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This file contains:
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Ron Ziegler RE: "Election and the Next Two Years." 11pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/16/1970
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: "Recommendations in Accordance with Mr. Haldeman's Memorandum of November 7th." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1970
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: Reiterating several points of election results analysis. 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: "Recommendations in Accordance With Mr. Haldeman's Memorandum of November 7th." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1970
To: The President From: Tom Charles Huston RE: "1970 Elections and Prospects for 1972." 16pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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26146234
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WHSF: Contested, 45-30
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This file contains:
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Ron Ziegler RE: "Election and the Next Two Years." 11pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/16/1970
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: "Recommendations in Accordance with Mr. Haldeman's Memorandum of November 7th." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1970
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: Reiterating several points of election results analysis. 9pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: "Recommendations in Accordance With Mr. Haldeman's Memorandum of November 7th." 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/19/1970
To: The President From: Tom Charles Huston RE: "1970 Elections and Prospects for 1972." 16pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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45
30
11/16/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: H.R. Haldeman From: Ron Ziegler RE:
"Election and the Next Two Years." 11pgs
45
30
11/19/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson
RE: "Recommendations in Accordance with
Mr. Haldeman's Memorandum of November
7th." 6pgs
45
30
11/18/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan
RE: Reiterating several points of election
results analysis. 9pgs
45
30
11/19/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Charles W. Colson
RE: "Recommendations in Accordance With
Mr. Haldeman's Memorandum of November
7th." 6pgs
45
30
11/13/1970
Campaign
Memo
To: The President From: Tom Charles
Huston RE: "1970 Elections and Prospects
for 1972." 16pgs
Thursday, March 15, 2012
Page 1 of 1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
2 cagin
WASHINGTON
November 16, 1970
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: Ron Ziegler Rg -
RE:
Election and the next two years
These are my thoughts following the 1970 elections
THE ELECTION
The objective and honest assessment of the 1970 elections must be:
1. The President is better off in the Senate -- he has
gained in both party strength and ideological strength.
2. The President is no worse off in the House than
before -- the fact that Republicans lost no more
than nine seats can be considered significant
when compared with past off-year elections --
but basically there is no change in the House.
3. The Gubernatorial and State Legislature races
were determined primarily on local issues and
should have little effect on 1972.
4. Incumbency seemed to fall out in two opposite
directions in the 1970 elections.
The executive (Governor) incumbent
seemed to be at a clear disadvantage
while the legislative incumbent seemed
to have a clear advantage.
-2-
Only 13 incumbent Congressmen
were defeated (10 Republicans; 3
Democrats) out of 392 who sought
re-election.
However, of the 24 incumbent Governors,
seven were unseated (all Republicans). The
fact is that the executive had to make decisions
that were often unpopular -- i.e. tax increases.
This issue defeated Tiemann, Bartlett, it
almost defeated Curtis in Maine and helped
elect Meskill in Connecticut and probably hurt
Broderick in Pennsylvania.
5. Poc candidates hurt us in some areas -- in my
view we could have done better than Roudebush,
Spaulding, Romney, Gross, Carter, and Burton.
We lost Illinois the day Ogilvie selected Smith.
NOTE: This raises the question of matter of
Karl Mundt. While there is talk about the
Senator resigning before the Governor-elect
is sworn in, there should also be careful
consideration givento who will replace him.
Whoever is chosen must be electable in 1972
or we will be giving away another Senate seat.
The Administration has said enough about the 1970 elections.
We have analyzed them -- sold our point of view
some critics
say oversold it, We should now move on to other things.
The President's efforts in 1970 were necessary and clearly within the
campaigning precedent set by former Presidents in off-year election
years. Had the effort ended in San Jose or before, the assessment
which follows would perhaps be different.
THE ISSUES
The San Jose incident and the events that followed it have tended to
give fuel to our critics -- and they will exploit what they feel is the
"Leadership issue" to the fullest. We must develop a strategy to
deal with this.
-3-
Issues
It seems to me there are two categories of issues; the first substantive
contains the issues of the economy, social unrest and foreign
policy (Vietnam, defense expenditures, European troop reduction,
approach to East-West relations.)
= PR megative
The second category that our critics will attempt to build and exploit
what
in an effort to over-ride the Administration handling of the first
category contains (1) The Vice President and his so-called devisive
is
rhetoric, (2) Moral leadership in the context of uniting the country,
positive
(3) The development of the issue that the Administration is more
side
concerned with political exploitation and interest than about the
This of ?
National interest.
As false as these impressions are, our critics' attempts to build
and exploit these points will be assisted by columnist and commentators
many of whom are philosophically sympathetic to this point of view.
Also, they will see this as a way to strike back at what they feel
have been unjust attacks on them by the Vice President. The critics
can be expected to base many of their charges on interpretations of
Vice Presidential speeches over the past two years and this of
course provides good copy.
Finally, one of the results of the events following San Jose is that
our critics are claiming and will continue to claim with some credi-
bility that the Vice President is not an independent spokesman but an
echo of the President's view
From now on when the Vice President
makes a controversial attack we must expect it to be tied directly to
the President.
It always hasken -andrightly.,so.
THE STRATEGY
I suggest we develop a strategy that outflanks our critics -- by that I
mean proceed in a way that is totally opposite from what the bias of
our critics would lead them to think we would do.
While the Scammon-Wattenberg thesis may apply to some of the issues
listed in the first category, it is my view that the attitude and direction
the President set forth in his Inaugural Address should lay the basis
for our strategy to deal with the second category issues.
-4-
All the staff would be well advised to re-read the President's
Inaugural Address and to reflect on how the President has
conducted himself in dealing with the many complicated foreign
and domestic problems that he has faced over the last two years.
From this the strategy and "posture the President should maintain
for the period to the end of this year and in 1971" should be self
evident.
The President has approached every major problem of the past
Posture
two years with confidence, calmness, grace and a certain amount
of mystique -- his decisions have been courageous. and forthright
This posture and attitude should permiate the entire White House
staff and everything we do should be geared to maintain this ture
in an atmosphere of dignity.
The above elements and the President's competence in dealing with
oreign policy and his ability to analyze and calmly solve problems
facing the country should become the dominate posture of the Presi-
dency and the White House.
The dignity of these qualities has far more depth and appeal than the
shallow charismatic appeal that some will work to project over the
next two years.
As DeGaulle has said:
"The great leaders have always stage-managed their
effects -- the statesman must concentrate all his efforts
on captivating man's minds. He must know when to
dissemble, when to be frank.
"He must serve as the servant of the public in order to be its
master -- he must outbid his rivals in self confidence. 11
It has also been said that often times what is said and how it is said
is more effective than what is done.
A fitting bridge for our approach to the next two years I think can be
found in these words from the President's Inaugural Address:
-5-
"Standing in this same place a third of a century ago,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt addressed a nation ravaged
by depression and gripped in fear. He could say in
surveying the nation's troubles: "They concern, thank
God, only material things. 11
Our crisis today is in reverse.
We have found ourselves rich in goods, but ragged in
spirit; reaching with magnificent precision for the moon,
but falling into raucous discord on earth.
We are caught in war, wanting peace. We are torn by
division, wanting unity. We see around us empty lives,
wanting fulfillment. We see tasks that need doing, waiting
for hands to do them.
To a crisis of the spirit, we need an answer of the spirit.
And to find that answer, we need only look within ourselves.
When we listen to "the better angels of our nature, 11 we
find that they celebrate the simple things, the basic
things -- such as goodness, decency, love, kindness.
Greatness comes in simple trappings.
The simple things are the ones most needed today if we
are to surmount what divides us, and cement what unites us.
To lower our voices would be a simple thing.
