choice
a month or more ago;
two weeks ago; or one week ago?
Humphrey
McGovern
Wallace
Supporters
Supporters
Supporters
One month or more
25
14
4
Two weeks
4
11
1
One week or less
4
3
0
1
-2-
V.
Question: Did you watch all, some, or none of the debates between
the Democrat candidates?
Total
All 3
9
1 2
33
None
35
VI.
Question: Did the debates between the Democratic candidates affect
your decision in voting in the California primary?
Humphrey
McGovern
Voters
Voters
Yes
1
2
No
32
27
Total registered voters in L.A. county (excluding city): 3,223,825
Total registered Democrats - 1,863,216
Republicans- 1,145,172
Unidentified- 215,437
Sample
N = 210
Women = (D) = 73
D = 112
Men = (D) = 49
R = 75
I = 23
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 8, 1972
CONF IDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
California Primary
This memorandum will outline my observations with regard to the
effect of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the apparent shift of
voters to Humphrey late in the campaign. My thoughts are largely
based on what I have gleaned from the Washington Post, the New
York Times, and the CBS polls and not on any data which I have
collected or had a chance to analyze. The following are the
important points:
1. I doubt that there was a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey,
rather I suspect there were a large number of voters who were
originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and tem-
porarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign.
When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to
Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique, and relatively
unknown commodity and the fact his campaign was a much larger, more
obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have con-
tributed to the shift to the undecided category. This is a phenom-
enon I have seen in other elections where a new "rising star" was
running against an older, well-known established political figure.
The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the
election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the
undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to
the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates also seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions.
Apparently many of these views were unpopular with the Humphrey
voters (older voters, blue collar workers, and Jews). This pro-
bably contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.
3. McGovern outspent Humphrey in the media by a considerable margin,
while the debates and subsequent reporting of them probably comprised
a large proportion of Humphrey's total media exposure. This expos-
ure came shortly after the Field poll was conducted and at the time
when the shift back to Humphrey was occurring.
-2-
4. While I have not had a chance to study the turnout figures,
the active business-labor campaign against the environmental pro-
position may have caused some disproportionate turnout of people
who were against the proposition and who were largely Humphrey
voters. This is supported by the Yankelovich survey which found
that a large majority of Humphrey's total vote voted against the
proposition while a large majority of McGovern supporters voted
for it.
5. The Field poll may have had some effect itself in giving
Humphrey some underdog votes while causing some apathy among
McGovern supporters, although I doubt that this effect was very
great.
We will, of course, pick up primary vote on the California study
which we are starting next week which should give us some insight
into the nature of the Humphrey and McGovern support.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
California Primary
I believe the debates had a very significant effect. As I indicated
in earlier memoranda, both candidates lost. Humphrey because
he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because
he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect,
while I had thought McGovern came out the better because of
his "good guy" image, it is now apparent to me that Humphrey
scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
I am sure that the Field poll was off, as was the ABC poll and
that McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the
primary. On the other hand, I suspect he had better than the
5 point margin by which he won. He peaked early plus the fact
the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in
the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issue and
I would suspect that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan
for either candidate that that would have had a significant effect.
I think Humphrey also scored very well not only in the debates
but in his general campaign on the aerospace and jobs issue. My
reports from labor sources indicate Humphrey was finally begin-
ning to gain momentum in the closing days on thatissue with the
blue collar workers.
The New York Times' Yankelovich survey today is very revealing
on this point (attached).
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 8, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDE
SUBJECT:
Impact of California Debates
Background
The California debate between McGovern and Humphrey served as
a much needed forum for Humphrey to sharpen the issues between
the two candidates. Although the first debate did not have a
large viewing audience, it served as an opportunity for Humphrey
to put McGovern on the defensive concerning his stand on reducing
defense spending to $55 million and welfare reform to grant a
$1000 allowance to all needy Americans. Although neither the
public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the
debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media
began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied
the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of
being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying
to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This
was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid
commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.
The second debate, viewed in prime time, presented Humphrey in a
much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the
economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working
man of California. In order to dramatize his point, Humphrey asked
McGovern "What do you plan to do with the air bases in California -
make them into golf links?" Again the results of the debate were
a toss-up. But the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's
attack. Humphrey continued to campaign furiously throughout
California receiving good press coverage with the attacks.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
The third debate was generally a wash-out because, with five
participants, neither major candidate was allowed enough time
to hit the issues. Yorty may have offered an added dimension
by attacking McGovern. Humphrey once again surprised McGovern
by challenging him alone to a fourth debate.
