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This file contains:
To: Gordon Strachan From: Jeb Magruder RE: For Your Information - California Polls. Includes memos from Thomas C. Reed, Robert H. Marik, Harry Dent RE: "Listening Post" data. Survey data and California poll for 09/09/1971 attached. 19 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/27/1971
To: Gordon Strachan From: Dick RE: For Your Information RE: DMI analysis of "When the Voter Makes Up His Mind Prior to Voting." DMI analysis and memos from Jim Cavanaugh, Dick, and Ron Baukol attached. 58 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/2/1971
To: Bob From: Thomas C. Reed RE: Thanks for your call. Discussed data enclosed. Highlights of Post-Election DMI statewide California Survey from November 5-8, 1970, attached. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 4/13/1971
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Gordon Strachan RE: Polls from Minnesota and California with interesting sections marked. Minnesota and California polling data RE: Vietnam war and other candidates attached. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
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WHSF: Contested, 44-10
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This file contains:
To: Gordon Strachan From: Jeb Magruder RE: For Your Information - California Polls. Includes memos from Thomas C. Reed, Robert H. Marik, Harry Dent RE: "Listening Post" data. Survey data and California poll for 09/09/1971 attached. 19 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/27/1971
To: Gordon Strachan From: Dick RE: For Your Information RE: DMI analysis of "When the Voter Makes Up His Mind Prior to Voting." DMI analysis and memos from Jim Cavanaugh, Dick, and Ron Baukol attached. 58 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/2/1971
To: Bob From: Thomas C. Reed RE: Thanks for your call. Discussed data enclosed. Highlights of Post-Election DMI statewide California Survey from November 5-8, 1970, attached. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 4/13/1971
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Gordon Strachan RE: Polls from Minnesota and California with interesting sections marked. Minnesota and California polling data RE: Vietnam war and other candidates attached. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/26/1971
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
44
10
9/27/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: Gordon Strachan From: Jeb Magruder
RE: For Your Information - California
Polls. Includes memos from Thomas C.
Reed, Robert H. Marik, Harry Dent RE:
"Listening Post" data. Survey data and
California poll for 09/09/1971 attached.
19pgs.
44
10
7/2/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: Gordon Strachan From: Dick RE: For
Your Information RE: DMI analysis of
"When the Voter Makes Up His Mind Prior
to Voting." DMI analysis and memos from
Jim Cavanaugh, Dick, and Ron Baukol
attached. 58pgs
44
10
4/13/1971
Campaign
Letter
To: Bob From: Thomas C. Reed RE: Thanks
for your call. Discussed data enclosed.
Highlights of Post-Election DMI statewide
California Survey from November 5-8,
1970, attached. 5pgs
44
10
5/26/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Gordon Strachan
RE: Polls from Minnesota and California
with interesting sections marked. Minnesota
and California polling data RE: Vietnam war
and other candidates attached. 9pgs
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Page 1 of 1
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
September 27, 1971 H neednil
see
FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
pees-
FROM:
JEB MAGRUDER
labil
For your information.
September 27, 1971
Mr. Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
P. O. Box 371
San Rafael, California 94902
Dear Tom:
The "Listening Post" project looks to be a very
useful barometer of the political climate for the President
in California. I will appreciate receiving subsequent
reports as they are issued and willssee that the informa-
tion is transmitted to the appropriate people connected
with the campaign.
I think we have arrived at a good arrangement with
Compass Systems and the Reapportionment Trustee Committee.
The next step will be for us to work out plans to assure that
the system is used most effectively in winning California
in 1972. I will be in contact with you as we proceed in
that direction.
Many thanks for your help.
Sincerely,
Robert H. Marik
RHM:jm
cc:JSM
Jeb - Who else should see this?
Republican
National
Committee.
22 September 1971
Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
Executive Committee
Republican National Committee
P.O. Box 371
San Rafael, California 94902
(415) 456-7310
Dear Bob:
We have embarked on a continuous polling project in the
Los Angeles area which should give us a reasonable
estimate of the President's strength and possible opponents
in California.
I am enclosing a memorandum explaining the system and a
summary of the first, August, results.
Very best regards,
Fow
Thomas C. Reed
Mr. Robert Marik
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, #272
Washington, D.C.
Bob- Hope I was of some help. please
doir heritte to call. Tom
Republican
"Listening Post" consists of 1,000 telephone interviews monthly
National
in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Respondents are those
over 18, whether registered to vote or not.
Committee.
Voting patterns during the 1960's indicate that if one knows the
vote results in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, he also knows
Thomas C. Reed
Member for California
the upper and lower bounds of all statewide results. In particu-
Executive Committee
lar, Nixon or Reagan, when running for President or Governor,
Republican National Committee
P.O. Box 371
never did better statewide than their percentage of the total vote
San Rafael, California 94902
(415) 456-7310
in Los Angeles and Orange combined, and never did worse than
their percentage in Los Angeles alone.
The 1964 Goldwater presidential election involved a north-south split, but even so,
the rule was approximately correct. The chart below illustrates this result.
Nixon for
President
Nixon for
Governor
Goldwater for
President
Reagan for
Governor
Nixon for
President
Reagan for
Governor
60
% of
I.A. & Orange
all
Counties
votes
cast
Statewide
for
office
A. County
50
nly
40
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
Since President Nixon and Governor Reagan will be the principal political figures
in California in 1972, it seems reasonable to save costs by tracking only in Los
Angeles and Orange Counties and extrapolating statewide implications.
The polling organization for "Listening Post" is DMI. The project contract con-
tinues monthly through May 1972, with a final pre-primary report on 1 June, five
days before the primary.
"LISTENING POST"
EXHIBIT B
Preliminary Survey Results, 21 September 1971
1,000 telephone interviews in Los Angeles and Orange Counties 10 August-
30 August 1971 (5 days before and 15 days after the 15 August presidential
economic statement).
1. REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Republicans only)
"If the Republican Presidential Primary were held today, and the nominees
were Pete McCloskey and Richard Nixon, for whom would you vote?"
May 1971
This Survey
Statewide
Nixon
75.1%
74.4%
McCloskey
7.5%
7.7%
Undecided
17.4%
17.9%
2. DEMOCRAT PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Democrats only)
"Which Democrat would you personally like to see nominated for President?'
Statewide
"Field" Poll
This Survey
Published 9/8/71
E. Kennedy
32.3%
37.0%
E. Muskie
17.5%
19.0%
H. Humphrey
13.1%
13.0%
3. GENERAL ELECTION
A. Nixon-Kennedy-Wallace: "Now suppose the election for President were
held today and the candidates were Richard Nixon, Republican; Ted
Kennedy, Democrat; George Wallace, American Independent; how would
you vote:
Nixon
Kennedy
Wallace
No Answer
Total
39.4%
44.0%
8.5%
8.0%
Republicans
75.1%
12.0%
7.5%
5.4%
Democrats
19.8%
61.4%
8.8%
10.0%
Age 18-24
25.2%
65.4%
4.9%
5.5%
Age 25-34
34.1%
50.6%
8.6%
6.7%
Spanish surname
22.3%
61.7%
8.5%
7.4%
1
"LISTENING POST" Preliminary Survey Results, 21 September 1971
B.
To measure a base level of support: "Now if the election for President
were held today and Richard Nixon were running for reelection, would
you vote for him?
Yes
No
Depends
No answer
Total
30.4%
43.5%
17.6%
8.5%
Republicans
58.8%
16.6%
19.1%
5.5%
Democrats
14.3%
60.8%
17.9%
7.0%
4.
MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS:
National:
Economic (inflation, unemployment, etc.)
35%
Vietnam, war and peace
20%
Environment
12%
State of California:
Economic
55%(!)
(Unemployment
20%
Too much Welfare 19%
Taxes
10%
Inflation
6%)
Environment
14%
2
Fee
THE WHITE House
WASHINGTON
Date: September 27, 1971
TO:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
HARRY DENT ASD
Please handle
For your information
Gal27 not
Sent Thank to Haldeman, Nofziger, Magruder copy 9/27/71 to - HAldran
magroder
epublican
- Nozzjer
ational
ommittee.
21 September 1971
C. Reed
for California
cutive Committee
ublican National Committee
Box 371
Rafael, California 94902
456-7310
Dear Harry:
We have embarked on a continuous polling project in the
Los Angeles area which should give us a reasonable
estimate of the President's strength and possible opponents
in California.
I am enclosing a memorandum explaining the system and a
summary of the first, August, results.
Very best regards,
Tom
Thomas C. Reed
Mr. Harry S. Dent
The White House
Washington, D.C.
I've send a copy
directly to A/G mirchel.
faire all in danger with Brownell
back in town (fours).
Bat to Rose
T.
Republican
"Listening Post" consists of 1,000 telephone interviews monthly
National
in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Respondents are those
over 18, whether registered to vote or not.
Committee.
Voting patterns during the 1960's indicate that if one knows the
vote results in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, he also knows
C. Reed
the upper and lower bounds of all statewide results. In particu-
mber for California
ecutive Committee
lar, Nixon or Reagan, when running for President or Governor,
publican National Committee
never did better statewide than their percentage of the total vote
O. Box 371
Rafael, California 94902
in Los Angeles and Orange combined, and never did worse than
5) 456-7310
their percentage in Los Angeles alone.
The 1964 Goldwater presidential election involved a north-south split, but even so,
the rule was approximately correct. The chart below illustrates this result.
