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From Colson to Haldeman RE: a response to RN's request that his staff make the 1972 presidential campaign more meaningful to people. Seventh page missing. 16 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/21/1971
Copy of Henry Owen's "1948 Revisited: A Political Lesson," an article published in the "Washington Post" in May of 1971. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], no date
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies for RN in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
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This file contains:
From Colson to Haldeman RE: a response to RN's request that his staff make the 1972 presidential campaign more meaningful to people. Seventh page missing. 16 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/21/1971
Copy of Henry Owen's "1948 Revisited: A Political Lesson," an article published in the "Washington Post" in May of 1971. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], no date
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: general campaign strategies for RN in 1972. Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
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46
41
5/21/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Colson to Haldeman RE: a response to
RN's request that his staff make the 1972
presidential campaign more meaningful to
people. Seventh page missing. 16 pgs.
46
41
Campaign
Newspaper
Copy of Henry Owen's "1948 Revisited: A
Political Lesson," an article published in the
"Washington Post" in May of 1971. 2 pgs.
46
41
>
Campaign
Memo
From Chapin to Haldeman RE: general
campaign strategies for RN in 1972.
Handwritten notes added by unknown. 10
pgs.
Monday, March 26, 2012
Page 1 of 1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Political Strategy
This is in response to the President's request for "some free
thinking" on how to make our programs more meaningful to the
people. This can only be done effectively in the context of the
overall campaign strategy; hence this analysis attempts to
broaden the question somewhat -- and to examine several ways
in which the President's base of political support can be
strengthened for 1972.
The primary emphasis here is on domestic issues; we obviously
have the greatest control in this area and there is more certainty
in the political effect of what we do. This by no means suggests
that international issues may not be decisive -- they very well
could be -- but with international conditions as volatile as they
are it would be foolhardy to predicate a total strategy on them.
The following is an effort to identify some of the major factors
that have proven decisive in prior elections, assess where we
stand today in relation to those factors and suggest certain
strategic considerations for 1972.
A. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
At the risk of oversimplifying history, successful Presidential
politics in modern times have been generally built on one (or a
combination) of four dominant factors.
1. Personal Image - Charisma: Kennedy is the classic
example. Despite a mediocre Administration, an
undistinguished record in foreign affairs and a poor
legislative tally, he might well have been re-elected
2.
in 1964; if so it would probably have been largely due
to the successful mystique he created (with the help of
a friendly press). The fact that he was able to main-
tain a substantial base of political support a year before
the election would suggest that even a relatively inef-
fectual President can support himself on personality
alone.
2. Respect for Leadership: Clearly FDR was the master in
this category. A large majority of the people were con-
vinced that FDR was the Nation's only salvation; it was
irrelevant that most New Deal programs didn't work and
that we were so preoccupied at home that we watched the
world drift into the most dangerous war in history.
Roosevelt's gift was the believable promise setting
the great goals which he would inspire the Nation ( a very
important point which you made in our meeting). The
1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, for example, became the
national credo; young and old alike knew what the four
freedoms were. (Even though it was 30 years ago I can
still remember the Four Freedoms Saturday Evening Post
cover.) With a few well chosen phrases he was able to
rally enduring support through difficult times. 1
3. Success on the Big Issues: There were at least two elections
in modern times decided principally on the grounds that times
were good, the President had done a satisfactory job of
running the country and there was no great public demand
for a change; the big issues of the day were well in hand.
The first was Coolidge's election in 1924; the second, Ike's
in 1956. The Peace, Progress and Prosperity slogan clearly
reflected the public mood in 1956. Ike had the big issues
well under control; he had restored the country to a period
of normalcy. He was obviously also greatly helped by his
powerful "Father image". Ike fit the times and the times fit
Ike.
¹It was all the more remarkable in that the "Four Freedoms"
were enunciated by Roosevelt, after he had been in office for eight
years, at the tag end of a speech in which he outlined the dismal
state that the world was then in, that we were at war or would be
soon, that great sacrifices were necessary, that our defense pro-
duction program was a disaster, that we weren't equipped to fight
the war and that all hell was breaking loose.
3.
4. The Voters' Self Interest: On certain occasions in
modern times the people have been moved to vote
primarily according to their own economic self-interest.
1948 is the classic example. Certainly President Truman
had little charisma (at least at the time); the times were
not that good and there was a strong sentiment for
change in the country. Although Truman was a strong,
tough individual, it can hardly be said that in 1948 there
was widespread public respect for his leadership as
there had been for Roosevelt's. Yet he won - -- largely
because he made his own re-election important to the
economic interest of large segments of the voting popula-
tion. In 1964 Lyndon Johnson succeeded in appealing to
the economic interests of key groups and in frightening
the electorate as to the economic (and international)
consequences of electing his opponent.
