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From Khachigian to Haldeman (Per Buchanan) RE: Campaign Appearances. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/26/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman and Colson RE: Image of Nixon after corruption charge from McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/16/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson RE: McGovern and the "corruption" issue. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/13/1972
From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: Analysis of why McGovern lost. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/7/1972
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This file contains:
From Khachigian to Haldeman (Per Buchanan) RE: Campaign Appearances. 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/26/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman and Colson RE: Image of Nixon after corruption charge from McGovern. 1 pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/16/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Colson RE: McGovern and the "corruption" issue. 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 10/13/1972
From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: Analysis of why McGovern lost. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/7/1972
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48
6
10/26/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Khachigian to Haldeman (Per
Buchanan) RE: Campaign Appearances. 2
pgs.
48
6
10/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman and Colson
RE: Image of Nixon after corruption charge
from McGovern. 1 pg.
48
6
10/13/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman, Ehrlichman,
and Colson RE: McGovern and the
"corruption" issue. 3 pgs.
48
6
11/7/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Khachigian to Buchanan RE: Analysis
of why McGovern lost. 14 pgs.
Wednesday, June 03, 2015
Page 1 of 1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 26, 1972
POLITICAL MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN (Per Buchanan)
FROM:
KEN KHACHIGIAN
We have suffered in silence long eough. It's time to come out fighting.
There is the distinct appearance that we are acquiescing by our denials and
no comments. We need to go on the attack and to do it hard. It is time for
the same type of speech that Ed Muskie delivered in 1970 this time coming
from the Veep with a big build-up.
McGovern and the left, aided and abetted by the POST et al. are out to
destroy the President. They know they will lose and are going down as irres-
ponsibly as they can. But if this stuff sticks per McGovern's speech last
night they have it in their power to make the President a lame duck on
November 8th. Not by defeating RN, but by so undercutting his integrity and
authority that they will have effectively destroyed his ability to govern. Either
we turn that around, or the next four years are going to be unbearable.
Recommendation: The Veep goes on national television with a very low
key, but though, speech which Buchanan and I, can collaborate on. The theme
is that the McGovernites in their desperation are lying, maligning honorable
men, and engaging in the worst kind of divisiveness for their selfish personal
gain. Their goal is no less than the destruction of the President with lies and
demogoguery.
There need only be about five minutes of defensive stuff. Then we launch
into a major, devastating attack which could turn this whole thing around over-
night. McGovern won't be expecting it, and it could take him days to recover.
We now have the laundry list of McGovern immorality and corruption, the
bribes in his campaign, the smear tactics he used in 1962, 1968, and the smears
today, the quashing of the Bobby Baker inquiry, the brand new car he got, the
1968 campaign where he didn't reveal his secret contributors, the nepotism on his
own payroll, etc. Frankly, all these, taken together, could make McGovern
shrivel in hypocrisy.
Then we go through all the issues that McGovern is trying to cover up the
welfare, defense, and high budget stuff, plus his total surrender to North Vietnam
and finally all his irresponsible statements on J. Edgar Hoover, etc. It could break
his back.
I am perfectly aware that they think this is their issue, but we have enough now
to make it our issue. The risk is two or three points in the polls, but the gain
Page 2
is our own integrity and keeping RN's ability to govern. Done right, this
one half hour could utterly destroy Magoo, and we ought to be willing to
take the chance and go with it.
FXI
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
CHARLES COLSON
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Some ideas sent in that have some merit: Considering
the "corruption" charge, etc., why not have the
President photographed in quasi-religious services;
either Sunday services, funerals, if they come up --
or other -- which in and of itself makes McGovern look
nasty in the character of his charges.
Secondly, strongly recommend that we take out ads in
all major black publications attacking McGovern for taking
blacks for granted -- and calling on blacks to repudiate
that sentiment. These ads would serve to force McGovern
to spend money to answer them -- and they might well weaken
him in the black community as McGovern has never been
strong there personally. This is the one major voting block
where McGovern wins overwhelmingly -- and some hard
negative ads might convince blacks either to "go fishing"
or cut McGovern.
