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This file contains:
From Haldeman to Higby RE: Muskie's public image in comparison to that of RN. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/12/1972
From Hallett to Colson RE: the main points of a series entitled "The Politicians and the People" by Broder and Johnson. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/3/1972
Transcript of a conversation between "M" and "G," possibly referring to Magruder and Strachan, respectively. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 1/13/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Teeter's reports of polling information to the Attorney General. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/13/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: guidelines for campaign polling involving the memo recipient and the Attorney General. Handwritten note added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/21/1971
Handwritten notes involving Teeter and his forwarding of information to the Attorney General and Magruder. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 2/3/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 46-11
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26146300
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WHSF: Contested, 46-11
description
This file contains:
From Haldeman to Higby RE: Muskie's public image in comparison to that of RN. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/12/1972
From Hallett to Colson RE: the main points of a series entitled "The Politicians and the People" by Broder and Johnson. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/3/1972
Transcript of a conversation between "M" and "G," possibly referring to Magruder and Strachan, respectively. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], 1/13/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Teeter's reports of polling information to the Attorney General. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/13/1972
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: guidelines for campaign polling involving the memo recipient and the Attorney General. Handwritten note added by unknown. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 12/21/1971
Handwritten notes involving Teeter and his forwarding of information to the Attorney General and Magruder. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 2/3/1972
citationUrl
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Type
Document Description
46
11
1/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Higby RE: Muskie's
public image in comparison to that of RN. 1
pg.
46
11
1/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Colson RE: the main points
of a series entitled "The Politicians and the
People" by Broder and Johnson.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 8 pgs.
46
11
1/13/1972
Campaign
Other Document
Transcript of a conversation between "M"
and "G," possibly referring to Magruder and
Strachan, respectively. 9 pgs.
46
11
1/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: Teeter's
reports of polling information to the
Attorney General. 1 pg.
46
11
12/21/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Strachan to Haldeman RE: guidelines
for campaign polling involving the memo
recipient and the Attorney General.
Handwritten note added by unknown. 3 pgs.
46
11
2/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
Handwritten notes involving Teeter and his
forwarding of information to the Attorney
General and Magruder. 1 pg.
Monday, March 19, 2012
Page 1 of 1
[Item N-1]
Teeter
L.
January 12, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MR. LAWRENCE HIGBY
FROM:
H, R. HALDEMAN
In his analysis, Hallett makes the point that Muskie's public image
is everything the President's is not: strong, reflective, prudent,
even wise.
The President on the other hand, is viewed as a man on the make,
ashamed of and constantly running away from his past, manipulator,
unsure of his convictions, tactician instead of strategist, grand visier
of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for eloquence. Further, the
American people do not think he has any broad conceptional framework
or any sense of direction or purpose.
These are arguable points and they should be pursued by some valid
polling as soon as possible. In other words, we need to test the Nixon
image versus the Muskie image against the hypotheses laid out by
Hallett.
HRH:kb
[Iter
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 3, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM: DOUG HALLETT
Broder's and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians
and the People" are the following:
(1) People are less angry, less passionate, less pessimistic about the
future than they were a year ago. What was analyzed last year as fear about
the future has now turned to apprehension. While two-thirds of the people
surveyed still feel the country is no better off than it was in 1968, there is
less immediate concern about short-run disintegration and collapse.
(2) The President's strength has increased considerably as a by-product of
the China trip, the new economic policy, etc. On the other hand, the Pres-
ident's initiatives have also made him seem more unpredictable, more mys-
terious, more inconsistent than he did before to many Americans, He is the
first choice of a minority of the electorate. At a time when people are look-
ing for direction and purpose in their leaders, the President remains a remote
and uncertain figure.
(3) There is considerable confusion and indecision about 1972. Never have
political loyalties and allegiances been weaker. Party structures are almost
meaningless in most areas of the country. People want to vote for the man,
not the party. With the possible exception of the economy, no clear-cut issues
are likely to stand out this election year.
