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    "description": "This file contains:\n\nTypewritten notes RE: various campaign participants. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Other Document], no date\n\nfrom Khachigian titled \"Political Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 11/7/1972\n\nDraft from Khachigian RE 'Political Memorandum, Why McGovern Lost.' 22 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], 11/7/1972",
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    "ocrText": "Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nContested Materials Collection\nFolder List\nBox Number\nFolder Number\nDocument Date\nNo Date\nSubject\nDocument Type\nDocument Description\n47\n44\nCampaign\nOther Document\nTypewritten notes RE: various campaign\nparticipants. 3 pgs.\n47\n44\n11/7/1972\nCampaign\nReport\nReport from Khachigian titled \"Political\nMemorandum, Why McGovern Lost. 13 pgs.\n47\n44\n11/7/1972\nCampaign\nReport\nDraft from Khachigian RE 'Political\nMemorandum, Why McGovern Lost.' 22 pgs.\nThursday, April 23, 2015\nPage 1 of 1\nDOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]\nDOCUMENT\nDOCUMENT\nNUMBER\nTYPE\nSUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nN-1\nhotes\n\"miltor viorst who is... \"\nr.d.\nM\n( ( mix )\n[Doc 22]\n(typed]\nN-2\nmemor\nRhach-vin do Secretary,\n11/10/72\n[Doc 23]\n(nim)\nre: Clans and Preferences\nfor. become term, with attached\n[2] draft copies\n[attached to covernmens, Khan\nchigian to President, 11/10/72]\nN-3\nmemo\nPolitical memorander why\n11/7/72\nJ\n(Anix)\nDoc 24]\nme Govern Lost\"\n[attached do cover memo, behachisin\nTO Buchavan, 11/7/77)\nN-4\nmemo\nDraft copy of N-3, attached\n11/7/72\n(comx)\n[Doc 175]\ndon-3 case file with ideas\nformemo on by Mrs Govern\nlost, \" n.d,\nFILE GROUP TITLE\nBOX NUMBER\nFOLDER TITLE\nNovember [1972] Li0/27\nRESTRICTION CODES\nA. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.\nE. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or\nB. National security classified information.\nfinancial information.\nC. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's\nF. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law\nrights.\nenforcement purposes.\nD. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy\nG. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.\nor a libel of a living person.\nH. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nNA FORM 1421 (4-85)\nPresidential Materials Review Board\nReview on Contested Documents\nCollection:\nKenneth L. Khachigian\nBox Number:\n7\nFolder:\nNovember [1972] [1 of 2]\nDocument\nDisposition\n22\nReturn\nPrivate/Political\n23\nRetain Open\n24\nReturn Private/Political\n175\nReturn Private/Political\nMilton VIEXXX Viorst who is distinguished by his interview\nwith George McGover which produced McGovern's comment\ncomparing Ho Chi Minh favorably ** to George Washington --\n***** Viopst, whose range and thus danger, does not\nextend out of Washington to MM more than\nnewspapers.\nMankiewicz whose journies into the m predictive\nmode show about the same presimes prescience as Mank the\npolitician whose predictions of a triumphal McGovern\nworried Republicans enough to ensure that MEXS McGovern\nwas indeeds K thoroughly defeated. If the REpublicans\naxi had not had a Frank Mankiewicz in the McGovern high\ncommand, they would have had to invent one.\nNot EVEN any mea culpa\nMr. Kraft could fully spend the rest of his life trying\nto explain away his erross -- but the only safe prediction\nis that Joe Kraft will make more, yes, errors.\nThe problem with the crystal ball brigade ****** is that\nit wants to write history before it happens.\nWould justifimably provoke RN to say: \"Who are those\npundits and why are they saying those terrible things about\nme?\"\npage 2\nOne NH ****** wishes at times that he was really as\nabrasive as he is accused of being -- in that case he\ncould make his partisans happy by hoisting up the E oh-so-\nwrong columns, editorials and television commentaries in\na beaming\nthe same manner that/Harry Truman once held up that premature\nChicago Tribune foont page and say: \"I told you so!\"\nJohn Kenneth Galbraith, who, it will be recalled,\nsaid durin g the Tet Offensive of 1968 the Saigon Government\nwould fall within a \"fortnight.\" Webster's will either\nhave to changes its definition of that word or Galbraith\nmight have to eat it.\nHobart Rowen, whose self-described *m \"Marxist revo-\nutionary\" son married George McGovern's daughter -- is\nalways SHEX quick to predict the worst form Mr. Nixon's\nkni policies, but thenxwken WHE why wouldn't he; blood\nis thicker than water, they say.\nHarriet Van Horne, whom one reads in the evening\none\nmuch for the same reason ymm/asks for arsenic in YEMX his\nhors-d'eeuvres (sp?), surely has M pad-locked her stax\ndoor by now against the invaders. Harriet, are you still\nthere, or have you been size done in by the A\"Bloody Assizes?\"\nMr. Chuang Tse-tung, head of the table tennis delegation\nfrom the PRC during visit in Rose Garden on April 18, 1972\nsaid:\npage 3\n\"This time last year the U.S. table tennis team, headed\nby Mr. Steenhoven, made a friendly visit to China, and today,\nin the warm spring season, WEEK wak when flowers are in full\nbloom, the Chinese table tennis delegation is here on a\nreciprocal X visit.\"\n\"Warm spring season!\" \"Flowers in fmmlfull bloom!\"\nOmigosh -- tricked by diplomacy again.\nKen Khachigian\nNovember 7, 1972\nPOLITICAL MEMORANDUM\nWHY MCGOVERN LOST\nA massive effort must be taken after the election to head off the\nliberal establishment effort to detract from RN's election victory. That\neffort will take many tacks -- such as RN didn't bring in a Congress; people\nvoted against McGovern not for Nixon, etc. However, the liberal apologists\nwill push one line extra hard: the defeat was not for the ideas of left-liberal\nmovement but rather for the bearer of those ideas.\nThey will argue that liberalism is still viable -- that we still need\nbusing, and all the other liberal schemes, and that they need only wait until\nthey get a standard bearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did.