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For: the file. RE: random thought from Lou Harris. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/3/1972
The Simulmatics corporation. Nixon before Labor Day. Simulmatics report No. 3. 33 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 8/25/1960
To: Charles W. Colson. From: Doug Hallett. RE: Broder and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians and the People". 8 pgs . [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/3/1972
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For: the file. RE: random thought from Lou Harris. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 4/3/1972
The Simulmatics corporation. Nixon before Labor Day. Simulmatics report No. 3. 33 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 8/25/1960
To: Charles W. Colson. From: Doug Hallett. RE: Broder and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians and the People". 8 pgs . [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 1/3/1972
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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47
15
4/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
For: the file. RE: random thought from Lou
Harris. 4pgs.
47
15
8/25/1960
Campaign
Report
The Simulmatics corporation. Nixon before
Labor Day. Simulmatics report No. 3. 33pgs.
47
15
1/3/1972
Campaign
Memo
To: Charles W. Colson. From: Doug Hallett.
RE: Broder and Johnson's basic points in
their series "The Politicians and the People".
8pgs.
Tuesday, March 20, 2012
Page 1 of 1
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
April 3, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE
SUBJECT: Random Thoughts from Lou Harris
Harris believes that the President needs, between now
and the election, to continually create "straw men". Meany
affords us the best opportunity, but we've got to work at creating
others -- deliberate enemies. The President is against those who
plunged us into Vietnam but now want to sell out America's honor.
The President is against those retailers who over-charge consumers.
The middle man example in the food price issue is a perfect illustra-
tion. If there isn't a natural villain, create one so that the President
can be the defender of the public interest against natural enemies.
Harris believes that the President should be forceful but not
strident; that whenever he is strident, the President brings out the
hostility of a latent anti-Nixon feeling which still exists with a large
body of people, but that when he is deliberate, quiet, rational, forceful,
he does not engender this latent hostility.
2.
Harris believes that we should downplay the campaign through-
out the year, make it as boring as possible. Harris believes that a
bland campaign will help us in that we will benefit greatly from a low
turnout. Also, people react better to the President if he does not
polarize on gut issues. This does not mean that we should not address
the issues; we should defuse as many as possible, but not arouse the
passions of the electorate with a very divisive issue that might bring
out our opponents (as with anti-labor legislation, for example).
Harris believes the key to our success is in avoiding having the
American electorate act emotionally or precipitously with respect to the
President's candidacy. He points out that as his pollsters question people,
they get a better response after the questioning than at the outset. More
people favor the President's re-election after they have been walked
through the issues than when they are first confronted with the question
cold, "Do you favor the President as against Candidate X?"
One of the President's strong points is that people think he is
trying hard. He is beginning to develop a characteristic of sincerity,
that he is really working at solving the problems. Harris advises that
we should articulate everything we do rationally, calmly, quietly, and
forcefully. Make people think, make people thoughtful. Do not provoke
instant emotional reactions. The President's style has come through very
3.
well as being deliberate. We should not let him go swinging or
overreacting. If our opponent becomes strident, we should take it
in stride. The more irresponsible the opposition becomes, the
more the President is helped in being looked at as a solid, steady,
strong and deliberate statesman. Be the "solid brick in the middle"
Harris suggests. Ask people to think of the issues seriously.
In this same vein, we should turn the lack of so-called charisma
into an asset, arguing that no one has the right to use the office of
Presidency for the development of a personality cult, that personal
promotion is not the measure of one's success as President. One
cannot run the country through charm, rather through ability. Nixon's
style is to be serious and dedicated, that that is more important than
personal image.
Harris believes that Nixon's image is now being sharpened
as a rational, thoughtful, deliberate leader, all of which can be
destroyed if there is a spontaneous reaction or a sharp galvanizing of
the opposition in the months ahead. Harris believes that if people
are asked calmly and quietly to think through the choice for President,
that the President cannot be beaten by any of the present Democratic
Presidential candidates. If on the other hand, the election turns into
4.
a heated, highly controversial, emotionally charged campaign,
we will simply bring out enough anti votes to defeat us; there are just
more of them than us and if we galvanize them, we (not the Democratic
candidates) can beat ourselves. The key at the moment is to maintain
the tone that we have presently achieved and to hold it throughout the
election year.
wr
Charles W. Colson
Jet
THE SIMULMATICS CORPORATION
Cambridge/New York/Washington
ED NICHOLS ASSOCIATES
10400 Connecticut Ave.
Kensington, Md. 20705
933-6030
NIXON
BEFORE LABOR DAY
Simulmatics Report No. 3
Copy Number 51
Note: This edition will be revised as
later data becomes available.
August 25, 1960
NIXON BEFORE LABOR DAY
This report, like its companion piece (Simulmatics Report No. 2:
Kennedy Before Labor Day) contains five major areas of analysis:
The Nixon image before Labor Day with special emphasis on Nixon's
appeal to women voters; the Furst-Simulmatics survey of August 13-18,
1960, processed with data in our survey bank; the salient issues
(with the exception of foreign affairs); Nixon's weaknesses among
important voter-types; and Nixon's strength among Negroes and
Southerners.
This report should be read keeping in mind the information and
analysis in Kennedy Before Labor Day. Obviously Kennedy's advantages
are Nixon's disadvantages and vice versa. In the following summary
of our Nixon report we have therefore paralleled to a degree our
Kennedy summary in an effort to delineate Nixon strategy from the
Nixon point of view.
2.
SUMMARY
Nixon's personal image is predominantly favorable, although this is
not based on friendliness or charm. He has fewer amiable traits,
voters feel, but he seems self-confident, competent, and sober-minded.
This image, when coupled with the preeminence of the foreign affairs
issue, is responsible for Nixon's current lead over Kennedy.