Nixon for
President
Nixon for
Governor
Goldwater for
President
Reagan for
Governor
Nixon for
President
Reagan for
Governor
60
% of
L.A. & Orange
all
Counties
votes
cast
tatewide
for
office
L.A. County
50
Only
40
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
Since President Nixon and Governor Reagan will be the principal political figures
in California in 1972, it seems reasonable to save costs by tracking only in Los
Angeles and Orange Counties and extrapolating statewide implications.
The polling organization for "Listening Post" is DMI. The project contract con-
tinues monthly through May 1972, with a final pre-primary report on 1 June, five
days before the primary.
"LISTENING POST"
EXHIBIT B
Preliminary Survey Results, 21 September 1971
1,000 telephone interviews in Los Angeles and Orange Counties 10 August-
30 August 1971 (5 days before and 15 days after the 15 August presidential
economic statement).
1.
REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Republicans only)
"If the Republican Presidential Primary were held today, and the nominees
were Pete McCloskey and Richard Nixon, for whom would you vote
May 1971
This Survey
Statewide
Nixon
75.1%
74.4%
McCloskey
7.5%
7.7%
Undecided
17.4%
17.9%
2.
DEMOCRAT PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARY (Democrats only)
"Which Democrat would you personally like to see nominated for President? "
Statewide
"Field" Poll
This Survey
Published 9/8/71
E. Kennedy
32.3%
37.0%
E. Muskie
17.5%
19.0%
H. Humphrey
13.1%
13.0%
3.
GENERAL ELECTION
A.
Nixon-Kennedy-Wallace: "Now suppose the election for President were
held today and the candidates were Richard Nixon, Republican; Ted
Kennedy, Democrat; George Wallace, American Independent; how would
you vote:
Nixon
Kennedy
Wallace
No Answer
Total
39.4%
44.0%
8.5%
8.0%
Republicans
75.1%
12.0%
7.5%
5.4%
&
Democrats
19.8%
61.4%
8.8%
10.0%
Age 18-24
25.2%
65.4%
4.9%
5.5%
Age 25-34
34.1%
50.6%
8.6%
6.7%
Spanish surname
22.3%
61.7%
8.5%
7.4%
"LISTENING POST" Preliminary Survey Results, 21 September 1971
B.
To measure a base level of support: "Now if the election for President
were held today and Richard Nixon were running for reelection, would
you vote for him?
Yes
No
Depends
No answer
Total
30.4%
43.5%
17.6%
8.5%
Republicans
58.8%
16.6%
19.1%
5.5%
Democrats
14.3%
60.8%
17.9%
7.0%
4.
MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS:
National:
Economic (inflation, unemployment, etc.)
35%
Vietnam, war and peace
20%
Environment
12%
State of California:
Economic
55%(!)
(Unemployment
20%
Too much Welfare 19%
Taxes
10%
Inflation
6%)
Environment
14%
-
Fdo
IIII AND IMPARTAL WINI SURVEY 01 PUBLIC OPINION
Cal
ESTABLISHI AND ARCH CORPORATION SINCE 1946
San Francisco Headquarter:
LOS Angeles Office
Rolls
145 Montgomery Street
3142 WILL 1) New
San Francesco 04104
In, 9909
392-5766
385 5259
Mervin D Field, Director
Robert Heyer. Editor
COPYRIGHT 1971 BY FIELD RESEARCH CORPORATION. FOR PUBLICATION BY SUBSCRIBERS ONLY
Release 724
For release THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1971
NIXON'S POPULARITY WITH CALIFORNIA
IMPORTANT: Contract for this service is subject to
VOTERS WAS AT LOW EBB PRIOR TO
revocation if publication or broadcast takes place
ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS NEW ECONOMY
before release date or if contents of report are
AND MONETARY PROGRAM
divulged to persons outside of subscriber staff prior
to release time.
by Mervin D. Field
Before President Nixon announced his new economy and monetary program on August 15, his
political stock with California voters was at a very low ebb. If he had been up for re-election at that time
ne probably would have been defeated by any of four possible Democratic contenders.
A California Poll survey was completed just before the President delivered his dramatic economic
message to the public, but after his accouncement to visit Peking. In the survey, Nixon trailed such possible
Democratic rivals for the Presidency as Maine Senator Edmund Muskie, Massachusetts Senator Edward Kennedy,
New York Mayor John Lindsay, and former Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy.
A representative cross-section of 1008 potential voters (including a proportionate number of newly
enfranchised 18-20 year olds) were asked to indicate their present choice when shown a series of cards
isting different possible candidate line-ups.
When paired against Muskie, Kennedy, Lindsay, and McCarthy, President Nixon trailed in the
ote no matter whether it was a two-way major party or a three-way race including George Wallace and his
American Independent Party.
All voters Statewide
All voters Statewide
Wallace
Wallace
Wallace
Wallace
out
in*
out
in*
Muskie
50%
46%
Lindsay
48%
44%
Nixon
43
39
Nixon
43
35
Undecided
7
5
Undecided
9
9
Kennedy
49%
49%
McCarthy
47%
43%
Nixon
43
38
Nixon
44
38
Undecided
8
6
Undecided
9
10
(*The Wallace vote ranges from 7 to 12 percentage points in each of the above trial heats, but
has no significant effect on the relative strength of the major party candidates.)
(MORE)
-- Shown had 1 as lin ,dath Reporter: n.l. contables paper
public openion with and based upport to come by nights withouth 1.1, if patible I:- BE.' SEP 17 1971
scennhe sampling and 100mg per I'll obtained the the pith N Byp. hidhw prople of an the al procede it; and
important questions of the day Proportionate numbers of people of both 50% term all parts of Health from different sand comminaties, and of age, I'll another political and " prop. be
included in the emples Mayor Surveys - made with simples of 1000 III more respondents Income sulvey Jue unde with smaller imples of not less than GOD interviews
he California Poll - page 2
Against Senator George McGovern, who presently is not as well-known to the rank and file volers
some of the other Democratic candidates and Hubert Humphrey the 1968 Democratic nominee, Nixon
small leads. However, Nixon had a sizeable or extremely large lead when pitted against other Democratic
presidential contenders, such as Senators Birch Bayh, Henry Jackson, William Proxmire, Fred Harris, and
Congressman Wilbur Mills. Nixon's biggest lead occurred when Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty was listed
the Democratic presidential nominee.
All voters -- Statewide
All voters -- Statewide
Wallace
Wallace
Wallace
Wallace
out
in*
out
in*
Nixon
48%
43%
Nixon
49%
46%
McGovern
41
39
Harris
29
25
Undecided
11
9
Undecided
22
19
Nixon
49%
43%
Nixon
50%
47%
Humphrey
41
38
Mills
27
22
Undecided
10
8
Undecided
23
20
Nixon
49%
45%
Nixon
60%
53%
Bayh
33
29
Yorty
24
20
Undecided
18
15
Undecided
16
18
Nixon
49%
45%
Nixon
51%
46%
Proxmire
34
28
Jackson
28
27
Undecided
17
15
Undecided
21
16
(*In these trial heats Wallace's strength ranges from 9 to 12 percentage points. As in the other
pairings, the Wallace vote does not appear to effect significantly the relative position of the
two major party candidates.)
A comparison of Nixon's early August 1971 position vis-a-vis two of his possible Democratic rivals
ext year with previous California Poll measurements illustrate the decline in his popularity. For example in
NO cases where previous measurements are available a previous lead of six percentage points over either
ennedy or Muskie had been transformed to an 11 percentage point deficit behind Kennedy and a 7 percentage
oint deficit to Muskie.
All voters -- Statewide
August
May
November
1971
1971
1970
NIXON
39%
44%
47%
MUSKIE
46
45
41
WALLACE
10
4
4
UNDECIDED
5
7
8
NIXON
38%
43%
47%
KENNEDY
49
46
41
WALLACE
7
3
4
UNDECIDED
6
8
8
(MORE)
SEP 17 1971
lhe California Poll - page 3
Nixon's announcement of his new economic program has occasioned considerable favorable
comment, and since making it, it is believed by many observers that his popularity position with the voters
has improved.
It is quite clear that the domestic economy had emerged as the number one issue, and that
Nixon's re-election chances hinge on his ability to fulfill the promise of his new program that he can turn
the domestic economy around.
-30-
COPYRIGHT 1971 BY FIELD RESEARCH CORPORATION. FOR PUBLICATION BY SUBSCRIBERS ONLY
SEP 17 1971
THE INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL WIDI SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION
ESTABLISHE AND FRATED BY FIELD RESEARCH CORPORATION SINCE 1946
San Francisco Headquarters
LOS Angeles Office
145 Montgomery Street
3142 Wilshire Boulevard
San Francisco 94104
Los Angeles 90005
392-5766
385-5259
Mervin D. Field, Director
Robert Heyer, Editor
INFORMATION ABOUT THIS SURVEY
Dates
of interviewing:
August 2 - 8, 1971
Poper-
ulation covered by
survey:
Representative cross-section of California adult public
nber of interviews:
This report is based on opinions of a sample of 508 persons: 181 self-identified as
Republicans, 252 as Democrats, and 75 other party or no political affiliation.
sample
ple design:
The survey interviews are selected in accordance with a probability sample design
which provides for random (i.e., non-judgmental) selection of households. Assign-
ments in a particular place are done in clusters with randomly drawn addresses as
starting points for each cluster of interviews. For this survey, 240 clusters throughout
the state were selected. Each cluster consisted of a set of consecutive households
beginning with the designated starting household. Interviewers made up to three calls
on every listed address in an attempt to complete an interview. One adult per house-
hold was selected for interview on a systematic basis to provide a balance by sex and
age. Interviewing was conducted during late afternoon and evening on weekdays and
all day on the week-end. The sample is designed to be self-weighted on all variables
of interest, such as area of state, degree of urbanization, political party affiliation,
and socio-economic status. Whenever imbalances in key variables occur in the sample
due to sampling variability or other factors, corrective weights are applied during the
data processing stage to return the sample to proper proportion.
wording
ling of the
exuestions
"I know that the 1972 presidential election is more than a year away, but let's assume
tions on which
it was being held this month. If you were voting today, who would you vote for?
report is based:
(CARDS WERE SHOWN TO RESPONDENT LISTING TRIAL HEAT PAIRINGS.)
