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The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
From Buchanan to The President RE: The Elections of '70 and ' 72. 10 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
From Buchanan to The President RE: The Veep and the Campaign of 1970. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
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The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Report], no date
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From Buchanan to The President RE: The Veep and the Campaign of 1970. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
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48
30
>
Campaign
Report
The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs.
48
30
>
Campaign
Report
The Elections of '70 and '72. 13 pgs.
48
30
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to The President RE: The
Elections of '70 and 72. 10 pgs.
48
30
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to The President RE: The
Veep and the Campaign of 1970. 4 pgs.
Wednesday, June 03, 2015
Page 1 of 1
THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & '72
"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains a
credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. Its three
hundred pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal
Democrat in 1972. However, the presentation of that strategy
points up a counter-strategy which Republicans are going to have
to adopt if they are not to lose the historic opportunity we have
had for the last five years.
We can no longer count on our Democratic friends to
cooperate in their own demise -- as they have in recent year S.
Liberals are waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin
and Harriet Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown,
politicians like HHH, Muskie and Lindsay are clearly moving on a
new tough course -- a course outlined in this book. They have
begun talking of law and order; they have ceased apologizing for
student militants and black radicals; they are silent on bussing.
We are no longer going to win the race for Middle America by default.
The Democrats are moving to win back their white collar defectors
and they are going about it the Scammon. Wattenburg way.
Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and
strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a
counter-strategy we should follow in the 1970 elections.
THE HEART OF THE BOOK
Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972
and relatively stabilize the economy, Presidential elections
throughout the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue". First
discovered by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the
issue on which Middle America will vote -- if one candidate is on
the wrong side as Humphrey was in 1968. This social issue embraces
drugs, demonstrations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash",
permissiveness, violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate
"a liberal" on these issues, and will vote against him on this issue
alone as viciories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee,
Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.
It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and
polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants
2
tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography
and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on
the "Social Issue", then "goodbye Democrats".
"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in
which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will
largely determine how potent a political force the party
will be in America in the years to come. "
THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM
From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves
as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent while those
identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.
Summer 1969 (Gal' p)
(The Way Americans Identify Themselves)
Conservative Moderate Conservative Moderate Liberal No Opinion
Liberal
23
28
18
15
16
In any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican)
should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat). However,
what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is that when
individuals consider themselves "conservative", it is "conservative" on
the social issue -- Americans will not abide a "liberal" on the social
issue. At the same time, however, polls show Americans clearly
favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty efforts, aid to education
issues traditionally defined as "liberal". How do we explain the
dichotomy. Say the authors:
"
the attitudinal center of American politics today
involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness
on the "Social Issue".
The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.
THE SOUTH
"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to
31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been some-
thing tidal
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being
3
perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were
also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had
become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash",
morals and disruption
The villains in Agnew's tirade were almost
exclusively white (kids) but throughout the South bumper stickers
blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero", and a Southern politician was
quoted as saying he was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant
voting for Nixon, so be it
In no southern state are there enough
Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority
Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which of
the two suitors the South will accept: "Wallaceite or Republican".
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70s
"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats,
by carrying non-southern states of Quadcali (California plus the
Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts*) can win
national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than
it used to be. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the
electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be
able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the
society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build
upon it.
"As this book is being written'in the early part of the year 1970
the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very
much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to
leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or
Wallace or their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats
feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if
she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that
the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood,
picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures
and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square,
then goodbye, lady and goodbye Democrats. 11
(Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country
from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors
say it is the key to victory in Presidential elections; and they dump
generously on Border State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. This
is the weakest part of the book. It is an effort to contrast their
approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants
to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which
is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two
strategies more than Scammon and Wattenburg would care to admit. )
4
ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING
"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even
glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day? Twenty-five thousand?
Fifty thousand? A hundred thousand? Two hundred and fifty thousand?
A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the
campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million
Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more
residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in
Oregon than if he says some "ing banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark,
Camden, and Tenafly all in me same day. 11
What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the
personal appearance?
"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one
must remember that far more party workers throughout the nation
are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot
on a news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by
a candidate's visit to Wechawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills
11
"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be
judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national
television, national magazines, national columnists, and national
reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national
issues and national images. 11
"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"
"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals
in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent
about the liberal program
Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts
deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as
well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or
crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys,
only bad environments
11
REPUBLICAN AWARENESS
"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican
gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President
Agnew says:
5
'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does
not share the philosophy of permissiveness expressed
by the best publicized moral and intellectual leaders of
our society. He read with disgust all the rave reviews
the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book
I
then it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy. 11
FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS
"This is the nature of centrism. Democrats must heal the
wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are
the party of Middle America and not of the fat cats. "
A FOURTH PARTY
"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left
party would take almost all its votes from one party the Democratic
Party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuring
Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left
party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazies out of
the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals. 11
LINDSAY & CHARISMA
Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference
when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue.
