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This file contains:
From Patrick E. O'Donnell to Herbert L. Porter and J. Curtis Herge. RE: "Surrogate Attack Plan." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 17 pgs. Campaign [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
Handwritten note. This document discusses Humphrey and McGovern and upcoming debates. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Ray Price to the President. RE: Debates. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/7/1972
L.B.J. Should Debate on TV: A Man Who Admits that a TV Debate Cost Him the Presidency Attacks Lyndon Johnson for Refusing to Confront the Republican Candidate this Fall, by Richard Nixon. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], no date
Handwritten Note. This document discusses a debate and a meeting taking place the following day. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/7/1972
From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE: Impact of the "Debates" on the California Democratic Presidential Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Analysis of California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses a field poll as well as Humphrey and McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Evening Star - "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll," by Jack Rosenthal. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Richard Moore (Dictated by phone from Los Angeles). This document discusses a field poll and the final results. In addition, McGovern, Humphrey, and debates are also discussed. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: Predictions vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
The Washington Post- "Survey of Californi Voting: McGovern: New Constituency," by James Johnson. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Buchanan to L. Higby. Speech Insert. This speech discusses McGovern, his views and politics and the speech givers opinions on McGovern. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/8/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Primaries: California, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Dakota. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/7/1972
For Immediate Release--Washington. This document discusses black voters, the war in Vietnam, and campaigning. 4 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Newsletter], 6/15/1972
From Alvin Synder to Larry Higby (cc: Charles Colson, Ken Clawson, Mort Allin). This document discusses McGovern's comments on CBS radio the previous night. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
For Committee for the Reelection of the President. WTOP Radio CBS Network in Washingtion D.C., June 12, 1972 10:00 PM. Title: Comment by Senator George McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/12/1972
From L. Higby to Charles Colson. This document discusses several conclusions regarding regarding the Buchanan "assault memorandum." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/14/1972
Wire. Title: "Republicans," by Mike Shanan. This document discusses the concerns with reelecting President Nixon, the California Primary, and McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/15/1972
From Tod R. Hullin to Bob Haldeman. "John would appreciate having your thoughts on the attached." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/25/1972
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Quick Reponse Research Capability. 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/4/1972
From H.R. Haldeman to Pat Buchanan. This document discussing reviewing "basic attack materials" for the campaign during a trip to Russia. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 5/17/1972
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Results of Meeting at Camp David. 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/5/1972
Wire. This document discusses Nixon's reelection and McGovern as an apponent. It includes several comments from John N. Mitchell. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
Press Conference Transcript. This document dictates a press conference between John N. Mitchell, National Director of the Committee for the Reelection of the President, David Shumway, and the press. 21 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/8/1972
From Tod Hullin to Bob Haldeman. This document discusses three forwarded memos. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/27/1972
From Ken Cole to John Ehrlichman. This document discusses a meeting on how to better position the President domestically. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/20/1972
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Major Presidential Event. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/20/1972
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: 1701 Campaign and Advertising Strategy. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/19/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: George Wallace - Dr. Lukash. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Peter H. Daily through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Campaign Slogan: President Nixon. Now More Than Ever. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
Title: Concept Tests with Detroit Area Ticket-Splitters. (Middle age, high school graduates or less, with middle incomes from the Detroit Metropolitan Area). 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 6/1/1972
The New York Times. "McGovern's Credibility," by Tom Wicker. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/22/1972
From H.R. Haldeman to John Mitchell. This document discusses the situation in California regarding the president preelection. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/27/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Lyn Nofziger- California. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Ken Rietz to Jeb Magruder and Fred Malek. This document discusses an attachment. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Ken Smith to Pat Buchanan. This document is in regards to Young Voters for the President. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Campaign Surrogate Attack Plan. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/24/1972
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26145988
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WHSF: Contested, 33-4
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doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26145988
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 33-4
description
This file contains:
From Patrick E. O'Donnell to Herbert L. Porter and J. Curtis Herge. RE: "Surrogate Attack Plan." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the Democratic Primary Results in California. 17 pgs. Campaign [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/15/1972
Handwritten note. This document discusses Humphrey and McGovern and upcoming debates. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
From Ray Price to the President. RE: Debates. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/7/1972
L.B.J. Should Debate on TV: A Man Who Admits that a TV Debate Cost Him the Presidency Attacks Lyndon Johnson for Refusing to Confront the Republican Candidate this Fall, by Richard Nixon. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], no date
Handwritten Note. This document discusses a debate and a meeting taking place the following day. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/7/1972
From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE: Impact of the "Debates" on the California Democratic Presidential Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Analysis of California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates on the California Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This document discusses a field poll as well as Humphrey and McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
Evening Star - "McGovern 'Weakness' Located in Voter Poll," by Jack Rosenthal. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman. RE: California Primary. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Richard Moore (Dictated by phone from Los Angeles). This document discusses a field poll and the final results. In addition, McGovern, Humphrey, and debates are also discussed. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/8/1972
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE: Predictions vs. Results in the California Democratic Primary. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/8/1972
The Washington Post- "Survey of Californi Voting: McGovern: New Constituency," by James Johnson. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/8/1972
From Buchanan to L. Higby. Speech Insert. This speech discusses McGovern, his views and politics and the speech givers opinions on McGovern. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/8/1972
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE: Primaries: California, New Jersey, New Mexico, South Dakota. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/7/1972
For Immediate Release--Washington. This document discusses black voters, the war in Vietnam, and campaigning. 4 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Newsletter], 6/15/1972
From Alvin Synder to Larry Higby (cc: Charles Colson, Ken Clawson, Mort Allin). This document discusses McGovern's comments on CBS radio the previous night. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/13/1972
For Committee for the Reelection of the President. WTOP Radio CBS Network in Washingtion D.C., June 12, 1972 10:00 PM. Title: Comment by Senator George McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/12/1972
From L. Higby to Charles Colson. This document discusses several conclusions regarding regarding the Buchanan "assault memorandum." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/14/1972
Wire. Title: "Republicans," by Mike Shanan. This document discusses the concerns with reelecting President Nixon, the California Primary, and McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], 6/15/1972
From Tod R. Hullin to Bob Haldeman. "John would appreciate having your thoughts on the attached." 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/25/1972
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Quick Reponse Research Capability. 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/4/1972
From H.R. Haldeman to Pat Buchanan. This document discussing reviewing "basic attack materials" for the campaign during a trip to Russia. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 5/17/1972
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Results of Meeting at Camp David. 5 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/5/1972
Wire. This document discusses Nixon's reelection and McGovern as an apponent. It includes several comments from John N. Mitchell. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Other Document], no date
Press Conference Transcript. This document dictates a press conference between John N. Mitchell, National Director of the Committee for the Reelection of the President, David Shumway, and the press. 21 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 6/8/1972
From Tod Hullin to Bob Haldeman. This document discusses three forwarded memos. 1 pg. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/27/1972
From Ken Cole to John Ehrlichman. This document discusses a meeting on how to better position the President domestically. 3 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/20/1972
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Major Presidential Event. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 4/20/1972
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: 1701 Campaign and Advertising Strategy. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/19/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: George Wallace - Dr. Lukash. 2 pgs. [Subject: White House Staff] [Memo], 6/28/1972
From Peter H. Daily through Jeb S. Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE: Campaign Slogan: President Nixon. Now More Than Ever. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
Title: Concept Tests with Detroit Area Ticket-Splitters. (Middle age, high school graduates or less, with middle incomes from the Detroit Metropolitan Area). 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 6/1/1972
The New York Times. "McGovern's Credibility," by Tom Wicker. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 6/22/1972
From H.R. Haldeman to John Mitchell. This document discusses the situation in California regarding the president preelection. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/27/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Lyn Nofziger- California. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/29/1972
From Ken Rietz to Jeb Magruder and Fred Malek. This document discusses an attachment. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/26/1972
From Ken Smith to Pat Buchanan. This document is in regards to Young Voters for the President. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Campaign Surrogate Attack Plan. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/24/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/26/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Patrick E. O'Donnell to Herbert L.
Porter and J. Curtis Herge. RE: "Surrogate
Attack Plan." 2 pgs.
33
4
6/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Humphrey-McGovern Debates and the
Democratic Primary Results in California. 17
pgs.
33
4
>
White House Staff
Other Document
Handwritten note. This document discusses
Humphrey and McGovern and upcoming
debates. 2 pgs.
33
4
6/7/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Ray Price to the President. RE:
Debates. 2 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 1 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
Campaign
Newspaper
"L.B.J. Should Debate on TV: A Man Who
Admits that a TV Debate Cost Him the
Presidency Attacks Lyndon Johnson for
Refusing to Confront the Republican
Candidate this Fall," by Richard Nixon. 2
pgs.
33
4
6/7/1972
White House Staff
Other Document
Handwritten Note. This document discusses
a debate and a meeting taking place the
following day. 1 pg.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert H. Finch to the President. RE:
Impact of the "Debates" on the California
Democratic Presidential Primary. 3 pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE:
Analysis of California Primary. 3 pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ed Debolt to Harry Dent. RE: Survey
on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern Debates
on the California Primary. 4 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 2 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Bill Safire to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Some Lessons of the California Primary. 3
pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Pat Buchanan to H.R. Haldeman. This
document discusses a field poll as well as
Humphrey and McGovern. 1 pg.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
Evening Star - "McGovern 'Weakness'
Located in Voter Poll," by Jack Rosenthal. 1
pg.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Robert M. Teeter to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: California Primary. 3 pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Jeb S. Magruder to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Impact of California Debates. 3 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 3 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/8/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Richard Moore (Dictated by phone
from Los Angeles). This document discusses
a field poll and the final results. In addition,
McGovern, Humphrey, and debates are also
discussed. 2 pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Roy D. Morey to Ed Harper. RE:
Predictions vs. Results in the California
Democratic Primary. 4 pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
The Washington Post- "Survey of Californi
Voting: McGovern: New Constituency," by
James Johnson. 4 pgs.
33
4
6/8/1972
White House Staff
Other Document
From Buchanan to L. Higby. Speech Insert.
This speech discusses McGovern, his views
and politics and the speech givers opinions
on McGovern. 2 pgs.
33
4
6/7/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Harry S. Dent to the President. RE:
Primaries: California, New Jersey, New
Mexico, South Dakota. 3 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 4 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/15/1972
White House Staff
Newsletter
For Immediate Release--Washington. This
document discusses black voters, the war in
Vietnam, and campaigning. 4 pgs.
33
4
6/13/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Alvin Synder to Larry Higby (cc:
Charles Colson, Ken Clawson, Mort Allin).
This document discusses McGovern's
comments on CBS radio the previous night. 1
pg.
33
4
6/12/1972
Campaign
Other Document
For Committee for the Reelection of the
President. WTOP Radio CBS Network in
Washingtion D.C., June 12, 1972 10:00 PM.
Title: Comment by Senator George
McGovern. 1 pg.
33
4
6/14/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From L. Higby to Charles Colson. This
document discusses several conclusions
regarding regarding the Buchanan "assault
memorandum." 2 pgs.
33
4
6/15/1972
White House Staff
Other Document
Wire. Title: "Republicans," by Mike Shanan.
This document discusses the concerns with
reelecting President Nixon, the California
Primary, and McGovern. 1 pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 5 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
4/25/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Tod R. Hullin to Bob Haldeman. "John
would appreciate having your thoughts on
the attached." 2 pgs.
33
4
4/4/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Quick
Reponse Research Capability. 5 pgs.
33
4
5/17/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From H.R. Haldeman to Pat Buchanan. This
document discussing reviewing "basic attack
materials" for the campaign during a trip to
Russia. 1 pg.
33
4
6/5/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Fred Malek to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Results of Meeting at Camp David. 5 pgs.
33
4
White House Staff
Other Document
Wire. This document discusses Nixon's
reelection and McGovern as an apponent. It
includes several comments from John N.
Mitchell. 1 pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 6 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/8/1972
Campaign
Other Document
Press Conference Transcript. This document
dictates a press conference between John N.
Mitchell, National Director of the Committee
for the Reelection of the President, David
Shumway, and the press. 21 pgs.
33
4
4/27/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Tod Hullin to Bob Haldeman. This
document discusses three forwarded memos.
1 pg.
33
4
4/20/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Ken Cole to John Ehrlichman. This
document discusses a meeting on how to
better position the President domestically. 3
pgs.
33
4
4/20/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: Major
Presidential Event. 2 pgs.
33
4
4/19/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ed Harper to Ken Cole. RE: 1701
Campaign and Advertising Strategy. 4 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 7 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/28/1972
White House Staff
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: George Wallace - Dr. Lukash. 2 pgs.
33
4
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Peter H. Daily through Jeb S.
Magruder to John N. Mitchell. RE:
Campaign Slogan: President Nixon. Now
More Than Ever. 4 pgs.
33
4
6/1/1972
Campaign
Report
Title: Concept Tests with Detroit Area
Ticket-Splitters. (Middle age, high school
graduates or less, with middle incomes from
the Detroit Metropolitan Area). 7 pgs.
33
4
6/22/1972
Campaign
Newspaper
The New York Times. "McGovern's
Credibility," by Tom Wicker. 1 pg.
33
4
6/27/1972
Campaign
Memo
From H.R. Haldeman to John Mitchell. This
document discusses the situation in
California regarding the president pre-
election. 1 pg.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 8 of 9
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
33
4
6/29/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Lyn Nofziger- California. 1 pg.
33
4
6/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ken Rietz to Jeb Magruder and Fred
Malek. This document discusses an
attachment. 1 pg.
33
4
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Ken Smith to Pat Buchanan. This
document is in regards to Young Voters for
the President. 3 pgs.
33
4
6/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Gordon Strachan to H.R. Haldeman.
RE: Campaign Surrogate Attack Plan. 8 pgs.
Tuesday, August 30, 2011
Page 9 of 9
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: H. R. Haldeman
Box Number: 313
Folder:
[Campaign 22 Part II June 15-29, 1972 Folder 2]
Document
Disposition
84
Return
Private/Political memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-15-72
85
Return
Private/Political memo, Buchanan to Higby, 6-8-72
86
Retain
Open
87
Return
Private/Political Memo, Dent to the President, 6-7-72
88
Return
Private/Political [CREEP Press Release 6-56a] 6-15-[72]
89
Return
Private/Political Memo, Snyder to Higby, 6-13-72
90
Return
Private/Political Memo, Hiaby to Colson. 6-14-72
91
Retain
Open
92
Return
Private/Political newswire, "For the first time..." 6-15-[72]
93
Return
Private/Political Memo, Hullin to HRH, 4-25-72
94
Return
Private/Political Memo, HRH to Buchanan, 5-17-72
95
Return
Private/Political Memo, Malek to HRN, 6-5-72
96
Return
Private/Political newswire, "John n. mitchell said..."6-8-[72]
97
Return
Private/Political Memo, Hullin to HRH, 4-27-72
98
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-28-72
99
Return
Private/Political Memo, Dailey to Mitchell, 6-20-72
100
Return
Private/Political Clipping, " McGovern's Credibility,' 6-22-72
101
Return
Private/Political Memo, HRH to Mitchell, 6-27-72
102
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-29-72
103
Return
Private/Political Memo, Rietz to Magruder E.Malek, 6-26-72
104
Return
Private/Political Memo, Strachan to HRH, 6-24-72
105
Return
Private/Political Memo, O' Donnell to Porter E Henge, 6-26-72
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 26, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HERBERT L. PORTER
J. CURTIS HERGE
FROM:
PATRICK E. O'DONNELL
pol.
SUBJECT:
"Surrogate Attack Plan"
In response to a request for comments issued with distribution of
the "Surrogate Attack Plan", we have put together a chronological
listing of selected events taking place during the period September 4
through November 7, 1972. They were chosen for a number of reasons
and are oriented towards but not limited to large national organizations,
key states, major local events and miscellaneous but politically advan-
tageous forums. Input came from such special voting blocks as youth,
labor, blacks, aged, farmers, veterans, Jews, ethnics, etc., etc.
On comparing this list with the assignments set forth in the Surrogate
Plan, we find a plethora of occasions where either the party scheduled
into the geographical area is not appropriate for the job or there is no
one allocated to the area at all. Nonetheless, a substantial number of
these meetings will demand and, as in the past, must receive Cabinet
level Administration representation. Accordingly, we are concerned
that the "flexibility" for covering events not included in your plan, as
cited in page two of your memo will be, in reality, an unattainable
factor. If the lead surrogates are scheduled by 1701 to campaign
three days a week, primarily on a key state and geographic basis,
it is extremely unlikely they will be available to do further travelling
and/or speaking to cover numerous major events not yet taken into
consideration by your scheduling operation.
In short, the plan is at least a first step towards thoughtful and
intelligent utilization of our top spokesmen during the campaign
crunch period. However, we definitely feel that it is a matter
-2-
of some priority to cover as many of these important forums as
possible with Cabinet level spokesmen rather than attempting to
create events on a wholesale basis simply to adhere to a rough
plan which, by its very definition is oriented towards percentages
and geographic distribution. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
re-election effort that all interested parties resolve these and other
logistical difficulties before signing off on or formalizing the plan.
We have not addressed the inevitable issue of the reluctant or
choosy surrogate. Past experience has proven these individuals
to be a most disconcerting thorn in the side of progress. If they
are not properly and fully motivated, the best plan in the world
will crumble in execution. It will probably take at least one
"head-on" meeting with the President to sufficiently ignite the
fire. We can discuss this at a later date.
bcc: Gordon Strachan
X
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 15, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Humphrey-McGovern Debates
and the Democratic Premary
Results In California
Question:
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey
and McGovern accounted for the 14-208 point increase from
the pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote.
Conclusion:
The Hart Survey in the Post found that 538 of the Democrats
saw at least one debate, 178 thought McGovern won while 16%
thought Humphrey won, 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's
voters thought he won and 300 of McGovern's voters thought
he won.
Finch, Colson, Dant, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter,
Buchanan, and Harper/Morey believe the debates increased
Humphrey's vote total. Moore disagrees.
Analysis:
Humphrey increased his position from 26 to 40% because the
debates enabled him to drive home his points on jobs and
McGovern's fuzzy welfare proposals and Defense cuts (Finch,
Dent, Bushanan).
The debates and resultant media coverage "scared hell out
of Jews" (Safire). Although the debates may not have had
a large audience, the California media began emphasizing
Humphrey's attack (Magruder, Dent, Buchanan).
- 2 -
The debates enabled Humphrey to shift the undecideds to
his column by hitting McGovern on his "extreme" positions.
However, the debates did not cut into McGovern's fairly
constant 45% total (Agree: Teeter, Buchanan, Safire,
Yankelovich; Disagree: Finch, Hart).
Whether the Field poll was wrong to start with was also
considered. Finch, Colson, and Moore believe Field was
wrong. Buchanan says the Field poll was not wrong and
he has reason to believe McGovern's lead may have been
larger.
A more detailed analysis 1a attached as well as the original
memoranda from Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue, Safire, Teeter,
Buchanan, and Harper/Morey. Also attached are newspaper
reports of the Hart and Yankelovich surveys.
GS/jb
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Humphrey-McGovern
Debates and the Democratic
Primary Results in California
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey and
McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the pollsters'
projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, Magruder/La Rue,
Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses
(attached). Their summarized comments should be considered in
light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the Democrats saw at
least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won while 16% thought Humphrey
won; 20% felt neither won; 30% of Humphrey's voters thought he won and
30% of McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart and Yankelovich
surveys are also attached.
Finch believes:
1. The Field poll showing McGovern with a 20 point lead was
patently wrong, if not dishonest. In the past, Field has tradi-
tionally "over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But,
there is no question that approximately two weeks prior to the
election, McGovern had a clear lead probably -- 10 points --
over Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited money and
a superb organization. Even if the Field poll was taken at face
value, it would have to be argued that the 13% undecided went
over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard of phenomena.
2. While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
2
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain
costs of various McGovern proposals and other extreme
positions taken by the S outh Dakota Senator.
3. In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing
and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be
interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident air.
He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner of War
issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Democratic New
Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.
4. The third discussion, with the five participants, had its impact
on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to buttress
Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course endorsed
HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved her
visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black Community on
which Humphrey had been relying.
5. Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange
Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he
"wrang" the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and
leaned heavily on his arguments on Defense levels and California
jobs. He also appears to have scored well with Catholics,
although he probably did not exploit sufficiently McGovern's
vulnerability in the "Three A's" Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.
Dent believes:
1. Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions,
especially welfare and Defense spending, made the Democrat
primary closer in California than expected.
2. Dent notes that the Hart Survey minimized the impact of
the HHH atacks but pointed out that undecideds were influenced
more by HHH in the closing days.
3
3. Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's
positions on Defense and welfare cost him votes. One
in five found the debates important in voting, the majority
of these going to HHH. The most damaging position of
McGovern was his plan to drastically reduce Defense
spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed
disapproval here.
4. An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out
of the black vote and did even better with the chicanos.
This could mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout"
views through the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean
that the more affluent voters moved away as they became better
informed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than
ever black and brown vote.
Safire believes:
1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern
won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered
Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% --
no such bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should
expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since
McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie
(too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic) or
Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly, McGovern is
now enjoying much of what we had- in 1966 and 1967 -- the man
who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with
the press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal
opinion (Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in
his camp. In the news backwash, however newsmags and
columnists we can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing
to his fade-out at the end.
2. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher
issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's
softness in the Middle East. I have a hunch that Jews will not
vote for a candidate because he is for aid to Israel (they all say
they are) but will vote against one whom they think is against
Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a showdown.
4
3. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern
keyword. Fifteen percent of the California Democratic
voters became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two
weeks, when they had their first close look at him, Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions
because of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's
clothing, and all that. One fifth may have been disaffected
because he backed off his positions that is, he's not the
purist he used to be; no longer a virgin.
Buchanan believes:
1. The Field poll was not wrong. He has it from a source that the
Field poll actually played down the McGovern spread, which was
larger than twenty points.
2. Humphrey attacks begin to pay off his attacks primarily
on Defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give
aways of McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey
stridency and panicky approach he must have sufficiently
frightened many people to convince 300, 000 to come his way.
This I believe explains it coupled with:
(a)
The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH,
which tended to reinforce the Humphrey attacks
on McGovern as a radical; and
(b) The surfacing in the California press of increasing
numbers of national Democrats calling McGovern an
extremist, a guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.
3. What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over
Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went
from 26% to 40% in a week so, did McGovern really lose any
votes? Or, did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats
and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell out of
them?
5
Teeter believes:
1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to
Humphrey, rather, there were a large number of
voters who were originally predisposed to Humphrey
prior to the Campaign and temporarily moved into the
undecided column by the McGovern Campaign. When
they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition
to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique
and relatively unknown commodity and the fact this Campaign
was a much larger, more obvious and better financed effort
than Humphrey's would have contributed to the shift to the
undecided category. The fact McGovern actually got about
the same percentage in the election as he did in the Field
poll and also the fact that the undecided voters in the Field
poll were demographically similar to the Humphrey voters
would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those
positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided
voters back to Humphrey.
Colson believes:
1. The debates had a very significant effect, but both
candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and
vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost
debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect,
while Colson had thought McGovern came out better because
of his "good guy" image, Colson now believes Humphrey
scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
2. The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. McGovern
did not have a twenty point lead a week before the Primary.
He peaked early plus the fact that the debates did expose some
extreme positions. Particularly, in the third debate, McGovern
looked very weak on the POW issues and Colson suspects that
to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate,
the debates had a significant effect.
6
Magruder and LaRue believe:
1. Although neither the public nor the media ever
declared Humphrey the winner of the debate, substantial
damage was done to McGovern. The media began to
emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then
occupied the least advantageous position in the political
arena that of being on the defense. He spent the next
several days trying to explain his programs while Humphrey
kept up the attack. This was all news to Californians.
Humphrey had little, if any, paid commercials at this point
while McGovern had begun saturation.
2: The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey
in a much more conciliatory light. However, he kept
questioning the economic impact the McGovern Défense cut
would have on the working man of California. Again the
results of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave
maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.