"Now, let's assume that in addition to the two major parties Democrat and Republican
there was also a George Wallace ticket. If you were voting today and the presidential
ballot looked like this who would you vote for ? (CARDS WERE SHOWN TO RESPONDENT
LISTING THREE PARTY TRIAL HEAT PA!RINGS.)
(See reverse side for answers to some
typical questions about the Poll)
The California Pull was toundo in 1946 as d medium for promoting public openion The California Pull IS completely independent of all Epohneal parties and candidates Its sole purpose IS
public opinion curately and objectively Finance support for the Pull comes from newspapers and television stations that have leave rights within the city of publication. The Pull unlives
SEP
1971
scientific sampling and questioning procedures in obtaining the data reputs III its releases Representative samples of adults die interviewed all permite intervals on election issues and other sucially
important questions of the day Proportionate numbers of people of both you. from all parts of the state, from different and communities, and of all anje, economic, political, and occupation quiops are
included in the samples Major surveys are made with samples of 1,000 of more respondents Internal surveys sometimes are made with smaller samples of not less than 600 interviews.
NOTE TO EDITORS: Following are answers to some questions frequently asked about The California
Poll. These may be helpful for your own background or to answer questions put to you about The
Poll. Any or all of this may be published at your option.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA POLL
2. Who runs The California Poll ?
The California Poll is owned and operated by Field Research Corporation, an independent national
public opinion and marketing research agency with headquarters in San Francisco. The Poll was
founded in 1946 and has been published continuously since that time. The Poll is non-partisan.
2. Who pays for the surveys conducted by The California Poll ?
The cost of operating The California Poll is underwritten by 13 newspapers and four television
stations in California. Each one pays an annual fee for exclusive publication or broadcast
rights in its area. The Poll does not accept fees from any candidates, political parties, or
individuals who have any interest in the data being published. Its sole purpose is to report
public opinion objectively and accurately.
D.
How are The California Poll's surveys conducted?
'ta
The surveys are made by means of personal interviews conducted by trained interviewers using
printed questionnaires. Survey respondents are selected by scientific methods to assure that an
accurate cross section of adults in all walks of life throughout the state and representing all
shades of political belief are included in their proper proportion in the sample.
D.
Are the same people interviewed in each survey ?
No. Fresh samples of respondents are drawn for each survey. (Panels of respondents re-interviewed
at intervals are also a valid and valuable research technique for certain special purposes, but they
are seldom used for surveys of the type conducted by The California Poll.)
2Q How are the samples selected and how many people are interviewed
Samples are drawn by probability sampling methods which give each household in the state an equal
chance of being called on for an interview. Within households, the interviewers select adult re-
spondents to fit sex and age quotas to match the state population as a whole. Samples vary in size
between 500 and 1000 respondents per survey.
Do people give honest answers to surveys of this type?
In countless surveys of this type we have found that people are remarkably candid in talking to our
interviewers, and wherever we have an opportunity to test the validity of their answers (for ex-
ample, in an election) there is good evidence that they have actually given US their true opinions.
We recognize that without public confidence surveys of this kind would be impossible and so we
guarantee each respondent complete anonymity. After a percentage of the interviews have been
validated by supervisors, the data are compiled only as statistical summaries. Names of survey
respondents are never released for sales or political use.
Q Are sample surveys of this type accurate ?
Time after time it has been demonstrated that carefully designed samples of this size are very
reliable. Wherever the results can be checked against known data, they have proved to be
accurate with relatively narrow tolerance limits. For example, a survey of 1000 respondents
typically will be accurate within plus or minus approximately 4.5 percentage points, and a
survey of 500 respondents has a tolerance range of about 6.7 percentage points. Thousands
of such surveys are done each year for business and government and great reliance is put on
their findings.
See reverse side for specific information about
the current survey.
SEP 17 1971
File
August 20, 1971
Calif Palls
MEMORANDUM FOR
i
R. HALDEMAN
GEORGE SHULTZ
CHUCK COLSON
SECRETARY CONNALLY
SECRETARY HODGSON
The attached poll was recently completed in Southern
California by J. D. Power and Associates. John
Ehrlichman asked that I forward it for your attention.
Tod R. Hullin
Administrative Assistant
to John D. Ehrlichman
Attachment
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO NEAL BALL
FROM: Judith C. O'¹Veil
SUBJECT:
The following figures were obtained from Barry Robertson of the
J.D. Power & Associates firm in Los Angeles. They conducted the
poll and gave it in the form of a release to the local TV stations
(Los Angeles and San Diego). KTTV in Los Angeles released it
last night.
There were 400 households interviewed, and 1/4 of those households
had at least one union member there. Here are the questions which were
asked and the results:
1. Do you approve or disapprove of the wa ge freeze?
75% - Approved
13% - Disapproved
82% - Republicans
90% - Republicans
75% - Democrats
12% - Democrats
65% - Union Members
16% - Union Members
77% - Non-Union Members
12% - Non-Union Members
2. Do you approve or disapprove of the price freeze?
86% - Approved
6% - Disapproved
90% - Republicans
4% - Republicans
87% - Democrats
5% - Democrats
83% - Union Members
7% - Union Members
87% - Union Members
6% - Non-Union Members
3. Do you approve or disapprove of the import surcharge?
71% - Approved
15% - Disapproved
76% - Republicans
12% - Republicans
69% - Democrats
18% - Democrats
69% - Union Members
18% - Union Members
72% - Non-Union Members
14% - Non-Union Members
-2-
4. How likely is it that the President will disband the freeze at the
end of 3 months?
8%
9% - Republicans
60% - Democrats
9% - Union Members
70% - Non Union Members
27%
31% - Republicans
23% - Democrats
23% - Union Members
29% - Non Union Members
Probably Will Not
33%
28% - Republicans
41% - Democrats
34% - Union Members
33% - Non Union Members
Definitely Will Not
15%
20% - Republicans
11% - Democrats
21% - Union Members
13% - Non Union Members
Mr. Robertson said that they are also trying to break this down even
further according to age, salary, etc. and that so far they have been able
to determine that of the Low Income group ($10, 000 or less) 71% approved
of the freeze.
FU
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 2, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN
The attached memo is for your information. We
are still trying.
Dieto-
File
THE WHITE HOUSE
Polls-
WASHINGTON
July 1, 1971
calil.
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY CASHEN
FROM:
JIM CAVANAUGH P
I talked with my AMA contacts yesterday to see
if they had a DMI analysis of "When the Voter
Makes Up His Mind Prior to Voting." They said
they didn't, but would check around to see if
there were anything like this available.
They have looked at this question as they have
reviewed the results of post-election surveys
in congressional races. As you probably know,
as a general rule the more widely known the
candidate is, the sooner the voter makes up his
mind.
D.ck -
I will keep you
posted: \ anything
further June develops on
This one.
Hee
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Gordon-
\
I hope this.
is what you
are looking
for
Duik
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 8, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DICK HOWARD
FROM:
RON BAUKOL
Ron
SUBJECT:
DMI Analysis
Attached is the DMI analysis of "When the Voter Makes Up His
Mind Prior to Voting". As you can see, it is part of a bigger
analysis. According to Cavanaugh, there is no separate study
on this topic.
This analysis has worthwhile data on when people decide (see
pp 23, 28-30) but the other information presented is very sketchy.
The piece reads like a come-on for a more detailed (and expensive)
survey; it raises many questions and answers few.
CONFIDENTIAL I
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By - EmP pise NARS, Date 5-23-80
BEHIND THE 1970 ELECTIONS:
An Overview Of
Benchmark, Panel And
Post-Election Surveys
Conducted Across The Nation
On Behalf Of The
AMERICAN MEDICAL POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEE
By
Decision Making Information
Written
February, 1971
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
PREFACE
Santayana claimed that those who do not learn from
the past are condemned to relive it. Although we are not
pessimistic in regard to "last year's election outcomes,
we see no reason why 1970 should not serve as a valuable
learning experience and a springboard to greater success
in future years.
To our knowledge, the information we are about to
discuss represents the most extensive body of post-election
survey research ever available (it is certainly the most
recent). The points we will cover raise many critical
questions about the techniques and impact of campaigns.
Although we list some of those questions, this "menu" is
by no means exhaustive.
