Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains:
To: Robert H. Marik From: Arthur J. Finkelstein RE: Agreeing with the general conclusions of Roy Morey on his appraisal of the Catholic vote in the 1972 election. 2pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 12/16/1971
To: The President From: John Ehrlichman RE: "Catholic Vote and 1972." 1pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/20/1971
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Robert M. Teeter RE: "Catholic Vote." 3pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/6/1972
To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/16/1971
To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/16/1971
To: John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman, Charles Colson From: Pat Buchanan RE: Regarding Morey's "The Catholic Vote and 1972" memorandum. 7pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/23/1971
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
26146202
label
WHSF: Contested, 45-14
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
26146202
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
WHSF: Contested, 45-14
description
This file contains:
To: Robert H. Marik From: Arthur J. Finkelstein RE: Agreeing with the general conclusions of Roy Morey on his appraisal of the Catholic vote in the 1972 election. 2pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 12/16/1971
To: The President From: John Ehrlichman RE: "Catholic Vote and 1972." 1pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/20/1971
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Robert M. Teeter RE: "Catholic Vote." 3pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/6/1972
To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/16/1971
To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/16/1971
To: John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman, Charles Colson From: Pat Buchanan RE: Regarding Morey's "The Catholic Vote and 1972" memorandum. 7pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/23/1971
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
26146202
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
77bf353bf1b35892
ocrText
Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
45
14
12/16/1971
Campaign
Letter
To: Robert H. Marik From: Arthur J.
Finkelstein RE: Agreeing with the general
conclusions of Roy Morey on his appraisal
of the Catholic vote in the 1972 election.
2pgs
45
14
9/20/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: John Ehrlichman
RE: "Catholic Vote and 1972." 1pg
45
14
1/6/1972
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Robert M. Teeter
RE: "Catholic Vote." 3pgs
45
14
9/16/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey
RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs
45
14
9/16/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: Ken Cole, Ed Harper From: Roy Morey
RE: "The Catholic Vote and 1972." 9pgs
45
14
9/23/1971
Campaign
Memo
To: John Ehrlichman, H.R. Haldeman,
Charles Colson From: Pat Buchanan RE:
Regarding Morey's "The Catholic Vote and
1972" memorandum. 7pgs
Tuesday, March 06, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DIR ACTION SERVICES, INC.
POLITICAL AND MARKET RESEARCH
memo Done 12/29 Hwonts new
212-490-0220
P. O. BOX 635
914-WO 7-6240
!YE, NEW YORK 10580
December 16, 1971
Dr. Robert H. Marik
Committee for the Re-Election of the President
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. Suite 272
Washington, D. C. 20006
Dear Bob:
I agree with the general conclusions of Roy Morey on his appraisal of
the Catholic vote in the 1972 election. Mr. Morey mentions briefly
that more importantly than religious identification, one should ask
economic status. This I feel, is a most salient observation.
The Catholic vote, like most ethnic votes we will deal with in the
1972 campaign, is one that is going through a behavioral voter shift.
The motivation for this shift is not as Mr. Odle suggested, based upon
religious positions, but rather those positions which corelate closely
with the "Scammon-Wattenberg" social issues.
In New York State, for example, when abortion was listed along side
other social issues, its impact in terms of voting behavior was vir-
tually nil. I suggest that issues such as abortion, aid for Parochial
schools and other provincial Catholic positions are deeply felt and
motivating among a small, but vocal group of Catholics. However,
these Catholics are by and large, very conservative in their political
disposition anyway and their voting decision making will be based on
other factors.
If the President were to take anti-Catholic positions, i.e., pro-abortion,
anti-Parochial aid, etc., no doubt he would lose this group. However, if
he were to make Catholic issues a major campaign thrust, the very real
danger, as Mr. Morey points out, is of offending other groups which are
necessary for an ultimate Republican coalition. In essence then, the
Catholic voter must be perceived not as a Catholic, but rather as either
an upper-income, middle-income or lower-income person and as an Irishman,
an Italian or a Pole, etc..
I would suggest an essential agreement with Mr. Morey's position, i.e.,
that the President's stance on those issues which are primarily Catholic,
be kept muted neither overtly pro nor overtly negative.
- 2 -
Finally, Mr. Odle suggests that Mr. Buckley appealed to Catholics as
Catholics in his campaign and that it was the Italian Catholic vote
more than anything else, that put him in the Senate. I feel that it
was the case of Mr. Buckley's speaking to low-income and middle-income
working Catholics as low-income, middle-income working people. It is
also hard to overstate the significance that race had in the blue-collar
Catholic sections of the inner cities. In fact, it is the middle-income
Catholic voter who probably most personifies the "Scammon-Wattenberg"
thesis.
I do, however, favor a Presidential visibility in such things as Knights
of Columbus speeches, Italian feasts, meetings with Cardinals and other
good will type actions, rather than in overt issue stances.
Sincerely,
AJF:db
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIV: MARKING
January 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM
E.O. 12C65, Section 6-102
By NARS, Date 6-3-80
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT: CATHOLIC VOTE
This memorandum is in reply to your request for my thoughts on the
Catholic vote.
While I think we should reserve any hard conclusions until our first
wave of polling is completed in February, a few trends have emerged
from studies we have done in the past, which I think allow us to make
some tentative decisions. It is, however, a very difficult political
issue because much of the evidence is conflicting. There are clearly
cases in which Governors have helped themselves markedly by making
overtures directly to the Catholic vote and other instances where
other Governors in other states have either failed to help themselves
or hurt themselves at the polls by attempting to appeal directly to
Catholics.
All available data does, however, indicate that there has been a defi-
nite break in the traditional Democratic voting behavior of Catholics
in suburban and, to a lesser extent urban areas. Catholics, in and
around metropolitan areas, particularly in the north are clearly be-
coming more independent politically and splitting their ticket at an
increasing rate. This trend is not apparent to any significant degree,
however, in rural areas, the border states, or the south.
This trend appears to be primarily a result of Catholics becoming more
upward mobile in the society and assuming increasingly middle class
values, thereby, changing their political attitudes and voting behavior.
Some of the reasons for this shift, in addition to the fact that many
Catholics have improved their socio-economic status are that many urban
Catholics have strong ethnic backgrounds and have remained in somewhat
closed ethnic communities in the large cities until recently but have
tended to leave these ethnic communities in the second or third genera-
tion as they moved up on the socio-economic scale. At this point, many
of their ties to their ethnic group, including their traditional politi-
cal attitudes and voting behavior, weakened.
