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Featuring President's Posture Thru '71 and discussion of Democratic and Republican Campaign themes, as well as the discussion on the focus of Hope and Idealism. 12pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
To: The President From: Harry S. Dent RE: "Election Analysis and the Future." 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1970
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: "The 1970 Campaign." 14pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
To: The President From: Jim Keogh RE: Request for some post-election thoughts. 7pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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WHSF: Contested, 45-28
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This file contains:
Featuring President's Posture Thru '71 and discussion of Democratic and Republican Campaign themes, as well as the discussion on the focus of Hope and Idealism. 12pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
To: The President From: Harry S. Dent RE: "Election Analysis and the Future." 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1970
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: "The 1970 Campaign." 14pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
To: The President From: Jim Keogh RE: Request for some post-election thoughts. 7pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Description
45
28
Campaign
Report
Report featuring President's Posture Thru '71
and discussion of Democratic and
Republican Campaign themes, as well as the
discussion on the focus of Hope and
Idealism. 12pgs
45
28
11/19/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Harry S. Dent RE:
"Election Analysis and the Future." 9pgs
45
28
11/6/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan
RE: "The 1970 Campaign." 14pgs
45
28
11/13/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Jim Keogh RE:
Request for some post-election thoughts.
7pgs
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Page 1 of 1
J. President's Posture Thru '71
All that can be heard among friends and foes alike is how the
President must soften his image, return to being President and
not candidate, lower his voice, stop shaking his fist, etc., as
if windup off-year campaign activity were planned year-round.
We would do well to dismiss the straw man of stridency and
examine how best to protray the President as what he is:
He'is not now, and never likely to become, a beloved figure of
benignity, and it would be a mistake to attempt to strike such
a pose.
He is not a man who believes that national unity is a prerequisite
to progress; instead, he has pointed out that progress comes
first, and then will lead to a form of unity, or at least a reduction
in the level of bitterness.
Thus, his posture should be that of a man willing to fight for the
kind of progress for which the time is ripe. The representative
of "all the people" must not play it so cool as to refuse to do
battle for their interests, and those interests are controversial.
The posture for '7] cannot be unitarian, apolitical, ameliorating,
lofty the posture of a Chairman of the Board.
-2-
The posture should be firm, calm, decisive, certain of where
he wants to take the country and willing to damn the torpedoes
to get there -- the posture of a President.
I agree with the conventional wisdom that the President must
appear "Presidential, 11 but I do not define that word to mean
soothing and not-boat-rocking, as some do -- I think it means
surefooted and certain about goals, reserving final judgment
to history.
Needed for this now is an Order of Battle: a clearly under-
stood line of prioritits in both legislation and administration.
We should begin twisting arms and publicly fighting for the
Family Assistance package. The controversy on the right will
position us firmly in the center, and we will have something
to crow about that is epochal.
We should have a tough-minded state of the union that lays out
the great choices that cannot be avoided next year (cut inflation
or have full employment at once, spend more on education or
insist on reform, take chances on defense with big cuts or push
the Nixon Doctrine of peace through strength) and makes the
decisions and sells them persuasively. Recognize the controversy
and address it soberly and rationally rather than obfuscate it.
We should have a fresh, new high-priority program for next
year. Health will be the issue; the Domestic Council is now
working on a big health proposal; this should be given the major
push for 1971.
Above all, we should not try to produce a "new image;" the
general impression of the first two years is a good one to build
on. We should press our strengths: Surefootedness in foreign
affairs (driving home its meaning to Ame ricans at home in terms
of no more war and no more draft) and placing the public interest
ahead of the special interests (where there is much more work to
be done showing how we are bringing about a genuine prosperity).
-3-
Every posture to be effective must have a single underlying
theme into which all others are fitted. In RN's case it is this:
Ile is the single indispensable force toward bringing about a
full generation of peace.
II. One Possible Picture in the Summer of 1972
a. All the troops home from Southeast Asia; draft ended;
non - Communist regime of some type still in Saigon.
b. Middle East still troublesome, but new truce in effect.
c. SALT talks moderately successful, but defense spending
on rise again because of Soviet conventional buildup and Chinese
nuclear buildup.
d. Crime rate in US stabilized, but still rising.
e. Continued extremist bombings and acts of terror, in-
cluding kidnappings.
1. Inflation rate between four and five per cent.
g. Unemployment rate around five per cent.
h. Real GNP growth rate about four per cent.
i. Interest rates below 7%, housing booming.
j. Budget 15 billion in deficit, President urging spending
restraint.
k. Environment still an issue, but losing appeal.
1. Presidential approval rating about 50%, having dipped
under but recovered strongly after Summit meeting.
m. Wallace a factor again; stronger on Hacy Long populism
this time.
-4-
n. Lindsay-Gardner fourth party effort negative, now behind
Democrats.
O. Dems to nominate a centrist like Muskie or Kennedy, with
a Southerner for Vice President. Gallup Poll shows President
slightly ahead, Harris substantially behind.
p. Family Assistance Plan checks beginning to go out
nationally with big Demo push for increases.
JII. If the foregoing is 70% accurate, the Democratic campaign
themes will be:
a. End violence by "bringing us together" -- without divisive
President.
b. End inflation with some form of controls.
c. "Gel the country moving again" faster growth, full
employment.
d. Divert defense dollars to meet human needs at home.
c. Massive health and education aid.
f. Time for a change.
