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    "description": "This file contains:\n\nYitled \"Election 1970: Anatomy of a Disappointment.\" Compares the 1970 election to the one which it beared the greatest resemblance - 1954. 8pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date\n\nTo: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan RE: \"The 1970 Campaign.\" 14pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970\n\nTo: The President From: Charles W. Colson RE: \"1970 Congressional Campaign.\" 6pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970\n\nTo: H.R. Haldeman From: Murray Chotiner RE: \"Campaign Managers.\" 4pgs [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970\n\nTo: The President From: Murray Chotiner RE: \"Pennsylvania.\" 1pg [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/12/1970",
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    "ocrText": "Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nContested Materials Collection\nFolder List\nBox Number\nFolder Number\nDocument Date\nNo Date\nSubject\nDocument Type\nDocument Description\n45\n31\nCampaign\nReport\nReport titled \"Election 1970: Anatomy of a\nDisappointment.\" Compares the 1970\nelection to the one which it beared the\ngreatest resemblance - 1954. 8pgs\n45\n31\n11/6/1970\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: The President From: Patrick J. Buchanan\nRE: \"The 1970 Campaign.\" 14pgs\n45\n31\n11/6/1970\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: The President From: Charles W. Colson\nRE: \"1970 Congressional Campaign.\" 6pgs\n45\n31\n11/12/1970\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: H.R. Haldeman From: Murray Chotiner\nRE: \"Campaign Managers.\" 4pgs\n45\n31\n11/12/1970\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: The President From: Murray Chotiner\nRE: \"Pennsylvania.\" 1pg\nThursday, March 15, 2012\nPage 1 of 1\nELECTION 1970: ANATOMY OF A DISAPPOINTMENT\nAmid all the post-election jockeying and posturing, the amazing\nthing is that no one thought to compare the 1970 election to the one\nto which it bears the greatest resemblance: 1954.\nThe similarities are striking. A Republican President was half-\nway through his first term, having defeated a non-incumbent Democrat\ntwo years earlier in the midst of a limited war in Asia. By means of\na successful peace initiative, the Republicans had turned the war into\na non-controversial issue. But the economy was in a mild recession,\nand Republicans understandably tried to deflect the focus to other matters.\nThe Vice President, campaigning in the West, charged that incumbent\nDemocratic Senators were \"almost without exception members of the\nDemocratic party's left-wing clique which\nhas tolerated the Communist\nconspiracy in the United States. 11\nRepublican opportunities for Senate gains were striking. Running\nsix years earlier, Harry Truman had pulled in nine new Democratic\nSenators; of the seats contested in 1954, 21 were Democratic, only 11\nRepublican. Many of the Democrats were liberal. Some analysts con-\ntended that the Republicans could be expected to lose substantially, both\nbecause of the recession and the long-standing tradition that the party in\npower loses many seats in off-year elections. Other analysts pointed to\nthe large numbers of Democratic Senators seeking re-election, and to the\nfact that the Republican President had not had substantial coattails two\nyears earlier. Republicans had gained 22 House seats and only one\nSenator in 1952, unusually small gains for a year of Presidential victory.\nHoping for uncharacteristic off-year gains, the President and Vice\nPresident put their prestige squarely on the line. While the Vice President\nconcentrated on hard-hitting partisan attacks, the President, according\nto Congressional Quarterly, \"appealed to the voters to return a Republican\nCongress and he campaigned harder and longer than any other President\nhad ever done in a midterm election. 11\nWhen the returns were in, there was disappointment for both sides.\nThe Republican loss in the House -- 18 seats -- was well below the\nmidterm average. But the seemingly golden opportunity for Senate gains\nhad been frustrated. The GOP did pick up three previously Democratic\nseats. But four previously Republican seats went Democratic, giving the\nDemocrats a net gain of one. The heavily Democratic \"Class of 1948\"\nwas still heavily Democratic, now by a margin of 22 to 10.\n2\nThe Administration claimed a moral victory, pointing to their\nless-than-average midterm losses. But Democrats pointed to the\nintensive Presidential efforts to affect the result, and claimed that\nthose efforts had failed. Liberal Republicans began a campaign to\ndump the Vice President which was to last until the next Republican\nconvention. Political analysts across the spectrum said the new\nDemocratic governorships would serve as a vital Presidential base.\nAnd the press was virtually unanimous in its major finding: Dwight\nEisenhower would be vulnerable in 1956.\nAlthough this analogy makes a mockery of much of the currently\nfashionable analysis, Republicans should not come away wholly com-\nfortable about the 1970 returns. To be sure, it is premature to talk of\nRichard Nixon as a lame-duck President. Unfortunately, it is equally\npremature to talk of the Republican Party as the nation's natural majority\ncoalition.\nThe fact that Dwight Eisenhower was easily re-elected following his\nparty's mild setback of 1954 is an important point, and may be applicable\nto President Nixon's situation now; but the overriding fact of the\nEisenhower years was the failure of the President and Vice President to\nbuild an enduring GOP majority in the nation. It seems to us that this\nfailure is in grave danger of repeating itself.\nParticularly illustrative in this respect is the pattern of the Senate\nraces. In the eleven states of the industrial Northeast, Republicans won\ntwo previously Democratic seats, and a conservative Republican captured\na third that had been held by a liberal Republican. But in the thirty-nine\nstates outside the Northeast 33 of which had been carried by either\nNixon or Wallace in 1968 the election was a standoff. Republicans\ncaptured Democratic seats in Tennessee and Ohio, but Democrats turned\nthe tables in California and Illinois.\nThe heart of the Republican disappointment was the small, rural,\nconservative states of the Plains and Mountains. These thirteen states\nall voted overwhelmingly for Richard Nixon in 1968, by margins ranging\nfrom 8 per cent (Nevada) to 28 per cent (Nebraska). At the beginning\nof this year, Republicans targeted five Democratic Senators who seemed\neminently eligible for retirement. They were McGee (Wyoming), Moss\n(Utah), Cannon (Nevada), Montoya (New Mexico), and Burdick (North Dakota).