\nThe following analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it seems to me,\nshould be put out as much as possible to counter all the opinion contra. This\nmemorandum focuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the high points\nof the RN victory should be taken up in a separate memorandum.\nTHE CENTRAL POINT TO MAKE\nTo those who argue that McGovern had bad strategy and bad tactics and\nthat he made too many mistakes to run a good campaign, we have one basic\nresponse: the tactics of the liberal movement are the logical outgrowth of\nthe liberal ideology. That is, don't blame McGovern per se, blame the\nphilosophy. Elitism, close-mindedness, moral righteousness, viewing\nthings as good versus evil and the penchant for overstatement are all\n-2-\nfundamentals of the liberal-left political ideology. If McGovern ran a\nbad campaign -- don't blame his strategy because the strategy is the\nideology. The personal flaws of McGovern were bred of the flaws of his\npolitical philosophy.\nThus, McGovern could change his mind on central issues, and then with\na straight face defend his credibility. This hurt his standing with the voters,\nbut being trained in the narrow view as he has, he sees his position only in\nmoralistic terms, or, as PJB put it, as the true believers.\nPeople rejected the McGovern philosophy pure and simple. If the questions\nof his credibility and wishy-washyness arose, it was only because of his\napproach to public policy -- one in which he could cut aircraft carriers back\nfrom 16 to 6 and still maintain with a straight face that this would not affect\nthe strength of the sixth fleet. That is the underlying problem with the left\nradicals, i. e., that the wild things they propose really won't disjoint things\nimportant to citizens or voter blocs.\nBut there are other things to look at in terms of what McGovern did\nwrong, and I'll take them in sequence.\nTHE PARTY REFORM\nIt is not for nothing that the Democratic Party reform was promulgated\nunder the \"McGovern Commission.\" This is where we underestimated\nMcGovern. Immediately, he saw the potential of these guidelines -- they\n-3-\nserved his purposes perfectly. The reforms brought precisely those\npeople into the process who would directly further his candidacy. Moreover,\nit was only McGovern at that point who saw that the complexity of the rules\nwould be baffling to those who did not know them, and he hired the fellow\nwho knew the rules best to be his delegate counter -- Rick Stearns.\nHis opponents did not see soon enough the potential of having a tight\nsolid base which could bring victory in a field of many candidates. Therefore,\nMcGovern moved quickly to pre-empt the party's left wing, and knowing\nthat and with tight organization and his left flank protected, he could con-\nceivably get the nomination. To that extent the liberal-left issues were\nwinners for McGovern in the early stages of the game.\nPRIMARIES\nMcGovern made it through the primaries with skill, luck, and, later,\nwith a little help from his friends in the media. New Hampshire was a\nMuskie disaster, and McGovern was clever in making his loss out to be a\nvictory. McGovern's first score. McGovern was wiped out in Florida in\nwhat should have been the first test of the McGovern political philosophy --\nbut it was not reported that way. It was said that McGovern never expected\nto win Florida. Nevertheless, his views on gutting the space program,\nsupport for massive busing, and a few other positions surely were important\nin the Florida defeat.\n-4-\nNext came Illinois where McGovern wisely worked more on getting a\nfoothold while avoiding a direct test with Muskie. This strategy -- a good\none -- brought him to Wisconsin which he targeted from the beginning as\nhis strongest state with the yough-lust and an excellent organization. There\nthe tight-knit support for his radicalism and an excellent youth turnout gave\nhim a victory. Moreover, the Republicans helped by crossing over for\nMcGovern and Wallace. If only Democrats had voted, HHH would have won.\nYet Wisconsin was the key for McGovern and most importantly it knocked\nLindsay out and gave McG an unexposed left flank.\nFrom Wisconsin on, it was not very difficult for McG. He took Rhode\nIsland because there was only about a 10% Democrat turnout -- and the tight\norganization, getting the liberals and doves out, did it again. Then came\nMassachusetts and Pennsylvania with Muskie mercilessly caught in between\nHHH and McG. By this time the press was necking in the back seat with\nMcGovern, and Massachusetts was a cinch while HHH kept Muskie at bay in\nPa. Again, the organization also went to work in Pa. to pick up some\ndelegates -- what proved to be a good strategy for McG; he nickel-dimed\nhis opposition. Throughout, McGovern was assisted by low voter turnouts\ncoupled with his zealots going to the polls in droves. April 25th served to\nput Muskie over the side -- a hapless victim on a fast track.\n-5-\nThrough Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and North Carolina, in my\njudgment, the press effectively protected McGovern. He didn't do real well\nin any of these states -- except Ohio -- yet they only said it was because\nhe didn't try. Yet, by then they should have known that the McGovern\nideology was like death in those states. Moreover, in Ohio he was basking\nin the media glow which did not mention his radical positions at all, but\nrather how he represented \"the alienated and discontented. \" That left\nMcG free to use his excellent TV spots to bilk the voters of their support.\nThey only saw a nice guy on the tube, not a radical.\nNebraska was the beginning of the end for McGovern. For the first\ntime, his opposition began to hammer effectively at the McGovern leftism.\nAbortion, amnesty, pot, welfare and defense all became problems. It was\ntoo late for HHH to have much of an impact, but the seeds were planted.\nThe threat that Offutt Air Base in Omaha would be closed by McGovern was\nthe first big hit.\nBy this time in Oregon and California, McG had the only effective\norganization and a huge public relations advantage. The media was busy\nexplaining why they were wrong about the early primaries, and in deference to\nMcG were giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland were\nin between, but McG avoided media setbacks because the Wallace shooting\nknocked everything else off the front page. Yet those two states were another\nhint that McGovern represented the wrong side of the political spectrum.