Readers may develop additional questions (or may
disregard some that we have raised) in order to direct
our efforts to produce an in-depth, highly focused exam-
ination of these surveys -- specifically geared as much
toward planning for the future as toward accounting for
the past.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
1
II. ISSUES IN THE 1970 ELECTIONS
6
III. MASS MEDIA AND CAMPAIGN
ADVERTISING IN 1970
9
IV. THE TIMING OF VOTER BALLOT
CHOICES IN 1970
21
V. DIRECT MAIL AND TELEPHONE
CAMPAIGN CONTACT
36
VI. THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S
AND SENATOR MUSKIE'S "ELECTION
EVE" TELEVISION PRESENTATION
43
VII. CONCLUSION
51
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
INTRODUCTION
The fourteen (14) post-election surveys discussed
in this report were conducted by Decision Making Infor-
mation via telephone between November 3 - 7, 1970. A
total of four-thousand, five-hundred and twenty (4,520)
registered voters were interviewed. Eleven (11) of the
fourteen (14) surveys represented the second or third
survey in those specific areas during 1970, SO that there
is a good deal of trend data, as well. In these eleven (11)
cases, one half (1/2) the sample was "freshly" drawn, with
the other half (1/2) drawn from voters interviewed in previous
survey(s), SO that trends could be discussed. The remaining
three survey samples were drawn entirely on a random proba-
bility proportionate to size basis.
The areas surveyed include:
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
BENCHMARK
PANEL
FIRST
GUBERNATORIAL
California
X
X
X
New York
X
X
X
Minnesota
X
X
X
SENATORIAL
North Dakota
X
X
X
Texas
X
Utah
X
X
X
Wyoming
X
X
X
CONGRESSIONAL
California 38
X
X
X
Kansas 2
X
Minnesota 6
X
X
X
New Mexico 2
X
X
X
New York 34
X
X
X
Utah 1
X
X
X
Wisconsin
X
4,520 Interviews
Telephone
November 3 through November 7, 1970
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR READERS TO BEAR IN MIND
THAT THESE SURVEYS ARE NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED STATES AS A WHOLE. However, when certain
post-election sample characteristics are compared with
those of another sample -- a representative sample of
voters drawn for a national survey conducted by Decision
Making Information in 1970 -- the similarities are
noticeable.
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
4
EDUCATION
Grade
Some
High
Some
College
Post
School
High
School
College
Grad.
Grad.
Or Less
School
Grad.
Post Election
Selected Areas
(N = 4520)
9.0
14.3
34.0
23.4
11.3
7.0
National Probability
Sample (N = 2000)
14.4
17.9
33.9
17.6
10.0
6.2
INCOME
$10,000
$7,000
$5,000
Under
Plus
$9,999
$6,999
$5,000
Post Election
Selected Areas
(N = 4520)
43.5
29.8
13.0
13.6
National Probability
Sample (N = 2000)
56.3
15.5
9.3
19.0
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
5
Nonetheless, while we will discuss the post-election
results in ways that may imply national representivity - -
for the sake of simplicity and brevity -- we cannot say
with any measured degree of confidence that these results
are, necessarily, reflective of nation-wide patterns.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
6
ISSUES IN THE 1970 ELECTIONS
There appears to be ample justification for spot-
lighting Unemployment as a clear dividing issue in 1970's
campaigns. For, despite the fact that all campaigns are
not won and lost on the basis of issues, no single issue
more clearly separates voters along partisan lines than
does Unemployment.
In our fourteen (14) post-election surveys, voters
were shown a list of eight (8) key issues, and asked to
tell us how important a role each of them played in
determining their vote. Examining these issues on the
basis of how often each was described as "extremely
important" in determining vote, they can be rank ordered
across all surveys as follows:
1. Drug Abuse )
Ranked in the
>
Clearly top
kevel
top three by
2. Crime
)
ranked
>
both Republicans
)
and Democrats
3. Inflation
4. Taxes
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
7
5. Pollution
6. Vietnam
>
Trailing
7. Unemployment ) well behind
8. Campus Protests -- Definitely in last place
On the surface, these findings actually appear to
minimize the role of Unemployment. However, a closer
look at partisan responses indicates that Unemployment
was clearly the least salient issue among Republicans - -
ranked solidly in last place -- while Unemployment was
far more salient among Democrats -- ranked fourth, and
quite close to third ranked Inflation! In fact, the
disparity in Republican/Democrat evaluations of the
importance of Unemployment stands as the most obvious
single issue-difference between these voting blocs.
Unfortunately, the task of producing an acceptably
definitive analysis of the role of issues in 1970 is com-
plicated by the fact that these overall tendencies (even
among Republicans and Democrats) are not uniform across
all surveys. Some of the important questions yet to be
answered involve:
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
8
1. What issues seem to be most important in terms
of geographic location? Are there implications
for differing issues-thrusts in different sec-
tions of the nation?
2. What issues seem to be most important in terms
of differing elective offices? Are Congres-
sional elections bound up with different issues
than are those for U. S. Senate? Do these
differences, if they exist, suggest that certain
candidates may speak on specific kinds of issues
with more credibility, since those issues seem
to be closely associated with determination of
vote for that particular office?
3. Aside from partisan and geographic differences,
what demographic characteristics are associated
with a tendency to see certain issues as impor-
tant vote determinants? Do older voters attend
to different issues than younger voters? Does
the same apply to more versus less educated
voters, more versus less affluent voters, union
members versus non-union members, highly effi-
cacious voters versus low efficacy (alienated)
voters, etc. ?
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
9
MASS MEDIA AND CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING IN 1970
At first blush, the 1970 campaigns appear to have
reached the electorate almost at will. When voters were
asked to indicate recall of campaign advertising or
contact, the results border on astonishing:
1. Three out of four voters (72%) recalled tele-
vision campaign advertising.
2. Two out of three voters (68%) recalled newspaper
campaign advertising.
3. Likewise, two out of three voters (63%) remem-
bered receiving direct mail from campaigns and,
amazingly, almost three out of four voters who
recall receiving such mail claim to have read
it!
4. Over half the electorate (57%) recall exposure
to campaign billboards.
5. Almost half of the electorate (41%) recall radio
campaign advertising.
6. One out of three voters (33%) remembers being
contacted by at least one party via telephone,
and urged to go to the polls.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
33%
T
10
4 41%
R
A
D
I
0
57%
B
I
L
7
B
0
A
R
D
S
RECALL OF CAMPAIGN CONTACT
X XX XX45%
X X XXXXX
XXXXX
X XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
X XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXX
R
E
A
D
D
I
R
E
C
T
M
A
I
L
63%
D
I
E
C
T
M
A
I
L
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
68%
N
E
M
S
P
A
d
E
R
S
72%
T
E
_________________________
E
V
I
S
I
0
N
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
11
However, if the qualitative impact of these communi-
cations is an important criterion, then the post-election
surveys raise some crucial questions in regard to 1970's
races. These surveys also asked voters to recall the
most important things they learned about each candidate.
When voters responded to this question, they were then
asked to supply the source from which they learned these
important pieces of information. In the following table,
the solid bars indicate the extent to which each source
was named as a supplier of the "most important thing
learned about" the candidates. The dotted bars allow us
to compare these percentages with the ones involving
simple recall of campaign advertising.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
SOURCE OF MOST IMPORTANT
INFORMATION ABOUT CANDIDATE
100
90
80
72%
70
68%
63%
60
50
41%
40
33%
30
25%
20
14%
10
2%
3%
2%
0
1%
0.3%
T
R
F
D
E
A
R
I
L
A W N S P R S P E E
D
I
R
E
I
E
E
V
0
N
C
A M Y L F I
I
D
T
S
S
N 0 T L H P E E E
I
M
0
A
N
I
L
41%
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
13
The table, SOURCE OF MOST IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT
CANDIDATES, reveals three salient points:
1. In virtually all cases, there is a tremendous
"slippage" between recall of advertising via
some medium, and that medium as a source of
"most important information". [Moreover, the
plain fact is that some voters could not recall
the source of important candidate information,
and even more voters were unable to remember any
important information they learned about a candi-
date -- explaining why the solid bars do not
total 100%.]
2. Television appears to be the most "efficient"
medium -- in terms of its comparatively smaller
proportion of "slippage", and mass media appear
to be more "efficient" than do direct mail or
telephone (although these last two were probably
used later in the campaign, after important
candidate information had already been trans-
mitted via the other communication channels).
3. The role of friends and family as suppliers of
important candidate information seems surpris-
ingly low.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
14
Unfortunately, even this degree of "slippage" between
recall of campaign advertising, and source of important
candidate information does not reveal the entire problem.
Focusing on those voters who had received their most impor-
tant candidate information via the "mass" media (television,
newspaper and radio), the surveys asked whether that infor-
mation had been communicated in a news format, or in an
advertising format. [Here, it is vital to remember that
mass media accounted for almost 90% of the recalled sources
of important candidate information. ]
The following table (FROM WHAT MASS MEDIA FORMAT WAS
MOST IMPORTANT CANDIDATE INFORMATION SECURED) reveals that
important candidate facts were more likely to be absorbed
from news formats than from paid advertisements. Conse-
quently, the "slippage" between campaign advertising and
important information is even greater than at first might
be supposed.
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
15
FROM WHAT MASS MEDIA FORMAT
WAS MOST IMPORTANT CANDIDATE
INFORMATION SECURED
100
D
OTHER
I
90
R
22% BOTH NEWS & ADVERTISING
E
80
C
T
70
M
A
60
32% ADVERTISING FORMAT
S
S
50
M
40
E
D
30
I
39% NEWS FORMAT
A
20
H
10
I
T
0
S
(41%) OF ALL VOTERS
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
16
However, even these findings can be misleading since
there is tremendous variation between individual campaigns.