In these difficult years, America has suffered from a fever
of words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it
can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into
hatreds; from bonibastic rhetoric that postures instead of
persuading.
We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting
at one another -- until we speak quietly enough so that our
words can be heard as well as our voices.
-6-
For its part, government will listen. We will strive to
listen in new ways -- to the voices of quiet anguish, the
voices that speak without words, the voices of the heart --
to the injured voices, the anxious voices, the voices that
have despaired of being heard.
Those who have been left out, we will try to bring in.
Those left behind, we will help to catch up.
For all of our people, we will set as our goal the decent
order that makes progress possible and our lives secure. 11
The same elements in our society that motivated the above exist in
our society today -- perhaps to a lesser degree -- perhaps not.
NEW DECADE OF PROGRESS (Suggestion)
The President also said in his Inaugural -- "As we reach toward our
hopes our task is to build on what has gone before -- not turning from
the old, but turning toward the new. 11
We perhaps should use this as the underlying theme for presenting
Theme
the Administration programs over the next two years -- a series of
programs that will lead to the decade of progress in reform, world
peace, domestic unity and accomplishment.
The Decade of Progress is a phrase that is positive, evocative, far-
seeing. It is broad enough to encompass the President's entire foreign
and domestic program. Certainly there are other phrases or concepts
that might do just as well, but the essential thing is to begin at once
with some theme that will build a sense of movement and direction in
the national consciousness. Whoever is said to have "won" the
election, there is no denying that considerable bitterness has ensued.
The Administration has taken on something of a negative look in many
people's minds - - admittedly much of this is the oing of our adversaries
and the media, but we have to deal with it nevertheless. The President
-7-
came in facing some dirty and totally uninspiri g jobs -- end the
war, end inflation, end the crime wave. With a solid start now made
of all these fronts, the time is right to emphasize a spirit of beginning
and building to talk in a more positive and long-range context
The new theme can be introduced in such a way that no shifting of
gears will be apparent. We do not say, "Let us have a new decade
of progress, 11 but rather "America has begun a new decade of progress, 11
and then we tick off the areas in which beginnings have already been
made. This can be done quite naturally in the context of a mid-term
progress report to the American people. The "new decade" idea has
a mainly domestic thrust, but it also complements perfectly the
"generation of peace" note that the President sounded so effectively
in Europe, and it fits with the foreign aid reform, State of the World
message, and other foreign policy initiatives.
Specifics
I would make the following specific suggestions:
Short Run -- November, December
The President should not move abruptly.
1.
Press Conference
The President should have one press conference
before the end of the year. This should be held
after Thanksgiving, perhaps the first week of
December (December 2nd.)
2.
Major Addresses
The President should give one major address
wherein he outlines his goals for the future of
the country. The address should be compatable
with the State of the Union but not as specific.
It could be philosophical. The National Association
of Manufacturers would be the perfect forum.
-8-
3. Lame-Duck Session
The President should be only indirectly involved
in the Lame-Duck session, addressing himself
to general concepts of such things as welfare
reform. We should allow the leadership,
Cabinet members and White House staff (Finch,
Ehrlichman, Shultz) to deal with the detailed
legislative debate,
The blatant partisan changes that are likely to
come should be ignored by the White House.
We should hold our fire and not get into a
rhetorical debate with our Senate critics.
This should include the Vice President. Our
critics will be trying to draw us in and we
should stay aloof from them.
The President should devote his time to
solidifying his support in the Senate in
meetings with the servative and moderate
and liberal factions of the Senate.
4. Travel
The President should not travel before the
Trand,
first of the year except of course to Florida
for the post Thanksgiving period and to
California for the post Christmas period.
The trip to New York for the National Asso-
ciation of Manufacturers dinner should be the
only other exception.
Long Range
1. Media Relations
media
We should follow basically the same strategy, i.e.
the President should remain somewhat aloof and
avoid frequent and personal contacts with the press,
-9-
I do suggest the following:
A. Press conference
The President should hold one East Room
televised press conference a month and one
in-office press conference on three week
intervals.
The advantages of this are many -- the
President sets the line and the tone for the
Administration. Administration spokesmen
can then bridge off his words.
The President's proven ability to handle these
sessions and the tremendous effect they have
bodes well for following this pattern.
The TV sessions allow the country to see the
President in charge.
The in-office press conference serves our
purpose in two ways: It gets the President's
line out but it also lets the press in a little
closer to the President -- but not too close.
It must be remembered the President can and
does control these sessions, despite what
some say to the contrary.
B. Media contacts
No -should do
Television
We should cease immediately the Colson type
contact. Klein and myself should increase
our sessions with the network heads and
commentators. More can be accomplished
through "friendly persuasion" based on
mutual trus than can be accomplished by
intimidation of the networks.
-10-
As a part of this effort it would be most
worthwhile for the President to meet with
the network heads periodically after the
first of the year for general discussion
and acquaintance session.
We have a lot to overcome to stabilize our
relations with the networks -- today they do not
trust us. They resent us and emotionally
react against us.
No Administration ever gets what they consider a
fair break from the news media. We perhaps suffer
from this more than most. It is my feeling, however,
that the way to deal with this adversary is not to
confront him head on -- this only gives excuse to
their sometimes bias -- but to outsmart him. One
never outsmarts the enemy by running at him head-on.
The White House staff should meet more freely and
openly with White House regulars. For example,
instead of just sitting back and decrying a negative
report, let's feed him information that he will have
to use.
HRH can be very effective at this.
2. Use of Cabinet and Vice President
Cabinet
The Cabinet should be revitalized, built and used.
Today it is nothing more than a ceremonial body.
I would suggest that the Cabinet not only meet more
regularly but that they talk programs and substance
and after the meeting on occasion -- the Cabinet
officers be put before the press to sell and lobby for
his programs.
Individual meetings should be set up more often with
Cabinet members and the President and then let them
go before the press.
-11-
Example:
Cabinet meeting could be held this week --
discuss status of appropriations, FAP, etc.
Richardson, Schultz and perhaps Finch
could go before press -- this would be a
good news story
shows President involved
but also Cabinet in there fighting for our programs.
Vice President
I would not attempt to evaluate the effect of the Vice
President's activities and statements over the past
year and a half
it is my opinion, however, that
he has built a base of support which is constant and
will not expand even if he continues to follow the
same pattern.
Therefore the Vice President's role should be shifted
from that of an outspoken, controversial critic of
our society to a hard-working builder of our society,
one who takes up the legislative oar and speaks to
and works for thoseprograms that will build The Decade
of Progress.
3. Relations with Congress
We should be aloof to their criticism and statesmanlike
Corr
and conciliatory to them personally.
We understand the Legislative process and two party
system. They can do the screening and we will do the
building.
4. Travel
Gand
The President should continue to go to the country.
However the staff should take on the responsibility of only
presenting him in a dignified Presidential setting. This
does not mean elimination of motorcades and crowds.
It's the handling of the situation we should address ourselves to.
THE WHITE HOUSE
Coloon II
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
November 19, 1970
ADMINIS MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By EP
Date 5-10-82
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Recommendations in accordance with Mr. Haldeman's
memorandum of November 7th.
1. Analysis of the President's election efforts: (Copy of memo of
November 6th attached)
a. Your campaigning was essential to arouse our troops,
demonstrate loyalty to the candidates and the party,
generate media coverage and keep the economy issue
somewhat submerged.
b. The law and order issue was effective in the Northeast
where the problem exists. It did not score for us in the
more conservative, rural areas where there is no disorder
problem.
c. We were not able to make the public believe that Democratic,
liberal permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime.
