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This file contains:
From Teeter to Mitchell RE: Teeter's final anslysis of the first wave of campaign polling. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From Strachan to Magruder RE: calling into question Teeter's polling data, particularly his analysis of certain demographic groups. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/21/1972
From Teeter to Mitchell RE: formulating a campaign theme based on recent polling results. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/12/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 46-2
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This file contains:
From Teeter to Mitchell RE: Teeter's final anslysis of the first wave of campaign polling. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/11/1972
From Strachan to Magruder RE: calling into question Teeter's polling data, particularly his analysis of certain demographic groups. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/21/1972
From Teeter to Mitchell RE: formulating a campaign theme based on recent polling results. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/12/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Type
Document Description
46
2
5/11/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Teeter to Mitchell RE: Teeter's final
anslysis of the first wave of campaign
polling. Handwritten notes added by
unknown. 8 pgs.
46
2
4/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Magruder RE: calling into
question Teeter's polling data, particularly
his analysis of certain demographic groups.
2 pgs.
46
2
4/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Teeter to Mitchell RE: formulating a
campaign theme based on recent polling
results. 3 pgs.
Monday, March 19, 2012
Page 1 of 1
Item N
Committee for the Re-election of the President
MEMORANDUM
May 11, 1972
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
CONF IDENTIAL /EYES ONLY
By Omp
NARS, Date 6-16-80
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Final First Wave Analysis
During the past several weeks we have analyzed the first wave
polling results utilizing a number of the most advanced statistical
techniques available. This analysis has enabled us to identify
the most important independent variables which influence presi-
dential vote and to develop a very sophisticated analysis package
which can be run and interpreted rapidly on all of our subsequent
polling.
While it is not necessary to have knowledge of, these techniques in
order to use the results, I would be happy to go over them in more
detail with you anytime.
Our conclusions from this analysis are:
1. Past party voting behavior is the single most important factor
which affects the presidential vote. The classification of voters
into behavioral Republicans, Democrats, or Ticket-splitters accounts
for almost three times as much of the variance why people vote for
or against the President as is explained by any other variable.
This appears to be particularly true in Wisconsin, Indiana, and
California.
2. The next most important factors affecting the Presidential
vote are the voters' perceptions of the President's trust and his
issue handling ability. Trust is best defined by the following
variables -- honesty, open minded, and just. Seemingly, these
personality traits are related to perceptions of credibility. To
a lesser degree the presidential vote is related to perceptions of
competence -- experienced, trained, and informed.
Most voters have a general perception of how well the President
handles issues and problems overall and that appears to be more
important to voting than is their perception of his handling of
any one or two issues. This overall issue handling ability seems
to be perceived by the voters as a single personality dimension
similar in many ways to the dimensions of trust, competence, etc.
-2-
The only individual issues which appear to have any significant
independent effect on voting are Vietnam inflation, and general
?
unrest. Vietnam and inflation were also, fortunately, the issues
that the President was seen as handling well, and his ability to
handle the general unrest problem was rated about equally to that
of his opponents.
Those issues on which the President is rated relatively poorly --
?
crime, drugs, and unemployment --- do not appear to affect presidential
voting to any major degree. This is particularly true of crime and
unemployment. Apparently the President is seen as having done a
good job on those problems that the voters think have gotten better
overall, while he is seen as having done a poor job on those pro-
blems which have become worse during the last few years. There
also appears to be little believability that the President will
make much difference in the crime or drug problems.
malek
3. Demographic bloc voting is significantly less important than
past party voting behavior, and less important than perceptions of
the candidates trust, competence, and issue handling ability. Once
party behavior is taken into account there is little difference in
the vote for various demographic groups. In other words, differences
in the rate that various demographic groups support Nixon can be
explained almost entirely by party preferences rather than member-
ship in any particular demographic group. The factors having some
but small effect on the vote are age, income, and education. Gen-
erally speaking, voters who are older, have higher incomes, and
have more education seem to have a greater propensity to vote for
the President, primarily because of their propensity to vote Repub-
lican more than as a result of their demographic group. Bloc voting
against the President is evident only with a limited number of
groups -- blacks, young voters (18 to 25 year olds especially in
California), and Jewish voters in New York. All appear to oppose
the President to a greater degree than would be predicted by their
past voting behavior or party preference.