In point of fact, the following table (NEWS VERSUS ADVER-
TISING AS SOURCE OF IMPORTANT CANDIDATE INFORMATION IN
FOUR STATES), which concentrates on four statewide races,
almost seems to suggest that the more money spent on
political advertising, the less important information was
recalled from that advertising (assuming that Governor
Rockefeller expanded the greatest dollar volume, Governor
Reagan next, and so on).
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
17
NEWS VERSUS ADVERTISING FORMAT AS SOURCE OF IMPORTANT
CANDIDATE INFORMATION IN FOUR STATES
OTHER
BOTH NEWS AND
ADVERTISING
23%
20%
30%
16%
10%
20%
59%
ADVERTISING
FORMAT
28%
63%
55%
36%
22%
NEWS FORMAT
49%
48%
53%
64%
OF ALL VOTERS
N.Y.
CAL.
TEXAS
MINN.
REMEMBERING
GOV.
GOV.
SEN.
GOV.
MASS MEDIA
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
Naturally, there is probably another factor at work
here. Governor Rockefeller, running for a fourth term,
was a long and well established "newsmaker"; as was
Governor Reagan -- running for his second term. On the
other hand, the Bentson-Bush race, and to an even greater
extent, the Head-Anderson contest in Minnesota, matched
lesser known, more "recent" political figures. It is
likely that New York and California voters had been
highly exposed to the actions and statements of their
incumbent Governors well in advance of campaign adver-
tising.
Nonetheless, since advertising usually represents
the largest single class of campaign budget items, the
post-election surveys may well hold clues to some critical
answers:
1. What kinds of voters recall campaign advertising
in what kinds of media? Are Democrats and
Republicans alike? Are young and old alike;
union versus non-union; Easterners versus
Westerners versus Mid-Westerners; etc.?
2. What kinds of voters seem to secure important
candidate information in news formats versus
advertising formats?
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
3. What is the real function of advertising in
political campaigns? Are dollars wasted in
the case of established political figures and
maximized in relation to relative unknowns?
What should be the goals of paid advertisements
in these two kinds of races?
4. Given the encouraging readership of direct
mail, what is its role in situations involving
relative unknowns versus established news-
makers? Should its timing be changed?
5. Is there any relationship between issues and
advertising recall?
6. Given the apparent voter orientation toward
news formats, can there be a more supportive
relationship between a candidate's publicity/
public relations program and his advertising
program -- or should advertising be geared
to something else entirely?
7. How do all of these questions apply to the
Congressional race versus the contest for
U. S. Senate versus Gubernatorial campaigns?
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
20
In essence, we have all heard the classic contention
that fifty percent of all campaign advertising is wasted --
but that no one knows which fifty percent. Is it possible
that more than fifty percent is wasted -- or at least mis-
directed? Do these post-election surveys offer opportun-
ities to determine which "fifty percent" is wasted?
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
21
THE TIMING OF VOTER BALLOT CHOICES IN 1970
A sizable group of political scientists claims that
political campaigns actually persuade very few voters, but
are merely activities to reinforce vote decisions that
have been made independently of the campaigns themselves.
In some ways, the post-election surveys cast grave doubts
over this contention.
Certainly, many voters had indeed made their choices
before the campaigns reached full swing. As a whole, the
surveys indicate that one out of three voters (33%) had
chosen their man before August, and that half the elec-
torate (50%) had committed by the end of September, 1970!
Then, almost paradoxically, as campaigns began to hit
their stride, there was a lull during the first half of
October (when only 11% of the electorate committed) and
an even greater drop in commitment during the third week
of October (with 8% reaching decisions) as the campaigns
actually neared their peaks.
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
22
On the other hand, our findings indicate that between
the last week in October, and the elections themselves (the
last ten [10] days), almost one voter in three (31%), , reached
his decision point -- with seventeen percent (17%) actually
committing either one or two days prior to the election, or
on election day itself! Clearly, it is possible to contend
that a decisive bloc of voters were in a position to be
influenced by the campaigns themselves, since they did not
make up their minds until quite late in the game (see table:
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF INDIVIDUALS INDICATING WHEN THEY
FINALLY MADE UP THEIR MINDS TO VOTE).
undentify under these
how to we
Food
decisions minute
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
100
90
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF
INDIVIDUALS INDICATING WHEN THEY
80
FINALLY MADE UP THEIR MIND
TO VOTE
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
32.8
6.8
10.7
11.3
7.9
13.4
9.7
0
BEFORE
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
FIRST
THIRD
LAST
1 - 2
AUGUST
HALF
WEEK
WEEK
DAYS
OCTOBER
OCTOBER
OCTOBER
BEFORE
50.3
19.2
30.5
DM
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
24
Naturally, these overall figures do not highlight the
extremely wide variations from one state to another, or
from one campaign to another. For example, in California's
gubernatorial contest, almost sixty percent (60%) of the
electorate had chosen before August and less than twenty
percent (19%) committed during the last ten (10) days.
However, in California's 38th Congressional District
(Senator Tunney's old district), only one voter in five
(21%) had selected his congressional choice before August,
while fully half the electorate (50%) did not choose until
the last ten (10) days!
Further examples indicate that in Texas' U. S. Senate
race, over forty percent (42%) of the electorate had
committed prior to August, while only twenty-five percent
(25%) made up their minds during the last ten (10) days.
Roughly similar patterns characterized the Wyoming and
North Dakota U. S. Senate campaigns, -- although a more
detailed analysis is clearly necessary before one can
confidently claim that a pattern of early decision making
in statewide races exists (since the Utah Senate contest
and New York's gubernatorial campaign might be tabbed as
notable exceptions to that pattern if only surface data
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
are considered). Readers may wish to examine the table:
WHEN DID YOU FINALLY MAKE UP YOUR MIND HOW YOU WOULD VOTE
FOR
?
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
26
WHEN DID YOU FINALLY MAKE UP YOUR MIND HOW YOU
WOULD VOTE FOR
?
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR
Before August
Last 10 Days
CALIFORNIA 38 C.D.
Before August
Last 10 Days
NEW YORK GOVERNOR
Inc
Before August
Last 10 Days
NEW YORK 34 C.D.
Before August
Last 10 Days
UTAH SENATE
Inc
Before August
Last 10 Days
UTAH 1 C.D.
Before August
Last 10 Days
MINNESOTA GOVERNOR
Before August
Last 10 Days
MINNESOTA 6 C.D.
Before August
Last 10 Days
TEXAS SENATE
Before August
Last 10 Days
WYOMING SENATE
23,
Before August
XX
Last 10 Days
NORTH DAKOTA SENATE
Before August
Last 10 Days
KANSAS 2 C.D.
Before August
Last 10 Days
New Mexico 2 C.D.
me
Before August
Last 10 Days
WISCONSIN 1 C.D.
Before August
Last 10 Days
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
27
Still another dimension of ballot-choice-timing bears
close scrutiny: when did voters make up their minds to
vote for specific candidates? The following two tables
(TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR CONGRESS IN THE 34TH
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK and TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR
THE SECOND DISTRICT OF KANSAS) illustrate how Republican
Congressman Terry, in New York, built a slight lead into
a decisive victory; while Democrat Congressman Roy, in
Kansas, turned a significant deficit into a solid win
(certainly Congressman Roy's victory challenges the theory
that campaigns serve only to reinforce ballot choices
already held).
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
28
TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR
CONGRESS 34TH DISTRICT NEW YORK
%
50
TERRY
40
30
MCCURN
20
10
Before
In
In
1st
3rd
Last
1-2
Election
August
August
Sept.
Half
Week
Week
Days
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Before
Election
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
29
TIMING OF THE VOTE DECISION FOR
CONGRESS SECOND DISTRICT KANSAS
op
50
ROY
40
MIZE
30
20
10
Before
In
In
1st
3rd
Last
1-2
Election
August
August
Sept.
Half
Week
Week
Days
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Before
Election
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
These last two tables, and the overall table as well,
seem to pinpoint the second to third week in October as a
critical point in 1970 campaign timing. Both the Terry
and Roy campaigns appear to have reached relative plateaus
during this period -- as did the campaigns of their oppo-
nents, and as did the overall table of vote choice timing.
However, all three tables show a sharp increase in decisions
over the next time period. The significance of this "lull"
and "spurt" pattern may be well worth examining.
A third dimension of ballot-choice timing concerns
voter cross-over. To what extent do voters switch allegiance
during a campaign -- and if they do cross over, what impli-
cations does it have for considering campaigns as "conversion/
reinforcement" activities, as opposed to mere exercise in
reinforcement? Because our surveys were often conducted
over time, we are able to discuss trend aspects of some
campaigns. Utah's Burton/Moss U. S. Senate contest provides
a fine illustrative case in point.
As of October 1, 1970, survey research indicated that
Laurence Burton had the support of four out of ten Utah
voters (40%), and was within striking distance of Senator
Moss, who then had forty-six percent (46%) of the vote;
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
31
with a potentially decisive bloc of voters (14%) still
uncommitted. Moreover, the post-election survey shows
strong evidence that Utah's electorate was in a high
state of "flux", since well over one voter in three
(38%) claimed that at one time or another, he had
indeed considered voting for the man he did not choose
on election day.
