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This file contains:
From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the next Gallup Poll. Duplicates attached. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/15/1972
From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the next Gallup Poll. Handwritten note added by Haldeman. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/15/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies created in response to a Higby memo. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: the First Family's campaign schedule. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From John Scali to Haldeman RE: an addendum to a previous election strategy memorandum. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman RE: general campaign strategies in response to queries from Ken Cole and Higby. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Safire to Haldeman RE: planning for the Republican National Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 46-31
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WHSF: Contested, 46-31
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This file contains:
From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the next Gallup Poll. Duplicates attached. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/15/1972
From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the next Gallup Poll. Handwritten note added by Haldeman. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/15/1972
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies created in response to a Higby memo. 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: the First Family's campaign schedule. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From John Scali to Haldeman RE: an addendum to a previous election strategy memorandum. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Whitaker to Haldeman and Ehrlichman RE: general campaign strategies in response to queries from Ken Cole and Higby. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Safire to Haldeman RE: planning for the Republican National Convention. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Type
Document Description
46
31
9/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the
next Gallup Poll. Duplicates attached. 3 pgs.
46
31
9/15/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Strachan RE: results of the
next Gallup Poll. Handwritten note added
by Haldeman. 1 pg.
46
31
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Doug Hallett to Haldeman RE: general
campaign strategies created in response to a
Higby memo. 5 pgs.
46
31
7/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson, through Higby, to Haldeman
RE: general campaign strategies. 2 pgs.
46
31
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: the First
Family's campaign schedule. 2 pgs.
46
31
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John Scali to Haldeman RE: an
addendum to a previous election strategy
memorandum. 2 pgs.
46
31
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Whitaker to Haldeman and
Ehrlichman RE: general campaign strategies
in response to queries from Ken Cole and
Higby. 8 pgs.
46
31
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman RE: planning for
the Republican National Convention. 1 pg.
Monday, March 26, 2012
Page 1 of 1
512
September 15, 1972
11:40 a.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Should we be thinking of putting the word out that we expect
the Gallup Poll to fall off anywhere between 8 and 12 points
the next time it comes out? The point here is to start
building expectation for a drop and get the word out early.
If we don't drop, it's all the better; and if we do drop,
at least we've started building a cushion for it.
Do you want to check Bob on this?
September 15, 1972
11:40 a. m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Should we be thinking of putting the word out that we expect
the Gallup Poll to fall off anywhere between 8 and 12 points
the next time it comes out? The point here is to start
building expectation for a drop and get the word out early.
If we don't drop, it's all the better; and if we do drop,
at least we've started building a cushion for it.
Do you want to check Bob on this?
September 15, 1972
11:40 a.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GORDON STRACHAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Should we be thinking of putting the word out that we expect
the Gallup Poll to fall off anywhere between 8 and 12 points
the next time it comes out? The point here is to start
building expectation for a drop and get the word out early.
If we don't drop, it's all the better; and if we do drop,
at least we've started building a cushion for it.
Do you want to check Bob on this?
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
To Chopen
WASHINGTON
September 15, 1972
11:40 a. m.
H.
MEMORANDUM FOR.
GORDON
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
Should we be thinking of putting the word out that we expect
the Gallup Poll to fall off anywhere between 8 and 12 points
the next time it comes out? The point hereis to start
building expectation for a drop and get the word out early.
If we don't drop, it's all the better; and if we do drop,
at least we've started building a cushion for it.
Do you want to check Bob on this?
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Doug Hallett
SUBJECT:
Larry Higby's Request of July 19.
The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and
amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memo-
randum - - you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice
you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half
a joke.)
The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may
recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good
opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful
Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.
My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier
memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a
local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt,
and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics
and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West,
and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election - - and
that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive
positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off
people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local,
regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should
be directing our negative issues - - abortion, acid, homsexuality, our
more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare
reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably
printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our
own efforts.
2.
To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being
contravened. In particular, our positive national material -- the pamphlets,
the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen -- is
the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968.