IV. Our likely Appeals:
a. Peace without Surrender.
b. Prosperity without War.
C. Confidence in the President as President.
V. The Weakness in our Appeals:
a. Peace without Surrender. Biggest weakness here is "What
have you done for me lately ?" Churchill did a fine job in World
War 11, but then it was time for Labour. Peace is a powerful
promise in time of war or in threat of war (Wilson in 1916: He
-5-
Kept Us Out of War) but it loses potency in time of peace.
Ironically, the achievement of peace is a wasting political
asset: The more secure the peace, the less gratitude goes to
those who bring it about. Besides, gratitude for past success
is the thinnest reed to lean on in politics.
b. Prosperity Without War. ("Oh, there he goes about the
war again. Took him three years to get out, and there are
still millions unemployed. ") Inflation is always an attacker's
issue, and a turn in the rate of increase is a purely intellectual
defense bread costs more, and that's what counts. People
will still remember the boomtime of the Sixties and forget the
war causes and hope for the kind of soaring markets and full
employment of those days.
c. Thus, WC will be playing Republican basic strength (keep
out of war) at a time when that issue will be Josing its gut appeal,
while the Democrats will be playing their strength (good times
with the party of the people) at a time when their issue will be
gaining in appeal.
d. Meanwhile, the social issue personal security, resent-
ment at redistribution of wealth and power by Washington fiat
will be somewhat blunted by our incumbency. The aginners are
agin the Ins. On the whole, we will continue to benefit from our
concern with the Porgotten American, but not to the extent of
slicing deeply into the labor vote, ortin decimating Wallace.
e. Confidence in the President as President the power of
the incumbency will continue to be an asset. Undecideds will
tend to play it safe with the President they know. But the news
1 ocus in 1972 will all be on the selection of the Democratic
nominee; his campaign organization will be blooded and freshly
tested; and he will go into the campaign with the momentum of a
convention victory and the mantle of new solutions to all our problems.
How, then, should we plan now to make our own appeals unbeatable?
-6-
VI. The Peace Theme
a. The President has already sounded the tocsin for "a full
generation of peace. 11 This cannot be allowed to be dropped as
only a '70 campaign phrase it is a phrase central to his Ad-
ministration, and must be repeated and reprised by all
Administration spokesmen. It should be the title of a USIA
documentary; of a book of Nixon foreign policy speeches; of a
Kissinger article in Foreign Affairs Quarterly; of Rogers speeches
and a Reader's Diget byliner. The Full Generation of Peace should
be worked into the Bicentennial planning, it should be the theme
of the Christmas Tree lighting and of Christmas sermons across
the country; it should also be the new theme of the White House
Conference on Children and Youth, because they are the ones who
will enjoy it -- indeed, they will be the "generation of 'peace" as
we succeed.
This phrase has in it what the Silent Majority, the Forgotten
American, the New Federalism and Forward Together never had
a specific, realizable promise of hope. When we in the Administration
are completely tired of it, we will know that we have just begun to
get it across, and we should then redouble our efforts. This is our
own "war to end wars" and we must not let it go.
b. Punctuating the Peace. We cannot permit peace 10 limp
in unheralded, causing people to wonder retrospectively, "When
did the war end?" Absent a break in negotiations and a formal
truce-signing, we must create a war's ending of our own. One
time for this would be when the last combat troops left in Victnam
come home next spring there should he a national parade, in
six cities, with veterans of the war marching alongside the last
detachment of troops coming home. Then the following year, when
the last of the remaining troops come home, we should declare
"Homecoming Day" with appropriate festivities.
C. Arms Control. The average American has only the vaguest
idea of what the SALT talks are. Any form of success there, which
we would consider of the greatest significance, would be greeted by
a pleased yawn by the general public.
-7-
It may be that we have not played up their significance because
of the possibility of stalemate; if, however, there develops a
likelihood of even partial success, we should dramatize it with a
Presidential visit to Vienna and formal signing of Stage I with
Soviet leaders.
Such a ceremony would at once be contrasted with the Kennedy-
Khrushchev debacle in the same city, and the summit meeting would
be limited to one subject with success forcordained. A subsequent
full-range summit would be possible at a later date.
The political tail cannot be made to wag the diplomatic dog,
but if progress is forthcoming, we should recognize the fact that
the meaning of SALT. has not yet begun to permeate the public
consciousness, and plan for a much wider understanding of what
it means for defense spending and the likelihood of peace.
d. The President as Peacemaker. There was a sign in
Illinois that Ollic Atkins got a picture of: "Welcome, Mr. Peace. "
This is the sign that must appear everywhere in 1972, without
our inducement; the President should become known next year as
"Mr. Peace. 11 At a commencement speech next June he should
be introduced as such, not by a university president but by is
student. This, of course, can never be officially sponsored or
used by Administration officials, but it should be welcomed when
used by supporters. In this way, the President will be the
personification of lasting peace. (The use of the term "Mister"
can be highly effective: RN used it in his nomination of Goldwater
in taking him from "Mr. Conservative" to "Mr. Republican" to
"Mr. President". ) Mr, Peace. of course leaves all other Misters
behind. 11. is a sobriquet that will ring true as he actually brings
the world closer to peace and specifically ends our involvement in
a war.
e. The President as Peacekeeper. The preservation of peace,
in these times, requires a strong defense. "Only a Strong America
can Keep the Peace" should be the theme with which we confront
those who would slash the defense budget; "penny-wise and lives
foolish" is what we call those who invite war through US weakness.