Buchanan
K K
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 13, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
POLITICAL MEMORANDUM
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
CHARLES COLSON
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
McGovern appears to have but one card left to turn over the
"corruption" issue. And it is not a bad one. There is a theme
abuilding in the media, which runs like this: What has happened
that America and Americans are sympathetic that they will not
become enraged at the atmosphere of scandal and chicanery that
now exists in Nixon's Washington. Agronsky, Sidey, Severeid,
Reasoner, Shana Alexander and a host of others are pushing the
theme.
The Times has put its top Mafia guy on the Watergate-Espionage-
Sabotage issue -- and the Washington Post may very well have a few
more trumps to play.
My concern is that we not "freeze the ball" with our twenty-odd point
lead, and three and a half weeks to go -- as we did in 1968. We have
two possible lines of attack as I see it, and I would prefer the latter.
First, is to attack the Post head-on along these lines. "Just as in
1968, the leftist press is digging up all the dirt it can print between
now and the election to salvage the collapsed McGovern campaign.
In 1968 it was the Times when their smear on Agnew; in 1972 it is the
Post's desperate last-ditch effort to smear the President on Watergate.
Innuendo and unproven charges are being given the kind of ride they
have not gotten since the days of Joe McCarthy. Where Dick Tuck's
screw-ball antics were applauded and laughed off pranks performed
by some over-zealous types a) have not even been tied to the
President's organizations; and b) are condemned as though we were
running a concentration camp. 11
- -2-
Something along these lines -- taking the attack to the Post.
However, before proceeding up this avenue, we had best know
exactly how much more the Post has than the stuff it is running
right now.
However, my preferred line would be for us to use the above only
as an "answer" and to respond to the Washington Post's vendetta, and
the others who are fortifying McGovern's charges, with their venom
and outrage by stepping up the attack on McGovern on our issues.
To this end, I believe that:
A)
The earlier we use Connally, the broader the audience, the
better. This speech not only creams McGovern it turns the focus
of ma tional debate back onto our issues -- foreign policy, defense
cuts, amnesty, bipartisan tradition - - and hits McGovern hard for
his radicalism.
B)
We need new and more attack ads, in my view; and a crash
program should be initiated to provide them. What are the issues
hurting McGovern most? When we find these, we ought to have one
minute reminder ads for massive use on a state-by-state basis in
the waning days of the campaign.
C)
We ought to consider the possibility of placing print ads in
black papers all over the country condemning McGovern for not
placing such ads and "taking blacks for granted. 11 An ad which says
in effect you won't see McGovern taking an ad in this paper because
he thinks you're already in his pocket.
D)
While we have hit McGovern some on his Vietnam speech, it is
not enough, and not hard enough his speech disappointed and
concerned even Kraft and Reston we should be hitting him hard
and repeatedly, and at high levels on Vietnam.
E)
We have several "bombs" lined up like the Defense Budget
Analysis, the Welfare Analysis, the Connally Speech we need more
major "events" or "attacks" at high levels, which can frame the
debate in our terms, not theirs. We must keep the country thinking
of McGovern and his idiotic schemes, his ineptitude and his radicalism -
if we are going to hold onto our existing lead.
F)
The time is approaching I would think, when we would want
to move the issue further by calling for a "vote against extremism"
and get prominent Democrats and Union Leaders to start talking
publicly, and calling for the "repudiation" of the Radical Left that
has seized our party.
-3-
G)
Perhaps we need once again to go back through all our
i-McGovern material -- pick out only the harshest and toughest
material we have and feed that to the press for one more round.
In brief conclusion, the next ten days are crucial to breaking the
back of the McGovern campaign; we ought not to be holding back
material now -- but pouring out everything we have. We should
be getting as much of this anti-materi al into the record as possible;
if McGovern has made no progress by two weeks before the election,
the stampede might begin, and that may be it.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 7, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM:
KEN KHACHIGIAN Q
SUBJECT:
ANALYSIS OF WHY MCGOVERN LOST
Attached is a fairly detailed political analysis of why McGovern did not win
in 1972. The reason for this exercise is to offer up the response to the commen-
tary which will maintain that McGovern lost not because of his ideology but
because of himself. I.e., it will be argued that extreme liberalism is still
a valid political phenomonon but that McGovern was the wrong candidate to
carry the colors.