(This has to be done on a continuing basis.) It simply couldn't
be sold in the heat of the election when the Democrats moved
back adroitly to the center.
d. Vietnam was a plus, if anything, but was largely neutralized
by the public's very great satisfaction with your handling of
the issue.
e. The economic issue hurt us critically, particularly in the
farm belt where farmers have a severe credit squeeze and
high interest rates. The GM strike was a real factor in
several key states, particularly Indiana.
f. With the issues basically cancelling each other out, i. e., the
economy V. law and order, people voted personalities and
individual problems in individual states were controlling.
We beat ourselves in Florida, Ohio and Texas. Without an
overriding issue, people just liked Burdick's personality
better than Kleppe's, etc.
-2-
g. We did make significant gains in the blue collar, white ethnic
areas (Buckley, Prouty, Weicker and Beall attest to this).
h. There was too much campaign overall. People tired of it in
late October. The Vice President peaked early.
2. Posture the President should maintain:
Posture
a. The "business as usual" posture is especially important now
and throughout early 1971. The liberal media have unfairly
characterized your campaigning as the il free wheeling, attacking,
stump speech 11 type. What is needed is to establish in the public
mind a certain aloofness (without isolation) along with the
mystique and grandeur of the Office.
The attack on the Democrats must be a continuing party and
Congressional effort, but kept disassociated from the White
House as much as possible.
To emphasize your effective handling of critical international
problems is our strongest posture. Policy pronouncements in
this area are very timely (like military assistance to Israel,
Korea, Cambodia, etc.)
On the domestic front we face a very severe danger that the
Democrats will attempt to seize the initiative on major spending
programs and new, appealing social initiatives aimed at the
middle class, like National Health Insurance.
If we start the new Congress on the defensive, we will have
great difficulty in re-capturing any momentum. We should not
get into a position of fighting the same old issues on their ground
(i.e., who can do more), thus casting ourselves in the Republican
stereotype of being opposed to everything.
The combination of a very large revenue sharing program with a
alue added tax plan, launched early and dramatically in the Con-
gress, gives us a rare opportunity to put the Democrats on the
defensive. This could be one of the most far reaching, imagin-
ative reforms ever in domestic policy. We need, however, an
all-out effort to sell it. It should be sold as a way of getting money
back to local communities and out of the tangled federal bureau-
-3-
cracy -- money to be used by local communities to manage
their own programs as they see fit, or to help reduce the
crushing burdens of local and state taxes. By getting pro-
grams out of the federal government and instituting a value
added tax, federal income taxes can be reduced with parti-
cular emphasis on helping the middle class which has been
squeezed the hardest. If we promote it well, this package
could give us the offensive throughout the coming session.
To propose vast environmental programs, new schemes to
help the poor, expanded aid to the cities gets us absolutely
nothing politically. Whatever political benefit is in it, the
Democrats will take away from us by showing that they can
do more in the Congress than we have proposed.
To take a whole new approach -- revenue sharing and value
added tax -- has real political appeal because it combines
reform in government with tax benefits to the constituency
which we must reach. It is also a real signal that we
Republicans have faith in the people to manage their own
affairs, locally.
3. Recommended changes in the handling of the media:
media
a. We should continue quiet but firm pressure from here on the
media. The FCC can keep the networks off balance and worried,
as they are now, over the possible regulatory measures.
b. We should work on getting more stations in friendly hands.
c. We need to brief continually on a positive basis friendly or
neutral TV analysts and commentators to get a favorable line
to them in advance of their programs -- as we now do with
friendly newspaper columnists. Most of them are so biased
that it will only be marginally effective but we can't hurt by
trying.
d. At modest cost an independent TV news service can be estab-
lished here in Washington to feed out "friendly" TV news spots
directly to licensees for use on non-network news programs.
-4-
e. Early in the year you should meet separately with the chief
executives of the three networks, simply a "get acquainted, "
general discussion meeting.
f. There is a need now for a Presidential news conference to be
followed in 1971 by news conferences at more frequent, regu-
lar intervals. You are at your best by far in this format.
The particular style of conference might be varied from time
to time. The meeting with the three anchor men last summer,
for example, was especially effective.
4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet:
From a political standpoint the Vice President should be pro-
grammed to work on the South, and the labor/white middle class
ethnic vote.
Obviously, he needs to develop stature in the international field
(missions assigned by you).
He further might assume the leadership as the leading spokesman
for a major domestic initiative (for example, revenue sharing).
The Cabinet needs to be used in a concentrated effort to help
sell the value added tax/revenue sharing package -- a theme
to be hit hard by the entire official family.
We need, as you so well already recognize, a much stronger
spokesman on economic policy.
5. Relationships with the Congress:
This is touched upon above in reference to the domestic program.
It is absolutely imperative that we seize the initiative with Congress.
Only something as dramatic as the proposed domestic program
will do this.
This is bound to be a hostile and contentious Congress, at war
with us. Our success with the Congress will depend on your
continued strength in the country. Your standing in the public
opinion polls, which remained relatively high despite all of the
criticism by the media and the Cambodian aftermath, did more
for us in Congressional relationships last summer than every-
thing else combined. If the Republicans in particular respect
your political strength, they will be much less likely to break
-5-
with you. Liberal Republicans should either be frozen out
or welcomed in, depending on how they respond to early tests
between us and the Congress. Percy obviously wants on board
so does Ed Brooke. The Goodell situation (Ed Brooke told me
he agreed with our position (!)) is bound to have a good effect
on all but our most stubborn dissidents.
6. Presidential Travel:
Trevel
I do not recommend extensive Presidential travel in the first
several months of 1971. It is important, particularly because
of the media treatment of the campaign, that the President be
in a firm and strong position of leadership of the Government.
Over the next several months this can be best demonstrated
here in the White House with the use of occasional outside forums,
like the NAM on December 4, for major policy pronouncements.
7. Political Emphasis:
Political
It goes without saying that getting the economy moving again and
soon is an overriding political objective.
In 1972 we should have with us ournatural constituencies in the
New South, the border states and the West. The key large swing
states will be Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and per-
haps even New York (Texas is a separate situation). The swing
votes within these heavily industrialized states will be the white
ethnic, middle class working man and family.
This voter, in particular, is frustrated because he doesn't believe
that government can solve his problems or perhaps any problems.
We have and must continue to build an impressive record of govern-
ment reform (the value added tax/revenue sharing hits this directly).
He is squeezed hard by rising prices and increasing tax burdens.
Income tax cuts for the $5, 000-$20, 000 per year worker or de-
ductions (as for college tuition) will have a powerful political
appeal.
Above all, he wants stability and order in his economy. We need
to show a positive record of accomplishment on law and order
issues.
-6-
To win the swing vote in the swing states, we must intensify
our efforts to cultivate the Catholics, labor and ethnics. We
need to be sensitive to their needs and prove we can do some-
thing about the problems which concern them most.
Luman
Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
Buchane
WASHINGTON
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
(1) The President already has my analysis of the election results.
Would reiterate several points.
First, where our operation was far ahead of the field in assessing
the impact of the mass media in the 1968 elections in the length
and intensity of the 1970 campaign we did not take into proper ac-
count the enormously enhanced power the Vice President, but
especially the President have to dominate the media as incumbents.
In past years, it took weeks and months to hammer home a single
issue. The same can now be accomplished in days. The 1972 cam-
paign should be thought out on the same kind of basis the President
thought out his entire 1966-1968 political profile. Now is our time
for a "political moratorium". Further, the fall campaign of 1972
should be so constituted as to emphasize various and changing themes,
saving the strongest pitch for possibly the last week (or two). We
should not underestimate our ability to make a case, our ability to
focus national attention on a single theme or the capacity of the pub-
lic for being turned off by "overkill."