\nThat story was lost in the Wallace tragedy.\n-6-\nBy the time McGovern got out to the West Coast, the regular\nDemocrats found out that they were in the process of being had by McGovern.\nBut it was too late. The Dem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern\nguerillas, and there was no time for pacification. (Maybe the fact that\nMcGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in Vietnam than\ntheir opponents colored his political strategy: he was the Viet Cong of\nthe Democratic party).\nThus, McGovern won the California, South Dakota, New Mexico and\nNew Jersey primaries all on the same day -- a tribute to irreversible\nmomentum. (As McGovern said that night: \"I can't believe I won the\nwhole thing\" -- neither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore\nthat night that they would do anything to try to stop him. ) But California\nwas the true turning point in the 1972 presidential campaign and it turned\non issues, not on McGovern's personality or bad tactics.\nMcGovern saw a 20 point lead in the polls drop to 4%. In short, he was\ndevastated by the HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught\nup with him, and HHH was able to articulate them in his hammering\nstaccato fashion as no other figure in American politics could do. Those\nthree national debates -- which could not be filtered by the writing press\nor Frank Reynolds and his gang -- were the real Waterloo for McGovern.\nVast attention was given to the welfare plan, the defense plan, the Vietnam\nbug-out, the fact that McGovern had voted against Jewish interests. HHH\n-7-\nwas vicious and relentless and he did for us what we could have never done\nfor ourselves. Moreover, he did to McG what Rockefeller did to Goldwater:\nhe labelled McGovern.\nLuckily for McG the next primary was New York, and he couldn't lose\nit because there was no preferential vote -- only delegate selection. Thus,\nthe small left-wing delegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by only\na little over a 10% voter turnout.\nTHE MEDIA IN THIS PERIOD\nMcGovern got more than his share of breaks from the press in the\nearly days. They covered for his radical positions by writing tons of\nessays on populism and anti-politicians and alienated voters. Moreover,\nMcGovern's staff was being given the kid-glove treatment. Stories followed\non the McG \"wunderkinder.\" Caddell (whose poll information has been so\nspectacularly bad, yet universally praised) was made out to be Gallup and\nHarris rolled into one. Stearns, Grandmaison and Pokorny (who Sidey\neulogized with the prairie sod in his ears) were \"master strategists\" --\nand oh so young! Mankiewicz was quoted from coast to coast -- the\nman with the quick wit and fast repartee (in my opinion Mankiewicz is\nan absolute political lightweight who covered up with a quick wit -- he gave\nmonumentally bad advice).\nThese \"kids\" began to believe their press clippings and probably thought\nit was a good time to screw the old-liners. I would guess that the boys in\n-8-\nthe clubhouse didn't appreciate either their treatment or the stories they\nread about the \"kids. \" Their duty was to win elections and not worry about\nideology. The McG people believed that winning elections was a part of\nthe ideology -- that the two were intertwined, and that their radicalism was\nthe wave of the future. But give the devil his due -- the organization worked\nwell and played the delegates and the convention states like violins.\nTHE CONVENTION\nThe Convention also had to be quite harmful to McGovern. By this time\nMcGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was too late to stop him -- he really\nhad it wrapped up after Califor nia. Nevertheless, the leftism was fully\nexposed on national television, and the shock for some probably has not\nyet worn off. The spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and the\nhomosexuals was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical\nthat his positions made him out to be, and this hurt.\nThen came the compromises -- putting the abortion, women's lib, and\nother minority planks over the side -- along with George Wiley and Gloria\nSteinem. It was time to kiss and make up with Daley, though Daley would\nresist. But the sum total was a picture of just another politician, one who\nwould make deals to win and comprose his principles -- or at least certain\nprinciples.\n-9-\nBut McGovern walked out of that convention a radical. For all\nintents and purposes he could not escape that label through November.\nIt was not because of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tactics and\nit was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his position\non the political spectrum -- he was on the left, and he believed in his ways.\nEAGLETON\nI think the death blow was already delivered before the Eagleton\naffair. It only confirmed everything which had already been building\nup against McGovern. Those who argue that Eagleton was the turning\npoint don't know what they're talking about. Eagleton was extremely impor-\ntant in terms of harming McGovern's credibility and trust. But even before\nEagleton the seeds were planted -- Eagleton merely made it harder for\nMcGovern. Without the Eagleton affair, McGovern would have still been\nweighted by his positions.\nBlaming the Eagleton affair will be a liberal cop-out and a McGovern\nstaff cop-out. Eagleton did not make McGovern lose a 20 point lead in the\nCalifornia balloting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton thing before\nhistory writes that it was this and only this which cost McG his crack at the\nPresidency. It just ain't true. There was a Gallup after the Dem convention\nand before Eagleton which saw RN gaining three points. McGovern was\nalready on the way down.\n-10-\nRADICALISM -- THE FATAL FLAW\nHubert Humphrey was always thought to be a radical. He had radical\nideas, like McGovern. But the people around HHH were not radical. He had\npols all around him -- cigar-chomping boys who prowled the back rooms.