\nBright, attractive candidates won Republican nominations in the five states;\nfour had been personally recruited by President Nixon, three were incumbent\nRepresentatives, and all were conservatives. All but one (William Raggio\nof Nevada) seemed like possible victors as late as two weeks before the\nelection. All lost. The one who came closest (New Mexico's Anderson\nCarter, with 47 per cent of the vote) was the one who had not been\n3\nrecruited by Mr. Nixon, and the only one who had been through a\ndivisive primary. The worst showing was made by Rep. Thomas Kleppe\n(38 per cent in North Dakota), whom an impartial poll had shown two\npoints behind before the President's October visit to the state. In Nebraska,\nconservative veteran Roman Hruska barely survived a lightly regarded\nchallenge by a perennial Democratic office-seeker. In the entire Plains\nand Mountain region, the most conservative and Republican area of the\nentire nation, only Sen. Paul Fannin of Arizona emerged with a solid\nRepublican win.\nThe pattern is inescapable: the area that was most pro-Nixon in 1968\nwas the least pro-Nixon in 1970; the area least pro-Nixon in 1968 (the\nindustrial Northeast) gave the party its most striking successes of 1970.\nThe big Eastern wins in New York, Connecticut, and Maryland all took\nplace in states carried by Hubert Humphrey in 1968. Not exactly a\nharbinger of partisan realignment.\nExcept in this sense: traditional Democrats deserted their party in\nsubstantial numbers in states where the primary was won by candidates\nwho seemed radically out of step with the rank and file. The fact that\n\"New Politics\" Democrats like Joseph Duffey in Connecticut, Richard\nOttinger in New York, and Howard Metzenbaum in Ohio scored most of\ntheir primary wins in the eastern half of the nation (George Brown, for\nexample, was defeated in the California primary) may go a long way toward\nexplaining the drift of Eastern Democrats particularly urban Catholics\ntoward the GOP. In states where bread-and-butter liberals like John\nTunney, Hubert Humphrey, and Harrison Williams controlled the Democratic\nprimaries, the Republican-vs. -radical alignment proved impossible for the\nparty to make credible.\nBut the other half of the coin the failure of conservative Republicans\nto beat liberal Democrats in overwhelmingly conservative states contains\nthe major finding of the 1970 Senate elections. This is the failure of the\nNixon Administration to satisfy its own constituency.\nIt is tempting to attribute this Administration failure to the economy.\nBut a careful look at the returns does not justify such a sweeping assumption.\nAfter a post-election survey of 129 House districts and 13 states with Senate\nelections where unemployment was at or above the national average,\nCongressional Quarterly concluded: \"Unemployment. was less than a\ndecisive issue in the over-all outcome of the Congressional election\nOnly in the Midwest and Plains states, where declining farm income and\n4\nrelated problems were a factor in substantial Democratic gains, does\nthere appear to have been a trend based on economic issues. 11 Indeed,\nthe entire nine-seat Democratic gain in House races would have been\nwiped out had traditionally Republican Farm Belt districts voted as they\nhad in 1968. And House returns, not Senate or gubernatorial returns,\nare the traditional barometer of economic unrest. If unemployment had\nbeen the decisive factor many pundits have claimed it to be, Democrats\nwould have scored net House gains in other areas than farm-related ones.\nOne must look elsewhere than economics for the Democratic trend in\nthe most anti-liberal sections of the nation. The simplest answer seems\napplicable: the pro-Nixon voters of 1968 are not getting what they thought\nthey were going to get.\nIn 1968, candidate Nixon campaigned against excessive Johnson\ndomestic expenditures; President Nixon has retained every one of the\nGreat Society programs (including the Job Corps, which he pledged to\nabolish) and has increased the outlays for many of them: Candidate\nNixon categorically pledged not to support a guaranteed annual income;\nPresident Nixon has proposed the Family Assistance Plan, seen as\nexactly that by all who have examined it, and regarded at least as a\nmassive increase in the Federal welfare load by everybody else.\nCandidate Nixon called for decentralization; President Nixon has\ninstalled the most rigidly centralized White House bureaucracy in\nhistory. Candidate Nixon attacked the Democratic-fostered \"security\ngap\"; President Nixon has cut defense spending to the bone, causing a\nmassive aerospace slump in such key 1970 battlegrounds as Texas, New\nMexico, and Southern California.\nThe one area where the 1968 Nixon constituency seems at least\npartially satisfied is the South. The Administration policy of appointing\nstrict constructionists to the Supreme Court and of working with, rather\nthan against, Southern leaders in implementing court-ordered desegre-\ngation, must be judged at least a partial success. With the primary\ndefeat of Ralph Yarborough and the November defeat of Albert Gore, the\nera of \"national liberalism\" in the South has come to an end. Of the 22\nSenators who will represent the Old Confederacy in the 92nd Congress,\nonly one William Fulbright of Arkansas is left of center on the\nnational spectrum. A similar pattern has emerged among Southern\nmembers of the House in recent years.\n5\nThis move to the Right in the South has not yet resulted in a heavy\nrealignment toward the Republicans, and certainly did not in 1970. Of\nthe 106 Southern House seats, only one changed partisan hands this year\n(the Virginia seat of a retiring Democrat went Republican). But Republicans\nheld all four of the seats vacated by incumbents who went for higher office,\nand the GOP will be in position to benefit from the mandatory changes of\nSouthern district lines with the 1970 Census. The loss of two Governor-\nships (while gaining one) was disappointing to local Republicans, but less\nso to the Nixon Administration. The two GOP lame-ducks, Winthrop\nRockefeller and Claude Kirk, were the only two prominent Southern\nRepublicans who voted for Nelson Rockefeller at the 1968 convention. Pretty\nmuch exploded is the Ripon Society thesis that the way to Republican gains\nin the South is a \"moderate\" coalition involving Negroes and silk-stocking\nliberals. Another Ripon favorite, liberal gubernatorial nominee Paul\nEggers in Texas, went down to his second straight crashing loss to color-\nless conservative Democrat Preston Smith. Liberal Republicans will win\nevery now and then in the South (though only one, Governor Linwood Holton\nof Virginia, now holds major office of any kind), but this will occur only\non a temporary basis, as a direct result of Democratic factionalism. When\nthe Democrats get around to mending their own coalition, as they did this\nyear in Arkansas, such gerry-built political structures will inevitably\ncome crashing down. Like it or not, for the foreseeable future Southern\nDemocrats will have a rarely breakable lock on Negro loyalty.