Second, reexamine the instruments of campaigning. Frankly, to
what degree, if any, does campaigning enhance an incumbent's
stature in the public mind? Is a rally with a cheering crowd and
an effective cheer line by the President on night TV as good a forum
for taking RN's case to the country as a nine p.m. press conference
telling the nation why RN needs these men. Will the nation respond
in better political terms to Nixon the campaigner, or to Nixon the
President making his campaign speeches quietly and forcefully in
prime time from the Oval Office? Has the day of the front-porch
campaign or its modern counterpart returned?
If I were to make a shotgun judgment now as to what kind of cam-
paign the President should run in 1972 I would recommend that
he wrap himself in the trappings of his office give once a week
major address on nationwide television at night and make not
more than a handful of separate campaign appearances at noon to
2
show the nation, via networks, the President has the confidence of
the people in the provinces -- he is their man.
But the President clear ly needs an intensive analysis on the effects
of campaigning per se. The team we have put together is by general
judgments the best campaign team in history. Even our media
adversaries say they wish we could run the government as well as we
can run a campaign. The danger that lurks is that we shall become
so enamoured of our success at managing the techniques of campaigning,
1968 style, that we may lose sight of the fact that they may now be
irrelevant or worse, counter-productive for a sitting President
in 1972.
Third, there are states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Florida,
essential to victory in 1972, where the Party has been mangled. We
have to begin now to move to resolve differences and bring these
parties together, or else begin almost at once organizing our own
political machinery for the elections of 1972. John Sears told me that
if the President were interested, he would draft a political memorandum
with his thoughts on what should be done now and in the coming year,
both on an organization basis and a strategy basis with regard to
Seas
downgrading Muskie, and perhaps building up Humphrey as our
opponent, on countering Wallace and strengthening our political
machinery in the swing states. If the President is interested
I will tell him to move on it right away.
(2)
Posture of the President through 1970 and into 1971.
Potine
The immediate necessity is to put politics and the campaign of 1970
behind us. Nothing we can do or way further is going to alter
judgments, already made, abo ut whether or not 1970 was a success
or a failure. Our case has been presented the other side has
presented its version of the results and the commentators and
columnists have by and large already staked out their positions.
Anything more is overkill.
This is consistent with my strong view that the time for Nixon the
politician campaigning for his party is over the time is now for
the President to represent himself to the nation as the elected
President of the American people above the political wars now
certain to ensue within the Democratic Party.
3
Through its gross distortion of the kind of campaign the President
conducted, the media has driven home the impression of Nixon the
partisan of the United States. We must not play into their hands
with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of 1970 or
the prospects for 1972 in either party. We must get back exclu-
sively to the business of governing and leading the nation.
The election-eve impression left of RN the strident partisan and
Muskie the national conciliator can be reversed in a matter of weeks.
My strong recommendation is that at the President's first press con-
ference, following the election which will be a bear-baiting exercise
he demonstrathumor, a relaxed attitude, exude confidence -- and
speak in terms of politics being behind us and now moving forward to
work together on the nation's business at hand. Speak of the national
need in calm reasoned terms for what the President has request-
ed for the defense of friendly nations; speak of the need for action in
areas where action has been delayed and people have unnecessarily
suffered for that delay. (Unless I hear otherwise, this would be the
kind of mood I would try to put into the Q. and A. for the next ap-
pearance.)
(With regard to Muskie, he suffers from the fact that he is not con-
sidered an outspoken leader by the ideological wing of his party
he is likely, as McGovern is doing now, to begin taking potshots at us,
which will be clearly political. We ought to simply dismiss them as
political - not engage in head-to-head and let him go about destroy-
ing his media image by himself, which he may well be forced to do to
win the hearts of the ideologues that dominate the left wing of his
party.)
Looking at further horizons, I see a need for the President to move
back toward the role of national reconciliator symbolic gestures
toward the black majority should be made (not to win votes; we can't)
but to indicate to the great middle that the President is attempting to
answer the crucial needs of the entire nation none excluded.
We also need to have something positive and appealing for the work-
ing people of this country in the way of tangible major domestic
programs. Since, in any choice between a counterfeit liberal and
the real McCoy, the country will take the real McCoy we ought to
have some domestic initiatives of our own with the Nixon brand
clearly on them. Regrettably, we are now pouring billions into pro-
grams like OEO, Model Cities, Urban Renewal, etc. for which we
get no credit whatsoever.
4
My thought would have been to terminate or diminish as many of their
programs as possible in order to shift the considerable amount of dol-
lars into Nixon programs which would have a visible impact by 1972.
To this degree, I concur with Phillips: To put together a new majority
in American politics, we are going to have to provide the working men
and women, white and blue collar, with more than rhetoric; we have to
bring home the bacon; whether in the form of parochaid, or what.
Finally, to counter the impression being pushed by the media that this
is an Administration concerned only with cold statistics, an Admin-
istration long on public relations gimmickry and short on substance
and vision I feel the President should seek out occasions to demon-
strate "humanity" and "heart" spontaneous occasions, not planned
meetings to demonstrate a symbolic affinity with, and concern for the
unemployed and the less fortunate.
The old Republican nemesis is the national image of the party of the
bankers, party of business, the party that doesn't really give a damn
about people. The Democrats are going to use this in 1972 as they
have in every election since 1932 and we need to consciously con-
sider words, deeds, symbolic acts that will give the lie to this charge
before it is made by the National Democratic Party in earnest.
(3)
Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media
meglia
The networks are not with us. NBC is openly hostile. The national
press is in an ugly mood over both the lack of press conferences,
and the feeling that we are B. S-ing them about the election returns.
Given their natural affinity for a political fight, given their ideologi-
cal pre-disposition, given their normal enthusiasm for the challenger,
the underdog our situation here is not good.
On the plus side, it has never really been that good the hostility of
the liberal media was always one element we had to consider. What
to do.
We are never going to be loved by the national press corps that is a
given fact. Any transparent attempts to become buddies will fool no
one; will succeed nowhere. What our specific focuses should be, I be-
lieve are these:
(a) Go over the heads of the national press to the nation on more
televised press conferences, Where we run into a problem
of over-exposure, do them in the morning or at noon. Have
the national press in for more of the Presidential, non-tele-
vised press conferences, These carry risks but this
5
instrument is among our most effective; we are extremely good
at it; invariably the President scores with the people, if not with
the press.
(b) While our differences with the national media remain irreconcilable
we should take the initiative to ease tensions a bit. While there is
much psychologically satisfying in roasting them with regularity,
there is not much political profit in this. We have garnered much
of that already. If we intend to take them on and hard we
ought to first re-establish good relations, and wait until the fall
of 19
Any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots at NBC
for a specific abuse and not be perceived in such a way as
that we are roasting the entire corps. This tends to leave some
of them SO browned off they make a special effort to gut us at
every opportunity.
Our best hope for a fair shake lies now with the Reasoner-Smith
team at ABC We ought to give them our best leaks -- provide
them with the best breaks. If we have to pick one network to do
some major special on clearly it should be this one.
In attacking and supporting, we should as mentioned above, be
selective a Herb Kaplow who will do something fair for us
on the worst network, should not be slighted while Chancellors
and Vanocurs should get nothing. And if we move on the attack,
it should similarly be selective.
4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet
Like the President -- but to a far greater degree -- the Vice Presi-
dent should shift over from the political offensive to the policy of-
fensive. The time for combativeness, for political in-fighting, is
clearly over for now. In my view, the Vice President should be
given a good slice of the domestic franchise to oversee, an issue or
issues, a program or programs, to demonstrate the other side of
the man -- the capable and competent executive working to get things
done. His role as the President's Terrible Swift Sword should be
minimized; he should be used in this assignment only when necessary;
the President should utilize Cabinet Members and White House Staf-
fers with good liberal credentials to start carrying the fight. They
have capital in the bank to do it; the Vice President needs to re-
plenish capital.