(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. People
are alienated from their government; they feel powerless; they question
whether their leaders can respond to their fundamental concerns. 60 percent
do not believe their leaders tell them the truth.
(5) The youth vote is likely to be smaller than the vote of the electorate-at
large and young people are not likely to participate in large numbers in the
political process. While young people are hostile to the President, they will
not have a significant effect on the election.
page 2
(6) Muskie is the only Democratic contender both known to a majority of
the electorate and known positively. Kennedy and Humphrey are better
known, but less liked. While he has potential, however, Muskie has not
yet developed the broad base of support and respect he would need to defeat
the President.
(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders.
While many people agree with their statements, they sense they are not
tolerant enough to be President. Wallace and Agnew are too sure of them-
selves.
It is important to note that Broder's and Johnson's conclusions are
based on a distorted sampling of the electorate. They interviewed only 300
people. All pollsters agree that in-depth interviews with only a small samp-
ling permits the interviewers to reinforce their own preconceived notions.
Broder's and Johnson's sample does break down parallel to the 1968 election
results, but it is far from representative. Only one Southern state was in-
cluded in the survey. 26 percent of the sample were new voters -- and half
of these were college students. These and other distortions have led to con-
clusions at variance with more scientific polls. Whereas polls indicate that
blacks have gained confidence in the system in recent years, for example,
Broder and Johnson assert they are more alienated.
On the other hand, I think the basic theme of the articles the
tion issue is accurately portrayed. Nothing else could account for the wide
variation between popular support for the President's basic stands and sup-
port for his leadership. Nothing else could account for the President's dom-
inance of the issues and his relatively weak showing, both in the trial heats
and in the confidence polls.
The following is my point-by-point analysis:
(1) People are less pessimistic about the future -- This is true. The cam-
puses have calmed. The doomsday rhetoric has quieted. People are begin-
ning to believe, for the first time, that the war is ending and that the economy
will not fall apart. Such events as the Moscow and Peking trips even show
promise of leading the way to a better future.
Unfortunately, however, the President's success in the areas listed above
is not necessarily translateable into votes at the polls. The President's sup-
port is based on professionalism, not on any personal or psychic or intel-
lectual loyalty. People expect the President to be an effective tactician. In-
versely, if he is not -- if his professionalism shows any weakness - - his base
of support is likely to decline. While it will be hard for the Democrats to
page 3
counter if everything is going alright next fall, it one or more of the above
issues have gone bad the President may not receive credit for anything he
has done. One weakness in the chain will cast into doubt the long-run via-
bility of every link, leading the way to such questions as: "Why couldn't
we have gotten out of Vietnam faster? Why didn't the President impose wage-
price controls earlier
Indeed, the President's successes may even work against him in a curious
sense. In 1968, the President was acceptable to many people to whom he
would not normally be acceptable. People such as Walter Lipoman were
for him because they thought we needed a tough, flexible operator to deal with
the kind of problems we had then. Now that the immediate technical prob-
lems have been solved, now that the wounds have been healed to some degree,
we can afford we may need other kinds of leadership, The same peo-
ple who wanted an operational President in 1968 may be looking for a philisophical
one in 1972. They are no longer scared about the present; they are concerned
about the future -- and they want someone who can help define it for them.
As it stands, the President does not fill the bill.
(2) The President's strength has increased as a result of dramatic new in-
itiatives, but these same initiatives have made him a more remote figure
to many Americans. I don't think there is any question but that the President
has gained as a result of his initiatives and is much better positioned for the
campaign than he was six months ago. What is remarkable is that he has
gained so little, standing now only 2 or 3 points above where he was six
months ago.
In my view, this is our fault Given the President's public personality
when he entered office, given the over-inflated rhetoric of the sixties, it
is not surprising that people were suspicious of promise and waiting for
performance when the President took office. We recognized this in the first
six months to a year of the administration. In the last two years, however,
we have done virtually everything imaginable to undermine our own credi-
bility and consistency.
mush
In 1969, we were going "forward together. " In 1970, we had a "New Fed-
eralism. 11 By 1971, we had hypoed it up to a "New American Revolution. "
Who knows what it will be this year? The Second Coming, perhaps?