It appears to be possible to improve the vote for the President in
several demographic groups where he is weak. We have made these
conclusions from our analysis of the data from the individual voting
blocs:
A. Older voters (60 years and over) are the single
most important group in the election. In Missouri
and Oregon, the President is especially weak. Taxes,
inflation, and the economy are the important issues.
B. The President is running very poorly with young voters
(18 to 24). Heavy turnout and registration by this
group could be devastating. The percentage of Repub-
lican support among youth is very small. Vietnam and
the economy are the issues. We have special weakness
in California and Wisconsin.
-3-
C. The vote for Nixon among blacks varies greatly. The
President is running well with this group in the south,
the border states, and New Jersey and New York. There
is a severe credibility problem and racial appeals to
this group are unlikely to work. Pocketbook issues will
be important.
D. Spanish-Americans are supporting the President to a
greater degree than expected. The support appears to
be flexible. We could expect to improve our support
with this group by at least 15% in California.
E. Ethnic support in Philadelphia is very weak and seems to
be causing our poor showing there.
4. The importance of each of the vote determining factors varies
considerably from state to state. Generally, the relative importance
of these factors in affecting the vote is listed below:
Party
Nixon Trust
Comparative Issue Handling Ability
Age
Opponents Competence
Income
Religion
Education
After party, the voters' perceptions of Nixon trust and comparative
issue handling ability are the factors which have the greatest
influence on the President's vote.
The factors in the individual state studies are shown in Attachment
A. Attachment B graphically shows the importance of these factors.
5. While the President was in relatively good shape against any of
his potential opponents in January, there was a relatively small
undecided vote for that point in time and there appears to be some
limits on the President's potential vote. There are relatively
large groups of voters who vote for the President on all of the
sample ballots and who vote against the President regardless of
who his opponent is on all the sample ballots. This indicates to
me that once the Democratic nominee is selected the undecided vote
may be very small. This, along with the probability that the Demo-
cratic candidate will increase his support and that the ratio will
get closer during September and October, means that we should attempt
to build as large a lead as possible between now and the national
conventions on the theory that we will lose ground after the con-
ventions. Moreover, every point we can gain between now and the
conventions will come with less effort and at less cost than those
percentage points needed during the fall campaign.
-4-
6. There does not appear to be any definite ideological basis for
voting on any of the ballots. That is, very few people if any are
voting for the President because they feel he is particularly con-
servative or liberal, or that people are voting against the President
because they feel he is too conservative or too liberal.
7. The Vice-President's approval rating is somewhat lower than the
President's in almost all of the states but follows up and down
about in line with the President's. I cannot identify any particular
segment of voters with whom the Vice-President is either adding or
subtracting from the ticket.
8. The net effect of a Wallace third party candidacy was very
small in January and has undoubtedly changed since then. We should
defer any hard conclusions as to whether we want him on or off the
ballot until after the second wave of polling, but my inclination
at this point is that we would do better without him on the ballot.
9. There is no question but that we have a very realistic chance
to carry any or all of the big states -- New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Texas, and California and we should
continue to make a maximum effort in those states. California
appears to me to be the one state where we may not be doing as
well as we might be at this time and where there are indications
of future problems. Voters in California seem to have a more fixed
perception of the President. That is, of course, logical in that
California voters probably know him better than those in any other
state.
Recommendations
Based on our analysis, we make the following recommendations:
1. A ticket-splitter analysis should be done in each of the priority
states by precinct or ward and township. For the rest of the country,
the analysis should be done by county. This is undoubtedly the most
efficient way to locate ticket-splitters and to develop priority
areas for both our organizational and communications efforts. More-
over, it will allow us to identify Democratic areas which have some
propensity to split their ticket, and from these areas we may be
able to cause ticket-splitting in favor of the President.
2. With apparently small undecided vote, a strong organizational
effort will be critical. I would recommend putting a dispropor-
tionate share of our resources into organizational personnel to
assure that this effort is maximized. I also think our organiza-
tional effort should be structured so that we have the flexibility
to concentrate our people in a few states late in the campaign,
even to the degree of assigning one to each county or congressional
district for the top priority states in late September and October.
-5-
Special organizational effort should be made to improve the
President's voting strength in Philadelphia (especially with ethnics),
New York City (outside Manhattan), Buffalo, Los Angeles (Orange
County), Baltimore suburbs, Montgomery County (Maryland), Mid-Texas
(Austin), rural Missouri, and Kenosha/Racine Wisconsin.