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM
A second reason for the increasing political independence of Catholics
is the erosion of the hitherto strong Catholic dogma, particularly
among younger Catholic families. These two points - upward mobility
and the diminishing importance of Catholicism per se - contribute to
the increasing importance of newly attained social class and economic
status in voting behavior.
At this same time, there may also be a group of Catholics who have
retained their strong religious beliefs and who feel the Democratic
party has moved away from them as it has become more liberal and their
life-style has been threatened. These people have been primarily
Democrats in the past but have always been basically conservative and
held the traditional American values which many Democrats now appear
to repudiate. This group tends to be lower end educationally and
economically and also a group that has disliked Republicans fairly
intensely for a long time. There was (in 1968) and is today some
definite Wallace support among this group. Many of these voters now
feel strongly cross pressured politically because their philosophical
beliefs tend to push them more towards voting Republican but they have
grown up disliking Republicans and formed fairly strong Democratic
voting patterns. In my judgement, this group will be much harder for
the President to attract than will the middle class upper end Catholics
who have moved to the suburbs.
While the data indicates that socio-economic status rather than religion
are generally the most important determinants of voting behavior, the
issue of aid to parochial schools is clearly one where Catholics vote
primarily on the basis of their religion and one which appears to cut
across most socio-economic lines. It is important to understand, however,
that even though religion determines voting behavior, on this issue most
Catholics see it strictly as an economic rather than religious ideological
issue. The opposition to aid to parochial schools among non-Catholics
however, is based largely on philosophical or ideological grounds. Poli-
tically, it clearly becomes a question of whether the President can pick
up more Catholics than he will lose non-Catholics by proposing some type
of aid to parochial schools.
Based on the data I have available, I think the President's appeal to this
group of voters should be aimed at them as a social class rather than
Catholics for two reasons. First, I think there is a strong possibility
that he might lose more non-Catholics than he would pick up Catholics, by
proposing some type of federal aid to parochial schools. This may be par-
ticularly true in several of the Border and Southern States that are
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
MEMORANDUM
important to us and where there is some definite anti-Catholic sentiment.
Moreover, in many of the states with large Catholic populations where
such a proposal would clearly help them or states that we have very little
chance of carrying anyway, such as, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti-
cut and Michigan. The second reason is that there is a high probability
that the President's opponent will be a Catholic and the preliminary re-
turns on our first wave polls that Illinois, Wisconsin, Kentucky show
Muskie having a very strong appeal to Catholics which I doubt could be
loosened even if the President proposed some type of federal aid to paro-
chial schools and Senator Muskie opposed it. While Kennedy's appeal to
Catholics is somewhat less than Muskie's, particularly in Illinois, it
is substantial in Wisconsin and Kentucky and it would probably not be
changed on the issue of aid to parochial schools.
Summing up, I simply think that the potential payoff of such a position
against either Muskie or Kennedy would be small in that risk of a net
loss with non-Catholics is too great. The Catholics who are most avail-
able to the President are those who will vote on issues not related to
their Catholicism and whose main concern is with insuring their security
in their new social environment, which makes them most interested in the
economic issues of inflation and unemployment. They are those who have
or are just realizing the American dream and want desperately to protect
their newfound status.
G
THE WHITE HOUSE
INFORMATION
WASHINGTON
September 20, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT
FROM
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
SUBJECT
Catholic Vote and 1972
Roy Morey of the Domestic Council staff has been systematically
analyzing the various issues raised in our budget review,
for instance, veterans, senior citizens, etc.
His most recent paper, attached, is on the Catholic vote and
particularly the significance of the issue of aid to parochial schools.
Since his conclusions diverge from the course which we are
following, I am forwarding it to you in its entirety with the
expectation that you will wish to review it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 16, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
KEN COLE
ED HARPER
FROM:
ROY MOREY
Roy
SUBJECT:
The Catholic Vote and 1972
This memo briefly outlines the voting behavior of Catholics in the
1960 election, the Catholic electorate today and political trade offs
involved in attempting to woo the Catholic vote in 1972.
I. The Catholic Vote in 1960
Before discussing the Catholic vote in 1972, it is necessary
to briefly review the 1960 election because it will be used
as an historic referent -- especially if either Muskie
or Kennedy is the Democratic nominee. The following is a
list of major conclusions about the voting behavior of
Catholics and the issue of Catholicism in the 1960 election:
1. There was a significant Catholic vote in 1960.
According to the Gallup poll Catholic support for
a Democratic nominee increased from 51 percent
in 1956, to 78 percent in 1960. Furthermore, 62
percent of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in
1956, actually voted for Kennedy in 1960. While only
3 percent of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in
1956 switched to Nixon. This does not mean, however,
that during the mid-1950s Catholics were leaving the
Democratic Party only to return to the fold in 1960
when the Democrats offered a Catholic candidate. The
Gallup results show that in the 1958 Congressional
elections 75 percent of the Catholic voters supported
Democratic candidates. The GOP appeal to Catholics
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
2
in 1956 seemed to be more attributable to the magic
of Ike, rather than a desertion from the Democratic
Party. However, as will be pointed out later, the
Democratic appeal to Catholics in 1960 may have been
a high watermark not to be achieved again.
2. The Catholic vote alone was not sufficient for Kennedy's
victory.
While it is true that there was a sizable shift in the
Catholic vote toward Kennedy, there were other shifts
in the electorate which indicate that in addition to the
Catholic vote, Kennedy relied on increased Democratic
votes among Blacks, Jews and other groups to win. Gallup
reports that on a national basis, the votes of Jews increased
from 75 percent to 81 percent Democratic over 1956 and
the votes of Blacks from 61 percent to 68 percent. In 1960,
Illinois and Texas together accounted for 51 electoral votes.
Out of approximately 4. 7 million votes cast in Illinois,
Kennedy's margin of victory was only 8, 858. A shift of
4, 500 votes by any group -- Catholics, Blacks, Jews, etc,
would have been enough to make the difference, In Texas,
Kennedy's margin was 46, 233 out of 2. 3 million votes cast.
Here again, a shift by as many as 25, 000 Blacks, Catholics,
Jews, etc, would have made the difference in carrying the
state. The point is that the Catholic vote alone was not the
single factor which gave Kennedy a victory in 1960.