Evocations of Wilson, FDR and Truman on preparedness necessary.
-8-
We must bridge the gap between making the peace and keeping
the peace to overcome the "what have you done for me lately"
syndrome. The threat of war will be real after Victnam; we
cannot allow a complacency to settle in, or an attitude to develop
that says "You did just fine at what you are best at (ending a war),
now let's give the Democrats a chance to do what they re best
at (ending unemployment). 11
Despite summits, despite possible detentes, WC must continually
point out the continuing dnager to the peace that requires a
vigilant, strong President to counter. There is nothing phony
about this: The threat will exist, and it is proper national policy
to make sure the public knows it. The temptation 10 say "we've
made peace" should be resisted, and replaced with "we've taken
the first step now the next steps are all-important. "
VJI. Prosperity Without War
If we do pretty well in slowing inflation and pretty well in reducing
unemployment, we could still lore on this issue because (a) it is
always attackable as "not enough" and (b) the Democrats have
greater public confidence as the party of boom.
Therefore, we merchandise all we do here not only as precedent-
shattering (nobody really cares about how tough it was for us to
do) but in terms of how much better off the average man is and in
what danger he would be in if the reckless types go in again.
To the workingmen, our sell should be "You never got a real
raise in the Sixties, but you did get a real raise in the Seventies
and even bigger real raises are in store. 11
On unemployment, much as this distresses the purists, we must
break away from the old way of figuring unemployment. Total
unemployment is a phony figure, since "full" employment starts
just under 1% but 4% unemployed sounds too much like a lot of
people out of work involuntarily, and is too easy a political
target. The only unemployment figure that counts is breadwinser
unemployment married men and that is a figure that must be
-9-
established as "priority unemployment" and that is the figure
we can expect to see heading downward in '71 and '72. There
will be screams of rage, but let us change the basis for com-
parison we have a good case to make, economists know it,
and it is about time we began judging our efforts in terms of
"real" unemployment and setting aside part-timers, teenagers,
voluntarily unemployed job-hunters and the rest.
Another aspect of unemployment we must remember is this: It
is not so much the number of unemployed that gets the news play,
it is the direction of the trend. It is better politically for a 5.5
rate to drop to 5. 0 in 1972 than for a 4.0 rate to rise to 4. 5.
Thus, it is not only economically right for us to take our lumps
early next year, but it is politically right as well.
The stock market is important politically, It would be far
better for it to sit for a while and then begin a long climb
starting toward the end of next year. 11 will go up when money
is easier to borrow and investors are convinced that you are
determined to see good times in '72, with a sound basis laid
for a genuine prosperity in '73. For that reason we should not
seek to change the game plan now it would appear to be a
panic result of the 172 elections. We suffered this year for
doing the right thing, now Jet'sget the nourishment out of it in '72.
One selling theme in '71 should be "at last you can make plans
for the future. 11 We have a relatively stable dollar, and we're
chipping away 21 breadwinner unemployment this spells real
security at last. Another theme should be "prosperity for all
the people" reminding the fixed-income people how they
suffered in Democratic "prosperity. 11
To get this across, the President should do some fireside chats
in 1971 FDR's fireside chats were almost always on the
subject of the economy, and they gave people the impression he
was getting something good done against great obstades. The
speeches were not simplistic; he flattered the public by talking a
litile over their heads on economic affairs. The important thing
is not to thoroughly educate, but to instill confidence that we're
moving right along and things are steadily getting better.
-10-
This area, I think, is where the Vice President and the Cabinet
should spend a lot of time. Not right away -- the message will
not sustain two years of banging away, no message will. But
as soon as a turn becomes more evident in 1971, we should begin
to hit hard on how right we were, and how wrong were those who
would have turned the nation toward rationing and black markets.
(Note: We should never talk about "controls" which are popular;
the results of controls are not, and we should concentrate on
them. )
VIII. Use of the Vice President
The VP doesn't need selling to his supporters, for he can do no
wrong in their eyes; nor can he be forgiven by committed
partisan Democrats he tagged with "radical liberal. 11
To widen his support in the middle, we must overcome the
sloughing- off of him as a joke by some. The attack on him that
would sway many people is not SO much that he is a divider (the
other side of that coin is that he is a scrapper and a fighter for
his beliefs; which will gain him affection) but that he is ludicrous.
So: no more big words, no more alliterative flourishes, and no
more jokes about him by other members of the Administration,
even about golf.
Ile is an "homine sericus" and should undertake a series of
speeches and articles probing social concerns at great length and
with profound seriousness. In this way, he would not be backing
off his image of the stern pointer-outer of defects in the body
politic, but he would be much harder to attack as inconsequential
or frivolous. His views would have to be countered by long and
sobersided tracts, and we should seek out print "debates" on the
counterculture, on apathy, on clitism, on the real meaning of
intellectualism, on the future of federalism and the like.
