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From W. Richard Howard to Strachan RE: surrogate speakers. Handwritten note added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/20/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 46-18
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This file contains:
From W. Richard Howard to Strachan RE: surrogate speakers. Handwritten note added by unknown. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/20/1972
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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46
18
1/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From W. Richard Howard to Strachan RE:
surrogate speakers. Handwritten note added
by unknown. 4 pgs.
Monday, March 26, 2012
Page 1 of 1
[Item N-1]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
GONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By
Emp
NARS, Date 6-30-80
January 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR GORDON STRACHAN
SUBJECT: Spokesmen Resources
It is clear that the attached report only records history. It is
also obvious that 1701 had absolutely nothing to do with most of
the recorded events. These events were clearly scheduled by
the principals themselves, probably without even consulting
1701. This is just another example of quantity over quality which
is so apparent in almost everything that comes out of the 1701
operation.
I believe that rather than receiving the attached massive record-
keeping report, you should request to receive a report on the
actual efforts of the spokesmen resource operation. Some of it
is quite good and I have attached copies of the latest New Hampshire
and Florida surrogate programs, (Tab A), as examples of what I
believe to be relatively effective spokesmen resource scheduling.
These are being coordinated between O' Donnell and Porter and the
only problem I see is that some of the spokesmen are light-weights
and the VP isn't scheduled into New Hampshire. It seems to me
that the best way to get the maximum productivity out of their
operation is to request similar reports on each of the key states,
including the primary states. In other words, I believe the report
would be much more useful if organized by key states rather than
by surrogate candidates, and updated monthly. This would also
eliminate the ridiculous and totally unnecessary notification that
Jack Kemp addressed the Monday Morning Quarterback Club in
Birmingham, Alabama.
I have discussed scheduling several times with both Magruder and
Porter and I believe Pat O'Donnell understands very clearly that
the only way to make a surrogate program work is to have our
2.
chairmen in each state put together speakers programs including
their impressions of which spokesmen would be particularly
effective, and what events are available and appropriate for these
surrogates. It is then up to Porter and O'Donnell, using all the
political input available to them, to start scheduling. This, of
course, assumes some degree of competence on the part of our
state chairmen and the very necessary quidence by the National
Campaign Manager.
As to your recommendations for an effective program, I have the
following comments:
1.
I disagree that the spokesmen resource operation should
concentrate on a relatively few number of individuals. As
I have indicated before, we should draw on anybody and
everybody based on the best estimate of our state chairmen.
He is the one who should know who would be effective and
those are the people we should plug in, tempered somewhat
by our national guidelines. I do agree, however, that the
report is loaded to a considerable degree. Except in a few
rare cases like Jerry Ford, I have found Congressmen not
to be particularly effective. Certain Governors like Reagan
and Rockefeller are extremely effective. Whereas, Governors
such as Dunn, Meskill and Millikin are much less SO. It would
amaze me to see Senator Javits say very many things positive
about the President and I question his being a key spokesman.
And as we all know, some of the Cabinet and key White House
staff are much more effective than others.
I totally agree that our key spokesmen should receive speech
materials. Our office, however, does not have the necessary
resources to write speeches. We do put out fact sheets, talking
papers and quick responses, hopefully in a timely fashion.
But this can only supplement basic speech material. In 1970
several speeches were prepared by Ray Price's office (Tab B)
and I think they are the right people to prepare speech material.
They could put together several general speeches and 6 or 8
specific speeches on positive points our Administration wants
to push. These could be updated closer to the election, but at
3.
least it would give our people some basic material to work
from now. As far as TV and radio advice: every key spokes-
man's scheduler has been told that Al Snyder is available to
consult with them at any time. The idea is that once an event
is set up, each schedulerwill put together a full schedule
including radio and TV and he knows that Al Snyder is available.
The last point about political briefings was handled in 1970
in the following fashion: The RNC put together relatively
complete and quite good political profiles of each key state
(Tab C). When a key spokesman was scheduled into a state
he received a last minute up-to-date political profile from
us and we made sure that the RNC kept these reports up-to-
date. I see no reason why this cannot work the same way.
I would hope that Harry Flemming doesn't have enough time
to run around personally briefing every key spokesman for
every event.
2.
Your second point about spot checks is relatively simple to
handle by requesting from each scheduler, a copy of his
detailed itinerary following each event. With a relatively
quick review of the itinerary you can tell whether the spokes-
man has completed what we would consider to be a full and
effective day campaigning, or whether he has just flown in,
made a quick speech to 100 people and quickly flown back
to Washington.
3.
Regarding your third point about John Scali, you should be
aware that Scali believes he works for the President and would
therefore take orders only from Bob Haldeman. He is perfectly
happy to coordinate with Chuck Colson and they do work well
together, but as you realize John Scali is John Scali and in
order to get him to do something, the push has to come from
as high a level as possible. It is my belief that until Scali
receives a strongly worded direct push from Mr. Haldeman
he will not do the necessary follow up.
It seems relatively ridiculous and a waste of time for me to continue
writing memos to document my thoughts in the area of spokesmen
resources. I have done this several times, and I would guess I will
4.
have to do it several times again, but I keep making the same points.
It is unfortunate that so far my thoughts have not been fully understood.
I only hope this contains some quality and not just quantity.
You asked for my candid comments and I believe I have given them to
you. Therefore, I would appreciate it if copies of this memo were
not distributed to any and all interested and uninterested parties.
Thanks.
Dik
W. Richard Howard