The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three
of five New Yorkers voted against returning him in the mayoralty in
the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not
been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacino
would have cleaned up the floor with him.
Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat".
"What other phrase better describes the results of an
election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls
only one in four votes of the 'white workingman', or if one
chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential
Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to
say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the
last time out. "
6
As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN
would crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could
conceivably bring about the election of George Wallace -- so much
for Big John.
MYTHS & ASSERTIONS
1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth
after another in this volume.
Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election
in 1968 was a vote "against Vietnam".
McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the
total vote in that state and a University of Michigan survey showed
that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that
LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time
of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop
the bombi g; by 44 to 36 percent Americans favored an invasion of
North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking
about it, but Vietnam was not the voting issue of 1968.
The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary
was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds:
That same day an anti-war amendment in dovish Madison was defeated
58-42; a law-and-order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal
anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one
nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN
crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.
Finally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and
McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the
word Vietnam -- though the media played it as the key to the election.
Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices
Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.
Nonsense Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the
popular choices of their parties -- (RN over Rocky 60-23; HHH over
McCarthy 58-38) and thus the only Democratic choices. Rigged
conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-five
years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was not
nominated was Goldwater in 1964.
7
Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and
the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new
and winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenburg believe this a
prescription for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black
vote is the lowest percentage: of any groups in America. Secondly, the
young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor
white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the
South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey
voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns.
Morc than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their parents.
In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish than the
over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21-29 group.
As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are more
likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about
Ph. D. S the Democratic vote is greater here but the .number of
voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.
True, blacks are solidly Democratic but it is also
true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest--
11
the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in
the last six weeks of the campaign. was about equal
to the total number of black votes cast in 1968. "
We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is
unpoor, unyoung, unblack, unintellectual. The average voter is a
47-year-old housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law
is a cop and who is herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is
dropped to 18 the average voter is still well over forty years of age.
"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the
Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper;
knock out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and
the back seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or
the unpoor, unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine,
and the car won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some,
but fact it is. 11
Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent
of the population could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will
be down to 15 percent; further:
8
11
of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went
for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrey.
The richest state in the nation -- Connecticut went for HHH. 11
(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black
represents a great plus for Democrats if they can get them registered
and voting, since unlike the poor and young - blacks do vote in blocs
Democratic blocs.
"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor,
nine out of ten are white. "
'PACKAGING' NIXON
Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another.
But Stenvig won in Minneapolic with $3, 600 spent. While HHH was
saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV,
Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls -yet Agnew
had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrey. "Voters
are not nitwits. 11 RN was ahead because he
"
was more closely attuned to the temper of a
larger segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He
was a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is
simplistic and accurate
The feelings that Nixon
capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a
Border State Strategy -- they were part of a national
strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have
discussed earlier
It may be said in fact that Agnewism
as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnew,
the individual, almost lost it for him. 11
Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats
and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and the
union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace O"
HHH, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one
or the other of these groups.
"The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to
the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied
campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice,
9
accusing McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts forcibly integrated
in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and
Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but
simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half
the women are afraid to go out at night.
WALLACE '72
In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million
votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.
PRIMER FOR DEMS
Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on
precisely how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:
Do Not Say: 'Well, I don't agree with the Students
for a Democratic Society when they invade a college
president's office, but I can understand their deep sense
of frustration. I
Do Say: 'When students break thelaw they \will be
be treated as lawbreakers. 111
Example:
The Democrats made a disasterous error in saying "Law
and order is a code word for racism. 11 This is a losing position on the
Social Issue -- they should say "I am for civil rights and against
crime. 11 They should not link the two.
ON CANDIDATES
A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy".
Humphrey would have been better off had he come down on one side
or the other on Vietnam rather than leaving the impression of
being wishy-washy.
10
CONCLUSION
"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the
streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view
about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the
suburbs she lived in a neighborhood that became all black,
to know that her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that
she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood
deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her
son is going to a community college where LSD was found on
the campus to know all this is the beginning of contemporary
political wisdom. 11
11
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970
Given this Scammon-Wattenburg thesis which is
right on the mark for Democrats we are in scrious danger of
being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem
crystal clear.
1. We cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the right
side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now
with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded and the brand must
stick - as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black rioters,
as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their record in the
last Congress. But for us to contest with them primarily on the
Economic Issue Big Spenders, etc. as the major assault seems
not a prescription for success. Republicans for forty years have
been tarring Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels,
and Democrats have been winning those Congresses, lo, these same
Forty Years.
The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism"
and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue where we are
strong and they are weak.
2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume
left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and
Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water.
The swing voters are thus Democrats law and order Democrats,
conservatives on the "Social Issue", but "progressive" on domestic
issues. This is the Wattenburg thesis - - and it is basically correct.