3. The Yankelovich survey reveals that one out of five voters
considered the debates important in deciding for whom to vote.
The majority of those who relied on the debates favored
Humphrey. More voters voted against McGovern than against
Humphrey. One-fourth of the voters preferred their candidate
because they disliked their opponent. Senator Humphrey
received one-half of these votes while Senator McGovern received
one-third. The survey also states that 40% of Humphrey's vote
would go to the President on November 7, while 40% would shift
to McGovern and 20% is undecided.
Moore believes:
1. The debates by themselves were not a major factor accounting
for the difference between the Field poll and the final results.
2. Other reasons for the Humphrey increase include:
(a) The Field poll itself generated over-confidence
by McGovern workers and greater effort by
Humphrey workers.
(b) McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure
for New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously
7
indicating over-confidence and taking
California for granted.
(c) As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey
has a knack for a strong finish. On the last
two days, Humphrey campaigned strenuously
up and down the state with good T.V. coverage,
while McGovern was absent.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
All believe the debates increased Humphrey's vote total. The old
rule -- if ahead, don't debate -- applies. As to specific recommen-
dations:
1. Finch urges no attempt to label McGovern a "flaming
radical", rather argue he's naive, otherwise his soft-spoken
T.V. manner will destroy the label;
2. Dent suggests a "drip, drip" campaign on McGovern's stands
without Presidential involvement;
3. Safire suggests a general appeal to Jews and a specific
attack on McGovern's honesty by distributing his WALL STREET
JOURNAL ad to students;
4. Buchanan implies we should follow Humphrey's example and
scare the hell out of the voters;
In addition to the debates, the other reasons for the Humphrey/McGovern
results are:
1. McGovern peaked too soon and left California for New Mexico
and Houston indicating he took California for granted;
2. Polls gave Humphrey sympathy and hard-working labor types;
3. Proposition 9's (environment) two-one loss brought out
Humphrey voters.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date: 6/10/72
To : A.S.
From :
L. Higby
A accretary coubl have chipped
their together. Do a summy
analysis σ conclusion for
H. ro he doesn't have
to work through 50 pager
today please L
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECTE
Humphrey-McGovern Debates
and the Democratic Primary
Results in California
The question is whether the three debates between Humphrey
and McGovern accounted for the 14-20% point increase from the
pollsters' projection to Humphrey's final vote. Finch, Dent, magruder Rue
Safire, Buchanan, Teeter and Harper/Morey submitted analyses
(attached). Their summarized comments should be considered
in light of the Hart Survey which found that 53% of the
Demo saw at least one debate; 17% thought McGovern won
while 16% thought Humphrey won; 20% felt neither won;
30% of Humphreys voters thought he won and 30% of
McGovern's voters thought he won. The Hart X and
XXXXXXX Yank lovich surveys are attached.
Finch believes: the Field poll showing McGovern
with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not
dishonest. In the past, Field has traditionally
"over sampled" in the northern part of the state. But
there is no question but that a point approximately two
weeks prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead
probably somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage
points- Humphrey and this was fortified by unlimited
money and a superb organization. Even i the Field poll
was taken at face value, it would have to be argued that the
13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey -- an unheard
phenomena.
While Humphrey was clearly "up tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs
of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions
taken by the South Dakota Senator.
In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing and
plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not have to be
interrupted to close his sentences and had a more confident
air. He did separate himself from McGovern on the Prisoner-
of-War issue and was clearly appealing to the orthodox Demo-
cratic New Deal constituencies of labor, the farmer, the old
-2-
and the minorities.
The third discussion, with the five participants, had its
impact on the election in a peculiar way. Yorty tended to
buttress Humphrey on his strong defense position (and, of course
endorsed HHH the day before the election), and Chisholm improved
her visibility picking up 4% out of the vote of the Black
Community on which Humphrey had been relying.
5) Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles, San Diego and Orange
COunties, as well as in the San Joaquin Valley, showed that he
wrang the most out of the orthodox New Deal appeal and
leaned heavily on his arguments on defense levels and
California jobs. He also appears to have scored wll with
Catholics although he probably did not exploit sufficiently
McGovern's vulnerability in the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and
Amnesty.
Finch recommends that care be tilized in not having our
people attempt to characterize McGovern as a "flaming radical."
Rather, it can be arqued that he is terribly naive (i.e.,
his position on hoping that North Vietmam would release our
Prisoners-of-War once we left), and totally unrealistic
about fiscal matters. In other words, his positions are "extreme"
or far out. The reason this is important is that he does come
across on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy
sort of man from the mid-West and this appearance belies the
gross stupidity of some of his statements and programs.
Dent believes: Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist
positions, especially welfare and defense spending, made the
Democrat primary closer in California than expected.
Dent notes that the Hart survey poll full POST article attached)
minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but pointed out that
undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the closing days.
Some 53% of the Demo voters said the watched lof 3 debates.
They split on who won -- 16% HRH, 17% McGovernm and 20%
said even. The rest didn't watch Of AHH voters, 30% said he won
and of McCovern's, 30 said he won.
Yankelovich (Full NEW YORK TIMES articles attached) supports
the view that McGovern's positions on defense and welfare
cost him ovtes. One in 5 found the debates important in voting,
the majority of these going to HHH. Yankelovich says this
raised IIIII's vote by several points. The most damaging position
of McGovern was his plan to drastically redue defense X
spending. Among all voters, more than 1/3 expressed dis-
approval here.
-3-
c)
An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the
black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could
mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through
the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the
more affluent voters moved away as they became better in-
formed, since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than
ever black and brown vote.
The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big
gap. Here are other factors:
1) McGovern peaked too soon.
2) Polls gave sym!athy to HHH and caused labor and others to
work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than
McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and
talked like the President.
4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to
leftist extremism.
5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.
6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on
Monday.
believes
Safire had four comments on the California Primary.
1) The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern
won by far less than had been expected. They clobbered
Muskie after New Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such
bad luck for McGovern. Lesson here is that we should
expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner help than usual, since
McGovern is better attuned to most reporters than say, Muskie
(too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously charismatic)
or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? oddly,
McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967--
the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the
press. Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion
(Wicker, Appel, Haynes Johnson) are odeologically in his camp.
In the bews backwash, however-- newsmags and columnists -- we
can do a lot to slow his momentum by pointing to his fade-out
at the end.
4
2) Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher
issue here probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's
softness in the midEast. I have a hunch that Jews will not
vote for a candidate because NXX he is for aid to Israel (they
all say they are) but will vote against one whom they think
is against Israel, or more accurately would be weak in a
showdown. This could be enormously significant in New York,
Illinois and California, not only in findraising but in vote
patterns. A
3) Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern key-
word. Fifteen per cent of the XXX California Democratic voters
became disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when
they had their first close look at him. Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because
of the Humphrey attack. A radical in X sheep's clothing, and
all that. One fifth may have been disaffected because be backed at
off his positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be.
No longer a virgin.
believes
Buchanan explains the McCovorn drop by :
h) The Field Poll was not wrong; I
I
have
it from a source that the Field Poll actually played down the
McGovern spread, which was larger than twenty points.
Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily
on defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare give-
aways of McGovern, on Israel and POW's. Despite the Humphrey
stridency, and panicky approach -- he must have sufficiently
frightened many people to convince 300,000 to come his way.
This I believe explains it coupled with:
?
)
The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended
to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical;
and
mcGovern
The surfacing in the California press of increasing
numbers of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a
guy who will sink the whole ticket, etc.
What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over
Humphrey got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went
from 26% to 40% in a week -- So, did McGovern really loose any
votes? Or did HHH simply pick up from all the other Democrats
and pick up all the undecideds as well -- by scaring the hell
out of them.
believes
- Teeter argues that:
1. There was not a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey,
rather there were a large number of voters who were
originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign
and temproarily moved into the undecided column by the
McGovern campaign. When they actually voted they voted their
basic predisposition to Humphrey. The fact that McGovern
was a new, unique and relatively unknown commodity
and the fact khis campaign was a much larger, more obvious
and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have contri-
buted to the shift to the undecdded category. The fact
McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the
election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that
the undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically
similar to the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into thos
positions. This contributed to a movement of undecided voters
back to Humphrey.
Colson believes' the debates had a very significant effect,
but both candidates lost. Humphrey because he looked mean and
vicious as the attacker and McGovern because he lost debating
points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect, while $ had
thought McGovern came out better because of his "good guy image,
apparent to that Humphrey scored significantly on
McGovern with his attacks.
The Field Poll was off, as was the ABC poll. and that McGovern
did not have a 20 point lead a week before the primary. He
peaked xxx early plus the fact the debates did expose some extreme
positions. Particularly in the 3rd debate, McGovern looked
very weak on the POW issues and Would suspect that to anyone
who was not a confirmed partisan for either candidate that that
have had a significant effect. The NEW YORK TIMES Vankelovic
survey today is very revealing on this point
(attached)
MXX
Magruder and LaRue believe: although neither the public
nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the debate,
substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media began to
emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied the
least advantageous position in the political arena - that of
being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying to
explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This
was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid
commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.
6
2)
The second debate in prime time, presented Humphrey N in a
much more conciliatory light. However, he kept
questioning the economic impact the McGovern defense cut would
have on the working man of California. Again the results
of the debate were a toss-up, but the media still gave
maximum coverage to Humphrey's attack.
Analysis
The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched
at least one debate. As previously stated the public on the
surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut
winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern
won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off,
and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters
thought that Humphrey had won X the debates while 30% of the
McGovern voters thought McGovern had won the debates.
The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three
voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three
weeks (many during the debates) Of those voters, 5 to 4
voted for Humphrey.
The Yankelovich Survey reveal that 1 out of 5 voters considered
the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority
of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.
The Survey also indicated that more voters voted
against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the
voters preferred their candidate because they disliked their
opponent. Sen. Humphrey received 1/2 of these votes while
Sen. McGovern receive 1/3. The survey also states that 40%
of IIIII, vote would go on the President on November 7, while
40% would shift to McGovern and 20% is undecided.
Aumprocy's
believe
Moore
argues
the debates by themselves were not a
major factor accounting for the difference between the
Field Poll and the final results.
Los Angeles xxxxxx audience ratings were 12% for first
debate, 13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings
in other California cities probably somewhat higher but still
each debate was probably not seen by 80% of the voters Reasons
given by various observers in California for the frerence
blewk between the 20% McGovern lead and actual frerence
of only 5% include the following:
2) other reasons fathe Humplress increase include:
_-7--
a) Field Poll itself generated over confidence by McGovern
workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his departure
New Mexico and Texas on Monday hurt him seriously indicating
over confidence and taking California for granted.
As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a knack for
a strong finish. On last two days, Humphrey campaigned
strenuously up and down State with good TV coverage while
McGovern was absent.
Incidentally, Los Angeles Times att Ibutes Congressman
Schmitz defeat entirely to his opposition to the
President China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging
news from Orange County.
FAL Here Morey beleves:
- Roy Morey analyzed the California results for Harper. Morey
believes that significant sources of McGovern's strength were
identified by Hart Research Associates. Their figures show that
while Humphrey had been running as a two to one favorite among
blue collar workers in previous primaries, McGovern captured their
vote by 46% to 38%. In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among
Black voters from 72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34%
in California. McGovern's popularity among the Blacks increased
over the same period from 13% to 36%.
2) The data also demostrates that urban voters feel that McGovern
is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less
than two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar
margin. Humphrey seems to have increased his surburban strength
(29% up to 43% ) at the expense of core city support.
Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior
set by two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters
classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part
for his strength in surburban Los Angeles County.
3)
McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to
24 year old vote, and among liberals and professional -
executives he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous
primaries, McGovern had been finding consistently stronger
support among women; in Californias he did 15% better among the
men than did Humphrey, and only 3% better among the women.
There are several factors which are useful 11 at tempting
to
account for the better than predicted Humphre showing.
Wall Sheet fournal ad to students;
4) Bachanan implies we should
follow Humphreys example and seare
the hell out of the voters;
© Coloo
In addition to the debates
the other reasons her the Humplrey-
me Govern reoults are:
and left Colif forn. Mes + Houston indicating
1) me Govern peaced too seen he P.
2) Polls gave Humphrey for gronted;
woll Cohil
sympathy and hard warking labor
types;
3) Proposition 9's (envionment)
2-1 loss brought out templey voter;
all but Harper/
all believe the debates increased
The old
Aumphrey's vote total, se employing
rule - if alread, don't ddate-applies.
as to specific recommendations:
1) Fincle urges no attempt to lobel
me Goven a "flaming radical;" Rother
argue he's nain, otherwise his soft-
spollen TU manner will destroy the lobel;
2) Dent suggests a "crip, drip"
compaign on me Govern's stands without
p tial involvement;
appeal
an general and
3) Safere
on me Govern's honesty by destributing his
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
RAY PRICE
2007
SUBJECT:
Debates
You asked for my recommendation on how to handle the
question of debates.
First, on timing: If you were going to debate, I would
recommend letting it be known as soon as possible, so as not
to seem later to have been backed into it. Assuming you will
not, however (and I see no reason why you should), I would
urge not answering the question publicly now; to do so would
simply give the opposition a new political horse to ride at your
expense, and allow it to build up pressure. For the present,
you can simply say that you won't discuss campaign matters
until after the convention.
As for rationale, there are three basic arguments that I
think have powerful logic behind them -- the first two of which
you could make publicly, and the third of which could be made
in a background manner on your behalf:
1) It's unwise. A President, in the ultimate sense,
cannot and should not engage in free "debate. 11 His comments
must always be somewhat limited, according to a President's
sense of their potential impact around the world and according
to his private knowledges about sensitive, tentative situations
in stages of delicate development here and abroad. The national
policies of the United States should not be directly risked because
-2-
of domestic politics (they are indirectly risked, of course).
Even a no-comment or a decline-to-discuss posture by a
President could have major ramifications of an undesirable nature.
If it were possible to separate the incumbent as candidate
from the office of the Presidency, it would be another kettle of
fish; but this is not possible, and the office shouldn't be subjected
to it. Even though speaking as a candidate, you would be heard
as President not only in the U. S., but around the world -- and
people abroad might not be able to draw the distinctions.
2) It's unnecessary. There is no need for a debate to
clarify the details of a President's positions. His views, unlike
those of a non-incumbent, are already spread out in exact detail
on the public record of his actions in the office he seeks. It is
the challenger's views, and his differences with the President's
record, that the public needs to learn -- and the challenger can
educate the public on these points better or.just as well by himself.
3) It's silly. A debate is a bit of campaign theatrics that
clarifies nothing and does not contribute to public education on
the issues; in fact, it can do the opposite according to the trend
and emphases of the subject matter covered or not covered by the
debate. The only real purpose is to give a good forum to the
non-incumbent and any serious challenger should be well-financed
enough to purchase that forum himself. There is no requirement
or precedent anywhere that a President should help his opponent
campaign.
As for your 1964 insistence that LBJ should debate, I'd
answer that quite straightforwardly by saying that now that you
view it from the perspective of the Presidency, you think LBJ
was right.
SPEAKING,OUT
Saturday Joneney Part
As the G.O.P. candidate in 1960. Mr. Nixon participated in the nation's first
presidential TV debates. A former songressman, senator and President, he
now practices law for the firm of Nixon. Mudge, Rose, Guthrie and Alexander.
L.B.J.
SHOULD DEBATE
ON TV
A man who admits that a TV debate cost
him the Presidency attacks Lyndon Johnson for refusing
to confront the Republican candidate this fall.
By Richard M. Nixon
A reporter at President Kennedy's second
started the campaign as the less well-
hundred million people saw at least part
press conference, held on February T,
known candidate. By participating in
of the Kennedy-Nixon debates. Interest
1961 called the President's attention to
debates with him, Nixon gave him the
in the campaign, according to polls, rose
some remarks that his campaign man-
opportunity to remove that liability and
12 percent from the time of the first de-
ager. Robert Kennedy had made just
to fight the campaign out on even terms."
bate on September 26 until the last one
after the 1960 election. Robert Kennedy,
President Johnson faces the same prob-
on October 21, compared to a one per-
said the reporter, had "expressed some
lem I did. He is better-known than any
cent increase in interest during the same
doubt that one who was already President
one of the potential Republican nominees.
period in the campaign of 1956. Almost
would agree to debate with one who wants
He will be urged, as I was, not to give up
seven million more people voted in 1960
to be President."
this advantage by participating in tele-
than in 1956, whereas less than half a
"Could you tell us," the reporter asked,
vision debates. Or as Julius Duscha of
million more voted in 1956 than in 1952.
"to clear the air on this, whether, if you
the Washington Post reports, he may feel
This spectacular increase in the number
are a candidate in 1964, you would agree
that "he can do without debates because
of voters, according to most observers,
to debate?"
he believes he does better in other kinds
was due in large part to the interest
The President replied, "I would, sir."
of campaign appearances."
created by the television debates.
On two other occasions before his
But the issue of debates this year, as
Moreover, millions of Americans who
death, President Kennedy stated un-
in 1960, is much bigger than whether they
would never go out to hear a political
equivocally in press conferences that he
will help the Democratic or the Republi-
speech, or even listen to one on television,
would participate in television debates
can nominee. Television debates were not
tuned in to the debates to sec a fight and
with his Republican opponent.
designed to serve a candidate for office:-
stayed to learn about the issues. As a re-
A recent Gallup poll shows that 71 per-
they were designed to serve the public.
sult, the electorate in 1960 was probably
cent of Americans want to see the 1964
As Roscoe Drummond recently wrote,
the best-informed in the nation's history.
candidates debate on television. The net-
"President Johnson would, I believe,
As one who has been through the rigors
works have offered free time, and Con-
be doing a great disservice to the cause
of a presidential race, I am convinced
gress has removed the last legal obstacle
of bringing the campaign closer to mil-
that television debates are essential if we
by waiving the equal-time requirement.
lions of voters if he stands out against
are to have less costly and more thought-
But at this writing it appears that there
the debates."
ful campaigns. In 1860 Abraham Lincoln
will be no debates, because President
America's most distinguished political
ran for President without ever leaving
Johnson has repeatedly refused to partici-
observers have expressed similar views
Springfield, III. One hundred years later
pate in them.
with regard to the public interest in tele-
John Kennedy, from the time of the
Mr. Johnson's position is difficult to
vision debates. "The country gained in a
convention to the election, traveled
understand, not only because it is a re-
unique and promising experiment," wrote
44,000 miles in 43 states. In that same
pudiation of President Kennedy's deci-
columnist James Reston. Walter Lipp-
period 1 traveled 65,000 miles through
sion, but also because it is a complete
mann saw the debates as breaking down
50 states. As the nation approaches the
flip-flop from his own position in 1960,
"the synthetic candidates, the men who
200 million mark in population, only
when he urged me to debate and even
communicate with the public only by
television holds the key to less frantic
called for more than four debates.
reading speeches that other men have
and more contemplative campaigns.
On this issue 1 believe the great major-
written." And, to Dr. Malcolm Moos of
But television has become almost pro-
ity of the American people would agree
Johns Hopkins, the debates "presented
hibitively expensive. It now costs $11,000
that President Kennedy was right and
an opportunity for the voters to make
to buy 10 one-minute spots on a New
President Johnson is wrong.
judgments between the half-tints, the
York City station; the same time sells for
I suppose I should be the last person
semitones, the frequently small, but sig-
$3,150 in Portland, Oreg., and $3,500 in
to advocate television debates, in view
nificant, nuances that make up the differ-
Dallas, Tex. A large part of the almost
of what happened in 1960. Most observers
ence in American politics."
$20 million that was the reported cost
agree with Earl Mazo of The New York
I believe that television debates con-
of the 1960 campaigns went for the pur-
Times, who wrote, "If there had been no
tribute significantly to four major objec-
chase of television time. Such an addition
debates on television, Nixon would have
tives which are in the public interest:
to the already astronomical expenses of
been elected President." As the late
a bigger vote, better-informed voters,
running for office has menacing implica-
Claude Robinson, who did the polling
lower campaign costs, and, in the end,
tions for a society that should be con-
for our campaign, pointed out in a con-
a better President.
cerned with the potentially corrosive
fidential memorandum to me, "Kennedy
It has been estimated that over one
influence of money in politics. It was this
*One measure of a democracy's strength is the freedom of its citizens to speak
out-to dissent from the popular view. Although the editors often disagree with
the opinions expressed in Speaking Out, they dedicate the series to that freedom.
L.B.J. Should Debate
I had left the studio confident that I
son-but I'm not too sure. Stevenson
had driven across my arguments and suc-
might have won the first debate, but over
concern that caused President Kennedy
cessfully met my opponent's. Polls later
three or four debates Eisenhower would
to appoint a blue-ribbon panel headed by
indicated that a majority of those who
have worn better. The force of his per-
Chancellor Alexander Heard of Vander-
heard us on radio or read the debate in
sonality would have come through.
bilt University to find ways to improve
the newspapers felt that Nixon had out-
A very clever debater does not nec-
the financing of presidential campaigns.
scored Kennedy. But of those who saw
essarily make a good President. On the
The Heard Commission, aware of the
the debate on television, a solid majority
other hand, he is not likely to be elected,
$6 million worth of free time given by the
felt Kennedy had won. What irritated me
if debating skill is all he has. It's easy
television industry for the 1960 debates,
was that while I had put all my emphasis
enough to debate well, but on television
recommended that the law again be
on content, the thing that influenced the
other things come through. The TV
changed to allow debates in 1964. Con-
television audience was my appearance.
camera shows the man, and the people
gress has voted to change the law, but
I suppose 1 should have anticipated
sense his qualities.
unless President Johnson changes his posi-
that 1 might look worn and washed-out
As a result of our experience in 1960,
tion, there will, of course, be no debates.
on camera. Laid up for two weeks with a
I believe there could be some improve-
I believe the strongest argument for
serious knee infection, I had left the hos-
ments in the format for the television
debates is that they candidates put
pital four or five days before my doctor
debates in 1964.
on a better campaign, with the result that
wanted me to and embarked on two
1. In 1960 the candidates were ques-
the man who wins becomes a better
weeks of intensive campaigning, prop-
tioned by newsmen. 1 believe that, in ad-
President. As Prof. Harvey Wheeler
stopping across the country, making six
dition to this format, the candidates
pointed out: (1) Debates prevent a can-
and eight speeches a day. Two days before
should participate in some debates where
didate from waging a campaign on the
the debate I got a bad case of flu and was
they alone appear and are given the op-
basis of special-interest appeals-no
still running a temperature during the pro-
portunity to question each other.
longer can say thing when address-
gram. I had lost so much weight that my
2. Instead of having all the debates
ing labor and something else when ad-
shirt collar hung loosely on my neck, and
cover the waterfront, it would sharpen
dressing business. (2) Debates force a
my suit looked baggy. But although I was
the discussion to limit the debates toward
candidate to present a systematic pro-
physically exhausted, 1 didn't feel tired.
the end of the campaign to single subjects
gram; it becomes increasingly difficult,
As my doctor explained to me later, when
of greatest interest. One debate might be
for example, for a candidate to promise
your morale is high, you can go on fight-
devoted entirely to the subject of civil
a welfare program that is inconsistent
ing battle after battle, even though you
rights; another might be devoted to the
with his tax program. (3) Debates tend
are physically spent.
subject of our policy in Vietnam.
to make election issues out of problems
I was so intent on the battle that I
3. To assure that the debates are de-
for which there is no organized lobby,
never stopped to think about how I
cided to the greatest extent possible on
such as foreign policy.
looked. I have always detested makeup.
the basis of what the candidates say,
And, as Professors Elihu Katz and
1 don't like the feel of it or the idea of
rather than how they look, arrangements
Jacob Feldman concluded, "The debates
wearing it. All 1 did before the program
could be made to place the candidates
might make for a greater acceptance of
was to shave as closely as I could and
in separate studios so that lighting and
the winning candidate." The reason for
apply some powder with a "beard stick."
other technical factors could be adjusted
this, they say, is that "voters learned
If I had had a makeup man-as my op-
to suit each one's needs. (Such an arrange-
something about the candidate they op-
ponent quite properly did-he could
ment might have prevented an awkward
posed-they learned that he was human
have predicted the result: The powder
situation that arose during my debates
Voters also have the opportunity to see
failed to hide my beard but made my skin
with Senator Kennedy. 1 tend to perspire
the real man, not the synthetic product
look even paler.
in a warm room, and I perspired all too
of public-relations experts. For example,
freely in the first debate. So before the
in our four, hour-long debates, President
A diet of milkshakes
second debate, my staff arrived at the
Kennedy and 1 discussed over 50 major
studio first and got the air-conditioning
national and international issues without
After the program, as the unfavorable
going strong. When Kennedy's staff dis-
benefit of notes or ghost-writers. The
reports on my appearance began to come
covered this, the two sides almost came
voters could justifiably conclude that they
in, I changed my attitude. TV experts ex-
to blows. 1 remember that Bobby Ken--
were hearing our own views on each issue,
plained that makeup for television is not
nedy had a fine row with our TV man,
rather than the views of someone else.
the same as makeup for the stage. Its
trying to get the room warmer.)