Of all group reactions to Nixon, the most important is that of the
women voters. Women like Nixon better than Kennedy; they like him
better than men do. They have more confidence in him, trust him, and
like him better on TV. They care very much less about party than men
do and party is Nixon's major shortcoming. If Nixon wins, the women's
vote will have been decisive.
Nixon has been less effective on TV than Kennedy. The crucial TV
debates are therefore a risk for him. Should he be able to trap
Kennedy into approaching the debates at his own level of super-
coolness, he can "win" the debates. The danger to Nixon is that
Kennedy can make use of his more personable traits--including a range
of emotions such as fervor, humor, friendship, and spirituality be-
yond the expected seriousness and anger--and thus cause Nixon to "lose"
the debates.
Summary
3.
Nixon is better known than Kennedy. Almost everyone has an opinion
about him. Most undecided voters are trying to make up their minds
about Kennedy.
Personality alone will not, as we have said, be decisive in this
election, but Nixon can be hurt if his campaign style does not cap-
italize on his personal assets. Should Nixon campaign intensely, but
above party strife and personal attack, and if he can get Kennedy to
campaign at this level with him, he may lose a few Republicans and
bored Independents who will stay at home, but he can gain among the
undecided Democrats and Independents. Among the latter group, many
still need reassurance that he is indeed sober-minded, mature, and
competent.
The issues of this campaign right now are foreign affairs, party, and
religion.
The religious issue can be a headache for him.
The foreign affairs issue is Nixon's greatest source of strength.
The party issue is his greatest weakness.
Religion: Nixon is maintaining Republican Catholic votes and
is picking up some anti-Catholic votes. As long as the issue
remains relatively quiescent, he stands to gain. (The religious
issue is analyzed in our Kennedy report. It is not, therefore,
dealt with as a separate section here.)
Summary
4.
Foreign Affairs: Nixon's strength, as we have indicated, derives
from the belief of many voters-women, especially--that he is
better able to deal with the Russians. This is the issue cur-
rently on voters' minds. It is discussed in Simulmatics Report
No. 4: Kennedy, Nixon, and Foreign Affairs.
Party: Nixon's image is an important contribution to the fact
that party lines are SO. definite in this election. Republicans
like Nixon very much; a substantial number of Democrats strongly
dislike him. Nixon is vulnerable here because there are more
Democrats than Republicans.
It is axiomatic that Nixon's chances improve as a national mood of
nonpartisenship increases. He gains votes as an international states-
man, loses as Mr. Republican.
Nixon has done a good job of organizing his supporters. His task is
to minimize their partisan fervor, to blur party lines, and to avoid
insofar as possible the bread-and-butter issues that tend to stir
Democratic party feeling.
Only a minority still see him as "Tricky Dicky". He has benefitted
by the passage of time. He is popular with many young voters who
have no recollection of the so-called "old Nixon". Even so, a number
of voter-types actively dislike him. Among these are:
Summary
East Coast, well-to-dc, Protestant, male, Democrats and Independents
Jews, Democrats and Independents
West Coast Chinese and Japanese, Democrats and Independents
Big city industrial workers, Democrats and Independents
Farmers, Democrats, Independents and Republicans
West Coast, small town, lower income, Republicans
East Coast, Protestant, working class, male, Republicans
Nixon's challenge among voters that actively dislike him (or his record)
is the redirection of their attention from the man--or the issue that
concerns them--to the international scene. This can be his best hope,
for example, in the Midwest where he is faced with a farm revolt.
Nixon is doing well among Negroes and Southerners.
Should Nixon be able to keep the campaign focused solely on foreign
affairs (and away from domestic issues); should he wage a campaign that
tends to disassociate himself from the Republican party, he will better
his chances in these ways: he can pick up some votes leaning to Kennedy
on the religious issue. He avoids obvious contrasts between his own
personality and Kennedy's. He minimizes his losses among groups that
regard him as reactionary.
Conclusion: At this point, Nixon is ahead, but any campaign
development that tends to emphasize his Republicanism (in terms
of domestic and foreign issues) and engage him in a partisan
struggle will affect the final vote of those 23% of voters who
are as yet undecided.
6.
NIXON BEFORE LABOR DAY
Simulation - Documentation - Analysis
Contents
I.
What is Nixon's Image
page 7
The Women's Vote
page 14
Young Voters
page 18
II. Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
page 21
Nixon's Image
7.
I. WHAT IS NIXON'S IMAGE?
The general public image of Nixon today is predominantly
favorable.
A. Nixon is no hero any more than Kennedy is. He is not
vastly popular, but he has made an impression on almost
everybody. On balance, this is a marked advantage. The
public views him as follows:
The Furst-Simulmatics Survey asked Independents and
Republicans who have decided to vote for Kennedy what they
thought about Nixon, i.e., why they had turned against him?
Among the questions asked were, is he "too liberal" and
is he "too conservative"? "Too conservative" was chosen
over "too liberal" two to one, 26% to 13%.
It is apparent
that Nixon is still viewed as a conservative, in spite of
efforts to liberalize his image. Although some pundits
find little difference between Nixon and Kennedy, the public
readily places Nixon right of center and Kennedy left of
center.
Many voters hold a strong bread-and-butter resentment
toward the right-of-center politics that they feel Nixon
represents. The educational level of voters who say they
dislike Nixon reinforces this contention:
Nixon's Image
8.
Percent of Voters by Educational Level
Who Say they Dislike Nixon
Years of School
Percent
Less than 6 years
19
7 - 8 years
13
9 - 11 years
8
12 years
6
More than 12, but no College
4
Some College
5
College completed
6
These figures and other data in our survey bank thus
indicate, contrary to popular belief, that ideological liberals
are not the only ones who dislike Nixon. Hostility toward him
is often found among Democratic anti-Catholics and anti-Negroes
because of the economic issue. Nixon's gradual move toward
a more liberal image is partially aimed at this type of
hostility.