There are many ways to respond to this, and I have done so with an analysis
of the many different factors of the McGovern movement. However, each time
we return to the basic reason: that McGovern was trying to sell an unpopular,
unwanted ideology to the American people.
Eagleton will get a great deal of blame from some -- but McGovern was
tarred way before Eagleton. It began in California where HHH tied the
albatross around McGovern's neck, and we took it from there. Labor didn't
walk out because of Eagleton, but because of the McGovern platform.
Right on down the line, it is simple to disprove the argument that we
were in a personality contest. Make no mistake about it, the contest was
between drastically differing political philosophies -- and the left got a good
licking in a fair contest.
Whether you measure it by polls, the actual results, or by sentiment
in certain areas, McGovern was tied down to the thinking which America
didn't want. Vietnam dovishness, welfarism, isolationism, pacifism,
permissiveness, and a host of other gut issues found McGovern on the far
left objectively on the far left.
To say that he ran a bad campaign or that he bungled the Eagleton affair
or that he made too many mistakes misses the fundamental reason for the
rejection of McGovern. The attached tries to chronicle the McGovern defeat,
and in my judgment, should provide enough for some of our people to move out
to columnists and opinion-makers. I think the President -- in his post-election
analysis -- should make an important effort to knock down in advance some of
the stories we will see. This memo might give him some ideas in that direction.
Ken Khachigian
November 7, 1972
POLITICAL MEMORANDUM
WHY MCGOVERN LOST
A massive effort must be taken after the election to head off the
liberal establishment effort to detract from RN's election victory. That
effort will take many tacks -- such as RN didn't bring in a Congress; people
voted against McGovern not for Nixon, etc. However, the liberal apologists
will push one line extra hard: the defeat was not for the ideas of left-liberal
movement but rather for the bearer of those ideas.
They will argue that liberalism is still viable -- that we still need
busing, and all the other liberal schemes, and that they need only wait until
they get a standard bearer who won't make the same mistakes McGovern did.
The following analysis serves to debunk that viewpoint, and, it seems to me,
should be put out as much as possible to counter all the opinion contra. This
memorandum focuses on why McGovern lost -- any analysis of the high points
of the RN victory should be taken up in a separate memorandum.
THE CENTRAL POINT TO MAKE
To those who argue that McGovern had bad strategy and bad tactics and
that he made too many mistakes to run a good campaign, we have one basic
response: the tactics of the liberal movement are the logical outgrowth of
the liberal ideology. That is, don't blame McGovern per se, blame the
philosophy. Elitism, close-mindedness, moral righteousness, viewing
things as good versus evil and the penchant for overstatement are all
-2-
fundamentals of the liberal-left political ideology. If McGovern ran a
bad campaign -- don't blame his strategy because the strategy is the
ideology. The personal flaws of McGovern were bred of the flaws of his
political philosophy.
Thus, McGovern could change his mind on central issues, and then with
a straight face defend his credibility. This hurt his standing with the voters,
but being trained in the narrow view as he has, he sees his position only in
moralistic terms, or, as PJB put it, as the true believers.
People rejected the McGovern philosophy pure and simple. If the questions
of his credibility and wishy-washyness arose, it was only because of his
approach to public policy -- one in which he could cut aircraft carriers back
from 16 to 6 and still maintain with a straight face that this would not affect
the strength of the sixth fleet. That is the underlying problem with the left
radicals, i.e., that the wild things they propose really won't disjoint things
important to citizens or voter blocs.
But there are other things to look at in terms of what McGovern did
wrong, and I'll take them in sequence.
THE PARTY REFORM
It is not for nothing that the Democratic Party reform was promulgated
under the "McGovern Commission. " This is where we underestimated
McGovern. Immediately, he saw the potential of these guidelines -- they
-3-
served his purposes perfectly. The reforms brought precisely those
people into the process who would directly further his candidacy. Moreover,
it was only McGovern at that point who saw that the complexity of the rules
would be baffling to those who did not know them, and he hired the fellow
who knew the rules best to be his delegate counter -- Rick Stearns.