Some who oppose debates argue that
purpose is not to make a person look
4. There should be at least one debate
it would not be in the best interests of the
better than he really does but to correct
between the two candidates for Vice
country for the President to participate
for unnatural effects produced by the
President. President Eisenhower's three
because, having knowledge of so much
TV cameras. So for the other debates we
serious illnesses, together with President
secret information, he might be forced
got the best TV makeup people we could
Kennedy's assassination, have brought
into making a statement that would be
find. My doctor put me on a diet of milk-
home to the American people with shat-
detrimental to the national interest.
shakes, and by the next program my
tering impact the immense importance
President Kennedy obviously did not
weight was up, and 1 looked a great deal
of the Vice Presidency. This year, more
share this view and, in 1960, when I was
better.
than any other time in American history,
Vice President, a member of the Cabinet
But even if 1 hadn't been able to cor-
the voters will be giving the qualifications
and the National Security Council, 1 also
rect my televised appearance, 1 still think
of the vice-presidential candidates the
did not share this view, although 100,
it wouldn't have made a crucial difference.
same thoughtful study that they give
knew all the nation's top secrets.
It is the man himself and what he says
those of the presidential candidates. A
1 cannot see how a President's engaging
that ultimately affect people.
television debate between the vice-
in debate differs significantly in this re-
In this connection, I recall my first
presidential candidates will assist the
spect from his week encounters at press
impression of Khrushchev. is decidedly
voters in making that evaluation.
conferences. When faced by his political
not an attractive-looking man. The first
Four years ago the United States took
opponent or newsmen, he always has the
time you see him, you wonder how a man
a bold new step forward in political
option of turning a question aside and
who looks so unprepossessing could run
campaigning. While the Kennedy-Nixon
saying, "No comment." And, in view of
a mighty nation. But, whatever we may
debates were compared to those of
the fact that President Johnson has of-
think of him, his strength gets across to
Lincoln-Douglas in 1858, the analogy
fered complete briefings to the Republi-
you. You feel the power of his personality.
was faulty. Lincoln and Douglas were
can nominee on all secret information,
Some people object that a meeting of
running for the Senate; 1960 marked the
his opponent would not try to gain an
candidates on television puts too much
first debate between American presidential
unfair advantage in case the President
emphasis on debating skill. Perhaps it
candidates. The Japanese even did us the
was forced to answer a question involving
does. But a President today must be
honor of copying our innovation, though
classified information in this manner.
quick on his feet, must be able to respond
with a slight variation-when Prime
Some object that when two candidates
to questions under pressure, must be
Minister Ikeda and his opponent dc-
confront each other on television, one
articulate. It may not have been nec-
bated before TV cameras, they paused
may have an unfair advantage-if only
essary in the world of 50 or 100 years ago,
to sip green tea between questions!
because some people look better on tele-
but it is today. Voters want to see the way
America has given the world a new and
vision than others do. I certainly can
a man handles himself under fire. A con-
exciting technique in democracy and
sympathize with this objection. 1 will
frontation on television is an excellent
we should not allow it now to be discarded
never forget my frustration after my first
test of a candidate.
in our own country.
debate with Senator Kennedy, when I
One might wonder who would have
learned how arbitrary factors of this sort
won if Eisenhower and Stevenson had
had affected the result.
debated on television. Some think Steven-
L.
analysis of me G note in 6/7 Cal
Effect of debate of Cal vote
operated on th. that debate
didnt help HI
Several people -all pere types
Teeler Dent moore
Find Routhanan
Tomerrow Begin evening due - 6: 30p
Magruder heRue (marils)
9
safire
Colson
Harper
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
Impact of the "Debates" at on the
SUBJECT:
Democratic Presidential Primary
in California
The question has 20 to whether the three
"debates" were in large part responsible for Humplrey's
highly improved showing on June 6 in California.
Having watched all three "exercises" and having been in
California on and of throughout the period involved, the
answer is unequivocally: Yes
Finch believes
Two points to be made before a discussion of the
debates themselves. First the Field poll showing McGovern
with a 20 point lead was patently wrong, if not dishonest.
As you know In the past Field has traditionally "over-
sampled" in the northern part of the state. But there is
no question but that at a point approximately two weeks
prior to the election McGovern had a clear lead probably
somewhere in the magnitude of 10 percentage points over
Humphrey, and this was fortified by unlimited money and
a superb organization. Even if you accepted- the Field u
poll at face value, it would have to be argued that the
13% undecided went over enmasse to Humphrey an unheard
phenomena.
The fo Ipwing comments relate only to the first two debates
since the third discussion, which included Horty, Chisholm
and a Wallace representative, must be treated separately.
While Humphrey was clearly "up-tight and on edge" in the
first debate, talking too much and reaffirming the prevalent
impression that most voters have of him, he did drive home
his points with regard to jobs, the high or uncertain costs
of various McGovern proposals and other extreme positions
taken by the South Dakota Senator.
- 2 -
In the second debate, Humphrey was much more appealing
and plausible, kept his answers more brief, did not
have to be interrupted to close his sentences and had
a more confident air. He did separate himself from
McGovern on the Prisoner-of-War issue and was clearly
appealing to the orthodox Democratic New Deal consti-
tuencies of labor, the farmer, the old and the minorities.
In
my
opinion, the third discussion, with the five
participants, had its impact on the election in a peculiar
way. Yorty tended to buttress Humphrey on his strong
defense position (and, of course, endorsed HHH the day
before the election), and Chisholm improved her visibility,
picking up 1% out of the vote of the Black community on
which Humphrey had been relying.
It
seems
to
that Humphrey's showing in Los Angeles,
San Diego and Orange Counties, as well as in the San Joaquin
Valley, showed that he wrang the most out of the orthodox
New Deal appeal and leaned heavily on his arguments on
defense levels and California jobs. He also appears to
have scored well with Catholics although he probably did
not exploit sufficiently McGovern's vulnerability in
the "Three A's" -- Abortion, Acid and Amnesty.
As the Los Angeles Times reported:
McGovern ran up big margins in San Francisco,
Alameda and Santa Clara counties, among others,
and this more than made up for the beating he
took from Humphrey in Los Angeles Orange and
San Bernardino counties.
McGovern cut into Humphrey strength in the
black communities but preliminary figures showed
he did not do as well as expected with Mexican-
Americans nor with some suburban voters.
A check of three predominantly Jewish precincts --
No. 2236 on Beverly Blvd., No. 2230 on N. Crescent
Heights and No. 2226 on Stanley Ave. covering
different economic groups showed Humphrey vinning
by a comfortable 20 percentage points -- 58% to 38%.
A check of blue-collar precincts in South Gate,
Bell Gardens and Bellflower showed Humphrey
beacing McGovern 54% to 33%.
- 3 -
McGovern staffers said the decision to go into
the three televised "debates" with Humphrey cut
into campaign time which had been allocated to
the blue-collar areas
As for the black vote, a check of four key precincts
-- two In the Watts area and two in Willowbrook --
showed almost a dead-even split between the candidates.
The
final
point
that care
be utilized
in not having our people attempt to characterize McGovern
as a "flaming radical." Rather, it can be argued that
he is terribly naive (i.e., his position on hoping that
North Vietnam would release our Prisoners-of-War once
we left), and totally unrealistic about fiscal matters.
In other words, his positions are "extreme" or "far out. "
The reason this is important is that he does come across
on television as a plausible, soft-spoken, trustworthy
sort of a man from the mid-West and this appearance
belies the gross stupidity of some of his statements
and programs.
*
Charles Kerch prediction
Actual results
Field Poll
(week of May 28)
(May 30-31)
McGovern
54%
45%
46%
Humphrey
26%
40%
26%
Wallace
9%
5%
8%
Muskie
40
2%
1%
Chisholm
3%
4%
2%
Yorty
2%
1%
1%
Jackson
2%
1%
1%
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HARRY S. DENT ASD
SUBJECT: Dent believes
Analysis of California Primary
Humphrey's attacks on McGovern's extremist positions, especially
welfare and defense spending, appear to have made the Democrat
primary closer in California. than by polls
and writers. This conclusion is based on contacts with Cali-
fornia leaders, newsmen, and a review of polls in The New York
Times (Yankelovich) and the Washington Post (Hart) and a tele-
phone poll (attached) taken by the RNC.
Most feel the Field Roll has never been too accurate. It
showed a 20-point lead. McGovern. claimed his poll showed 16.
Field himself told UPI his poll caused HHH to "get off his
dime and hit harder He thinks the 13% undecided went for HHH.
The RNC poll of 112 Democrats concluded the debates had a mini-
mal Impact for HHH, but those who were undecided tended to go
Dent more for notes HHH. that the (full Post articles alla attached
The Hart poll minimized the impact of the HHH attacks but
pointed out that undecideds were influenced more by HHH in the
closing days One of 3 voters said they decided on their candi-
date in the last 3 weeks. HHH carried these 5-4.
Some 53% of the Demo voters said they watched 1 of 3 debates.
They split on who won--16% HHH, 17% McGovern, and 20% said
even. The rest didn't watch. Of HHH voters, 30% said he won
and of McGovern's, 30% said he won
(Rull NVTarticles altached)
Yankelovich supports the view that McGovern's positions on defense
and welfare cost him votes. One in 5 found the debates important
- 2 -
in voting, the majority of these going for HHH. Yankelovich
says this raised HHH's vote by several points
The most damaging position of McGovern was his plan to drasti-
cally reduce defense spending. Among all voters, more than
1/3 expressed disapproval here. Among those voting for someone
other
than
McCovern,
the
disapproval
rate
rose
to
2/3
HHH hit heavy with full page newspaper ads the last week. Put
Livermore thought these attacks were effective. Tom Reed and
Lvn Nofziger gree especially Nofziger.
Newsmen who feel HHH hurt McGovern are Kevin Phillips, Bob
Novak, and Bob Semple.
An interesting point is that McGovern edged HHH out on the
black vote and did even better with the chicanos. This could
mean they learned more of McGovern's "handout" views through
the debates and ads. If so, this could also mean that the
more affluent voters moved away as they became better informed,
since McGovern barely won, even with a bigger than ever black
and brown vote.
Novak suggested at the Governors' Conference that the GOP begin
a steady drip drip" campaign against McGovern's extremism and
keep It going til election day.
Contacts with other Cali fornians confirm the view that HHH's
attacks helped.
The HHH attacks were not alone in closing the reported big gap.
Here are other factors:
1) McGovern peaked too soon.
2) Polls gave sympathy to HHH and caused labor and others to
work harder. They did a better "get out the vote" job than
McGovern's people, who did a good canvas job.
3) The President's trips hurt McGovern, and HHH acted and
- 3 -
talked like the President.
4) Proposition 9's 2-1 loss brought out people opposed to
leftist extremism.
5) California isn't as liberal overall as McGovern.
6) McGovern left for trips to New Mexico and Houston on
Monday.
RECOMMENDATION: That we begin to have surrogates et al, begin
the "drip drip" plan suggested by Novak, without Presidential
involvement. The first TV debate film should be properly edited
and used.
Republican
National
Committee.
June & 1972
To:
Harry Dent
From:
Ed DeBol
Re:
Survey on Effect of Humphrey-McGovern
Debates on the alifornia Primary
As you requested this morning, the RNC Political/Research Division
has attempted to measure the effect of the tactics employed by
Hubert Humphrey in the televised McGovern Humphrey debates.
During the day several hundred homes in the San Gabriel, San Fer-
nando Valley area around Los Angeles were selected at random and
contacted. The results were as follows:
Number of registered Democrats contacted
112
Number voting
77
Number that did not view at least one debate
51
Number influenced by debates
3
Due to the time factor the questionnaire had to be brief and the
sample selected at random. However, in general our survey indicated
that most voters had made their decisions prior to the debates and
that the debates by themselves had little impact on the outcomes.
Undertaking a project of this magnitude required the virtual shutdown
of the Research/Political Division for the entire workday.
The results of the survey and an analysis follow.
Dwight D. Eisenhower Republican Center: 310 First Street Southeast, Washington, D.C. 20003. (202) 484-6500.
RNC RESEARCH DIVISION
JUNE 8, 1972
DEBATE SURVEY: ANALYSIS
A special telephone survey of Los Angeles County voters conducted
on June 8, 1972, revealed the Humphrey-McGovern debates had a minimal
effect upon the vote preferences of those surveyed. Results of the
poll indicated that only 61 of those surveyed even watched any of the
debates and of those that did only 3 said these debates influenced
their final choice. (These results are hardly surprising considering
that Neilsen ratings showed that a Marcus Welby rerun and Cannon outdrew
the second debate among television viewers. As a campaign worker
stated after one of the debates, "The loudest noise in California
tonight was the clicking of television sets to other channels.")
In a survey taken by the Field Corporation at the end of May, Humphrey
was trailing McGovern by 20% (McGovern had 46% to Humphrey's 26%).
If the debates did not significantly contribute to Humphrey's gain in
the last week of the campaign, then one must ask what factors did con-
tribute to the Minnesota Senator's late surge. First, some overcon-
fidence among the McGovern forces was evident during the latter days of
the campaign. McGovern left California for two days during this period
to make visits to New Mexico (which held its primary on the same day as
California) and Houston, Texas, where he met with several Democratic
governors. Second, Humphrey probably picked up approximately an addi-
tional 2% of the vote through Mayor Yorty's endorsement (whose final vote
was about 2% below his showing in the Field poll). HHH may also have
been aided by the complicated write-in procedure of the California
primary, thus driving a few Wallace voters into the Humphrey camp.
Finally, if the Field poll is accurate, the bulk of Humphrey's gain in
the final days of the campaign must have come from undecided voters.
According to the Field survey, many of these undecideds were elderly and
black groups where Humphrey has traditionally enjoyed strong support.
Their final decision to vote for Humphrey appears to be more a product
of their traditional loyalties than of the influence of Humphrey's cam-
paign, particularly his strong attacks against George McGovern. (Nor
does our survey indicate that Humphrey's blasts at McGovern played a
decisive role in securing the votes of our respondents who voted for
Humphrey, since many of them (29) had decided to vote for him early
in the campaign before the initiation of Humphrey's attack strategy).
As is so often the case, many of the undecided voters appear to have
gone with their traditional favorite (Humphrey) on election day, after
having experienced some doubt over their choice when confronted with
McGovern's relatively "new" face and, perhaps, Humphrey's aggressive
attacks upon the South Dakota Senator.
CONCLUSION
The television debates were viewed by a relatively small percentage of
the Democrat voters in the state and even fewer have cited it as a
decisive factor in their final decision. It is more likely that other
factors i.e. overconfidence by McGovern forces, a cut-back on spending
in the closing days by the McGoverr campaign, etc., resulted in Humphrey
gaining ground while McGovern held the 15% attributed to him by the Field
Corporation poll a week before the election.
RNC RESEARCH DIVISION
JUNE 8, 1972
DEBATE SURVEY RESULT
Date of Survey: June 8, 1972
Actual Democratic turnout: 72%
True percentage of Democrats in L.A. County (excluding city) = 57%
I.
Question: Are you a registered Democrat?
Yes
No
Total
112 (53%)
98 (47%)
( If a registered Democrat, ask following question )
II.
Question: Did you vote in the recent California Democratic primary?
Yes
No
Total
77 (68%)
35 (32%)
( If answer is yes, ask following questions)
III. Question: For whom did you vote in the Democratic primary?
Total
Humphrey
33
McGovern
29
Wallace
5
Other
10
IV.
Question: When did you make VP your mind to vote for the Democrat
candidate of your choice ... a month or more ago;
two weeks ago or one week ago?
Humphrey
McGovern
Wallace
Supporters
Supporters
Supporters
One month or more
25
14
4
Two weeks
4
11
1
One week or less
4
3
0
-2-
V.
Question: Did you watch all, some, or none of the debates between
the Democrat candidates?
Total
All 3
9
1 2
33
None
35
VI.
Question: Did the debates between the Democratic candidates affect
your decision in voting in the California primary?
Humphrey
McGovern
Voters
Voters
Yes
1
2
No
32
27
Total registered voters in L.A. county (excluding city): 3,223,825
Total registered Democrats - 1,863,216
Republicans- 1,145,172
Unidentified- 215,437
Sample
N = 210
Women = (D) = 73
D = 112
Men = (D) = 49
R = 75
I = 23
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Some I essons of the California Primary
Safire had Dow commentson the Calif Pimay
1. The media has not emphasized the fact that McGovern won
by far, less than had been expected. They clobbered Muskie after New
Hampshire because he got "only" 48% -- no such bad luck for McGovern.
Lesson here is that we should expect less tear-down-the-frontrunner
help than usual, since McGovern is better attuned to most reporters
than, say, Muskie (too careful) or even Lindsay (too obviously
charismatic) or Humphrey (old story, no news). Why? Oddly,
McGovern is now enjoying much of what we had in 1966 and 1967 --
the man who came out of nowhere, who worked hard and long, who
deserves recognition. Also, Frank Mankiewicz is a pro with the press.
Also, most reporters who mold or follow liberal opinion (Wicker, Appel,
Haynes Johnson) are ideologically in his camp. In the news backwash,
however newsmags and columnists -- we can do a lot to slow his
momentum by pointing to his fade-out at the end.
2. Shirley Chisholm turned out to be Humphrey's spoiler.
Her 5% could have made the difference for Humphrey HHH broke
even with the blacks who did not vote for Shirley, but I think he would
have gotten most of hers.
3. Humphrey's last two weeks must have scared hell out of
Jews who had been leaning toward McGovern. The switcher issue here
probably was Israel, and the threat of McGovern's softness in the Mideast.
We should study closely what HIIIII did with the Lews in California the
last two wooks, I have a hunch that Jews will not vote for a candidate
because he is for aid to Israel (they all say they are) but will vote
against one whom they think is against Israel, or more accurately
would be weak in a showdown. This could be enormously significant
in New York, Illinois and California, not only in fundraising but in
vote patterns and is subject WO should do a lot of thinking about A
-2-
survey of the Jewish vote In the California primary depth stuff
ould be money well spent. (Mitchell So deri this)
4. Disenchantment should now become the anti-McGovern key-
word. Fifteen per cent of the California Democratic voters became
disenchanted with McGovern in the final two weeks, when they had
their first close look at him. Why?
My guess: Four-fifths became frightened at his positions because
of the Humphrey attack. A radical in sheep's clothing, and all that.
One fifth may have been disaffected because he backed off his
positions -- that is, he's not the purist he used to be. No longer a
virgin.
I would like us to exploit both these leads. Our tendency will be to
neglect the latter, figuring the radicals will never vote for us, and
concentrate on showing the centrist Democrat that he's in the hands of
leftists. This would be missing a good bet, because a large part of
his enthusiasm comes from the kids, and a large part of his basic
appeal comes from "honesty" if we can dramatize and ridicule the
McGovern Shift, we can erode both enthusiasm and honesty.
One specific way right now: Have the Youth Division of the Commitee
for the Re-Election of the President prepare this cheap flyer: a full-
sized reprint of the May 22 Wall Street Journal McGovern ad, in
which he shows he's not really a threat to free enterprise and says
that besides, Congress would never pass his proposals. Fold it in
quarters and headline it: "Here is McGovern's Special Message to
Wall Street: Not to Worry. W Then, in the margins around the re-
printed ad, write in the cGovern quotes that sharply conflict with
what is said in the ad, complete with red arrows between the two.
Message on the back: Maybe now Wall Street will trust McGovern
but now, can you trust him?" Distribute heavily on campus and in
areas where the Democratic left is strongest. Best, of course,
would be to have some other Democratic candidate do this, but that
is unlikely to happen, and it is too good a shot to miss.
Then we could use something like this to illustrate the point about
"disenchantment" (that's a liberal vogue word, associated with
F. Scott Fitzgerald, and can hang around McGovern neck like an
-3-
albatross) -- with something to peg it to, the media will go for it
in a big way, because it is perfect for the next swing of the pendulum:
the story about maybe George ain t the man he's cracked up to be.
We could help that along, taking the offensive on "credibility."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
From my knowledge only these can explain the precipitate McGovern
Buchanan esplains One me Govern drop by:
drop of fifteen
a) The Field Poll was wrong; I discount this -- as I have it from a
source that the Field Poll actually played down the McGovern spread,
which was larger than twenty points.
b) Humphrey attacks begin to pay off -- his attacks primarily on
defense cuts and jobs in California, on the welfare giveaways of
McGovern, on Israel and POWs. Despite the Humphrey stridency,
and panicky approach he must have sufficiently frightened many
people to convince 300, 000 to come his way. This I believe explains
it coupled with:
1. The Jackson and Yorty endorsements of HHH, which tended
to reinforce the Humphrey attacks on McGovern as a radical;
and
2. The surfacing in the California press of increasing numbers
of national Democrats calling GM an extremist, a guy who
will sink the whole ticket, etc.
What needs to be remembered is that for most of the nation, George
McGovern is someone they have become aware of for two weeks at
least two months at most. First impressions are favorable -- but they
are not firm impressions.
What seems interesting is that McGovern who was 46-26 over Humphrey
got just about that: 46%. But Humphrey was who went from 26% to 40%
in a week So, did McGovern really lose any votes? Or did HHH
simply pick up from all the other Democrats, and pick up all the
undecideds as well by scaring the hell out of them.
Buchanan
McGovern 'Weakness'
Located in Voter Poll
By JACK ROSENTHAL
The debates appeared to be
New York Times News Service
unimportant, however, com-
LOS ANGELES Substan-
pared with the substance. And
tial voter displeasure with his
positions on defense spending
the single most damaging sub-
reductions and welfare re-
stantive point for McGovern,
form appeared to have cut
according to the survey, was
deeply into Sen. George Mc-
his proposal to recalculate-
Govern's margin of victory
and sharply reduce-the na-
in Tuesday's California presi-
tion's defense budget.
dential primary.
Among all voters, more than
This was the major conclu-
a third expressed strong dis-
sion of a survey of 570 Dem-
agreement with this proposal.
ocratic voters as they left the
Among those who voted for
polls in 11 counties. The sur-
candidates other than McGov-
vey was conducted by the
New York Times and Daniel
ern, the disapproval rate rose
to two-thirds.
Yankelovich, Inc., a major
social and market research
concern.
The McGovern positions be-
came a focus of attack from
his principal rival, Sen. Hu-
bert H. Humphrey of Minne-
sota, notably in three na-
tionally televised debates be-
fore the election.
EVENING STAR 6/8/72
Proposal Ridiculed
In those debates, Humphrey
sharply assailed his South
Dakota opponent's call for a
reduction in defense spending
to $55 billion and ridiculed
his proposal to grant a $1,000
allowance to every needy
American.
As the debates began, the
statewide California poll con-
ducted by Mervin D Field
reported that McGovern held
a 20-point margin over Hum-
phrey. In the final election
returns, McGovern came out
5 points ahead, totaling 45
percent of the Democratic
vote.
Field blamed "voter volatil-
ity" yesterday for the discre-
pancy. He told United Press
International the undecided
voters, who were listed at 13
percent in the poll a week be-
fore the primary, probably
had decided on Humphrey.