Nixon's Image
9.
B.
Voters who actively dislike Nixon are a minority--
a substantial minority and a vehement one, but still
a minority. About one person in five or six when asked
to rate Nixon indicated that he actively disliked him.
These people who dislike Nixon, however, are
largely loyal party Democrats.
Here are the percentages, by party, of voters
who dislike Nixon:
Republicans
8
Independents
23
Democrats
37
Nixon's Image
10.
C. Nixon is not disliked by the majority of voters. They view him
as a sober and honest man. His image is not that of a dirty
fighter or of "Tricky Dicky".
However, an occasional vestige of that once widespread image
appears. For example: In the group of Republicans and Independ-
ents who have decided to vote for Kennedy, as noted above, 26%
called Nixon conservative, and 13% liberal--ideology, there-
fore, counted for 39% of their anti-Nixon vote. Compare this to
the percentage of voters who gave personality reasons for their
anti-Nixon vote: only 17% said Nixon cannot be trusted and 30%
said they just didn't like Nixon.
Kennedy, incidentally, fares better in terms of personality,
which also lends weight to the conclusion that the old image of
Nixon as "Tricky Dicky" still has a few adherents. Only 9% of
Democrats and Independents who are voting for Nixon said Kennedy
can't be trusted, and only 21% said they "just don't like him".
The sharpest test of trustworthiness was a question asked
of all 1817 respondents in the Furst-Simulmatics survey:
"Which man would you trust most as a person?" The replies
were:
Kennedy
27%
Nixon
24%
Both equally
30%
No Answer or Don't
Know
19%
Nixon's Image
11.
Distrust of Nixon is particularly prevalent among Jews.
Only
4% of them regard him as more trustworthy than Kennedy:
Whom Can you Trust?
%
%
%
Protestants
Catholics
Jews
Nixon
33
11
4
Kennedy
20
42
40
Both
29
31
29
Don't Know, No Answer
18
16
27
Distrust of Nixon is highest in the East:
Whom Can You Trust?
of
%
%
&
%
East
Midwest
West
Border
South
Nixon
19
25
26
31
24
Kennedy
31
27
23
21
28
Both
28
34
27
27
30
Don't Know, No Answer
23
14
24
21
18
Distrust of Nixon is more prevalent among men:
Whom Can You Trust?
%
%
Men
Women
Nixon
21
25
Kennedy
31
24
Both
31
29
Don't Know, No Answer
16
22
Nixon's Image
12.
D. As we point out in our Kennedy Report, Kennedy does better
than Nixon on the dimension of friendliness.
This is particularly so among Jews and in the East.
Only 8% of Jews find Nixon friendlier as against 44% Kennedy.
In the East only 18% found Nixon friendlier as against 41%
Kennedy. For the population as a whole, the figures are
25% Nixon friendlier, 36% Kennedy friendlier.
The most significant difference in regard to the image
of friendliness is between men and women. Nixon does better
among women here, as on all points.
Who is Friendlier
&
%
Men
Women
Nixon
22
27
Kennedy
42
33
Both
24
25
Don't Know, No Answer
12
15
Nixon's Image
13.
E.
The most important aspect of the Nixon personality is his image
of competence, experience, and self-confidence. Here is Nixon's
great vote catching asset, particularly when it is applied to deal-
ing with the Russians. This is shown by the Furst-Simulmatics survey:
Who Seems More Self-Confident
About What He is Doing
%
%
%
All Respondents
White Men White Women
Nixon
33
30
34
Kennedy
29
35
25
Both
25
24
26
Don't Know, No Answer
13.
10
15
Who Could Do the Best Job of Dealing
With the Russian Leaders
%
All Respondents
Nixon
43
Kennedy
24
Both
8
Don't Know, No Answer
25
The importance of this aspect of the Nixon image cannot be over-
rated. We refer the reader to Simulmatics Report No.4: Kennedy, Nixon,
and Foreign Affairs, which deals specifically with how the public's
interest in world affairs is threatening to undermine a massive Dem-
ocratic majority. If Nixon wins the election it will be a triumph
for the image of Nixon's experience and competence.
THE WOMEN'S VOTE
The Women's Vote
15.
THE WOMEN'S VOTE
The Furst-Simulmatics survey shows that Nixon is winning the
women's vote.
Voters Preference by Sex, Whites Only
%
%
Men
Women
Kennedy for sure
30
20
Leaning Kennedy
12
13
Kennedy Total
42
33
Nixon for sure
25
29
Leaning Nixon
12
14
Nixon Total
37
43
Undecided
22
24
This result is foreshadowed in the Simulmatics survey bank data.
It shows that there is less anti-Nixon feeling among Democratic and
Independent women than among such men:
Gap Between Independent Males and Females
Regarding Hostility to Nixon
Percentage Points
City
Men 11 over Women
Town
Men 6 over Women
Rural
Men 2 over Women
The Women's Vote
16.
Several factors are responsible:
1. Women voters in general, and educated urban residents
in particular, are less susceptible to the ties of class
and party than men. They are more influenced by image and
less influenced by hard economic issues. Their relative
preference for Nixon can be seen as an assertion of inde-
pendence from their husbands as well as a specific reaction
to the Nixon and Kennedy images. Other pro-Nixon points are
his association with Eisenhower; self-made character; and
his image of the clean-cut, quiet, conscientious family-
centered public servant. Some women find him easier to
understand.
2. The image of the Kennedy machine has hurt Kennedy and
helped Nixon among these political romantics.
3. There is some envy of Mrs. Kennedy's beauty and her
position in the world.
The Women's Vote
17.