It may get a little boring, and it will not make the front pages as
much, and it will require the hiring of a good, deep thinker-writer
to help out, but it will fit philosophically and it will let some wounds
heal over time. By '72, he will be stronger than ever for a
political campaign.
"Lying low" would be a mistake; digging deep would be the most
productive course.
-11-
IX.
The White House Glow
1971 should be a year of expanded social, cultural and educational
activity in the White House itself. It should be the center of news-
worthy activity and a frequent dateline, especially with TV film
coverage of innovative events.
We already have a plan ready to go on a series of White House
lectures by entinent historians and political scientists 10 an
Administration audience every third week in the East Room.
This will take is minimum of Presidential time (perhaps two
welcomes in the entire series) and be a source of continuing
stories.
We should have at least one Duke-Ellington-type night a month.
For each Irvin Berlin salute, there should be a Burt Bacharach
salute; for each Bob Hope or Jackie Gleason, there should be
more modern comics to poke fun at ourselves; for each "1776"
there should : a non-musical dramatic presentation, from both
on and off Broz dway.
The guests at these functions should no longer be limited to fat
cats or Admin? stration staff or old friends; they should include
TV news editors, society columnists from Detroit and Los
Angeles who ave never been to a White House function, sports
reporters and columnists at functions honoring sports greats, etc.
One of our trombles is that we try something new, it works, and
then we drop it before it has a cumulative impact. Case in point:
The astronants dinner in Los Angeles. We should do at least
four major state dinners in cities around the nation next year,
bringing the fill] panoply of pomp and circumstance into action
in different regions. It will have ten times the impact it gets in
Washington and locations and invitations can be picked for the
greatest mileage.
Our goal is not recapture Camelot, or to exude a chi-chi image;
our aim should be to reflect the excitement of a spectrum of
American life and make sure that reflection is adequately disseminated.
The war is ending. Let's turn on the lights.
-12-
X. Focus for Hope and Idealism
The Bicentennial Commission, after a year of horsing around, is
beginning to come to grips with a plan for the years leading up to
1976.
The President should identify himself as interested in this project
and be the center of two events as yet unplanned: Thomas
Jefferson's birthday on April 13 and the Fourth of July 1971. A
speech about the full generation of peace from the steps of the
Jefferson Memorial, and an event on the Fourth of July in
Philadelphia should bring into focus the President's ideas about
what he wants for the nation and what he thinks the American
spirit is all about.
We have posed all kinds of questions in our "national goals" "
report; the President should begin answering them next year.
In addition, at least one of the President's daughters should be-
come closely associated withthe Commission's activities as
they begin to generate interest.
The White House Conference ()1) Children and Youth can also be a
springboard for our concern with idealism and the American future.
The President should give a formal speech here and then make
some surprise visits to smaller seminars to listen as well as
speak. Out of this conference should grow a National Youth Service,
a project RN promised in the '68 campaign, and one which can
channel some energies into worthwhile projects based on voluntarism.
Deat
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 19, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Election Analysis and the Future
I. Analysis of the President's Election Efforts
Had to be a plus--some gains and avoided big losses. It
was a defensive rather than offensive strategy--no way to
win big and much to lose. Democrats outnumber us 5-3.
The President should have campaigned. Our prime issue
was the social issue, and it blunted the economic issue by
getting so much news play and by putting the Democrats on
the defensive for some time.
The achievements on the war were spotlighted by the
President but not by the press. It did not have the news
appeal or glamor of the social issue. To spend much time
defending on the economic issue would have called atten-
tion to the pocketbook squeeze without relieving the
squeeze.
Thus, little fault can be found with the Presidential
campaigning. It drew crowds, publicity, and votes, and
saved us from disaster.
Our problem seems to be that with our limited budget
capacity and lack of Hill support, we do not have a stun-
ning array of achievements to show what we have done
materially for people, especially their pocketbooks. We
have been in the position of financing Democrat programs
and maybe even cutting back on some. We are caught in
the position of reporting on the progress we are making
- 2 -
in solving the nigh-insoluble problems left on our door-
step.
We don't have anything visible to run against such as LBJ.
Now we are in power, and most people think we are running
everything in Washington. So, when we hit law and order,
we are responsible for it, in the public view.
Thus, the prime available issue was used. At the end we
probably overdid it, especially with the last TV show and
its production defects. In addition to the TV show, can-
didates have privately criticized the negative ads and
too many Washington suggestions.
Had the President sat back we would have gotten the blame
for more losses, and no net gains in the Senate. This
value of campaigning is clearly indicated by the following
vote chart in the Maryland area visited by the President:
Republican
Democrat
Beall
Tydings
Registration
Registration
Vote
Vote
5th Legislative
6,260
41/2
/
28,600
13,000
8,000
District
6th Legislative
4,870
,
24,840
10,000
7,000
District
7th Legislative
4,000
bil
25,240
8,600
8,600
District
II. Posture the President Should Maintain Through 1971
Through the end of this year the President should be shown
Working hard and as cordially as possible with the lame
duck session. This should shed the partisan image the campaign
developed and blunt the idea that the Congress is going to
- 3 -
"get him" for his campaign activities. Also, this would
show the President pressing on to get his domestic program
moving against the odds and with a willingness to accept
the election results whether viewed as good or bad. Any
anti-Congress remarks should come from the Cabinet The
President should appeal to the public without appearing to
be critical of Congress or partisan.