6
The Vice President makes an effective low-key presentation on
television; when he is provided a new franchise, he should take
to the networks to argue his case. He should be shown fighting
for something not just against somebody. It would enhance
his stature if he were given a foreign assignment of some dura-
tion this would broaden his image with the public; he might
well make a campus appearance or appearances; he might well
make a surprise visit for a A. and A. session with black leaders;
he should be given the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities
other than as simply campaigner; he should be provided the op-
portunity to show the many other facets to his personality other than
fierce partisan.
The Veep is the most loyal of the President's soldiers; he took more
wounds and scored more direct hits in the campaign than any other
of the President's men this was his job. But, to continue to do
that job effectively, he needs to retire temporarily a political glad-
iator to show the nation that he is something other than the War
Lover of American Politics.
Whenever, there is a new program to be announced that the Presi-
dent is not going to announce the Vice President should be the
one before the cameras. Whenever RN is about ready to let some-
thing go of significance in the domestic arena the Vice President
might well be the one who gets the headlines by giving an inkling of
the new progressive direction of the Administration.
(The Cabinet)
Unless specifically asked, I would feel it presumptous to recommend
changes in the President's highest appointed body. But my views
briefly are these: The President's commitment to clean up the
Department of State has manifestly not been carried out by those
given the franchise the President's men are not the men domina-
ting that body the career service historically hostile to the
President has too many positions of power and we are going to
suffer damaging leaks in the 1972 campaign unless we do something
about it. The Secretary of the Interior does this President no good
and a great deal of harm with his transparent attempts to ingratiate
himself with the liberal media. While I continue to admire Secretary
Romney's tenacity and guts, he is a committed believer in the com-
pulsory integration of American society to solve the race problem.
My feeling is that this is socially dangerous at this time and politically
disasterous and we spend too damn much time and effort trying to
change peoples minds to change their policy to accord with the
President. We might attempt changing the men rather than the minds.
Finally, in the area of the economy, a mortal danger for 1972, we need
7
a man at Treasury who can articulate the President's policies, a
staunch loyalist, who has both credentials and capability in the
economic and political areas.
(5)
Relations with Congress
With regard to the regular Republicans, we are still in good shape.
Good.
As for the "Baker's dozen", they are going to make their own de-
cisions as to what to do depending on their own political hides;
they care as little about ours as we do about theirs. For example,
Hatfield a True Believer can be expected to depart little from
his former path. Percy, the Opportunist, who is up in 1972, is
already making friendly noises. My view is that we ought not to
wage war with them but to treat them in accord with the degree
of support they give us and not lean upon them. Where we can
find areas of agreement, exploit them; and see if we can convince
them in their and the party's interests to minimize the de-
gree of Goodellism that goes on.
As for the Democrats, as one of our aides put it, we are going to
be "walking through a vat of acid, 11 for the next two years. In the
Senate half a dozen have their eye on the President - and all
their decisions, actions, statements, attacks and support are go-
ing to be on that basis. There is nothing at all we are going to be
able to do with them. We should have our Cabinet and White House
staffers programmed to answer their charges to deal with them
on the political warfare level.
As for our own Congressional Relations in my view Bill Timmons
is not only absolutely loyal but also the most hard-working of the
President's men in the least enviable of Presidential assignments.
I think he needs more manpower over there; I think he needs more
visible identification as the President's man for Congressional re-
lations; I think he needs more access to the President himself and
his inner councils; I think he needs to be given more credibility for
his job on the Hill by the President's visible demonstration that
he is our man on Capitol Hill.
Finally, the President should place the onus for starting the political
war on the Democratic Party in Congress by letting them fire the
first few shots. Perhaps, when this Congress fails to act, as it will,
and goes home for Christmas the President could, more in sor-
row than anger, go on the nation's networks or lead off a press con-
ference with a doleful recounting of its failures to act in the national
interest and the President's hopes that the new Congress will
serve the nation a little better.
8
(6)
Presidential Travel
Abroad: The exigencies of foreign policy will dictate if the President
must go abroad to advance the national interest. From the standpoint of
RN's political posture, I strongly recommend against any "Grand Tour"
trips ala the recent sojourn to Europe and the Mediterranean. The
President is generally conceded high marks for his handling of foreign
policy. The nation via television has already seen the President moving
through countless cheering throngs abroad. Repeat performances will
be redundant; they will be written off in the media as the last trip
was by some traveling reporters as politically motivated. We have
drawn down our balance in this account there is not much capital
left in foreign visits over the next six months. Lest we be charged,
as we have been charged, of going abroad in search of crowds while
the gnawing domestic problems remain unsolved, I recommend against.
Also, by not going abroad in the near future, the President will have
positioned himself well for a major foreign visit in early of mid-1972 --
when it would be perceived as something of a far greater interest, and
when it could more effectively underscore the President's successes
overseas in time for the 1972 elections.
At Home: Consistent with the view that the President must put the
partisan image back of himself, reflect the "humanity and heart" of
the Administration, reassume the posture of President of all the
American people, I would recommend spontaneous visits, stop-offs
to areas of social depression in the country whether of unemployed
whites or rural blacks.
Because of the appreciable amount of negative reportage we are
receiving for "staging" events these would necessarily have to be
truly spontaneous; symbolic of the President's personal concerns
for the people he leads. Democrats have consistently been superior
to Republicans with this sort of communication -- and given our party's
hereditary image as the Party of Big Business this is a woeful weakness.
Such visits will also blunt the inevitable charge of the 1972 elections
that Republicans are concerned only with cold statistics like 5.5 percent
unemployment that the President doesn't give a damn about poor
people.
Similarly, however, as the nation has seen the President in cheering
throngs abroad -- so also, from the campaign, has it seen streets
lined with cheering people at home. Though the motorcading through the
crowds may serve as a rejoinder to any contention the President is
not popular with the people it also would seem redundant in the after-
math of the election.
y
(7)
Final Points.
First, we are getting some nasty criticism for having exploited
PR
the San Jose incident, and for alleged being an Administration more
interested in image than substance -- long on P.R. and short on
accomplishment. If pressed, this attack could be very damaging
and I recommend we consider drawing in our horns on the P.R.
operation side of things. The nation is one that is very keen to
and very down on P.R. and the last thing we want in the
world is to have the press start picking up the McGinnis theme of
hucksterism. We should have a high level review of the effectiveness
or again the word comes to mind, the possible "overkill" of this
side of the operation. At all cost we should avoid any tarnishing
of the President's image as President in the minds of the people - -
and these attacks bother me.
Finally, at all costs we must avoid, in the wake of the election,
and in the pressure the President is assuredly getting from the left,
any kind of transparant public move to the left. This damaged us after
Kent State and such would now be tacit admission the Restons
and Sideys were right and we were wrong on the campaign. It
would be disheartening to the bulk of our support. Rather than any
left or right move it should be a forward move away from the
partisan role of the campaign toward fulltime President again.
Alb
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
THE WHITE HOUSE
Coloon II
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINI
ARKING
November 19, 1970
L.O.
G-102
By EP
5-10-82
CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Recommendations in accordance with Mr. Haldeman's
memorandum of November 7th.
1. Analysis of the President's election efforts: (Copy of memo of
November 6th attached)
a. Your campaigning was essential to arouse our troops,
demonstrate loyalty to the candidates and the party,
generate media coverage and keep the economy issue
somewhat submerged.
b. The law and order issue was effective in the Northeast
where the problem exists. It did not score for us in the
more conservative, rural areas where there is no disorder
problem.