\nThe failure to perceive this was a major reason for one of the\nbiggest Republican disappointments of 1970: the defeat of George Bush\nin Texas. Since the election, Bush has said privately that the central\nmistake of his campaign against conservative Democrat Lloyd Bentsen\nwas his open wooing of Negro and Mexican-American voters. Bush,\nno liberal himself, credits this tactic with bringing out a far bigger than\nexpected rural conservative vote for Bentsen. At the same time, Bush\nwas unable to push his Negro and Mexican vote totals much above his 1964\nlevels, when his opponent was liberal Ralph Yarborough. Bush is reported\nto have said: \"If I couldn't get them in this situation, there's no sense in\nany Republican trying for them ever again.\nRay Garland, the Ripon backed \"moderate\" Senate candidate in\nVirginia, may have come to similar conclusions. Running as the center\nman between liberal Democrat George Rawlings and conservative independent\nSen. Harry Byrd, and bidding openly for a Negro-Republican coalition,\nGarland found himself squeezed from both ends. Rawlings swept the\nNegro vote in all areas -- and Byrd carried most of the Republican ones.\nGarland was left with 15 per cent of the vote the worst Republican showing\nin a generation. Though Byrd was tacitly backed by the Administration,\n6\nhis remarkable 53 percent victory has not been widely cited as a\ntriumph of the Southern strategy, either by the press or the Ripon\nSociety One wonders what would have been their reaction if Byrd\nhad come close to losing to either Rawlings or Garland. At any rate,\nRipon-acclaimed Governor Holton, who backed Garland, is reportedly\nhaving second thoughts about the strongly liberal image he has pro-\njected in his first year of office.\nBut the most encouraging outcome in the South over and above\nthe statewide sweep in Tennessee, the Byrd win, and despite the losses\nof Bush and Rep. William Cramer in Florida -- is the suddenly modest\nstanding of George Wallace. The victories of moderate, locally based\nDemocrats like Governers-elect Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Jimmy\nCarter of Georgia, and Reubin Askew of Florida, have caused an over-\nnight erosion of Wallce's organizational base outside the hard-core states\nof Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Shortly after the election,\nloyalist Southern Democrats like Sen. Ernest Hollings of South Carolina,\nhimself slightly right of center, started making distinctly anti-Wallace\nsounds, and Wallace's own profile has been noticeably low of late If\nPresident Nixon carries through his pledge to appoint a Southern con-\nservative to the next Supreme Court vacancy, and continues his relatively\nsmooth handling of desegregation, Wallace may not run. In a two-man\nrace with a liberal Democrat, Nixon would be favored to win all 128\nof the Southern electorial votes. The Southern strategy has positioned\nitself for possibly massive success in 1972.\nBut ACU has always maintained, the Southern strategy is not enough.\nThe Supreme Court and school desegregation, both of which the Adminis-\ntration has handled reasonably well, bulk much larger as issues in the\nSouth than anywhere else. The failure of Republican candidates in\nstrongly Republican states is sympotmatic of the Administration's failure\nto satisfy the non-Southern voters it won in 1968. And the 1970 Catholic\ngains will quickly evaporate if the Democrats nominate, as expected, a\nCatholic for President in 1972 unless strong steps are taken between\nnow and then to mold a new, creatively conservative Administration\nprogram to appeal to a new majority of voters.\nThe Administration should take the following negative steps:\n1. Removal of Secretary George Romney of the Housing and Urban\nDevelopment Department. If Romney is permitted to continue with his\n7\nradical, divisive plan to relocate slum dwellers in suburbia -- a plan\neven liberals like Robert Kennedy repudiated -- he will become as\nmuch of a liability to the Administration as he was to his wife Lenore\nin her Michigan Senate race. Aside from the social arguments against\nthe Romney plan, suburbia is the political focal point of any majority\ncoalition for the Republican Party To permit Romney to proceed along\nhis present path is political lunacy.\n2. Removal of Secretary of Agriculture Clifford Hardin. When\nHardin's department (which is studded with holdover Democrats)\nannounced a cutback in dairy price supports right before a special 1969\nHouse election in the heaviest dairy district in the nation, that was a\nminor disaster. But when the Department released figures two days\nbefore this year's election showing the lowest farm prices since 1934,\nHardin became the single man most responsible for the Republicans'\nFarm Belt disaster, and thus for the net nine-seat House loss. He\nshould be replaced by a working Republican politician who will clean\nthe department's liberal bureaucrats right out -- for good.\n3. Scrapping of the Family Assistance Plan. ACU is amply on\nrecord concerning the merits of this bill, so we will confine ourselves\nto a simple political statement: if FAP is ever implemented, it will\nbecome the single biggest long-term Republican liability since the Great\nDeparssion The majority of Americans clearly believe that welfarism\nhas gone much too far not that it needs to be radically expanded, as\nFAP would in practice do. The GOP as the party of expanded welfare\nis a losing proposition.\n4. A serious effort to cut domestic expenditures -- starting with\nthe unpopular Great Society programs but definitely not excluding\npublic housing and older bankrupt urban renewal items. A successful\neffort to cut back domestic spending could lead the way to a politically\npotent tax cut by 1972.\nThe Administration should take the following positive steps:\n1. Announcement of support for the voucher plan, which would give\nparents a free choice between private and public education for their\nchildren Such an initiative would intersect with two powerful political\ncurrents: the concern of Catholic voters over the decline of the under-\nfinanced parochial school system, and increasing dissatisfaction on the\npart of a much broader group with the public school system in general.\n8\nA recent Gallup Poll found that the largest single problem cited by\ndissatisified parents was discipline, and that 53 percent believe that\npublic school discipline is \"not strict enough. 11 An earlier poll found\nthat a majority of parents would send their children to private schools,\nwere they financially able.