3. The religious issue cut both ways in 1960.
While some Catholics swung to Kennedy, it is clear that
Protestants who had formally voted Democratic swung
away. The best estimates indicate that probably as much
as 10 percent of the electorate shifted both ways on the
religious issue and in terms of aggregate popular vote,
the swing away from Kennedy because of his religious
affiliation cost him 1.5 million votes or 2. 3ʳof the total
popular vote.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
3
4. The net results of religious shifting favored Kennedy.
While Kennedy's Catholicism lost him popular votes,
it still helped him more than it hurt him in the election.
This is due to the fact that Catholics were disproportionately
located in closely divided large electoral vote states. The
best evaluation of the probable effect of the religious issue
in 1960 is the MIT simulation project conducted by Pool,
Abelson and Popkin (Candidates, Issues and Strategies,
1964). According to their calculation Kennedy lost, by
the religious issue, the following states he otherwise
would have won: Kentucky (10), Tennessee (11), Florida (10),
Oklahoma (8), Montana (4), Idaho (4), Utah (4), California (32),
Oregon (6), Virginia (12), and Washington (9), He won the
following states he would have otherwise lost: Connecticut (32),
New York (45), New Jersey (16), Pennsylvania (32), Illinois
(27), and New Mexico (4). Hence, according to this best-fit
simulation, Kennedy achieved a net gain of 22 electoral
votes because of the religious issue.
On balance, it appears that Kennedy was hurt somewhat
in the Southern and Border states and perhaps in the Midwest
and Mountain states as well, but he more than made up for
it in the Northern and Midwestern industrial states whose
electoral votes were far larger.
According to a study that was done several years ago on
Wisconsin, Democratic candidates for Congress in Wisconsin
suffered defeat in close districts probably because of Protestant
defection due to Kennedy's candidacy. This is interesting to
keep in mind in a state which is over 33 percent Catholic.
The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan
published a study several years ago which indicates that
there was a net loss in the popular vote because of Kennedy's
religious affiliation. The study estimated what was the "normal"
votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic Presidential
candidates and then calculated the 1960 divergence from this
hypothetical norm, they concluded Kennedy lost about 2.2%
of the two party vote, with the largest portion of the
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
4
defections coming from the South. The two-edged
nature of the religious issue is an important factor
to keep in mind looking toward 1972.
II.
The Catholic Vote Today
The 1960 election was atypical, because not only was there
a Catholic candidate running, but Catholicism itself was an
issue. In fact, the Kennedy forces found it profitable to make
Catholicism an issue. According to an informal conversation
with Lou Harris, the decision by Kennedy on how to handle
the Catholic issue was based on key state polling. The decision
seemed to be to lay out Catholicism in full view as an issue as
a calculated risk to pick up Catholic votes in key electoral
states, knowing full well that other states were not going to be
picked up. This informed gamble paid off for Kennedy.
Today, the situation is substantially different. While it is
true that Catholics are still more likely to vote Democratic
than Protestants, they are less likely to vote as Catholics.
A Gallup poll conducted in July, 1968, indicates that the
voters' choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided
by religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact, it was slightly
reversed. The religious affiliation of a candidate is simply far
less important (including Catholic voters favoring Catholic
candidates) than it was in 1960. In fact, Scammon and Wattenberg
contend that "today Catholicism seems thoroughly dead as a
political issue. " There are several reasons for the decline in
importance of the Catholic affiliation.
1. 1960 was billed as a test case and now that that hurdle
has been cleared it is far less important in the minds
of most Catholics. In analyzing voting behavior, one
finds that a social factor like religion or ethnicity would
become important temporarily during the political campaign
and become relatively unimportant subsequently.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
5
2. Group identification is politically important if it is
in a group which has a bearing on social status --
such as race or ethnicity. Within recent years, religion
has become far less important in determining social
status than it once was; yet the same thing cannot be
said for race and ethnicity. Poles, Puerto Ricans,
and Mexican-Americans maintain ethnic identification
but do not necessarily look upon themselves as
Polish-Catholics, Mexican-American Catholics, etc.
3. There has been considerable movement and economic
mobility among Catholics in the past decade, and today
most Catholics are middle income types who do not
live in the central cities. As they have become more
affluent and have moved to the suburbs, they tend to
identify less with Catholicism as a political issue and
more with general social and economic issues. For
the ethnic blue collar Catholic who remains in the city,
issues such as race, community control of the schools,
crime and patriotism have largely replaced Catholicism
as a major political issue.
While it is true today that blue collar and retired Catholics
lean in the Democrat direction, one should not over look
Goldwater's gains among city Catholics in New York and
Nixon's gains among New York City Catholics and the
ethnic Catholic Congressional District of Pucinski and
Derwinski in Chicago. One may ask whether the voter
is Catholic or Protestant, but of much greater significance is
the question is the voter rich or poor, Black or White,
employed or unemployed an urban or suburban dweller,
etc.
III.
Issues of Interest to Catholics
The point has been made previously that in attempting to woo
the Catholic vote, perhaps one need not appeal to Catholics
as Catholics. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section,
there are definite risks in attempting to woo Catholics as
Catholics.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
6
According to Tully Plesser, President of the Cambridge
Marketing Group in New York, unpublished data he
collected in June indicates that the major issues among
Catholics are not related to Catholicism but rather to
general economic and social conditions. Catholics seem
to be more concerned with tax levels, tax increases and
general problems in the environmental area. No doubt
most of those interviewed do not live in the central city
areas and these concerns would reflect a point made earlier
about the movement and economic mobility of Catholics.
It could well be that the issue of aid to parochial schools is
of concern to an increasing minority of Catholics who in fact
have their children in Catholic schools. The issue of parochial
aid is of greatest importance to inner-city dwellers and at the
heart of their concern is the question of autonomy and
community control of the schools and racial separation. The
ethnic blue collar urban Catholics are on the firing line of
the racial problems that plague our city cores. They believe
in maintaining control of their schools, (parochial) as much
as they believe in the virtues of a Catholic education.