\nMcGovern was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn hippy kids and free\nlove adherents, etc. McGovern's politics were caught up in the culture of\nthe \"movement\" and only made his radicalism seem worse.\nThese were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again, they were basic\ndefects of the radical liberal movement. McGovern though that the kooky\npeople around him were logical extensions of his new politics, of the coming\nhome of America, and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would\nthink that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying that Henry\nWallace was still \"right,\" that the Soviets would treat him as a \"friend\"\nand not test him; or question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were\nbad.\nHis friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger, Steinem, et al. -- all came from\nthe closed club of liberal intelligentsia which saw the historical movement\nthrough its own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes,\nthey were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern misread the\nmood of the country and refused to admit it because liberal intellectuals\nalways think they have a monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite serious about\nthis -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was otherwise, and\nMcG is a former college professor)\n-11-\nTHE CAMPAIGN\nThe campaign itself was marred by the same fundamental flaws\nof ideology. I don't believe at all that it was a tactical error for McGovern\nto campaign in the early days on Vietnam and some of the most leftish\npositions. I think he believed that his surrender policy in Vietnam (he\nwas actually to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals) was the right\nposition and probably the politically expedient position. The income redis-\ntribution plan and some of the other way-out ideas were still in his speeches\nin early September, although not explicitly. And throughout, there was\nVietnam, where McGovern grew to higher reaches of sell-out. He dumped\nhis $1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan and gave out\ndetailed explanations of how this would work.\nBasically, I don't think that McGovern forsaked his radicalism. He\nsimply tried to make it sound not all that bad in the campaign. Sure, he made\nsome stupid mistakes, but the singular mistake was the belief that he could\nsell to the steelworker in the fall what he spoonfed to the students in the\nwinter -- a disrespected political philosophy.\nFinally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language were classics\nin New Left politics. The pure smear, the overstatement, the disruption,\nthe Hitler analogy, the fostering of discord and the planting of fears --\nall permeate the liberal ideology. When liberals disagree, the first charge\n-12-\nthey make is \"fascist\" or \"Hitler. \" It is reflexive. It is the formbook\nliberal tactic -- to many liberal politicians, the ideology imbues the\nform -- the substance is the form. And in the end you cannot fault\nMcGovern for his tactics without really faulting his ideological base.\nNOTES\nIt might be said that McGovern lost the election because of the way\nhe won the nomination. He sold his soul to the left and had little\ninclination to seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be\nlaid alone to ineptitude -- it is no less than a major misreading of\nAmerican values and the cultural ethos of our country.\nThe polls showed over and over again that the public resented McGovern\n\"running down America. 11 And while Haynes Johnson traveled the country\ntalking about alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are basically at\npeace with themselves, satisfied with their lives, and optimistic about the\nfuture. What he saw was good old American skepticism -- the \"show me\"\nattitude -- and he mistook it for a penetrating anomie and social listlessness,\nNot only did the polls show McGovern misreading the country's mood,\nthey also showed that McGovern misread the public's perception of the\ncorrect position on the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the\nPresident had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues. This shows an\nunusually high perception of McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was\n-13-\na huge jump over the period in the primaries where McGovern was viewed as\nbenign. This confirms that McGovern was hurt deeply by HHH's efforts in\nCalifornia and that that was the most harmful point in the McGovern candidacy.\nIt was not that McGovern played the wrong strings -- he was playing the\ntuba in a string orchestra. He was out of syncopation; out of tune; and blaring\nfortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.\nIn a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start. His radical politics\ntook a good shellacking from the Ameri can public -- a deserved repudiation\nof alien ideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing --\nafter all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times -- let's put\nthe blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America\nwhich was born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by\nthe grocer's son who saw the excesses and called 'em like he saw 'em.\nKEN Khachipin\nPOLITICAL MEMORANDUM 11/7/72\nWHY MCGOVERN LOST\n11/6/72\nD\nMEMORANUM FOR PAT BUCMANAN\nFROM: KEN KHACHIGIAN\nSUBJECT: WHY MCGOVE RN LOST POLITICAL ANALYSIS\nA massive effort must be taken after the election to\nhead off the\nmedia effort to detract from RN's\nelection victory. That effort will take many tacks --\nsuch as\nRN didn't\nbring in a Congress; people voted\nagainst McGovern not for Nixon, etc. However, the libeal\napologists will push one line extre hard: the defeat\nideas of\nwas not\nfor the left-liberal movement but rather for\nthe bearer of those ideas.\nThey will argue that liberalism is still viable --\nthat we still need busing, and all the other liberal schemes\nand that they need only wait until they get a standard\nbearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did. The\nfollowing analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it\nseems to me, should be put out as much asm possible to\ncontra.