Analysis
The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched
at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the
surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut
winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern
won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off,
and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters
thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern
voters thought that McGovern had won the debates.
The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three
voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three
weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted
for Humphrey.
The Yanklevich Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered
the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority
of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.
The Yanklevich Survey also indicated that more voters voted
against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters
preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent.
Senator Humphrey received one half of these votes while Senator
McGovern received one third. It is very probable that the debates
triggered many of these negative opinions because Humphrey for
the first time was able to show the weaknesses in McGovern's
programs.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
Conclusion
It is our feeling that the debates served to put McGovern
on the defensive and to dampen the momentum of his well-
organized and well-financed campaign. McGovern probably
peaked several days before the election. It is difficult
however, to determine how much they contributed to Humphrey's
surge on Election Day. Other important factors were present:
1. The impact of the California poll may have
spurred Humphrey workers and caused complacency
in the McGovern camp.
2. McGovern's get-out-the-vote activity was not as
well coordinated as the voter identification
canvass.
3. Proposition 9 on the California ballot was a pro-
ecology issue. Most McGovern supporters were pro-9
and Humphrey supporters anti-9. Whitaker and Baxter
spent over one million dollars in an anti Proposition
9 P.R. campaign. This may have brought much of the
latent Humphrey support to the polls.
4. Humphrey campaigned much harder in the last days,
while McGovern went to New Mexico and to Houston
to the Governor's conference.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
(Dictated by phone
WASHINGTON
from Los Angeles)
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
H
FROM:
RICHARD MOORE
Seems unlikely that debates by themselves were major factor
in difference between field poll and final results. Field
poll was taken May 30 and 31 and released June 1. Poll
consisted of 857 completed phone calls to self-identified
Democratic voters.
Note, however, that first debate where Humphrey was
on the attack and generally considered most effective had
already taken place when poll was taken and second debate
took place May 30 when poll was half completed. Only the
third debate which included Yorty and Shirley Chissom
took place completely after poll. Incidentally, Los
Angeles audience ratings were 12% for first debate,
13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings
in other California cities probably somewhat higher
but still each debate was probably not seen by 80%
of the voters. Reasons given by various observers
here for difference between the 20% McGovern lead and
actual difference of only 5% include the following:
1. Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern
workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
2. McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his
departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday
hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and
taking California for granted.
3. As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a
knack for a strong finish. On last two days,
Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State
with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.
- 2 -
4. Nofziger reports that Al Barkan, political person from
COPE, came into State during last two weeks and the
labor effort appears to have been effective in closing
days particularly in Los Angeles County which Humphrey
carried.
Proposition 9 which lost by 2 to 1, attracted non-liberal
voters who might not otherwise have voted.
Finally, many suggest that although field poll may be
defective in commerical marketing, it has spotty record
in political poll and was probably wrong to begin with.
My total impression is that debates did help by generating
word of mouth of Humphrey's hard hitting attack and the
important factor was McGovern's departure.
Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman
Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's
China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging
news from Orange County.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ED HARPER
Ray
FROM:
ROY D. MOREY
SUBJECT:
Predictions VS. Results in
the California Democratic
Primary
Five days prior to the election, Mervin Field, Director of the syndicated
California poll, found that as of May 30 - 31 McGovern was favored by
46 percent of the state's Democrats to Humphrey's 26 percent. The
final vote in the California primary indicates McGovern with 44. 2
percent, Humphrey with 39.2 percent, Wallace with a 6.0 percent
write-in and Chisolm with 4.4 percent. Before analyzing reasons
for Humphrey's better than predicted showing, lets first look at the
primary results.
The Results
Counties in which McGovern was particularly strong included (results
in thousands) Alameda (120-69), Marin (24-9), Sacramento (62-48),
San Diego (90-74), San Francisco (82-49), San Mateo (52-38) and
Santa Clara (95-60).
Humphrey's major strength was in Los Angeles County (553-472)
but he made a respectable showing in districts including Orange
(83-70), San Bernadeno (43-35), and Ventura (25-20).
Significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart
Research Associates. Their figures show that while Humphrey had
been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in
previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%.