There are numerous reasons why Catholic elementary schools
are on the decline, and only some of these reasons relate to
higher operating costs. Other important reasons for their
decline include: a) movement of Catholic ethnic groups into
suburbs that already had academically superior public schools,
b) upward mobility, which places more emphasis on using family
funds for college, c) elimination of Protestant biases in public
schools, d) the loss of teaching. clergy. The point is that the
issues of greatest concern to most Catholics may not be strictly
Catholic issues in nature such as aid to parochial schools.
Furthermore, the parochial aid issue is complicated and many
Catholics may either contribute to the decline of these schools,
or are relatively unconcerned about the problem. The same
may be said for Catholic clergy. A 1970 Gallagher Presidents'
Report Survey found that 35.4 percent of the active Roman
Catholic priests affirm that the Church should discontinue or
abandon its schools.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
7
IV. Conclusions, Strategic Implications and Trade Offs
Since in the minds of many, winning the Catholic vote is
translated to a position on the question of aid to parochial
schools, many of the points in this section are related to
that issue. The point should not be lost, however, that
one can woo Catholics without favoring public aid to parochial
schools. One should recognize that most Catholics may not
rank the plight of parochial schools as an issue of major
concern to them, and that religious identification as a
significant political variable has declined in recent years.
1. The parochial school aid question is a two-edged sword.
While it may be possible to pick up a few votes among
urban Catholics, one stands the risk of alienating Protestant
voters. On the national level, one must remember that two
out of every three voters are Protestants and the proportion
would be much higher in most of our key states (see Tab A).
In Illinois and Michigan, for example, this is a sensitive
issue which cuts both ways. The strength of the GOP in
Illinois is in the largely Protestant suburbs and out-state
vote. In Michigan last year, Governor Milliken pushed
through the Legislature a program for aid to non-public
schools. This gained him a few Catholic votes in Detroit,
and probably lost him more among Protestant out-state
Republicans. The school aid program he favored was
overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum vote.
Where the parochial aid issue may mean the most, that is
among urban blue collar and largely ethnic Catholics, we
are least apt to attract strongly committed Democrats. In
the case of a few areas in Chicago, if we win these types,
it may be for reasons other than parochial aid, anyway.
The most heavily Catholic states like Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, went for Al Smith in 1928, Hubert
Humphrey in 1968, and no doubt will go Democratic
once again in 1972 regardless of the President's
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
8
position on aid to parochial schools.
2.
Even if a Catholic is nominated by the Democrats
one must recognize that religious identification appeal
is not constant for all candidates. According to Tulley
Plesser, Edward Kennedy has a considerably stronger appeal
among Catholics as a Catholic than does Muskie, despite
the fact that they are both Catholics. The point here is
that part of the strategy of wooing the Catholic vote
must depend upon the Democrat opponent. If the opponent
is Muskie, his Catholic appeal per se, will be a reduced
factor. Jackson is a Presbyterian and the indications are
clear that Lindsay might have a difficult time pulling the
urban Catholic vote no matter what he does.
3. One may not have to agree with Scammon and Wattenberg
that Catholicism as an issue is dead, but the fact is that
1960 was a high watermark in the history of the importance
of this issue. In its decline, it probably still lingers in the
minds and hearts of anti-Catholic Protestants more than
it does among Catholics. If so, we must look carefully at
the Protestant strength found in most of our key states.
4. The parochial aid issue may not be that important in the
minds of most Catholics. There are approximately 4
million Catholic children enrolled in Catholic schools,
and almost twice that number (approximately 7, 788, 000)
enrolled in public schools.
5. There are other appeals on general social and economic
issues which may be more significant to Catholics than
an appeal on parochial aid. These include taxes, crime,
basic values, patriotism, and equality of opportunity.
Obviously in many areas, there is a significant over-
lap between ethnic and religious affiliation. Ethnic
identification is much the stronger and this should be
kept in mind in making an appeal. The same could
be said for Spanish-speaking Americans in Florida,
Texas and California.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
9
6. By coming down too hard on the issue of aid to
parochial schools, not only do we run the risk of
alienating Protestant voters, but more directly
we could alienate the well organized and active
1. 8 million public school teachers in this country.
The President's recent statement on Catholic aid
drew extremely negative responses from not only
the NEA but others involved in public education as
well.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 16, 1971
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
KEN COLE
ED HARPER
FROM:
ROY MOREY Pay
SUBJECT:
The Catholic Vote and 1972
This memo briefly outlines the voting behavior of Catholics in the
1960 election, the Catholic electorate today and political trade offs
involved in attempting to woo the Catholic vote in 1972.
I.
The Catholic Vote in 1960
Before discussing the Catholic vote in 1972, it is necessary
to briefly review the 1960 election because it will be used
as an historic referent -- especially if either Muskie
or Kennedy is the Democratic nominee. The following is a
list of major conclusions about the voting behavior of
Catholics and the issue of Catholicism in the 1960 election:
1. There was a significant Catholic vote in 1960.
According to the Gallup poll Catholic support for
a Democratic nominee increased from 51 percent
in 1956, to 78 percent in 1960. Furthermore, 62
percent of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in
1956, actually voted for Kennedy in 1960. While only
3 percent of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in
1956 switched to Nixon. This does not mean, however,
that during the mid-1950s Catholics were leaving the
Democratic Party only to return to the fold in 1960
when the Democrats offered a Catholic candidate. The
Gallup results show that in the 1958 Congressional
elections 75 percent of the Catholic voters supported
Democratic candidates. The GOP appeal to Catholics
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
2
in 1956 seemed to be more attributable to the magic
of Ike, rather than a desertion from the Democratic
Party. However, as will be pointed out later, the
Democratic appeal to Catholics in 1960 may have been
a high watermark not to be achieved again.
2.
The Catholic vote alone was not sufficient for Kennedy's
victory.
While it is true that there was a sizable shift in the
Catholic vote toward Kennedy, there were other shifts
in the electorate which indicate that in addition to the
Catholic vote, Kennedy relied on increased Democratic
votes among Blacks, Jews and other groups to win. Gallup
reports that on a national basis, the votes of Jews increased
from 75 percent to 81 percent Democratic over 1956 and
the votes of Blacks from 61 percent to 68 percent. In 1960,
Illinois and Texas together accounted for 51 electoral votes.
Out of approximately 4.7 million votes cast in Illinois,
Kennedy's margin of victory was only 8, 858. A shift of
4, 500 votes by any group -- Catholics, Blacks, Jews, etc,
would have been enough to make the difference, In Texas,
Kennedy's margin was 46, 233 out of 2.3 million votes cast.