\ncounter all the oppositie a opinion This memorandum\nfocuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the\nhigh points of the RN victory should be taken up in\na\nseparate\nsepared\nmemo,\nwhich\ndraft up\nif\nTHE\nCENTRAL POINT TO MAKE\nTo those who argue\nthat McGovern had bad stragegy\nand bad tactics and that he\nmade too many\nmistakes\nto run a good campaign, we have one basic response: the tacitics\npage 2\nof the libreral movement are the logical outgrowth of\nthe liberal ideology. That is, don't\nblame McGovern\nper\nblame the philosophys Elitism, close-mindedness,\nmoral righteousness,\nviewing things\nas good versus\nevil and the penchant for overstatement are\nall\nfundamentals of the liberal-left political ideology. If\nMcGovern ran a bad campaign -- don't blame his strategy\nbecause the strategy is the\nideology. The personal flaws\nhis\nof McGovern\nwere bred of the\nflaws of politidal\nphilosophy.\nThus, McGovern could change his mindo on central issues,\nand then with a straight face defend his\ncredibility.\nThis hurt his standing with the voters, but\nbeing train\ned\nin the narrow view as he has, he sees his position\nonly\nin moralistic terms, or, as PJB put:\nit, as the true\nbelievert\nPeople\nrejected the McGovern\nphilosophy pure\nand simple. If the\nquestions of his credibility and\nwishy-washyness arose, it was only because of his approach\nto\npublic policy -- one in which he could\ncut aircraft\nwith a\ncarriers back from 16 to 6 and still\nmaintain that\nthis would not\naffect the streng of the sixth fleet. -\nThat is the underlying problem with the left radicals, i.e.,\nthat the wild things they propose really won't disjoint things\nimportant to\ncitizens or\nvoter blocs.\npage 3\nBut there are other things to look at in terms of\nwhat McGovern did\nwrong, and I'll take them in sequence.\nTHE PARTY REFORM\nIt is not for nothing that the Democratic Party\nreform was promulgated under the \"McGovern Commission.\"\nThis is where we underestimated McGovern. Immediately,\nhe saw the potential of these guidelines -- they served\nhis purposes perfectly. The reforms brought pre-\ncisely those people into the process who would directly\nfurther/ his candidacy. Moreover, it was only McGovern at\nwho\nthat point\nsaw that the comp Mexity of the rules would\nbe baffling to those who did not know them, and he hired\nthe feallow who knew the rules best to be his delegate\ncounter -- Rick Stearns.\nHis opponents did not somewhing see the potential of having\na tight solid\nbase which could bring victory in a field\nmany\nof candidates. Therefore, McGovern moved quickly\nand\nto\npreempt the party's left wing, and knowing that\nwith tight organization and his left flank\npro-\ntected, he could conveivably get the nomination. To that\nextent the liberal-left issues were winners\nfor McGovern\nin the early stages of the\ngame.\npage 4\nTHE PRIMARIES\nP.I\nMcGovern made it\nthrough the prima\nares\nwith\nskill,\nluck, and, later, with a litt help from his\nfreends in the media. New Hampshire was Muskie disaster,\nand McGovern was clever in making his loss out\nto be\na victory. McGovern's first score. McGovern was wiped\nout in Florida in what should have been the first test\nof the McGovern political philosophy -- but it was not\nreported that\nway. It was said that McGovern never\nexpected to win\nFlorida. Nevertheless, his views\non gutting the space program, support for massive busing,\nand a few other postions surely\nwere important in\nthe Florida defeat.\nNext came Illinois where McGovern wisely worked more\non getting a foothold\nwhile avoiding a direct\nwith Muskie. This strategy -- a good one -- brought\nhim to Wisonnsin which he targeted from the beginning as\nhis strongest state with the youth-lust and an excellent\norganization. There the\ntight-knit support\nfor his\nand excellent youth turnout gave him\na\nvictory. Moreover, the Republicans helped by\ncrossing over for McGovern\nand Wallace. If only Democrats\nhad voted, HHHL would have won. Yet Wisconsin was the\nkey for Mcgovern and most importantly it knocked Lindsay out\nand gave MCG an un exposed left flank.\npage 5\nFrom Wisconsin on, it was not very difficult for McG.\nHe taok Rhode Island because there\nwas only about a 10%\nDemocrat turnout -- and the tight organization, getting\nthe libeerals and doves out, did it again. Then\ncame Massachusetts\nand Penasylvania with Muskie mercilessly caught in between\nHHH and McG. By this time the press was\nnecking\nin the back seat with McGovern and Massachusetts was a cinch\nwhile HHH kept Muskie\nat bay in Pa. Again, the organization\nalso went to work in Pa. to pick up some delegates -- what\nproved to be a good strategy for MCG; he\nnickel-(sp)\ndimed his opposition.\nThroughout, McGovern was assisted\nby low Lvoter turnouts coupled with his zealots going to the\npolls in droves. April 25 served to put Muskie over the\na\nside\nhapless victim a fast track.\nThfough Ohio, Indiana,\nTennessee, and North Carolina,\nin my judgment, the press effectively protected McGovern.\nHe didn't do real well in any of these states -- except\nOhio -- yet they only said it was because he didn't try.\nYet, by then they should\nhave known that the McGovern\nideology was like death in those states. Moreover, in Ohio\nhe was basking in the media glow which did not mention\nhis radical positions at all, but rather how he represented\n\"the alienated and disconteneed.\" That left MCG free to use\nhis excellent\nTV spots to bilk the voters of their support.\nThey only saw a nice guy on the tube, not\na radical.\npage 6\nNebraska was the beginning of the end for McGovern.\nFor the first time, his opposition began to hammer effectively\nat the McGovern leftism. ABortion, amnesy, pot, welfare\nand\ndefense all became problems. It was too late\nfor HHH to have much of an impact, but the seeds were planted.\nThe threat that\nOffutt Air Base in Omaha would be\nclosed by McGovern was the first big hit.\nBy this time in Oregon and Californa, MCG had the\nonly effective organization\nand a huge public { relations\nadvangage. The media was busy, explaning why they were\nwrong about the early primaries and in deference to MCG\nwere giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland\nwere in between, but MCG avoided media setbacks because\nthe Walaace shooting knocked everything else off the front\nanother hint\nthat\npage. Yet these two states were\nMcGosern represented the wrong dide of the political spectrum.