How to conduct ourselves then.
Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical"
label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist"
label on the President's programs for reforming society, for getting
America moving; tar them as for bussing -- and against our crime
control legislation.
Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats 11 - but
we cannot get these voters by using rehashed Republican arguments
or stale Republican rhetoric.
12
"Big Spenders" is a theme that 'might work, will work, with
our Republicans we are using it in all our GOP literature but
will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may
mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress
does not seem charged with much electricity, either.)
3. Scanimon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by
Democrats may anger "liberals", but liberals have no place to go
anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans
have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's
go straight after the Daley Democrats.
4. We should win these Democrats to the Presidential
banner by contending that RN is a progressive on domestic policy
blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership of the
Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and
pornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the
Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they
forget about the right of society; that the President is a man
trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is
being thwart d by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its
heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy
who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being
attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists
who think peace lies in an abject retreat from the world and the
dismantling of the Army, Navy and Air Force. This is said strong
but these would be the ways we could best appeal to the patriotic,
hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are the missing element
in the Grand New Party.
5. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity
and helping local Senate candidates the two are thoroughly complimen-
tary.
The Democrats see Seammon's book are only now
coming around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a
strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in
New Jersey than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and
Elizabeth. The way to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise
him to the skies, fine but to hammer the national Democratic
Leadership in a manner that will keep our big press corps excited
and with us; that will get network time every night if possible with
our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate
while we are helping the local one,
13
All we have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run
around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as has been suggested
already. We ought to remember also, that when we give up the
television time on the networks -- someone else, namely our
Democratic friends, gets it.
A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators
and Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, we should t r the
liberal Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the
party of bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration, " the
party whose last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago
in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership
that let this country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is
blocking RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic Leadership
has altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student
radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of
Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as
selling out to the crazies in their own ranks and selling out the
interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in
the millions. We 'might even say LBJ was destroyed by the
"ultra-liberals" in his own party.
7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and
offensive) position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by
hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is resp onsible
for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is
frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment
whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that
indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but
the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems vital. )
8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or
not we are in a "recession" seems an utterly foolish idea -- since
the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us
and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is
not likely to be convined he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and
unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals
whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise
in prices. This is the Big Spender theme -- but in different rhetoric,
tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind of
ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue.
Call them ultra-liberals.
THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & '72
"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenberg contains realistic
cogent strategy.
Certain columnists, and politicians like Humphrey and Muskie, are
clearly moving on a new tough course a course outlined in this book.
They have begun talking of law and order; they have ceased apologizing
for student militants and radicals; they are silent on bussing.
Republicans are no longer going to win the race for Middle America
by default. The Democrats are moving to win back their white collar
defectors and they are going about it the Scammon-Wattenberg way.
THE HEART OF THE BOOK
Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972 and rela-
tively stabilize the economy, Presidential elections throughout the
coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue. " First discovered by
Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which Middle
America will vote, if one candidate is on the wrong side as Humphrey was
in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demonstrations, pornography,
disruptions, "kidlash, " permissiveness, violence, riots, crime. The
voters will not tolerate a "liberal" on these issues, and will vote against
soft candidates as victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in
Milwaukee, Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly
demonstrated.
It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and polls
conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants tougher
administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography and drugs.
If the Democrats do not move into that center position on the "Social Issue,"
then "goodbye Democrats. 11
"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner
in which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will
largely determine how potent a political force the party will
be in America in the years to come. 11
2
THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM
From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves as
"conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent while those identifying
as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.
Summer 1969 (Gallup)
(The Way Americans Identify Themselves)
Conservative
Moderate
Moderate
Liberal No Opinion
Conservative
Liberal
23
28
18
15
16
In any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican)
should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat). However,
what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is that when
individuals consider themselves "conservative, 11 it is "conservative" on
the social issue. Americans will not abide a "liberal" on the social
issue. At the same time, however, polls show Americans clearly favor
medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty efforts, aid to education -- issues
traditionally defined as "liberal. 11 How do we explain the dichotomy.
Say the authors:
11
the attitudinal center of American politics
today involves progressivism on economic issues and
toughness on the "Social Issue. 11
The party that can hold this center will win the
Presidency.
THE SOUTH
"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to 31 per-
cent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been something tidal
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being perceived as a pro-black
national party, but they were also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of
3
the Social Issue that had become identified with liberal Democrats:
soft on crime, "kidlash, 11 morals and disruption
The villains in
Agnew's tirade were almost exclusively white (kids) -- but throughout
the South bumper stickers blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero. 11
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70s
"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats, by car-
rying non-southern states of Quadcali (California plus the Northeast
Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts *) can win national elections
without the South, although it is more difficult than it used to be. As-
suming that Republicans stay near the center, the electoral question of
the seventies is whether the Democrats will be able to cope with the
Social Issue electoral forces at work in the society and, by coping, hold
together the FDR Coalition and build upon it.