Field also said the poll,
taken a week before the pri-
mary, "created an unprece-
dented impact on the cam-
paign itself. We have not wit-
nessed in the 26 years we have
been polling in this state any-
thing like the attention it re-
ceived in the media."
One in Five
The Tines-Yankelovich sur-
vey suggested that one voter
in five found the debates im-
portant in deciding which can-
didate to vote for. The major-
ity of these voters turned to
Humphrey. This appears to
have raised the Minnesotan's
proportion of the vote by sev-
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 8, 1972
CONF IDENT TAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
California Primary
Teeter argues that :
This memorandum will outline my observations with regard to the
effect of the Humphrey-McGovern debates on the apparent shift of
voters to Humphrey late in the campaign. My thoughts are largely
based on what I have gleaned from the Washington Post, the New
York Times, and the CBS polls and not on any data which I have
collected or had a chance to analyze. The following are the
important points:
not
1.
that there was a major shift from McGovern to Humphrey,
rather
there were a large number of voters who were
originally predisposed to Humphrey prior to the campaign and tem-
porarily moved into the undecided column by the McGovern campaign.
When they actually voted they voted their basic predisposition to
Humphrey. The fact that McGovern was a new, unique, and relatively
unknown commodity and the fact his campaign was a much larger, more
obvious and better financed effort than Humphrey's would have con-
tributed to the shift to the undecided category. This is a phonom-
CHON I in other elections where a "rising was
running against an older, well cotablished political figure.
The fact McGovern actually got about the same percentage in the
election as he did in the Field poll and also the fact that the
undecided voters in the Field poll were demographically similar to
the Humphrey voters would support this conclusion.
2. The debates seemed to sharpen the focus on several of
McGovern's extreme positions and locked him into those positions.
Apparently many of were unpopular with the numphrey
voters (older voters, blue collar workers, and Jews) This Pro-
bably contributed to a movement of undecided voters back to Humphrey.
3. McGovern sutspent Humphrey in the media by margin,
while the debates and subsequent reporting of them probably comprised
a large proportion of Humphrey's total media exposure. This expos
ure
ame
after
the
Field
Dell
was
conducted
and
at
the
time
when the shift back to Humphrey was occurring.
-2-
4. While I have not had to study the turnout figures,
the active business-labor campaign against the environmental pro-
position may have caused some disproportionate turnout of people
who were against the proposition and who were largely Humphrey
voters. This IS supported by the Yanks lovich survey which found
that a large majority of Humphrey's total vote voted against the
proposition while a Targe majority of McGovern supporters voted
for it.
5. The Field poll may have had some effect itself in giving
Humphrey some underdog votes while causing some apathy among
McCovern supporters although I doubt that this effect was very
great.
We will, of course, pick up primary vote on the California study
which we are starting next week which should give us some insight
into the nature of the Humphrey and McGovern support.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
California Primary
Columbelieve the debates had a very significant effect,
but
indicated
in
earlier memorande both candidates lost. Humphrey because
he looked mean and vicious as the attacker and McGovern because
he lost debating points on the issues to Humphrey. In retrospect,
while I had thought McGovern came out the better because of
his "good guy" image, it is now apparent to me that Humphrey
scored significantly on McGovern with his attacks.
that the Field poll was off as was the ABC poll and
that McGovern did not have a 20 point lead a week before the
primary.
On
the
other
hand,
I
he
had
better
than
the
5 point margin by which he won. He peaked early plus the fact
the debates did expose some extreme positions. Particularly in
the 3rd debate, McGovern looked very weak on the POW issue and
I would suspect that to anyone who was not a confirmed partisan
for either candidate that that would have had a significant effect.
I think Humphrey also scored very well not only in the debates
but in his general campaign on the aerospace and jobs issue. My
reports from labor sources indicate Humphrey was finally begin-
ning to gain momentum in the closing days on thatissue with the
blue collar worker
The New York Times' Yankelovich survey today is very revealing
on this point (attached).
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
June 8, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
SUBJECT:
Impact of California Debates
magracter
and
LaRue
believe
California debate between McGovern and Hupphrey served
a much needed forum for Humphrey to sharpen the issues between
the two candidates. Although the first debate did not have
large viewing audience, it served as an opportunity for Humphrey
to put McGovern on the defensive concerning his stand on reducing
defense spending to $55 million and welfare reform LO grant
a
$1000 allowance to all needy Americans Although neither the
public nor the media ever declared Humphrey the winner of the
debate, substantial damage was done to McGovern. The media
began to emphasize the attack by Humphrey. McGovern then occupied
the least advantageous position in the political arena - that of
being on the defensive. He spent the next several days trying
to explain his programs while Humphrey kept up the attack. This
was all news to Californians. Humphrey had little if any paid
commercials at this point while McGovern had begun saturation.
The second debate, viewed imprime time, presented Humphrey in a
much more conciliatory light. However, he kept questioning the
economic impact the McGovern defense cut would have on the working
man of California. In order CO tramatize his point Humphrey ashed
McGovern 'What do you plan to do with the air bases in California -
make them into golf links?" Again the results of the debate were
a toss-up, But the media still gave maximum coverage to Humphrey's
attack. Humphrey continued to Campaign furiously throughout
Gal
receiving
good
coverage
with
the
attacks.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
The third debate was generally a wash-out because, with five
participants ther major candidate was allowed enough time
to hit the issues. Yorty may have offered an added dimension
by attacking McGovern. Humphrey once again surprised McGovern
by challenging him alone to a fourth debate.
Analysis
The Hart Survey shows that 53% of the Democratic voters watched
at least one debate. As previously stated, the public on the
surface did not perceive either candidate as the clear cut
winner. The Hart Survey pointed out that 17% thought McGovern
won, 16% thought Humphrey won, 20% felt that it was a stand off,
and the remainder had no opinion. 30% of the Humphrey voters
thought that Humphrey had won the debates while 30% of the McGovern
voters thought that McGovern had won the debates.
The most revealing clue of the Hart Survey was one out of three
voters decided for whom they would vote during the last three
weeks (many during the debates). Of those voters, 5 to 4 voted
for Humphrey. Yandlovica
The Yan Ich Survey revealed that 1 out of 5 voters considered
the debates important in deciding for whom to vote. The majority
of those who relied on the debates favored Humphrey.
The Yank Yandlelovie Survey also indicated that more voters voted
against McGovern than against Humphrey. One fourth of the voters
preferred their candidate because they disliked their opponent.
Senator Humphrey received one half of these votes while Senator
McGovern received one third. It IS very probable that the debates
triggered many of these negative opinions because Humphrey for
the first ime was able to show the weaknesses in McGovern's
programs.
that 40%ol HH's vote
The survey also states
the nov. 7, while 40%
would go to the Pon
would to me Govern,
and 20% is undecided
CONF DENTIAL
- 3 -
Conclusion
It is our feeling that the debates served to put McGovern
on the defensive and to dampen the momentum of his well-
organized and well-financed campaign. McGovern probably
peaked several days before the election. It is difficult
however, to determine how much they contributed to Humphrey's
surge on Election Day. Other important factors were present:
1. The impact of the California poll may have
spurred Humphrey workers and caused complacency
in the McGovern camp.
2. McGovern's get-out-the-vote activity was not as
well coordinated as the voter identification
canvass.
3. Proposition 9 on the California ballot was a pro-
ecology issue. Most McGovern supporters were pro-9
and Humphrey supporters anti-9. Whitaker and Baxter
spent over one million dollàrs in an anti Proposition
9 P.R. campaign. This may have brought much of the
latent Humphrey support to the polls.
4. Humphrey campaigned much harder in the last days,
while McGovern went to New Mexico and to Houston
to the Governor's conference.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
(Dictated by phone
WASHINGTON
from Los Angeles)
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
H
FROM:
RICHARD MOORE
Moore
nota
Seems ikely that debates by themselves were/major factor
difference between field poll and final results. Field
poll was taken May 30 and 21 and cleased June 1. Poll
consisted of 857 comb] ted phone cal to self identified
Democratic oters.
Note however, that first debate where Humphrey was
on the attack and generally considered most effective had
already taken place when poll was taken and second debate
took place May 30 when poll was half completed. Only the
third debate which included Torty and Shirley Chissom
took place completely after poll. Incidentally, Los
Angeles audience ratings were 12% for first debate,
13% for second and only 6% for third debate. Ratings
in other California cities probably somewhat higher
but still each debate was probably not seen by 80%
in
of the voters. Reasons given by various observers
here for difference between the 20% McGovern lead and
actual difference of only 5% include the following:
1.
Fired itself generated over confidence by McGovern
workers and greater effort by Humphrey workers.
2. McGovern's refusal of a final debate and his
departure for New Mexico and Texas on Monday
hurt him seriously indicating over confidence and
taking California for granted.
3. As Teddy White told David Wolper, Humphrey has a
knack for a strong finish. On last two days,
Humphrey campaigned strenuously up and down State
with good TV coverage while McGovern was absent.
- 2 -
4. Nofziger reports that Al Barkan, political person from
COPE, came into State during last two weeks and the
labor effort appears to have been effective in closing
days particularly in Los Angeles County which Humphrey
carried.
Proposition 9 which lost by 2 to 1, attracted non-liberal
voters who might not otherwise have voted.
Finally, many suggest that although field poll may be
defective in commerical marketing, It has spotty record
in political poll and was probably wrong to begin with.
My total impression is that debates did help by generating
word of mouth of Humphrey's hard hitting attack and the
important factor was McGovern's departure.
Incidentally, Los Angeles Times attributes Congressman
Schmitz' defeat entirely to his opposition to the President's
China and Russia initiatives which is very encouraging
news from Orange County.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
ED HARPER
Rry
FROM:
ROY D. MOREY
SUBJECT:
Predictions VS. Results in
the California Democratic
Roy morey somanalyzed O Primary Calfornia results forttaym
Mirey
Five days prior to the election, Mervin Field, Director of the syndicated
believes
California poll, found that as of May 30 - 31 McCovern was favored by
46 percent of the state's Democrats to Humphrey's 26 percent. The
final vote in the California primary indicates McGovern with 44.
percent, Humphrey with 39.2 percent, Wallace with a 6.0 percent
write-m and Chisolm with 4.4 percent. Before analyzing reasons
for Humphrey better than predicted showing, lets first look at the
primary results.
The Results
Counties in which McGovern was particularly strong included (results
in thousands) Alameda (120-69), Marin (24-9), Sacramento (62-48),
San Diego (90-74), San Francisco (82-49), San Mateo (52-38) and
Santa Clara (95-00).
Humphrey's major strength was in Los Angeles County (553-472)
but he made a respectable showing in districts including Orange,
(83-70), San Bernadeno (43-35), and Ventura (25-20).
Significant sources of McGovern's strength were identified by Hart
Research Associates, Their figures show that while Humphrey had
been running as a two to one favorite among blue collar workers in
previous primaries, McGovern captured their vote by 46% to 38%.
In addition, Humphrey showed a decline among Black voters from
72% in the April Pennsylvania primary to 34% in California. McGovern's
popularity among the Blacks increased over the same period from
13% to 36%.
2
The data also demonstrates that urban voters feel that McGovern
is a better candidate by a margin of more than two to one; less than
two months ago, Humphrey held the advantage by similar margin.
Humphrcy seems to have increased his suburban strength (29% up
to 43%) at the expense of core city support.
Humphrey did well among the elderly (taking California's senior
set by a two to one margin) slightly less than half his voters
classify themselves as conservatives, accounting perhaps in part
for his strength in surburban Los Angeles County.
McGovern on the other hand captured more than 70% of the 18 to
24 year old vote, and among liberals and professionals - executives
he ran two to one ahead of Humphrey. In previous primaries, McGovern
had been finding consistently stronger support among women; in
California he did 15% better among the men than did Humphrey,
and only .3% better among the women.
A Last Minute Shift?
There have been a number of explanations advanced for the better
than predicted Humphre howing: The McGovern decision to leave
the state the day before the election; last minute sympathy vote for
Humphrcy; McGovern' position on the-issues as exposed in the
television lebates and elsewhere finally caught up with him. While
the is insufficient data to assess each of theories, there is
some evidence which should cast doubt on the significance of the
television debates in influencing voter decisions.
It may be argued that the debates and issues and positions exposed
in the debates account for the diminution of McGovern strength during
the final days of the campaign. This is a plausible theory, but difficult
to support. Only a little over half of the California Democrats (53%)
watched any of the three debates. Among those three watched, there
was a mixed reaction on the outcome -- 16% thought Humphrey came
out ahead, 17% said McGovern was the winner, and 20% thought the
debate produced a stand-off. In short, there does not seem to be much
evidence to suggest that the debate played an important role in either
insuring a McGovern' victory or in decreasing his winning margin.
There are several factors which are useful in attempting to account for
the better than predicted Hunrphrey showing. First is the matter of
voter volatility in primary elections in general, and the California
3
primary in particular It has been demonstrated elsewhere that
public opinion polling is a more risky enterprise in primary rather
than general elections.
More important, however, in explaining the apparent shift toward
Humphrey in the final days is the undecided vote. A week before
the election, the undecided vote was 13% in the Mervin Field poll
and most of this went to Humphrey on election day. This was
especially true among older voters who made up a majority of
the undecided group. The Hart boll conducted for the Washington
Post indicates that as much as a third of the voters did not make
up their minds until the last three weeks of the campaign and that
Humphrey picked up most of these late deciders.
In addition, there were early Wallace supporters who eventually
decided to forego a write-in and vote for either McGovern or Humphrey.
Humphrey picked up more of these nominal Wallace supporters than
did McGovern.
Weighing the Results
In assessing the results of the California Democratic primary, one
should keep in mind the size and composition of the electorate. Only
67% of California's 5. 1 million Democrats turned out for this election
Kennedy and Hartke
as compared with the and me Carthy 73% turn out in the 1968 contest between
We cannot assume that the 67% who turned out constitute a represent-
ative microcosm of the entire California Democratic electorate. As
Austin Ranney reports in the current issue of the American Political
Science Review, the make up of the electorate in primary elections
differs from the voters who turn out for general elections. The
Ranney data indicates that the primary voters tend to be more affluent,
better educated, with an over all higher socio-economic background.
They also tend to be more ideologically committed. Although there
were a few voter group/reversals for McGovern from his experience
in other states, the fact remains that his support in California tended
to be from those who are more likely to turn out for a primary election.
Among voters with incomes over $15, 000 he did as well as he has in
other states. McGovern out polled Humphrey among the better educated
and professional groups and he gained two out of three votes among
those who classified themsolves as liberals.
4
The VN war and the state of the economy (including unemployment)
were the major issues on the minds of both McGovern and Humphrey
supporters. Hence, it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction
between the two based upon positions taken on the issues. Humphrey
supporters felt he is committed to ending the war and favor his
stand on equality for Blacks and tax reform. McGovern supporters
tended to mention withdrawal from VN, a guaranteed minimal
income for the poor and his stand on tax reform. The distinction
drawn in voter's minds scem to be more a matter of style than
substance.
Judging from the success McGovern/had with the more affluent
and professional groups, there does not seem to be much evidence
to support the contention that those with incomes above $15, 000 were
scared into the Humphrey camp by talk of McGovern's income
redistribution scheme.
This year, the primaries have given voters an opportunity to express
their feelings of discontent and concern. This is reflected in the
successes of both McGovern and Wallace. However, the voter will
have to make a considerably different kind of decision in the general
election. In'the final analysis he is called upon to pass judgment
on whom he thinks should be entrusted with the responsibility of
the Presidency.
cc: Bradford Rich
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
Survey of California Voting
McGovern: New Constituency
By Haynes Johnson
nucleus of the Humphrey strength in
Govern among blue-collar workers by
Washington Post Staff Writer
other contests-the blacks, the poor,
a 46 per cent to 38 per cent margin.
LOS ANGELES, June 7 - Although
the urban dwellers, the blue-collar
(McGovern's principal pollster, Pat
George McGovern did not win the
workers, the ethnics-deserted him in
Caddell, estimated that McGovern took
California primary by the landslide the
California.
pollsters had projected, Democratic
47 or 48 per cent of the state's black
The most striking evidence of Mc-
voters in the nation's largest state
Govern's broader appeal came in two
vote to 43 per cent for Humphrcy and
handed him another kind of victory:
voting groups, the blacks and the blue-
that he picked up 57 per cent of the
for the first time this year he has
collar workers. In previous primaries
Chicano vote, 20 points ahead of Hum-
emerged as the candidate with the
Humphrey had been getting anywhere
phrey. But Caddell said Humphrey
most broadly based constituency.
from 70 to 80 per cent of the black
seemed to have won the Jewish vote
In other primaries his strength was
vote.
by 18 to 20 per cent and to have won
concentrated among young voters, af-
Humphrey also had been running
the blue-collar vote by 2 or 3 per cent.)
fluent suburbanites and liberals. Mc-
about 2-to-1 ahead of McGovern among
The Hart survey, of 847 voters in 26
Govern basically held that constituency
blue-collar workers.
counties throughout the state, also
yesterday, and ran significantly better
A survey by Hart Research Asso-
turned up other evidence of McGov-
among voters who previously had been
ciates conducted for The Washington
crn's increasing acceptance among di-
the strongest supporters of his op-
Post showed Humphrey actually losing
verse elements of registered Demo-
ponent, Hubert Humphrey.
the black vote by 2 percentage points
crats. Mexican-Americans voted for Mc-
Those voters who had formed the
in California and running behind Mc-
- 2 1
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
MCGOVERN BROADENS CONSTITUENCY
Govern by 61 to 31 per cent
What is intriguing about
for Humphrcy.
California-and unanswera-
In other words, people
Among voters with family
ble at this stage-is how the
who were undecided tended
incomes under $7,000 a year,
polls erred S0 badly here.
to be more influenced by
the two major contenders
McGovern came into elec-
Humphrey than McGovern
evenly divided the field.
tion day seemingly headed
in the closing days of the
Previously in the Pennsylva-
for a landslide victory. The
election
nia, Ohio and Maryland pri-
respected California Poll
:
The television debates are
maries the Hart/Post survey
conducted by Mervin Field
less conclusive
showed Humphrey running
showed him ahead by 20 per-
Some 53 per cent of all
anywhere from 2-to-1 to 3-to-
centage points. But as they
Democratic voters in the
1 over McGovern in that
have demonstrated all year
state, representing well over
in the privacy of the voting
category
a million persons, said they
booth, citizens refused to be
Finally, II 11 m l' y
had watched at least one of
catalogued in advance of the
standing among urban vot-
the three TV encounters
election.
ers plummeted in Califor-
But despite such wlde expo-
Various Theories Offered
nia. In California the urban
sure, neither candidate re-
vote represents one-third of
There are any number of
ceived a clear signal of sup-
the potential Democratic
theories being advanced to
port based on the way he
electorate. Yesterday Hum-
explain the far-better Hum-
came over the set
phrey took only 27 per cent
phrey final vote: that the in-
When asked which candi-
of that vote. In Pennsyl-
tensely personal nature of
date was the winner, the cit-
vania, by contrast, he had
his campaigning against the
izens responded this way:
held 45 per cent of the
odds spurred a last-minute
Sixteen per cent of all
urban vote and in Ohio he
sympathy vote; that Mc-
Democratic voters thought
took 53 per cent.
Govern's position on specific
Humphrey came out ahead
McGovern's margin rose
issues, including income re-
Seventeen per cent said
distribution and cuts in de-
McGovern
from 23 per cent of the ur-
ban vote in Pennsylvania to
fense spending, cast. new
Twenty per cent thought
doubt on his candidacy; that
;
the debates were a stand
52 per cent in California.
the television debates caused
off.
Suburban Vote Divided
a significant switch to Hum-
And the remainder didn't
The key to the eloseness
phrey.
watch,
of the California vote ironi-
None of these can be veri-
The same kind of incon-
cally lies in the one area
fied with any accuracy.
clusive breakdown C a m C
that had been the bastion
They remain theories.
among those who voted for
for George McGovern: the
The Hart survey data
either McGovern or Hum-
suburbs. The two candidates
does, however, give clues to
phrey
divided that vote yesterday.
what was taking place as the
or those who backed
And in California this group
election approached. Voters
Humphrey on Tuesday, only
makes up nearly half of the
were asked when they made
30 per cent thought he was a
Democratic electorate.
up their minds to support ei-
clear-cut winner in the de-
In Pennsylvania, Humph-
ther Humphrey or Me-
bates. Of those who voted
rey had carried 29 per cent
Govern. One out of three
for McGovern, the same fig-
of the suburban vote to Mc-
voters said they decided on
ure of 30 per cent gave their
Govern's 45. In California,
their candidate within the
man the clear edge.
Humphrey captured 43 per
last three weeks. Of these
cent of the suburban vote
voters, Humphrey beat
Marked by Bifterness
while McGovern won 41 per
McGovern by a 5-to-4 mar.
The Hart results do cast
cent.
gin.
light on another element of
Humphrey's strength was
critical importance to not
concentrated in one major
only Humphrey and Mc
area-sprawling Los An-
Govern, but to their party's
geles County.
chances against Richard
A reading of the Call:
Nixon in the fall. This cam-
nia returns thus clearly
paign was marked by a cur-
shows how successful Mc-
rent of bitterness, some-
Govern has been in estab-
times muted, sometimes
lishing himself as a candi-
flaring into the open, be-
date with wide political ap-
tween the two senators who
peal. His California standing
have been long time friends
has to be measured against
in Washington.
the time, only three months
ago, when he was largely re-
garded as a one-issue candi-
date who could not rise
above 7 per cent in the na-
tional polls.
1 3 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
On election day, that bit.
In other states, the issues
terness was most notably ex-
of inflation or taxes ranked
McGovern maintained his
pressed by the Humphrey
high, but the California vet.
position among young vot.
voters. Almost half of those
ers were saying yesterday
ers, liberals, the more afflu-
who voted for Humpbrey
that their economic prob-
ent and among professional
said they would support Mr.
lems are more acute and
groups.
Nixon if McGovern is the
more demanding of solution.
In California, as in other
Democratic nominee in Nov-
These two concerns, the
primaries, he took better
ember. Among McGovern's
war and the economy, will
than 70 per cent of voters
supporters, however, two
probably dominate the ac-
between the ages of 18 and
out of three said they would
tual presidential campaign.
24. With voters earning
back Humphrey if he wins
When it comes to distin-
more than $15,000 a year, he
the Democratic nomination
guishing between the two
did as well in California as
next month in Miami Beach.
leading Democratic candi-
in other states.
But a full 10 per cent of
dates, there is little in voter
Among voters classifying
the McGovern voters said
responses to distinguish
themselves as liberals, Mc-
they would not participate
them. A majority of the
Govern received two out of
at all in the presidential
Humphrey voters said they
three of the ballots cast. In
election if the choices are
thought he would honorably
the professional-executive
the same as four years ago
end the war. Only two other
category of voters, Mc-
-another Humphrey-Nixon
issues were strongly asso-
Govern received a clear-cut
match.
ciated with Humphrey in
majority, running more than
Implicit in these findings
their minds. These were his
2-to-1 ahead of Humphrey.
is a potentially-perilous situ-
positions on full equality for
In a political season of
ation facing the Democratic
blacks and on tax reform.
contradictions and confu-
Party. They raise the pros-
For McGovern, two out of
sion, these elements among
pect of a party SO badly di-
three of his supporters men-
the voters remained con-
vided that the Republicans
tioned his call for immedi-
stant factors. There was one
could be returned to office
atc withdrawal of American
group in the California elec-
as a result.
troops from Victnam. And
torate, though, that defied
On the surface' that is
almost half cited his stand
the standards set in other
comforting news for the
on guaranteeing a minirum
primaries.
President and his party. But
income for the poor. About
McGovern had been doing.
a careful qualification has
40 per cent mentioned his
consistently better among:
to be added to that equa-
tax reform proposals.
women voters all across the
tion.
The voters seemed to per-
country. The Hart survey
In trial heats among Dem-
ceive the men in different
yesterday turned up yet an-
ocratic voters yesterday,
both Humphrey and Mc-
ways. McGovern supporters
other contradiction to the
were more inclined to stress
political norm.