In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from
72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's
popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from
13% to 36%.
2
The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern
is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than
two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin.
Humphrey seems to have increased his suburban strength (29% up
to 43%) at the expense of core city support.
Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior
set by a two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters
classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part
for his strength in surburban Los Angeles County.
McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to
24 year old vote, and among liberals and professionals - executives
he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern
had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in
California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey,
and only 3% better among the women.
A Last Minute Shift?
There have been a number of explanations advanced for the better
than predicted Humphrey showing: The McGovern decision to leave
the state the day before the election; a last minute sympathy vote for
Humphrey; McGovern's position on the issues as exposed in the
television debates and elsewhere finally caught up with him. While
there is insufficient data to assess each of these theories, there is
some evidence which should cast doubt on the significance of the
television debates in influencing voter decisions.
It may be argued that the debates and issues and positions exposed
in the debates account for the diminution of McGovern strength during
the final days of the campaign. This is a plausible theory, but difficult
to support. Only a little over half of the California Democrats (53%)
watched any of the three debates. Among those three watched, there
was a mixed reaction on the outcome -- 16% thought Humphrey came
out ahead, 17% said McGovern was the winner, and 20% thought the
debate produced a stand-off. In short, there does not seem to be much
evidence to suggest that the debate played an important role in either
insuring a McGovern victory or in decreasing his winning margin.
There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for
the better than predicted Humphrey showing. First is the matter of
voter volatility in primary elections in general, and the California
3
primary in particular. It has been demonstrated elsewhere that
public opinion polling is a more risky enterprise in primary rather
than general elections.
More important, however, in explaining the apparent shift toward
Humphrey in the final days is the undecided vote. A week before
the election, the undecided vote was 13% in the Mervin Field poll
and most of this went to Humphrey on election day. This was
especially true among older voters who made up a majority of
the undecided group. The Hart poll conducted for the Washington
Post indicates that as much as a third of the voters did not make
up their minds until the last three weeks of the campaign and that
Humphrey picked up most of these late deciders.
In addition, there were early Wallace supporters who eventually
decided to forego a write-in and vote for either McGovern or Humphrey.
Humphrey picked up more of these nominal Wallace supporters than
did McGovern.
Weighing the Results
In assessing the results of the California Democratic primary, one
should keep in mind the size and composition of the electorate. Only
67% of California's 5.1 million Democrats turned out for this election
as compared with the 73% turn out in the 1968 contest between
Kennedy and Hartke.
We cannot assume that the 67% who turned out constitute a represent-
ative microcosm of the entire California Democratic electorate. As
Austin Ranney reports in the current issue of the American Political
Science Review, the make up of the electorate in primary elections
differs from the voters who turn out for general elections. The
Ranney data indicates that the primary voters tend to be more affluent,
better educated, with an over all higher socio-economic background.
They also tend to be more ideologically committed. Although there
were a few voter group reversals for McGovern from his experience
in other states, the fact remains that his support in California tended
to be from those who are more likely to turn out for a primary election.
Among voters with incomes over $15,000 he did as well as he has in
other states. McGovern out polled Humphrey among the better educated
and professional groups and he gained two out of three votes among
those who classified themselves as liberals.
4
The VN war and the state of the economy (including unemployment)
were the major issues on the minds of both McGovern and Humphrey
supporters. Hence, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction
between the two based upon positions taken on the issues. Humphrey
supporters felt he is committed to ending the war and favor his
stand on equality for Blacks and tax reform. McGovern supporters
tended to mention withdrawal from VN, a guaranteed minimal
income for the poor and his stand on tax reform. The distinction
drawn in voter's minds seem to be more a matter of style than
substance.
Judging from the success McGovern had with the more affluent
and professional groups, there does not seem to be much evidence
to support the contention that those with incomes above $15, 000 were
scared into the Humphrey camp by talk of McGovern's income
redistribution scheme.
This year, the primaries have given voters an opportunity to express
their feelings of discontent and concern. This is reflected in the
successes of both McGovern and Wallace. However, the voter will
have to make a considerably different kind of decision in the general
election. In'the final analysis he is called upon to pass judgment
on whom he thinks should be entrusted with the responsibility of
the Presidency.
cc: Bradford Rich
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
Impact of the "Debates" ON on the
SUBJECT:
Democratic Presidential Primary
in California
The question has been raised as to whether the three
"debates" were in large part responsible for Humphrey's
highly improved showing on June 6 in California.