What happened to those highly volatile Utah voters
during the last month? For one thing, almost two out
of three voters (64%) who were uncommitted as of October 1,
1970, ultimately voted for Senator Moss (only 34% of the
undecideds came into the Burton column). Furthermore,
the voters already committed to one candidate or another
showed a marked tendency to shift allegiance. Mr. Burton
actually lost one of four (26%) of his previously committed
voters to Senator Moss, while the Senator's support was
far more solid -- only thirteen percent (13%) switching
to Burton (see table: UTAH SENATE RACE CROSS-OVER ANALYSIS:
OCTOBER 1 THROUGH NOVEMBER 3).
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
32
UTAH SENATE RACE CROSS-OVER ANALYSIS
OCTOBER 1 THROUGH NOVEMBER 3:
Distribution of October 1 Votes
Against Final Votes Cast
40%
BURTON
(74%)
13%
26%
36"
MOSS
UNDECIDEDS
649
(87%)
(0%)
46%
14%
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
33
The question of why these changes occurred cannot
be fully answered from our preliminary findings. However,
the post-election survey does shed valuable light on this
matter. Over half (56%) of Utah's voters claim to have
learned the most important facts about the candidates
after October 1, 1970.
Interestingly, almost four out of ten voters (39%)
indicated that the most important things they discovered
concerned "something about the campaigns" themselves.
What more than three fourths of these voters learned (31%
of all voters in Utah) related to: "Too much mud slinging";
"Smear campaign"; "Name calling"; "Illegal tactics"; etc.
Most of the remaining voters who found out something
about the campaigns (5% of all Utah voters) spoke of "Out-
side help".
Although a closer examination of the surveys is required,
it is certainly possible that these findings go far toward
explaining the deterioration of Mr. Burton's position between
the beginning of October and election day. Moreover, these
facts prompt further questions regarding the volatility
of the electorate in other races, and point up the value of
analyzing the "switching patterns" that can be seen as a
result of having surveyed SO many campaigns at more than
one point in time.
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
34
Obviously, we have not yet scratched the surface on
this critical factor of ballot choice timing. It is
equally obvious that the post-election surveys represent
a rich vein of information in this area. We might profit-
ably use this information to investigate questions such as:
1. Is ballot choice timing similar in U. S. Senate
races, in Congressional races, in Gubernatorial
races -- or is it totally dependent upon the
specific situation?
2. What kinds of voters decide at what times? Are
there differences between Republicans and Demo-
crats, young and old, union and non-union,
urban - suburban - rural, etc?
3. Is there a relationship between issue concern
and ballot choice timing?
4. Is there a relationship between advertising
recall, or important facts learned about candi-
dates, and ballot choice timing?
5. Is there a relationship between ballot choice
timing in a statewide race, and the timing in
a Congressional contest within the state?
6. Given the large bloc of voters who had still not
committed immediately prior to the election, can
we assess the effects of President Nixon's and
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
35
Senator Muskie's "election eve" television pre-
sentations (the post-election surveys contain a
good deal of information here that can be quite
startling if surface indications hold up under
close examination -- we will touch upon this
later in the report).
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
36
DIRECT MAIL AND TELEPHONE CAMPAIGN CONTACT
We have already noted that almost two out of three
voters (63%) recall receiving direct mail from campaigns
in 1970, and that almost three out of four of these voters
claim to have read that literature.
However, this pattern is not a uniform pattern (see
table: DID YOU RECEIVE/READ DIRECT MAIL). Of the cam-
paigns examined in the table: the Senate races in Utah,
Wyoming and North Dakota; and, the Congressional race in
New Mexico's Second District; appear to have resorted to
direct mail to a noticeably greater extent than did their
more Eastern neighbors. (Although, even in relatively
urban New York State there are strong indications of
urban - suburban - rural differences in direct mail reader-
ship.)
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
DID YOU RECEIVE
(IF YES) DID
PAMPHLET IN
YOU READ IT?
THE MAIL?
CALIFORNIA 38
66.0%
65.0%
MINNESOTA 6
56.0%
57.0%
MINNESOTA GOVERNOR
43.0%
72.0%
NEW MEXICO 2
70.0%
73.0%
NEW YORK GOVERNOR
46.0%
72.0%
NEW YORK 34
56.0%
74.0%
NORTH DAKOTA SENATE
72.0%
67.0%
UTAH SENATE
87.0%
81.0%
WYOMING SENATE
75.0%
73.0%
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
38
On the whole, Republicans were either more prone to
use direct mail, or Republican mail was recalled better
than was Democrat mail.
RECALL OF WHICH CANDIDATE SENT DIRECT MAIL
% of Voters
% of Voters
Contacted
Contacted
Only the Republicans
27%
---
Only the Democrats
---
13%
Both Candidates
45%
45%
Republican
Democrat
Total
Total
72%
58%
The Republican Party was also more likely to have
contacted voters by telephone, and urged them to the
polls. However, the overall pattern points to a compar-
able effort on the part of both Democrats and Republicans!
Such a pattern is contrary to normal expectations in many
areas.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
WHICH PARTY TELEPHONED TO GET OUT THE VOTE?
% of Voters
% of Voters
Contacted
Contacted
Only the Republicans
32%
---
Only the Democrats
---
27%
Both Parties
21%
21%
Republican
Democrat
Total
Total
53%
48%
Again, there are extreme variations when one examines
each race individually. Republicans appear to have done
far the better job in most Congressional races, and in the
California Gubernatorial and Texas Senate contests. However,
in statewide races in areas such as: Utah, Wyoming, Minne-
sota and New York; Democrats seemed able to more than hold
their own (see table: DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN,
DID ANYONE TELEPHONE YOU OR SEE YOU ABOUT GETTING TO THE
POLLS TO VOTE? (IF YES, ASK) WHICH PARTY?).
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
DURING THE LAST WEEK OF THE CAMPAIGN, DID ANYONE TELEPHONE YOU OR
SEE YOU ABOUT GETTING TO THE POLLS TO VOTE?
(IF YES, ASK) WHICH PARTY
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
LIFORNIA GOVERNOR
Republican
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
X
Democrat
LIFORNIA 38 C.D.
Republican
Democrat
W YORK GOVERNOR
Republican
XX
Democrat
W YORK 34 C.D.
Republican
XX
Democrat
AH SENATE
Copie Boiler Loom
Republican
Democrat
AH 1 C.D.
Republican
XXX
Democrat
NNESOTA GOVERNOR
Republican
Democrat
NNESOTA 6 C.D.
Republican
Democrat
XAS SENATE
Republican
Democrat
OMING SENATE
Republican
XXXXXXXX
Democrat
RTH DAKOTA SENATE
Republican
XX
X
Democrat
NSAS 2 C.D.
Republican
Democrat
W MEXICO 2 C.D.
Republican
XX
Democrat
SCONSIN 1 C.D.
Republican
Democrat
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
41
Both the direct mail and telephone contact portions of
the post-election surveys offer somewhat unique fields
for detailed analysis:
1. Was direct mail -- and more important, telephone
contact -- targeted properly? How often did
voters contacted by the Republican party vote
Democrat? How often did the reverse occur?
How did voters who were not contacted cast their
ballots?
2. Were the direct mail and telephone contacts timed
properly? To what extent did they reach voters
who had not yet made up their minds?
3. What issues were important to the voters that
received direct mail?
4. What kinds of voters do not recall receiving
direct mail? Did either party "miss a good
prospect?
5. What kinds of voters did not read their direct
mail? What kinds of voters did read it? Is
there a greater tendency for rural voters to
read their direct mail?
6. Is readership of direct mail linked to any pat-
tern of campaign advertising recall via mass
media? In other words, are campaigns reaching
the same type of voter through all channels of
communication?
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
42
7. Is direct mail readership at all related to
learning something important about a candidate,
but not being able to recall the source of that
information? [Readers will recall that a very
sizable bloc of voters could not recall the
source of their most important candidate facts.]
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
43
THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S AND SENATOR MUSKIE'S
"ELECTION EVE" TELEVISION PRESENTATIONS
In assessing the role of the President's "election
eve" campaign effort, and that of Senator Muskie, three
things must be borne in mind:
1. We have not yet had the opportunity to delve
deeply into this area of the post-election surveys.
2. It is quite possible that these speeches played
a powerful role in the campaigns, since as much
as seventeen percent (17%) of the electorate had
not chosen its candidates at the time of the
presentations.
a. Ten percent (10%) of the electorate chose
one or two days prior to election day.
b. Seven percent (7%) of the electorate chose
on election day itself.
3. President Nixon's speech appears to have reached
twice as many voters (40% of the eligible voters),
as did Senator Muskie's speech (20% of the eli-
gible voters).
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
Perhaps the clearest method of illustrating the poten-
tial of fully detailed analysis in this area, is to excerpt
what should be considered a moderately detailed analysis of
the effect of the President's address in New York's 34th
Congressional District (one of the few areas in which such
an analysis was attempted -- though even here, the excerpt
is part of a larger analysis whose thrust is not directed
primarily at assessing Presidential impact).
EXCERPT FROM NEW YORK'S 34TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT POST-
ELECTION ANALYSIS
The Role of the President
"On the surface, it would not appear that President
Nixon's "last minute" campaign effort could have had much
affect on the Congressional contest. Less than one out of
three (32.5%) voters in the district remember seeing the
President's presentation -- and only one out of ten voters
(11.9%) saw all of it. However, most interestingly, over
ninety percent (94.5%) of our sample do not remember seeing
any of Senator Muskie's speech!