Then comes the spirit of Christmas and Presidential family
togetherness- a good way to conclude the year.
In 1971, there should be more attention given to the
domestic side than previously. Partisanship should be
kept very limited by the President. However, the basic
political spade work for 1972 should be accomplished on a
carefully planned schedule by the staff, the RNC, and any
PR.
outside groups. This includes organizing and propagandizing
activities for the President in all states--done on a re-
gional breakdown. Every state should be organized outside
the GOP down to the community level. We should establish and
supply PR committees in each state with the capability to
provide speech material, speaking engagements, letters to
editors and Congress, and general PR assistance to all
political groups in their states. We need to do this on a
regional basis in order to get across the right points in
the right places. This would include special attention
and treatment for key leaders.
The organizations would be patterned on the citizens op-
eration of 1968. The key names on a state by state break-
down is available. The weak sisters can be weeded out and
new blood injected. We will want to get key leaders as we
did with the school desegregation committees. Some of these
could be starters in the South. To keep these groups inter-
ested and organizing, we could send in Administration spokes-
men. In all of this, we would keep the President aloof
except for private receptions at the White House--like we
had for the New Jersey group. The President can appear for
- 4 -
half an hour and then let us feed them first class in
the Conference Dining Room. Those New Jersey people were
much impressed--cocktails, a talk with the President, a
West Wing tour, a White House dinner with a Cabinet member
and some staff, and trinkets to take home. The tab for
20 was $184.
I am already getting calls from state leaders wanting me
to come for a strategy and planning session for the 1972
campaign. Theidea was laid before the Southern Chairmen
this week and they fully agree. They want the citizens
idea explained to their GOP leadership to get their
understanding and assistance in rounding up the most
effective non-GOP leaders. The pessimistic columnists
had scared them into readiness to launch the 1972 efforts
right away.
The RNC needs to get going on party organizational drives.
The 1970 performance was not very effective. One reason
was the lack of organizational push from the RNC. An
expert like Dick Richards of Utah (barely missed election
to Congress) should direct such an effort. He is a former
State Chairman and Nixon loyalist. The RNC should also
study and organize to get the 18-year-old vote.
Presidential visits to states on Presidential business
should continue. This is the best non-political campaigning.
It would be good to have hit every state with some meeting.
1971 would be a good year to show more courageous leader-
ship actions such as the Cambodia operation. Let's go against
the safe or sureroute on some domestic matters, even where
there is a risk of defeat on an issue-just so we know where
we can reasonably expect to wind up. Naturally, these must
be issues of public concern where the traditional route is
the safe and expected one but where the public really yearns
for boldness, even if the action hurts at that time. The
Cambodia venture is a perfect example--knowing what to
reasonably expect eventually but appearing very bold and
- 5 -
risky at the time of action. A suggestion would be to move
with vigor against the hippie revolutionary groups. Also,
to abolish some more OEO programs and jobs (CAPs) and do
it in the name of fighting waste.
Such planning and thinking may require establishment of a
private think tank team.
III. Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media
midio
1. More regional briefings.
2. More news conferences the President makes points on TV.
3. Kennedy had state delegations of news executives in for
luncheons. Very favorable reaction.
4. Let's get some friends to invest in news media purchases.
5. More regional treatment of our PR activities, especially
to serve our political and propaganda units we are to set up
in 1971.
6. A black PR assistant to work on the black news media.
7. Do more to plug anti-Administration leaks. Leaks should
only be positive.
IV. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet
UP
1. Substantive use of the Vice President to show he is more
than a speaker and politician- a potential President.
- 6 -
2. His staff needs strengthening, especially someone like
Harlow whose advice and sincerity he respects and will heed.
3. Continue to show support for the Vice President.
4. Why not have more frequent Cabinet meetings, using the
Vice President in place of the President to conduct idea,
advice, and political briefing sessions to be transmitted to
the President and to pass on orders the President need not
or may not desire to give?
5. Continue our speakers bureau and use the Cabinet to make
more appearances where the President and Vice President can't
accept.
V. Relations with Congress
Cokg.
A tough job--will be tougher now. Strategy and use of the
public to assist us will be important. We may need more
staff here. Many of our problems here may stem from not
enough time and personnel to do the little but essential
ego-rubbing--like periodic visits to their offices to hear
them out and seek their advice, on both sides. A visit by
a White House aide always impressed me when on the Hill.
They can never be satisfied, but we can politick them more
with more help.
Our biggest complaints come on departmental liaison shops.
We may need a super liaison chief for all of them.
Congressmen feel an air of arrogance from our people in
the departments and non-liaison people in the White House.
We should school all our people on Congressional relations
and the way to rub their egos with rather than against the
grain.
Friendly Democrats should especially be wooed with an inde-
pendent type Nixon Democrat they respect.
- 7 -
Timmons seems to need more identification with clout or
proximity to the President.
Big receptions at the White House get Congressmen down here
and in the presence of the President. They can then say
they get down here frequently.
We should have a few Congressional friends who secretly
listen for us on the Hill. These people talk and gripe
mightily. Knowing their thinking and tempers can be helpful.