We show no consistency of effort and commitment. The welfare program
is pronounced the greatest domestic program since the New Deal, but we
expend far more effort trying to place G. Harrold Carswell on the Supreme
Court. We start off with a very exciting and challenging commitment to
page 4
the first five years of life, but denounce day-care (no, middle-class day-
care) as commiting the government to communal living.
Even our major efforts have a tinsely glow to them. The China trip and
the economic policy may be admirable in themselves -- they are certainly
incredible as they were ballyhooed by us. And all the time we are doing
this, we tell the American people it was the previous administration which
is responsible for overheated rhetoric and expectations and that we are
the ones who are calming things down.
In the short run, of course, there have been benefits from our dodges and
turns and from our Junior Chamber of Commerce boosterism. Maybe Agnew
has even scored once or twice. But in the long run, I think, we have under-
mined the seriousness of the President and his Presidency. It is no wonder
that today we find the public doubting anything we do, seeing in us instability
when their greatest want greater than any special-interest need -- is for
just the opposite.
(3) 1972 is uncertain. With the possible exception of the economy, no issue
-- concern, no political allegiance, no party-loyalty seems likely to dom-
inate. There is opportunity in the disintegration of the nation's institutions
church, family, town, university, union. There is opportunity to reach
and win over large numbers of newly-independent voters. It is not oppor-
tunity of which we have taken the fullest advantage. We have not allowed
ourselves to restructure public dialogue, provide new direction and new
loyalties. While we have solved short-term problems and may benefit from
having done so, we have not added new certainty or direction to the public
mood.
Just the reverse, in fact. We have remained committed to all the folderol
of the past superficial 'Presidentialism, 11 Billy Graham home-town re-
ligion, We're no. 1, partisam excess at the same time we do everything
possible to undermine the past's core. Substantively, we have been by-and
large on track (although we are not dealing seriously with the economy, a
problem which is structural not cosmetic). P. R. wise, we have behaved
as village burghers, testing the wind, dragged into every reform, declining
to identify ourselves with our own concerns, failing to recognize the coher-
oncy and broader meaning of our own programs.
Take our non-fiscal justification for vetoing day-care, for instance. In the
days of farms and small villages, having mothers bring children up at home
made sense. Women were intimately involved in the production process of
the farm. Children were able to roam and learn in a broadly educational
environment. But now? Homes are isolated from places of work; staying
page 5
home means staying uninvolved. As for children, staying home means
remaining in a sterile, homogenous suburban heighborhood or an even
more confining urban apartment. Of course we need day-care massive
day-care. Far from committing government to communal living, day-
care means, instead, committing government to preserving some sem-
blance of the community bringing-up process which we have enjoyed for
most of our national history and giving women the same opportunity to feel
productive and useful that their grandmothers had.
On many other issues, we exhibit the same kind of narrow provincialism
even when we are on the right side of the issue. I don't believe people buy
it anymore. Even when it is the best they can articulate, I think they ex-
pect more from their leaders. We have failed to give it to them and are,
I think, paying the price.
(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. I
don't think it is quite as dominant as Broder and Johnson do, but I think it
is much more important that we generally acknowledge. People don't "feel"
the President's leadership except for a few brief. moments such as the
China announcements. The strongest, most memorable statements the
President has made while in office have been statements of anger or know-
nothingism or blatant politics; i.e. Carswell defeat, Calley conviction,
Cambodia, vetoing day-care, pornography, abortion. They have not been
devoted to explaining what the President is and what he is trying to do.
This is more than charisma at least charisma in the John Lindsay sense.
It involves finding words and mediums which express the core of the Pres-
ident's character, Lyndon Johnson is not a superficially charismatic man,
yet in his early years, before the war wore him down, his speech and his
actions reflected a personal force that we never get from the President.