\n2. Reprivatization of necessary, but badly performed, government\nfunctions. One example would be a bill repealing the monopoly of the\nnew Postal Corporation on first-class mail.\n3. Increased defense expenditures, particularly for nuclear weapons\nand other hardware. Aside from the strategic necessity of this step in\nthe face of the massive Soviet nuclear and naval buildup, the sectors of\nthe economy aided will be those most available to Republicanism.\n4. Tough new legislation to street crime and political violence.\nBecause of the Democrats' near-unanimous cave-in to Vice President\nAgnew on the crime issue, a new legislation is unlikely to meet with\nmuch Congressional opposition. In 1972, Republicans will no longer be\nable to label Democrats as the party of permissiveness; they will have\nto be able to \"point with pride\" to their own record. The only way to\nreverse the rise in street crime and pornography, and curb radical\nviolence, is through much stronger legislation than has heretofore been\npassed. Otherwise, the crime issue will work for the Democrats in 1972.\nThe Administration's rhetoric in 1970 was more than adequate; the\nspeeches of Vice President Agnew, in particular, brought concervative\nideas to an audience bigger than ever before. But 1970 also proved that\nrhetoric is not enough. If the Administration is to hold its supporters of\n1968, much less take advantage of the promising opportunities to expand\nits base, it must carve out a moderately conservative position that has\nits root in deeds as well as words. We are convinced that a majority of\nAmericans wants to go this way; if the Admini stration agrees, the\nRepublican Party can become the embodiment of that majority, in 1972\nand beyond.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nTHE 1970 CAMPAIGN\nMemorandum to the President\nFrom Patrick J. Buchanan\nNovember 6, 1970\nSTRATEGY\nLooking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right\none upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with\nthe Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to\ndefend himself, to get on the right side of it -- and thus precluded\ntheir taking the offensive on the only good issue they had -- the\neconomic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent\nhalf the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking\nabout his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a\nflag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy\nwas calling campus militants \"campus commandos. \" (The President\nmight have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from\nMassachusetts now has a haircut.) What happened this campaign --\nin a number of instances -- was that Democrats like Tunney and\n2\nStevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue,\nthrough speeches and spots, as Scammon and Wattenburg had\nurged them to do and once they got right on this issue; it became\na contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess,\nand they won hands down.\nOn the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he\nwould very probably be the new Senator from New York.\nThose Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently\ngave up nothing on their left -- just as S-W contended (the kids have\nnowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able\nto endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus\nlosing nothing there.\nThose candidates, who came off in the election as out and out\nliberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy and did not get well on our\nissues -- were defeated.\nThe legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what\nissues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we\ndevoted our campaign to the economic issue -- those final statistics\nabout a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the 5 retail price\nincrease, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price\nindex would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort\nto the economic issues, Gore would have won -- and Buckley very\nprobably lost.\n3\nAs for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the\ncountry with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue\nsharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from\nthe Welfare Plan -- and we constantly had to stress work incentives.\nAll through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.\nMy main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that\nwe started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely\non the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks\nto get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with\nthe issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly\nsucceeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too\nsoon, considering media's impact.\nOne thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to\ncommand the media and get our points across -- we do not need to\nhit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it\nin a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might\nhave been better off to start out -- not full-bore -- but low-keyed,\nlight and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around\nthe second week of October -- which would not have given the opposition\nenough time to re-orient their campaigns.\nThere is another point that should not go unanswered. The\n\"social issue\" was not a \"missile gap\" issue -- i. e., a complete\n4\ncreation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people\nof this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state\nafter state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recog-\nnize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned\ncorrectly and go after our opponents.\nWhen one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we\nhad problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where\nthe U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-\nfire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had\nnothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we\ncould take to the country and say clearly -- here we stand; here they\nstand -- throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to\nremember that we were trying to throw them out of office -- not keep\nourselves in -- and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive\nfor the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a\nchange.\nTHE ECONOMY\nClearly, this must have hurt I see nothing else to explain why\nReagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal\ncampaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation\nwhy our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they\nmight all run a close race.\n5\n(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information\nought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so\nfar off.)