4. In the Southern and Border cities, women favor Nixon because
of their conservative, anti-Catholic views. These views are, of
course, shared with the men in Southern and Border States, but
the men are more involved in the politico-economic system of
civic life in the Southern communities which makes it harder for
them to break with the Democratic party. Similar factors explain
why small town and rural Democratic women in the South stay more
loyal to the Democratic party than do those in the cities. But
women in the big cities of the South have broken out of the
traditional social system far enough to express traditional atti-
tudes in a new, i.e., Republican, way.
Percent of Protestant Voters Who Would
Vote for Democrat against Nixon
By Class and Region
of
%
Men
Women
Border states, well off
79
54
Border states, poor
76
65
Southern Big City, well-to-do
69
46
Southern Big City, middle class
75
60
Southern Big City, poor
75
60
YOUNG VOTERS
Young Voters
19.
YOUNG VOTERS
Nixon also has an advantage among young voters who have been
introduced into politics in the Eisenhower era.
Many of Nixon's political limitations follow from the "old
Nixon" image, composed of white-collar McCarthyism, partisanship,
and conservatism. Young voters were not exposed to the old Nixon.
They see the "new Nixon", a man above party, concerned with welfare
proposals, foreign policy and civil rights. This new image is
attracting younger Independents and Democrats. Nixon is distinctly
more popular among those who could not vote before 1952.
Percentage of Democrats Who Say
They Like Nixon, by Age
Age
Percentage
21-29
57
30-39
43
40-49
46
50-59
49
60-69
44
Over 70
41
Young Voters
20.
The Furst-Simulmatics survey shows the following vote among
different age groups which emphasizes Nixon's advantages with the
very young, who don't know him as a conservative, and the very old
who are conservative.
Percentages of votes among the Different
Age Groups
%
%
%
Age
Kennedy
Nixon
Undecided
Under 25
44
47
9
26 - 34
41
39
21
35 - 45
38
35
27
46 - 55
33
39
27
Over 56
34
45
21
II PARTY FEELING AND DOMESTIC ISSUES
!
22.
II. PARTY FEELING AND DOMESTIC ISSUES
Nixon is controversial, but he is controversial between parties,
not within parties. The Nixon image tends to polarize the parties.
The fact that he is the Republican candidate is one of the things
that makes it likely that party-line voting will predominate in this
election. Nixon, of course, expects to blur party-lines. He will not
stress party. He will present himself only as an international states-
man, not as Mr. Republican--unless he is engaged in an all-out party-
line fight by an aggressive, partisan Kennedy.
Nixon is ahead of Kennedy because of the prevailing belief that
he can deal with the Russians better than Kennedy. The major threats
to Nixon's candidacy are that he represents the Republican party and
that his opponent is Catholic. (See our analysis of the religious
issue in Simulmatics Report No. 2.)
The issue of party feeling and the entire range of domestic issues
that operate within its context are the source of Nixon's greatest
vulnerability. His weaknesses are analyzed here in terms of those
undecided voter-types who would vote against him should Kennedy be
able to develop a feeling of intense partisanship in the country on
bread-and-butter issues.
We also discuss briefly two notable areas of Nixon strength--the
Negro Independents and Southerners.
The Kennedy campaign policy toward Nixon is more important for its
impact on Democrats and Independents than for any possibility of
seriously breaking Republican ranks.
Among a number of Democratic and Indopendent groups with important
blocks of undecided voters, the persons who dislike Nixon are quite
numerous.
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
23.
THE ELITE
One such group is well-to-do Eastern metropolitan Protestant
men. The Democrats and Independents among them include many
of the intelligentsia, top professionals, and liberal elements
of the leading elites of the country. Those who say they dis-
like Nixon are 78% of the Democrats and 35% of the Independents.
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
24.
WORKERS
Big city working class Democrats show the expectable dislike
of Nixon as a representative of big business Republicanism.
Protestant and Catholic workers, however, behave somewhat differ-
ently. Catholic workers are more likely to vote against Nixon
regardless of the Democratic candidate. This is because of their
strong party identification. But Protestant workers are more
critical of Nixon, presumably because they were less involved with
his anti-Communist campaign some years back. But these subtleties
aside, the essential point is that the Nixon image is definitely not
that of a friend of the workers:
Worker Attitudes Toward Nixon
Metropolitan, Work-
& Who Dislike Nixon
P Who Would Vote for
ing Class Voter
a Democrat Against
Nixon
Male
Female
Male
Female
Voters
Voters
Voters
Voters
Eastern Catholic
39
33
62
62
Protestant
42
52
61
58
Midwestern Catholic
47
46
77
73
Protestant
46
45
70
75
Western Catholic
36
26
73
70
Protestant
58
49
72
57
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
25.
FARMERS
The most significant type of farmer voter is the Mid-westerner.
Here we find a subtle pattern not unlike that just noted for city
workers: i.e. the farmers who are most likely to vote against Nixon
and those who most dislike him are not exactly the same. Among the
Independents, for example, poor, farm-area residents are more likely
to vote against Nixon because they feel closer to the Democrats. But,
among the well-off farm owners, criticism of Nixon is most vocal.
These latter voters are the conscious elements in the farm revolt.
Midwestern Independent Rural Voters
by Income Group
% Vote for Any Demo-
& Who Dislike
crat Against Nixon
Nixon
Well-off farm owners
Men
37
29
Women
33
26
Poor form area residents
Men
44
14
Women
39
15
The Midwestern rural area is clearly a fruitful ground for
Democratic effort. The current attack on Nixon's farm policies
should pay off there. This is particularly important, because as
noted in our Kennedy Report, anti-Catholicism would otherwise be
strong among precisely these same people. Keeping the farm issue
salient will help offset the impact of the religious issue in this
self-consciously Protestant area.