3. As indicated before, I think the development of an overall
theme or idea for the campaign is imperative and that this should
be done before the Democratic convention and should center around
the President's hopes and aspirations for our country. To be effec-
tive it must be positive and give people the hope that many of our
problems can and will improve.
4. As the President's overall issue handling ability is more impor-
tant to determining vote than his handling of any individual issue,
those issues on which he is perceived as handling well should be
emphasized and those he is seen as handling poorly should only be
used if we have an impressive story to tell or if the appeal is
designed for some particular group.
5. We should emphasize the following personal attributes in our
media programs:
Trust - Just
Honest
Open Minded
Competence - Experienced
Trained
Informed
Competent
It is possible to use the President's ability to handle issues in
communicating the above attributes. No special effort needs to be
directed to make the President appear -- warm, relaxed, and having
a sense of humor. To the extent that it is possible to convey
these characteristics, we should do so, but not at the expense of
the trust and competence variables.
6. Special efforts should be implemented to maximize the President's
strength with specific voting blocs.
A. A campaign directed at older Americans through the
voting bloc group should be given top priority. Maximum
available resources should be allocated into this program.
A massive turnout drive should be implemented, and a
supportive direct mail effort should be considered.
Because of the current high level of registration, no
special effort in this regard needs to be made to register
older voters. Special emphasis should be made to improve
our level of support with older Americans in the follow-
ing priorities:
-6-
Missouri (Primarily Rural)
Oregon
Texas
Wisconsin
Maryland
Indiana
California
Pennsylvania
New York
Taxes and inflation should be given emphasis.
B. All registration drives among young voters should be
stopped. Our primary objective with this group should
be low turnout and persuasion of Democrats and swing
voters to vote for the President. Areas for special
emphasis to improve support among young voters should
be:
Wisconsin
California
Maryland
Pennsylvania
New York
Primary issue emphasis should be made on Vietnam, jobs
for youth, and pollution.
In meeting our objective of converting Democrats and
independents, we must be careful not to direct our young
voter campaign solely at our own voters. To keep turnout
at a minimum we should attempt to keep the marijuana
referenda now proposed for California and Michigan off
the ballot if possible.
C. The Jewish vote bloc should implement a program to
improve the President's strength with this voter group
in New York state. Careful consideration should be
given to the question of parochial schools with this
group. Our data indicates support of aid to parochial
schools may be a negative with Jewish voters.
D. In order to carry several critical northern states we
will need to carry a greater percentage of blacks than
we did in 1968. Because of our credibility problems,
we must be careful in making any racial appeals so that
our efforts are not counterproductive.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
MARKET OPINION RESEARCH
ATTACHMENT A
CALIFORNIA
NEW JERSEY
OHIO
TEXAS
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
WISCONSIN
INDIANA
Party Type
21%
Party Type
7%
Opp. Issue
11%
Nixon Trust
10%
Age
12%
Opp.
Party Type
29%
Party Type
14%
Competence
9%
Opp. Trust
4
Nixon Trust
6
Party Type
6
Party Type
8
Party Type
7
Age
8
Party Type
7
Opp. Issue
11
Age
4
Opp.
Education
5
Nixon Issue
8
Nixon Issue
7
Income
3
Competence
6
Income
7
Income
9
Income
4
Age
4
Age
7
Nixon Trust
5
Opp. Issue
3
Age
5
Age
5
Nixon Trust
4
Nixon
Opp.
Nixon
Opp. Issue
4
Religion
2
Strength
3
Opp. Issue
4
Strength
3
Strength
5
Opp. Issue
2
Nixon Issue
4
Income
4
Nixon Trust
2
Nixon
Income
4
Nixon Issue
3
Opp. Issue
3
Education
2
Age
4
Competence
3
Education
4
Opp. Trust
1
Religion
3
Religion
2
Income
2
Nixon
Religion
2
Sex
3
Nixon
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon Issue
2
Opp.
Religion
2
Competence
2
Education
1
Strength
1
Nixon Trust
2
Competence
1
Opp. Trust
1
Sex
2
Opp.