\nLooking at the races by State -- which we have to do -- I think\nwe can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national\ntrends -- as this was not a national election.\nConnecticut, the President certainly helped -- so also did the\nVice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker\nwas acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.\nIn New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately\nclaim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into\nhis camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both\nacceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Demo-\ncratic candidate -- what else explains why a young, good-looking\nDemocrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky\nhit hard on the Social issue.\nIn New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his\ncampaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions\nand then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for\nhis defeat - but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing\nboard liberal won by half a million in that state.\n6\nIn Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against\nan unknown -- we ought to find out. Perhaps economy.\nIn Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an\n\"anti-Tydings vote\" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good\nstrong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.\nIn Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got\n15 per cent of the vote.\nIn Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner,\nin Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner\nin the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the \"Grey Fox, 11 and\nthe only reason we beat this fellow was the issues -- not on candidates\nor personalities.\nIn Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost -- but he lost to a\nfellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues.\nSo, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and\n1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor\nabout Bush for Agnew hurt.\nFlorida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell\ngambit, with the Kirk-Guerney-Cramer feud, which turned off the\nvoters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two\npopulist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.\n7\nIf I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP\nnonsense and Kirk myself and the fellows elected seemed conservative\nenough.\nAs for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern\nStrategy - - we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals.\nThe only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough\nwere defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy --\nit does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level --\nindeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of\nthe Mason-Dixon line -- and would sweep that area still in a national\nelection.\nIn Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive\nfellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were\nquestionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because\nof our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.\nIn Michigan, the GOP had a disasterous primary and came out\nwith the worst possible candidate -- and Hart is attractive, without\nenemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social\nissue - and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind\nof campaign.\nIn Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two\nweeks of the campaign - and succeeded in getting well on the issue\nby his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his\n8\nDeputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with\nnone other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.\nIn Missouri -- money, and a young and attractive candidate\nalmost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of\nthe State of Missouri.\nIn the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races --\nthe only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social\nIssue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plaines.\nBut the economic issue does -- as the President knows from hearing\nthe howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in\npublic works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes\nand drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.\nIn California, it must have been the economy -- since everyone\nagreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and\nUnruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign getting\nout of police cars -- and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy\nwas through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.\nTHE HOUSE\nMost analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be\ntranslated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond\n9\nusual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment\nhigher than full employment -- and that might well explain our 10\ndefeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents\nwere put up for Senate races -- which contributes to that figure.\n(US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those\nyears when unemployment was on the increase.)\nTHE GOVERNORS\nHere is the big loss; here is the major problem -- along with\nthe State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by one.\nPennsylvania - - They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-\nBroderick Administration.\nOhio -- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against\nGilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note -- however,\nGilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using\nagainst him.)\nWisconsin- A real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 - -\npartially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets\nthe entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television;\nand who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers\ndollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor\nshowing pulled Olson down as well.\n10\nMaine and Rhode Island - - the near losses here for Democrats\nindicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices\nand rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether\nthey are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little\nattraction here.)\nArkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and\nMr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have\nbeen especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one\nhimself -- and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-\nheaded Democrat populists that did well all over the South.\nFlorida - - Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.