Also we should have some planted talkers of our own in the
cloakrooms. The listeners aren't necessarily the talkers.
MacGregor and Bush working at a high level should help.
Harlow will leave a hole.
VI. Presidential Travel
Tshne
Continue to visit states on Presidential visits.
A trip to Moscow or to Japan after the trade battle.
VII. Other Suggestions
1. We need better control over the Executive Branch. We
got better control on the final phase of desegregation and
avoided troubles when Morgan was given a special assignment.
2. We need a czar to get the President's will implemented
outside the White House. This should be either the Vice
President or a Cabinet-rank man known to have the confidence
of the President. He would insure one voice where we want one
voice and orchestrate more than one when desired. Also, he
would enforce house cleaning and bureaucrat control. We will
have more trouble here as we head toward 1972.
- 8 -
3. We still don't get enough political action out of
our people. The Democrats play politics while Republicans
rely too much on merit. Result: they win more than we
do. We even defy the laws of politics with some of our
"meritorious" actions. Some look for a way to say "no"
when "yes" is easier. VA and GSA find a way to say "yes."
4. We need more political input on entertainment and
church. A good job was done on this Sunday's service.
5. We need more substance to go with the PR techniques we
are using. At the end of four years we must show some
meat with the potatoes. What can we sell in 1972-that
we have ameliorated problems and reformed programs left
by Democrats, but what else have we done. We need more
emphasis on substance.
6. The Administration needs to project a warmer and more
human image. This can't be contrived--must be honest.
Examples: The White House staff picked up wood along the
Potomac one Saturday; Tricia's Halloween party for D. C.
children; General Hughes' cooperation in providing a
military helicopter to move a crash victim to a hospital--
these and some other human interest stories all got good
press, but we need more!
7. More direct Presidential involvement in selected "human
interest" situations would be good. The President might con-
sider doing something where the "Bring Us Together" theme
can be renewed. If we don't hang on to that line--and do it
legitimately, the Democrats are going to take it and turn it
on us in 1972.
8. This Administration hasn't displayed much of a sense of
humor--except for Martha Mitchell. We appear a little negative
and unhappy, and this particularly turns off the younger
people--many of them really do think that "Democrats have more
fun."
- 9 -
We (Republicans and the Administration) tend to come over
as being stuffy. Better PR should be able to improve at
least part of this. (The Buckley family has been very
successful in projecting a positive and human image while
being conservative.)
We should really work at projecting this warmer image at
the Congress.
Daring 50 Dent
Harry S. Dent
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Buchan I
THE 1970 CAMPAIGN
Memorandum to the President
From Patrick J. Buchanan
November 6, 1970
STRATEGY
Looking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right
one upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with
the Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to
defend himself, to get on the right side of it - - and thus precluded
their taking the offensive on the only good issue they had - - the
economic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent
half the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking
about his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a
flag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy
was calling campus militants "campus commandos. 11 (The President
might have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from
Massachusetts now has a haircut.) What happened this campaign - -
in a number of instances -- was that Democrats like Tunney and
2
Stevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue,
through speeches and spots, as Scammon and Wattenburg had
urged them to do -- and once they got right on this issue; it became
a contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess,
and they won hands down.
On the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he
would very probably be the new Senator from New York.
Those Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently
gave up nothing on their left just as S-W contended (the kids have
nowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able
to endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus
losing nothing there.
Those candidates, who came off in the election as out and out
liberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy and did not get well on our
issues - were defeated.
The legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what
issues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we
devoted our campaign to the economic issue -- those final statistics
about a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the 5 retail price
increase, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price
index would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort
to the economic issues, Gore would have won -- and Buckley very
probably lost.
3
As for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the
country with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue
sharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from
the Welfare Plan -- and we constantly had to stress work incentives.
All through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.
My main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that
we started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely
on the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks.
to get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with
the issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly
succeeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too
soon, considering media's impact.
One thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to
command the media and get our points across -- we do not need to
hit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it
in a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might
have been better off to start out - - not full-bore -- but low-keyed,
light and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around
the second week of October - - which would not have given the opposition
enough time to re-orient their campaigns.
There is another point that should not go unanswered. The
"social issue" was not a "missile gap" issue i.e., a complete
T
4
creation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people
of this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state
after state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recog-
nize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned
correctly and go after our opponents.
When one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we
had problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where
the U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-
fire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had
nothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we
could take to the country and say clearly - - here we stand; here they
stand throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to
remember that we were trying to throw them out of office - - not keep
ourselves in - and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive
for the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a
change.
THE ECONOMY
Clearly, this must have hurt I see nothing else to explain why
Reagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal
campaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation
why our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they
might all run a close race.
5
(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information
ought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so
one
far off. )
was
Looking at the races by State -- which we have to do I think
we can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national
trends as this was not a national election.
Connecticut, the President certainly helped - - so also did the
Vice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker
was acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.
In New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately
claim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into
his camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both
acceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Demo-
cratic candidate -- what else explains why a young, good-looking
Democrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky
hit hard on the Social issue.
In New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his
campaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions
and then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for
his defeat but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing
board liberal won by half a million in that state.