Here again, a shift by as many as 25, 000 Blacks, Catholics,
Jews, etc, would have made the difference in carrying the
state. The point is that the Catholic vote alone was not the
single factor which gave Kennedy a victory in 1960.
3.
The religious issue cut both ways in 1960.
While some Catholics swung to Kennedy, it is clear that
Protestants who had formally voted Democratic swung
away. The best estimates indicate that probably as much
as 10 percent of the electorate shifted both ways on the
religious issue and in terms of aggregate popular vote,
the swing away from Kennedy because of his religious
affiliation cost him 1.5 million votes or 2. 3% of the total
popular vote.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
3
4. The net results of religious shifting favored Kennedy.
While Kennedy's Catholicism lost him popular votes,
it still helped
than it hurt him in the election.
This is due to the that Catholics were disproportionately
located in closely divided large electoral vote states. The
best evaluation of the probable effect of the religious issue
in 1960 is the MIT simulation project conducted by Pool,
Abelson and Popkin (Candidates, Issues and Strategies,
1964). According to their calculation Kennedy lost, by
the religious issue, the following states he otherwise
would have won: Kentucky (10), Tennessee (11), Florida (10),
Oklahoma (8), Montana (4), Idaho (4), Utah (4), California (32),
Oregon (6), Virginia (12), and Washington (9), He won the
following states he would have otherwise lost: Connecticut (32),
New York (45), New Jersey (16), Pennsylvania (32), Illinois
(27), and New Mexico (4). Hence, according to this best-fit
simulation, Kennedy achieved a net gain of 22 electoral
votes because of the religious issue.
On balance, it appears that Kennedy was hurt somewhat
in the Southern and Border states and perhaps in the Midwest
and Mountain states as well, but he more than made up for
it in the Northern and Midwestern industrial states whose
electoral votes were far larger.
According to a study that was done several years ago on
Wisconsin, Democratic candidates for Congress in Wisconsin
suffered defeat in close districts probably because of Protestant
defection due to Kennedy's candidacy. This is interesting to
keep in mind in a state which is over 33 percent Catholic.
The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan
published a study several years ago which indicates that
there was a net loss in the popular vote because of Kennedy's
religious affiliation. The study estimated what was the "normal"
votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic Presidential
candidates and then calculated the 1960 divergence from this
hypothetical norm, they concluded Kennedy lost about 2. 2 %
of the two party vote, with the largest portion of the
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
4
defections coming from the South. The two-edged
nature of the religious issue is an important factor
to keep in mind looking toward 1972.
II.
The Catholic Vote Today
The 1960 election was atypical, because not only was there
a Catholic candidate running, but Catholicism itself was an
issue. In fact, the Kennedy forces found it profitable to make
Catholicism an issue. According to an informal conversation
with Lou Harris, the decision by Kennedy on how to handle
the Catholic issue was based on key state polling. The decision
seemed to be to lay out Catholicism in full view as an issue as
a calculated risk to pick up Catholic votes in key electoral
states, knowing full well that other states were not going to be
picked up. This informed gamble paid off for Kennedy.
Today, the situation is substantially different. While it is
true that Catholics are still more likely to vote Democratic
than Protestants, they are less likely to vote as Catholics.
A Gallup poll conducted in July, 1968, indicates that the
voters' choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided
by religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact, it was slightly
reversed. The religious affiliation of a candidate is simply far
less important (including Catholic voters favoring Catholic
candidates) than it was in 1960. In fact, Scammon and Wattenberg
contend that "today Catholicism seems thoroughly dead as a
political issue. " There are several reasons for the decline in
importance of the Catholic affiliation.
1. 1960 was billed as a test case and now that that hurdle
has been cleared it is far less important in the minds
of most Catholics. In analyzing voting behavior, one
finds that a social factor like religion or ethnicity would
become important temporarily during the political campaign
and become relatively unimportant subsequently.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
5
2. Group identification is politically important if it is
in a group which has a bearing on social status --
such as race or ethnicity. Within recent years, religion
has become far less important in determining social
status than it once was; yet the same thing cannot be
said for race and ethnicity. Poles, Puerto Ricans,
and Mexican-Americans maintain ethnic identification
but do not necessarily look upon themselves as
Polish-Catholics, Mexican-American Catholics, etc.
3. There has been considerable movement and economic
mobility among Catholics in the past decade, and today
most Catholics are middle income types who do not
live in the central cities. As they have become more
affluent and have moved to the suburbs, they tend to
identify less with Catholicism as a political issue and
more with general social and economic issues. For
the ethnic blue collar Catholic who remains in the city,
issues such as race, community control of the schools,
crime and patriotism have largely replaced Catholicism
as a major political issue.
While it is true today that blue collar and retired Catholics
lean in the Democrat direction, one should not over look
Goldwater's gains among city Catholics in New York and
Nixon's gains among New York City Catholics and the
ethnic Catholic Congressional District of Pucinski and
Derwinski in Chicago. One may ask whether the voter
is Catholic or Protestant, but of much greater significance is
the question is the voter rich or poor, Black or White,
employed or unemployed an urban or suburban dweller,
etc.
III.
Issues of Interest to Catholics
The point has been made previously that in attempting to woo
the Catholic vote, perhaps one need not appeal to Catholics
as Catholics. In fact, as will be discussed in the next section,
there are definite risks in attempting to woo Catholics as
Catholics.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
6
According to Tully Plesser, President of the Cambridge
Marketing Group in New York, unpublished data he
collected in June indicates that the major issues among
Catholics are not related to Catholicism but rather to
general economic and social conditions. Catholics seem
to be more concerned with tax levels, tax increases and
general problems in the environmental area. No doubt
most of those interviewed do not live in the central city
areas and these concerns would reflect a point made earlier
about the movement and economic mobility of Catholics.
It could well be that the issue of aid to parochial schools is
of concern to an increasing minority of Catholics who in fact
have their children in Catholic schools. The issue of parochial
aid is of greatest importance to inner-city dwellers and at the
heart of their concern is the question of autonomy and
community control of the schools and racial separation. The
ethnic blue collar urban Catholics are on the firing line of
the racial problems that plague our city cores. They believe
in maintaining control of their schools, (parochial) as much
as they believe in the virtues of a Catholic education.