\nThe Western Governors - I don't know why some of these failed\nto win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would\nattach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents - -\nwho are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a\nCongressman or Senator be blamed.\nFINAL POINTS\nSOME TURKEYS\nOne reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did\nnot field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done\n11\nbetter than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than\nMurphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most\nanyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there -- and it\nis not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long\nagainst it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were\nappointed -- not elected to the job -- Goodell and Smith.\nCAMPAIGN ADVERTISING\nMuch of this has become counterproductive because of the massive\nnature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and\nnetworks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are\ncertain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- just as\nthose gutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks -- and they\nsaid SO. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped\nour last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical\nproblems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance\nof speech.\nOn the law and order issue -- clearly it can be overdone as we\nbelieve Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as\nany Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on\nthe Social Issue as George Wallace found out. But our problem\nwas that we began too early too hard in my view -- enabling the\nDemocrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.\n12\nSOCIAL ISSUE\nIt was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember\nthat in 1972 -- they will be using it against us to some effect, if\nit is not visible that there has been a national change in either\nclimate or statistics.\nTHE PRESIDENT\nWe are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being\naccused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign --\nthat is simply not true -- but it is a result of our natural enemies in\nthe Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his\ncandidates, in the GOP and the presentation of RN as a partisan\nnecessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President\nof all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether\nthe gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of\nour most vital political asset -- the Presidency.\nTHE CAMPAIGN\nVictory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the\nbitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand\nin the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might\nreflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration\njust as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i. e., me)\nalso have an investment in its vindication.\n13\nVICE PRESIDENT\nHe carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the\nnational media off our backs -- gnawing at us -- until the final two\nweeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy.\nWe ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by\nthe media -- but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good\npublicity very nearly everywhere we went.\nThe President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic\ndislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign\n- we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this\nyear - and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign\nagainst the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice\nPresident's controversial positions and his out-spokenness -- and the\nstrategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.\nBut, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation\nas a fighting partisan in the fifties -- so also, has this Vice President.\nStrong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some\ndomestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive - also,\nthat he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Adminis-\ntration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech\n14\nor two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things\nhe can garner great publicity for -- at the same time he broadens\nhis own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective\ncampaigner on the stump.\nBecause of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the\ntime being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward\n1972.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nNovember 6, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT:\n1970 Congressional Campaign\nNeither the failures nor the successes of this campaign\ncan be attributed to any one factor. Indeed, there\nwere significant regional and local factors which\nweighed heavily in the final outcome. As an illustra-\ntion, one half of our total national House losses\noccurred in four contiguous Congressional districts\nlocated in North Dakota, South Dakota and Minnesota.\nObviously, the farm issue was critical and nothing\nelse in the national campaign could overcome it.\nWe must also remember the inherent difficulty of trans-\nlating Presidential popularity into support for\nindividual candidates. We lost many states that you\nwould have carried handily had this been a Presidential\nelection. We just couldn't succeed in making your\nsupporters feel that they had to vote for your candi-\ndates. Nor historically, has this ever been easy to do.\nYour campaigning was vital in terms of arousing our\nown troops and eliminating the apathy, which contrary\nto the normal historical pattern would have this year\nworked against us. Finally, by campaigning you demon-\nstrated your loyalty to the candidates and to the party.\nThe results, had you not campaigned, would have been\nfar worse and you would have taken the full blame which\nwould have hurt in 1972.\nBeyond these general observations, I think some specific\npoints can be made:\n1.\nLaw and order is a national issue but it affects\nvoting patterns differently in different areas.\nThe issue helped us in the liberal urban, suburban\nNortheast but, ironically did very little for us.\nin the conservative, rural Midwest and Far West.\n-2-\nThe reason, I think, is that the issue is meaning-\nless where there is no crime and violence problem.\nIf the people in North Dakota are not really con-\ncerned about crime or the safety of their homes,\nthey can't get very worked up about their own\nSenator just because of his poor record on that\nissue. In the urban areas of the East, where fear\nof crime and violence is wide spread, our stand on\nlaw and order (and that of our candidates) was the\nkey issue (except where the economic issue surpassed\nit).\n2.