"Despite these findings, the President's role cannot
be dismissed lightly. For one thing, there were a great
many voters who were in a position to be influenced. One
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
45
voter in five (19.5%) had still not made his congressional
choice by election day, and another twelve percent (12.1%)
claim to have been uncommitted as late as one or two days
prior to the election. Consequently, there was certainly
room for last minute influence, as almost one voter in
three (31.6%) was still undecided in those last few days.
"However, these voters were Democrats (47.6% of whom
were uncommitted as late as one or two days prior to the
election) far more often than they were Republicans (19.5%
of whom were still uncommitted in those last days).
Further, although both Congressional candidates apparently
made great and successful efforts to solidify their vote
during this period, McCurn's campaign (the Democrat cam-
paign) picked up real steam for the first time (though he
could not close the gap or halt the progress of the Terry
drive).
"Given these facts: with thirty-two percent (31.6%)
uncommitted at the time of the Nixon/Muskie speeches, and
thirty-three percent (32.5%) in the Nixon viewing audience
(though obviously not a direct match); it is important to
note that a bit more than half the voters (52.3%) who
viewed the President's address voted for Congressman Terry.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
46
However, fully forty-one percent (41.5%) of the President's
viewers cast their ballots for Mr. McCurn. The true signifi-
cance of this result becomes apparent as one traces each
campaign's progress -- on the basis of when voters made
their congressional choice (it is important to remember,
here, that we are working with small cell sizes and voter
recall, though the results are impressive).
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
% Committed Vote
When Voters Made
Terry
McCurn
Terry
Up Their Minds
Vote
Vote
Lead
Before August
7.8%
3.3%
+4.5%
During August
10.6%
4.4%
+6.1%
During September
15.7%
8.9%
+6.8%
First Half of October
25.2%
15.7%
+9.5%
Third Week of October
28.6%
19.1%
+9.5%
(No dramatic increase in
Terry's lead in three
months)
FOURTH WEEK OF OCTOBER
41.5%
25.8%
+15.7%
(Note the spurt by Terry)
One or Two Days Before
The Election
48.3%
31.4%
+16.9%
ELECTION DAY*
57.8%
39.8%
+18.0%
*Note that both men move strongly in the period of the
President's speech, with Terry actually moving a bit
more powerfully (in terms of proportional movement).
In the period of the Nixon speech, Terry gains 9.5%,
while McCurn gains 8.4%. Recalling the fact that 52.3%
of those seeing the President's speech voted for Terry,
while 41.5% voted McCurn, it is highly coincidental,
that of the voters who were still uncommitted when the
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
48
President spoke, 53.1% voted Terry and 46.8% voted
McCurn! In other words, when Nixon viewers are cross-
tabulated with Congressional vote, the percentages are
almost identical to those that one finds when voters
still uncommitted at that time, are cross-tabulated with
Congressional vote! A potential coincidence, but one
well worth investigating.
"If one attributes the slightly disproportionate McCurn
share to the Muskie speech, assuming that most of the small
Muskie audience voted for McCurn, then one can suggest that:
PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPEECH WAS A DECISIVE FACTOR AMONG
THE 19.5% WHO WERE UNDECIDED UNTIL ELECTION DAY. THE
PRESIDENT WAS EFFECTIVE WITH THESE VOTERS IN VIRTUALLY
IDENTICAL PROPORTION TO THE WAY THEY CAST THEIR BALLOTS
ON ELECTION DAY. IT MAY WELL BE THAT THE PRESIDENT
DID CAUSE THESE VOTERS TO FINALLY COMMIT -- ONE WAY OR
THE OTHER. SENATOR MUSKIE'S PRESENTATION RECEIVED
FAR FEWER VIEWERS THAN HAD PRESIDENT NIXON'S; BUT WAS
EVIDENTLY CONVINCING ENOUGH TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT
THAT McCURN'S SHARE OF THE "ELECTION DAY COMMITMENT"
WAS SLIGHTLY GREATER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN PREDICTED
BY THE NIXON SPEECH ALONE. 11
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
49
It must be emphasized that this excerpt may only
represent one isolated instance -- and even here, a more
detailed examination is mandatory if definite conclusions
are to be drawn. In any event, there is no lack of vital
questions on the matter of Presidential versus Muskie
effectiveness in 1970:
1. Was the President's power to amass a viewing
audience always greater than was Senator Muskie's?
In what areas/campaigns were the differences most
apparent?
2. What kinds of voters were most likely to be exposed
to the President's address?
a. Republicans versus Democrats.
b. Old versus young, union versus non-union, urban
versus suburban versus rural, etc.
C. Had these voters committed to candidates yet?
If so, to what candidates?
d. Had they ever considered voting for the "other"
candidate -- if so, can the "conversion power"
of the speeches be evaluated?
e. How did the speeches affect voters who were
still uncommitted?
3. If the Muskie presentation were examined from a
standpoint similar to that just described for the
President's speech, what would be learned?
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
4. What kinds of voters were not reached by the
presentations? How did they vote? Additionally,
what about those voters who saw the presentation (s),
but did not go to the polls?
5. What issue concerns characterized the viewing
audience?
6. How many (and what kinds of) voters watched all of
the President's address -- as opposed to three
fourths, half, or one fourth of it? Does this
bear any relationship to vote?
7. Is there anything that can be said about the advan-
tages/disadvantages of the President's having
spoken "first", with Senator Muskie speaking
"last". [There are preliminary indications in
New York's 34th Congressional District that the
longer a voter watched the President, the more
likely he was to vote Democrat. Could it be that
the President was responsible for the vast major-
ity of the Republican/Democrat effect of both
speeches -- and was this more to Republican advan-
tage than if Senator Muskie had been the one to
"push" the electorate one way or the other, with
very few voters, then, bothering to listen to
President Nixon?]
DMi
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
51
CONCLUSION
As we noted in the introduction to this report, the
points we have summarized and the questions we have posed
do not begin to exhaust the worthwhile areas of investi-
gation available from these post-election surveys. It is
important that readers use this report, not as a definitive
statement or listing of alternatives, but as a springboard
to an in-depth, highly focused attempt to learn from the
1970 campaigns.
To our knowledge, the post-election surveys represent
the most extensive (and certainly the most recent) empirical
body of knowledge concerning what happened in a single
election year. While they will not always allow us to
establish solid causal relationships, this will certainly
permit analysis at a less speculative level.
DMI
DECISION MAKING INFORMATION
File- -
Polls -
Thomas C. Reed Member for California California
Republican
National
Committee.
4/13/71
Bab-
\
Thanks for your call.
Enclosed so the material we
discussed in L.A. to is probably
nat news to you, as .9 understand
the raw data came from a
package submitted to the white
House some wronths ago.
Talk to you in May
Tom
HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-ELECTION DMI STATEWIDE CALIFORNIA SURVEY
Date:
November 5-8, 1970 (Thursday-Sunday after election)
Sample:
225 Telephone interviews of those previously interviewed in
August. Sample is small, error is + 7%.
1.
ISSUES: What issue was most important in making the voting decision?
1. Pollution
2. Taxes
3. Unemployment
8. Campus protest
These priorities correspond with the final week of tracking. Use of
August benchmark poll figures (showing campus demonstrations to be
much more of an issue) during the close of the campaign could have
led to inappropriate strategy.
2. DECISION TIME: One political rule of thumb says that in a major race,
when each major party has nominated its candidate by some rational,
open procedure, then the two candidates each start out with about one
third of the vote. The campaign is then fought for the support of the
remaining one third.
This appears to have been
100%
the case in the 1970
governor's race. People
were asked when they made
90%
their decision. The chart
at the right plots percent-
age of the electorate who
80%
have made up their mind
VS. time. On Labor Day,
70%
exactly two thirds have
made up their minds.
60%
The survey also asked if
the voter had considered
50%
voting for other than his
August
September
October
Nov.
final voting-booth choice.
15% said yes. Therefore, on Labor Day, the stability of the electorate
was as follows:
66% has made up their minds.
29% were not committed, but were leaning and never really
changed their minds. Given some major new issue,
evidence, or scandal, however, they were available.
15% were truly undecided.
It would appear that 9% made up their minds on election day and the
three days preceding.
Reagan won re-election with a margin of 8 points.
3. PARTY LINE VOTE: Reagan held the Republican Party together very well,
losing only 7% to Unruh. The Kuchel endorsement at Labor Day was
probably the key event in this drive. On the other hand, Murphy did not
have this kind of support. He lost 19% of the Republicans to Tunney.
The Norton Simon primary probably was the lightning rod for this dis-
affection.
Reagan made good inroads into the Democrats, getting 26% of their
votes. Murphy got only 14% of the Democrats.
Democrats were evenly split on the question of whether Reagan's en-
dorsing Murphy did Reagan any harm. Half thought it helped Reagan.
Republicans, of course, thought it was helpful to all concerned.
4. WHY VOTE FOR/AGAINST REAGAN, MURPHY:
People voted for Reagan because:
29% his record
28% liked him personally, trusted him
20% disliked Unruh
People voted for Unruh because:
50% disliked Reagan
16% liked Unruh personally
0% his record
Unruh was totally unsuccessful in selling his "record" as an out-
standing logislator. (Or, the Reagan-Monagan campaign was able
to totally destroy that would-be image.) Therefore, half his vote was
straight anti-Reagan vote.