Govern scored substantial
victories when pitted face-
his stand on specific issues
In California George
to-face against Mr. Nixon.
than his personal. qualities,
McGovern ran significantly
better among men than
The figure for Humphrey
while the Humphrey back-
was 68 per cent to Mr. Nix-
ers spoke more about their
women, holding a 15-point
on's 21 per cent. McGovern
man's personality, his speak-
spread over Humphrey
topped the President by 66
ing ability, his warmth and
among men but only 3 per
sincerity.
cent among women.
to 28 per cent.
Whether that is an indica-
Findings Confirmed
Support of Elderly
tion of further change in a
These confirm the find-
ings of other published polls
In only one segment of
changing electorate or
this week that showed Mc-
the voting population did
merely a qulrk of California
Humphrey maintain the
no one can say. Even the
Govern beating Mr. Nixon
strength he has demon-
pollsters won't venture an
camong all California voters.
strated in other primaries.
opinion of why that is SO.
Simply put, this means that
the President has problems
Voters aged 65 and over,
and those who are retired,
This story is based on inter-
in California, the largest
gave him a lopsided 2-to-1
views conducted for The
state and a state that he car-
margin over McGovern.
Washington Post by Hart Re-
ried in both 1960 and 1968.
search Associates of Wash.
His California consti-
Another way of looking at
ington. The company inter-
tuency was marked by an-
the relative strength of the
viewed 847 California voters
other aspect. Slightly less
President in his native state
in 26 of the state's 58 coun-
than half of his voters clas-
can be seen in examining
ties. These voters represent
sified themselves as conserv-
the issues cited by the vot-
92 per cent of the potential
atives. That, perhaps, ex-
ers. In California, as in
Democratic electorate in Cali-
plains his strong showing
other states, the war ranks
fornia. The voters were con-
among Los Angeles County
as the greatest concern of
suburban voters. In Califor-
tacted immediately after they
most voters. But close be-
cast their ballots in Tuesday's
nia, and particularly South-
hind that is another prob-
presidential primary election.
ern California, the makeup
lem. To a striking degree,
The purpose of the interviews
of the suburbs differs from
California voters yesterday
those in other sections of
was to determine why people
singled out the problems of
the country. Here, the sub-
vot d as they did and to de.
unemployment and job seen-
termine the kind and depth
urban voter generally is
rity as being of paramount
of support the major Demo-
more conservative.
importance.
cratic candidates enjoyed.
This is the last of n series of
similar voter surveys carried
out for The Post by Hart Re.
search on the 1972 presiden-
tial primary elections.
- 4 -
THE WASHINGTON POST
Thursday, June 8, 1972
4-Primary Record
of Rivals' Strength
By a Washington Post Staff Writer
LOS ANGELES, June 7-The changing nature of the
McGovern-Humphrey constituencies is shown in the
following table, based on voter surveys conducted in
four presidential primaries by Hart Research Associates
for The Washington Post.
Pennsylvania
Ohio
Maryland
California
April 25
May 2
May 16
June 6
Urban Voters
%
%
%
%
Humphrey
45
53
48
27
McGovern
23
34
13
52
Suburban Voters
Humphrey
29
33
22
43
McGovern
45
49
37
41
Blue-Collar Workers
Humphrey
43
54
33
38
McGovern
19
35
16
46
Blacks
Humphrey
72
80
67
34
McGovern
13
16
12
36
Low-Income Voters
1
Humphrey
44
59
34
42
McGovern
20
32
12
42
To: L. Higby
X
From: Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
'72 JUN 8 AM
June 8, 1972
11:10
SPEECH INSERT
My friends, Senator McGovern's followers tell us that the
Senator is a sincere man, a candid man, an honest man -- a man
who means exactly what he says.
And when Senator McGovern says he is going to build the bi ggest
welfare program this nation has ever heard of -- one thousand dollars
to every man woman and child in the country -- and make the Middle
Class pay for it, I take him at his word.
And when the Senator not only introduces in the Senate, but twice
publicly embraces a $6500 guaranteed annual income -- I think the
Senator means it.
And when Senator McGovern tells us he would put on the scrap
heap nine of our fifteen aircraft carriers, 80 percent of our naval
squadrons, half our surface fleet and halt to two-thirds our American
bomber force -- I think he means exactly what he says.
And when Senator McGovern says that he would reduce the American
armed forces below the level of pre-Pearl Harbor, I think that's
exactly what the Senator would do.
-2-
And when Senator McGovern votes in favor of racial balance in
every major metropolitian area in America, and when he says that
forced bussing is an "essential" to achieve compulsory integration,
I think he means exactly what he says.
I think that some of the Senator's views are radical, extremist
views -- but I believe the Senator means exactly what he says. I
believe he is an honest, sincere, committed radical.
#######
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
The President
FROM:
Harry S. Dent
HED
SUBJECT:
Primaries: California
New Jersey
New Mexico
South Dakota
George McGovern won all four primaries Tuesday to give him
over 900 delegates and clearly establish him as the biggest
vote getter, delegate winner, and primary victor on the
Democrat side. He appeared to be winning by 9% in California
with 56% of the vote counted. Wallace, getting a 5% write-
in vote there, pulled a surprise in New Mexico, finishing
second with 29% and half the delegate votes -- all without
any campaigning.
The President held Ashbrook to 10% in California, while
McCloskey got 6% in New Mexico and one delegate vote.
Senators Eastland, Case, and Metcalf won their primaries.
In South Dakota, Rep. Abourezk will be pitted against
either ex-State Senator Robert Hirsch or Attorney General
Gordon Mydland. (Convention to decide because Hirsch didn't
get 35%).
James Meredith was defeated in the Mississippi GOP Senate
primary by VW dealer Gil Carmichael 80% to 20%.
McGovern won all 271 delegates in California, 9 (half) in
New Mexico, all 17 from South Dakota (no competition), and
at least 59 of New Jersey's 109. McGovern expects 80
votes from New Jersey.
Page Two
June 7, 1972
There was no direct head-to-head vote count in New Jersey.
McGovern's slate leader got 30,000 more votes than HHH's
leader with 80% of the vote counted. It was a defeat for
the old Demo machine.
CBS projected only a five point victory margin for McGovern
in California. He won big with youth and split the black
vote in California and New Jersey. Los Angeles and Orange
County almost pulled the Hump through.
HHH says he will keep on, but told his supporters he will
see that the Demos are united to beat RN.
CBS also projects 1266 delegate votes for McGovern at
convention time to 540 for HHH.
McCloskey beat his two primary opponents 24,000 to 17,000 each.
The President's delegate count now stands at 818, with
674 needed for nomination.
In New Mexico, the Demos nominated ex-State Rep. Jack
Daniels to contest with 1970 GOP' gubernatorial candidate
Pete Domenici who easily knocked off Dave Cargo. in the
U. S. Senate race.
VOTE FIGURES (UNOFFICIAL)
CALIFORNIA
DEMOCRAT PRIMARY (With 62% precincts reporting)
MCGOVERN
969,243
47%
271 delegates
HUMPHREY
791,034
38%
WALLACE
109,979
5%
CHISHOLM
91,162
5%
MUSKIE
46,161
2%
YORTY
27,420
1%
MCCARTHY
21,808
1%
JACKSON
18,320
1%
LINDSAY
17,456
1%
REPUBLICAN PRIMARY (With 61% precincts reporting)
RN
1,200,921
90%
96 delegates
ASHBROOK
130,787
10%
NEW MEXICO
DEMOCRAT PRIMARY (With 96% precincts reporting)
MCGOVERN
48,812
33%
10 delegates
WALLACE
43,378
29%
8
HUMPHREY
38,260
26%
0
MUSKIE
6,497
5%
0
JACKSON
4,241
3%
0
CHISHOLM
3,168
1%
0
NONE SHOWN
3,417
2%
-
REPUBLICAN PRIMARY (With 96% precincts reporting)
RN
48,793
89%
13 delegates
MCCLOSKEY
3,300
6%
1
NONE SHOWN
2,557
5%
note
names
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: DeVan L. Shumway
(202) 333-7060 #6-56a
WASHINGTON, June 15 -- More than 2,500 black leaders from all
parts of the country gathered in the nation's capital Saturday
and heard former CORE Director Floyd McKissick declare that,
"If you have a two-party system or the semblance of a two-party
system, it's stupid for all black people to be in just one."
McKissick also told the guests at a $100 a plate dinner
sponsored by the Black Committee for the Re-election of the
President; "It's a new day, brothers and sisters."
"Who created the ghetto?" McKissick asked. "President
Nixon didn't create that ghetto."
"Who created the war? President Nixon didn't create the war
in Vietnam. But he's tried to get us out."
McKissick was one of several national black leaders who
praised President Nixon, prompting Paul R. Jones, Executive Director
of the Black Committee for the Re-election of the President to
note, "A lot of people are going to be surprised this year. The
President only received 12% of the black vote in 1968, but he's
going to do much, much better this time because he's earned it."
Others attending the dinner were: Mayor Robert Blackwell of
Highland Park, Mich., who served-as Master of Ceremonies; Dr.
Charles Hurst, President of Malcolm X College, Chicago; Mark Rivers,
President of Watts Manufacturing Company, Los Angeles; former CORE
(more)
2-2-2-2
Director Floyd McKissick; professional football great and
motion picture star Jim Brown, C. A. Scott, Publisher of
the Atlanta Daily World, the oldest black newspaper in the
nation; W. 0. Walker, publisher of the Cleveland Call-Post;
baseball Hall of Famer Jackie Robinson; Arthur Fletcher, former
Assistant Secretary of Labor and President of the United Negro
College Fund; jazz immortal Lionel Hampton, who presented a
Cavalcade of Music for the evening's entertainment; recording
star Billy Eckstein; former Dodger star Don Newcombe; and
2,500 others.
-30-
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: DE VAN L. SHUMWAY
(202) 333-7060
#6-56b
WASHINGTON -- Although President Nixon could not be present at the
black fund-raising dinner for his campaign in the nation's capital
Saturday, he sent a message which was read to the more than 2,000
black leaders attending. The message was read by his younger brother,
Edward C. Nixon.
The text of the President's message:
It is a special privilege as well as a great pleasure to send
my heartiest greetings to this gathering of supporters from across the
nation. I wish it might have been possible to join you this evening
so that I could tell you how deeply I share your sense of pride in the
many achievements you have brought to the nation through your positions of
leadership in the black community.
It is gratifying to know of your willingness to help in the
coming campaign, for 1972 will truly be a year of decision for all
Americans. It will be a year when we continue to move forward together
with the proposals offered by this Administration -- to reorganize
government, to further our efforts in returning dignity to the common
man, and to bring prosperity to all our people and a lasting peace to
our troubled world.
We have an immense challenge before us, but with your backing we
will meet it entirely. For your support will inspire countless others
to join our cause, one which seeks to make government the effective
servant of all its citizens rather than to enslave them under the heavy
hand of bureaucracy. Ours is to insure freedom for all men and women
to pursue the vast opportunities of America on an equal basis.
Richard Nixon
- 30 -
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT: DeVan L. Shumway
202/333-7060
#6-56c
WASHINGTON -- "IT'S A NEW DAY, BROTHERS AND SISTERS," Floyd McKissick,
former Director of CORE and Developer of Soul City, N.C., told more
that 2,000 Black leaders gathered at a fund-raising dinner for
President Nixon's campaign Saturday in the Nation's capital. In this
photo, taken at the dinner, McKissick is joined in conversation
by Special Assistant to the President Robert Brown (1), Nixon Campaign
Director John N. Mitchell (2nd from right) and Rev. Dr. William Holmes
Borders, Pastor of the Wheat St. Baptist Church, Atlanta, Ga. (R).
McKissick said, "President Nixon didn't create the war in Vietnam,
but he's tried to get us out."
-30-
it,
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 13, 1972
NE Met Tope 6/15 FU
2:55 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
LARRY HIGBY
FROM:
ALVIN SNYDER AS
Attached is a transcript of McCovern's comments
on CBS radio last night.
6/14-58m will has send + CC
CC: Charles Colson
Ken Clawson
Mort Allin
RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4435 WISCONSIN AVE. N.W., WASHINGTON. D. C. 20016, 244-3540
FOR
COMMITTEE FOR THE REELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
PROGRAM
News
STATION
WTOP Radio
CBS Network
DATE
June 12, 1972 10:00 PM
CITY
Washington, D.C.
COMMENT BY SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN
STUART NOVINS: Presidential candidate George McGovern
said in New York he rejects the advice of those who want him
to moderate his positions. The story by Connie Chung.
CONNIE CHUNG: McGovern admitted tonight that even some
of his advisors, in addition to political leaders, have suggested
he move away from the left of the political spectrum. Speaking
in a Bronx rally, he added, however, "the people are not looking
for a leader who stands in the middle of the road. They are
looking, instead, for a man who stands for change."
SENATOR GEORGE McGOVERN: I'm being advised every day
by the poltical pundits, by some of my advisors, that I ought
to move toward the center. Well, let me say that we have demonstra-
ted in one election after another during the past year that
the center is moving to us.
CHUNG: McGovern will make his pitch to union workers
tomorrow when he tours factories and plants in upstate New York,
hoping labor will lean towards his way of thinking.
Connie Chung, CBS News, New York.
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON. D. C.
LOS ANGELES
NEW YORK
DETROIT
NEW ENGLAND
CHICAGO
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
June 14, 1972
E.O. 1.0 3, contion 6-102
By EP , 4-1-82
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR :
CHARLES COLSON
FROM 1
L. HIGBY
After discussion with Bob and Buchanan regarding the Buchanan
assault memorandum, the following conslusions were reached:
4 It probably would not be that productive to forward
the memorandum to Belsano and Regers, and he suggests
that we not do it since Buchanan does not want the
memorandum to receive wide circulation.
2. Anybody who does look at the memorandum should do
so only for the basis of getting comments back in to you
and Bob as to their thoughts. No actions should be taken
based on the memorandum until some basic strategy
decisions have been made and we all agree that it is time
to move ahead.
3. It would be valuable for Hallett to take a look at the
memorandum on a confidential basis and write up his
critique of it, plus cover any additional points that he
feels should be made that Buchanan has overlooked.
In addition, Hallett should specifically address himself
to the following points:
a. The Buchanan memorandum overlooks our
strong point in foreign policy. We need some-
one to write the case in this area.
b. We need to do an addendum to the Buchanan
memorandum that takes up the point of how we
attack McGovera in a way that builds the President's
foreign policy image.
2
c. Someone needs to develop a battle plan as to
what the holes are in the Buchanan piece.
d. What are the four things that we want to come
out versus how we refute McGovern's points.
Have Hallett give this a try and forward his results to Bob.
LH:pm
JUNE 15 # 2
A216
a$16
I 1bylvvyyxlX
Republicans Bjt 460
By MIXE SHANAHAN
Associated Press Eriter
WASHINGTON AP - For the first time, Republicans charged with
re-electing the President are viewing the potential candidacy of Sen.
George McGovern with genuine concern.
Until the California primary most staff members on the Committee for
the Re-election of the President were hoping McGovern would be the
nomines because they ware sure he could be beaten handily, according
to Rowublican political sources.
But now the South Dakota senator is viewed by political pros
including campaign director John N. Mitchell, as a ran whose string
of primary victories make him an opponent to be rechoned with.
Compounding this and more frightial to a Republican success, say
the scurces, is the possibility of Sen. Edward N. Kennedy, I-Mass.,
joining the McGovorn ticket as a vice presidential candidate.
Recently, they say, Konnedy had been dropped from Republican-financed
polls taken on potential opponents to Nixon.
But since Konnedy said in a newspaper interview he wouldn' completely
excl do the possibility of accepting the vice presidential nomination,
his name will probably be added to the surveys, the sources said.
In a meeting with the campaign staff this week, Mitchell, the former
attorney general, used tough language in outlining the beginning
of the Revublican election campaign.
Ironically, Mitchell ordered heavy cmphasis on grass-roots political
organization, the formula most political analysts agree is the key
to McGovorn's SUCCESS so far in collecting over two-thirds of the
delegate votes needed to lock up the Democratic presidential
monination.
One source quoted Mitchell as saying, "Goddamn 1t, forget all this
media stuff. Let's get out and find out Where the vote 18 and get it
out.
A staff man was also quickly dispatched for the first time to stay
with the McGovern carrign and find out the strength of his
organizational structure, how 1t really works in the states.
To vant to find out what makes it tick, on the assumption
they'll do the same thing if he gets the nomination, the so rce
said.
Staff members once believed Son. Eimund S. Muskie of Maine or Son.
Hubert H. Humphrcy of Minnesota were the only two Democrate who had
the slightest chance of beating President Kixon.
Now that bolinf, spurred by Mitchell's talk. is out the window.
The California primary also sparked a near doluge of offers from
wealthy contributors particularly from California and New York.
"One ran had to make a hurry-un trip to New York to meet with 15
people the manted to contribute large amounts of money, " another
source said.
Ee said the contributors, mostly bankers and industrialists, are
deoply disturbed by some of McGovern's proposals.
sr220ped June 15
MEMORANDUM
E
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
APRIL 25, 1972
FOR BOB HALDEMAN
John would appreciate having your thoughts on the
attached.
Many thanks.
Tod R. Hullin
Attachment
pard
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 10, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
Attached is Ed Harper's memo on the establishment
of a quick response research capability for the
Presidential campaign. I have made some marginal
notations, and would also appreciate any guidance
you might have before I sit down and review this
with Ed.
Please return.
KEN COLE
Attachment
E-review -
THE WHITE HOUSE
DEVELOPM AN
LIKING
WASHINGTON
E.O.
6-102
By EP
41-82
CONFIDENTIAL
April 4, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR KEN COLE
FROM:
ED HARPER Ed
SUBJECT:
Quick Response Research Capability
This memorandum describes (1) the need for a quick response
research capability to support the President during the coming
campaign, (2) the work already underway to develop that
capability, and (3) the decisions which need to be made in the
near future to insure that capability. This memorandum is not
designed as an action document, but as a discussion document
which we might use to define further our problems and alter-
native responses.
THE NEED
All speeches and statements the President makes are must be backed
up by authoritative research to insure that they it is (1) factually correct,
(2) consistent with his established policy positions, and (3) issued
with full recognition of secondary programmatic, political and
budgetary implications. Present procedures for research back-up
for the President's speeches and statements may not suffice under
campaign conditions.
The nature of the President's participation in the campaign between
the convention and election day is as yet undecided. Campaign
requirements might differ little from present research back-up
requirements if the President strictly adhered to a rigidly set
schedule and only used speeches written in advance. On the other
hand, research back-up requirements would differ significantly
if the President travels for extended periods of time using a stump
speech with new sections for each stop and issuing statements on the
campaign trail.
:
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
Even if the President does decide on a rigidly set schedule for
his campaign involvement, Ray Price feels that special research
and writing support will be necessary for several reasons. First,
even if we plan to get the speeches done ahead of time, Ray Price
doubts that we would get them all done. Second, the President
will probably generate new policy ideas on the campaign trail
which he will want to use immediately in his speeches. Third,
the President will probably want to issue statements from the
campaign plane commenting on the proposals of the Democratic
candidate.
The research support operation will need to have a wide variety
of data and analysis instantly available to the President no matter
where he is. The data which should be available include:
A. Issue and answer data including the opponents' arguments
on all major current issues.
B. Supporting data including-
1.
Demographic data
2.
Key issue and program data
3.
Political data
4. Historic background data
C. Democratic contender's positions on the major issues.
The President should also have available wherever he is instant
(a few minutes) analytic capability as well as a fast (a few hours)
analytical capability.
Instant analytical services could be available by having a senior
IDE?
?
research man aboard the candidate's plane. From their 1968 and
1970 experiences, Bryce Harlow, Martin Anderson, and Alan
Greenspan all see this as a necessity. Martin Anderson said that
the Administrative people "will give you 10,000 reasons why there
should not be a research man on the candidate's airplane, but you
must insist that there be a man exclusively devoted to research or
everyone will be sorry in the end. 11 Martin noted that on many
occasions, if he had not been there to check facts, they would not
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
have gotten checked because everybody else was frantically busy.
Bryce felt a research man is important for other reasons: "You
need to have somebody with a different perspective from the
speech writers, political people, and advance men when you are
cranking out messages and statements in the heat of the campaign. 11
Fast (a few hours) analytical services can be made available to the
President by having the research man on the plane able to get in
touch quickly with our top Domestic Council policy person on each
here
issue. This requires good communications facilities. Based on
1968 and 1970 experience, the research man on the plane should
have available to him a telephone, a TWX, and a DEX.
In unusual emergency situations when the appropriate Domestic
Council staff member is unavailable, the research man on the
plane should work with the appropriate OMB or CEA issue analyst.
Peter Michel could be particularly helpful in assisting the research
man organize fast, analytic responses to specific problems. Only
if no Executive Office personnel are available should the research
man directly contact agency analysts. For emergency purposes,
the research man on the plane should have a list of appropriate
OMB and agency analysts to call on every key issue.
WORK UNDERWAY
A number of projects are underway to build a solid data foundation
and put in place a fast analytic response capability for the campaign
effort.
The following is a list of data gathering projects and their status:
1. Issues and Answers - A system for updating on a weekly
basis an "Issues and Answers Book, 11 including the
opponents' arguments, has been established and will
be in high gear by campaign time.
2. Demographic Data--Standard demographic works as
well as political atlases are being collected.
:
CONFIDENTIAL
4 -
3. Key Issues and Program Data--Federal program
expenditures on a state, county, and city basis are
being prepared. Significant statistics about each
of the major issues have been identified and will be
produced on a state-by-state basis and on a city and
county basis where available.
4. Political Data--Political data for each state is being
collected which will include electoral records, key officials'
and contenders' issue positions. Political and issue polls
are also being collected on a state-by-state basis.
5. Historical Data--Good reference works on U. S. history
and state histories are being collected.
6. Contenders' Positions--Records of the contenders' issues
positions are already being kept and some analyses of their
most important policy proposals are being made. A major
effort to analyze the contenders' policy proposals will be
made as soon as the most likely Democratic candidate can
be identified.
line thought
7.
Fast Response Capability- I shall put together an issue-
~
oriented phone book, as campaign time approaches, which
will list every concievable issue and the two or three top
?
who should handle that issue on the Domestic Council, in
OMB, and in the agencies.
The fast analytic response capability is being developed
through the issues and answers process described above.
The process established for developing the issues and
answers involves identifying key agency personnel who
are able to answer questions about each major contemporary
issue. Through this process we will have identified the
better analysts in the agencies as well as the Executive
Office and have them used to producing useful materials on
a fast turnaround basis.
CONFIDENTIAL
- 5 -
DECISIONS TO BE MADE
If you concur in my general assessment of the problem and how it
should be handled, I do not feel that we will need to add any staff
beyond some summer interns before the election. The key
decisions that do have to be made relate to logistics:
First, after having talked with Bryce, Martin, and Alan, I feel
that I must strongly recommend that plans be made to have a
research man travel on the campaign plane. Our earlier idea
that John Ehrlichman handle this responsibility will probably not
away i this
work because undoubtedly if John is around, the President will
have him doing things other than checking out facts and doing
research.
Second, the campaign plane and the campaign stop-over places
should have communications facilities for the research effort
including a telephone, a TWX, and a DEX system. Some of these
Hurt
facilities could be used for other purposes, but let us be sure not
to skimp on these critical facilities.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
May 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAT BUCHANAN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
During the Russia trip would be an excellent time to
prepare the basic attack materials for the campaign.
Your periodic reports on the information gathering
systems on the Democratic contenders indicate that
the RNC, 1701 (November Group) and Mort Allin have
the raw data. This bulk of material should now be
culled for the most egregious quotes by Humphrey,
McGovern, O'Brien, et al.
As you may know, the Democratic issue attack has already
been described in the DNC Fact booklet released last
month. Ed Harper on Ehrlichman's staff supervised the
preparation of a detailed point by point response.
The Democrats' statements and our issue responses should
then be put into the most usable campaign document. This
document or manual would then be updated after the Demo-
cratic Convention and periodically during the campaign.
John Mitchell and I have discussed this project in general
terms, and we look forward to reviewing the material upon
returning from Russia.
Thank you.