His opponents did not see soon enough the potential of having a tight
solid base which could bring victory in a field of many candidates. Therefore,
McGovern moved quickly to pre-empt the party's left wing, and knowing
that and with tight organization and his left flank protected, he could con-
ceivably get the nomination. To that extent the liberal-left issues were
winners for McGovern in the early stages of the game.
PRIMARIES
McGovern made it through the primaries with skill, luck, and, later,
with a little help from his friends in the media. New Hampshire was a
Muskie disaster, and McGovern was clever in making his loss out to be a
victory. McGovern's first score. McGovern was wiped out in Florida in
what should have been the first test of the McGovern political philosophy --
but it was not reported that way. It was said that McGovern never expected
to win Florida. Nevertheless, his views on gutting the space program,
support for massive busing, and a few other positions surely were important
in the Florida defeat.
-4-
Next came Illinois where McGovern wisely worked more on getting a
foothold while avoiding a direct test with Muskie. This strategy -- a good
one -- brought him to Wisconsin which he targeted from the beginning as
his strongest state with the yough-lust and an excellent organization. There
the tight-knit support for his radicalism and an excellent youth turnout gave
him a victory. Moreover, the Republicans helped by crossing over for
McGovern and Wallace. If only Democrats had voted, HHH would have won.
Yet Wisconsin was the key for McGovern and most importantly it knocked
Lindsay out and gave McG an unexposed left flank.
From Wisconsin on, it was not very difficult for McG. He took Rhode
Island because there was only about a 10% Democrat turnout -- and the tight
organization, getting the liberals and doves out, did it again. Then came
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania with Muskie mercilessly caught in between
HHH and McG. By this time the press was necking in the back seat with
McGovern, and Massachusetts was a cinch while HHH kept Muskie at bay in
Pa. Again, the organization also went to work in Pa. to pick up some
delegates -- what proved to be a good strategy for McG; he nickel-dimed
his opposition. Throughout, McGovern was assisted by low voter turnouts
coupled with his zealots going to the polls in droves. April 25th served to
put Muskie over the side -- a hapless victim on a fast track.
-5-
Through Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee, and North Carolina, in my
judgment, the press effectively protected McGovern. He didn't do real well
in any of these states -- except Ohio -- yet they only said it was because
he didn't try. Yet, by then they should have known that the McGovern
ideology was like death in those states. Moreover, in Ohio he was basking
in the media glow which did not mention his radical positions at all, but
rather how he represented "the alienated and discontented. 11 That left
McG free to use his excellent TV spots to bilk the voters of their support.
They only saw a nice guy on the tube, not a radical.
Nebraska was the beginning of the end for McGovern. For the first
time, his opposition began to hammer effectively at the McGovern leftism.
Abortion, amnesty, pot, welfare and defense all became problems. It was
too late for HHH to have much of an impact, but the seeds were planted.
The threat that Offutt Air Base in Omaha would be closed by McGovern was
the first big hit.
By this time in Oregon and California, McG had the only effective
organization and a huge public relations advantage. The media was busy
explaining why they were wrong about the early primaries, and in deference to
McG were giving him every break possible. Michigan and Maryland were
in between, but McG avoided media setbacks because the Wallace shooting
knocked everything else off the front page. Yet those two states were another
hint that McGovern represented the wrong side of the political spectrum.
That story was lost in the Wallace tragedy.
-6-
By the time McGovern got out to the West Coast, the regular
Democrats found out that they were in the process of being had by McGovern.
But it was too late. The Dem party had been infiltrated by the McGovern
guerillas, and there was no time for pacification. (Maybe the fact that
McGovern seemed to think more of the Communists in Vietnam than
their opponents colored his political strategy: he was the Viet Cong of
the Democratic party).
Thus, McGovern won the California, South Dakota, New Mexico and
New Jersey primaries all on the same day -- a tribute to irreversible
momentum. (As McGovern said that night: "I can't believe I won the
whole thing" -- neither could his fellow Democrats who probably swore
that night that they would do anything to try to stop him. ) But California
was the true turning point in the 1972 presidential campaign and it turned
on issues, not on McGovern's personality or bad tactics.