Having watched all three "exercises" and having been in
California on and off throughout the period involved, the
answer is unequivocally: Yes!
Two points need to be made before a discussion of the
debates themselves. First, the Field poll showing McGovern
with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest.
As you know, in the past Field has traditionally "over-
sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is
no question but that at a point approximately two weeks
prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably
somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over
Humphrey,* and this was fortified by unlimited money and
a superb organization. Even if you accepted the Field
poll at face value, it would have to be argued that the
13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey- an unheard
phenomena.
The following comments relate only to the first two debates
since the third discussion, which included Yorty, Chisholm,
and a Wallace representative, must be treated separately.
While Humphrey was clearly "up-tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs
of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions
taken by the South Dakota Senator.
- 2 -
In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing
and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not
have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had
a more confident air. He did separate himself from
McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly
appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal consti-
tuencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.
In my opinion, the third discussion, with the five
participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar
way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong
defense position (and, of course, endorsed HHH the day
before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility,
picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black community on
which Humphrey had been relying.
It seems to me that Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles,
San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin
Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox
New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on
defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to
have scored well with Catholics although he probably did
not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in
the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.
As the Los Angeles Times reported:
McGovern ran up big margins in San Francisco,
Alameda and Santa Clara counties, among others,
and this more than made up for the beating he
took from Humphrey in Los Angeles, Orange and
San Bernardino counties.
McGovern cut into Humphrey's strength in the
black communities but preliminary figures showed
he did not do as well as expected with Mexican-
Americans nor with some suburban voters.
A check of three predominantly Jewish precincts --
No. 2236 on Beverly Blvd., No. 2230 on N. Crescent
Heights and No. 2226 on Stanley Ave. -- covering
different economic groups showed Humphrey winning
by a comfortable 20 percentage points -- 58% to 38%.
A check of blue-collar precincts in South Gate,
Bell Gardens and Bellflower showed Humphrey
beating McGovern 54% to 33%.
- 3 -
McGovern staffers said the decision to go into
the three televised "debates" with Humphrey cut
into campaign time which had been allocated to
the blue-collar areas.
As for the black vote, a check of four key precincts
-- two in the Watts area and two in Willowbrook ---
showed almost a dead-even split between the candidates.
The final point to me would be that care must be utilized
in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern
as a "flaming radical." Rather, it can be argued that
he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that
North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once
we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters.
In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out."
The reason this is important is that he does come across
on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy
sort of a man from the mid-West and this appearance
belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements
and programs.
*
Charles Kerch prediction
Actual results
Field Poll
(week of May 28)
(May 30-31)
McGovern
54%
45%
46%
Humphrey
26%
40%
26%
Wallace
9%
5%
8%
Muskie
4%
2%
1%
Chisholm
3%
4%
2%
Yorty
2%
1%
1%
Jackson
2%
1%
1%
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
Survey of California Voting
McGovern: New Constituency
By Haynes Johnson
nucleus of the Humphrey strength in
Govern among blue-collar workers by
Washington Post Staff Writer
other contests-the blacks, the poor,
0
a 46 per cent to 38 per cent margin.
LOS ANGELES, June 7 - Although
the urban dwellers, the blue-collar
(McGovern's principal pollster, Pat
George McGovern did not win the
workers. the ethnics-deserted him in
Caddell. estimated that McGovern took
California-primary by the landslide the
California.
pollsters had projected, Democratic
47 or 48 per cent of the state's black
The most striking evidence of Mc-
voters in the nation's largest state
Govern's broader appeal came in two
vote to 43 per cent for Humphrey and
handed him another kind of victory:
voting groups, the blacks and the blue-
that he picked up 57 per cent of the
for the first time this year he has
collar workers. In previous primaries
Chicano vote, 20 points ahead of Hum-
emerged as the candidate with the
Humphrey had been getting anywhere
phrey. But Caddell said Humphrey
most broadly based constituency.
from 70 to 80 per cent of the black
seemed to have won the Jewish vote
In other primaries his strength was
vote.
by 18 to 20 per cent and to have won
concentrated among young voters. af-
Humphrey also had been running
the blue-collar vote by 2 or 3 per cent.)