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
26.
The Furst-Simulmatics survey revealed the weakness of Nixon on
the farm issue. Respondents were asked first, what the three most
important issues were and then, who would do better on those issues,
Kennedy or Nixon?
Confirmed Nixon voters generally cite their own man* and con-
firmed Kennedy voters do the same-but the undecided make the dif-
ference.
Undecided Voters Who Say Farm Issue
is Important
Kennedy Better
Nixon Better
Total
on it
on it
88
12
100%
The farm issue is the issue on which Kennedy led Nixon far and
away among uncommitted voters who cared about it. Since we are only
asking people their judgment on things that are important issues to
them, Kennedy's lead on the farm issue among these people is a major
advantage.
* 7% of Nixon voters who cared about the farm issue conceded that
Kennedy was better on it and another 6% of Nixon voters said the
candidates were indistinguishable. This 13% is a higher proportion
than for any other issue of Nixon voters favoring Kennedy or, at
worst, not opposing him.
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
27.
ANTI-NIXON REPUBLICANS
There are a number of exceptions to Nixon's solid Republican
front.
A small but significant number of California Republicans still
remember the "old Nixon". From his days as a state politician and
Senator he has a residue of resentment. This does not mean that
California Republicans as a whole will not support him. On the con-
trary, they will. But it means that scattered among his strong
Republican supporters are a few potential dissident votes for Kennedy
from people who "knew him when". In a close California vote, these
votes could be valuable.
Who are these anti-Nixon Western Republicans and where are they
to be found? The Simulmatics program--because it partitions the
population into such small groups--can spot them. They are lower
income voters in the smaller cities and towns where people are more
conscious of what their representatives have done for the community.
In those places and in that social class dislike for Nixon was ex-
pressed by:
36% of Republican men
26% of Republican women.
The fact that this feeling is centered among lower class people
indicates that it is essentially an economically based objection to
the old reactionary Nixon who was no friend of the working man, the
old folks, or of needed local public works.
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
28.
In California, then, it seems clearly desirable for Kennedy to
play on the economic record of the old Nixon. California is one
place in the country where some people who are not confirmed Democrats
recall his past.
We should make it clear that this is likely to provide only a
small offset to Nixon's advantages as a local boy and Kennedy's dis-
advantage of being less well known there. (See our Kennedy Report.)
Among the Western town lower class Republican voter-types discussed
here, Kennedy gets just 8% of the votes.
Lower income, Protestant Republican men in metropolitan areas
show some of the same objections to Nixon on bread-and-butter grounds
as noted just above. As often happens when labor issues are involved,
the men vote more along conventional economic lines than do the women.
The fact that Catholics do not show the same proportion of anti-Nixon
feeling among these working class Republicans may be attributed to
the appeal of Nixon's anti-Communist record among them. The Republican
Protestant big city working class men who expressed dislike of Nixon
were:
In the East
15%
In the Midwest
15%
In the West
19%
These are small numbers, but for one Republican in six in a particular
group to say he doesn't like Nixon is a significant factor to be ex-
ploited politically. We conclude that there are gains to be had from
keeping voters focussed on the old Nixon and his reactionary economic
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
29.
Note on the Inportance. of Party Alignment in This Election
Despite these exceptions, the general rule is that party today
largely determines attitudes toward Nixon. Even among social groups
which, as a whole, overwhelmingly do not like Nixon, those members
who say they are Republicans do like him.
For example, Eastern Jews and West Coast Orientals are typical
groups among whom Nixon is unpopular. Note that in both groups the
Republicans among them like Nixon and the anti-Nixon ratio is at most
the one-in-six noted above.
Nixon and Eastern Jewish Voters
%
Anti-Nixon
Eastern, well-off, Jewish Democrats
55
Eastern, poor, Jewish Democrate
62
Eastern, well-off, Jewish Independents
69
Eastern, poor, Jewish Independents
71
Eastern, well-off, Jewish Republicans
15
Eastern, poor, Jewish Republicans
15
(Note that few people care to say they don't like someone,
so that 30% represents substantial dislike.)
I L
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
30.
Nixon and Western Buddhists, Etc.
% Anti-Nixon
Western Buddhist, etc., Democrats
45
Western Buddhist, etc., Independents
29
Western Buddhist, etc., Republicans
0
From this type of data we conclude that there is no reason to
expect a repetition of the 1948 Republican stay-at-home revolt.
Nixon is liked by his party. Even the Republican dissidents men-
tioned above have been loyal GOP voters since 1948. Typically,
conservative Republicans are content to hope for return of the
"old Nixon"; moderate Republicans hope for more of the "new Nixon".
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
31.
NEGROES
Nixon is running very strongly among Negro Independents. Almost
one-half have declared a preference for him. Johnson on the ticket
helps Nixon here. While standard-of-living appeals will lessen Negro
pro-Nixon sentiment, only an extremely bold position on civil rights
would gain Kennedy & strong Negro majority (e.g., a categorical Kennedy
pledge to rigidly enforce the bar on government contracts to companies
engaging in discriminatory employment practices).
Negro Independents' Vote Intentions
%
Lower Class
East
For Nixon
47
Against Nixon
32
Midwest
For Nixon
56
Against Nixon
29
West
For Nixon
36
Against Nixon
54
Border
For Nixon
59
Against Nixon
36
South
For Nixon
32
Against Nixon
21
In the Furst-Simulmatics survey in the middle of August, the
over-all Negro vote divided as follows:
%
%
Men
Women
Kennedy
41
43
Nixon
34
31
Undecided
24
27
100
100
Nixon's Negro vote is impressive when compared to the 1952 and 1956
elections in which Negroes gave the Democrats 3/4 and 2/3 of their
Party Feeling and Domestic Issues
32.