CC: John Mitchell
HRH/GS/jb
F/U - 6/5
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 5, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
FRED MALEK 70m
SUBJECT:
Results of Meeting at
Camp David
The purpose of this memorandum is to review for you some
of the activities which took place at our recent Camp David
meeting and to indicate the results flowing from the meeting.
I had two goals in mind for the Camp David meeting: a) to
make the Voter Bloc Directors feel more a part of the top-
level campaign team and b) to bring closer together the
Voter Bloc Director and his counterpart at the White House.
Both of these goals were met.
The meeting began at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, May 25, with
a presentation by Bill Novelli on advertising in the campaign.
Bill began with an overall view of general advertising campaign
strategy, then related the role of advertising to each of the
voter bloc groups. Bill's presentation was outstanding and
many of the subjects discussed evoked a great deal of dis-
cussion from both the Voter Bloc Directors and the White
House Project Managers.
After dinner on Thursday evening, I conducted a lengthy
discussion on field organization. Fred La Rue was our guest
and he did a fine job. During the discussion period we zeroed
in on some of the existing coordination problems between the
Nixon field operation and the voter bloc activities. This was
a very beneficial discussion period.
- 2 -
On Friday morning, May 26, Ann Dore gave a presentation
on the development of communication and press plans for
the voter bloc groups. Since the development of an overall
public relations program is the responsibility of the White
House Project Manager, I used this opportunity to discuss
the responsibilities of the Voter Bloc Directors and the
Project Managers. We had a lengthy and very frank dis-
cussion period and I identified some severe problems, and
developed action steps to correct these problems. While
some real weeknesses still exist, I feel the role of the
Director and Project Manager has now been clarified; and
there is now greater understanding between these two groups.
The second morning session dealt with administration efforts
to support the reelection. Stan Anderson and Frank Herringer
of my staff presented the various programs we have initiated
to make the bureaucracy more responsive and to take ad-
vantage of the incumbency to the maximum degree possible.
In the afternoon session Jeb Magruder and I held a discussion
on the overall campaign strategy. This session was par-
ticularly helpful to both the Voter Bloc Directors and
Project Managers. Each participant had an opportunity to
ask questions and to comment on the various topics as they
were discussed.
All in all this meeting was a huge success. Each participant
now has a far better knowledge of the overall campaign direction
as well as a better understanding of his responsibilities and
those of his counterpart. Finally, it was a great morale boost
for all participants, and their gratefulness was quite evident.
Let me close by expressing my deep thanks to you for approving
the use of Camp David. In light of the new policy, I am par-
ticularly appreciative of your making this exception. I can
assure you that it had exactly the desired effect and was
enormously helpful.
Attachments
ATTENDEES
Alex Armendariz
Spanish Speaking
Mike Balzano
Ethnic
Howard Cohen
Youth
Bud Evans
Aging
Larry Goldberg
Jewish
Paul Jones
Black
Bill Marumoto
Spanish Speaking
Frank Naylor
Veterans
Bill Rhatican
Veterans
Ken Rietz
Youth
Don Rogers
Labor
Charles Shearer
Citizens
Dan Todd
Aging
Clayton Yeutter
Agriculture
PARTICIPANTS
Stan Anderson
Ann Dore
Frank Herringer
Fred La Rue
Jeb Magruder
Bill Novelli
TAB B
CAMP DAVID AGENDA
May 25/26
Thursday - May 25
Time
Event
3:00 4:00
Arrive
4:00
Opening Remarks
(Fred Malek)
4:15 : 5:45
Session I: Campaign Advertising
(Bill Novelli)
- Overall advertising strategy
- Use of advertising by the
Citizens Group
6:15
Cocktails
7:15
Dinner
8:30 10:30
Session II: Field Organization
(Fred La Rue)
- A typical state organization
- The role of the Political
Coordinators
- Working relationships between
the Citizens Groups and Field
Organization
Later
Movie
Friday - May 26
7:00 8:00
Breakfast
- 2
8:30 10:00
Session III: Press and Publicity
(Ann Dore)
- The role of the Press Office
- Development of Press Plans
- Relationship with the Citizens
Group
- Use of Surrogates
10:15 11:30
Session IV: Administration
Efforts to Support the Reelection
(Fred Malek, Frank Herringer,
Stan Anderson)
- Description of several programs
underway to better utilize the
incumbency
12:00
Lunch
1:00 2:00
Session V: Summary and General
Discussion
(F.red Malek)
2:00 4:00
Free time
- Have baggage ready
4:15 5:30
Session VI: General Campaign
Strategy
(Jeb Magruder, Fred Malek)
5:30
Leave for Washington
UPI-168
(GOP)
WASHINGTON--JOHN N. MITCHELL SAID TODAY WHAT COULD BE EXPECTED FROM
A CAMPAIGN MANAGER WITH A CANDIDATE WHOSE NOMINATION IS ALREADY
ASSURED AND WHOSE OPPONENTS ARE BICKERING AMONG THEMSELVES:
HE EXPECTS TO WIN.
THE FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN HIS FIRST NEWS CONFERENCE AS
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE TO RE-ELECT THE PRESIDENT, TOLD REPORTERS
THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD DEFEAT ANY DEMOCRAT THE OPPOSITION PUT UP.
ASKED SPECIFICALLY IF NNXON WOULD BEAT SEN. GEORGE S. MCGOVERN,
THE DEMOCRATIC FRONTRUNNER FOR THE NOMINATION, MITCHELL REPLIED:
"VERY VERY HANDILY."
"I DON'T THINK ANY OF THEM WOULD BE TOUGH," HE SAID.
HE DENIED THE REPUBLICANS WERE HOPING MCGOVERN WOULD GET THE
NOMINATION,
HE DENIED THE REPUBLICANS WERE HOPING MCGOVERN WOULD GET THE
NOMINATION, SAYING HE WAS GOING TO LET THE DEMOCRATS DECIDE THAT. AS
FOR MCGOVERN'S CAMPAIGN POSITIONS, MITCHELL SAID HE WOULD LET THE
SOUTH DAKOTA SENATOR'S DEMOCRATIC OPPONENTS TALK ABOUT THEM TOO. BUT
TO PUT A FINE POINT ON IT, MITCHELL SAID MCGOVERN'S OPPONENTS HAVE
CALLED HIS VIEWS ON DEFENSE SPENDING CUTS, WELFARE AND TAX REFORM
AND "A LONG LIST" OF OTHER ISSUES "EXTREME."
MITCHELL SAID MCGOVERN'S LEADING POSITION IN THE DEMOCRATIC RACE
DIDN'T SURPRISE HIM. HE SAID THE SENATOR HAD DONE "REASONABLY WELL,"
BUT HAD RECEIVED LESS THAN A MAJORITY OF THE VOTES IN A NUMBER OF THE
PRIMARIES HE WON. HE ALSO CALLED MCGOVERN "AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY TO
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHO HAS BEEN PRETTY WELL PACKAGED BY SOME
EXPENSIVE MEDIA CAMPAIGNS." HE SAID THE "PROLIFERATION OF CANDIDATES"
ALSO HELPED MCGOVERN.
MITCHELL, WHO ALSO MANAGED NIXON'S 1968 CAMPAIGN, SAID THIS
YEAR'S CAMPAIGN WOULD BE THE TYPE "AN INCUMBENT PRESIDENT
SHOULD RUN -- I SEE NO PLACE IN IT FOR BITTERNESS OR DIVISIVE
TACTICS." NIXON WILL RUN ON HIS RECORD, MITCHELL SAID.
6-8--W0405PED
TAYLOR/srsl
1
1
PRESS CONFERENCE
2
Thursday, June 8, 1972
(.)
2:25 p.m.
4
Participants:
5
HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL,
6
National Director of the Committee for the Reelection
7
of the President: accompanied by
6
DEVAN SHUMWAY
$
and
10
MEMBERS OF THE PRESS
11
12
Petite Ballroom,
Roger Smith Hotel
13
Washington, D. C.
14
MR. SHUMWAY: Ladies and Gentlemen, I am Devan
15
Shumway. Mr. Mitchell will have a brief opening statement and
16
then will be happy to take your questions, and I will stop it
17
at about half an hour.
10
MR. MITCHELL: Are you all set?
19
This must be the only show in town from the looks of
20
the crewd.
21
VOICE: Can't hear you.
22
MR. MITCHELL: Why don't you stop making noise back
23
there, and maybe you will. It looks like the situation is
24
normal.
25
All set?
srs 2
2
1
Who produced this one?
2
In case you gentlemen haven't taken cognizance of it,
3
I would like to make sure you know that President Nixon now
4
has enough committed delegates for his nomination at the
5
Republican Convention in Miami.
6
Secondly, I would also like to have you ladies and
7
gentlemen know that contrary to some published reports, the
8
Committee for the Reelection of the President is not engaged
9
in the selection of the Democrat candidate for the Presidency.
10
And, having set the record clear on that, I am
11
available to take your questions.
12
QUESTION: What do you mean by that last remark?
13
MR. MITCHELL: It seem that some of the press thought
14
that the Committee for the Reelection of the President had been
15
engaged in selecting the Democrat candidate and I want to
16
flatly deny that.
17
QUESTION: Haven't you already picked McGovern?
18
MR. MITCHELL: No, and I don't know anyone else that
19
has, dofinitively.
20
QUESTION: Are you implying that Senator McGovern
21
would be the softest touch, the softest nominee they could
22
nominate?
23
MR. MITCHELL: No, I am not imploying that whatso-
21
ever. I made no statement with respect to which of the
25
numerous Democrat candidates that we should run against, or
SIS 3
3
1
would like to. I think that is entirely within the process of
2
the Democrat Party and we will refrain from that subject matter
3
until after this convention in Miami.
4
QUESTION: What is -
5
QUESTION: How do you feel about the prospect of
6
facing McGovern?
7
NR. MITCHELL: We are not particularly concerned who
&
the candidate is. We think President Nixon will be reelected.
9
QUESTION: What will the possibility of Mr. Wallace
10
going on a third ticket do to your strategy?
11
MR. MITCHELL: Well, this, of course, is an open
12
question. I think that it is one in which nobody can speak
13
to it with certainty. Governor Wallace ran as a third party
14
candidate in 1968 and the debate is still going on among the
15
experts as to whether or not he hurt or helped a Democrat
16
or Republican.
17
I think that at this particular time, as then, you
18
have to look at it as a campaign that is divided into 50 parts
19
and the effect of a third party candidate, by Governor Wallace,
20
would depend upon the particular states in which he might be
21
entered.
22
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, you seem to use the word
28
"Democrat" as an-adjective. Is that going to be the style this
24
year or
25
MR. MITCHELL: Is there another, better use forit?
SIS 4
4
1
QUESTION: Well, it usually is the word "Democratic",
2
using the adjective.
3
MR. MITCHELL: Well, you can have my permission to
4
write it that way in your story if you prefer it.
5
QUESTION: You prefer it the other way?
0
MR. MITCHELL: It depends on the context in which I
7
use it.
8
QUESTION: What will the issues be this year, Mr.
9
Mitchell, in your view?
10
MR. MITCHELL: Of course, it depends entirely on who
11
the opposing candidate may be and I would believe that as far
12
as the campaign for the reelection of the President, it will
13
be his outstanding record as an incumbent and we certainly will
14
run on that.
15
QUESTION: What will be the issues if McGovern is
16
a candidate?
17
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am not quite certain what
18
issues Mr. Mac may bring up. I don't think that we will have
10
any problem of assessing what some of his Democrat opponents
20
have said during the campaign in which they pointed out that he
21
has taken extreme issue on cutting the defense budget, and his
22
so-called welfare md tax bill, his statements on the POWs
23
and there will be a long list of them.
24
QUESTION: Have you not with the President since his
25
return?
srs 5
5
1
MR. MITCHELL: Since his return from Moscow? No, sir!
2
I have not.
3
QUESTION: Do you regard Senator McGovern as an
4
extremist in his views?
5
MR. MITCHELL: I am not quite certain what views the
6
good Senator is going to stand with. I was referring to the
7
fact that people within his own party have so characterized him
8
as taking extreme positions and extreme views.
9
QUESTION: Do you. have reason to believe that
10
Vietnam will not be an issue?
11
MR. MITCHELL: I would believe that Vietnam could
12
very well not be an issue. I would expect that the North
13
Vietnamese are going to have to come to the realization that
14
the President has put before them a very, very attractive
15
peace proposal that would be in their interest to accept and I
16
trust that before too long they will come to this conclusion.
17
QUESTION: Senator McGovern's people have already
18
suggested they have looked to this to be a rather bitter
19
campaign and they expect it to be rather bitter in nature.
20
Can you allay their fears on that?
21
MR. MITCHELL: I can assure you as far as the
22
Committee for the Rcelection of the President is concerned we
23
are going to run the type of campaign that an incumbent
24
President should run and deal with the issues and we see no
25
place in it for bitterness or any of the other divisive
srs 6
6
1
activities that may have been suggested.
2.
QUESTION: Is the Committee planning for the Presiden
3
to go out on the hustings and do any campaigning among the
4
people?
5
MR. MITCHELL: Well, the President has stated that he
6
will not even consider the subject matter of politics or
7
campaigning until after the conclusion of the Republican
S
Convention in August. I believe that the decision as to what
9
he will do at that particular time will be made in relationship
10
as to what is the state of the nation and what time he might
11
be able to allocate to campaigning as distinguished from his
12
duties as Chief Executive.
13
QUESTION: If I can follow that up, Mr. Mitchell,
14
are you in any shape at this time to recommend to what
15
extent he will go around to the various states as an active
16
candidate?
17
MR. MITCHELL: Quite the contrary. The determinations
18
in that area will be made on the basis of the availability of
19
his time as President.
20
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what specifically ão you
21
have in mind doing to carry to the people your feeling about
22
the success of the Moscow-Peking summit trips? Any specific
23
compaign plans in that connection?
MR. MITCURLL: I don't believe they need the campaign
25
plans. I think the people in this country are quite aware of
srs 7
7
1
the accomplishment of the President in Peiping, in Moscow,
2
and of the agreements that came out of Moscow, and their follow
3
on effect on the American people.
I believe that the American people are well aware of
S
it and you don't have to merchandise that or package it to
6
try and sell it.
of
QUESTION: Would that overshadow any differences
0
you might have politically with regard to the status of the
9
economy?
10
MR. MITCHELL: I believe that the President's
11
performance in office is such that nothing needs to be over-
12
shadowed, including the economy, where every possible indicator
13
is showing that the economy is on the upswring.
14
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, why do you think Senator
15
McGovern has done as well as he has done?
16
MR. MITCHELL: I am sorry; I can't hear you.
17
QUESTION: Why do you think Senator McGovern has done
18
as well as he has done in the primaries?
19
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I com not so sure I would put
20
it into that context. I think to date he has done remarkably
21
well. You mout that in his sc-called wins in these
Childrent primaries he had relatively low percentages, certain-
ly less then a majority throughout most of all of them.
24
If I had to suggest the thought, it would probably
25
be on the basis that George McGovern is an unknown quantity to
srs 8
8
1
the American people, who has been pretty well packaged by some
2
expensive media compaigns. If you will just take a look at
3
California where I understand his file expenditures in the
4
middle of May were in excess of $1.6 million and add on the
5
amount that was expended from that time to the date of the
0
California primary, you can see what I am talking about.
7
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you have any idea what his
0
principal sources of fincial support are?
9
MR. MITCHELL: We have some ideas as you gentlemen
10
do in the madia; and I iam sure that after he files his
11
report, that is required by the new election law, this weekend,
12
that we will all know who they are.
13
QUESTION: Why did you choose not to submit the
14
President's contributions prior to April 6, the cutoff date?
55
MR. MITCHELL: That is very simple. We believe in
16
complying with the dictates of Congress that exist in the
17
legislation and, as you know, under the Corrupt Practices
18
Act, it was in effect until the 7th of April. We did not have
19
to file them. We will, of course, comply fully with the new
20
election law that is on the books and the filing will be made
21
in the requisite time.
22
QUESTION: Is there anything to forbid filing
23
anything?
24
MR. MITCHELL: Well, there is nothing to forbid anybod
25
from filing anything, but it was not required and I would point
srs 9
9
1
out that none of the candidates who went about the so-called
2
filings complied with the provisions of this new law.
3
QUESTION: Would you give us a list of preferred
4,
running mates that might be considered by the President?
5
MR. MITCHELL: I believe that the President--you are
6
talking about President Nixon, I presume?
7
QUESTION: Yes, the Republican.
00
MR. MITCHELL: I don't think that you need a list. I
9
think what you should do is to go back to the conversation that
10
Mr. Rather here had with the President and some of the state-
11
ments that have been made by the Vice President and you will
12
come to the realization that that determination will be made
13
at a later date.
14
QUESTION: How much of a role will Mr. Connally
15
play, then, in the the developing campaign?
16
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I, of course, have not gotten
17
to the point where I have talked about any assigned role to Mr.
18
Connally. As you know, he is now on a very extensive trip for
19
the President. Undoubtedly, he will be undertaking further
20
trips for the President. I believe that in what Connally has
21
stated publicly, in his own statements, that he fully supports
22
the President and he will continue to actively do so.
23
QUESTION: Would you interpret the votes of George
24
McCovern and George Wallace as protest votes and, if so, how
25
would you deal with them?
srs 10
10
1
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I don't know that they are
2
necessarily protest votes. I think that they are votes for a
(.)
particular candidate and certainly they are candidates who are
4
polos apart and I don't think that we have to deal with both
5
of those blocks.
U
If you will look at the popular vote that the
7
President has received in relatively uncontested primaries, he
2
has received more votes than any other candidates and I am
9
sure that when you transfer from the primaries to the general
10
election it will become evident that he will receive even more
01
of a majority than the comparison between what he has received
12
and those other candidates.
13
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, were you personally surprised
14
at the emergence of McGovern as the front runner for the
15
Democrate?
16
MR. MITCHELL: Not particularly, no.
17
QUESTION: Mr. Nitcholl, would you care to predict
10
what the outcome would be 10 Mr. Nixon ran against Mr. McGovern
10
without any third party?
25
KR. MITCHELL: Would I predict the outcome?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. MITCHULL: I think the President would win very,
20
very handily.
24
QUESTION: Would you give us some numbers, just
25
ballpark numbers?
srs 11
11
NR. MITCHELL: I am leaving that to you fellows. You
2
have such a good track record over the past six months.
3
QUESTION: Everybody else is surprised by George
4
Mac today. Why aron't you surprised?
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I am not surprised for a very
G
simple reason: As I mentioned before, he is a candidate who
&
has received a minority of the votes in the Democrat Party.
No has had more financing than any other candidate in the
9
Democrat Party. He has picked the spots to go into and when
you come off with 30 percent of a vote in a state like Wisconsin,
11
after the type of campaign that he ran, I am not surprised at
12
all. It was proliferation of the candidates in the other party
13
that allowed him to emarge.
14
QUESTION: Are you saying, then, he is just lucky?
15
MR. MITCHELL: I don't think luck has anything to
16
do with it.
17
QUESTION: Do you agree with Mr. Finch's statement
10
yesterday about Mr. Connally?
10
MR. MITCHELL: I didn't hear Mr. Finch's statement;
20
I am corry.
21
QUESTION: Mr. Finch said it would be supremely
22
unlikely for Mr. Connaly to be nominated as Vice President.
23
Would you agree with that?
24
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I have said I couldn't address
25
myself to it because that is a matter that is to be decided
SIS 12
12
i
down the road, under the circumstances that exist at that time.
2
QUESTION: Do you find as he did that there is a
3
certain amount of opposition within your party to the idea
E,
of Mr. Connally becoming Vice President?
5
MR. MITCHELL: No, I haven't.
6
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Nixon asked you your
7
advice on running mates four years ago and we assume he will
8
again.
9
MR. MITCHELL: How do you arrive at that conclusion?
10
QUESTION: I heard about it; read it some place.
11
MR. MITCHELL: That, along with about 50 other
12
people, as I recall.
13
QUESTION: Yes; at any rate, my question is,
14
without necessarily telling who are your choices, are you
15
ready at this time to make a recommendation?
16
MR. MITCHELL: No, I wouldn't want to do that
17
either to him or to you. I think the appropriate time to make
10
that recommendation would be closer to the convention.
10
QUESTION: What is wrong with Mr. Agnew's record?
20
MR. MITCHELL: As fax as I am concerned, there is
21
nothing wrong with Mr. Agnew's record. I think he has been an
22
outstanding Vice President.
23
QUESTION: Why not renominate him?
24
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I say that that decision should
25
be made further down the road. The nominating process
srs 13
13
-
doesn't take place in this first week in June and I think
2.
anybody in politics ought to reserve all of their options.
$
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you see a rele for the
4
President after the convention is in helping elect a Republican
or
Congress or Republicans to Congress?
0
MR. MITCHELL: I most assuredly do. By running
7
strong in the Presidency, it would provide broad coattails to
$
help in the election of a Republican Congress.
a
QUESTION: Where do you consider the President is
10
vulnerable? To put the question another way, where do you
11
expect the Democrats to attack, on what issues--on the issues
12
of the President's personality?
13
Where are you expecting the major thrust of their
14
campaign?
15
MR. MITCHELL: I think that would be dependent
16
entirely on who their candidate was and how they proposed to
17
approach it. Obviously, as I have said before, they have this
10
issue of unemployment which is more rhetoric than it is
10
a political issue. When you look at the fact that this
20
Administration has provided some 6.5 million additional jobs
21
since it has been in office, that the heads of households that
22
are unemployed is in the 2.4 or 5, 6 or 7 range, that the
23
statistics relate mostly to women who have come into the labor
24
market, the nate of uncuployment will decrease and I think it
will be more rhetoric than it will be a factual issue.
25
SIS 14
14
1
QUESTION: Would you consider Hubert Humphrey a
3
tougher candidate to beat than George McGovern?
10
MR. MITCHELL: I don't know as I could possibly
4
answer that because it would depend upon what would happen after
L.
the nomination of either one of them. Question mark: Will
5
labor support the nominee? Will there be a third or fourth
7
party? You would have to make those determinations or
8
ascertain those facts before you could make a determination.
2
QUESTION: Who do you think would be the toughest
10
Democrat candidate?
11
MR. MITCHELL: I don't think city of them are tough.
12
QUESTION: How about Senator Kennedy?
13
MR. MITCHELL: WELL, I am not sure that the good
14
senator is interested in becoming a candidate and I think if he
15
did become one, we would have to assess where he stood and
16
how the American people assessed him before we could make that
17
judgment.
18
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, by any measure that you would
19
choose, do you think the Republican Party is still as much
20
a minority party as it was four years ago?
21
MR. MITCHELL: I believe that at the present time,
22
certainly on the basis of registration, that it is. I believe
23
also, and certainly depending upon the candidate of the other
24
parties, that there may be considerable movement to the
25
Republican Party. Ve recognize the fact that it is a minority
srs 15
15
1
party and that is why it is so important that our campaign be
2
run directed at the independents and Democrats as well as
(:)
the Republicans. It is absolutely necessary in order to elect
4
a President in these United States running on a Republican
ticket.
QUESTION. Are you speaking more of a movement if
McGovern is nominated--are you expecting more of a movement
to the Republican Party if he is nominated?
3
MR. MITCHELL: According to what the governors were
saying down in Houston, I think that might be reasonably assume
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, you quited Democrats as
labeling McGovern's views as extremist. Do you so label them,
13
too?
1/2
MR. MITCHELL: I would prefer to stand on what the
15
Democrats are saying about Mr. McGovern rather than get mixed
10
up in their nominating process.
17
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what are the chances of a
10
peace settlement in Vietnam before the election?
19
MR. MITCHELL: Well, I can't answer that question, but
20
I would believe that they are probably better now than they
21
have been in the past.
22,
UOESTION: Mr. Mitchell, how do you intend to--while
23
employment has gone up--the number of people employed, the
as
unemployment rate has also gone up--how do you intend to answer
that if it
ever comes to that?
25
srs 16
16
1
MR. MITCHELL: Well, the unemployment rate is start-
2
ing down; as you know, it is below 6 percent and it will
3
continue down between now and the election according to the
4
prognostications of all of the informed people.