\nThat story was lost in the Wallace trapedy.\nBy the time McGovern got out to the WEST Coast, the\nregular Democrats found\nout that they were in the process\nof\nbeing had by McGovern. But it was too late. The\nDem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern guerillas,\nand there was no time for pacification fact\nthat McGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in\nVietnam\nthan their opposants colored his political\nstrategy: he was the Viet Comp of the Dansentic\nparty).\npage 7\nThus, McGuvern won the California, South Dakota,\nNew Mexico and New Jersey primaries all on the semne\nday\nirreversible momentum. (As McGovern\nsaid that night: \"I can't believe I won the whole thing\"--\nneither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore that\nnight that they would do anything to try to stop him#.)\nBut California was the true turning point in the 1972\npresidential campaign and it\nturned on issues, not\non McGovem's personality or\nbad tactics.\nMcGovern\nsaw a\n20\npoint lead inf the\npolls drop to 4% In short, he was devastated by\nthe HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught\nup with him, and HHH was able to articlulate\nthem in\nhis\nhammering\nstaccato fashion as no other\nfigure in American politics could do. Those three national\ndebates -- which could not be filtered by the writing\npress or Frank Reynolds and his gang\nwere the real\nWaterloo for McGovern. Vast attention was given to the\nwelfare plan, the\ndefense plan, the Vietnam bug-out,\nthe fact that Mc G overn had voted against Jewish interests.\nHHH was vicious and relentless and he did for us what we\ncould have never done for ourselfes. Moreover, he did\nto MCG what Rockefeller\ndid to\nGoldwater:\nhe labelled m (Govern.\npage 8\nLuckily for McG the next primary was New York, and\nhe couldn't lose it\nbecause there was not preferential\nvote -- only deledgate selection. Thus, the small left-wing\n(onlya\ndelegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by\na\n10% voter turnout.\nTHE MEDIA IN THIS PERIOD\nMcGovem got more than his share of breaks from\nthe press in the early days. They covered for his\nradical positions by writing tons of essays on populism\nand anti-politic and alientated voter Mordever,\nMcGovern's staff was being given the kid-glove treatment.\nStories\nfollowed on the McG \" wunderkinger \" Caddell\n(whose poll information has been so spectacularly bad,\nyet\nuniversally praised) was made out to be Gallup and Harris\nrol\ninto one. Stearns, Grandmaison and Pokorny (who Sidey\neulogized with the prairie sod in his ears) were \"master\n\"\nstrategists and oh so young! Mankiewicz was quoted from\ncoast to coast -- the man with the quick wit and fast\nrepartee (in my opinion Mankiewicz is an absolute\npoliitcal lightweight who covered up with a quick wit --\nhe gave monumentall bad advice)\nThese \"kinds\" began to believe their press clippings\nand probably thought it was a good time to screw the\nold-liners\nI would\nguess that the\nboys in\nthe\nclubhouse didn't appresiate either their treatment or\npag e 9\nthe\nstoreis they read about the \"kids.\"\nTheir duty was to win elections and not worry about\nideology. The McG people believed that winning elections\na part of the ideology -- that the two were intertwined,\nand that\ntheir radicalism was the wave of the future.\nBut give the devil his due -- the organization worked well\nand played the delegates and the convention states like\nviolins.\nTHE CONVENTION\nThe Conventinn also had to be quite harmful to McGovern.\nBy this time McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was\ntoo late to stop\nhim -- he really had it wrapped up\nafter California. Neverthe ess, the leftism was fully\nexposed on\nnational\ntelevision, and the shock for\nsome probably has not yet worn off. The spectacle of\nthe abortion people, the libbers and the homosexuals\nwas too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical\nthat his positions made him out\nto be, and this hurt.\nThen came\nthe compromises -- putting the abortinn,\nwomens lib, and other minority planks over the side -- along\nwas\nwith George Wiley and Gloria\nSteinem. It\ntime\nto kiss and make up with\nDaley, though Daley would\nresist. But the sum total was a picture of just another\npolitican, one who would make deals to win and compromise\nhis principles -- or at least ertain principles.\npage 10\nBut Mc a overn walked out of that convention KME a\nradical. For all intests and purposes\nhe could not\nscape that label through November. It was not because\nof mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tacitcs and it\nwas not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his\nposition on the polifical spectrum -- he was on the left,\nand he believed in his ways.\nEAGLETON\nI think the death blow was already\ndelivered\ne\nbefore the Eaglton affair. It only confirmed everything\nwhich had already been building up against McGovern. Those\nwho argue that Eagleton was the turning point don't know\ne\nwhat\nthey're talking about. Eagliton was extremely impor-\ntant in terms harming McGovern's credibility and trust.\nBut even before Eagleon the seeds were planted -- Eagleton\nmerely made ith harder for McGovern. Without the Eagleton\naffair, McGovern\nwould have still been weighted by\nhis positions.\nBlaming the\nEagleton affair will be a\nliberal\ncop-out and a McGovem staff cop-out. Eaglton did\nnot\nmake McGovern\nlose a 20 point lead in the Calf iornia\nballioting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton\nthing before history writes that it was this and only\nthis which cost MCG his crack at the Presidency. It just ain't\npage 11\ntrue. There was a\nGallup after the Dem convention and\nVRN\ngamms\nbefore Eagleton which saw\nthree points,\nMcGovern was already on the way down.\nRADICALISM\nTHE FATAL FLAW\nHubert Humphrey was alwas\nthought to be a radical.\nHe had radical ideas , like McGovern. But the people aroudn\nHHH were not radical. He\nhad pols all around him --\ncigar-chomping\nboys who prowled the back rooms.\nMcGovern\nwas surrounded by radicals -- all those damn\nhippy kids and free love adherents, etc. McGovern's politids\n\"Movement\"\nwere caught up in the\nculture of the\nand\nonly made his radicalism seem worse.