There are numerous reasons why Catholic elementary schools
are on the decline, and only some of these reasons relate to
higher operating costs. Other important reasons for their
decline include: a) movement of Catholic ethnic groups into
suburbs that already had academically superior public schools,
b) upward mobility, which places more emphasis on using family
funds for college, c) elimination of Protestant biases in public
schools, d) the loss of teaching clergy. The point is that the
issues of greatest concern to most Catholics may not be strictly
Catholic issues in nature such as aid to parochial schools.
Furthermore, the parochial aid issue is complicated and many
Catholics may either contribute to the decline of these schools,
or are relatively unconcerned about the problem. The same
may be said for Catholic clergy. A 1970 Gallagher Presidents'
Report Survey found that 35.4 percent of the active Roman
Catholic priests affirm that the Church should discontinue or
abandon its schools.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINIS avely CONFDENTIAL
7
IV. Conclusions, Strategic Implications and Trade Offs
Since in the minds of many, winning the Catholic vote is
translated to a position on the question of aid to parochial
schools, many of the points in this section are related to
that issue. The point should not be lost, however, that
one can WOO Catholics without favoring public aid to parochial
schools. One should recognize that most Catholics may not
rank the plight of parochial schools as an issue of major
concern to them, and that religious identification as a
significant political variable has declined in recent years.
1. The parochial school aid question is a two-edged sword.
While it may be possible to pick up a few votes among
urban Catholics, one stands the risk of alienating Protestant
voters. On the national level, one must remember that two
out of every three voters are Protestants and the proportion
would be much higher in most of our key states (see Tab A).
In Illinois and Michigan, for example, this is a sensitive
issue which cuts both ways. The strength of the GOP in
Illinois is in the largely Protestant suburbs and out-state
vote. In Michigan last year, Governor Milliken pushed
through the Legislature a program for aid to non-public
schools. This gained him a few Catholic votes in Detroit,
and probably lost him more among Protestant out-state
Republicans. The school aid program he favored was
overwhelmingly rejected in a referendum vote.
Where the parochial aid issue may mean the most, that is
among urban blue collar and largely ethnic Catholics, we
are least apt to attract strongly committed Democrats. In
the case of a few areas in Chicago, if we win these types,
it may be for reasons other than parochial aid, anyway.
The most heavily Catholic states like Massachusetts
and Rhode Island, went for A1 Smith in 1928, Hubert
Humphrey in 1968, and no doubt will go Democratic
once again in 1972 regardless of the President's
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
8
position on aid to parochial schools.
2.
Even if a Catholic is nominated by the Democrats
one must recognize that religious identification appeal
is not constant for all candidates. According to Tulley
Plesser, Edward Kennedy has a considerably stronger appeal
among Catholics as a Catholic than does Muskie, despite
the fact that they are both Catholics. The point here is
that part of the strategy of wooing the Catholic vote
must depend upon the Democrat opponent. If the opponent
is Muskie, his Catholic appeal per se, will be a reduced
factor. Jackson is a Presbyterian and the indications are
clear that Lindsay might have a difficult time pulling the
urban Catholic vote no matter what he does.
3.
One may not have to agree with Scammon and Wattenberg
that Catholicism as an issue is dead, but the fact is that
1960 was a high watermark in the history of the importance
of this issue. In its decline, it probably still lingers in the
minds and hearts of anti-Catholic Protestants more than
it does among Catholics. If so, we must look carefully at
the Protestant strength found in most of our key states.
4. The parochial aid issue may not be that important in the
minds of most Catholics. There are approximately 4
million Catholic children enrolled in Catholic schools,
and almost twice that number (approximately 7, 788, 000)
enrolled in public schools.
5.
There are other appeals on general social and economic
issues which may be more significant to Catholics than
an appeal on parochial aid. These include taxes, crime,
basic values, patriotism, and equality of opportunity.
Obviously in many areas, there is a significant over-
lap between ethnic and religious affiliation. Ethnic
identification is much the stronger and this should be
kept in mind in making an appeal. The same could
be said for Spanish-speaking Americans in Florida,
Texas and California.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
9
6. By coming down too hard on the issue of aid to
parochial schools, not only do we run the risk of
alienating Protestant voters, but more directly
we could alienate the well organized and active
1.8 million public school teachers in this country.
The President's recent statement on Catholic aid
drew extremely negative responses from not only
the NEA but others involved in public education as
well.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
Ifo Red alsow
September WASHINGTON 23, 1971 between the statement
Bucharan 20 may
MEMORANDUM TO:
John Ehrlichman
H. R. Haldeman
have Mo tranke. I'mp
J would have and 122
Charles Colson
Pats views (puhaps sitiably
FROM:
Pat Buchanan
toned down) will cat through to
the policy make types They could
While this memorandum, for stylistic and obvious reasons, is not sent
to the President -- would hope that the dissenting views herein expressed,
would be gotten to him -- before he makes any decision upon the rather
remarkable document I have in hand entitled, "The Catholic Vote and 1972.
For if we are making scheduling, budget and political decisions on the basis
of this remorseless nonsense, then we are going to have to count upon a
Chicago repeat to be back in 1972.
Points that come up after only a rapid reading of the Morey memorandum:
1. Nowhere does one see proper recognition of the hard political fact that
while there are six million Jews in this country, 22, 000, 000 blacks --
there are some 46, 000, 000 Catholic. Not only are the Catholic by far the
hugest bloc of available Democratic votes to win for us -- they
by Mr. Morey's statistics, the easiest to convert.
2. Here is another hard political fact that does not emerge: If the President
could raise himself from say 25 percent of the Catholic vote to 40 percent
of the Catholic vote that would be worth more in terms of absolute vot.
than if the President went from 0 percent of the Jewish vote to 100 percen
Since Catholic Democrats are more numerous and easier to win over than
black Democrats and Jewish Democrats, clearly this is where our emphasis
should be placed.
3. Morey contends that "Catholicism" is no longer so binding a factor as it
once was in 1960 -- with JFK. That is precisely our point. We are not
asking that the President throw in with the mackerel snappers, convert and
become a daily communicant. We are saying that since "Catholicism,"
per se, "religious affiliation, 11 is less important than it was in 1960, RN
has a far better chance in 1972 of taking away Catholic voters from a
Catholic candidate, i.e., (Muskie). Indeed, much of Morey's analysis,
analyzed properly, makes a strong case for going after that Catholic vote.