I
6
In Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against
an unknown we ought to find out, Perhaps economy.
In Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an
"anti - Tydings vote" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good
strong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.
In Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got
15 per cent of the vote.
In Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner,
in Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner
in the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the "Grcy Fox, " and
the only reason we beat this fellow was the issues -- not on candidates
or personalities.
In Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost -- but he lost to a
fellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues.
So, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and
1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor
about Bush for Agnew hurt.
Florida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell
gambit, with the Kirk-Guerney Cramer feud, which turned off the
voters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two
populist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.
7
If I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP
nonsense and Kirk myself and the fellows elected seemed conservative
enough.
As for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern
Strategy - we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals.
The only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough
were defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy --
it does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level - -
indeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of
the Mason-Dixon line and would sweep that area still in a national
election.
In Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive
fellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were
questionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because
of our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.
In Michigan, the GOP had a disasterous primary and came out
with the worst possible candidate - - and Hart is attractive, without
enemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social
issue - and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind
of campaign.
In Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two
weeks of the campaign and succeeded in getting well on the issue
by his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his
8
Deputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with
none other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.
In Missouri money, and a young and attractive candidate
almost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of
the State of Missouri.
In the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races -
the only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social
Issue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plaines.
But the economic issue does -- as the President knows from hearing
the howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in
public works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes
and drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.
In California, it must have been the economy -- since everyone
agreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and
Unruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign g getting
Social
out of police cars -- and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy
was through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.
THE HOUSE
Most analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be
translated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond
9
usual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment
higher than full employment and that might well explain our 10
defeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents
were put up for Senate races -- which contributes to that figure.
(US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those
years when unemployment was on the increase.)
THE GOVERNORS
Here is the big loss; here is the major problem - - along with
the State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by onc.
Pennsylvania - They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-
Broderick Administration.
Ohio --- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against
Gilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note - - however,
Gilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using
against him.)
Wisconsin- - A real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 - -
partially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets
the entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television;
and who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers
dollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor
showing pulled Olson down as well.
10
Maine and Rhode Island - the near losses here for Democrats
indicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices
and rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether
they are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little
attraction here.)
Arkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and
Mr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have
been especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one
himself - - and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-
headed Democrat populists that did well all over the South.
Florida Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.
The Western Governors I don't know why some of these failed
to win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would
attach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents - -
who are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a
Congressman or Senator be blamed.
FINAL POINTS
SOME TURKEYS
One reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did
not field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done
11
better than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than
Murphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most
anyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there and it
is not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long
against it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were
appointed not elected to the job - - Goodell and Smith.
CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
Much of this has become counterproductive because of the massive
nature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and
networks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are
certain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- justas
those gutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks - - and they
said SO. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped
our last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical
problems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance
of speech.
On the law and order issue clearly it can be overdone as we
believe Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as
any Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on
the Social Issue as George Wallace found out. But our problem
was that we began too early too hard in my view enabling the
Democrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.
12
SOCIAL ISSUE
It was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember
that in 1972 they will be using it against us to some effect, if
it is not visible that there has been a national change in either
climate or statistics.
THE PRESIDENT
We are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being
accused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign --
that is simply not true -- but it is a result of our natural enemies in
the Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his
candidates, in the GOP and the presentation of RN as a partisan
necessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President
of all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether
the gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of
our most vital political asset -- the Presidency.
THE CAMPAIGN
Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the
bitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand
in the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might
reflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration
just as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i. e., me)
also have an investment in its vindication.
13
VICE PRESIDENT
He carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the
national media off our backs gnawing at us until the final two
weeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy.
We ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by
the media - - but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good
publicity very nearly everywhere we went.
The President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic
dislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign
- we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this
year - - and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign
against the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice'
President's controversial positions and his out-spokenness and the
strategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.
But, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation
as a fighting partisan in the fifties so also, has this Vice President.
Strong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some
domestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive -- also,
that he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Adminis-
tration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech
14
or two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things
he can garner great publicity for - - at the same time he broadens
his own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective
campaigner on the stump.
Because of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the
time being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward
1972.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Keogh
WASHINGTON
November 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM KEOGH
In answer to the request for some post-election thoughts, I
would like to take the liberty of spinning out my personal reactions
Campaigs
without necessarily trying to establish their general validity.
First, I believe that the campaign schedules of the Vice
President and President were almost exactly right. It was wise to
start the Vice President early and tough and - - considering the
gravity of the situation - -- to have the President come in with an
intensive move at the end.
Looking first at the Vice President's campaigning, it seems
to me that he came on as he should have -- hard and natural. But
then he tended to overdo it.
First - - and perhaps a minor point -- he piled up too much
alliteration. A little about pusillanimous pussyfooting and nattering
nabobs of negativism was fine -- it got attention -- but then he did
so much of this that it became a joke and even many of our good
friends got to be a little embarrassed about it.
Beyond this, he seemed to be indulging in overshrill and over-
kill. Instead of landing a good hard punch and letting his target
-2-
drop, he pounded and pounded. The media began dwelling on this and
eventually many of our supporters began to feel that maybe the Vice
President was hitting too hard. The Christine Jorgensen line about
Goodell is an example. By then Charlie was bloody and reeling, and
that line left the Vice President open to charges of cruelty and bad
taste that made even some of his best fans wince.