fluent suburbanites and liberals. Mc-
about 2-to-1 ahead of McGovern among
The Hart survey, of 847 voters in 26
Govern basically held that constituency
blue-collar workers.
counties throughout the state, also
yesterday. and ran significantly better
A survey by Hart Research Asso-
turned up other evidence of McGov-
among voters who previously had been
ciates conducted for The Washington
ern's increasing acceptance among di-
the strongest supporters of his op-
Post showed Humphrey actually losing
verse elements of registered Demo-
ponent, Hubert Humphrey.
the black vote by 2 percentage points
crats. Mexican-Americans voted for Mc-
These voters who had formed the
in California and running behind Me-
- 2 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
MCGOVERN BROADENS CONSTITUENCY
Govern by 61 to 31 per cent
What is intriguing about
for Humphrey.
California-and unanswera-
In other words, people
Among voters with family
ble at this stage-is how the
who were undecided tended
incomes under $7,000 a year,
polls erred SO badly here.
to be more influenced by
the two major contenders
McGovern came into elec-
Humphrey than McGovern
evenly divided the field.
tion day seemingly headed
in the "closing days of the
Previously in the Pennsylva-
for a landslide victory. The
election.
nia, Ohio and Maryland pri-
respected California Poll
The television debates are
maries the Hart Post survey
conducted by Mervin Field
less conclusive.
showed Humphrey running
showed him ahead by 20 per-
Some 53 per cent of all
anywhere from 2-to-1 to 3-to-
centage points. But as they
Democratic voters in the
1 over MeGovern in that
have demonstrated all year
state, representing well over
in the privacy of the voting
category.
a million persons, said they
booth. citizens refused to be
Finally, Humphrey
had watched at least one of
catalogued in advance of the
standing among urban vot-
the three TV encounters.
election.
ers plummeted in Califor-
But. despite such wide expo-
Various Theories Offered
nia. In California the urban
sure, nelther candidate re-
vote represents one-third of
There are any number of
reived a clear signal of sup-
the potential Democratic
theories being advanced to
port based on the way he
electorate. Yesterday Hum-
explain the far-better Hum-
came over the set
phrey took only. 27 per cent
phrey final vote: that the in-
When asked which candi-
of that vote. In Pennsyl-
tensely personal nature of
date was the winner, the cit-
vania. by contrast. he had
his campaigning against the
izens responded this way:
held 45 per cent of the
odds spurred a last-minute
Sixteen per cent of all
urban vote and in Ohio he
sympathy vote: that Mc-
Democratic voters thought
took 53 per cent.
Govern's position on specific
Humphrey came out ahead.
McGovern's margin rose
issues. including income re-
Seventeen per cent said
distribution and cuts in de-
from 23 per cent of the ur-
McGovern.
ban vote in Pennsylvania to
fense spending, cast new
Twenty per cent thought
52 per cent in California.
doubt on his candidacy; that
the debates were a stand-
the television debates caused
off.
Suburban Vote Divided
a significant switch to Hum-
And the remainder didn't
The key to the closeness
phrey.
watch.
of the California vote ivoni-
None of these can be veri-
The same kind of incon-
vally lies in the one area
fied with any accuracy.
clusive breakdown C a m e
hat had been the bastion
They remain theories.
among those who voted for
or George McGovern: the
The Hart survey data
either McGovern or Hum-
suburbs. The two candidates
does. however, give clues to
phrey.
divided that vote yesterday.
what was taking place as the
Of those who backed
And in California this group
election approached. Voters
Humphrey on Tuesday, only
makes up nearly half of the
were asked when they made
30 per cent thought he was a
Democratic electorate.
up their minds to support ei.
clear-cut winner in the de-
In Pennsylvania. Humph-
ther Humphrey, .,Or Mr.
bates. Of those who voted
rey had carried 29 per cent
Govern. One out 08 three
for McGovern. the same fig-
of the suburban vote to Me-
voters said they decided Un
ure of 30 per cent gave their
Govern's 45. In California,
their candidate within YRE
man the clear edge.