\nThese were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again,\ndefects\nradical\nthey\nwere basic\nof\nthe\nliberal movement. McGovern\nthought that the kooky\npeople around him were logical\nexensions of his new politics, of the coming home of America,\nand of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would\nthink that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying\nthat Henry Wallace was still \"right,\" that the Soveets\nwould treat hims as a\"freend\"and not test him;\nor\nquestion why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were bad.\nHis friends -- Galbraith, Schlesinger,\nSteinem,\net\nal. all came from the closed club\nof liberal intell\npage 12\nsaw the\nhistorice\nmovement through\nown narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes,\nthey were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern\nmisread the mood of the country and refused to admit it\nbecause\nliberal intellectuals alwasy\nthink they\nhave a\nmonopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite\nserious about\nthis -- I never knew a liberal college professor who was\notherwise, and McG a former college professor)\nTHE CAMPAIGN\nThe\ncampaign itself was marred by the same funda-\nmental flaws of ideology. I don't believe at all that\nin the early days\nit was a tactical error for McGovern to campaign/on\nVietnam and some of the most leftish pestions. I think\nhe believed that his surrender policy in Vientam (he was\nactaally to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals)\nwas the right positions and probably the politically\nexpedient\nposition. The income redistribtuion\nplan and some of the other way-out\nideas were still\nin his speeches in early September, althoggh not explicity\nAnd throughout, there\nwas Vietnam, where McGovern\ngrew to higher reaches of sell-out.\nHe dumped\nhis\n$1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan\nand gave out detailed explanations of how thise would\nwork.\npage 13\nI\ndon't think that McGovern forsaked\nhis radicalism. He simply tried to make it sound not all\nthat bad in the\ncampaign. Sure he made some stupid\nmistakes, but the\nsingular mistkae was the belief that\nto the steelworker\nhe could sell in the fall what he spoonfed to the students\nin the winter\na\ndisrespected political philosophy.\nFinally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language\nwere classics in New Left politics. The pure smear,\nthe overstatement, the disruption, the Hitler\nanalogy,\nthe fostering of discord and the planting of fears -- all\npermeat the libemal ideology. When liberals disagree, the\nfirst\ncharge they make is\n\"fascist\" or \"Hitl\n=\nIt is reflexive. It\nthe formbook liberal tactic --\nimbues\nto many liberal politicians, the ideobogy\nthe\nform -- the substance is the fom And in the end you\ncannot fault Mogovern for his tacties without faulting his\nideological base.\nNOTES\nIt might be said that McGovern lost the\nelection\nbecause of the\nway he won the nomination. He sold\nhis\nsoul to the left and had little inclination to\nseek salvation. That massive political error cannot be\nlaid\nalone to ineptitude -- it is no less than a\nmajor misreading of American values and the culturmal\nethos of our country.\np. 14\nThe polls showed over and over again that the public\nresented McCovern \"running down America.\" And while\nHaynes Johnson traveled the country talking\nabout\nalienation, he missed the fact that Americans are\nbascially at peace with themselves, satisfied with\ntheir\nlives, and optimistic about the future. What\nhe saw\nwas good old American skepticism -- the \"show\nook\nme\" attitude -- and he\nmist\nit for a penetrating\nanomie and social listlessness.\nNot only did the polls show Mc overn misreading the\ncountry's mood, they also showed that McGovern misread\nthe public\nperception of the correct position on\nthe issues. Harris found out in the summer that the\nPresident\nhad the prefermable position on 15 out of\n16 issues. This shows an unusually high perception of\nMcGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was a huge\njump over the period in the\nprimaries where\nMcGovern\nwas view d as benign. This confirms that McGovern was\nhurt deeply by HHH's efforts in California and that that\nwas the most harmful\npoint\nin the McGovern candidacy.\nIt was not that McGovern played the wrong strings --\nhe was playing the tuba in a string orchestra.\nHe\nwas out of syncopation; out of tune; and\nblaring\nfortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.\n1 age 15\nIn a nutshe\n,\nMcGovern was wrong from the start#.\nHis readical politics took a good shellacking (sp?) from\nthe American public -- a deserved repudiation of alien\nideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing --\nafter all, he did some quite\nintelligent politicking\nat times -- let's put the blame where it belongs: on\nthe elitist, leftward movement in America which was\nborn of Kennedy, raised in the Great Soceity and\ncut\ndown by the\ngrocer's son who saw the excesses and\ncalled\n'em like he saw 'em.\nideas for memo on Why McGovern lost\nMCG (ost because of the way he won /\n-- said that it is McGovern's tactics -- the way he\nruns the campaign, not the libemal ideology. This is\ntheir way of X blaming MCG without blaming leftism --\nBut his tacigcs are a logical outgrowth of iddology -- the\nelitism, * close-mindedness, excessive moralism, etc. In\nthe case of the *EM extreme left procedures are part\nof the ideology -- here is step by step of how McG\nwons nomination, how he lost election.\n-- Begin with XHMX party reform -- here is where\nMcG smart politician -- ** few others saw the potential\nof having a tight, solid base to win a victory in a\nwidespread field of candidatesx :_ won primaries by\ndumb luck -- New HMH Hampshire (Muskie error and must media help --\nafter all, Muskie EXE won) -- Florida, Wallace, zip for MaG\nthough great interest in race R -- Illinois, a handful (if\nwe realized we should have known by then he would nickee dime\nhis oppostion to death) -- Wisconsin, won because of Repub.