Eisenhower could garble every other sentence, but, when you watched him
on television, you knew he was a leader. Even Truman, haberdasher that
he is, was able to express to his constituency a raw cussedness which was
central to his leadership.
Richard Nixon? (Man on the make; ashamed of and constantly running away
from his past; manipulator; unsure of his convictions; tactician instead of
strategist; Grand Vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for elo-
quence. That is the public impression. And that is why he is weak today.
By 50 percent to 40 percent, the American people do not think he has any
broad conceptual framework, any sense of direction or purpose
This is probably the attatude L most intellectudy.
In a sense, the nature of leadership is not nearly so important as its fact.
That has been our mistake. We have adopted a pacification strategy, this
page 6
for that group, that for this, with deliberable avoidance of controversial
intellectual and social stands, trying to reassure the left, which cares
everything about words. with substance, trying to reassure the right, which
cares everything about substance, with words. We have ended up alienating
everyone and we will not be able to correct that until we start realizing
that tommorrow's headline is not nearly so important as next fall's "impres-
sion"; that next week's tactical advantage may come at the expense of next
November's strategic victory.
(5) The youth vote is likely to be relatively unimportant in 1972. Broder
and Johnson confirm two of our own opinions: young people are going to vote
less frequently than the rest of the population and they are not going to work
in significant numbers for political candidates. Broder and Johnson are
victims of their own distorted sample on their third point. Their analysis
that young people are far more hostile to the President than the population-
at-large is not born out by the polls. Kennedy has a substantial lead over
the President in the trial heats, but he is the only Democrat who has any
lead among the youth vote.
On the other hand, once the Democrats nominate one man and he has achiev-
ed a visible, stylish identity, he could take the same kind of lead among
youth Kennedy now has. The President's support in this group is thin be-
cause of Vietnam, unemployment, etc.
(6) Muskie is the only Democrat both known to a majority of the electorate
and known positively to it, but does not yet have the strategic advantage over
the President. One of the most disturbing factors in our approach as we
enter the campaign year is our gross underestimation of Muskie. He has
been brilliant, as good as the President was in 1968, and he shows promise
of being far more effective than the President has ever been in the public
phase of his campaign. If he has not yet emerged as the President's equal, he,
also does not yet approximate the President's stature as he will as a nom-
inated candidate for President. good point
People around here counting on a significant fourth party are, I think, crazy,
Muskie is going to do so well in the primaries that no one will join McCarthy
even if he does do it. Without irreparably damaging his right flank, Muskie
has moved far enough left to have the tacit support of somebody like Al Low-
enstein. Establishment reformers like Gilligan are already in his corner
publicly. The Democrats want to win this year I don't think they're
going to allow themselves to destroy their chances with suicidal splintering.
page 7
in
Most important of all, Muskie's public image is everything the Pres
ident's is not: strong. reflective, prudent, even wise, The President
could not maintain early leads against Pat Brown and Hubert Humphrey
How in the hell
we think he's going to do better against an Ed Muskie
with his usual plastic statesman, say-nothing strategy is beyond me.
(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders
More evidence for the alienation theory. It is not just that Wallace and
Agnew are too strident it is also that they are somehow too facile, too
be
quick, too simplistic. People know that what they have traditionally be-
lieved and what Agnew and Wallace preach -- is not right anymore;
that it needs replacement; that the society has changed and that their
mark
public leaders must deal with those changes even if they can't.
The lesson of Wallace and Agnew is that people want to be led -- they don't
want to see their leaders mouth the same idiocies they do over a Saturday
night beer. Yet that is exactly what we try to do elevating the idiocies
into wordy, billowy speeches, to be sure practically every time the Pres-
ident makes a prepared, public statement.
I would caution, however, that Agnew's unsuitability for the Presidency
does not mean he should be replaced as Vice - President. This should be
decided on the basis of comprehensive polling this spring. There are too
many people who say they would vote for the President, but "not that Agnew. "
On the other hand, I would regret very much having Governor Connally on
the ticket, not just because I would hate to seem him close to the White
House, but, more importantly, because he would overshadow -- and thus
undermine -- the President. The President was right in his original intent
with Agnew ne runs better with nobody.