Fairly early in the campaign, we made a hard turn -- and in my
opinion, it was too hard a turn. At the meeting with the Cabinet on
August 19 when political matters were discussed, the President struck
what seemed to me to be a very good tone. The President said the
economy would be the most important factor in the election. Above
all, the President urged, spokesmen should take a positive position on
what the Administration is doing and is trying to do, should also be
positive about our candidates, should hit what the Congress has not
done but should beware of building up opposition candidates by attack-
ing them in a negative way.
Then, along the way, we bought Scammon and Wattenberg. And,
in my judgment, we bought more of their theory than we should have.
The opposition soon saw what we were up to and moved toward joining
us.
In our intense concentration on the Scammon and Wattenberg
thesis, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that the economic
-3-
issue -- fear of depression -- was cutting us to the bone in a broad
sweep across the west. The irony of this is that the President had
warned repeatedly about this issue -- the fear of what might happen
in the economic situation, not necessarily what the present situation
was. The opposition exploited this fear expertly. We did not pay
enough attention to the issue.
Despite all this, I think the President's campaigning was --
in the main -- close to target. Ultimately it came through the
media as too negative -- and that's a serious problem -- but anyone
who was really paying attention knew there was a great deal of the
positive, too. The Anaheim rally was generally fine on national
television -- a bit too much of Reagan and Murphy for national con-
sumption -- but the President was just right.
Then we made a shattering error. Putting the Phoenix rally
speech on national television the night before the elections was a
dreadful blunder. First of all, a taped rally speech is basically not
a good piece of material for national use on TV. In this instance,
the sound, the setting, the approach made the President seem angry
and harsh and almost mean. The substance was unobjectionable
but the effect was not Presidential. And the strategy gave the oppo-
sition an opportunity to put on Muskie who seemed very statesmanlike,
even if quite dull.
-4-
It was a mistake to have the President on television at all the
night before this election. By then the people had heard enough cam-
paigning. But if the President felt it was necessary to go on, then
the format should have been a quiet chat in a studio or office setting --
the kind of presentation in which the President has proven that he has
no peer.
In the last analysis, I do not think that the Monday night mistake
had much effect on the results. But I am concerned that it was damag-
ing to the President's image in the longer term. It left the wrong tone
and opened the way to the interpretation that the whole campaign was
bitter and harsh.
Turning from the general tone to a specific area, I believe that
in retrospect it was a mistake for the Administration to be wooing the
leaders of organized labor. We throw a big Labor Day dinner for them
and they go out and bludgeon us with rhetoric and money spent for the
opposition. Besides, they are on the wrong side of a very big issue:
inflationary pressure. I realize there are other factors involved here,
but I fear that when the Administration cozies up to the labor bosses
it only tends to alienate a lot of other people who are more likely to be
on its side.
As for the future, I think the Administration must now realize
that it is "the Government in Washington, D. C. 11 From now on,
there should be intense concentration on achievement and solid
-5-
accentuation of the positive. It is no longer profitable to emphasize
what the Administration is against; from now on, the emphasis must
be on what the Administration is for - what it has done and is doing.
madia
I fear that with our constant feeling that we do not do a good enough
selling job we have come too close to the attitude that it doesn't
make much difference what we do so long as we sell it right.
In terms of the Administration's relationships with the media,
I can do no better than repeat what I wrote in a memo in June:
"I believe we are relying too much on what -- to use
a crude term -- I can only describe as gimmicks. We
would do ourselves more good by being more straightfor-
ward.
Too many people are spending too much time draw-
ing up too many game plans. This may make us feel better
and it may make a record on paper -- it seems to show
action - - but I doubt that it is getting results that are worth
all that effort.
Let's face a few facts. Most of the working media
people are 1) against us, and 2) suspicious of us. In the
main, they are hard to fool, although they often fool them-
selves and that usually gives them an even more negative
-6-
stance so far as we are concerned. It is very difficult
for us to put anything over on them; it is practically im-
possible for us to subvert them. If they were for us we
could do these things; since they are not, we can't.
When we try a gimmick they usually are waiting
at the entrance to the alley and they wind up making us
look more devious than we are. This gives us a credi-
bility problem. The results more often turn out to be
counter-productive. And the media wind up being more
suspicious of us than ever.
I think we should do what we're going to do and
present our case for it straightforwardly and not try to
be quite so cute. In the long run, this could be a big
plus with the media. They would be unbelieving at first,
then startled when they realized that we really were
playing it straight. In the end, while they might not be
any more for us, I believe they would respect us.
One tactic that I believe we should use more is the
honest-to-God calculated leak. I don't mean a contrived
leak where we are just trying to sell a line, but a factual
leak of a coming development. This is probably the best
way to get a favorable first story out in a big way. The
-7-
reporter and editor who have the story are too anxious
to protect it to let our opposition tear it apart before
they deliver it. And a reporter or editor who knows that
he is getting a big break on some important stories is
a little less apt to be negative.
All this may seem too simple and too direct but
I believe that in the long run it would be a better approach
than trying to con a cynical media corps that has seen so
many gimmicks for so many years. A straightforward
approach might shock them toward straight reporting. "
###