People voted for Tunney because:
39% liked him personally
27% disliked Murphy
0% his record
People voted for Murphy because:
27% liked him personally
23% party loyalty
16% disliked Tunney
15% his record
Murphy was only half as successful as Reagan in selling his record.
Even his own supporters had to fall back on party loyalty to explain
their vote.
Tunney came across as a nice young man with no record at all who took
advantage of an anti-Murphy sentiment no doubt centered around the
Technicolor episode.
5. SOURCES OF INFORMATION:
A. Voters get twice as much information about an incumbent from
"news" as from paid political advertising. The ratio is 1. 5:1
for a non-incumbent.
B. Television, in either the news or paid ad context, gets through
twice as much information as all other media. Newspapers
come in second.
This suggests that paid TV ads are best used either for simple name
identification (Team for the 70's ads) or to drive home a simple,
unforgettable picture of a major issue already under discussion. An
incumbent should take full advantage of the "news" coverage of his
activities -- before a campaign ever begins -- to implant major
quantities of favorable information in the voter's mind.
6. SPECIFIC GROUPS:
The sample in too small to be very definitive about subgroups of the
electorate, but the following might be true:
Reagan/Unruh
Murphy/Tunney
Sub-Group
Sample Size
percent
percent
"New Left Coalition"
Young (under 35)
93
43/57
32/68
Poor (under $3Mp.a.)
22
47/53
33/67
Black
25
8/92
8/92
"Working Man"
"Hardhats"*
34
47/53
24/76
Union families (i.e.,
one union member in
respondent's house-
hold
116
43/57
24/76
*"Hardhats" were all those meeting 3 criteria:
1. Employed in a semi-skilled or skilled manual job.
2. Earning more than $8M p.a.
3. White
The vote among those under 35 should serve notice for the future.
Reagan was able to make his case and almost hold his own in union
familities. Given the tremendous anti-Reagan propaganda barrage in
union publications, it ranks as quite an achievement. Murphy's
inability to do likewise was probably key to his defeat.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Date
May 26, 1971
NOTE TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Polls from Minnesota and
California are attached with
interesting sections marked.
File
Polls
182
"President Nixon has said that if we leave South Vietnam in
a position to defend herself we will have peace in the next
generation. Do you agree or disagree?"
Agree
17%
Disagree
72
No opinion
II
"President Nixon has said that all U.S. troops will be with-
drawn from Vietnam as soon as the South Vietnamese have a good
chance to defend themselves and U.S. prisoners are returned. When
do you think this time is likely to come?"
Two years or longer, never
44%
Before end of 1972
I9
Other responses, no opinion
37
"When do you think all U.S. troops WILL be out of Vietnam?"
By end of current year
9%
By end of 1972
15
Two years or more, never
51
Other responses, no opinion
25
MINNESOTA POLL - Vietnam
In late April, 1971, 600 Minnesotans 18 years of age or older were
asked:
"When it comes to ending the war in Vietnam, do you think the
administration is making a great deal of progress, a little pro-
gress, or no progress at all?"
The trend since the beginning of the year:
Jan.
Feb.
Mid March
Late April
A great deal
19%
12%
13%
17%
A little
61
55
57
61
No progress
17
30
28
20
No oplnion
3
3
2
2
-183-
"PresIdent Nixon has sald that he has kept every promise he
has made on removing U.S. troops from Vietnam, and that the in-
vasions into Cambodia and Laos have served to weaken the enemy and
hasten the end to United States involvement in the war. Do you
agree with Mr. Nixon's summary or disagree?"
All adults
Men
Women
Agree with summary
42%
50%
35%
Disagree
49
45
53
Other answers or no opinion
9
5
12
"The 49 percent who feel the assessment is not valid also were
asked where they disagree. Of this group, 30 percent question the
statement on troop withdrawal, another 30 percent feel the Cambodian
and Laotian invasions did not weaken the enemy, and 21 percent
doubt that the Invasions will hasten the end of U.S. involvement.
"Seventeen percent believe the Cambodian and Laotian operations
achieved the opposite of what the President claimed -- that they
deepened U.S. involvement in the war.
"Nineteen percent disagree with the assessment completely or
feel there is a credibility gap.
"Six percent mentioned general disapproval of the war, 9 per-
cent gave other answers and 2 percent were Indefinite."
The next question asked of all respondents In the survey:
"Between May I and Dec. 1, American troop withdrawal will be
100,000 men, or about 1,800 a month more than now. Are you satis-
fled or not with this rate of withdrawal?"
-184-
All Adults
Men
Women
Satisfied by withdrawal rate
58%
62%
55%
Not satisfied
35
33
36
Other answers or no opinion
7
5
9
"Some people were disappointed because the President made no
promises about cutting back air attacks or about withdrawing all
American troops. Do you agree or disagree that his announcement
was disappointing for those reasons?"
All Adults
Men
Women
Agree, announcement
was disappointing
53%
47%
58%
Disagree
40
49
33
Other answers or no opinion
7
4
9
CALIFORNIA POLL - Vietnam
A representative cross-section:of 1,050 Californians were asked
between April 25 - May 3, 1971 questions pertaining to the Vietnam
war. The questions asked were:
Credibility Gap
"There has been so many shifts in our government's statements
about the Vietnam war in the past that I find it hard to believe
the President is giving us the whole story now."
May 1971
May 1970
Agree strongly
39%
34%
Agree somewhat
30
30
No opinion
12
8
Disagree somewhat
10
16
Disagree strongly
9
12
-185-
"We should pull out of Vietnam and Southeast Asia as soon as
possible even if this step is seen by the rest of the world as a
political and milltary defeat for the United States?"
May 1971
May 1970
Agree strongly
41%
33%
Agree somewhat
18
13
No opinion
9
9
Disagree somewhat
15
16
Disagree strongly
17
29
"Losing the war in Vietnam is something that this country
should avoid at all costs."
May 1971
May 1970
Agree strongly
16%
23%
Agree somewhat
10
14
No opinion
14
9
Disagree somewhat
24
22
Disagree strongly
36
32
"Some people have said that if the United States withdraws
from Vietnam the Communists will eventually gain control of the
South Vietnamese people and government. How concerned would you
be about this happening in respect to the security of the United
States? Would you be greatly concerned, somewhat concerned, or not
too concerned?"
Statewide
May 1971
May 1970
Greatly concerned
38%
46%
Somewhat concerned
33
28
Not too concerned
25
24
No opinion
4
2
-186-
"President Nixon's schedule of withdrawals from Vietnam
should be speeded up so that all ground troops are out by the
end of this year.'
Agree
Disagree
Strongly
Somewhat
Somewhat
Strongly
No Opinion
50%
20%
12%
8%
10%
Statewide
By age
18-20
62%
16
10
6
6
21-29
52
24
10
8
6
30-49
48
19
13
9
II
50-69
49
18
II
11
11
70 & over
50
16
II
14
9
By Income
Under $4,999
57
17
8
9
9
$5,000-$9,999
50
21
11
9
9
$10,000-14,999
48
22
13
8
9
$15,000-19,999
42
22
16
13
7
$20,000 & over
47
17
II
10
15
CALIFORNIA POLL
Trial Heat
Between April 26 - May 1, 1971, a representative cross-section
of 1,050 Californians were asked:
"I know that the 1972 presidential election is more than a
year away, but let's assume it was being held this month. If you
were voting today, who would you vote for?"
-187-
NIXON - MUSKIE - WALLACE
May 1971
November 1970
Nixon
44%
47%
Muskie
45
41
Wallace
4
4
Undecided
7
8
NIXON - KENNEDY - WALLACE
Nixon
43
47
Kennedy
46
41
Wallace
3
4
Undecided
8
8
NIXON - HUMPHREY WALLACE
Nixon
45
52
Humphrey
41
36
Wallace
5
5
Undecided
9
7
"Should Nixon not be the candidate for any reason, present
prospects for a Republican victory next year become even dimmer.
Two other Republicans considered to be leading contenders in the
event Nixon is not the nominee, California Governor Ronald Reagan
and Vice President Spiro Agnew, fare quite poorly in current tests
of strength against Muskie, Kennedy, and Humphrey."
Reagan
33%
Muskle
53
Wallace
6
Undecided
8
-188-
Reagan
34%
Kennedy
54
Wal lace
5
Undeci ded
7
Reagan
38%
Humphrey
46
Wal lace
6
Undecl ded
10
Agnew
23%
Muskie
58
Wal lace
6
Undeci ded
13
Agnew
28%
Kennedy
56
Wa lace
5
Undeci ded
11
Agnew
28%
Humphrey
49
Wa ace
7
Undeci ded
16
1
-189-
The same sample was asked:
"Let's assume that in addition to the two major parties -
Democrat and Republican - there was also a George Wallace ticket
and a fourth ticket called 'Common Cause' headed by John Gardner.
If you were voting today, who would you vote for?"
FOUR PARTY RACE
All voters - Statewide
Nixon
42%
Muskie
36
Wallace
7
Gardner
9
Undecided
6
Nixon
44%
Kennedy
34
Wallace
4
Gardner
9
Undecided
9
Nixon
43%
Humphrey
32
Wallace
5
Gardner
9
Undecided
II