B. WHERE WE STAND
These four categories give us some yardstick -- - albeit arbitary
to examine where we stand and our opportunities.
1. Image-Charisma: We cannot and should not try to make
the President something he isn't. (I gather this is the
point of Buchanan's memo, as it was the point made in
the Pierson column.) It would be foolish and counter pro-
ductive to try to build a Kennedy-type mystique -- there
isn't time, the press would never let us get away with it
nor is it necessarily a very reliable source of political
strength. A President doesn't have to be likeable, have
a sense of humor or even love children. It is important
only that his personal qualities engender confidence.
2. Respect for Leadership: There is an important distinction
between this and the image point above (a distinction we
haven't clearly made). We can and we should make people
better understand the President why he is the strong,
determined, disciplined and self-confident leader that he is.
4.
The Connally thesis in this respect is absolutely
valid. Those who know the President and work with
him as we do, recognize his brilliant, extraordin-
arily retentive and perceptive mind, his long-range
strategic view of problems, his high purpose and we,
in turn, come to have enormous confidence in him.
We must try to get this across; the electorate can
develop some of the same confidence if the story is
told correctly. The obvious handicap in developing
the Connally thesis is that it will almost invariably
be filtered out, discounted and at times ri diculed by
a very hostile press. The press have painted so many
negative images over the years that even if we do the
most superb job in the world, I doubt that we can shift
enough opinion in the next 18 months to make this the
decisive factor in the election. Whatever we can do,
however, will help and is important.
The great goals approach is perhaps the toughest.
Roosevelt's speech caught the public imagination at
a time when the country was uniting in the face of a
common danger. The President has used some truly
great phrases a "Generation of Peace" etc. Maybe
because of the press or because the country has be-
come excessively blase, these haven't become national
rallying themes. Between now and next year's State of
the Union, we should study in depth those things the
people of the Nation most desire and the way in which
we can state the goals for the country that will, in fact,
inspire and gain confidence. None of us should shoot
from the hip in this area. We must know the public
mood, not just what the polls report, but by examining
it in depth. If there is any one thing peculiar to our
times it is the extreme volatility of public attitudes,
caused more than anything else by the constant impact
of the electronic media which can cause very dramatic
almost overnight shifts in attitudes.
5.
What people may want more than anything else is to
have their confidence in the future re-established and
our constituency at least wants to believe in America
and in what they regard as fundamental values. They
are tired of constantly being told what is wrong with
society and of having their consciences wracked with
continuous recrimination. We are on the right side of
this issue but the real question is how to lift 200 million
people out of their seats.
In short, I believe that this is a terribly important area
for us. We must work to develop public confidence in
the President personally, to gain respect for him as a
leader and to give the nation an uplift; the obstacles are,
however, very great and this, therefore, should be but
one of several strategies.
3.
The Big Issues: Obviously the war (foreign policy
generally) and the economy are the two big ones; our
domestic program next.
a. The War. Even if we are virtually out of Vietnam the
Democrats will cynically argue that we could have ended it
much sooner, that we dragged it out to no avail and that we
got out only because the Doves in the Congress forced us
out. A war weary people are likely to want to turn their
attention to other things and forget Southeast Asia. What
they will be more concerned with is who can best keep the
peace. It is obvious to us that by remaining strong, by
getting out of Vietnam on a responsible basis, by preserving
the credibility of the United States we are doing a better
job of building a lasting peace. On the other hand in an
era of growing isolationism, people might well feel that
our firmness and our resolve to do those things necessary
(Laos and Cambodia) run a greater risk of getting us into
another war than the head-in-the-sand Dove line. We can
be vulnerable to demagoguery on this issue.
6.
Moreover the war is, in a sense, a negative issue.
We are badly hurt if we don't end it but we may not
gain a great deal of credit if we do.
2
Obviously if major events -- SALT, Disarmament,
a summit, Vietnam, China go our way there could
be such an overwhelming positive reaction in the
foreign policy area that the President would be un-
beatable regardless of anything else. While we are
hoping this happens, we should not rely on it since so
much of this is beyond our control.
b. The Economy. Even if the economy is back in full
swing by next year, as I personally expect it will be, the
Democrats will argue that we still have inflation and we
had more unemployment through the Nixon years than
under the Democrats. The Democrats will traffic heavily
on the public's traditional suspicions about economics.
In almost every issue poll the Democrats outscore us in
public confidence with respect to handling of the economy
and thus this is at best always an uphill issue. Whether
we win on this will depend on whether we are able to allay
fears about the future, convince people that unemployment
will not again rise and that prices can remain relatively
stable.
c. The Domestic Program. This may well be our biggest
problem at the moment but, at the same time, our biggest
opportunity. Our domestic programs are "managerial
oriented" not "people oriented". In my view this is both a
PR and a substantive problem with a much heavier emphasis
on the latter. As you pointed out, there is very little "what's
in it for me" in our domestic program.