McGovern saw a 20 point lead in the polls drop to 4%. In short, he was
devastated by the HHH one-man shredding machine. The issues caught
up with him, and HHH was able to articulate them in his hammering
staccato fashion as no other figure in American politics could do. Those
three national debates -- which could not be filtered by the writing press
or Frank Reynolds and his gang -- were the real Waterloo for McGovern.
Vast attention was given to the welfare plan, the defense plan, the Vietnam
bug-out, the fact that McGovern had voted against Jewish interests. HHH
-7-
was vicious and relentless and he did for us what we could have never done
for ourselves. Moreover, he did to McG what Rockefeller did to Goldwater:
he labelled McGovern.
Luckily for McG the next primary was New York, and he couldn't lose
it because there was no preferential vote -- only delegate selection. Thus,
the small left-wing delegate machine moved on, aided and abetted by only
a little over a 10% voter turnout.
THE MEDIA IN THIS PERIOD
McGovern got more than his share of breaks from the press in the
early days. They covered for his radical positions by writing tons of
essays on populism and anti-politicians and alienated voters. Moreover,
McGovern's staff was being given the kid-glove treatment. Stories followed
on the McG "wunderkinder. 11 Caddell (whose poll information has been so
spectacularly bad, yet universally praised) was made out to be Gallup and
Harris rolled into one. Stearns, Grandmaison and Pokorny (who Sidey
eulogized with the prairie sod in his ears) were "master strategists" --
and oh so young! Mankiewicz was quoted from coast to coast - the
man with the quick wit and fast repartee (in my opinion Mankiewicz is
an absolute political lightweight who covered up with a quick wit he gave
monumentally bad advice).
These "kids" began to believe their press clippings and probably thought
it was a good time to screw the old-liners. I would guess that the boys in
-8-
the clubhouse didn't appreciate either their treatment or the stories they
read about the "kids. 11 Their duty was to win elections and not worry about
ideology. The McG people believed that winning elections was a part of
the ideology -- that the two were intertwined, and that their radicalism was
the wave of the future. But give the devil his due -- the organization worked
well and played the delegates and the convention states like violins.
THE CONVENTION
The Convention also had to be quite harmful to McGovern. By this time
McGovern was tarred on the issues, but it was too late to stop him -- he really
had it wrapped up after Califor nia. Nevertheless, the leftism was fully
exposed on national television, and the shock for some probably has not
yet worn off. The spectacle of the abortion people, the libbers and the
homosexuals was too much. McGovern was seen, finally, to be the radical
that his positions made him out to be, and this hurt.
Then came the compromises -- putting the abortion, women's lib, and
other minority planks over the side -- along with George Wiley and Gloria
Steinem. It was time to kiss and make up with Daley, though Daley would
resist. But the sum total was a picture of just another politician, one who
would make deals to win and comprose his principles -- or at least certain
principles.
-9-
But McGovern walked out of that convention a radical. For all
intents and purposes he could not escape that label through November.
It was not because of mistakes in his strategy or flaws in his tactics and
it was not George McGovern the man or personality. It was his position
on the political spectrum - - he was on the left, and he believed in his ways.
EAGLETON
I think the death blow was already delivered before the Eagleton
affair. It only confirmed everything which had already been building
up against McGovern. Those who argue that Eagleton was the turning
point don't know what they're talking about. Eagleton was extremely impor-
tant in terms of harming McGovern's credibility and trust. But even before
Eagleton the seeds were planted -- Eagleton merely made it harder for
McGovern. Without the Eagleton affair, McGovern would have still been
weighted by his positions.
Blaming the Eagleton affair will be a liberal cop-out and a McGovern
staff cop-out. Eagleton did not make McGovern lose a 20 point lead in the
California balloting. We have got to stop the myth of the Eagleton thing before
history writes that it was this and only this which cost McG his crack at the
Presidency. It just ain't true. There was a Gallup after the Dem convention
and before Eagleton which saw RN gaining three points. McGovern was
already on the way down.
-10-
RADICALISM -- THE FATAL FLAW
Hubert Humphrey was always thought to be a radical. He had radical
ideas, like McGovern. But the people around HHH were not radical. He had
pols all around him -- cigar-chomping boys who prowled the back rooms.