Humphrey captured 43 per
last three weeks. Of those
voters. Humphrey beat
Marked by Bitterness
cent of the suburban vote
while McGovern won 41 per
McGovern by a 5-to-4 mar-
The Hart results do cast
cent.
gin.
light on another element of
Humphrey's strength was
critical importance to not
concentrated in one major
only Humphrey and Mc-
area-sprawling Los An-
Govern, but to their party's
geles County.
chances against Richard
A reading of the Califor-
Nixon in the fall. This cam-
nia returns thus clearly
paign was marked by a cur-
shows how successful Mc-
rent of bitterness, some-
Govern has been in estab-
times muted, sometimes
lishing himself as a candi-
flaring into the open, be-
date with wide political ap-
tween the two senators who
peal. His California standing
have been long-time friends
has to be measured against
in Washington.
the time, only three months
ago. when he was largely re-
garded as a one-issue candi-
date who could not rise
above 7 per cent in the na-
tional polls.
1 3 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972,
On election day, that bit-
In other states. the issues
terness was most notably ex-
of inflation or taxes ranked
McGovern maintained his
pressed by the Humphrey
high, but the California vot-
position among young vot-
voters. Almost half of those
ers were saying yesterday
ers, liberals, the more afflu-
who voted for Humphrey
that their economic prob-
ent and among professional
said they would support Mr
lems are more acute and
groups.
Nixon if McGovern is the
more demanding of solution.
In California, as in other
Democratic nominee in Nov
These two concerns, the
primaries. he took better
ember. Among McGovern's
war and the economy, will
than 70 per cent of voters
supporters, however. two
probably dominate the ac-
between the ages of 18 and
out of three said they would
tual presidential campaign.
24. With voters earning
back Humphrey if he wins
When it comes to distin-
more than $15,000 a year, he
the Democratic nomination
guishing between the two
did as well in California as
next month in Miami Beach.
leading Democratic candi-
in other states.
But a full 10 per cent (C)
dates. there is little in voter
Among voters classifying
the McGovern voters said
responses to distinguish
themselves as liberals, Mc-
they would not participate
them. A majority of the
Govern received two out of
at all in the presidential
"Humphrey voters said they
three of the ballots cast. In
election if the choices are
thought he would honorably
the professional-executive
the same as four years ago
end the war. Only two other
category of voters, Mc-
-another Humphrey-Nixon
issues were strongly asso-
Govern received a clear-cut
match.
ciated with Humphrey in
majority, running more than
Implicit in these findings
their minds. These were his
2-to-1 ahead of Humphrey.
is a potentially perilous situ-
positions on full equality for
In a political season of
ation facing-the Democratic
blacks and on tax reform.
contradictions and confu-
Party. They raise the pros-
For McGovern, two out of
sion, these elements among
pect of a party so badly di-
three of his supporters men-
the voters remained con-
vided that the Republicans
tioned his call for immedi-
stant factors. There was one
could be returned to office
ate withdrawal of American
group in the California elec-
as a result.
troops from Vietnam. And
torate, though, that defied
On the surface that is
almost half cited his stand
the standards set in other
comforting news for the
on guaranteeing a minimum
primaries.
President and his party. But
income for the poor. About
McGovern had been doing.
a careful qualification has
40 per cent mentioned his
consistently better among
to be added to that equa-
tax reform proposals.
women voters all across the
tion.
The voters seemed to per-
country. The Hart survey
In trial heats among Dem-
ceive the men in different
yesterday turned up yet an-
ocratic voters yesterday,
both Humphrey and Me-
ways. McGovern supporters
other contradiction to the
were more inclined to stress
political norm.
Govern scored substantial
victories when pitted face-
his stand on specific issues
In California George
to-face against Mr. Nixon.
than his personal qualities,
McGovern ran significantly
The figure for Humphrey
while the Humphrey back-
better among men than
was 68 per cent to Mr. Nix-
ers spoke more about their
women, holding a 15-point
on's 21 per cont. McGovern
man's personality, his speak-
spread over Humphrey
topped the President by 66
ing ability, his warmth and
among men but only 3 per
sincerity.
cent among women.
to 28 per cent.
Whether that is an indica-
Findings Confirmed
Support of Elderly
These confirm the find-
tion of further change in a
ings of other published polls
In only one segment of
changing electorate or
this week that showed Me-
the voting population did
merely a quirk of California
Humphrey maintain the
no one can say. Even the
Govern beating Mr. Nixon
among all California voters.
strength he has demon-
pollsters won't venture an
Simply put. this means that
strated in other primaries.
opinion of why that is SO.