\nExcept in the urban Northeast, we did not succeed\nin making the public believe that Democrat, Liberal\npermissiveness was the cause of violence and crime.\nThere are a combination of reasons for this. As\nnoted above, people in the more conservative states,\nwhile they are all for law and order, don't blame\ntheir own liberal Senator for a problem that they\ndon't personally confront. Secondly, the Democrats\nin many cases recaptured safe ground on the issue:\nStevenson is a classic example. Thirdly, our\ncampaign pitch didn't really come across in a way\nto lay the responsibility onto the Democrats. In\nthis sense we were, perhaps, too negative. Everyone\nknew that we were against permissiveness and violence\nbut we didn't sell the point that violence and dis-\norder in our society are caused directly by the\nrhetoric, softness, and catering to the dissidents\nwhich the Democrats have engaged in. We just didn't\nmake the connection in the mind of the average voter.\n3.\nThe war issue became neutralized in the campaign.\nPeople are generally very satisfied with your handling\nof the war. Because they are and because it, there-\nfore, has become something of a non-issue, they\nweren't motivated to vote against those who have\nopposed you on the war. In short, the issue would\nhave been an enormous plus had you been the candidate\nbut it didn't significantly benefit our supporters or\nhurt our opponents. Evidence of this was in Massachu-\nsetts which has been the most \"dovish\" state in the\n-3-\nunion. There was a war referendum on the ballot --\n440,000 supported immediate withdrawal, 190,000\nsupported an all-out military victory and 711,000\nsupported the President's peace plan. At the same\ntime doves won big margins. Your success with the\npeace issue probably helped us generally, but it\ndidn't hurt our opponents.\n4.\nThe economic issue hurt badly. The pocketbook\nissue is always the gut issue in any campaign. It\nwas this year a question of fear more than fact;\nconcern over whether the country is heading into\nanother recession or, perhaps even depression\ncoupled with continued inflation, was a potent\nfactor in a number of areas. As Scammon has\npointed out in his book, the social issue is domi-\nnant only if there is no pocketbook issue. This\none obviously hurt us in California. (Also, how-\never, was the problem of Murphy's image, age and\nthe Technicolor retainer.) It hurt in a number of\nCongressional races particularly in the Midwest\nand in certain areas of particularly heavy\nunemployment (the vote in Seattle is an example).\nThe economic issue was compounded by the GM strike\nwhich unquestionably cost us the Indiana race --\nif we have lost it -- and made the Taft race closer\nthan it should have been. The general economic\nissue was further compounded by the farm problem.\nRepublicans did badly in those states in which high\nparity price support has always been the issue\n(Nebraska, the Dakotas, Kansas, for example); witness\nthe four contiguous House seats in which the farm\nissue beat us and a number of districts that we should\nhave won, but for the farm issue. We had been warned\nof discontent in the Farm Belt but it was too late to\ncounter it.\n5.\nIn general, we probably peaked too early. The Vice\nPresident peaked in late September, his line became\nvery predictable and with many voters \"old hat.'\nOnce committed to it, there was, of course, no way\nto turn around; perhaps, the tempo and approach could\nhave been varied. Clearly, the Vice President had a\nvery healthy impact in arousing our troops, raising\nmoney and generating campaign activity. (His Goodell\n-4-\nstrategy was a key to New York.) Once he had peaked,\nhowever, his line became increasingly ineffective\nin winning either Democrats or Independents.\nIn this general regard the Democrats scored against\nus, by engendering sympathy. They charged us with\ndirty campaigning and excess spending, which tended\nto make us appear to be \"overkilling.\" They were\nclever in making this more of an issue than it should\nhave been. The press continually reported that we\nwere outspending the Democrats 5 to 1 but failed to\nreport that approximately $3 million was being spent\non Democratic campaigns by the Council for a Livable\nWorld, the McGovern Fund ($1 million alone), COPE\nand the National Committee for an Effective Congress.\nI am told this issue killed Burton even though Moss\noutspent Burton 2 to 1. Winthrop Rockefeller was a\ncase in point, as was the sympathy for Lawton Chiles\n\"poor boy\" campaign.\nPeople became tired of the campaign ten days to 2\nweeks before it was over. We took the blame for\nexcessive spending in campaigning. This hurt us as\npeople became sick of politics and the usual charges\nand counter charges which they then tended to dismiss.\n6.\nWe made significant inroads with the blue collar, white\nethnic vote, George Gallup's comments to the contrary\nnotwithstanding. This vote elected Beall, defeated\nDuffey, elected Buckley and put Prouty over big. We\nare scoring in this area because of law and order and\npatriotism. (We are conducting an analysis of\nselected blue collar districts to test this conclusion.)\nProuty, who was a colorless, ineffective campaigner,\ncarried Democratic blue collar wards in Burlington\nbecause of their antipathy toward his excessively\nliberal opponent. The same happened in Baltimore.\nDodd took the blue collars away from Duffy. Buckley\nswept the white ethnic, blue collar vote. Significantly\nwe did well in areas where unions we have begun to win\nover are strong (construction workers) ; badly, where we\nhaven't made progress ( (the UAW, steelworkers).\n-5-\n7.\nAs in every campaign, there were mistakes made\nin individual states which hurt us.\nTexas: For weeks prior to the election, George\nBush was convinced that he had the election won\nprovided no one rocked the boat. He refused to\nallow us to use some very derogatory information\nabout Bentsen. He resisted any ads -- positive\nor negative -- and refused to attack Bentsen. We\nprobably should have forced him to do more. Dick\nScammon thinks that Bush lost it for this reason\nand because he ignored the social issue and tried\nto be more liberal than Bentsen.\nMaryland: In the case of Beall, he similarly\nrefused to attack. We ended up doing it for\nhim in a variety of ways and the political situa-\ntion in Maryland reversed itself dramatically in\nthe last week of the campaign.\nFlorida: Clearly the split in the party cost us the\nstate.\nIllinois: There was no way ever to elect Smith but\nhis campaign grew excessively negative and, I am\ntold, turned the liberal moderates in the Chicago\nsuburbs sour. Also Ogilvie has serious splits in\nthe party (there are some serious warnings here for\n1972).\nOhio: The state ticket scandal cost us the Governor-\nship.