C. We were not able to make the public believe that Democratic,
liberal permissiveness was the cause of violence and crime.
(This has to be done on a continuing basis. ) It simply couldn't
be sold in th heat of the election when the Democrats moved
back adroitly to the center.
d. Vietnam was a plus, if anything, but was largely neutralized
by the public's very great satisfaction with your handling of
the issue.
e. The economic issue hurt us critically, particularly in the
farm belt where farmers have a severe credit squeeze and
high interest rates. The GM strike was a real factor n
several key states, particularly Indiana.
f. With the issues basically cancelling each other out, i. e., the
economy V. law and order, people voted personalities and
individual problems in individual states were controlling.
We beat ourselves in Florida, Ohio and Texas. Without an
overriding issue, people just liked Burdick's personality
better than Kleppe's, etc.
-2-
g. We did make significant gains in the blue collar, white ethnic
areas (Buckley, Prouty, Weicker and Beall attest to this).
h. There was too much campaign overall. People tired of it in
late October. The Vice President peaked early.
2. Posture the President should maintain:
Posture
a. The "business as usual" posture is especially important now
and throughout early 1971. The liberal media have unfairly
characterized your campaigning as the II free wheeling, attacking,
stump speech II type. What is needed is to establish in the public
mind a certain aloofness (without isolation) along with the
mystique and grandeur of the Office.
The attack on the Democrats must be a continuing party and
Congressional effort, but kepi disassociated from the White
House as much as possible.
To emphasize your effective handling of critical international
problems is our strongest posture. Policy pronouncements in
this area are very timely (like military assistance to Israel,
Korea, Cambodia, etc.)
On the domestic front we face a very severe danger that the
Democrats will attempt to seize the initiative on major spending
programs and new, appealing social initiatives aimed at the
middle class, like National Health Insurance.
If we start the new Congress on the defensive, we will have
great difficulty in re-capturing any momentum. We should not
get into a position of fighting the same old issues on their ground
(i.e., who can do more), thus casting ourselves in the Republican
stereotype of being opposed to everything.
The combination of a very large revenue sharing program with a
Value added tax plan, launched early and dramatically in the Con-
gress, gives us a rare opportunity to put the Democrats on the
defensive. This could be one of the most far reaching, imagin-
ative reforms ever in domestic policy. We need, however, an
all-out effort to sell it. It should be sold as a way of getting money
back to local communities and out of the tangled federal bureau-
-3-
cracy money to be used by local communities to manage
their own programs as they see fit, or to help reduce the
crushing burdens of local and state taxes. By getting pro-
grams out of the federal government and instituting a value
added tax, federal income taxes can be reduced with parti-
cular emphasis on helping the middle class which has been
squeezed the hardest. If we promote it well, this package
could give us the offensive throughout the coming session.
To propose vast environmental programs, new schemes to
help the poor, expanded aid to the cities gets us absolutely
nothing politically. Whatever political benefit is in it, the
Democrats will take away from us by showing that they can
do more in the Congress than we have proposed.
To take a whole new approach -- revenue sharing and value
added tax has real political appeal because it combines
reform in government with tax benefits to the constituency
which we must reach. It is also a real signal that we
Republicans have faith in the people to manage their own
affairs, locally.
media
3. Recommended changes in the handling of the media:
a. We should continue quiet but firm pressure from here on the
media. The FCC can keep the networks off balance and worried,
as they are now, over the possible regulatory measures.
b. We should work on getting more stations in friendly hands.
c. We need to brief continually on a positive basis friendly or
neutral TV analysts and commentators to get a favorable line
to them in advance of their programs as we now do with
friendly newspaper columnists. Most of them are so biased
that it will only be marginally effective but we can't hurt by
trying.
d. At modest cost an independent TV news service can be estab-
lished here in Washington to feed out "friendly" TV news spots
directly to licensees for use on non-network news programs.
-4-
e. Early in the year you should meet separately with the chief
executives of the three networks simply a "get acquainted, "
general discussion mecting.
f
There is a need now for a Presidential news conference to be
followed in 1971 by news conferences at more frequent, regu-
lar intervals. You are at your best by far in this format.
The particular style of conference might be varied from time
to time. The meeting with the three anchor men last summer,
for example, was especially effective.
4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet:
From a political standpoint the Vice President should be pro-
grammed to work on the South, and the labor/white middle class
ethnic vote.
Obviously, he needs to develop stature in the international field
(missions assigned by you).
He further might assume the leadership as the leading spokesman
for a major domestic initiative (for example, revenue sharing).
The Cabinet needs to be used in a concentrated effort to help
sell the value added tax/revenue sharing package -- a theme
to be hit hard by the entire official family.
We need, as you so well already recognize, a much stronger
spokesman on economic policy.
was
5. Relationships with the Congress:
This is touched upon above in reference to the domestic program.
It is absolutely imperative that we seize the initiative with Congress.
Only something as dramatic as the proposed domestic program
will do this.
This is bound to be a hostile and contentious Congress, at war
with us. Our success with the Congress will depend on your
continued strength in the country. Your standing in the public
opinion polls, which remained relatively high despite all of the
criticism by the media and the Cambodian aftermath, did more
for us in Congressional relationships last summer than every-
thing else combined. If the Republicans in particular respect
your political strength, they will be much less likely to break
-5-
with you. Liberal Republicans should either be frozen out
or welcomed in, depending on how they respond to early tests
between us and the Congress. Percy obviously wants on board
so does Ed Brooke. The Goodell situation (Ed Brooke told me
he agreed with our position (!)) is bound to have a good effect
on all but our most stubborn dissidents.
6. Presidential Travel:
Travel
I do not recommend extensive Presidential travel in the first
several months of 1971. It is important, particularly because
of the media treatment of the campaign, that the President be
in a firm and strong position of leadership of the Government.
Over the next several months this can be best demonstrated
here in the White House with the use of occasional outside forums,
like the NAM on December 4, for major policy pronouncements.
7. Political Emphasis:
Political
It goes without saying that getting the economy moving again and
soon is an overriding political objective.
In 1972 we should have with us ournatural constituencies in the
New South, the border states and the West. The key large swing
states will be Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio, Illinois and per-
haps even New York (Texas is a separate situation). The swing
votes within these heavily industrialized states will be the white
ethnic, middle class working man and family.
This voter, in particular, is frustrated because he doesn't believe
that government can solve his problems -- or perhaps any problems.
We have and must continue to build an impressive record of govern-
ment reform (the value added tax/revenue sharing hits this directly).
He is squeezed hard by rising prices and increasing tax burdens.
Income ax cuts for the $5, 000-$20, 000 per year worker or de-
ductions (as for college tuition) will have a powerful political
appeal.
Above all, he wants stability and order in his economy. We need
to show a positive record of accomplishment on law and order
issues.
-6-
To win the swing vote in the swing states, we must intensify
our efforts to cultivate the Catholics, labor and ethnics. We
need to be sensitive to their needs and prove we can do some-
thing about the problems which concern them most.
Luwer
Charles W. Colson
CONFIDENTIAL
EMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
Huston
DETERMINED TO BE AN
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVE
By 6-102
November 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Tom Charles Huston TH
SUBJECT: 1970 Elections and Prospects for 1972
Perhaps the most significant result of the 1970 elections is that the
rank-and-file Democrats came out of it convinced that they can win the
Presidency in '72. It is only necessary to remember the difference in
attitude among Republicans in the dark days following the Goldwater
debacle and in the jubilant days following the 1966 elections to realize
that the psychology of victory should not be underestimated as a political
factor.