Conclusion: The same as usual: Not all the foreign trips to all the foreign
capitals in the world are going to help the President unless they are coupled
with a far more serious effort to deal with his very weak relationship with
the American people.
The following steps should be taken:
(1) Get new speechwriters this is the most important. This President
has the least experienced, least able group of speechwriters in recent
history We need guys with clout, who are involved and know a lot about
substance, and who can put stuff together which is coherent, purposeful,
and comprehensive which will have the same effect as the President's
masterful desegregation statement.
H - note - grass to Price
page 8
Ideally, we would have guys like Daniel Boorstin, Irving Kristol, Edward
Banfield, and Nathan Glazer. We probably can't get them, but the Pres-
ident ought to speak to Moynihan about it. We need and want people from
that Public Interest - Commentary School and Moynihan would know where
to locate good people whom we could get.
(2) Calm the P.R., stop getting overexcited about each new issue, and in-
still some consistency and follow-through in our P. R. political opera-
tion. We should not be aiming at taking advantage of each new issue by it-
self, but at taking advantage of each new issue as it relates to the President's
over-all approach. Above all, avoid the cheap-shot, the head-line hunt, the
simple slogan.
(3) Realize that what is important about the President is that he is the first
President to realize that the hyper-individualistic "We're No. 1"
frontier American philosophy is bankrupt and outdated The President is
the first President to comprehend that internallyand externally this country
Typicol
and its people are part of a community structure as such, the President
is the first real conservative President the country has ever had. He has
readjusted both foreign and domestic policy away from twentieth century
liberalism, realizing that an unbriddled committment to individualism in
the modern world is enslaving and destructive; that both Vietnam and the war
on poverty are symbols of its bankruptcy; that real freedom and real indivi-
dualism cannot be conferred from above, but must be worked out organically
within a community structure by community norms -- hence an incomes-de-
centralization strategy instead of a services strategy in domestic policy,
hence the Nixon Doctrine instead of Wilsonian zealotry in foreign affairs.
This should be the basic theme in every utterance made by this Administra-
tion.
(4) Stop displaying the President as if he had a stick up his ass. Put him in
gutsy, colorful, photographic situations with people. Take him out of air-
planes, hotels, and military reservations and put him in hospitals, police
cars, outdoors, in urban areas, at local union meetings, on tough university
campuses, at Indian reservations, etc. Use the White House more imagi
(5) A more imaginative use of media -- we shouldn't be afraid to put the
President in conflict situations -- the Rather thing was good insofar as it
went (by far the best of conversations), but we can go farther. Show that
the President can handle both his enemies and the people by putting him in
situations with them. We should also be hitting much more the prestige mags
with prestige pieces. Personally, I thought the President's 1967 Foreign Af-
fairs article was more a travelog than an analysis, but even it has had im-
pact far beyond its immediate readership.
that
[Item N-
1/13/'72
m
All right, now let's put it this way. If I want to screw
a guy I would have written it that way.
G
Really?
Yea. You just put it to him in such a way that there was
no way he could come back to you other than "get that son
of a bitch out of the meeting".
G
No, you could have covered it with the AG.
m
No, my point is how you wrote the memo. It is how you wrote
the memo or how you say something to someone. I would have
said it to the AG if that was my situation in a much
different way. Well for an example, all sorts of things
that we have done that Bob asks for as far as your participation -
remember? And even though I would have a little problem over
here or over there I worked around it - right? I figured out
some way, when it came down to hiring Greg Petersmeyer or when
it came down to getting Gordon into this meeting or that
meeting - of making it sound O.K.
G
I understand. But all of those are minor little problems.
That's O.K. this is a minor little problem.
G
Not if I have irreparably damaged my relation
m
I did not say you had. I said that if you continued doing
that you would. Even Gordon, don't you ever give anyone a
-2-
little editorial license? Haven't you known me well enough
yet to know that there are times when I purposely exaggerate
a bit to make my point.