\nMaine: With just a little help from the national\nlevel we might have elected a Governor (Irwin was\nhurt by the feeling the state was written off).\nPennsylvania: Shafer was so disliked, no Republican\ncould succeed him. Scott won, which indicates the\nGovernorship was purely a state issue.\nNew Jersey: Our candidate made classic mistakes,\nshifting positions and creating distrust.\n-6-\nMichigan: There was no hope without a candidate.\n8.\nNegativism. Rightly or wrongly, the Democrats and\nthe press made us (the Vice President in particular)\nappear to be too negative. As indicated in my memo\non the Broder articles, we need to stress more and\nmore the positive theme of accomplishment; that we\nare not only against unlawfulness and disorder but\nthat we are doing things to control it and that we\nare reforming Government. We need to promote our\nrecord of accomplishment as we have done so well in\nforeign policy.\nConclusion: We made maximum use of national media. Our\nanalysis shows that your campaign resulted in giving us\ntwice the coverage the Democrats got. Without this, I\nam convinced the result would have been much worse because,\nespecially in the closing days, the effect of your\ncampaign was to take the economic issue out of the news.\nAs indicated above, in hindsight, I think we could have\nwon a few more, particularly in the Senate, and with\nstronger party machinery could have done better with our\nGovernorships.\nOn balance, we did better than the press and the pundits\ncredit us with doing. If you accept the premise that it\nis inherently difficult for Presidential popularity to\nrub off on local candidates, then we did very well,\nparticularly in the House.\nFinally, I do not think the elections reflect any loss of\nsupport for you. To the contrary, I am convinced that had\nthis been our election, we would have won big.\nCharles W. Colson\nSTRICTLY\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nCONFIDENTIAL\nWASHINCTON\nDETERMINED TO BE AN\nADMINISTRATIVE MARKING\nE.O, 12065, Section 6-102\nBy contriss NARS, Date 6-5-80\nNovember 12, 1970\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nH. R. HALDEMAN\nFROM:\nMURRAY CHOTINER\nRE:\nCAMPAIGN MANAGERS\nCALIFORNIA\nMurphy for Senate/Bill Roberts\nRoberts knows his business but too many times I would\ncall the Murphy headquarters and was informed that he\nwas at his own office, which means, like so many other\nprofessional campaign managers, he had other \"fish to\nfry\" which required his attention.\nLike too many professional campaign managers who have\ntheir own agencies -- he was inclined to concentrate on\nmedia which is commissionable - - as a result precinct\norganization, direct mail and the volunteer side of a\ncampaign is relegated to second place.\nILLINOIS\nSmith for Senate/Jim Mack\nNice guy but never seemed to be able to give an answer,\nwhich meant he had to check with other people. He may\nhave been the manager in name but not in fact. I also felt\nI was merely relaying messages to \"someone\" through him.\nSTRICTLY\nCONFIDENTIAL\nSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL\n2\nINDIANA\nRoudebush for Senate/Gordon Durnil\nDurnil is a fine person but obviously without authority.\nEverything went through Keith Bulen. Bulen had so many\nthings going at the same time that sometimes it was hard to\nknow which project received his undivided attention.\nMICHIGAN\nRomney for Senate/Al Boyer\nHe is very personable, has good ideas, but I always felt he\nlacked political judgment.\nMISSOURI\nDanforth for Senate/Wayne Millsap\nMillsap is a lawyer and was one of the hardest working\nmanagers of all those with whom I came into contact. He is\nknowledgeable.\nNEW MEXICO\nCarter for Senate/Dennis Howe\nHe was a hard worker, was knowledgeable, but I always\nfelt he didn't have enough confidence in himself.\nDomenici for Governor/Jim Morris\nHe seemed to lack the necessary experience to wage a state-\nwide campaign.\nNORTH DAKOTA\nKleppe for Senate/Jim Groot\nHe was imported from out of state through Jim Allison. He\nseemed particularly well-qualified and knew what he was doing.\nCONFIDENTIAL\nSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL\n3\nOHIO\nTaft for Senate/John Kelley\nThis is another case where he didn't seem to have either\nauthority to act or confidence to do SO.\nUTAH\nBurton for Senate/Brad Hays\nExceptionally well-qualified. The only objection to Brad\nis that he was spread between Utah and Wyoming, with\nexcursions to Virginia and elsewhere. He was part of the\nRoy Pfautch organization.\nOther possible objections to Brad's operation were that\nthe local people resented to the very end the importation\nof an out of state manager and the fact that he always\nwasn't available on the scene.\nWYOMING\nWold for Senate/Roy Pfautch\nRoy is very knowledgeable but, here again, was another\ncase of a professional organization taking on too much work.\nThe result was -- he was not available and Brad Hays had\nto come over from Utah to assist.\nGeneral observations are:\n1.\nMy contacts in most instances were with the candidates.\nTherefore, other than those listed above, I cannot give you im-\npressions of managers in other States.\n2.\nProfessional managers, strictly speaking, are not the\nanswer. We need Party people who are campaign oriented with\nthe ability to conduct campaigns.\nSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL\nSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL\n4\n3.\nThey should not be spread too thin. A statewide\ncampaign is all a good campaign manager should endeavor\nto handle.\nIn short, we need more good campaign managers.\ntramary\nSTRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nNovember 12, 1970\nMESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nMURRAY CHOTINER\nSUBJECT: PENNSYLVANIA\nWith the exception of Senator Hugh Scott, the election in\nPennsylvania was something of a debacle.\nSteps to regroup and rebuild should start early if we hope\nto have any chance of carrying the State in 1972, as well as\nrecapturing the Governorship in 1974.\nWith that thought in mind, I met with Bob Kunzig this\nmorning. I will be meeting with State Chairman Cliff Jones\nthis afternoon and will talk with Senator Scott when he\nreturns from Mexico on Sunday. I will also meet with Jack\nJordan, former State Chairman, and now at HUD.\nYou will be importuned to appoint Ray Broderick and/or\nRay Shafer to an important post.\nMay I respectfully suggest that doing so will not contribute\nanything significant towards rebuilding the GOP in Pen-\nnsylvania, according to well-informed sources.\nAt the moment, the only two names that appear to be on\nthe horizon for future public office in Pennsylvania are Bob\nKunzig and Dave Maxwell, formerly Insurance Commissioner\nfor Pennsylvania, and presently General Counsel at HUD.\nJummy"
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