\nLindsay out: \"deft\"\nXXX crossovers to MCG and Wallace, otherwise HHH\nRhode\nIsland - won with something like 10% vote turnout Ax --\nChemic\nMaas. and Pa. -- MCG won one and HHH the other -- Muskie\nsandwiched unmercifully -- Mass was obvioas, tw low turnout\nbut heavy student and left-wing vote; Pa -vote for delegates,\nand thus McG's tight organization victoriius. -- --\nfund vitually Indiana out. HHH\npage 2\nOhio -- by that time, media BY love affair was on, McG\ngettings nothaxing but good press -- new face, clever ads --\nno one knew where he stood and again good org. -- HHH old\nface. Ohio hurt. -- Tennessee -- zip for McG --\nNorth 7 Carolina, zip for McG -- Nebraska, McGa won , but for\nfirst time and indicator of HHH attacks, big McG lead was\ncut in the last days -- first time HHH started on military,\nabortions and related issues -- AMERE Avoided W E st Va, except\nfor delegate votes (no loss could be had thus) -- Maryland\nand Michigan same day -- wash because of Wallace, but started\nto show how in two Democrat states, MCG was not wave of future --\nevaded busing issue in MIE Mich, but would catch up later --\nOregon, MM foregone conclusion for MCG, overwhelming buildup --\nOnly now do any Democrates realize what happening to them --\nthey were infiltrated and found the guerillas too late (maybe\nthe premier lesson fre for McG from Vietnam war) -- Finally\nCalif., N.J., New Mexico, and South Dakota (I can't belive\nI won the whole thing -- and unfortunately for MCG, neither\ncould other Dems who decided they couldn't swallow him and\nwould start against him although too late -- but Calif.\nwas turning point in terms of MCG V. RN on the whole campaign. --\nMCG saw a 21% poll lead drop to 4% on election day -- for the\nfirst time in campaign, issues caught up -- and HHH was\nablxe to articulate hhem in his hammering stacatto fashion in\npage 3\nthree national debates -- That was the real Waterloo for\nMcG just as California was for Goldwater --New York -- MEXH\nobvious, the leftists were in control and only about a 10%\nturnout again -- sure thing for METX McG.\n*******\nMcG won because he was organizied and Rick Stearns\nwho NIN helped write the rules also ran the organization.\nMeanwhile the press started writing about populism and\nMCG being the \"anti-politieian\" -- covering the leftism\nin their purple prose -- Moreover, all those syrupy stories\nabout the McG WE wunderkinder Caddell (whose poll information\nhas been so spectacularly WXEX wrong but universally praised) --\nStearns, Pokornay (with the prairie sod in his ears); Grandmaison,\nMankciewiez (who is the dumbest pol I believe we have ever\nfaced -- good wit but lousy strategist) -- They started\nto believe they were superior to all the oldimers who\nproabably resented this because they worked hard but\nKM only *** laughed at. -- Yet the org was still there, and\nplayed the rules like violin -- as good as Barry did in 1964 --\nbut Barry actually represented his party more than McG did\nhis. --\nConvention -- the leftism was fully exposed on national\ntelevision, EXCHK but the sheer momentum would not deprive\nMcG he was dead before the balloting -- the spectacle\nin the media -- queers, abortionishs, women's lib,\npage 4\nThen the km political acts -- putting the libbers, the welfare\npeople and othess over the side -- screwing everybody on\nthe miniority planks -- this was was printed in a rash of\narticaes after convnetion and it took hold -- finally,\nMcG was seen to be a politicaian just like the rest -- the\ndesire to hs kiss and make up with Daley etc. MBX\nEagleton affair MHMX merely confirmed what was building\nFO up -- the XX it awf served the purpose of dramatizing\nevarything that was wrong with MCG and proably caught\nthe press at a time when they were fed up with the\nway MCG hand had been given the sweetheart treatment --\nthe warts were there and it was time to show them, with\na vengeance.\nBut ***** through it all, the left-readadalism showed\nthrough -- the welfare and defense plans, the taxing,\ntheabortion, abnesty and pot positions -- he could not\nescape them (and he would have been better off x if he\ndidn't try to keep compromising and swithcing 2x this was\nthe worst thing he жиха could have done) -- but ***** this\nwas a minor flaw in tacfics; it was the basic radecalism of\nthe positions which went to the core FX of gut Democrats.\nHHH alwass talked like a radical but all those pols around\nhim showed MIR he was ok, but McGa not only talked like\na radical , but had radicals around him --\npage 5\n-- youth vote -- took it for granted; arrogance and elitism\nof left was the reason MCG acted this way -- his downfall\nwith youth; he left them somewhat -- but it is what left-\nwing has always attempted to do, MXK win over hard-core in\nprivate and in primaires and then ignore them in Fall to\nget the big EN I shx one.\nThen the campaign -- he chose to campaign for weeks\non the issues of the left -- Vietnam (wheee he was truly\ncrushed; this probably hurt him equally with other issues) ;\ntax loopholes; redistribution -- and he sometimes bacbked\noff, butxsmmakki tried X to still believe in it -- e.g.,\nsubstitute $L,000 per person with $x999 $4,000 per family (big\ndeal).\nFinally, the laguage and tactids -- in the end, pure\nNew Left -- indduendo, smear, overstatement, disruption,\nfostering discond, planting fears -- it was a calssic\nin the way New Left ideology permeates form -- the libral\nXXX substance is the liberal form -- you cannot attack\nMcGs tactics wihhout attacking his ideology.\nAlso notes: Polls showed that people thought MCG\nwas running down America; didn't buy his defense paans,\nhis tax plans; his foreign policy and isolationsm; and\nbasically found themselves to ** his W right -- also\nthey viewed McG as tof a far left -- polls showed time\nafter time that Mr ideology was a major weakness.\npage 6\nAmericans did not think they were= sick or racist or warmongering\nor heartless towards poor -- Magoo was pulling at wrong strings --\nthere might be *** things wrong with U.S. but George wouldn 2t\never admit it was a good countey anrd would never admit\nfor exampel that North Vietnam was a bad country H& -- the\nfatal left-wing flaw -- lack of consistency and moral\nfervor \"only I am wright and everyone else is wrong\"."
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