5
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Mac beat Mr. Humphrey
6
in most of the blue collar areas in New Jersey. Does that
7
worry you?
8
MR. MITCHELL: I am sorry; I didn't hear your question.
0
QUESTION: I said Mr. Mac beat Mr. Humphrey--the
10
candidate of labor--in most of the working class areas in New
11
Jersey, on Tuesday; does this bother you, because New Jersey is
12
like--
13
MR. MITCHELL: I am not ready to accept your premise
14
but I still believe if it came to a choice between either one
15
of them and the President, because of their respective position
16
that they will still vote in the majority for the President.
17
QUESTION: Do you think they will vote for Mr. Nixon
18
over Mr. McGovern?
10
MR. MITCHELL: or Mr. Humphrey.
20
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what sort of a campaign
21
committee --- kitty, excuse me --- are you figuring on? How
22
much financing will you have for the compaign? Is it in the
23
noighbowhood of $40 million as widely speculated?
24
MR. MYTCHELL: Noll, that is a very respectable
25
neighborhood and I would like to believe that we could get there
srs 17
17
1
but we are not setting our sights that high.
2
I can put it very simply, that every dollar that we can
S
appropriately use that wa can obtain through legitimate
D,
channels, we will find a use for it,in my opinion.
5
QUESTION: Well, sir, that is simple, but it doesn't
6
tell. us anything.
7
MR. MITCHELL: That is right.
0
(Laughter.)
9
QUESTION: I will try again.
10
MR. MITCHELL: Ted, I am glad you found that out.
11
QUESTION: Will you tell us approximately what you
12
are figuring on?
13
MR. MITCHELL: We are figuring on expending as much
14
money as we can properly use and properly collect. Now, let
15
me tell you how we are starting the campaign because raising
16
of funds is not an exact science.
17
We are structuring our campaign and putting our
10
dollars into the organizational process of it. That is where
19
our first dollars are going to. If we get through with that,
20
and we still have some money left over, we will use them for
21
the media and direct mail and those other activities that are
22
the frosting on the cake.
23
QUESTION: How much do you want to spend on organiza-
24
tion?
25
MR. MITCHELL: I can't tell you because we haven't t goe
Srs 18
18
1
all of our budgets in from the 50 campaigns that are being
2
run in the 50 states.
3
QUESTION: What is your position on televised
debates between the two candidates in the campaign?
5
MR. MITCHELL: WELL, I am sure you gentlemen are
6
aware that no encumbent President has ever debated a candidate
7
in a presidential election and as far as my position is
8
concerned, I would advise the President against it.
9
You are also well aware that every statement that a
10
President makes is a policy-forming statement and I am sure
11
that any encumbent of the White House would be very, very
12
foolish to undertake a debate to the point where people around
13
the world and in this country might get a misimpression from the
16
contents of that debate as to what the policies of this country
15
might be.
16
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, what is your current assessmen
17
of what the role of Governor Wallace will be in this election?
18
MR. MITCHELL: I haven't the faintest idea. I am
19
sure it will depend entirely on his health.
20
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you have any strategy
21
for getting votes in the South?
23
MR. MITCHELL: You bet, Sarah, we are going to send
23
you dam there.
24
QUESTION: Do you have any strategy to get John
25
Ashbrook back?
srs 19
19
1
MR. MITCHELL: I think John Ashbrook's statement
2
of yesterday or today, whenever it was made, is a clear case
3
he is already back.
4
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, do you think the President's
5
cause has bean hurt by the ITT matter?
&
MR. MITCHELL: I do not believe SO. I do not believe
7
the American public has swallowed one bit of that nonsense that
S
was tried to be portrayed by a small segment of the Judiciary
9
Committee. I think the ploy was overplayed and the majority,
10
large majority of the people in this country recognized it for
11
what it was.
12
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, how do you plan to get along
13
with the pross in this campaign?
14
MR. MITCHELL: I always get along very well with
10
the press; haven't you noticed?
10
QUESTION: Institutionally.
17
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, if I heard right, you said
10
the war in Vietnam may not be much of an issue, unemployment
10
would be more rhetoric than an issue, and that the
20
summit thing doesn't need any merchandising. What are we going
21
to have--a noncampaign?
22
MR. MITCHELL: I would not believe that that would b:
23
the case. I would believe that the opposing candidate, whoever
24
be might be, might try to raise cortain issues. What I am
20
saying is that I think that they will fail because of the
srs 20
20
-
record that the President has produced.
2
UQESTION: You seem to be suggesting a defensive
3
campaign there.
4
QUESTION: You said that--
5
MR. MITCHELL: There is never a defensive campaign
6
to go out and sell the record of the incumbent President.
7
QUESTION: The President has said that he would run
6
or that the public should watch his actions in relation
9
to the Negro community. What action will be cited?
10
MR. MITCHELL: Can I correct you? That was a mis-
11
quote of me, not of the President, and now if you will put
12
your question in that context and relate it to me, I will be
13
glad to answer it.
14
QUESTION: Well, I do believe that the President
15
himself has said the he should be judged by his actions, not
16
by his words.
17
MR. MITCHELL: Well, if you are talking about the
18
actions of this Administration in the black community, this
19
is a great record to run on.
20
Starting with the Justice Department of which I have
21
some personal knowledge, in every conceivable field in that
22
department there were more accomplishments than any previous
20
Administration, whether it be in the field of housing or school
20
desogragation or equal employment or whatever it was; all you
25
have to do is look at the record and measure it in any way you
21
srs 21
1
want and our accomplishments have been greater.
2
I think the record goes similarly to what has been
3
done over in HUD, over in HEW, in Commerce with respect to
4
the help for the business community among the minorities.
1.)
I think it is a great record and it has been so
6
accepted by anybody who has taken the time to look at it in an
7
impartial manner.
8
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell, why is the black leadership
9
so ungrateful?
10
MR. NITCHELL: Which black leadership are you talking
11
about? You mean the ones that are financed by the
12
Democrat Party and labor unions or the real black leadership in
13
the country?
14
QUESTION: Well, you name a black leader who has
15
praised the Nixon Administration.
16
MR. MITCHELL: It depends on what you classify as
17
leaders. If you will come to a dinner here in town on
18
Saturday night, I think there will be 1,500 there to carry that
19
thought forward.
20
QUESTION: Mr. Mitchell --
21
MR. SHUMWAY: Thank you very much, Ladies and
22
Gentlemen.
23
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you for coming.
24
(Whereupon, at 3:02 p.m., the press conference
25
was concluded.)
X
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 27, 1972
FOR BOB HALDEMAN
Attached are three memos that have come to John's attention.
He has asked that I forward them to you and request that you
review them. He would most appreciate having your reaction.
Tod R! Hullin
Attachments
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
KEN COLE
As I mentioned this morning, our senior staff got together
to discuss how we might do a better job of positioning the
President domestically and more specifically to determine
whether or not there was some unifying theme which could
be advanced and under which we could place the President's
domestic programs.
I would characterize the results of this meeting as inconclu-
sive, but I didn't expect much more given the mere 1-1/2 hours
which we had to discuss the issue.
The following are some random thoughts from the meeting which
may be of help to you:
1. The basic thrust of what the President is trying to do
in both domestic and foreign policy runs along the lines
of the Guam Doctrine. In foreign policy --- the U.S. will
help but the countries that we are helping have got to
take a major initiative to help themselves. In domestic
policy the Federal Government can help but the States,
we
the Cities, and Counties must play the major role in solving
their problems.
2. The President's strong point is that he is pragmatic.
He wants to do what will work. Promises aren't good enough.
He is looking for performance.
3. We believe that the President should run as an "In" as
far as foreign policy is concerned and as an "Out" as far
as domestic policy is concerned. We believe this is
possible because he has been able to achieve his decentrali-
zation of power on the foreign side while he has not been
able to achieve it on the domestic side. He should run
against the establishment - Congress, the bureaucracy and
special interests.
- 2 -
4. While we all agree that we need to find a better way
to communicate the above, unfortunately none of us
have very good suggestions as to how it might be done.
I know this is an unpopular line of thinking, but we
still feel that the President needs to play the major
role in communicating domestic policy. While the polls
indicate he is experienced, trained, informed, competent,
safe, and conservative, they also indicate that he lacks
one attribute which we feel is the mark of a leader,
especially in today's world - and that is compassion.
He obviously does not lack compassion, it's just that
the public rarely gets to see it. All of us agreed that
we have never been at a meeting with the President where
those others present from the outside had not said to
us afterwards what an entirely different man he was from
the picture they had received from the media. In the
majority of instances, their comments were directed not
only to his knowledge but most importantly to his
understanding of their situation. We need to find a way
to communicate this to the public.
c
5. Two examples of what might be done come to mind:
A. On his trip to the Capitol, apparently while walking
in the building, a lady in the crawd thrust a "Stop
The War" sign in his face and the President walked on
by. As we see it, much more could have been gained
H
(assuming TV cameras and some sound were present) had
he stopped to explain that he understood her concern
and then gone on to give the reasons why he had to do
what he was doing despite these concerns and that
perhaps he shared them.
B. Another example would perhaps dramatize revenue sharing
and the President's belief that the people as well as
state and local governments share the responsibility for
their destiny and that things are not just up to the
Federal Government. A visit to a ghetto area would
provide the President an opportunity to demonstrate
that he did have a first-hand knowledge of how awful
things were, and then to point out that for years
Washington has not been able to solve these problems
and in some cases has only added to them. He could
then go on to state his belief that the citizens of
the area can best solve their own problems given the
resources, hence revenue sharing. Only the estab-
lishment -- Congress and the bureaucracy are pre-
venting progress.
Little of this is different from what we have been
saying, but the visual or physical approach on the
President's part is quite different. It involves
some risks, but we are convinced that he can't "reach
the world" from the Oval Office or through impersonal
situations with governmental leaders and others of
the same ilk who lack credibility in the eyes of the
people.
6.
We feel too that the President could do more press con-
ferences. These are a pain in the neck to prepare, but
they are always "10 strikes" for him.
7.
One of my thoughts is that the President should not use the
"for all of the people" theme. My judgment, which was not
discussed with the others, is that this won't work. He is
perceived as being for big business and if we keep saying
he is for all the people it will be viewed as a hoax.
Rather, we need to show, and the President's domestic pro-
grams demonstrate this in some areas, that he is for the
little guy" or whatever it is you want to call him.
Specific programs which prove the point are Revenue Sharing,
Reorganization, Drugs, Busing, Education, and to a lesser
degree environment and health. Additionally, smaller pro-
grams such as pension vesting, minority business enterprise,
public feeding (Food Stamps, School Lunch, School Breakfast),
Jobs for Veterans and our Aging initiatives also count.
8. Lastly, we talked about Chapin's "Generation of Peace" theme.
It has some possibilities but needs additional conceptual
thought with regard to its relationship to domestic policy.
I have attached a copy of Ed Harper's memos on the overall subject
which you have reviewed previously but may want to take a look at
again. Also attached is a paper from Ed - "The President takes a
Vacation" - which he proposed at the meeting.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR KEN COLE
FROM:
ED HARPER
of
SUBJECT:
Major Presidential Event
This is to propose that the President take a vacation. The logic
of it is that the President has worked hard for three years and
never taken a vacation. Furthermore, he will have just worked
hard preparing for and participating in the Moscow Summit and
will have a very demanding campaign before him.
Everybody takes a vacation once in a while; why shouldn't the
President?
The President's taking a vacation would serve some very important
political purposes. First of all, it would identify him with the
average American who takes a vacation trip with his family to see
the great sights of America. Secondly, it provides the President
with an opportunity to show his spontaneous concern about America
and its people. Third, it would show dimensions to his personality
that are not readily apparent in the White House setting.
A vacation trip would give him the opportunity to do the following
things:
1. Casually meet many average Americans in different
circumstances.
2. Go to a baseball game, perhaps in Chicago.
3. Eat out with the public at a restaurant.
4. "Stand in awe" of the Grand Canyon.
5. Visit some Chicanos in a small town in the Southwest.
- 2 -
6. Drive around some of America's inner cities.
7. Independence Hall, Philadelphia.
8. Table Rock, Missouri - School of the Ozarks - Silver Dollar City.
9. Wisconsin Dells.
10. Savannah, Georgia.
11. Disney World, Florida.
12. Yosemite National Park.
13. Sante Fe, New Mexico (Taos Pueblo).
14. Fort Ticondaroga.
15. Atlanta - Stone Mountain.
16. Museum of Science and Technology - Chicago.
17. Ottumwa, Iowa.
18. Leadville, Colorado.
The trip would not be as hard as it might sound logistically. To
maintain the vacation format, the President would make no speeches,
attend no formal events, and issue no prepared remarks. Thus, the
President and Mrs. Nixon need be accompanied by no more than
perhaps one staff member beyond Secret Service and servants. The
small press pool could accompany him, but they would be given no
advance warning as to where they were going to go, or what he would
do. The President should scrupulously avoid meetings with any
political types. Perhaps the trip could retrace an old vacation route
of the Nixon family in previous years.
ELH:ppd
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
*
April 19, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR KEN COLE
FROM:
ED HARPER
SUBJECT:
1701 Campaign and Advertising Strategy
At Len Garment's request, the 1701 Advertising Group gave Len
Garment and me a special showing of their presentation on campaign
and advertising strategy. Pete Dailey, Phil Joanou, and Bill Taylor
made the presentation. Jeb Magruder stopped in at the outset to
emphasize that this was very preliminary and that it would be a
couple of months before they were ready to make any firm decisions.
The following are my notes on the presentation.
I.
BACKGROUND
Decisive Personal Attributes of the President:
RN IS--
Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent
Safe
Conservative
RN IS NOT.
Frank
Warm
Extroverted
Relaxed
Sense of Humor
Right Track VS. Wrong Track
"Is America going the right direction or is it on the wrong track? "
is = Roper question going back to 1960. A majority felt America
was on the right track until 1965. Since then a majority have felt
America is on the wrong track. There has been no significant
change since 1968.
- 2 -
Election Climate
1. Country is in trovole.
2. Government is not concerned
or responsive.
3. Politicians don't care.
4. Things are too complicated.
5. Government is not truthful.
6. People are fed up with government; they think it
doesn't work.
Credibility
1. You can't eliminate a credibility problem; you can'
'only minimize it.
2. The best ways to handle a credibility problem are
avoid overstatement and to admit small mistakes,
but at the same time contrast little mistakes with
big right decisions.
Some Issues Setting Vietnam Aside
1. High and unfair taxation.
2. Lack of credibility, trust.
3. Waste, inefficiency in government, high taxes and
prices,
4. Personal safety (related to crime and drugs).
5. Favoritism of "haves" over "have nots. "
6. High prices.
7. Jobs.
8. Break-up of neighborhood schools. Be careful with
busing; low key it.
Weak point is public's opinion that RN is not the best man
to handle key domestic issues; thus, our strategy should
be to bolster his handling of domestic issues.
II.
OVERALL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
- RN does not have to be a defender of the status quo. He is
against status quo.
--Inform public of RN's accomplishments:
- 3 -
How things were in 1968.
How they are today.
How they are going to be. (What kind of a country is
the United States going to become? Give the people hope.
His solutions the best solutions.)
Shift more concern to the domestic scene. RN is the
clearly perceived master of international affairs, but
not the master of any domestic areas.
-Strongly counter the opposition. RN should NOT attack the
opposition; he is not at his best in the attack and this is
not Presidential. Other Administration officials can do
the attacking.
-Aggressive campaign--b positive.
III.
CREATIVE STRATEGY
What we should say:
1. RN is an activist.
2. RN has long-range vision--everything part of
master plan.
3. RN inherited a mess. Remind public of '68' mess.
4. RN is a man of courage, decisiveness, and
dedication.
5. Present the issues.
Use specific issues, both those which have high
problem ranking and those which allow us to
tell a good story; e. g., economy, peace,
Vietnam, drugs, crime, environment, elderly.
How should we say it?
1. Personalize the issues.
2. Limit the use of the President in advertising.
President on camera--avoid RN as campaigner.
President voice over avoid RN as campaigner.
--Announcer's voice over clips of President in action.
-Announcer's voice over no Presidential footage.
- 4
3. Humanize the President; never subject of commercial;
incidental to coverage of other issues.
4. Presidential tone--honest, understated, believable.
IV.
COMMERCIALS
Bill Taylor of the Advertising group showed rough mock-up's
of 10 TV commercials. They seemed to be technically
competent and one showed some real imagination.
Each commercial ends with the slogan, "America Needs
President Nixon. " The PR Group proposed that, "America
Needs President Nixon, " replace, "Re-elect the President. "
V.
MY OVERALL REACTION
1. I agree with Jeb Magruder that it will be some time
before they are ready to make any firm decisions.
2. The work on the commercials to a layman looks good,
but leaves me wondering if anybody will ever be
convinced by any commercial.
3. I am left with a very uneasy feeling about the 1701
Survey Research Program, because it really does not
seem to be producing in-depth motivational analysis
which is being applied to the development of the
advertising strategy. To be fair, no one from the
Research Group was at this presentation.
ELH:ppd
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 28, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
George Wallace - Dr. Lukash
Dr. Lukash visited George Wallace today for 45 minutes.
Present in the hospital room were the Governor and Mrs.
Wallace, Dr. Shannow, and Lukash. Lukash extended the
President's best wishes to Wallace and had these obser-
vations:
1) Wallace is in better condition than newspaper
pictures indicate. Wallace has lost weight in his face
which makes him look sicker than he is,
2) Wallace is gaining weight, is experiencing some
abdominal pain, but is moving about well with braces and
wheel chair;
3) Wallace will attend the Democratic Convention.
Lukash believes he could meet with delegates and could
even make a speech to the Convention;
4) After the Democratic Convention Wallace will be
recovering in braces and a wheel chair for 3-6 months;
5) Wallace was very outgoing and talkative. The
Russia trip and Wallace's sincere appreciation of the
Haig briefing were mentioned,
6) Wallace's tendency toward depression is decreasing
though he was reluctant to hold a press conference to
counter the misquote of his son indicating Covernor Wallace
could not attend the Democratic Convention;
- 2 -
7) Although Wallace doesn't want any "freebies and
thereby obligate himself", the Governor asked Lukash
about the President's offer of a plane to Miami Beach.
Lukash was in the room when the President visited Wallace
on May 19 and overheard the offer of "one of my planes"
to Wallace. The Wallace staff is aware of the offer of
the plane because it has been discussed since the President's
offer. However, they want to keep the offer confidential
according to Lukash. The unresolved question is whether
the President intended to offer something comparable to
970 or a "medevac" plane. Lukash believes Wallace could
travel on 970 and would not require a "medevac" plane.
Wallace has not indicated which he expects. Lukash will
remain in close touch with Dr. Shannow, the local Republican
physician Wallace is relying on.
8) The Governor and Mrs. Wallace sincerely appreciate
the President's concern.
GS/jb
Have
Committee for the Re-election of the President
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM TO:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
PETER H. DAILEY
SUBJECT:
Campaign Slogan: President Nixon. Now
More Than Ever.
Based on the research that was done in Michigan over the last
weekend, it is our recommendation that we adopt the slogan:
President Nixon. Now More Than Ever.
We believe that the testing we have done is adequate. It
indicates that the slogan can affectively tie in with our
creative work, it can stand alone, and it has the open-ended
quality that we have been looking for. With your approval
of the concept, we will finalize the campaign materials and
have them ready for your approval by Monday.
Salem
CONF IDENTIAL
June 20, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Further Study of Slogan "President
Nixon. Now more than ever."
We were requested to conduct further research on the slogan,
"President Nixon. Now more than ever." to determine whether the
slogan was understandable and not too sophisticated in the context
of other competing slogans. To study this question two group
sessions were conducted in Detroit with ticket-splitters, over 35
years of 'age, with middle incomes, and non-college. At each session
we discussed several slogans including those used by McGovern and
Wallace in the primaries. This memorandum will outline the results
of the research.
In both of the groups the slogan was understood to refer to unfin-
ished work in progress. The groups pictured the President's past
record and looked to the future. This slogan embodied the concept
of "help him finish the job." The slogan was not interpreted by
anyone as anti-McGovern.
The statement also contained a sense of urgency not perceived with
the other slogans. The use of the word "now" seemed to express
this urgency. Also, the slogan had a certain emotional appeal
which the other slogans did not seem to possess. In discussing the
slogans, both groups stated that the words "we need" Nixon were men-
tally added to the phrase "Now more than ever."
Each group responded favorably to the various ways the slogan was
presented for banners, buttons, and bumper stickers except the
groups did not like the manner of execution for the outdoor bill-
board proposal. With regard to the materials, the groups readily
understood the connection between the contraction "Nixon. Now"
with the longer version. The shortness of "Nixon. Now" has very
strong appeal to lower middle class ticket-splitters. They view
it as simple, direct, and easy to understand. Regarding the outdoor
proposal, the groups did not like the use of a black background and
the reproduction of the President's picture. Apparently because of
the color and the picture the groups felt the outdoor proposal por-
trayed the President as sinister. Nevertheless, the concept of
using the slogan in the outdoor medium was readily accepted.
-2-
In general, the groups responded well to the slogan, "Now more than
ever." Every person in the group seemed to be able to give the
statement some personal meaning. The slogan did clearly communicate
its message. It is important to note that the participants generally
ranked the slogan between the other alternatives studied. Our
earlier study showed that "Now more than ever." ranked behind the
statement, "Help him finish the job." Comparatively, however, the
slogan under consideration expressed more urgency and emotional
appeal and also clearly embodied the concept of "finish the job."
If other ideas which convey the unfinished job are merged with
"Now more than ever," the result should be a powerful communication
device. To answer the original question raised, we see no reason
to reject the slogan as not being understandable and too sophisticated.
CONFIDENTIAL
SELECTED VERBATIM COMMENTS
It has emotional appeal.
We need him more than ever.
He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better,
so we still need him.
He's been good and we still need him to finish the job.
We need him more now than we needed him before.
He's started so many things and he would like to follow through.
It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but its clear.
It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking
over things he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do
of his past record.
I like the word "now" because we need to take action now.
It means we need him more than ever. He ain't going to do anything
in the next four years anyway.
I think there's more in it than "now more than ever" because there
are the things
that he's planning for the future and why
change horses in the middle of the stream when the trouble's still
there.
We do need him if he will finish the job he started.
I think that's assuring. Its saying stick with what you know. You
don't know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I
think its reassuring in that way, -- that we know what we have and
can go from there.
Really, it doesn't matter too much to me what the slogan is. The name --
when I see the name I conjure up my own thoughts about what the man is,
what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his
name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because
the old saying "paper lies still, you can put anything on it."
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
M
Concept Tests
with
Detroit Area
Ticket-Splitters
(Middle age, high school graduates
or less, with middle incomes from
the Detroit Metropolitan Area.)
June, 1972
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
Executive Summary
Purpose
To determine if "President Nixon Now More Than Ever" is understood by the
"average" voter. (Jower middle class ticket-splitter]
We know it's an open ended concept and that people like the "Now" orienta-
tion but as an idea, does it float?
Conclusions
1) While "President Nixon Now More Than Ever" is imediate, it has more
strength when other ideas are built into it.
Three of the 18 panel members openly suggested that the words "we need"
went through their heads when they read it, or they suggested these
words be added.
2) The shortness of it to "Nixon llow" has very strong appeal to the core
lower middle class ticket-splitter. They like simple, direct, easy to
understand communication.
3) If the message that rides with "Now More Than Eyer" can also include
the idea of "Help His Finish The Job", then as several panel members
noted, this merged idea will be very powerful. "Finish the Job" can
-1-
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
relate to any job and it includes all of us including the President
in their mind.
4) The "Now More Than Ever" idea has the orientation of dependency and
emergency, and several of the women panel members didn't like the
"Now" idea for this reason.
5) "Now More Than Ever" does not rebound against McGovern as a radical --
i.e., we need Nixon now because McGovern is too radical. (This
result may be due to the fact that most of the panel members could
not mentally see McGovern as a serious candidate of this time --
"Who is he, what's he done, I don't know enough about bim.")