More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so
far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive
way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator
Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric -- "white flag budget" -- and under-
researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice
President's rhetoric -- "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about
Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating
posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol
Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are
all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's
extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They
undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency
while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation
to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we
know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward,
progressive and potentiall/e the middle ground to Senator McGovern.
On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem
satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be -- getting
irgorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's
views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues --
Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national
security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings,
particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense
budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not
know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending
a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we
know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to
expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one
Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example,
that is true.
There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign SO
far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going
after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary
how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use
the Democratic Convention -- that we were going to encourage division,
have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. -- how much was done?
3.
And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern
get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on.
the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?
In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization
and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is
going to get him re-elected -- if only because nobody else will -- but
there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:
1.
Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there
may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do
the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive
duplication of effort, inter -office rivalry, competition, holding back
of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting
the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
(a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's
1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson.
Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts dinners,
funding requests, etc. -- have already been accomplished. (If
they haven't, it's too late. ) Now what we need is a hard-driving
organizational and political effort and that can only be done from
a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as many people from
here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people,
etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would
have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
(b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with
authority to run all over the place. It needs it -- still.
(c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction
to provide such support activities as are needed -- agency contact,
White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming,
etc.
(d) Writing -- now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and
God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief --
perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No
matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy
and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that
one guy.
4.
(e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and,
in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate
pretty well with the Shumway operation. P.R. -types like
Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P. R.
activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled
within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining
at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
(f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation --
presumably Ed Harper -- would report to Colson at 1701.
(g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with
the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as
it is now -- as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is
going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
(h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be
visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for
two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the
President. Starting now, the President should have a series of
afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at
least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't
believe how lax people are around here -- and mainly, I think,
because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal
identity with the President.
2. Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to
remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only
Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so
response-oriented and so quick to jump at every quiver in the
McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the
President should be locked in -- and something attached to the
President so he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The
same goes for everybody else.
3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our
constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of
awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything
else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign,
with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's
substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We
would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around
with a sense of humor.
5.
4.
Whatever the November Group is doing -- and I don't know
anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available
for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been
around the President for more than one campaign.
I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.
cc: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU:
L. HIGBY
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON KC
SUBJECT:
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy
executive posture between the conventions with the single
exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of
the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I
think this exception to the generally high-level tone
the President has set was a justifiable one and really
quite valuable.
(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high
level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but
it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and,
for that matter, the whole government apparatus is
campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.
I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably
maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in
how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus
really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less
effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary
for the President to come off his best posture and to, in
effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully
into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level
surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively,
but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates
program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every
ounce of energy into the campaign.
As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it
should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target
states and specific voting blocs.
-2-
(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern
as a "minority leader of a minority constituency. II I
think we should give every indication that any "regular,
normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or
Independent, can find leadership and solice under the
Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like
"elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical"
to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every
effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal
backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and
the nation as a whole.
Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time
in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers
should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of
over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In
foreign policy, where we are in my opinion, miles ahead,
McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel,
naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed
as an individual who is not the kind of man that world
leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed
as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without
backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who
lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to
them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida
when he indicated he would keep a residual force in
Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away
from it in the face of opposition from some of his more
radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.
(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people
will have the advantage of being able to attack every
little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch
to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and
foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted
Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner
and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the
country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability
starting now.
Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself,
will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's
wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping
for McGovern extensively SO that he may report after McGovern
loses in November that he did everything in his power to
elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a
team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
First Family Scheduling
I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope
that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate
asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as
possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening
and she was a knockout real star quality, said all the right things,
and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans
are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about
alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters
like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus
-- especially with parents and grandparents.
Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where
I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a
charice to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense
of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got
to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials
to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels
Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by
visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can
remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political
visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things
for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks
ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to
Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people, etc., that
there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap:
I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly
come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, in-
volved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous
pleasure-seeker from Camelot.
-2-
I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly.
Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous
non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were
represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular
would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.
A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could
organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as
an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that
maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in
Peoria.