Voters aged 65 and over.
the President has problems
in California. the largest
and those who are retired,
This story is based on inter-
gave him a lopsided 2-to-1
views conducted for The
state and a state that he car
margin over McGovern.
Washington Post by Hart Re-
ried in both 1960 and 1968.
search Associates of Wash-
His California consti-
Another way of looking at
ington. The company inter-
tuency was marked by an-
the relative strength of the
viewed 847 California voters
other aspect. Slightly less
President in his native state
in 26 of the state's 58 coun-
than half of his voters clas-
can be seen in examining
sified themselves as conserv-
ties. These voters represent
the issues cited by the vot
atives. That perhaps. ex-
92 per cent of the potential
ers. In California, as in
Democratic electorate in Cali-
plains his strong showing
other states, the war rank-
fornia. The voters were con-
among Los Angeles County
as the greatest concern of
suburban voters. In Califor-
tacted immediately after they
most voters. But close be
nia, and particularly South-
cast their ballots in Tuesday's
hind that is another prob
ern California, the makeup
presidential primary election.
lem. To a striking degree
Th purpose of the interviews
of the suburbs differs from
California voters yesterda
those in other sections of
was to determine why people
singled out the problems i.,
the country. Here, the sub-
voted as they did and to de-
unemployment and job Secu
urban voter generally is
termine the kind and depth
rity as being of paramo'n
more conservative.
of support the major Demo-
importance.
feratic candidates enjoyed.
This is the last of a series of
similar voter surveys carried
out for The Post by Hart Re-
search on the 1972 presiden-
wal primary elections.
- 4 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
4-Primary Record
of Rivals' Strength
By a Washington Post Staff Writer
LOS ANGELES, June 7-The changing nature of the
McGovern-Humphrey constituencies is shown in the
following table, based on voter surveys conducted in
four presidential primaries by Hart Research Associates
for The Washington Post.
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Maryland
California
April 25
May 2
May 16
June 6
Urban Voters
%
C₀
in
%
Humphrey
45
53
48
27
McGovern
23
34
13
52
Suburban Voters
Humphrey
29
33
22
43
McGovern
45
49
37
41
Blue-Collar Workers
Humphrey
43
54
33
38
McGovern
19
35
16
46
Blacks
Ilumphrey
72
80
67
34
McGovern
13
16
12
36
Low-Income Voters
Humphrey
44
59
34
42
McGovern
20
32
12
42
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972
Times Survey: Defections
:
In Party Face McGovern
By JACK ROSENTHAL
Special to The New York Times
LOS ANGELES, June S - A one out of every six California
riking proportion of voters Democrats (Mr. Humphrey goti
who supported Senator Hubert 40 per cent of the vote in the
S. Humphrey in California said Democratic primary Tuesday),
11 a survey that if Senator It is significantly higher than
George McGovern won the
the rate measured in any of the
Democratic nomination. they
four previous primary election
would abandon their party and surveys conducted by The
ote for President Nixon in Times and the Yankelovich re-
November.
search concern.
According to a cross-section The California survey was of
urvey conducted on primary a scientific sampling of 570
'ay here by The New York voters in 11 counties who were
Times and Daniel Yankelovich. interviewed as they left the
Inc., about 40 per cent of Hum- poils. The total included an
phrey voters say they would oversampting of 56 black
defect to the President in a voters.
Nixon-McGovern race.
The Humphrey defection rate
Another 40 per cent say they
contrasted markedly with that
would stand by Mr. McGovern
among McGovern voters. If
as the Democratic nominee. The
Senator Humphrey should win
remainder are undecided or say
the nomination, fewer than 20
they would not vote.
per cent of the McGovern vot-
The 40 per cent defection
rate is equivalent to the loss of
Continued on Page 18, Column 4
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Friday, June 9, 1972
Times Study: Defections Face McGovern
Continued From Page 1, Col. 6
the statewide California Poll re-
played an important role in
ported a 20-point McGovern
Senator McGovern's Wisconsin
ers say they would defect to
lead. In the final returns, Sena-
victory, the two men appeared
the President.
tor McGovern won by a 45-to-
to divide about evenly.
The high Humphrey defec-
140 per cent margin.