2 It is very much like the recent demonstrations. Had there been
a disaster, we would have been hurt; we handled it beautifully and gained
little -- not because the people don't associate the President with the
handling of the demonstrations (because they did) but rather because
it is a negative issue and there is little profit in what the public regards
as something basically unpleasant. Two pollsters have told me that even
though the public overwhelmingly agreed with our stand on the demonstra-
tions entirely and even though people associated the President with the
demonstrations, that this does not translate into a positive response with
respect to the President.
8.
work hard in the hopes that they will be able to educate
their children. The desire for education is strongest
among those adults who did not obtain a higher education
themselves; and they represent perhaps our most signi-
ficant political potential. Most Americans who work
resent those who do not and especially resent paying
higher taxes for loafers who abuse the welfare system.
Finally most middle class Americans fear a catastrophic
illness which can wipe out their savings and security.
Middle-aged people worry about their retirement; older
people worry about their ability to live on their retire-
ment and rising prices. The farmers have a set of
economic problems all their own. 3 There are things we
can do at this point to position ourselves and our programs
on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues that
such a profile suggests. For example:
a. Revenue Sharing. Most people today look at general
revenue sharing as simply another "hand out" from the
Federal Treasury to local politicians. If the public has
a poor attitude toward Federal bureaucrats, it has a
worse perception of local politicians.
Unfortunately our revenue sharing does not have any
tangible, economic meaning to the individual. We haven't
made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax
burden.
We had the choice originally of proposing what would have
been the purest form of revenue sharing, i.e. individual
tax credits by individual taxpayers for a portion of local
income, sales or real property taxes. After a very
extensive study, the Domestic Council and the Treasury
concluded that general revenue sharing involving grants
from the Federal government to states and local com-
munities was more equitable, more efficient and would
3 The social issues are perhaps equally important -- race, crime
in the streets and narcotics but these aren't economic and are
essentially negative. We are also postured correctly on these.
9.
provide the financial assistance needed more quickly.
It was clearly a better solution on the merits, but it
ran headlong into the opposition of Byrnes and Mills
who over the years had favored the credit approach;
it also ran counter to the traditional Republican philo-
sophy of revenue sharing, first advanced by Mel Laird
in the Fifties and subsequently endorsed by various
Republican Policy papers through the Sixties. Most
importantly it missed the political mark (a point Clark
MacGregor and I vainly tried to make before the final
decision was made).
A credit arrangement would give the opportunity (also the
burden) to state and local communities to increase their
levels of taxation. (The majority of which are now con-
trolled by the Democrats)
It is not too late to do this, although we would need an
excuse to shift our position -- perhaps if Mills scuttles
our bill or perhaps whenever we propose a value added
tax. With a new source of Federal revenue we could
couple with it a tax credit revenue sharing arrangement
arguing that the value added tax permits a much larger
(and different form of) revenue sharing.
It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the
present Congress (it could pass since Byrnes and Mills
are committed to this approach) so that next April 15
every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his
Form 1040 and receive a federal credit refund a direct
abatement for local taxes. We could argue that we - - the
Nixon Administration had brought tax relief to home-
owners and taxpayers all across the country.
b. Tax Credits for Education. Perhaps coupled with revenue
sharing tax credits we could include some tax credit or
deduction for educational expenses. Costs of higher
education are becoming nearly prohibitive for middle income
families, the group which offers us the greatest opportunity
10.
for political gain. For years there have been proposals
in the Congress to provide some tax credit or deduction
arrangement. The issue is there for the taking. Indeed
it is expensive, but once again, if it were coupled with
a substitute tax arrangement we could do it and still be
fiscally responsible. This is clearly a prime "what's in
it for me" issue.
C. Lifting the Ceiling of Earnings of Social Security
Recipients. What is better Republican philosophy than
to encourage Social Security recipients to earn more than
the current $1800 ceiling? We worry about all the little
things we can do to improve upon HEW's programs to
benefit the aging. These get us absolutely nothing
politically and really appeal only to the professional
senior citizens' lobby. The vast majority of retired citizens
couldn't care less about pilot programs for feeding the
elderly in Chicago. What they really care about is making
ends meet when they retire. Lifting the ceiling, for
example to $3000 would be expensive and would probably
also have to be tied to something like the value added tax
to give us the fiscal rationale. The fact is, however, that
it is a very powerful "what's in it for me" economic issue
and particularly potent with a constituency whose support
is vital to us (remember too that the retired vote can be
decisive in California and probably is decisive in Florida).
d. Medical Program. Our present medical program is so
complicated that as you point out few of us ever know what
is in it, let alone the vast majority of the American people.
We should seize upon one or two salient points like cata-
strophic health insurance, more doctors, and initiatives
like the cancer cure and then demagogue these points to death.