SOUTHERNERS
The problem of the South is complex. Nixon is not personally
popular in the South. Until the conventions, the strong Democratic
feeling in the South coupled with Nixon's occasional statements on
civil rights resulted in considerable critical comment about him.
41% of rural, Protestant, Democratic men expressed dislike of him.
So did 43% in the towns. But personal attitudes toward Nixon as a
man are not the crucial factors in the South. The determinants are
rather civil rights, liberalism, and factional struggles in the
Democratic Party. We found in our Furst-Simulmatics survey that Nixon
was winning in the South even though he was not getting as favorable
ratings on ability to deal with the Russians, self-confidence, or
interest in "people like you" as in most other parts of the country.
%
%
%
%
%
East
Midwest
West
Border
South
Best in dealing with the
Russians:
Nixon
38
46
48
46
42
Kennedy
26
24
17
17
28
Most self-confident:
Nixon
32
35
31
35
30
Kennedy
30
30
27
26
32
Best for people like
you:
Nixon
20
30
31
35
27
Kennedy
33
33
27
25
28
Nixon is not personally popular in the South though, as we have
seen, he does much better with big city women there. Kennedy retains
some personal popularity, but the regional political pressures are
likely to determine the outcome. Right now these are in Nixon's favor.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 3, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: CHARLES W. COLSON
FROM: DOUG HALLETT
Broder's and Johnson's basic points in their series "The Politicians
and the People" are the following:
(1) People are less angry, less passionate, less pessimistic about the
future than they were a year ago. What was analyzed last year as fear about
the future has now turned to apprehension. While two-thirds of the people
surveyed still feel the country is no better off than it was in 1968, there is
less immediate concern about short-run disintegration and collapse.
(2) The President's strength has increased considerably as is by product of
the China trip, the new economic policy, etc. On the other hand, the Pres-
ident's initiatives have also made him seem more unpredictable, more mys-
terious, more inconsistent than he did before to many Americans. He is the
first choice of a minority of the electorate. At a time when people are look-
ing for direction and purpose in their leaders, the President remains a remote
and uncertain figure.
(3) There is considerable confusion and indecision about 1972. Never have
political loyalties and allegiances been weaker. Party structures are almost
meaningless in most areas of the country. People want to vote for the man,
not the party. With the possible exception of the economy, no clear-cut issues
are likely to stand out this election year.
(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. People
are alienated from their government; they feel powerless; they question
whether their leaders can respond to their fundamental concerns. 60 percent
do not believe their leaders tell them the truth.
(5) The youth vote is likely to be smaller than the vote of the electorate -at-
large and young people are not likely to participate in large numbers in the
political process. While young people are hostile to the President, they will
not have a significant effect on the election.
page 2
(6) Muskie is the only Democratic contender, both known to a majority-of-
the electorate and known positively. Kennedy and Humphrey are better
known, but less liked. While he has potential, however, Muskie has not
yet developed the broad base of support and respect he would need to defeat
the President.
(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders.
While many people agree with their statements, they sense they are not
tolerant enough to be President. Wallace and Agnew are too sure of them-
selves.
It is important to note that Broder's and Johnson's conclusions are
based on a distorted sampling of the electorate. They interviewed only 300
people. All pollsters agree that in-depth interviews with only a small samp-
ling permits the interviewers to reinforce their own preconceived notions.
Broder's and Johnson's sample does break down parallel to the 1968 election
results, but it is far from representative. Only one Southern state was in-
cluded in the survey. 26 percent of the sample were new voters -- and half
of these were college students. These and other distortions have led to con-
clusions at variance with more scientific polls. Whereas polls indicate that
blacks have gained confidence in the system in recent years, for example,
Broder and Johnson assert they are more alienated.
On the other hand, I think the basic theme of the articles the aliena-
tion issue is accurately portrayed. Nothing else could account for the wide
variation between popular support for the President's basic stands and sup-
port for his leadership. Nothing else could account for the President's dom-
inance of the issues and his relatively weak showing, both in the trial heats
and in the confidence polls.
The following is my point-by-point analysis:
(1) People are less pessimistic about the future -- This is true. The cam-
puses have calmed. The doomsday rhetoric has quieted. People are begin-
ning to believe, for the first time, that the war is ending and that the economy
will not fall apart. Such events as the Moscow and Peking trips even show
promise of leading the way to a better future.
Unfortunately, however, the President's success in the areas listed above
is not necessarily translateable into votes at the polls. The President's sup-
port is based on professionalism, not on any personal or psychic or intel-
lectual loyalty. People expect the President to be an effective tactician. In-
versely, if he is not if his professionalism shows any weakness -- his base
of support is likely to decline. While it will be hard for the Democrats to
page 3
counter if everything is going alright next fall, it one or more of the above
issues have gone bad the President may not receive credit for anything he
has done. One weakness in the chain will cast into doubt the long-run via-
bility of every link, leading the way to such questions as: "Why couldn't
we have gotten out of Vietnam faster ? Why didn't the President impose wage-
price controls earlier
Indeed, the President's successes may even work against him in a curious
sense. In 1968, the President was acceptable to many people to whom he
would not normally be acceptable. People such as Walter Lippman were
for him because they thought we needed a tough, flexible operator to deal with
the kind of problems we had then. Now that the immediate technical prob-
lems have been solved, now that the wounds have been healed to some degree,
we can afford we may need other kinds of leadership. The same peo-
ple who wanted an operational President in 1968 may be looking for a philisophical
one in 1972: They are no longer scared about the present; they are concerned
about the future -- and they want someone who can help define it for them.
As it stands, the President does not fill the bill.