Yes, but Jeb, a complete lack of judgment.
I think you showed a complete lack of judgment in that case -
yes. He didn't say that, by the way, I think you did!
Well, you know, if I have a complete lack of judgment --
That is the case --- I have had some complete lackings of
judgment too. I can remember one night when I got mad at
your friend's wife! Right? That was a complete lack of
judgment on my part -Right?
G
O.K. - we all have those but that is different than getting
unhappy at some staff guy and getting unhappy at the Attorney or
having the Attorney General of the United States get unhappy
with you.
My point is that I think it was a complete lack of judgment.
I don't think the Attorney General thought about it five more
minutes.
G
But what is really going to happen? Will I be frozen out of
information?
Now there you did not quote right -- I said that "IF" it
-3-
continued to the point where people thought: 1. That you were
play_ng tricks on them --
Which I am not.
I know you are not but sometimes it seems as though you are
and that is why I said to be a little careful about trying
to find out information from the Klein's of this world. Do
not ever indicate lack of trust in a person or that he is not
telling you the truth. Always take it that he is. That because
of that you would be eventually -- sure! You know, if that
continued -- if everybody thought you were playing games and
I said you don't want to do that any more so let's not do it
any more. You are not frozen out.
I know, but that stuff you would "have to give me because it is
written and we might get asked about it". I am talking about
the information in terms of -
Gordon Strachan - don't you know that if I really wanted to
fool around I could do it and you would never know?
Yea, I know.
You know I could. If I didn't want to give you memos there
would be no way in hell you would ever get them.
That's right.
-4-
G
We talked two weeks ago about the subject - about how crucial
I think it is that my relationship with the AG be one of
confidence if not respect.
You know where your relationship with the AG should be, by the
way?
What?
Non. existent - basically.
I know but he knows who I am and if he thinks Haldeman's got
some little shit working for him --
The AG happens to think that about almost everyone on the White
House Staff. Now you don't right this down Gordon.
G
I am not writing it down -- I can't write when I am holding
the phone.
m
He thinks everyone at the White House, except Haldeman is a
little shit -- you know that! He thinks everyone is an
absolute disaster over there with some minor exceptions (I
am not sure if there are any -- I am kidding you now!). But
as you know, the White House Staff is not exactly overwhelming.
Of course, anybody at the White House would sort of fit that
discription and he doesn't think about staff guys. He never
worked with them -- I am the first guy I think that has ever
been able to break through his desire not to get
and
I don't know how I did it but I was lucky.
-5-
G
The point is that he (AG) realizes that I do a lot of things
for Bob and he knows who I am and he calls me by my first
name and I sort of view it as a special relationship with
Mudge Rose or whatever, but, the net result is that if that
in any way deteriorates my his relationship with the President
then I should leave.
Yes, you should leave if it deteriorates to the point where
it is un -- you know how I would know, by the way? He would
tell me.
He would?
mI am just sure he would, by the way. He would say to me
"Jeb, you know, I am just getting fed up with what I gather
is happening over here and I think you ought to tell Haldeman".
He wouldn't handle it himself --- he would do just what he told
me to do with his friend 00 Rita Hauser Monday which I had to do
painfully and tell her "Rita dear you are not going to run the
womans operation". He didn't do it - I did it. And that is
exactly how it would happen. Do you think he would do that with
Bob? You needn't worry about it.
But this incident which we talked about last night -
It did not do you an irreparable harm. It was, I think, a lack
of judgment -- I don't want to be too extravigant but -- I do
think that continued incidents of this kind
-6-
G
How pissed off do you think the Attorney General was?
At the time?
Yea.
At the time he was annoyed.
Humph.
I think. Now that is my judgment. He said something like
"that is ridiculous - - I will have to talk to Bob about it"
and that was it. It was very embarrassing to me Gordon, and
you know - I really was. I can't think of ever being
embarrassed quite in that way --, especially by a"little shit"!!