RaSA
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM;
JOHN SCALI gas
SUBJECT:
Election Strategy Addendum
I have these points to add to my Election Strategy memorandum:
1. It is increasingly clear McGovern's main supporters,
those providing the vital thrust, will be the college-educated,
young reformers obsessed with Vietnam as an issue. We
should make a determined, skillful effort to separate from
them as a bloc, the non-college, working youth. For each
college grad already lined up behind, or inclined toward
McGovern, there are three to four young workers who labor
in the factory, the corner grocery, the farm, the office or
in retail business. There is a natural rivalry between them
which can be exploited for the President's benefit. Why not
organize a "Working Youth for Nixon" organization which
will dramatically publicize the gulf between them and the
kooky college crowd. We might think of a big convention
of the working youth, highlighting their support of the
President and their deep interest in issues that bear directly
on improved conditions for their advancement. This must
be more than just lip service and a one-shot rally. To
further wean young labor from McGovern, for example, the
President could concentrate some attention on an issue
which we have ignored: Ideas and studies to relieve the
monotony of factory assembly work, a problem which already
has caused some strikes. Presidential concern about how to
improve quality of life for factory workers, particularly,
would be welcome. This is an issue which McGovern and
which labor has ignored thus far, but one with widespread appeal.
Mr. Haldeman
- 2 -
July 21, 1972
2.
The President must devote more time and attention to
an effort to "humanize" Richard Nixon. If not, he
will come off second best by contrast to McGovern, the
humble Methodist minister's son, who will "level"
with the American people when elected President. I
think it is folly in the extreme for the President to
adopt a DeGaulle mold. He is already vulnerable to
criticism that he is a "loner", isolated from the real
America. How do we do this? In two ways (1) by
becoming gradually more accessible to the press and
by informal comments now and then which include
"I made a mistake on that one, but I have learned"
...
There is nothing that appeals to the fibre of Americans
than to know that even the President will admit an
'occasional mistake. This will strike a responsive chord
and humanize him more in the eyes of the voters; (2)
by impromptu actions which seem unrelated to picking
up votes. I have in mind such activities as not-previously-
announced visit to a trade school where he would spend
three to four hours carefully examining how students
are taught, or a night-time visit to a police precinct
where he would spend several hours at the station house
and in a police cruiser. I would envision all of these as
events announced after the fact, tending to prove that they
are not publicity stunts. Newsmen, of course, would
complain afterward but let them. The amount of TV
reporting and print coverage would be almost as great
afterward, once newsmen reconstructed the visit. I
strongly recommend that this be tried over a period to
help dispel the belief the President is in the hands of
Madison Avenue and does not do anything which is not
carefully programmed for maximum political advantage
in advance.
I am not proposing that the President suddenly become a folksy,
back-slapper. That would be out of character. But, he can
successfully soften his image as the distant leader.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
John C. Whitaker
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the
President might do from now through November, and Larry
Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update
of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.
First, there are a number of things that the President can do
that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President.
He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one
frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive
meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he
can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors
(McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the
stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)
The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some
problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto mcs-
sages or reports on the status of peace talks on Vietnam, it
seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either
domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or
international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume,
have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that,
particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national
addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Demo-
cratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not
2 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-
White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me
that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements
which we traditionally handle by a 2, 000-word handout from
Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might
better be handled from now to November by the President him-
self making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's
shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity
for free reply and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news
which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting
event like an all-day trip to St. Louis.
At the Convention
I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of
Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of
confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best in-
telligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The
relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive
the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street
drama. Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be,
would probably be more photogenic than the business of the
convention. Any interplay between the President and the demon-
strators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers
with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies
in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an
overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because,
even though you can seal off the causeway, there would probably
be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound.
Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the
President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least
had the guts to talk to.
Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with
Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on
Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of
- 3 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing
State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence).
I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but
closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the
convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance
speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p.m. EDT people are not off the
Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately
after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unex-
pected visit to a separate location where a large, screened
youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the
President would join them. The point would be to have all
under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home
the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for
McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to
this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening
enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter
and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be
back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would
try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National
Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly
"playing President. 11
If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday
TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show,
I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved
up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without
ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely
anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having
a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having
the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought
if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to
assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announce-
ment of the President's choice of a running mate until then? --
That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the
President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.
Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the
risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to
Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice Presi-
dent. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their
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being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of
defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the
President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the
youth forum described above.
General Campaign Strategy
We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition - - almost --
and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and
Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should
push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace
the tax.credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just
endorsing the Mills bill. -- I know some Christian Scientists
who don't buy this.
Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now
about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless
that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously.
The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign
without appearing to be doing SO. Here is my list of don'ts:
-- Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
-- Don't engage in any debates.
-- Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press
that are advertised in advance. -- East Room format.
The press is vital. The President has won when the press was
with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).
(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red
meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of ac-
cessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as
radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-
looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our
domestic problems, but with the job only half done. Interviews
with pundits would be good.
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(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe
2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do
quickic press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national
scribes don't come in loaded for bear.
(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media
in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis,
Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warn-
ing. While the national press would have to be included in these,
and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer
questions from the more numerous regional reps should pre-
dominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like
these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters
in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick
his way through personally. For example, we could cover the
southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and
New England by visiting Boston (a town which.is tough to get in
and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the
New England impact should be worth the aggrevation). -- Denver
for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest.
We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise
these in the particular region. The first few we might get away
with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas
where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without
having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago
for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences
in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance --
buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks
if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase
the risks.
I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the
President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the
risk of rallics (hippics and a bore to the press) to produce them
is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in
the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to
substantive events. The motorcade can stop occassionally and,
if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car
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and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we
must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn.) This
will require us to develop a pithy five-minute speech, or a
series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for
rallies that he has used in past campaigns.
One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local
color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can
help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the
Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him.
I remember the success of the President's early morning visit
to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope
that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar
"unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local dincr at 7:00 a.m.
and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.
I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking for
a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international
town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network repre-
sentatives in a number of international capitols relaying live
questions answered by the President here in Washington. This
would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even
hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers,
tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them. 11 A "foreign
heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would
love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so
much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can
get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize
with the foreign heckler -- a good trap.
Pace of Campaign
Before the convention I think the President should schedule one
major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be
visible going about the serious business of Government. Right
after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his re-
turn from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic
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event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago
because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day,
although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important
date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event
could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with
Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although
I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-
time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes
of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should
go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John
Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but be-
cause that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need
another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor
done the same day.
As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more
than one trip a week -- and always substantive. The only out-of-
country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on
how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest
of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the
exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths
of being President.
The First Family
I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington
and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington
papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought
I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so
successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing
that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.
Theme of Campaign
From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made
an important start at restructuring international and domestic
affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms
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are still in the process of becoming -- - his Presidency is only
halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase
to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's? "Come home,
America. 11 The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that
McGoyern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokes-
man for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the
polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got
to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should
try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one
of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in pro-
posing basic governmental reform, in salving the American spirit
from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds
on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate
it.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
RE:
CONVENTION
I was talking to Howard K. Smith last night about what he expects for
television coverage, and he said that all the TV people expected a
pretty dull convention with the likelihood of violence in the streets.
That's'not good -- will associate us with violence, inability to reduce
dissent, etc.
Howard wondered if we were planning the usual lineup -- President
and Vice President acceptance speeches on the same night. He
suggested that if, for the first time, they could be on different nights,
they would be separate news events, each a must for coverage in full.
Moreover, it occurs to me, a mass audience is less likely to sit
through two long speeches practically back to back; in addition, if
the VP's speech is really good, it detracts from the President's,
and if it is no good, it loses the audience.
Therefore, why do we not do something radical in the way of political
conventions and nominate the Vice President on one night, have him
accept that night, and do the President the next night?
This would be met with a lot of cluck-clucking as anti-traditional,
but the real reason for putting them together in the past was to first
determine the Presidential nominee and have himselect the running
mate; with a sitting President who will make his choice known before
the Convention, that reason is obviated.
Thus, we could have two separate and distinct news stories, better
ratings, and a more solitaire setting for the President on his night.
Worth considering?
CC: Dick Moore