The fact that many folks now believe that a Democrat can win in '72
could, however, work to our advantage. Our best hope is that the ambition
of the Democrat contenders will re-open the ideological wounds self-
inflicted upon the party in 1968. Of particular interest is the possibility
that the Kennedy people may decide that 1972 is the year for a Democrat,
and if Teddy doesn't move, he will be out for eight years and that is too
long to wait. Initially I would think this impulse to move would be stronger
among the Kennedy camp-followers than with the Senator himself, but he
CONFIDENTIAL
CONTIDENTIAL
2
might very well be convinced that all is forgiven and he should go for the
big one. Should this happen, I would look for the Kennedy allies in the
media to pull a "Romney" on Muskie and knock him out of consideration as
a serious contender. Broder is already warning Muskie to be on the alert
for such a move.
POSTURE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAINTAIN IN 1971
Portune
The President's posture in 1971 should not be much different than it was
in 1967 he should maintain a relatively low profile and leave the arena to
the hustling contenders. A Democrat aspirant will be pressing hard to make
out an independent record in the Senate that qualifies him as the preferable
nominee, which means he will have to promote himself at his colleagues
expense. This may work in several ways. For example, I would not be
surprised to see Senator McGovern open up on Muskie on the grounds that he
compromised on the law and order issue at the expense of principle. The
left-wing of the Democratic Party is not at all happy with the shift many of
their candidates made on the law and order issue; after all they have a
considerable investment in the repression issue. If we played our hand
properly, we could see a fine row going among the Democrats over who has
yielded to political expediency at the expense of the young, the black, and
the poor.
CONCIDENTIAL
00m IDENTIFY
3
If we wish to pursue a policy of leaving the Democrats enough rope for a
family lynching party, it follows that the President should strike a posture of
studied statesmanship and bold leadership. The contrast should be between a
working President coping with tough problems and bickering Democrats
lockying for partisan advantage.
If I had to select a single word to characterize the posture the President
should assume, it would be "candor. 11 Candor requires that one take others
into his confidence, that one convey a sense of partnership, of shared
V
experience; it requires an openness of opinion as well as of deed, a willing-
ness to admit mistakes as well as to claim success. The best illustration
is the November 9, 1969, address on Vietnam. It was a masterpiece pre-
cisely because the viewer had the impression that he was being talked with,
not to; that the President was taking him into his confidence, explaining the
problem and discussing the solution, asking for understanding without
demanding support.
In pursuing a policy of candor, it is not necessary to ignore political
realities. The political battle is waged on two levels. Where the public
interest is demonstrably at stake, the appearance and the reality must be
one. What is done and how it is done are equally important and both must
be clearly visible and credible. However, where the problem is strictly
political (i.e., tactical) the appearance must often be at odds with the reality.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONSIDENTIAL
00ml IDENTIAL
4
It was said of President Van Buren that he rowed toward every objective
with muffled oars. This is a wise and necessary political tactic, one
which we appear to have foresworn in the recent election, but it is a
difficult and dangerous one, for the temptation is to confuse the tactic
with the strategy. The distinction is between political objectives and
national goals. Candor is a philosophy of government, "muffled oars" a
practice of politics -- and practice should always be the servant of
philosophy.
media
THE MEDIA
We take the media too seriously. It is hostile, it is irritating, it is
even on occasion demaging, but there isn't much we can accomplish by
worrying that David Brinkley is going to burp in our face. We have
attempted to neutralize the media by employing tactics that presuppose
that ideological hostility can be overcome by advertising techniques. We
should deal with the media on our terms and in a manner that is conducive
to presenting the image we want to get across, not the image that someone
else (usually our enemies) expects of us.
There are several dangers from a concentrated effort to maximize
media coverage. First, the risk of over-exposure. Studied aloofness is
often the best politics (DeGaulle certainly understood this). The President
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doesn't have to intrude on everyone's supper to earn their respect, confi-
dence, and support. Second, there is the risk that an extensive media
effort will look contrived. We are already seeing columns accusing us of
attempting to substitute a media-created image for substantive programs
and policies. We are rather overt in our media orientation and the public
might conclude that we are trying to con them.
We should use the media to project the image we want on the terms we
desire. In this respect, I believe we should concentrate on portraying RN
as a working President, as an educator who uses the media as a means of
reaching and educating the people and not as a means of exploiting or
deceiving them. Obviously, what I am saying is that the media should be
used to convey the candor of the President. Specifically, we should have
more televised press conferences, more in-depth discussions with network
commentators, and some televised "fireside chats. 11 Moreover, we should
not go to the people only when an issue is burning and we should not go
simply to solicit overt support. We should try some new formats. In short,
we should use the media as a precise and targeted weapon.
The burden of carrying the day-to-day message to the people on the
programs and policies of the Administration should fall to the Veep, the
Cabinet, the National Chairman, and the Congressional leadership. It is
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not enough to say that they don't do the job -- we should see that they do it.
The President should not be burdened with the inadequacies of daily television
news coverage. Unless we are prepared to go all the way and buy a network,
we ought to quit worrying about the problem. It is fruitless to attempt to
meet Brinkley, et. al. on their own terms and all we can get in the process
is ulcers. It's not worth it.
THE VICE PRESIDENT
WP
The Vice President did his campaign assignment well, but he may have
committed political suicide in the process. To an increasing portion of
Middle America, he is coming across as radical as those whom he attacks.
He needs to develop an image as a reasonable and credible man, a task which
he can easily handle if encouraged to do SO.
Many people believe the Vice President has told a lot of truth, albeit in
language that they regard as excessive. However, people can tolerate only
so much unpopular and disconcerting truth. They want to be reassured, not
alarmed. More importantly, they want to believe in the man as much as the
message. The Vice President should shift his emphasis without yielding an
inch on the substantive issues he raised. He should de-escalate the rhetoric
without de-escalating the substance of his message.
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The Vice President should take four steps in the months ahead. First,
he should address himself to proposed solutions to the problems he has
outlined. He should indicate that having identified various problems, he
is now ready to offer possible solutions. Second, he should make a
conspicuous effort to resume the exercise of his official responsibilities,
i.e., presiding over the Senate, presiding over the various councils he
chairs, etc. He needs to reassert himself as a working as opposed to a
campaigning Vice President. One area where he should concentrate his
efforts is in the field of inter-governmental relations. He should be our
principal spokesman for the New Federalism. Third, the President might
consider giving the Vice President a more prominent role in the formula-
tion and articulation of our domestic programs. And finally, the Vice
President should arrange to appear on as many interview-type television
shows as possible where he can develop his image as a rational, reasonable,
and believable man.
The risk of such a course is that the Vice President will be ignored by
the national media. However, I don't think that is too important. If he
gets out in the country he will get local coverage by virtue of his office.
Moreover, if he begins to play a prominent role in substantive policy
and program areas, he will have to get national media attention by virtue
of the newsworthiness of the subject matter.
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Consistent with my view that the President ought to maintain a rather
low and select profile, it might be advantageous to let the Vice President
assume a more prominent substantive role. Not only would this enhance
the prestige of the Vice President, but it would buffet the President and
enable him to avoid exposure except on the big ones where we want to make
a decisive point.
CONGRESS
Long
We are going to have to get along with Congress if we want to get our
legislative program through. In addition, we want to encourage the Senate
Democrats to fight among themselves in anticipation of securing advantage
in the race for the nomination. We should avoid institutional attacks of
affronts; we should also avoid making a major fight out of minor issues.
However, on carefully selected issues of major importance to the success of
the Administration, we should not hesitate to fight like hell. Although beyond
the scope of this memorandum, I might note in passing that I believe there
is political profit to be gained from drawing the line with Congress on
foreign and defense policy.