Well
But Gordon, you shouldn't resign. You should get a kick in
the ass -- which I thought I did give you last night and
you should try to figure how to get around some of these
things a little bit and I do think that they way you wrote
that memo (I don't blame Bob now that I heard the memo). You
know, we are in this together. This is not you saying Magruder
is Iodoing this.
No??
Well - I never write memos to the AG - you see all of my memos.
I never write them in that way.
-7-
Yea. But I am never doing anything.
Yes you are -- you are reporting but have a little humaness
Gordon. That is Larry's great benefit. He is human underneath
that bald head of his! I am serious now though, I don't
blame you. I wanted you to be upset. That is why I laid it
on. I wanted you to go home and think "Jesus Christ".
Well I sure did that.
I wanted you to. I said to myself -- Gordon and I have another
nine months to go and I want him to think about these things
so that next time we figure out a better way of doing it.
That is the whole exercise -- don't make the mistakes again.
If it is between you and me - fine. If it's the AG's attitude
then
The AG did not say anything about you at all.
Well if he ever does you have GOT to tell me.
I will -- I will guarantee you that if the Attorney General
of the United States says anything to me of a derogatory nature
about you I will tell you directly.
But you have a feeling -- which you seemed to have last night
that you might
I have a feeling that your almost complete lack of judgment in
that one case, if continued, would cause damage with your
-8-
relationship with the AG.
G
O.K.
And I think that is a true statement without any of the
frills or desire to make you think about things over the
evening - lose a little sleep and a few other things.
O.K.
I am serious Gordon. I really am.
You are a fantastically fine person and I mean that. You are
a little legalistic and you are not in the legal business
right now and I would like to see you get a little less, well
you know -
Factual.
Yes, we are humans. Webare all dealing in a very pressurized
atmosphere - right? And we are all going to be very up tight
and we have to try and stay as loose as we can be.
Ok - I will be loose for awhile!
Let me show Larry the memo.
No, now look - destroy the em memo. Seriously. Destroy that
memo and talk to Larry.
O.K.
-9-
O.K. Will do.
[Item
notsent
THE WHITE HOUSE
per
WASHINGTON
Administratively Confidential
January 13, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
G
SUBJECT:
Campaign Poll Information
On January 10 you asked me to call Jeb Magruder to remind
him that your agreement with the Attorney General required
Bob Teeter to report the polling results only to the Attorney
General without Magruder present.
I reached Magruder as he was waiting outside the Attorney
General's office. He and Teeter walked in and Magruder
excused himself saying that Gordon Strachan had called to
say that Magruder should not be present at the meeting.
Last night Magruder told me that I had "permanently damaged
my relationship with the Attorney. General" by directing
who should be present in his meetings. According to Magruder,
you should have called the Attorney General personally
because the "Attorney General is very status conscious"
and does not like to hear from junior staff people. He
was "livid". This incident did 'irreparable harm" to my
position because it indicated a "complete lack of judgment".
The result is that I will be "frozen out" of all but the
most perfunctory information from Magruder.
Obviously, if this is really the Attorney General's attitude
toward me, it is very doubtful that I can continue to
serve as your liaison with the Campaign Committee. Therefore,
if it would be in the best interest of the President, please
accept my resignation.
As to the substantive solution of the access to polling
information, I would suggest that when Bob Teeter has the
written reports on the first four surveys next Tuesday you
and the Attorney General meet with Teeter together. This
will accomplish two things. First, Magruder will not think
he is being discriminated against as the Attorney General's
staff man. Second, the point will be reemphasized with
Bob Teeter that he is to report to you and the Attorney
General alone.
put
December 21, 1971
sent
Administratively Confidential
supersed
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. BALDEMAN
suf Tal
FROM:
GORDON STRACHAN
Papulag
SUBJECT:
Polling Guidelines
To prevent any misunderstanding about the procedures for
handling polls, two questions need answers.
The first concerns the conducting of telephone polls for the
President. In the past only the President, you, Higby, Tom
Benham at ORC, and I have been aware that such polls are being
conducted. Two reasons for this procedure are sensitivity of'
the subject matter (e.g. Calley) and the necessity for quick
answers (2 1/2 days at maximum).