We mainly want to neutralize this issue because we can't
win on it; the Democrats can always offer more in the way
of national health insurance than we can responsibly accept.
The fact remains however that we can talk about it and
continually should the need for curing dread diseases,
better medical services and our health insurance program.
The key to this one is to keep it simple and understandable
and relate it always to the individual's economic (and health)
interest.
11.
5. Welfare Reform. We own this issue presently; we must
keep on hitting it, constantly. People simply don't like
to pay taxes to support loafers. The tougher we are in
tightening the work requirements, the more the political
gain. It is indirectly, therefore, a "what's in it for me"
economic issue.
6. Special Interest Cultivation -- 1948 Example. In developing
those issues which appeal to the voters' economic self-
interest it is particularly instructive to examine the
Truman election of 1948. There are some interesting
political similarities with our own situation. Truman was
derided and scoffed at by the sophisticated opinion makers,
as we often are. He faced a hostile Congress, as we do.
Based on results of the 1946 election, he could not count
on his party being in the majority. He was faced with a
third party threat. He had been forced to do unpopular
things in the international field and he had inherited the
difficult economic problems of converting from war to peace.
While Dewey went into the 1948 campaign talking about
national unity, peace and the need to make government more
effective, Truman devoted all of his resources to the bread
4
and butter gut issues.
A recent column by Henry Owen (attached as Tab A) makes
the very perceptive point that Truman won the election because
people thought he would better protect their bread and butter
interests "pocketbook politics had carried the day, dignity
and efficiency came in a poor second. 11 The Owen column
interestingly enough makes the point that the same issues
that elected Truman are perhaps even more important today.
If, indeed, there is a valid lesson from the 1948 election, it
is that we can build the same kind of a political base to make
the President's re-election important to the economic self-
interests of large segments of the voting population and we
4
According to Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dewey
and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution,
which had so captivated the eastern electorate in the post war years,
would captivate the rest of the country as well. 11
12.
must escape the Republican managerial syndrome.
For example (these are only examples, a very
comprehensive analysis should be prepared to pick
our best targets and best issues):
a. Labor and Building Trades: We are on the verge of
being irreparably damaged with the "hard hats" even
though 6 months ago this represented one of our most
fertile fields for political gain. We had to crack them
hard on the wage issue and we did. We are not, however,
intensifying the minority hiring campaign in the building
trades. While most people view this as a racial question
it is, plain and simple, a pocketbook issue with the "hard
hats"; they interpret our efforts as an attempt to break
down the existing union structure, to destroy the appren-
ticeship program and to eliminate their job security.
There are approximately 3.8 million building tradesmen
in the United States; at the moment they feel that we are
threatening not only wages but, more important, job
security.
As with so many issues, this requires a tough political
choice. Do we play to the blacks, which in my opinion
will get us nothing, or do we play to the "hard hats",
a large percentage of whom we got in 1968 and as to
whom we had been making enormous political progress.
This is a natural "new" constituency, newly emerging
middle-class Americans, most of them homeowners
living in the suburbs, becoming increasingly conservative
on social, international and racial issues. The combination
of wage stabilization, Davis-Bacon and minority hiring
will make it impossible for any of their leaders to support
us or to make gains with the rank and file.
We have another opportunity with the building trades. Most
building tradesmen have discovered that their hourly wage
increases have been largely offset by the fact that they are
working less and less throughout the course of a year; the
13.
higher their hourly wages, the greater the incentive
for labor saving devices and hence the less labor hours
available. Many of them are beginning to seek annual
contracts, rather than hourly wage increases. It is
argued that hourly wages could be significantly reduced
by annual contract negotiations, thereby benefiting
both the worker and the cost of construction. We don't
have to endorse this; we merely have to recognize the
problem which we have not done. If we were merely
to announce a study of the feasibility of annual contracts
in the building trades, asking the Construction Industry
Collective Bargaining Council to come up with recom-
5
mendations, the political impact could be huge.
This is the kind of issue that we need with labor generally.
One of the recommendations that the Rosow Report made
was that we provide for vesting of pension plans after
perhaps 10 or 15 years. Every blue collar employee
has a direct economic stake in this. While it is a tough
issue with business it is one that could help us make real
inroads with the rank and file of labor. All we need are
a couple of major items like this, which represent very
direct pocketbook benefit to the individual worker and
regardless of what Al Barken and Cope do next year we
will make important gains with the rank and file.
b. Business Community. While the business community's
political clout is minimal it is a source of support we cannot
overlook; the attitude of business leaders has an impact on
the white collar, professional category as to which Muskie
has shown surprising strength in the polls.
This has been the most activist Administration in history
in the field of anti-trust, the environment and consumer
issues. We can argue that had the Democrats been in power
5
Such studies have been conducted over the years in the
Department of Labor; merely recognizing them and grabbing the
issue is all that is required.
14.
they would have been worse, but that is a tough case
to make with politically naive businessmen. All we have
to do to help business in the pocketbook is to begin to
slow down dramatically in the anti-trust field, gradually
in the other two.
C. The Farm Vote. In 1968 we kicked hell out of the
Democrats on the issue of parity. It was 74; today
it is slightly below 70. Hardin tells us that there is no
way between now and next November to get back up to
the 1968 level. (This is in the nature of the parity
formula). This one fact alone tells us with certainty
that this will be a 1972 issue.
We can, however, get farm prices up; farmers have
been in a very severe price/cost squeeze. Farm prices
have to improve by the Fall of 1972 (regardless of the
impact on the wholesale price index) if we are to regain
our traditional support in the farm belt. It can be done
on a commodity by commodity basis as we know from
our experience with milk. We can further aid the farmer
by programs such as REA, home ownership loans, etc.
As to these, we have been acting as good Republican
managers, consistently cutting back on the farm budget;
the time is now at hand to begin increasing it.
d. The Retired Vote. In addition to the obvious an
increase in the earnings' ceiling of social security reci-
pients and cost of living social security increases
there are special retired groups we can appeal to: for
example the 850, 000 retired military personnel, a large
number. of whom live in Florida (62, 000) and California
(145, 000). In 1968 we promised to support recomputation
of military pay; we have not. Finally we have underway
a study which will lead to some recomputation recommenda-
tions; it will be very modest but a step forward, correcting
some of the gross inequities in the present military retirement
15.
system. This is a real pocketbook issue. When the
recommendations come from the study committee in
July (approximate cost $150 million a year) there will
be strong opposition from OMB. If we want to practice
pocketbook politics, this is a very good place to start.
e. Veterans Groups. I have had a running battle for
months over cuts made by OMB in the VA hospital care
budget. The amount cut was slightly in excess of $100
million. Two months ago a head count of the Veterans
Affairs Committees in the House and the Senate revealed
that we would be rolled in both committees; it was clear
that not only would these funds be restored but the Congress
would probably add substantially to our budget requests
and would, moreover, attach a mandatory spending clause.
Had we been willing to restore the $100 million cut, we
could have gotten the agreement of the veterans organizations
to stick with our budget figures; we would have avoided a
confrontation with the Congress and we then simply could
have withheld funds during FY 1972. As it is now, we
will probably be forced to spend the money and will have
lost on a gut economic issue with the veterans organization
whose membership totals over 6 million. Their recent
publications point up the ludicrous situation we find ourselves
in: on one page they strongly support us for our foreign
policy and on the next tear us apart for cutting health care
for the veterans. What's more, we gave Teague, Hartke and
Albert a marvelous issue you may recall two weeks ago
they were all on national TV networks blasting the
Administration for being "anti-veteran. "
My sole point is that we can do a much better job in
appealing to the economic self-interest of large groups of
citizens than we have done. We have to be just a little less
concerned about managerial efficiency and a little more
concerned about "people politics".
In this area we cannot ascribe fault to our public relations
effort; nor really can public relations help us. In some
cases it is downright dangerous to make a major PR effort
when substantively we have serious problems. Salute to
16.
Agriculture is a very good case in point. The public
believes that most politicians are phoney and we only
give our critics an opportunity to exploit this when we
launch major PR efforts in an attempt to cover up a basic
economic or political problem.
The other side of this coin is equally valid. If we have
made the right political decisions, the public relations
effort is relatively painless. For example, if we were
to do something in the building trades area, we would
have no difficulty in getting our story told and getting the
credit. Through mailings, trade journals and speeches
every building tradesman would very soon know what we
had done.
C. CONCLUSION
After two and a half years the die is farily well cast on the big
issues. Either we have or we have not done the things necessary
for those issues to be working for us next year.
We do have, however, two areas which we 'can most effectively exploit
and there is time to do it. Revamping our domestic program to make
it more people oriented and making a major effort to cultivate the
economic interest of those voting blocs that either have represented
our traditional constituency or should be part of our emerging new
constituency. These are identifiable. The ways to reach them
politically are no mystery and we have all the equipment the
advantage of incumbency -- with which to exploit them.
I am especially impressed, as you may have gathered, by some of the
fascinating parallels with the Truman re-election in 1948. Truman
rejected the advice that he try to reform his image or that he mount
a major sales effort. What he did instead, based on the Clark Clifford
memo of November 1947, was to analyze cynically, coldly and
shrewdly the rag-tag assortment of special interest groups and
minorities that FDR had welded together into a majority coalition;
he determined what political and economic favors were necessary
to retain or regain their loyalties and then met them head on. As
a result Truman devoted all of his resources to the subject which
most Americans cared most about then (and perhaps still do): How
to make a living.
17.
While I have emphasized the similarities with 1948, I, of course,
recognize that the circumstances then were quite different than
they are now. In April of 1948 Truman had a 36% approval rating
in the Gallup Poll and for him, therefore, this was a last ditch
desperate effort. We are certainly not in that condition.
Nonetheless in formulating our strategy for 1972, there is the
political gain of exploiting to the fullest the advantages of incumbency --
which on the issues we have not done as well as we could.
A
issues VS. Image
WASHINGTON POST
May, 1071
1. 18 Revisited:
A Political Lesson
one
By Henry Owen
GOVERNOR Dewey did not. He talked in
a dignified way about peace, and national
GOVERNOR DEWEY'S death brought
unity, and the need to make government
back memories of the 1948 election. The con-
more effective. His advisers were not pas-
ventional wisdom is that he lost because of
sionately concerned about bread and butter
his personality. Maybe #0; but a hard look at
issues; he mistook their highminded inter-
AFFLUENCE HAS, If anything. strength-
the voting results suggests an alternative ex-
ests for the voice of the country. To quote
ened the hold of economic issues on these
planation, which brings to mind Philip Gue-
Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips,
lower middle class voters: The rise in their
della's remark that historians spent so much
"Dewey and his men believed that the con-
living standards (and in their borrowing) has
time wondering how Napoleon lost the bat-
cepts of the managerial revolution, so capti-
made them highly vulnerable to shifts in the
tle of Waterloo that they forgot to ask how
vating to the Eastern elite in the postwar
economic tides. Fending off these threats is
Wellington won it: that the 1948 election
years, had captivated the rest of the country
concern number one. This is not only in the
wasn't SO much lost by Governor Dewey as
as well." As Phillips points out,
U.S. but in other major industrial countries.
it was won by President Truman. And that
"intellectually, his campaign was on a
Former Prime Minister Wilson had it all
the way in which it was won may have im-
higher level than Truman's, just as it was in
over Ted Heath on image; but he lost the
portant lessons for the future.
the matter of taste and decorum."
last British general election because voters
Shortly before the 1948 Democratic con-
Soon after the election, the Saturday Eve-
associated him with rising prices and unem-
vention, Arthur Krock summed up the pre-
ning Post sent Samuel Lubell out to inter-
ployment. In Germany, as Flora Lewis
vailing view: "A President whose defeat at
view voters and find out what had hap-
pointed out recently in The Washington
the next poll is generally prophesied faces
pened. His answer was simple: "People had
Post, worries over inflation and other do-
difficulties in performing his office that
voted for Truman because they thought
mestic issues have dominated recent
could conceivably bring disaster
At this
he would protect their bread and butter in-
elections; the press may be fascinated with
writing, the President's influence is weaker
terests. Labor rolled up the traditional Dem-
Brandt's image as the great practitioner of
than any President's has been in modern
ocratic majorities; farmers worried by the
Ostpolitik, but the voters aren't.
history, Although the country was fairly
80th Congress' refusal to extend grain stor-
President Truman won because he under<
prosperous, the conversion from war to
age, were seeking down to earth promises
stood the dominance of these economic is-
peace had been a rough one, and Mr. Tru-
which they didn't find in- Dewey speeches."
sues, and spent more time addressing them
man's style in coping with these problems
Pocketbook politics had carried the day; dig-
than worrying about his image. His answers
seemed to a good many opinion-shapers-in
nity and efficiency came in a poor second.
may no longer be relevant, and they were
his own party, in the Congress, and among
Since 1948, large changes have taken place
sometimes wrong even in 1948, but he was
the press-to be crude, erratic, and bum-
in the country. Affluence and education have
asking the right questions. If recent elec-
bling.
increased; memories of the Great Depression
tions in the United States and abroad mean
A natural pre-election remedy would have
have receded. And so it seems plausible to
anything, they suggest that winning candi-
been for the President to concentrate on im-
believe those who now tell us, as they did in
dates in the industrial world will still be
proving the areas where he was criticized
1948, that bread and butter issues no longer
those who give priority to these bread and
most-his style and image: trying to seem
dominate American political life. The trou-
butter questions, despite the continuing fas-
more business-like, dignified, and efficient.
ble is that most of this talk takes place be-
cination of well heeled political observers
But shrewdly, he judged that this was not
tween the relatively small number of Ameri-
with style and related matters. Here is a
the heart of the matter. Late in November
cans (less than 20 per cent) who have in-
good reason to review the memories of 1948.
1947, he had received from Clark Clifford a
comes over $15,000 a year. Their numbers
lengthy and perceptive memorandum outlin-
have grown, as the numbers of the poor
ing a proposed strategy for the coming cam-
have shrunk; but Census reports tell us that
paign. It ticked off the major voting blocs—
almost two-thirds of Americans are still in
farmers, labor, and Negroes-and the spe-
between, with incomes between $5,000 and
cific issues which concerned them. From then
$15,000 a year. If everything is going well,
on-in his 1948 State of the Union message,
these blue and white collar workers have
in his proposals to a special post-convention
the time and inclination to share affluent
session of the Congress, and in his election
Americans' concern with other issues; but
campaign-the President zeroed in on these
when inflation or recession threatens, their
issues. He warned farmers about falling ag-
attention focuses sharply on a few key
ricultural prices; he spoke to workingmen
questions: What's going to happen to over-;
about the need for housing, Social Security,
time pay? Will salary increases outpace
and minimum wage legislation. His oratory
inflation? Is the wife's part-time job in
and style were crude, but he addressed the
Jeopardy?
subject which most Americans most
May19- May 71
CONFL ENTIAL
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By
Ep
NARS, Date 7-12-82
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
DWIGHT L. CHAPIN
This is a memorandum to follow up the meeting which you had last Thursday
concerning Presidential goals and the general problem of putting the President out front
on issues and in situations where he can relate more to the people.
PHILOSOPHY
We have always known that others are better at selling the President than he is
at selling himself. He gets into trouble or does not come across as well when he has to
sell what he has done.
The point is that he has initiated revolutionary-type programs, made tremendous
strides both in foreign and in domestic affairs; yet this has not been communicated or
evidently realized by the public at large.
Although I had hoped to be able to read and research more than I have, the following
are some of the historical points out of Thomas Bailey's book which relate to the problems
we are having communicating the President and the relationship of a President to
the people. The commuts 121 Aft 7 /
pa.
2.
PRESIDENTIAL RELATIONSHIP TO PEOPLE
1.
President Wilson ran into problems when he gave the impression
he was concerned with people inmasses rather than with people as
individuals. (Don't talk about masses. Talk about the people or the
family, or the man, or the student, or the housewife. Relate on an
issue at the point of lowest common denominator.)
2.
A President should not start a crusade that people are not in the mood
to
for. Move off but do not get too far out front. (People are in a mood
for a crusade against cancer, medical care, and human related goals.
They have difficulty and it is easy to get too far ahead of them on
intangibles such as revenue sharing, or reorganization. Revenue
Sharing must be brought to them in a very personal way.
Desalting
of water may be an issue where we are putting the
Do
people
President too far out front.)
3.
The people look to the Commander in Chief as also being the teacher
in chief. (President Nixon does a good job here. He has a simplistic
approach to explaining complicated matters. The November 3
speech, the troop withdrawal announcements, and other activities
would seem to rate him high in this area. Perhaps we should do
more events putting the President in situations where he must
3.
explain things to the people.)
4.
Some times "bad politics " turn out to be "good politics" when the
people perceive the President has the best interests of the country in
mind. (The move into Cambodia should be a perfect exampel of this
as should revenue sharing in its own way. On revenue sharing, he is
moving against special interests groups to benefit the people. On the
SST, he stayed firm for it because it was important for the country
and in the long run would have been best for the country although at
the time it was bad politics.
NOTE: According to Bailey, all great incumbents have been in some
degree greatly inconsistent. He says that Jefferson when the chips
were down had the courage to be inconsistent. The President's
removal of the Department of Agriculture from the organization
plan would fit this mold. A leader with programs must remain firm.
Make concessions for the substance of the goal, but retreat a little
here for more there. The Agriculture example fits this perfectly.
5.
Voters will overlook Presidential shortcomings but seldom forgive
failure to provide leadership when constructive action is urgently
4.
needed. (We must have gained all kinds of points here, if this is true,
on the NATO exercise. The same should be true of the forthcoming
SALT statement).
6.
People admire a Chief who commands allegiance, unites sections,
1
inspirespeople to greater patriotism, arouses a challenge that will appeal
to better selves." This is the area where the President shines; therefore,
we probably do not do enough. The Regional Medial Briefings tie into
this. The participation in a Fourth of July exercise or the Pendleton and
West Point exercises should hook into this beautifully. The State of the
Union which the President anticipates should be the thing that arouses
the challenge that will appeal to people to better themselves. We need to
do more in terms of relating to the betterment of individuals and with the
Government's purpose being for the betterment of individuals and not
the betterment of an organized bureaucracy. "
All strong Presidents have had powerful enemies. (President Nixon
qualifies here.)
1 5.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1.
Presidential direction to a degree must coincide with the tide of the times.
(The News Summary points out that Forbes' Magazine has done a study among
businessmen and they have come up with a c onclusion that Ralph Nader should
be the running mate on some Presidential candidate's ticket next time around.
This is hill to our ears, but may reflect a tide in the consumer area which we
have been rebelling against. Another case in point could be the understanding of
the drug problem. I do not mean legalization, but to what degree do we show
a deep understanding of the problems of the humanitarian aspects versus the
law and order side. We should probably execute the pusher but it is how we deal
with the addict that perhaps we should question. )
2.
Bailey says that "we associate great revolutions, to use this over-used word, with
all great Presidents." Washington presided over a conservative counter-revolution,
Jefferson over the electoral revolution, Lincoln over the counter-revolution, Wilson
over the new Freedoms' revolution, and FDR over the New Deal revolution.
(Maybe the new American revolution is not far off-track. WE are at a key point
in history where perhaps another counter revolution - the people's counter-
revolution - is necessary in order to maintain those ideals of government in which
we believe.)
6.
3.
For FDR, radio was made to order. It amplified his self-assured manner, his genius
for over-simplification, and his matchless voice. (Going back to the first debate,
everyone said the President won on radio. The President has an excellent radio
voice. Perhaps we are on target by continuing with the radio speeches. However,
perhaps we are missing a golden opportunity tonot move off with the fireside
type chats on television. However, we have discussed this often but we have never
had the guts to try it. Perhaps we are wrong in setting down a pattern of four
network interviews and one on ones and we should try the new vehicle. )
4.
The Presidential giants were all activists and fall into the "impact of office
category." Lincoln demonstrated what could be done in persuading the people
to accept over stretching of the Constitution in surmounting crises. Teddy
Roosevelt operated on the stewardship theory that he could do anything that
the Constitution did not prohibit. People are primarily interested in how effective
a man is in discharging his duties entrusted to him and in not how good he is
for the office. (The key here is basically the President's design of his office.
What does he envision it to be? In other words, President Nixon's concept of
the Presidenty) shoul it public to / Phinilts?
7.
5.
On the legislative front, historically the role of executive as Representative in
Chief has been of immense importance. Presidents must lead and drive
Congress. Instead of blaming the Legislative Branch for its failures to legislate,
people will tend to blame the Executive. In modern times, the influence of the
President sinks as that of Congress rises and vice versa. (If this is true, the
President or the Executive Branch should see that a drumbeat of prodding
Congress is maintained and that periodically with vetoes or onmajor issues
(NATOS/SST and others) The President bangs away in exerting as much
leadership as possible. We should remain out front pushing hard for our flagship policies
an preempting to any degree possible those programs offered by our opponents.
6.
Undue candor can be harmful to the President. Perhaps this is why DeGaulle had
V
and kept his aloofness. I doubt that candor, when you take all of the isx situations
where the President has been candid, adds up to a total plus for the President. It
risk
increases the element of mistake and it gains very little when it is used except for
a fleeting moment. Candor should only be a technique for striving to achieve
a certain goal.)
8.
NOTES ON RELATING PROGRAMS TO PEOPLE
1.
We need to set our priorities within the White House against those programs
which the President and the Administration in toto should get get behind
based upon which will do the most positive things for thos e people who
comprise the constituency which will elect the President in 1972.
2.
We should take those programs and dissect them in singling out which phases
of the program appeal to what particular group and then proceed with selling
that aspect of the program to that group.
3.
Where a program comes into conflict with a group of substantial supporters
such as agriculture does under the Reorganization plan, then some minor
shift should be made in the program or a major undertaking should be put
in the works which convinces those peopleaf alienated that the program in
the long run is good for them.
4.
We should not run off with false ideas as to what programs the people really
prefer. For example, what makes IIMSX us think anyone is interested in
desalting the water, especially when it has no bearing on desert areas
but rather only on large metropolitan areas.
9.
5.
There must be a tight political group which analyzes each program as to what
it does for people. A controlling factor not only has to be the initiation of the
programs if indeed we go with any new programs, but at OMB.. The Gifford
control at OMB is extremely important. We need to take and analyze every
program as it comes through OMB with a ruthless political eye as to what it will
do for us., blak balancing those which help our opposition or alienate any of
6.
our people. The political group which decides what programs go and what
OMB
programs don't should shill be made up of Ehrlichman, Cap Weinberger, and
For Domestic
other NH
Flanigan. It should be a closely knit group which has the President's backing.
7.
A complete reevaluation of our programs and their potentials in terms of what
they do for people should be undertaken with polling a part of this if necessary.
The Domestic Council should immediately prepare breakdowns for all their
Each ONE loes
programs as to what it does for what group of people. They should list the
pros and cons on each issue as it orients to people. Again, this has got to be done
with a cold political eye and not on the basis of what is substantively good for the
country. This is perhaps a task that Morgan should move into since he does have
a fairly good political mind and it would be a way of easing him out of what he
is doing.
8.
A historical research study should be done to see what the common trends are
among incumbent Presidents in regard to the major issues and indeed what it is
that the people are looking at for in a President. I know that some of this work
10.
is underway through Derge. I also know that you have studied the Bailey book
and have pulled out much from that. It is important, however, that we keep the
President postured right through the next sixteen months and this may be even
more important than all the programs put together.