McGovern was surrounded by radicals -- all those damn hippy kids and free
love adherents, etc. McGovern's politics were caught up in the culture of
the "movement" and only made his radicalism seem worse.
These were not flaws of the man or his tactics -- again, they were basic
defects of the radical liberal movement. McGovern though that the kooky
people around him were logical extensions of his new politics, of the coming
home of America, and of the revolutionary basis of his candidacy. I would
think that McGovern never did see what was wrong in saying that Henry
Wallace was still "right, 11 that the Soviets would treat him as a "friend"
and not test him; or question why the Rubin and Hoffman endorsements were
bad.
His friends - Galbraith, Schlesinger, Steinem, et al. -- all came from
the closed club of liberal intelligentsia which saw the historical movement
through its own narrow vision. These were not casual campaign mistakes,
they were the most profound of judgmental errors. McGovern misread the
mood of the country and refused to admit it because liberal intellectuals
always think they have a monopoly on wisdom. (I'm quite serious about
this I never knew a liberal college professor who was otherwise, and
McG is a former college professor)
-11-
THE CAMPAIGN
The campaign itself was marred by the same fundamental flaws
of ideology. I don't believe at all that it was a tactical error for McGovern
to campaign in the early days on Vietnam and some of the most leftish
positions. I think he believed that his surrender policy in Vietnam (he
was actually to the left of the Viet Cong in his proposals) was the right
position and probably the politically expedient position. The income redis-
tribution plan and some of the other way-out ideas were still in his speeches
in early September, although not explicitly. And throughout, there was
Vietnam, where McGovern grew to higher reaches of sell-out. He dumped
his $1000-per-person plan for a $4000-per-four-persons plan and gave out
detailed explanations of how this would work.
Basically, I don't think that McGovern forsaked his radicalism. He
simply tried to make it sound not all that bad in the campaign. Sure, he made
some stupid mistakes, but the singular mistake was the belief that he could
sell to the steelworker in the fall what he spoonfed to the students in the
winter -- a disrespected political philosophy.
Finally, the McGovern campaign tactics and language were classics
in New Left politics. The pure smear, the overstatement, the disruption,
the Hitler analogy, the fostering of discord and the planting of fears - -
all permeate the liberal ideology. When liberals disagree, the first charge
-12-
they make is "fascist" or "Hitler. " It is reflexive. It is the formbook
liberal tactic -- to many liberal politicians, the ideology imbues the
form - - the substance is the form. And in the end you cannot fault
McGovern for his tactics without really faulting his ideological base.
NOTES
It might be said that McGovern lost the election because of the way
he won the nomination. He sold his soul to the left and had little
inclination to seek salvation. That massive political error cannot be
laid alone to ineptitude - - it is no less than a major misreading of
American values and the cultural ethos of our country.
The polls showed over and over again that the public resented McGovern
"running down America. " And while Haynes Johnson traveled the country
talking about alienation, he missed the fact that Americans are basically at
peace with themselves, satisfied with their lives, and optimistic about the
future. What he saw was good old American skepticism - - the "show me"
attitude -- and he mistook it for a penetrating anomie and social listlessness,
Not only did the polls show McGovern misreading the country's mood,
they also showed that McGovern misread the public's perception of the
correct position on the issues. Harris found out in the summer that the
President had the preferable position on 15 out of 16 issues. This shows an
unusually high perception of McGovern's radical views -- moreover, this was
-13- -
a huge jump over the period in the primaries where McGovern was viewed as
benign. This confirms that McGovern was hurt deeply by HHH's efforts in
California and that that was the most harmful point in the McGovern candidacy.
It was not that McGovern played the wro ng strings -- he was playing the
tuba in a string orchestra. He was out of syncopation; out of tune; and blaring
fortissimo while the public wanted pianissimo.
In a nutshell, McGovern was wrong from the start. His radical politics
took a good shellacking from the Ameri can public -- a deserved repudiation
of alien ideas. Let's not blame it on his political amateur standing --
after all, he did some quite intelligent politicking at times -- let's put
the blame where it belongs: on the elitist, leftward movement in America
which was born of Kennedy, raised in the Great Society and cut down by
the grocer's son who saw the excesses and called 'em like he saw 'em.