6) "Now More Than Ever" will do it because it is an open ended idea, BUT
in all or nearly all of our communication efforts, the one liner --
"Help Him Finish The Job" should be used because it is clear, simple,`
understandable, positive, and relates to the future from our present
base and more importantly, is the leading reason people are supporting
the President for a second term.
-2-
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
WOMEN
NOW MORE THAN EVER
"It has emotional appeal."
"We need him more than ever."
"He's done a good job before and things aren't getting any better, $0
we still need him."
"He's been good and we still need him to finish the job."
"Meed him more now than we needed him before."
"He's started so many things and he would like to follow through."
"It's perfectly clear. It's not a complete thought, but it's clear."
"I like it better that "Re-Elect the President." #
"It starts you thinking more. Starts your imagination thinking over things
he has done, has not done, will do, or will not do--whatever your choice
of the man is, whatever you think of him -- of his past record."
(Banner, coaster, pin)
"Impressive."
"There's too much writing in the pin."
"The top one is easiest to read."
"The larger print is easier to read from a distance."
"The banner is better because there's too much to go on the pin."
(Button)
"Ostentatious."
"Too much money spent." -
"It's pretty, but too expensive."
"I don't like it. There's too much money spent."
"How else can you get the massage across?"
"You could get it across without so much of the frill."
"The middle one has more decor."
-3-
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
"It's more eye catching."
"The button is more respectful."
(Poster)
"It looks like be has a beard."
"I don't like the blue on black."
"I like the orange because it shows up better."
"We know what he looks like, ve don't have to be reminded. What he looks
like isn't what's important."
"It's not a good likeness."
"It reminds me of Castro."
"It's not clean cut at all."
"I like the word 'now' because we have to take action now."
"It means to me that we need his to finish the jobs that he started."
"It shows that he's done a lot and wants to still keep working and finish
what he's started."
"It impresses me."
"President Nixon has helped more than ever to finish what he did start."
"I like that one, but not as well as the other one. We do need him if he
will finish the job ha started."
"I don't know if I want it to always say 'now' more than ever. We need him
but I don't want him in an emergency. We need him, but what's he going
to do? It's not quite as reassuring as the other one."
"There's something lacking in this and I can see it's 'now'. But, I'm
concerned about now and the future."
"I think that's assuring. It's saying stick with what you know. You don't
know what you're going to get if you don't have Nixon. I think it's
reassuring in that way -- that we know what we have and can go from there."
"Really, it doesn't matter too ruch to me what the slogan is. The name --
when I see the hame I conjure up my own thoughts about what the can is,
what he has done, what he stands for. Any slogan that's put after his
name or any other name, really doesn't mean that much to me because the
old saying 'paper lies still, you can put anything on it*."
"Gives the message that when you read 'Nixon', you have your own opinions
of him and you would think of that."
-4-
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
MEN
NIXON NOM MORE THAN EVER
"Too long and there's no name mentioned."
"The first one was better." (Re-elect)
"If you're for Nixon you might laugh and if you're not, you might be sorry.
You'd laugh because it's always been Nixon if you're a Nixon backer. So
you'd get a great charge out of that."
"It wouldn't swing me. If you ask yourself this here question: 'Do you
think Nixon will end the war if he's re-elected in the next four years?'.
By the same token, I go along with saying 'Will the next guy end the war
in the next four years?' So what's the difference, now President Nixon
now more than ever. What's he going to do?"
"It means we need him now more than ever. He ain't going to do anything
in the next four years anyway."
"I think there's more in it than more now than ever because the things that
have come up, say in the last year, the things that he's planning for
the future and why change horses in the middle of the stream when the
trouble's still there."
"He's not going to do anything anyway. Take bussing. He wants to stop
bussing until November 1973. Why? He's going to be in the next four
years after that."
(How would you change it?)
"I'd take 'The President' out and just say 'Nixon'. Everybody knows
Nixon's the President."
"Add 2 words: We Need Nixon Now Hore Than Ever."
"I'd throw out "More Than Ever' and just have 'President Nixon Now' in
big letters."
"To ce that's too long bacause if you're walking by, you have to read every-
thing and you're likely to get half way through and you are passed the
person. That's my personal opinion. But the coasters are okay because
you must be sitting down to use a coaster."
"Not fair to compare the two. There you have the other one on a ribbon and
this one on a paper board. You're losing class."
"Too many words."
-5-
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
"The shorter the sentence, it's eye catching. If you have too many words,
who wants to read it."
"Blue with white background would be better."
"It's mandatory that Nixon wins."
NIXON NOW MORE THAN EVER-Short messages
"That's an ideal bumper sticker."
"That's more like it."
"It flags out."
"You have the colors in there and it shows up a lot better.
"Everything that he's needed."
"Right to the point."
"Short and simple."
"Everybody knows what 'Now' means and everybody knows who Nixon is."
NIXON NOW MORE THAN EVER--Poster
"It's too dark - it looks like he has a beard."
"I like the black background. It's okay but the lettering should be in
red flourescent."
"They're not taking full advantage of that advertisement. If they would
put the picture of him in a proper color, the rest of it could be the
same. You see there's a lot of funny people in this country who vote
for the guy because he's beautiful. As far as being beautiful, this
isn't going to do anything for him."
"This is basically the thing we agreed on before. Nixon Now More Than
Ever without The President'. The picture eliminates the word.
Everyone recognizes the picture and you've only got four words to
read. This idea is fine, it's just that the color scheme is wrong."
-6_
THE NEW YORK TIMES
Thursday, June 22, 1972
IN THE 'NATION
McGovern's
Let's
Credibility
begin
again
Senator McGovern now seems to be
By TOM WICKER
WASHINGTON, June 21-His victory
McGovern
disavowing this specific program, so
all these errors of omission and com-
mission may not much matter, in a
in the New York primary puts Senator
practical sense. What does matter is
George McGovern on the brink of the
that expert economic analysis so im-
Democratic Presidential "homination.
That makes it all the more necessary
72
pugns the program that it was either
extremely careless or deceptive to put
that those who believe the-McGovern
it forward in that form; and what also
campaign promises the right directions
matters is that it is not believable that
for the nation should insist that he
McGovern men put that figure at
Mr. McGovern himself considered it
himself live up to that promise.
only an experimental idea.
Specifically, Mr. McGovern cannot
$63.6 billion; Mr. McGovern himself,
He discussed the program, for in-
at one and the same time proclaim his
in the California primary, repeatedly
intention to restore the "credibility" of
said it would be either $60 billion or
stance, in six pages of text with Eliza-
the Presidency and at the same time
$70 billion; in fact, disinterested tax
beth Drew in a television interview in
pretend that his program for income
authorities say, it would be less than
Los Angeles and never suggested it
redistribution was just a casual idea to
half that much to fact which both
was a tentative proposal ("Well, actu-
which he was never really committed.
aspiring politicians and gullible report-
ally, Liz," he said at one point, "I don't
ers should have had no difficulty in
think it would cost much of any-
The fact is that it was only when
analysts began to show the economic
establishing.
thing.") He did suggest the $1,000
holes in that program that Mr. McGov-
For another example, the McGovern
figure might have to be adjusted but
staff document-and consequently the
he consistently referred to "the pro-
ern started backing away from it.
In this space on June 4 there
article here-said that a family of
gram that I've recommended."
four, earning $60,000 a year, would
That, of course, may be what is
appeared an explanation of how the
have less income under the McGovern
finally important-George McGovern is
complicated scheme for an income
program because they would pay taxês
thinking of a program of income redis-
supplement of $1,000 per person to
on $64,000' a year (without exemp-
tribution, and it may well be that
n
every American - was supposed to
tions) rather than $57,000 a year (with
nothing is more vitally needed in a
work. That explanation was based on
exemptions but no grants). In fact, as
society in which 1 per cent of the
conversations with, and'a seven-page
many persons have since pointed out,
population holds 28 per cent of the
document prepared by, the McGovern
depending somewhat on its deduc-
wealth, and in which the poorest fifth
staff. All this was accepted far too un-
tions, that family's after-tax income-
of the people receives only about 4 per
critically, with the result that the Mc-
if rates remained the same-would be
cent of the annual national income.
Govern income program was made, in
little changed, and might in. some
In that sense, Mr. McGovern's errors
this column, to seem more practical and
cases be higher.
of specificity are less important than
carefully worked out than it is. This
Again, the McGovern staff docu-
his intentions; but the same-could have
was a journalistic sin for which respon-
ment said that to provide income
been said of Richard Nixon's 1968
sibility is hereby accepted; it was also
supplements up to a $12,000 income
pledge to "end the war and win the
reaffirmation of the cardinal lesson
for à family of four, without a net
peace." The road to credibility gap
that every political reporter learns and
increase in its taxes, would require an
and elsewhere is paved with good
re-learns-that everything said and
average tax increase of $50 per tax-
intentions, and if George McGovern
done by politicians seeking or holding
payer on those earnings between
really wants to restore the faith and
power has to be constantly challenged.
$12,000 and $20,000 a year. It did not
trust of the American people in their
The most obvious distortion con-
add; as it should have, that for those
Government, he has made a bad start
cerned the net gain to the Government
above $20,000 the tax increase might
of it with his income program.
if the $750 personal tax exemption for
average 80 per cent or, more, if the
As is always the case with credibility
every taxpayer were eliminated in
estimate of $27 billion in additional
lapses, he also has called into question
favor of the $1,000 McGovern grant.
needed revenue was to be reached.
some other pledges and calculations.
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
June 27, 1972
E.O. 12005, Soction 6-102
By Elp Date 4-1-82
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JOHN MITCHELL
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
I wanted to pass along to you some information from a contact in
California who is now with Spencer-Roberts. He has been involved
in most state-wide campaigns for fifteen years in California so should
have some feeling for what's happening there. He, of course, has an
axe to grind since Spencer-Roberts was in the running to get the
campaign. He reports the following:
1. If the election were held today, the President would
lose California.
2. Our effort out there is not very good.
3. Nobody in our top command has any real organizational
experience. Nofsiger is a press man, and the people who
he has brought in around him are all non-experienced.
4. The regional structure Nofsiger has imposed on the
state -- five divisions -- is contrary to the historic
Northera/Southern division with strong emphasis on the
counties. It is not a good division. There should be much
more emphasis OR the counties. (I'm not convinced this is
right.)
5. While we should be in a good position to pick up disaffected
blue collar types, Mexican/Americans, etc., we are not doing
one thing to go after these people, and we are not set up to do so,
I know that all you need is more advice on how to run the Campaign,
but pass this along for what it's worth.
HRH:LH:kb:HRH:kb
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 29, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Lyn Nofsiger - California
Lyn Nofsiger is in Washington today. Be has been meeting
with Mardian, Halek, Hagruder, and others at 1701.
Nofsiger wonders whether you would like to discuss the
California campaign with him. Nofziger is not pushing
for a meeting, but wanted you to know he was available.
In light of the memorandum you signed for Mitchell on
California (which has not been delivered to him) you
may want to talk with Nofsiger.
Whether you see Nofsiger or not, I will talk with him
at length.
Recommendation:
Haldoman see Nofsiger.
Haldeman will not see Nofsiger.
Re-schedule.
GS/jb
Gordon
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
the ulcue
note
FTF
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. NW
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20006
(202) 333-0920
June 26, 1972
Fred
MEMORANDUM FOR:
JEB MAGRUDER
FRED MALEK
FROM:
KEN RIETZ
I thought you would be interested in the attached.
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAT BUCHANAN
FROM:
KEN SMITH
FOR THE PRESIDENT
The following are some of the indications of youth support for
the President we have on record. As we discussed this record
has. not gotten the kind of coverage it deserves. Whatever you
can do to help get the work through the Administration would be
appreciated.
The last Beggs Copeland Campus poll showed RN to be the #1 choice
for President (26%). This was roughly double (from 14%) his sup-
port found by the same poll in January.
The President has won 92 mock elections in 25 states since Feb-
ruary: We know of only 24 losses. Our wins include the follow-
ing:
1) University of South Dakota
A state wide mock convention with over 500 students
from 30 schools participating.
RN
53.9%
McGovern
41.8%
2) Kansas University
In separate two way races, the President beat all
contenders getting in excess of 50% against all
candidates except McGovern, who he bested 46% to 42%,
with 13% undecided.
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 333-4570
-2-
3) University of Southern California
The President was the first choice of all candidates receiving
390 votes to 331 votes for second place McGovern.
4) University of Mississippi
The President showed his Southern strength be beating all candi-
dates, including Wallace in separate two way races, receiving 70%
or more of the votes in each race.
5) Ohio State University
In separate three way races that included Wallace, students gave
the President more than 50% of the vote in each race.
6) Washington State University
The President was the first choice of all candidates - receiving
1,238 votes to 777 for McGovern, 418 for Jackson, 386 for Muskie
and a scattering for the other candidates.
7) University of California at Davis
In an eight way non-partisan primary, Nixon received 57.7% of the
vote. McGovern was second with 34.6%
8) Florida Statewide College Primary
The President won the Republican primary on 35 out of 36 campuses
participating and received more votes statewide than any candidate
in either party.
-3-
Especially significant are three recent polls taken by National Organizations:
1) Phi Theta Kappa
This is the national junior college Honorary Fraternity that
corresponds to Phi Beta Kappa in universities. A mock election
held at their national convention, with 800 representatives from
50 states attending, selected the President, giving him 49.4% of the
vote to second place McGovern's 21.8%.
2) California Junior Statesmen
This prestigious statewide group surveyed 13,000 students at 45
selected high schools. Results: RN - 30%; McGovern - 22%; Unde-
cided - 23%; Wallace - 8%; and the rest scattered among other
candidates.
3) American Education Publications
This group's fifth national high school students presidential pre-
ference poll yielded first place to RN with 59,911 votes - roughly
31% of the total. Kennedy came in second with 15%, followed by
Wallace, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey and Chisholm.
In addition to polls, support has been shown by the endorsements of over
150 college leaders across the country, including the student hody presi-
dents of such large and prestigious institutions as University of Southern
California, University of Nebraska, University of Washington, Oregon
State, Brandeis, University of Colorado, University of Alabama, University
of Mississippi, University of San Francisco, New Mexico State, University
of Texas at Arlington, 01d Dominion University, Bradley University, Wabash
and many more. These endorsements were announced in a press conference
in Los Angeles last month and received very good press coverage.
Finally, there have been rallies on campuses from Florida to California
in support of the President's Vietnam policy. A realistic survey con-
ducted by Young Voters for the President on five campuses in the Los Angeles
area, just two days after the mining of Haiphong showed that 25.5% of the
students strongly agreed with that action, 21.9% agreed, 3.3% were indiffer-
ent, 21.6% disagreed, 21.5% strongly disagreed and 6% were undecided.
June 24, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. RALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT:
Campaign Surrogate Attack Plan
The campaign surrogate division at 1701 submitted the attached
plan to John Whitaker on June 9. Whitaker's June 22 response
is at Tab A. Comments from other White House Staff members
were solicited on your behalf. Cole, Chapin, Malek and Howard
agree that a "thorough, well done plan" has been prepared.
It'is conceptually sound to get three-day-a-week commitments
from the 32 surrogates, to send them only to the key states,
and to target the media appearance by their appeal to voter
blocs.
Cole, Chapin, Malek and Howard each had specific suggestions.
Cole wanted Bill Magruder and Phil Senchez added with increased
events in New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland and Syracuse, New
York. Chapin questions whether surrocates such as Romney and
Meskill should be permitted to "count" events in Michigan and
Connecticut. Also Chapin questions their news value in their
own states. Chapin wonders why Ehrlichman; Scali, MacGregor
and Garment aren't programmed. Malek urges a heavier than
three-day-a-week speaking schedule and wants Tom Kleppe and
Arthur Flemming added. Howard urges the commitments from the
surrogates be ruthlessly enforced or the plan will collapse.
John Whitaker shares several of these concerns and the specific
suggestions can be implemented.
The real problem, however, remains the division of responsibility
between John Mitchell's campaign surrogate group under Bart
Porter, Chuck Colson's domestic road show and sub-Cabinet
speaking operation under Pat O'Donnell, and John Ehrlichman's
spokesman role and responsibility.
On May 4 when you met with Mitchell, Ehrlichman, and Colson to
discuss the division of responsibility the decision was to
assign Whitaker full authority. After a personal appeal by
Mitchell, Whitaker did not accept. he will only "advise".
On May 19 when you met with Ehrlichman, Mitchell and Timmons
-2-
to discuss the Convention, Mitchell gave you the May 8
memorandur attached at Tab B. Mitchell wanted you to
assert the supremacy of 1701 over Colson's operation.
Al Haig Made Phrlichman's substantive briefing for the
surrogates on June 23 an unqualified success. However,
the surrogates do not understand Ehrlichman's role or
why he called the briefing without informing 1701.
The solution, according to Whitaker, is to put the 1701
and Colson operation in one room. Colson does not want
O'Donnell to move to 1701. The 1701 scheduling operation
cannot move to the White House.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you direct Whitaker and O'Donnell to move to 1701 to
implement the Surrogate Attack Plan.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
COMMENT
GS:dg
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 22, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BART PORTER
FROM:
John C. Whitaker Jolin Whetater
SUBJECT:
Surrogate Attack Plan
August 24 to November 11, 1972
It is a very fine comprehensive job.
1. The key question is, who is really in charge between you
working for John Mitchell and Pat O'Donnell working for Chuck Colson.
If Bob Haldeman, John Mitchell and Chuck Colson agree on a split
responsibility (i.e., O'Donnell schedule sub-cabinet, Domestic Council
road show, Kissinger, Rogers, Laird, or certain prima donnas who need
the "call from the White House", or in the case of "very non-political
events" it is imperative the request not come from your operation, etc.,
etc. ), either a very clear division of responsibility has to be worked out --
with you and O'Donnell present so you both understand the ground rules
or a decision has to be made that one or the other is running the whole
show. My concern is primarily one of lack of physical proximity between
you and O'Donnell. Maybe I rely on my own experience too much. In
'68, I was responsible for the President, Vice President, their wives,
Julie, Tricia, David, the Agnew children and only about 10 surrogates.
Not nearly as ambitious an undertaking as 34 surrogates plus a side bar
relationship with Senator Buckley. I had four schedules, one each for
(1) the President, (2) the Vice President, (3) the girls and David
Eisenhower, and (4) the surrogates. We worked in a large room shouted
at each other and hung together no memos, etc. It moved too fast to do
otherwise. Nowadays, the President and Vice President and First Lady
are all different operations and SO are Julie and Tricia. I just wonder if
you and O'Donnell won't get your wires crossed in spite of the best
intentions if you are not in the same room.
- 2 -
2. The heart of scheduling is, be hard as rock on your battle
plan, i.c. never go out of the key states and lock TV in first and then
figure out an excuse to be there. Everybody will fight you on this --
including John Mitchell and Bob Haldeman. There will be all sorts
of appeals to go to non-key states. Your answer should be, "fine,
after each surrogate has finished his three days a week work in the
key states. " In other words, non-key states are add-ons -- not sub-
stitutions for getting firm commitments for coverage of every media
center in every big state. You will find too many nice guys who will
break the rules and you have to fight them off.
3. If McGovern is nominated, I'd lighten up Texas and focus
more on liberal states.
4. Double check your frequency of visits in each state -- seems
like there are times when you have three surrogates in a state the
same day, then none for a week.
5. Many cities in key states seem to be missing from your media
center list. I don't know the criteria you are using, but from a seat-of-
the-pants feeling where either the President or surrogates have worked
in the past, I'd make sure the following cities are covered with
surrogates not on your media center list.
California: Santa Barbara, Bakersfield, San Jose and because
the state is so darn important, even Eureka, Redding and Santa Rosa.
Illinois: East St. Louis, (tri cities of Rock Island, Moline and
Davenport yes, even go to Iowa for Illinois TV coverage), Decatur,
Peoria, Rockford.
Michigan: Muskegon, Grand Rapids, Bay City, Saginaw and Flint.
Missouri: St. Joseph, Rolla and good old Springfield (the GOP
bastion of Missouri - a "get out the vote" excrcise).
New Jersev: With no TV (I may be out of date) you need to cover
it like hairs on a dog - a very rough one.
New York: Syracuse
Ohio: Dayton, Youngstown, Canton, Toledo
- 3 -
Oregon: So they don't feel forgotten out there in castern
Oregon, do Pendleton, and in the south, Roseburg, Medford and
Klamath Falls.
Pennsylvania: Allentown and Scranton/Wilkes Barre. Pennsylvania
is so important that there are two bus trips or one railroad trip with
potential that cover strings of small to medium size towns that collectively
are a lot of votes: (1) Philadelphia along the Penn Central line to
Pittsburg; and (2) Allentown north to Scranton then go pick up Erie off
by itself - but important.
Texas: Amarillo, Wichita Falls, San Antonio, El Paso. Dallas/
Fort Worth - jealousies preclude kissing off Fort Worth.
Wisconsin: Green Bay, Manitowac and Sheboygan, Eau Claire,
LaCross, Rhinelander, Wausau and Stevens Point. They are used to a
lot of attention after their primaries and they should get it.
7. I assume as you get polls every two 'weeks during the heat of
the campaign, the key state targets will shift -- those we can't lose and
those we can't win, that we thought otherwise when the campaign started.
It is therefore darn important that you maintain control over your
surrogates and take the pressure and never commit more than two weeks
in advance through September and one week in advance through October
25, and even less lead time the last ten days of the campaign.
8. A letter from John Mitchell to each surrogate "annointing"
you is important. You should also talk to each surrogate to go over
each schedule. John Mitchell has to give you clout because everybody
clse is going to tear you down.
9. I take the 15 key states as a given - Florida not being on the
list bothers me, but that isn't my call.
10. I would suggest sub-cabinet and celebrity, rather than surrogates,
focus in New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota. The President has basically
been weak in those states (particularly New Mexico and Nevada).
CC: John D. Ehrlichman
H. R. Haideman
Fred Malek
John Mitchell
Committee for the Re-election of the President
May 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
THROUGH:
JEB S. MAGRUDER
FROM:
HERBERT L. PORTER
Bart
SUBJECT:
Scheduling of Surrogate Candidates
Pursuant to your request, attached is a proposed memorandum
from you to Mr. Haldeman regarding the procedure to be followed
in scheduling surrogate candidates.
Attachment.
Committee for the Re-election of the President
May 8, 1972
MEMORANDUM
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN N. MITCHELL
SUBJECT:
Scheduling of Surrogate Candidates
This memorandum is written to record the conclusions reached
at our conference on Thursday, May 4, 1972, regarding the
scheduling of surrogate candidates. I would appreciate it
if you would review our conclusions with Chuck Colson.
Predicated on the theory that surrogate candidates can be
utilized most effectively through adherence to a program of
creative scheduling based upon political necessities, we
agreed to the following:
1. Effective immediately, all scheduling of the surrogate
candidates, including the members of the Cabinet, will
be done through the Spokesmen Resources. Division at
1701. This includes scheduling into non-political,
as well as political, events. We plan to have four
or five schedulers working at 1701 with the surrogate
candidates.
2. The Spokesmen Resources Division may call upon spokes-
men other than the surrogate candidates, including
Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries and White
House personnel, to appear at approved events.
3. The Executive Speakers Bureau at the White House
shall continue to exist and shall be responsible for
the organization of White House briefings and special
events. Examples are the busing road shows, Dr.
Page 2
Kissinger's foreign policy briefings, and the
extensive scheduling of the sub-Cabinet group.
Pat O'Donnell will also schedule Secretary Laird
and Secretary Rogers, which should not be done
from 1701. (As you know, we would still prefer
to have Pat O'Donnell move over to 1701 and work
under the direction of our Spokesmen Resources
Division, at the same time being available to
assist Colson on special projects, such as White
House briefings and road shows.)
4. To take advantage of the incumbency, we will
coordinate our activities with the White House.
For example, if it appears that the White House
would have a better possibility of placing a
surrogate into a non-political forum, 1701 will
call upon 0 Donnell to make that contact. 1701
will also coordinate its T.V. and media activities
with White House personnel.
5. Copies of invitations to the President and the
Vice President, which are regretted and which are
worthy of consideration, shall be forwarded to
the Spokesmen Resources Division at 1701 with
copies of the letters of regret.