Sex
2
Nixon
Education
1
Nixon Issue
2
Nixon Trust
1
Strength
2
Nixon Trust
1
Competence
1
Education
1
Opp. Trust
1
Nixon Issue
1
Education
2
Income
1
Opp. Trust
1
Nixon Issue
1
Opp.
Nixon
Nixon
Competence
1
Nixon
Opp.
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon
Strength
1
Religion
*
Competence
1
Competence
2
Competence
*
Competence
1
Nixon
Nixon
Opp.
Sex
*
Strength
1
Opp.
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Opp.
Competence
1
Strength
*
Strength
1
Competence
*
Competence
1
Nixon
Opp. Trust
1
Opp.
Religion
1
Strength
*
Sex
*
Opp. Issue
1
Strength
*
Nixon
Education
*
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Opp.
Strength
*
Opp.
Religion
1
Opp. Trust
*
Sex
*
Strength
*
Strength
*
Competence
*
Sex
*
Sex
*
* Less than 1%
Numbers following each factor indicate percentage of influence on the presidential vote.
ATTACHMENT B
NIXON - MUSKIE
Rep.
.9
T-S,Dem. ,Marg.
.4
Nixon Trust
Nixon Trust
Dem.
Hi
Lo
.6
.2
.1
T-S, Marg.
Dems.
T-S, Marg.
8.
.4
.4
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Muskie
Comp.
Comp.
Trust
Trust
Trust
Trust
Lo
Hi
Lo
Hi
Lo
Hi
.9
.6
.5
.2
.5
.1
Muskie
Muskie
Nixon
Nixon
Issue
Issue
Issue
Issue
Lo
Hi
Hi
Lo
.9
.5
.6
.3
Muskie
Muskie
Issue
Issue
Lo
Hi
.5
.2
Prot.
Other
Religions
.7
.5
Numbers under boxes indicate probability of voting for Nixon. The
higher the number, the greater the probability of voting for Nixon.
[Item N-2]
Cpril 21, 1072
JLB
F.':
CODE
SUBJUCT:
Siction's Enterin
more
As ve discussed this norming, I reviewed Cooton's Interio
Brolysis Pevert carefully. I mond 1 1/2 hours with Cod
Carrish asking cusctions regarding the conclusions, format,
and analysis procedure. come very real problems
with the text and nithodolow, the conclusion of the on
randum poses a Very corious cuestion regarding the whole
concaion theast. as conclusion on Fame ) is: "Denocraphic
bloc voting in significantly less important than voting
behavior in affection the election. the only exceptions to
this rule BIJ blacks, young voters in California, and Jawish
voters in -- York."
Bither the commain is organized recardless of the results
of the nolling date or the nolling data is wrong. All the
WORK by arik, and Valed's voter blocs have Leen
ained at the arounded that particular demographic ground 111
be decisive in this election. the annoals have been at airl
at Anchen, Frani a speaking, blue coller, labor, etc. OM
the conclusion the polling is that onl" blacks, yours
votume in Califor in and Jennah voters in A "ork are
impresanc. 02 tuit's E..3 CTT, sereone much nore canable
than Taul should 10 in C used of Blacks, Jun Pletz
should take all AL: trodus to California, and Present Clould
ordersly orders full time in 11 York with whatever recources
n2 cands to capture the Jodia vote.
1... real purpose of this long, rather ranbling recorander is
to raise the viole cuention of Loster's condillity and evice
to the CC aim. is continues to grand leas than one Card
are in milington. in you know, Rob 137 been yer" inter-
without in matine vica his to review what are resut: to A Lic
States. .rd., the Probing 325 Joon cancelle! from here
twice, Date tite responsabling has been sade even more difficult
with Tootor's alsohot.
- 2 -
Ivero in one fired "I that ou and I should revi 27 THE ally
conserning the is 0 with invoice information Jonel
ty : molls. to C a Very scholarly attack 00: :
C.K. I orts 1,0 2017 exery within C.. C
rementic Council.
GS/jb
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE. NW
April 12, 1972
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20006
(202) 333.0920
DETERMINED TO BE AN
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E,O. 12065, Section 6-102
By EMP NARS, Date 6-16-80
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE HONORABLE JOHN N. MITCHELL
FROM:
ROBERT M. TEETER
SUBJECT:
Campaign Theme
R.M.T.by.barrich
As we begin to focus the campaign exclusively on the general elec-
tion and as the President increases his travel schedule, I think
it important that we develop a central theme or idea for the campaign.