(2) The President's strength has increased as a result of dramatic new in-
itiatives, but these same initiatives have made him a more remote figure
to many Americans. I don't think there is any question but that the President
has gained as a result of his initiatives and is much better positioned for the
campaign than he was six months ago. What is remarkable is that he has
gained so little, standing now only 2 or 3 points above where he was six
months ago.
In my view, this is our fault. Given the President's public personality
when he entered office, given the over-inflated rhetoric of the sixties, it
is not surprising that people were suspicious of promise and waiting for
performance when the President took office. We recognized this in the first
six months to a year of the administration. In the last two years, however,
we have done virtually everything imaginable to undermine our own credi-
bility and consistency.
In 1969, we were going "forward together. " In 1970, we had a "New Fed-
eralism. 11 By 1971, we had hypoed it up to a "New American Revolution.
Who knows what it will be this year The Second Coming, perhaps?
We show no consistency of effort and commitment. The welfare program
is pronounced the greatest domestic program since the New Deal, but we
expend far more effort trying to place G. Harrold Carswell on the Supreme
Court. We start off with a very exciting and challenging commitment to
page 4
the first five years of life, but denounce day-care (no, middle-class day-
care) as commiting the government to communal living.
Even our major efforts have a tinsely glow to them. The China trip and
the economic policy may be admirable in themselves they are certainly
incredible as they were ballyhooed by us. And all the time we are doing
this, we tell the American people it was the previous administration which
is responsible for overheated rhetoric and expectations and that we are
the ones who are calming things down.
In the short run, of course, there have been benefits from our dodges and
turns and from our Junior Chamber of Commerce boosterism. Maybe Agnew
has even scored once or twice. But in the long run, I think, we have under-
mined the seriousness of the President and his Presidency. It is no wonder
that today we find the public doubting anything we do, seeing in us instability.
when their.greatest want greater than any special-interest need is for
just the opposite.
(3) 1972 is uncertain. With the possible exception of the economy, no issue
concern, no political allegiance, no party-loyalty seems likely to dom-
inate. There is opportunity in the disintegration of the nation's institutions
church, family, town, university, union. There is opportunity to reach
and win over large numbers of newly-independent voters. It is not oppor-
tunity of which we have taken the fullest advantage. We have not allowed
ourselves to restructure public dialogue, provide new direction and new
loyalties: While we have solved short-term problems and may benefit from
having done so, we have not added new certainty or direction to the public
mood.
Just the reverse, in fact. We have remained committed to all the folderol
of the past superficial "Presidentialism, 11 Billy Graham home-town re-
ligion, We're no. 1, partisam excess at the same time we do everything
possible to undermine the past's core. Substantively, we have been by-and
large on track (although we are not dealing seriously with the economy, a
problem which is structural not cosmetic). P. R. wise, we have behaved
as village burghers, testing the wind, dragged into every reform, declining
to identify ourselves with our own concerns, failing to recognize the coher- -
ency and broader meaning of our own programs.
Take our non-fiscal justification for vetoing day-care, for instance. In the
days of farms and small villages, having mothers bring children up at home
made sense. Women were intimately involved in the production process of
the farm. Children were able to roam and learn in a broadly educational
environment. But now? Homes are isolated from places of work; staying
page 5
home means staying uninvolved. As for children, staying home means
remaining in a sterile, homogenous suburban heighborhood or an even
more confining urban apartment. Of course we need day-care massive
day-care. Far from committing government to communal living, day-
care means, instead, committing government to preserving some sem-
blance of the community bringing-up process which we have enjoyed for
most of our national history and giving women the same opportunity to feel
productive and useful that their grandmothers had.
On many other issues, we exhibit the same kind of narrow provincialism
even when we are on the right side of the issue. I don't believe people buy
it anymore. Even when it is the best they can articulate, I think they ex-
pect more from their leaders. We have failed to give it to them and are,
I think, paying the price.
(4) The real issue is the psychological issue of trust and confidence. I
don't think it is quite as dominant as Broder and Johnson do, but I think it
is much more important that we generally acknowledge. People don't "feel"
the President's leadership -- except for a few brief moments such as the
China announcements. The strongest, most memorable statements the
President has made while in office have been statements of anger or know-
nothingism or blatant politics; i.e. Carswell defeat, Calley conviction,
Cambodia, vetoing day-care, pornography, abortion. They have not been
devoted to explaining what the President is and what he is trying to do.
This is more than charisma at least charisma in the John Lindsay sense.
It involves finding words and mediums which express the core of the Pres-
ident's character, Lyndon Johnson is not a superficially charismatic man,
yet in his early years, before the war wore him down, his speech and his
actions reflected a personal force that we never get from the President.
Eisenhower could garble every other sentence, but, when you watched him
on television, you knew he was a leader. Even Truman, haberdasher that
he is, was able to express to his constituency a raw cussedness which was
central to his leadership.
Richard Nixon? Man on the make; ashamed of and constantly running away
from his past; manipulator; unsure of his convictions; tactician instead of
strategist; Grand Vizier of all Rotarians, substituting pomposity for elo-
quence. That is the public impression. And that is why he is weak today.
By 50 percent to 40 percent, the American people do not think he has any
broad conceptual framework, any sense of direction or purpose.
In a sense, the nature of leadership is not nearly so important as its fact.
That has been our mistake. We have adopted a pacification strategy, this
page 6
for that group, that for this, with deliberable avoidance of controversial
intellectual and social stands, trying to reassure the left, which cares
everything about words, with substance, trying to reassure the right, which
cares everything about substance, with words. We have ended up alienating
everyone and we will not be able to correct that until we start realizing
that tommorrow's headline is not nearly SO important as next fall's "impres-
sion"; that next week's tactical advantage may come at the expense of next
November's strategic victory.