You have mentioned the possibility of clearing with the Attorney
General an 800 special account of which 300 was to be for polling.
Since this 300 was to be separate from the campaign polling bud-
get, it may be that you didn't want Bob Teeter as Campaign polling
consultant involved. However, you have granted Bob Teeter access
to the most sensitive polling information, including the Image
Study.
If the decision is to not use Bob Teeter, a method of informing
the Attorney General should be established. When the "secret
Administration poll" showing McCloskey at 22% appeared in the
press last week, I asked Magruder if he knew anything about it.
He said no and reported that the Attorney General had asked the
same question on December 18. Magruder told the Attorney General
that he did not but that the poll "might be one of those telephone
polls conducted by Haldeman's office". This type of comment,
whether intentionally designed to have the Attorney General suspect
White House staff political activities or not, cannot add to the
impression and reality of full disclosure to the Attorney General,
through Teeter, of all polling matters.
Three solutions to the problem of telephone polls are:
1. Conduct all polls through Bbb Teeter. Questions,
negotiations with the vendors and results would all
flow through Teeter. This would be similar to the
old relationship with Dr. Derge.
-2-
2. Continue the current system of working
directly with Tom Benham of ORC. Teeter could
be simultaneously advised of the general subject
matter of any polls conducted here. Because of
your December 9 memo, the Attorney General knows
that Teeter has full access to past polling in-
formation. It would seem logical to keep Teeter
informed of future polls. Informing Teeter, who
is to have direct access to the Attorney General,
would also lessen the subtle pressure by Magruder
to be privvy of all poll information.
3. Haldeman discuss directly with the Attorney
General general clearance to conduct polls without
question. This clearance could be obtained simultane-
ously with your discussion of the 300 polling budget.
4. Haldeman advise the Attorney General directly
when a telephone poll is being conducted.
RECOMMENDATION:
That all telephone polls continue to be conducted
directly with Tom Benham of ORC, but that Bob Tester
be advised concurrently.
AGREE
DISAGREE
COMMENT
If you approve any system involving a separate 300 budget, a new
payment system should be established because Dr. Derge has terminated
Behavorial Research Associates.
RECOMMENDATION:
That Herb Kalmbach set up another legal shell, probably
a Delaware corporation, to process payment to ORC.
AGREE
DISAGREE
COMMENT
Second, the question of who is to request or assign projects to
Bob Teeter needs to be resolved. Higby mentioned that you wanted
Teeter to examine the Catholic vote and ecology conclusions
reached by nembers of Ehrlichman's staff. Presumably Teeter's
analysis would go to you and the Attorney General. However,
-3-
Magruder is working to have all projects for Teeter go through
him. Teeter had been scheduled to be in Washington on December 20.
Magruder told Taeter that it would not be necessary for him to
be here this week. I had talked to Teeter over the weekend about
some projects we wanted him to do. Teeter naturally thought
Magruder had the last word.
RECOMMENDATION:
That Teeter be informed that he is to accept
projects from you and the Attorney General, but
that his analyses go only to you and the Attorney
General directly, not through Magruder.
AGREE
DISAGREE
COMMENT
You may want to cover this decision with the Attorney General.
It will be added to your talking paper of pending matters
GS:dg
[Item N6]
G/J8M
2/3
G
AG - is this type of
stuff A G wanted
Pr/ Teeter - yes,
AG very pleased
AG + J8m asked Teeter to prepare:
11) 5 page summary by
Teeter of data
+ charts any accompanying
2
Venders summary of
Vendor's reporton so
- no Venders "
3
Strategy recommendations
J8M likes idea of I page
for strategy commettee - Feeter
AG $ would tall generally to
cam Sha Grp, + in detail to
Dailey + Marik
AG is reallypissed off at Delay;
memo due dates set.
Schedule on telephone polls.
AG wonts to meete/ H + Teeter
on 2/7.