-2-
4. Says Morey, things other than Catholicism are more important to
Catholics. He mentions ethnicity; we don't disagree with that. We endorse
it one hundred percent. The Pre sident should go after the Catholic vote
in a multi-faceted approach. By endorsing the aspirations of ethnics
(Italians, Poles, Irish, Slovaks); by appointing conspicuous ethnics to top
visible federal posts, by his Middle America appeal, in addition to aiding
the schools in which SO many of them believe and in which millions upon
millions of Catholics and ethnics have placed their children.
My recommendation is now and has been that the Administration in
placing minority members in visible jobs stop concentrating on the
"media's minorities" (Blacks, Mexican Americans, Spanish-speaking) which
are tough to crack, almost solid Democratic -- and begin focusing on the large
ethnic minorities (Irish, Italians, Poles, Slovaks, etc.), the big minorities
where the President's name is not a dirty word, where the President's
personal beliefs and political actions are more consistent with their own.
When we begin to recognize and act on the idea that there are as many
Italian-Americans in the Bronx as there are Black Americans in Harlem,
we will better begin to serve the President's interests.
As noted in previous memoranda, and proved by Senator Buckley in New
York, there are more "Queens Democrats" than there are "Harlem
Democrats" and they are a hell of a lot easier for a Republican to get.
5. Morey contends that Blacks and Jews and Catholics won for JFK -- but
that is like comparing tangerines to grapefruits to watermelons. One can
say that the "Maltese-Americans" won it for Kennedy. The crucial points
are a) the size of the bloc and b) the winnability of the bloc. On both
counts any politician will tell you the Catholics are where the ducks are.
6. Morey contends there is a trade-off, that aid to Catholic schools will
alienate some Protestants. No one denies this. We may lose some votes.
But where is there recognition of these points. Just as 1) pro-Catholicism
on the part of voters diminished since 1960 -- so, too, has anti-Catholicism.
2) Aid to Catholic schools will no longer kill a candidate in Protestant
areas as is clearly evident from the fact that perhaps a dozen states in
the last decade mo ved that route. 3) Look closely at the trade-off. Are
Protestants, traditionally anti-Catholic, going to vote against Richard Nixon
for some indirect assistance to parochial schools -- and then turn around
and vote for a Catholic Ed Muskie. Hardly. Many of them will not like it.
But very few will go the full route. Morey mentions Milliken gaining votes
among Michigan Catholics, and losing them among upstate Protestants for
coming out for parochial aid. Without any statistics I question that. For
this reason. I can't believe that a reactionary Protestant will vote against
-3-
Milliken for aiding Catholic schools -- when the choice is to turn around
and vote for a long-haired Jewish liberal Democrat, which Milliken ran
against.
In short, our Protestant supporters will be angry, many of them, with this
kind of aid, but fewer than every before, and the overwhelming majority
not SO angry as to desert a middle-of-the-road Republican for a Catholic
liberal Democrat.
A phrase used around here recently is appropriate. The WASPS have
"nowhere else to go. 11
7. Where in this entire memo is recognition of the problem this creates
for the other side -- the Democrats. That party is divided between
Establishment liberals and increasingly militant blacks on the one hand --
and Roman Catholics on the other, for a simple view. The Jim Buckley
Democrats versus the New York Times Democrats if you will.
When RN comes out for aid to parochial schools, this will drive a wedge
right down the Middle of the Democratic Party. The same is true of
abortion; the same is true of hard-line anti-pornography laws. For those
most against aid to Catholic schools, most for abortion, and an end to all
censorship are the New York Times Democrats. And those most violently
for aid to Catholic schools and against abortion and dirty books, are the
Jim Buckley Catholic Democrats.
Rockefeller, in coming out for parochial aid, has recognized this. In
1970 he won over Catholic Democrats in greater numbers than ever while
his upstate Protestants grumbled about aid to Catholic schools, but they
"had no place else to go. 11
8. Morey mentions that "a Gallup Poll conducted in July 1968 indicates that
the voter's choice between McCarthy and Humphrey was not guided by
religious affiliation of the candidate. In fact it was slightly reversed."
This shows an utter lack of understanding of the Catholic Community and
the Catholic issue as we sèe it.
Of course, rank-and-file Catholics did not go for McCarthy. The reason
has nothing to do with his religion everything to do with his style.
McCarthy is an upper middle class liberal, who hobnobs with radical kids,
who writes poetry, a post-Vatican II peacenik, snobbish, ecumaniac who
apes the Harvard Wasps. Your average lower middle and middle income
-4-
Catholic cannot identify with McCarthy and the Beautiful People; they are
not Gene McCarthy men, they are Dick Daley men. The fellows who join
the K. of C., who make mass and communion every morning, who go on
retreats, who join the Holy Name Society, who fight against abortion in
their legislatures, who send their kids to Catholic schools, who work on
assembly lines and live in Polish, Irish, Italian and Catholic communities
or who have headed to the suburbs -- these are the majority of Catholics;
they are where our votes are.
Morey's statistics on Catholic clergy uninterested in Catholic schools repeats
the same error. The one-third of priests who are not interested in Catholic
schools probably contain the one hundred percent of Catholic clergy who
either endorse or "understand" what the Berrigan boys were trying to do.
What I am saying is that there is a deep division in the Catholic cominumity.
We should be working the Catholic social conservatives the clear majority.
As for the Catholic liberals, who ape the Wasp upper East Side liberals
like Southern liberals, they are the worst kind. Converts to liberalism, and
to "right thinking", they outdo the New York Times in their fanaticism for
their "New faith. 11
9. Morey contends that Catholic schools do not seem a really strong issue
among Catholics. How can one say that? Surely, among some Catholics
who have "made it" the improtance of Catholic schools has diminished. But
among those Catholics who deeply believe in their schools, among those who
send 5, 000, 000 of their children to Catholic schools, a "religious education"
is a burning issue, and in an age of "permissiveness" bound tostay a
burning issue. Why do I say this? Common sense I think tells us that when
Catholic pressure in the 1960s can bring Protestant legislatures in state
after state to vote aid for their schools that shows interest, concern and
paver. Secondly, running the Catholic school system in an "extra tax"
upon Catholics of one estimates runs five billion dollars a year. Any
group willing to pony up an extra five billion in taxes, to educate its
children a different way from the free public schools is a group whose
interests ought to be reckoned with.