(5) The youth vote is likely to be relatively unimportant in 1972. Broder
and Johnson confirm two of our own opinions: young people are going to vote
less frequently than the rest of the population and they are not going to work
in significant numbers for political candidates. Broder and Johnson are
victims of their own distorted sample on their third point. Their analysis
that young people are far more hostile to the President than the population-
at-large is not born out by the polls. Kennedy has a substantial lead over
the President in the trial heats, but he is the only Democrat who has any
lead among the youth vote.
On the other hand, once the Democrats nominate one man and he has achiev-
ed a visible, stylish identity, he could take the same kind of lead among
youth Kennedy now has. The President's support in this group is thin be-
cause of Vietnam, unemployment, etc.
(6) Muskie is the only Democrat both known to a majority of the electorate
and known positively to it, but does not yet have the strategic advantage over
the President. One of the most disturbing factors in our approach as we
enter the campaign year is our gross underestimation of Muskie. He has
been brilliant, as good as the President was in 1968, and he shows promise
of being far more effective than the President has ever been in the public
phase of his campaign. If he has not yet emerged as the President's equal, he
also does not yet approximate the President's stature as he will as a nom-
inated candidate for President.
People around here counting on a significant fourth party are, I think, crazy,
Muskie is going to do so well in the primaries that no one will join McCarthy
even if he does do it. Without irreparably damaging his right flank, Muskie
has moved far enough left to have the tacit support of somebody like Al Low-
enstein. Establishment reformers like Gilligan are already in his corner
publicly. The Democrats want to win this year I don't think they' re
going to allow themselves to destroy their chances with suicidal splintering.
page 7
Most important of all, Muskie's public image is everything the Pres-
ident's is not: strong, reflective, prudent, even wise. The President
could not maintain early leads against Pat Brown and Hubert Humphrey.
How in the hell we think he's going to do better against an Ed Muskie
with his usual plastic statesman, say-nothing strategy is beyond me.
(7) Wallace and Agnew are too controversial to be accepted as leaders.
More evidence for the alienation theory. It is not just that Wallacé and
Agnew are too strident -- it is also that they are somehow too facile, too
quick, too simplistic. People know that what they have traditionally be-
lieved and what Agnew and Wallace preach -- is not right anymore;
that it needs replacement; that the society has changed and that their
public leaders must deal with those changes even if they can't.
The lesson of Wallace and Agnew is that people want to be led -- they don't
want to see their leaders mouth the same idiocies they do over a Saturday
night beer. Yet that is exactly what we try to do -- elevating the idiocies
into wordy, billowy speeches, to be sure -- practically every time the Pres-
ident makes a prepared, public statement.
I would caution, however, that Agnew's unsuitability for the Presidency
does not mean he should be replaced as President. This should be
decided on the basis of comprehensive polling this spring. There are too
many people who say they would vote for the President, but "not that Agnew. 11
On the other hand, I would regret very much having Governor Connally on
1
the ticket, not just because I would hate to seem him close to the White
House, but, more importantly, because he would overshadow and thus
undermine the President. The President was right in his original intent
with Agnew he runs better with nobody.
Conclusion: The same as usual: Not all the foreign trips to all the foreign
capitals in the world are going to help the President unless they are coupled
with a far more serious effort to deal with his very weak relationship with
the American people.
The following steps should be taken:
(1) Get new speechwriters -- this is the most important. This President
has the least experienced, least able group of speechwriters in recent
history. We need guys with clout, who are involved and know a lot about
substance, and who can put stuff together which is coherent, purposeful,
and comprehensive -- which will have the same effect as the President's
masterful desegregation statement.
page 8
Ideally, we would have guys like Daniel Boorstin, Irving Kristol, Edward
Banfield, and Nathan Glazer. We probably can't get them, but the Pres-
ident ought to speak to Moynihan about it. We need and want people from
that Public Interest - Commentary School and Moynihan would know where
to locate good people whom we could get.
(2) Calm the P. stop getting overexcited about each new issue, and in-
still some consistency and follow-through in our P. R. -- political opera-
tion. We should not be aiming at taking advantage of each new issue by it-
self, but at taking advantage of each new issue as it relates to the President's
over-all approach. Above all, avoid the cheap-shot, the head-line hunt, the
simple slogan.
(3) Realize that what is important about the President is that he is the first
President to realize that the hyper-individualistic -- "We're No. 1"
frontier American philosophy is bankrupt and outdated. The President is
the first President to comprehend that internallyand externally this country
and its people are part of a community structure -- as such, the President
is the first real conservative President the country has ever had. He has
readjusted both foreign and domestic policy away from twentieth century
liberalism, realizing that an unbriddled committment to individualism in
the modern world is enslaving and destructive; that both Vietnam and the war
on poverty are symbols of its bankruptcy; that real freedom and real indivi-
dualism cannot be conferred from above, but must be worked out organically
within a community structure by community norms -- hence an incomes-de-
centralization strategy instead of a services strategy in domestic policy,
hence the Nixon Doctrine instead of Wilsonian zealotry in foreign affairs.
This should be the basic theme in every utterance made by this Administra-
tion.
(4). Stop displaying the President as if he had a stick up his ass. Put him in
gutsy, colorful, photographic situations with people. Take him out of air-
planes, hotels, and military reservations and put him in hospitals, police
cars, outdoors, in urban areas, at local union meetings, on tough university
campuses, at Indian reservations, etc. Use the White House more imaginatively.
(5) A more imaginative use of media -- we shouldn't be afraid to put the
President in conflict situations -- the Rather thing was good insofar as it
went (by far the best of conversations), but we can go farther. Show that
the President can handle both his enemies and the people by putting him in
situations with them. We should also be hitting much more the prestige mags
with prestige pieces. Personally, I thought the President's 1967 Foreign Af-
fairs article was more a travelog than an analysis, but even it has had im-
pact far beyond its immediate readership.