For example, slightly more
tion rate mirrored a series of
Another sign of the compara-
voters concerned about in-
signs of relative conservatism
tive conservatism of Humphrey
flation favored Senator Mc-
voters was the finding that less
Govern. Slightly more con-
among the Minnesota Senator's
than half think any Democrat
cerned about high property
supporters. The survey indi-
cated they were less concerned
can defeat President Nixon. By
taxes favored Senator Hum-
about the Vietnam war and
contrast. two-thirds of McGov-
COn economic issues, which
more sympathetic to Gov.
ern voters think SO, Among all
played an important role in
George C. Wallace of Alabama
California Democratic voters,
Senator McGovern's Wisconsin
than were McGovern voters.
only a little over half are opti-
victory, the two men appeared
mistic about November.
to divide about evenly. For ex-
And, the survey indicated,
Senator Humphrey's compara-
The rise from primary to
jample, slightly more voters
primary in the number of Hum-
concerned about inflation fa-
tively conservative positions
vored Senator McGovern.
won him growing support as
phrey voters who would not
Slightly more concerned about
the California campaign drew
support Senator McGovern par-
high property taxes favored
to a close.
allels the increasing attention
paid to the South Dakotan's
Senator Humphrey.
Young Support McGovern
proposals.
9An almost exactly equal
Senator McGovern won gath-
proportion-two-thirds-of the
These include restructuring
ering support from younger
voters surveyed said they would
the defense budget and reduc-
voters in the closing days of
support either Senator McGov-
the campaign. His support
ing it substantially to $55-bil-
ern or Senator Humphrey
lion, and replacing the present
among first-time voters. aged
against President Nixon in the
welfare system with a $1,000-
18 to 24, jumped to its highest
November general election.
level of any of the five surveys.
per-person allowance for the
qIf Senator Humphrey were
The California survey showed
poor.
nominated, however, one young
that the South Dakotan won
In the Florida primary. 25
voter in 10 said he would de-
about three-fourths of this large
per cent of Humphrey voters
cide not to vote at all. About
bloc. Translated into total
said they would prefer Mr.
one voter in six was a young
votes, that would mean he won
Nixon to Senator McGovern in
first-time voter, aged 18 to 24.
November. In Wisconsin the
about 425,000 of an estimated
California Democrats ap-
580,000 youth votes. His total
figure was 29 per cent; in
peared polarized when it came
margin of victory over Senator
Pennsylvania, 34 per cent, and
to Governor Wallace, a write-
Humphrey in California was
in Michigan, 22 per cent.
in candidate here. About half
Other Survey Findings
thought his views should at
about 175.000.
least be given a place in' the
Meanwhile. however. Senator
Among other findings of the
Democratic platform. At the
Humphrey appeared to make
California survey were the fol-
same time, the other half, fa-
offsetting gains among voters
lowing:
vored ignoring-or even de-
who were not youths. His net
Senator McGovern strongly
nouncing-him.
gain of about 20 per cent in this
improved his showing among
THad Senator Edward M.
category was twice that of Sen-
voting blocs formerly dominat-
Kennedy of Massachusetts been
ator McGovern.
ed by Senator Humphrey-
a candidate, he might have nar-
These gains among more con-
blacks, older adults and blue
rowly won the California pri-
servative and older voters ap-
collar voters. But these Mc-
mary, drawing almost equal
pear to reflect Senator Hum-
Govern gains were somewhat
numbers away from Senators
phrey's sharp attacks on Mc-
offset by Humphrey gains
McGovern and Humphrey. Al-
Govern proposals as verging
among younger adults and
lowing for statistical error the
on reckless and radical.
white-collar workers.
three men would have run with-
Further, the showing of late
The two men appeared to in three percentage points of
Humphrey gains parallels pre-
divide the black and the each other, according to the
Tious findings of The Times/
Mexican-American vote about survey.
Yankelovich Survey. These in-
equally.
(In California, as in previous
dicated that Senator Humphrey
GAs elsewhere, Senator Me- Times/Yankelovich surveys, the
had cut into a potentially large
Govern virtually monopolized Vietnam war was the most im-
McGovern victory margin with
the ant-Vietnam war vote
portant public issue. It was
his-attacks. These were made,
while Senator Humphrey was cited by two-thirds of the vot-
notably, in three nationally
the choice of most voters con- ers. As elsewhere, Senator Mc-
televised debates prior to the
cerned about experience in Govern won heavy support
election.
government.
from those concerned about the
A week before the election,
[On economic issues, which war.