The key to our success on the Hill will be our ability to forge a fairly
united Republican team in the Senate. We should make every effort to
pacify the liberals consistent with the policy posture of the President.
DURTHARTHOM
9
However, I think we should not overlook the possibility of putting pressure
on the deviants within the ranks of the party, making use of Dole, Tower,
and other loyalists for this purpose. In addition, we should not let Hatfield,
et. al. forget what happened to good old Charlie. We should also emphasize
that we must all sink or swim together in 172 and it is certainly not in the
interests of those seeking re-election to be publicly at odds with their
President. If possible, we might consider our own "shadow" leader, a
loyalist in the Senate who is unofficially recognized as the President's
personal spokesman, a man who can count noses so that when it is obvious
we have the votes we can leave the deviants alone and let them do their own
thing. This would probably get Hugh Scott's nose out of joint, but since he
is so expert at looking after his own skin, I don't see why we should be
reluctant to do the same.
PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL
Thank
Consistent with my suggestion of a low profile, I would recommend
against extensive travel except where demonstratively purposeful. While
the exposure when abroad is extensive, I am not convinced that it has any
lasting impact unless associated with concrete accomplishments. I keep
thinking of LBJ and the Spirit of Glassboro -- what a fleeting moment of
glory that was!
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THE CABINET
Cub.
We need some changes in the Cabinet. While perhaps I am vindictive
and narrow-minded, I have never forgiven Secretary Hickel for the letter
he sent during the Cambodian operation which was a gratuitous embarrass-
ment to the President. He should have been fired upon receipt of the
letter and he has no claim to his seat by virtue of estoppel. He still
should go.
If Secretary Romney persists in his plan to launch a massive federal
integration drive in northern suburban housing developments, he should be
sent back to Michigan to discuss the political wisdom of his plan with the
voters of Warren, Michigan.
There are a couple of other potential nominees for retirement, but
Hickel and Romney are initially adequate to get the message across that
loyalty and good judgment are values highly regarded in this Administration,
At the sub-Cabinet level there should be a major purge. We are being
screwed daily by people who have been held over or (I say this reluctantly)
by people whom we appointed. HEW could afford a complete house-cleaning
from Under-Secretary on down, and I suspect that I could put together a
list of two dozen top-notch candidates for purging without even bothering
to consult Senators Goldwater and Thurmond.
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While I am on the purge kick, I would like to put in a word for a man
who should be first on any list: Randy Thrower. The best argument against
Thrower is that there is no one in the White House who dares call IRS for
information without fear that word of the inquiry will be leaked. I am a
strong admirer of Van Buren's "muffled oar" strategy, but it is only
possible if you have control of your own Administration. I assume that we
intend to play for keeps in '72 and that means we need to have the goods on
the guys who are determined to do us in. We need control of IRS. It is
less important that the Commissioner be a tax whiz than that he be willing
to follow orders. Thrower can't. He is arrogant and insubordinate and
should go immediately.
Finally, a word about method. The impression is abroad that we are
afraid to purge disloyal or incompetent personnel. This is dangerous for
it breeds contempt as well as insubordination. Certainly there will be
screams of outrage if we have a massive purge, but the screams will last
about 10 days and we will have a loyal team for the next two years. Surely
we can afford to take the heat when the stakes are so high. Cabinet shake-
ups are not unusual in American history. Jackson fired his entire cabinet
save the Postmaster General. Truman fired Wallace when he was the
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darling of the liberals, progressives, and communists. Roosevelt had
no compunction about throwing overboard anyone whom he regarded as
a political liability. We should draw up a list of those who are either
disloyal or incompetent, find suitable replacements, and strike with a
single sudden blow. While the screams in the liberal press would be
awesome, the long-term benefits would be more than compensating. We
have to get control of the government; there are too many Trojan horses
within the walls as we prepare for what could be a close election in '72.
PARTY ORGANIZATION
GUP
I am beginning to sound like Stalin, but we also need a purge at the
National Committee. Larry O'Brien stands head-and-shoulders above
our man as a party chairman. He is a gut fighter and he is effective.
During the past campaign, many of us were appalled at the inability of the
National Committee to produce. And Jim Allison's appearance on tele-
vision the morning after the election where he admitted to our major
defeats and discounted the impact of the President and Vice President was
hardly helpful. Moreover, there have been so many columns about how
the White House refuses to listen to the sound advice of Morton and Allison
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that one must surely conclude that they are inspired by National Committee
personnel who are more concerned about their own interests than the
President's. We need a national chairman who is a fighter, who is
effective on the stump, who can use the media, who is loyal to the
President but not too closely identified with him personally, who is a
good administrator, and who will do as he is told. We also need a new
management team at the committee which is efficient, loyal, and able to
make use of the resources that are potentially available. We attempt to do
too much here that should and could be done at the National Committee if they
had the proper staffing and leadership.
STATE PARTY ORGANIZATION
We took it on the chin in some states with potential serious consequences
in 1972. States like Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, Florida, and Texas are
vitally important to us in 1972. We should take a direct interest in party
rebuilding efforts in those states to ensure that we have a viable organiza-
tion ready to field strong candidates in 172.
INTELLECTUALS AND ISSUES
The anti-war types have a song which begins, "Give Peace a Chance. 11
We should consider giving selected conservative alternatives a chance.
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Jim Buckley's campaign suggested that large numbers of traditionally
Democratic voters are searching for alternatives and not merely on the
law and order issue. In fact, the interesting thing about Buckley's
campaign is that he, as a professed conservative running on a third party
ticket, came across as a more reasonable and credible candidate on a
variety of issues than many regular Republicans who thought they were
waging a "conservative" campaign. These fellows were about as successful
in their efforts as I would have been running as a New Leftist, for the
voters can spot a phony. The heavy-handedness of their campaigns
suggested that they thought the conservative alternative was what the
New York Times said it was.
Since 1964 there has emerged a new generation of principled but
practical conservatives of whom Buckley is but one. On many university
faculties there are young intellectuals who are developing alternatives to
current programs whose intellectual well spring is the New Deal. We ought
to consider opening some lines to these people and soliciting their ideas and
suggestions. There is doubtless going to be a big push for a program of
national health insurance. I fear we may respond with a proposal that
merely splits the difference with Meany, that accepts his major premises
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and opens the door to socialized medicine. On such major issues where
it is obvious we should do something, we ought to look beyond the
bureaucracy of HEW and consider other alternatives. We ought not let
Buckley and Reagan become the spokesmen for an emerging conservative
program. We don't have to make any sharp swing to the right, but we
ought to translate some of our conservative rhetoric into a few conserva-
tive programs. We might find as Reagan did that they don't hurt us
politically. And if we choose those that are directed to ethnics, blue
collar workers, and Catholics, we might find they help us considerably.
A FINAL SUGGESTION
It might be worth the trouble and expense to ask a group of talented
political types on the outside to take on the assignment of keeping their
ear to the ground and passing on their thoughts and recommendations for
your study on a regular basis. I have in mind such people as Kevin
Phillips, John Sears, a couple of young intellectuals with public opinion
analysis backgrounds. These people might be able to give us an insight
on a regular basis that would be helpful in gaining a fresh perspective on
what is happening in the country. Perhaps this is unnecessary, but it
might be of some help.
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In conclusion, I would suggest we take the following steps over the
near-term: (1) get control of the government; (2) emphasize substantive
policy and minimize media exposure; (3) start organizing for '72 by
establishing a working organization at the White House, putting in a new team
at the National Committee, identifying key states that require special
party-building attention, and considering the use of outside analysts; and
(4) have the Vice President shift his emphasis to a positive tone in order to
establish himself as a reasonable and believable man and a working member
of the policy team.
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