It is important that the President's campaign have one central idea --
a message that everyone knows by election day to which various state-
ments and actions can be tied. It does not necessarily have to be a
slogan, although one could emerge later. The main point is that the
campaign have a central idea or message that the majority of voters
find attractive and would support.
Based on my analysis of our first wave data and the other research
data I have looked at, I am concerned that the President is viewed
as a tactician without an overall strategy or master plan for the
country. This causes voters to interpret many of his positions and
programs as things done for political expediency or to appease
specific special interest groups rather than as part of an overall
plan to move this country toward a perceivable set of goals or
objectives. A majority of voters do not apparently think the
President has such a master plan. No one seems to know how the
President would like to leave the country after eight years "for his
children and grandchildren."
I think it is imperative for the President and for the campaign to
articulate his master plan to the voters and to show how the President's
positions and programs fit into the plan. This should become the cam-
paign theme -- the idea that ties everything together.
While this is important for every campaign and every President, I
think it is particularly important for this one. It is a relatively
well-accepted fact that he does not have any great personal appeal
:
and will not be re-elected on the basis of personality or personal
appeal. Moreover, because of the current issue structure and the
type of problems he has had to deal with, I think we would have
trouble trying to fight the campaign on a series of specific issues.
As an incumbent, the President is always open to the charge that
he should have done more. More importantly, the general attitude
in the country toward government, and politicans is very negative.
If the voters know and understand what the President is trying to
do for the country and how each of his programs are a part of that
plan, it should be easier to gain support for his programs.
Also, the fact that voters are concerned about more issues now than
has been the case in previous campaigns and also because the solu-
tions to many of these problems are complex, it will be difficult
for the President to attract the ticket-splitter on the basis of
specific issues. Rather, he is going to have to appeal to these
swing voters on the basis of a set of well-articulated goals for
the country and further showing that his programs are moving the
country toward these goals, and that he is more capable of leading
the country toward these goals than his opponent.
The essential elements of this theme are what the President believes
to be the destiny of the nation and the element of hope. The
President could do this well. It would be positively received in
the press and it is the type of approach which the public apparently
wants and would favorably receive. The President may find that a
"destiny speech" is the appropriate vehicle to deliver such a theme.
It would allow him to stay on the high road and elevate the level
of the campaign. It would be something he could develop and use
now as President and yet carry into the campaign. It would give
the campaign a common thread with which to tie things together
while giving many of his individual statements and positions a
prospective which they currently lack, yet be general enough so
that the President would not be trapped by events between now and
the election.
By giving the voters the idea that he has a master plan, the President
would go a long way in solving the credibility problem. If the
voters could see his various positions in the context of an overall
strategy the President would be less suspect of being political.
This approach gives the administration more breath and depth by tying
things together such as China, Vietnam, welfare reform, bussing,
economic controls, revenue sharing etc. It would also emphasize
the complexity of the job and give us the benefit of being evaluated
on the record as a whole.
While I recognize that the President should not get into a position
of over promising, and also realizing that anything he says must be
believable, I think his basic theme must restore the element of hope.
I believe our data clearly shows that the people have lost hope that
things can and will get better. More recently, there are indications
that the public is looking for someone to restore this feeling of
hope and optimism which has characteristically been the American
attitude.
-3-
I have the feeling that the President has been very close to this
1dea several times when he has talked about the loss of the American
spirit and desire to be number one, but his choice of words has left
him just off the mark. Possibly a slight change of words or emphasis
could make this basic idea catch hold. Also, I have the feeling
that the President has used this approach to defend unpopular posi-
tions in the past, such as the SST. He has left the impression that
we should strive to be number one so that we will be better than
everyone else, not just for the sake of excellence itself. This is
a subtle difference which has occurred in our society in the past
10-20 years
We have the advantage of time to experiment with this approach over
the next several weeks while the Democrats are involved with the
primaries. The various domestic appearances which the President makes
during the spring and summer present an excellent opportunity to try
to find the combination of words and ideas that catch. Possibly
the President needs a "new" inaugural address to be used on some
occasion when people least expect it, such as during a campus appear-
ance or before ethnics. It may be possible to tie this approach to
the Bicentennial.
CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY