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    "description": "This file contains:\n\nTo: H. R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson. RE: Wallace people. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 9/25/1972\n\nTo: Charles W. Colson. From: Charles S. Snider. RE: Wallace, MacGovern and Nixon campaign. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Letter], 9/22/1972\n\nTo: H. R. Haldeman. From: W. Richard Howard. RE: Surrogate scheduling program. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/17/1972\n\nTo: H. R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson. RE: Issue mgmt. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/17/1972",
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    "ocrText": "Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nContested Materials Collection\nFolder List\nBox Number\nFolder Number\nDocument Date\nNo Date\nSubject\nDocument Type\nDocument Description\n47\n14\n9/25/1972\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: H.R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson.\nRE: Wallace people. 1pg.\n47\n14\n9/22/1972\nCampaign\nLetter\nTo: Charles W. Colson. From: Charles S.\nSnider. RE: Wallace, MacGovern and Nixon\ncampaign. 4pgs.\n47\n14\n4/17/1972\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: H.R. Haldeman. From: W. Richard\nHoward. RE: Surrogate scheduling program.\n10pgs.\n47\n14\n5/17/1972\nCampaign\nMemo\nTo: H.R. Haldeman. From: Charles Colson.\nRE: Issue mgmt. 9pgs.\nTuesday, March 20, 2012\nPage 1 of 1\nSame-\nSeptember 25, 1972\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nH.R. HALDEMAN\nFROM:\nCHARLES COLSON\nSUBJECT:\nWallace People\nI have been very impressed with Charlie Snyder, Wallace's\ntop man, who sent me the attached letter which Ithought you\nmight like to read. While it is rambling, he makes two very\ninteresting points.\nThe first is the overture now being made to Wallace by McGovern.\nThis is for real. I don't think there is a chance of their succeeding\nbut the McGovera people are presenting some very persuasive\narguments.\nThe second point deals with the campaign theme, and while he\nhasn't stated it very well, I think the trust issue is a very\npowerful one. Right now we own it. Sayder suggests that we\nexploit it, a point with which I concur on the positive side.\nTHE\nWR4\nCAMPAIGN\nN-6\nwi\nSeptember 22, 1972\n9/26/72\nThe Honorable Charles W. Colson\nSpecial Council to President\nWhite House\nWashington, D. C. 20500\nDear Chuck:\nPaul Johnson, the McGovern coordinator for more than half of\nFlorida, was in my office Thursday.\nHere is what he said:\n\"I have been over North Florida and Central Florida where\nI am the campaign manager for McGovern and I find that the\npeople are not for McGovern and .they are not for Nixon. They\nare still for George Wallace. They are waiting for George\nWallace to drop even a feather of a hint as to where they\nshould go. And that is where they will go.\"\nHe came here with a long brief on similarities between\nMcGovern and Wallace. It was a part of the increasing court-\nship of the campaign by the McGovern forces. They are using\n\"party man\" and \"Democratic candidate in 1976\" and such other\nhoopla to sell the thought that Wallace must annoint the\nMcGovern-Shriver ticket. There is an \"undecided\" group among\nWallace people, but it is decidedly more anti-McGovern because\nof his supporters than the man or issues. I keep emphasizing\nthe word \"supporters.\" So, when you say people are against\nMcGovern, they mean to a much greater degree, that they are\nagainst welfare cheats, queers, amnesty seekers, militants,\nhippies, etc. But somehow this supporter image has been\npushed aside. Paul Johnson said \"We are having our young\npeople cut their hair, shave their mustaches, and clean up\nto get away from bad supporter image.\" In line with this,\nSTAND\nUPFOR\nAMERICA\nP.O. BOX 1972\nTELEPHONE (205) 265-7081\nMONTGOMERY. ALABAMA 36103\nThe Honorable Charles W. Colson\nPage 2\nthe McGovern national organization has attempted to employ as\na speechwriter and consultant one of our campaign people who\nhas been responsible for the Governor's statements since 1958.\nHe turned them down because he is loyal to me although the\noffer was most attractive.\nNow cometh Ted Kennedy. And in line with this, Morris Dees\nhas been on the phone almost daily to the man they tried to\nemploy as a speechwriter. He says the turning point of the\nMcGovern campaign would be the Wallace endorsement.\nNone of which is going to happen. Right now, we have a state\nthat is 99 and 44/100 percent pure Nixon and Alabama straws in\nthe wind will be a key to what Wallace does or does not do. I\nhave been keeping him informed of this feeling and it is\ncemented at this stage.\nNow, I would like to hitchhike mentally with you. In other\nwords, I want to present some viewpoints that in our intell-\nectual redneckism (as opposed to pointy-headed intellectuals)\nmight give you and the Nixon organization an insight that I\nfeel is missing.\nWe are in touch with all three parties and their supporters.\nI believe I have found a key to this campaign that is not\npresent anywhere else in your organization.\nThe key word is trust. President Nixon said in his book \"Six\nCrises\" that \"in politics, victory is never total.\"\nThere is no total victory today. There is too much executi-\nvists. Too much over-confidence. Too little impact to the\naverage citizen.\nIf I can drop back and punt for a second, McGovern came out\nof the Democratic convention scarred to hell and back as a\nhippie-loving, abortion-pushing, amnesty-favoring, homosexual\nsupported liberal. Then he capped this with the Eagleton dis-\naster. He was down and dirty and untouchable by average\ncitizens.\nThe Honorable Charles W. Colson\nPage 3\nNow, I want to make this point\nthere are liberals and left-\nists but they are few in number and there are conservatives\nlike the Birchers, etc. but they are few in number. The\nelection is decided by average citizens who are not left,\nright or middle of the road. They are political wanderers who\nfavor a little of the left, a little of the right, and a\nlittle of the middle of the road. Mainly they are concerned\nabout a job, a three-bedroom house, a car, school, church,\nchildren, maybe a boat, and retirement. They don't know\nBangladesh from an Eskimo, and they have absolutely no con-\ncept about what is happening in Vietnam, Korea or Japan and\ntrade deficit is something for the economists.\nThey are sold politics by the tube. This is a TV political\nyear, pure and simple, and that's it. Right now, they have\nMcGovern, a man they can't stand. But the Democrats are working\non this. in reverse. They are trying to destroy Nixon's\npopularity by convincing the people that McGovern might be a\nman you can't stand but Nixon is a man you can't trust.\nSo the word is trust. Trust is the key. So Nixon has to sell\ntrust. Only not trust in Nixon but trust in the people If\nyou could come up with a theme that Nixon trusts the people.\nNixon trusts America. Nixon trusts freedom. Nixon trusts the\nrealness of our times. Then you get away from trust in Nixon\nand you associate trust with Nixon with trust in America and\ntrust in the people and everytime that McGovern and his crowd\ntry to break this trust image, they create an impression that\nthey don't trust the people, they don't trust America, they\ndon't trust freedom.\nI know how I would have our man present this theme. And I\nknow how our staff could take this one line and break it off\nin the McGovern crowd because they are saying you can't trust\nAmerica. In effect, they are still trying to sell the old saw\nthat \"would you buy a used car from Richard Nixon?\"\nI see this. Others see this. This is what the next 40 days\nis all about. The concept must be that trust is the key. The\nwheat deal, Watergate, Vietnam, all of this is tied in to breaking\ndown trust in Nixon but if the Nixon team can turn this around and\nmake it appear that this radical crowd is trying to destroy trust\nin America, then you have a victory SO fantastic that even the polls\nyou now have would be underestimated.\nThe Honorable Charles W. Colson\nPage 4\nThis \"NOW, more than ever\" line is great and I like it. I\nknow it is good. But where are the lines that go with it that\nexplains why? Why not because Nixon trusts the people and\nNixon trusts America--and that is why he is needed now more\nthan ever because our times demand trust.\nI see things happening across the country that polls won't\nreflect. The Democrats are still taking \"issue\" polls only--\nnot image polls. They are cracking on the anti-issues in an\nattempt to crack trust.\nI know the campaign is geared toward the middle of October\nbut I also know that NOW is the time for action to get the\nNixon campaign moving toward the Average citizen.\nThe average citzen wants to hear trust. He wants to be re-\nassured. Reassured. Reassured. This what it is all about.\nThese are thoughts for what they are worth.\nWith kind personal regards, I am\nSincerely,\nCharles S. Snider\nExecutive Director\ncss/bjc\n5th Draft: April M, 1972\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nH. R. HALDEMAN\nFROM:\nW. Richard Howard\nSUBJECT:\nSurrogate Scheduling Program\nOn April 12, Chuck Colson, Dwight Chapin, Jeb Magruder,\nLarry Higby (part of the meeting) and I met to discuss the surrogate\nscheduling program. This meeting was held in response to your\nApril 10 memorandum on this subject and an attempt was made to\ncome up with an agreed upon proposal to improve the surrogate\nscheduling operation.\nIt was agreed that this operation can be divided into three\nmajor functions:\n1. Planning and strategy of the surrogate operation;\n2. Execution of surrogate events, including maximizing\nthe impact of the event;\n3. Distribution of issues and lines for surrogates to use\n-- that is, effectively using the surrogates to sell\npoints of importance to us.\nWe also agreed that there are clearly political and non-political\nevents to be scheduled. All events should be looked at from the\nstandpoint of political value, but as to many, it is our interest\nto have our surrogates (at least those in the Administration)\n2.\nspeaking in their official capacity rather than overtly as a\nsurrogate. Hence, the auspices under which they are scheduled\nis quite important.\nI. Planning and Strategy. This function is defined\nas including both creative scheduling and the initial first level\nliaison with the key spokesmen. This means that events and visits\nare created or located, and specific key spokesmen are locked into\nthe events. At this point, the execution phase begins.\nA. Creative Scheduling. It was agreed by all present that\ncreative scheduling for the surrogates would be the\nresponsibility of 1701 and that they would have authority\nfor decisions relating to who goes where, when and why.\nMagruder indicates that the creative scheduling function\nis presently being handled by Marik, Teeter and himself.\nHe also indicated that the planning and analysis functions\nare being direcly related to surrogate scheduling thereby\nproviding the necessary guidelines. It is felt that this\nfunction could be more productive if a surrogate strategy\nsection were included in each state plan and if 1701 would\nbegin drawing on those with past experience to obtain additional\ninput.\n--It is recommended that for each key state, the State\nChairman, the 1701 political operative responsible for that\n3.\nState, and the 1701 scheduling staff, develop a detailed\nsurrogate strategy. This surrogate strategy plan should\noutline the important issues in each state and determine which\nsurrogates most effectively present these issue. Not only\nshould it be determined who should and shouldn't be used in\neach state, but the desired number of appearances should be\nestimated. This would be the substantive section of the\noverall surrogate strategy plan and the White House\nshould be totally in volved in the development of this\nsection. The plan should also contain a political section\noutlining each state's estimated requirements for key\npolitical drawing cards such as the VP, First Family,\ncelebrities, etc. I believe it is important for this\ntype of thinking and planning to be done for each key\nstate and that these plans be periodically revised. Without\nthem, only a Speakers Bureau operation exists.\nIt is further recommended that Magruder, Marik, and Teeter\nset up an informal advisory brain trust consisting of Chapin,\nWhitaker, Cole and myself who have all been involved in past\nscheduling operations. This group should periodically meet and\nreview the Key State plans so that their inputs and thinking\ncan be included in the overall surrogate guidelines. It would\nbe useful if the 1701 political operative concerned with each\n4.\nstate atteneded these meetings during the time their state\nis under discussion. Obviously O'Donnell and Porter should\nalso attend.\nB. Spokesmen Contact. During the discussion of this subject,\nMagruder proposed that all contact with the surrogates (a list\nof 30 key spokesmen developed by 1701 which include Cabinet\nofficers, White House Staff, Senators, Representatives and\nGovernors) be made by personnel located at 1701 and that\ndemands on the time of these key spokesmen should be totally\ncontrolled by 1701. The thinking behind his proposal is that\na key spokesman should be contacted by only one person\nregarding his surrogate activities, because contact by more\nthan one would be confusing and may even create demands which\ncounter each other. It was further proposed by Magruder\nthat Pat O'Donnell physically move to 1701 in order to better\ncoordinate this effort, and to increase the political emphasis\nof the scheduling function.\nColson's view is that O'Donnell should remain in the\nWhite House working closely with 1701 and functioning as a\nresource of the surrogate scheduling operation there. The\nlogic behind this position is that there will always be the\nrequirement for a scheduling function within the White House.\nThis is true because of the many requests for various White\n5.\nHouse briefings and special scheduling operations such\nas; busing road shows, economic road show, Kissinger\nforeign policy briefings, the special youth speakers operation\nand, of course, to continue the use O'Donnell makes of the\nsub-Cabinet group. Also, of course, we do have some success\nscheduling Laird and Rogers which couldn't readily be done\nfrom 1701.\nIt is also important to take full advantage of the clout\nof the White House. With most non-political (but obviously\npolitical important) forums, initial contact by the White House,\nas opposed to 1701, will be necessary to the success of placing\nour speakers in these forums. This latter point is particularly\nsensitive especially when programming committees of large\nnational forums which are made up of jealous and protective\nfactions of all political persuasions. Many non-political\ngroups want Administration spokesmen but will shy away from\nspokesmen scheduled by either political party or political\norganization like 1701. If contacted by 1701, these\norganizations might well feel obligated to invite someone\nfrom the Democratic side. In addition, if the trip is\narranged by the White House, press arrangements can be made\ndirectly by Clawson and Snyder or by the agencies under Barker's\nsupervision. TV interview shows in particular, governed as they\nare by the FCC's expansion of the equal time doctrine\n5.\n(the Zapple ruling) are reluctant during a political\nperiod to take a \"political spokesman\" whereas they can\nvery easily accept a Cabines member if he is appearing\nas an \"Administration Spokesman\".\nI am of the strong opinion that the fastest and most\neffective, program is to over organize it. It would probably\nway-to stifle a surrogate scheduling\nbe beneficial to have a single contact for each key spokes-\nman who would control all requests for him, but let's not\nhide from reality. Each Cabinet officers, Senator, etc.\nhas multiple demands on his time from numberous sources, and\nhe always will.; he must continuously determine the priorities\nof several requests and I believe the President very\neffectively indicated the importance of the political surrogate\nprogram. A periodic reminder of this importance may be\nnecessary.\nThere was also no agreement on the requirement for the\nentire scheduling operation to be together physically.\nI\nbelieve it would be sheer folly stupidity to set this up at 1701\nevaluanly\nand fail to take advantage of our incumbency.\nIt was agreed that at some time in the future the\nsurrogate program would heat up and White House scheduling\nrequirements would decrease in number and importance so that\nit might be desirable to merge the White House and 1701\nscheduling operations in one location. Magruder proposes\n6.\nthis merger take place in July. Colson believes that\nSeptember and October will be the most important and proposes\nthe change, if desirable, be made in August or September.\nBased on the above discussion the following\nrecommendations are made:\n--O'Donnel stay in the White House but be used\nby 1701 when White House clout is necessary for\nspecific scheduling events. Hewould continue\nto handle White House briefings, road shows,\nspecialized briefings, key non-political forums\nand, of course, the entire non-surrogate operation,\n--It was further recommended that O Donnell and the\nscheduling personnel at 1701 meet almost daily to\nreview scheduling opportunities, priorities,\nrequirements, and the decisions with respect to the\nexecution for the particular day. 0 Donnell would\nact as the agent for 1701 in obtaining Cabinet members\nand Administration spokesmen in accordance with these\ndecisions.\n--- It is further recommended that\nColson, Magruder,\nChapin review the surrogate program again during July\nto determine when and if the scheduling operations should\nbe merged.\n7.\nII. Execution and Coordination. Discussion of this area\nwas not extensive because there was relative agreement. It is\nrecommended that once the key spokesman is locked into a visit,\nresponsibility for the success of that visit arrangements-wise, is\nturned over to John Foust. Foust should have overall responsibility\nfor the logistics and the political value of the visit. Foust should\ncoordinate directly with each key spokesman's scheduler and it will\nbe his duty to ensure that each visit contains those events\nthat will have the best political effect. Fourst should also coordinate\nthe advance men, where used.\nAs the campaign continues, new events and techniques to expand\nthe political effect of a surrogate visit should be developed, tested\nand expanded. Therefore, the guidelines for both scheduling and\nexecution will constantly change to reflect the political situation.\nThe responsibility for maximizing the media impact of every\nappearance will depend upon the nature of the for um, the capacity in\nwhich the surrogate is speaking (i.e. surrogate or Administration\nrepresentative) and of course who the surrogate is. 1701's surrogate\nlist is about 1/2 political figures (Congressmen, Senators, and Governors)\nand 1/2 Administration spokesmen. As to the former, press and TV\narrangements of necessity must by made by 1701. The White House couldn't\ndo so without becoming overtly political. The Administration spokes-\nmen's press and TV arrangements should be handled as they are now. under\n8\nBarker supervision.\nThe Departmental PIO arrange then or when\nnecessary they can be arranged directly by Snyder and Clawson.\nIII. Lines and Issues. One of the most important aspects\nof the surrogate operation of course is to ensure that a particular\nsurrogate hits a line which we want hit. The issues to be emphasized\nat present come from either the President, Haldeman, Mitchell, Colson\nor a combination. It would be highly desirable in the future if\nMitchell, Haldeman, and Colson can coordinate this on a regular basis.\nIt was agreed that it would be Colson's responsibilty to be\nsure that Noel Koch has the particular line for use by Hill spokes-\nmen including of course surrogates when they are here in Washington,\nthat the RNC have it for use by party workers, to ensure that Des\nBarker has it for use by Cabinet officers, that Van Shumway have it for\nuse for press purposes and Committee personnel and workers and, of\ncourse, that Clawson and Snyder have it in connection with their\nresponsibility in programming Administration and press opportunities.\nThis relates to substantive issues either domestic or foreign policy.\nAs to the political lines to be taken, this, of course, is determined\nby Mitchell, and Shumway has the responsibility for seeing that all of\nour people are instructed as to that particular line at that time.\nSubstantive fact sheets will contine to be generated from here in\nthe White House, but also sent to 1701 for their use in speakers kits,\npolitical surrogate brieftings, etc. Political fact sheet would, of\ncourse, be handled by 1701 and passed on to the White H ouse for\n9.\ninformation only.\nThis does not involve a significant change in our present\nand\nmodus aperandi. It does require very close coordination, whit\nIt\nthis will\nwas agreed to take place on an almost daily basis between Magruder's\noffice and Colson's office.\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nMay 17, 1972\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nH.R. HALDEMAN\nFROM:\nCHARLES COLSON\nSUBJECT:\nIssue Management\nThe following is intended as an appendix to Malek's memo to you\nregarding issue management. I have a number of quarrels with\nthe Malek paper primarily in that the solution to the problem is\nnot setting up new organizational structures; it is in having some-\none, somewhere, sometime, someplace make the decision as to\nthe issues we need to pursue, how we are going. to pursue them\nand then let the troops execute.\nOne major caveat in considering the issues: this is that this has\nto be the most volatile year ever in terms of issues. What looks\nvery dynamic today may fizzle in a week. On the other hand, we\nhave to start somewhere and begin sometime. The worst of all\nresults would be to fight the campaign on whatever issue happens\nto be hot in October because it may or may not be \"ours\". I am\nalso excluding from this analysis, obviously, foreign policy issues\nor questions which go to the P.R. aspects of the President's image.\nThe whole issue of trust, candor and credibility is one that can't\nbe dealt with as a separate issue; in my mind it is the \"bottom line\"\nof how well we handle the issues and how well we project the President's\npersonal strengths in handling these issues. It also is a function of\nthe gap between rhetoric and performance and unless we can close\nthe gap we are, in my mind, not going to be able to do very much on\nthe trust and credibility issue. It can't be handled by P.R. in a vacuum;\nit is really determined by how the public perceives the President in\nhandling the tough issues.\nThe following is my analysis of the gut issues and some thoughts on\nthe substantive follow-through we need.\n2.\nA. The New Populism. Without trying to define this, I think it falls\nright now into three categories; 1) we are for the big guy, the\nDemocrats are for the little man; 2) taxes and 3) disenchantment\nwith government i.e., the bureaucracy. As to these three:\n1.\nWe are stuck with the big business label and it will be hard\nto shed. There are a number of blue collar initiatives we\ncan take, however, many of them outlined in my memo to\nyou of May 21, 1971 (ironically, almost a year ago). If we\ncan start coming forward with some of these initiatives and\nsharpen up our P.R. in this area (for example with our\npension program which we have totally neglected) then we\nmight be able to slide away from the big business label\nsomewhat. Obviously, from a P.R. standpoint, no visible\nassociation with big business or establishment-type events\nshould be considered for the President.\n2.\nThere is no way politically that we can defend the present\ntax structure, nor should we. Either Humphrey or McGovern\nwill attack it hard, notwithstanding the obvious hypocrisy of\ntheir position. The dissatisfaction of millions of people can\nbe exploited very effectively by the \"outs\"; we are the \"ins\"\nand the fact that the Congress has created the present tax\nstructure simply doesn't sell as a defense (see again, my\nmemo of May 21, 1972, page 7). There are 66 million home-\nowners. Curbing property taxes is a natural issue. It should\nbe ours; but we have skirted all around it. We made an\nunsuccessful attempt to equate revenue sharing with property\ntax relief and we hit the issue hard in this year's State of the\nUnion, but there has been almost no substantive follow-up.\nBryce Harlow notwithstanding, (the business community isn't\ngoing to go with McGovern or Humphrey), we should quite\ncandidly acknowledge that the present system is deficient,\ninequitable, overly complex, that the heaviest burdens are\non middle-class people, that people shouldn't get away scott-\nfree without paying any taxes and that property taxes are the\nmost regressive and onerous of all.\n3.\nWe can say that we have tried in a number of ways to change\nthe tax structure (citing our position in 1969 versus that of the\nCongress) and we are going to change it. We should proclaim\nit the number one priority of the second Nixon term. Ehrlich-\nman got off to a good start with the briefing a week ago, but if\nit is not followed up by a continuous flow of substantive steps,\nthe briefing will have proved to be counter productive or all\nJohn will be interpreted to have said is \"let's wait until next\nyear\". That is not good enough. We should insist that the\nACIR come in with a report in June and meet with the President.\nThe President should adopt the recommendation that property\ntaxes not be used for school financing purposes. He should\nthen, by direction to the appropriate departments, order the\npreparation of legislative proposals to accomplish specific\nobjectives and there should be subsequent announcements by\nvarious Cabinet officials of progress in their assigned areas\nof responsibility. Shultz can become highly visible as the\narchitect of the next tax plan. By Executive Order, the\nPresident can direct a simplification of tax forms and proce-\ndures. By July 1, we will be able to' announce that one essen-\ntail underpinning of the new Nixon tax program will be a\nminimum tax on everyone regardless of tax shelters; in short\nthe rich must pay a fair share of taxes. (We proposed this in\n1969 and were defeated -- it will not hurt our \"fat cats\"; they\naren't the ones getting off scott-free.) By September 1 the\npublic should have gotten a very good firm understanding of\nfour or five key elements of the tax package that we will pro-\npose to the Congress in January of 1973. By that time, the\nPresident should have been seen visibly involved in managing\na major Administration effort to come up with a fresh approach.\nIn fact, I would propose this be June's number one issue insofar\nas the President is concerned -- meetings with tax experts,\nTreasury officials, etc. etc.\nWhat I am suggesting here is a specific program with a series\nof substantive actions that result in a rather well defined set\nof principles that will govern whatever we propose next year\n(and what we discuss in the campaign). We can cut the ground\nout from under the demogogic arguments of McGovern and\nHumphrey if we do this. Otherwise we will be reacting\ndefensively through the months of September and October.\n4.\n3.\nParticularly if McGovern is the nominee, he will campaign\nagainst the establishment and the unresponsiveness of\nGovernment. This is an issue Wallace has used very\neffectively. Since we run the bureaucracy, we will be tarred\nwith that brush. A major effort should be undertaken to put\nsome day light between the President and the bureaucracy.\nWe have opportunity for this at least once a week if we will\nuse it. The housing scandals in FHA give us a perfect plat-\nform to call people in, raise hell, let a few heads roll and\nissue strong vigorous Presidential directives. We have done\nthis a few times, I think very effectively in the drug area but\nneed to do it more. Within 24 hours of the next mine disaster,\nthe President should turn on the Bureau of Mines, perhaps\nfire someone and once again, issue a whole set of new, tough\norders. Moreover Shultz and Weinberger can be very effective\nfor us during the campaign and in the months leading up to it\nin talking about reducing the federal bureaucracy. Nobody\nunderstands reorganization; they do understand cutting back\non bureaucrats. Substantively we have done all the right things\nmanagement-wise; now it is time to do a few demogogic things\nwhich will have high visibility and show a tough, forceful\nPresident cracking down on the bureaucracy. This goes to\nthe heart of the issue of Government being responsive to the\npeople.\nB. Busing. The fundamental problem with our position on busing is\nthat it is not clearly perceived. People know the President is against\nbusing but in the South they know they have already instituted busing\nplans, which the moratorium won't help, and in the North they see\nthe courts rushing forward with new busing orders. Nowhere is the\ngap between rhetoric and performance any clearer than in this area\nand I would submit this one really fuels the credibility issue.\nIn part our program is not understood because the moratorium is\nin fact offensive in the South (they believe it will stop busing in the\nNorth, but do nothing about busing that has already begun in the\nSouth) and it is not clear in the North that it will do anything. If\nCongress acts on the moratorium and the courts respect the statute,\nthen we will have something to run on in those areas affected but\nwe still have a problem in the South. If Congress does not act, we\n5.\nhave got to run against the Congress, once again, with a major\neffort in key areas. If Congress rejects the proposal, the\nPresident should consider calling for a constitutional amendment\nmaking it very clear, especially in the South, that existing busing\nplans can be undone.\nOur whole objective here is to simply get our position clearly under-\nstood nationally. Once it is understood, then we need not campaign\non it as a national issue, but rather exploit hell out of it in key\nareas. I would argue that busing, unlike a lot of other issues, is\nclearly voter motivational. It is one of those issues in particular\nareas that is absolutely decisive in a voter's mind. He will put up\nwith anything else if he feels that we not only are against busing,\nbut can and will do something about it (witness Michigan yesterday,\nwhich I hope will lay to rest the last vestiges of doubt around here\nas to whether or not busing is a cutting issue).\nC. Inflation/Food Prices. Inflation as an issue probably is worthless.\nPeople do not really know what the CPI means, nor is it terribly\nimportant to them that Rumsfeld succeeded in rolling back the price\nof Ford Pintos by $30 a car. What counts is the one basic commodity\nthat people buy every day food. Food prices have been rising so\nlong that people think they are rising even when they are not. They\nare relatively stable right now and perhaps the best that we canhhope\nfor is to simply neutralize the food price issue. On the other hand,\nif they begin to go up again, we know the political impact this can\nhave. We should be prepared to take very dramatic, bold action,\nperhaps another freeze, before the issue gets away from us. I\nhappen to believe the Sindlinger polls in March which showed a\nsignificant political upheaval building in the country over this one\nissue. I would urge that we not only be prepared for very dramatic\naction if food prices begin to rise again, but that we also consider\npossible ways to insure now that prices do not rise so that we can\ncrow about having stabilized food prices (for example meat import\nquotas).\nAll of the other components of the economic issue are in my opinion\neither cosmetic or regional. Obviously we should talk about doing\nthings to create more jobs, but at this point in time, they are either\n6.\ngoing to be there or they are not. The President should obviously\nbe postured against unemployment but there isn't a hell of a lot\nsubstantively that we can do. Regionally we can exploit the defense\nspending issue very effectively particularly if McGovern is the\nopponent.\nIn short, except for the food price issue I think that there is not\nmuch that we are substantively lacking in this area (at least that\nwe can doanything about).\nD. Welfare. I assume that our game plan is clear -- get no bill from\nthe Congress and then blast Congress for having failed to act. If\nwe can pull this off, it will give us the best of both worlds. I would\nurge, however, that we be prepared once we are out of danger inso-\nfar as Congress acting, that we take executive action (even if it is\nlater upset in the courts) to do something about the welfare problem.\nThe President might consider an Executive Order cutting off funds\nto welfare recipients who fail to meet certain work standards,\n(a rigid enforcement of the Talmadge Bill with a strongly worded\nPresidential statement will do it). The HEW bureaucracy will\nrevolt and everyone in this building will argue the legality of it\nand it's ineffectiveness. The impact could be absolutely electric\nif it were done under the proper circumstances in September.\nThe President could say he has waited 4 years for the Congress to\ndo something, the Congress hasn't acted and that he is therefore\ntaking firm and decisive executive action to eliminate abuses in\nthe welfare system. We can play around all we want with pilot\nprograms in New York and California as we have done to curb\nexcesses in the welfare program. What we need to get through to\nthe folks, however, is a very bold action by the President which\nwould highlight his commitment to end welfare abuses and at the\nsame time the Congress' inability to deal with the problem. (I\nwatched something very similar to this on the state level turn a\ngubernatorial election 180° around in 1970.) There will be 50 reasons\nwhy we shouldn't do this, but someone should figure out exactly how\nwe can if we want to.\nE. Drugs and Crime. I don't know whether there are additional sub-\nstantive steps that can be taken, but I would assign two or three of\nthe very best minds we have to develop additional substantive\ninitiatives in this area.\n7.\nP.R. wise we can be helped enormously on the crime issue by\nbuilding Pat Gray. He is a great subject to work with and in the\nfinal analysis this may be the best weapon we have. There is\nmuch more we can do as far as Presidential visibility is concerned\na helicopter trip over the Rio Grande, building up Ambrose, visits\nto treatment centers and meetings in key cities with strike forces.\nF. Environment. If the Harris theory is correct that the election will\nbe decided by the over $15, 000 a year, upper middle-class, white\nsuburbanites, we should start planning carefully ways in which to\npromote our record in the environmental area. I have no illusions\nthat this is a cutting issue; it is not. It is, however, a good,\nrather appealing little package that could be used especially with\ncertain constituencies and we should not neglect it simply because\nnone of us feel it will be decisive in the election. Substantively, we\nneed do nothing but there should be a complete strategy for\nexploitation of the good record we have made.\nG. No Fault Automobile Insurance. I believe this is a real sleeper\nissue and that we should poll on it as quickly as possible, particu-\nlarly in those states where it has either come irto effect or has\nbeen debated in the legislature. Auto insurance is a little like\nproperty taxes, everybody feels. they are being cheated. The\nDemocrats really have not gotten out front on this one. There\nis still time for aggressive Presidential leadership and we can\ntake over the issue right now. It's an excellent antidote to the\nbig business versus little guy syndrome. At the moment, we\nreally have no position.\nKey Voter Blocs\nIn the last two meetings with Ehrlichman, Mitchell, you, MacGregor and\nHarlow, I have been emphasizing the need for analytically determining\nwhat will be the decisive voting blocs in the '72 election. I suspect we\nwill never refine this to a scientific analysis and so perhaps we should\ncome to some subjective consensus.\nI can never get out of my mind the '48 election (see again my memo of\nMay 21, 1972). Truman won it, among other reasons, by cultivating the\n8.\nself interest of a few key voting blocs. We have precisely the same\nopportunity with the white ethnic, blue collar, new middle class,\nCatholics. In this area we are blowing it. In my opinion, we have\na wider gap between promise and performance here than in any other\narea and with just a little substantive effort, we can do a great deal.\nFor example:\n1.\nWe can support the Mills bill (which has strong bipartisan\ncosponsorship) providing tax credits for parents who have\nchildren in non-public schools. This issue can be exploited\nto a fare-thee-well and even if we are only talking about 7\nor 8 million Catholics (which is Morey's argument) that is\none hell of a powerful bloc. With the support of the Catholic\nhierarchy, we can undertake a very effective organizational\neffort in November. Humphrey is all for aid to parochial\nschools so at the very least we would neutralize him on this\nissue. McGovern is against it and here the opportunities are\nimmense in the key states. This is like busing; if properly\nexploited in key areas, it is a cutting issue.\n2.\nWe can also support a form of guaranteed annual income for\nthe building trades. All of-the staff work has been done on this\nwithin the Federal Government. Almost everyone recognizes\nthe need for something substantive in this area. It will happen\nin the next 2 to 3 years. All we need to do is seize the issue\nnow, endorse it and then campaign selectively within the areas\nwhere it too can be a cutting issue.\n3.\nFinally, we have the whole open-housing issue. Freezing Romney\nin place or even selectively rolling him back could pay enormous\npolitical dividends.\nThe second voter bloc of major concern is the aging. It can be statistically\nestablished that no Republican has been elected (or perhaps can be) without\na solid majority of the over-60 voters. Our program is right now so much\nmush; we embraced the Kennedy nutrition program which is of concern\nto poverty level elderly only. This is sheer nonsense because that is not\nthe aging group that will ever vote Republican. Our highest priority in\nthis area should be to get an agreed upon Social Security increase so that\nthe Democrats will not base their campaign on higher Social Security\n9.\nbenefits or force us to veto the increase presently contemplated in\nthe Congress which in turn will become a highly symbolic campaign\nissue. Also, with some clever legislative maneuvering, we could\nlift the earning ceiling limitation on Social Security recipients out of\nH.R. 1 and attach it to another bill so that perhaps we would have this\none good one to talk about with our elderly constituency. The property\ntax issue is also hig with the old folks. We are badly treading water\nin this area; especially if Humphrey should be our opponent, we will\nbe in deep trouble. His image is good with the elderly and he can really\nhurt us in key areas. We are not well positioned.\nIn my view, if we can solidify the traditional Republican vote with the\nover-60's and make the inroads I think possible with the Catholics\n(including marginal gains with the Spanish-speaking we are doing well\nin this area ) these two blocs could be decisive.\nAs a final item, I have recommended to you before that we compile a\nlist of goody type announcements that can be issued virtually every day\nin September and October things like marifime contracts, parks being\nreturned to the states, special manpower grants in key states, etc.\nSome of these will provide excellent forums for Presidential participation,\nand will in any event have strong political appeal at the time of maximum\nimpact. As best I can tell, these are being let out now as they become\nready. I suggest that as many as we think judicious be held back to be\nused during the key months and to give us at least the option of involving\nthe President in them. We may be overly sensitive to what appears\nblatantly political but I would have no hesitation in recommending that the\nPresident go to an event like the San Diego Shipyard event in September to\ndo another major maritime award. Whether the press calls it political\nor not, it will get through to the people, at the very time we want to re-\nmind them very visibly of what the President is doing for them. I believe\nthat we should brazenly exploit the advantages of incumbency while all the\nother side can do is promise."
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