10. Catholic schools as an issue can be compared with "gun control" and
"aid to Israel. " It is an issue on which a minority of Americans, i.e.
conservative Catholics, are SO deeply concerned that their votes can be
switched on that issue along. For the majority who may disagree, it is not
a "voting issue. 11
Thus, while eighty percent of the people favor gun control, if you come out
too strong for it, you win next to nothing, but you have ten or fifteen percent
of the electorate working night and day to see you defeated. (See: Joe
Tydings, circa 1970, and Joe Clark, circa 1968)
11. In 1960 because he could not lose the Catholic vote; it was in his
pocket, it had "no place else to go," JFK could come out against aid
to Catholic schools -- working the Protestant side of the street. That
was where the ducks were for him. Quite naturally, ours are over there,
in the Catholic community.
12. Just look at Muskie himself, and his tergiversations over the Catholic
issue. He waffles on abortion; he has refused to speak out on Catholic
schools; he has a split party; and the more we force these "splitting" issues
the better for the President.
13. The final argument against aid to Catholic schools is that it drew
"extremely negative responses" from the NEA, and "others involved in
public education". that could "well alienate 1. 8 million public school teachers.
For Christ sake, anti-Catholic publis schools teachers are not the President'
constituent; as for the NEA, and its lobby they have made an avocation
cutting the President's throat. We are Never going to get people like that
why should we be solicitious about offending them if it can get us votes
elsewhere.
Indeed, the fact that it would "frost" the NEA is one of the more appealing
arguments for going ahead with aid to parochial schools.
14. When we move on aid to parochial, schools, it can be done through the
mechanism of vouchers and tax credits, which is the least offensive to
everyone, and most acceptable. Which would minimize any losses -- and
we could through the Catholic media and Catholic outlets, maximize the gain.
If the President can go up 15 percent among Catholics, that would be worth
more than getting 100 percent of the Jewish vote, and worth more than
going from ten percent to forty percent among blacks.
Any my view is that it is one hell of a lot easier thing to do, because
conservative Republicans, i.e., James Buckley, ha ve shown that it is a
realistic political alliance. Morey supports this point by indicating
Goldwater's gains among Catholics in New York.
15. Finally, there is a potential, latent majority out there -- available for
the President which we have failed to put together. It consists of the
President's WASP and white-collar conservative base -- added to it
Southern Protestants and Northern, Midwestern and Western Catholics.
Morey is right in that parochial school aid alone will not win it for us.
-6-
When that is put together, not everyone in that coalition will agree on
every issue -- but they will agree on enough. Southern Protestants will
not like aid to Northern Catholic schools but the bonds that hold that
coalition together will be stronger than those forcing it apart. (Indeed,
Roosevelt's coalition of Southern whites plus Southern blacks had far more
inconsistencies than our potential coalition has).
And Morey is right in that we ought not to rely on one appeal -- whether it
be aid to parochial schools or what. It should be multi-faceted; it has to be.
A mixture of social conservativism, which is a majority view nationally, plu.
economic assistance and visability appointments and, for the Democrats
who are willing to go half-way with the President, not the Democrats who
detest him. Thus, instead of sending the orders out to all our agencies --
hire blacks and women -- the order should go out -- hire ethnic Catholics
preferable women, for visible posts. One example: Italian Americans,
unlike blacks, have never had a Supreme Court member -- they are deeply
concerned with their "criminal" image; they do not dislike the President.
Give those fellows the "Jewish seat" or the "black seat" on the Court when
it becomes available.
Regrettably, neither our budget or our political emphasis seems to me to
reflect these realities.
True, there will be losses from this kind of strategy. Josiah Lee Auspitz
will be very angry with us. But the Republican Party is a last-place ball
club; living in Washington, one can understand that. To win we have to
make "trade-offs." To come out of the cellar we may have to give up
Frank Howard. One should recall that recently a poll showed that
Independents have passed Republican and we are now only 22 percent
of the vote. One reason why can be found sitting in the Legislative
Leadership meeting -- and looking at all those WASPs.
If the GOP is to become a national majority party it will be because of
fellows like Cahill in New Jersey and Volpe in Mass who hold our base
and add to it the Catholics who were Democratic from time immemorial.
There is a clear potential majority out there. The President could be the
new Roosevelt, who put it together, or he could be the last of the liberal
Presidents. But to put it together requires a "leap in the dark," it means
"pushing our skiff from the shore alone;" it means telling John Chancellor
and the New York Times that, no, we have not dore anything for the blacks
this week, but we have named a Pole to the Cabinet and an Italian Catholic
to the Supreme Court.
-7-
In an oversimplified way, the reason the President is at 42 percent of
whatever it is that we have not broken out of our minority base. In y
heretical view, we are never, never going to do it with public relations.
The President is not Eisenhower; he did not lead the armies ashore against
Hitler's Europe. We are not going to build any new majorities on the
Nixon personality, or the admitted Nixon personal political skill. We need
to do it with issues and budget dollars, and we are not.
Let us assume that, for one, RN tubed OEO the day he took office, and had
spent the $5 billion we have wasted on that pit since then -- on providing
tax credits for non-public schools. That is just one example. From here
it does not appear we have a political "strategy" which is being imposed
upon the bureaucrats and budget makers; the latter seem more responsive
to media pressure than the imperatives of the President's and the party's
long run political interests.
If there must be unemployment to halt inflation, why are Southern California
aerospace workers unemployed -- instead of liberal school teachers, social
workers and poverty consessionaires. These latter aren't for us anyway.
Instead of buying off media hostility, that massive Federal budget should
have bought us by now a new majority, should have bought new friends for
Richard Nixon, should have bought him a place in the history books as the
Republican who got it all together.
Chesterton once wrote in defense of his faith, that "It cannot really be said
that Christianity has failed; because it cannot really be said that Christianity
has been tried. The quote may be off; but is apposite. The new Republican
Majority in this country is not a disproven myth; it has not seriously been
tried.
P.S. We are not doing the President any favors by sending in to him,
uncriticized, memorandum on politics of the vapidity of the document that
came to me. I know the affection for Kevin Phillips is well contained in
the West Wing; but he is a genius of sorts; and the White House might well
hire him for one week his political agency on a confidential basis
to assess the labors of the Morey team.