"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970 the
votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very much
up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to leave the
Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or Wallace or their
ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats feel that she
isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if she thinks that
Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that the Black Pan-
thers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood, picked-upon
kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures and that she,
the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, then goodbye,
lady -- and goodbye Democrats. "
* (Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country from
Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors say it is
the key to victory in Presidential elections; and they scorn Border
State Strategies and "Sun Belts" etc. It is an effort to contrast their
approach with the Kevin Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants
to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which is
nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two strate-
gies.)
4
ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING
"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even glimpse
a candidate in the flesh on a given day? Twenty-five thousand? Fifty
thousand? A hundred thousand? Two hundred and fifty thousand? A
two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the
campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million
Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more
residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in
Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark,
Camden, and Tenafly all in the same day. 11
What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the personal
appearance?
"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one must
remember that far more party workers throughout the nation are en-
thused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot on a
news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by a
candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills
11
"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be
judging their' Presidential choices largely on the basis of national tele-
vision, national magazines, national columnists, and national reporters
appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national issues and
national images. 11
"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"
"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals in
the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent
about the liberal program
Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts deep
and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as well as
leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or crime; the
public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys, only bad en-
vironments
11
5
REPUBLICAN AWARENESS
"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican gardening
will- be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President Agnew says:
'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does not
share the philosophy of permissiveness expressed by the best
publicized moral and intellectual leaders of our society. He
read with disgust all the rave reviews the press gives the
latest dirty movie or dirty book
1
then it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy."
FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS
"This is the nature of centrism. Democrats must heal the wound
of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are the party of
Middle America and not of the fat cats. 11
A FOURTH PARTY
"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left party
would take almost all its votes from one party -- the Democratic
Party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a 'spoiler' ensuring
Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left party
might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazies out of the tent,
decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals. "
LINDSAY & CHARISMA
Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference
when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue. The
6
Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three of five
New Yorkers voted against returning him in the mayoralty in the most
liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not been divided,
even Mario Procaccino would have won.
Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat. 11
"What other phrase better describes the results of
an election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls
only one in four votes of the 'white workingman, 1 or if one
chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential Demo-
cratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to say
that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last time
out. 11
MYTHS & ASSERTIONS
1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth after
another in this volume.
Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election in
1968 was a vote "against Vietnam. "
McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, got only 18% of the total
vote in that state -- and a University of Michigan survey showed that
60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that LBJ had not
done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time of New Hampshire,
by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop the bombing; by 44
to 36 percent Americans favored an invasion of North Vietnam. Can-
didates and press may have been talking about it, but Vietnam was not
the voting issue of 1968.
The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary
was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds: That
same day an anti-war amendment in dovish Madison was defeated 58-42;
a law-and-order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maier) won over a liberal anti-war
candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one nationally;
7
and Republicans who would later vote for Nixon crossed over by tens
of thousands to vote for Eugene.
Finally, in the last full page ads of Nixon, LBJ and McCarthy in
the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the word Vietnam
though the media played it as the key to the election.
Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices
Rockefeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.
Nonsense -- - Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the popular
choices of their parties (Nixon over Rocky 60-23; Humphrey over
McCarthy 58-38). Rigged conventions are exceptional.
Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and the
black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new and
winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenberg believe this a prescription
for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote is the
lowest percentage of any groups in America. Secondly, the young and
the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor white from
the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the South a
Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey voter. Neither
are the young monolithic in their voting patterns. More than any other
group to vote, they tend to vote like their parents. In addition, as a
group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish than the over-50s; Wallace did
his best among the 21-29 group.
As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are more likely
to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about Ph. Ds -
the Democratic vote is greater here - but the number of voters is so
miniscule as to be irrelevant.
True, blacks are solidly Democratic but it is also true that
among races black voting percentages are the lowest
"
the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in the
last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the total
number of black votes cast in 1968. 11
8
We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, unintellectual. The average voter is a 47-year-old
housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who
is herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to
18 the average voter is still well over forty years of age.
"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the
Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock
out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back
seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor, un-
young, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car won't
run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is. 11
Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the
population could be considered "poor;" by 1972 that figure will be down
to 15 percent; further:
11
of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six
went for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for
Humphrey. The richest state in the nation -- Connecticut
went for HHH. 11
"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor,
nine out of ten are white. "
'PACKAGING' NIXON
Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of Nixon won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another. But
Stenvig won in Minneapolis with $3,600 spent. While Humphrey was
saying he was running poorly in the polls because of Nixon's TV, Muskie
was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls -- yet Agnew had the same
TV exposure as Nixon, and Muskie as Humphrey. "Voters are not nit-
wits. 11 Nixon was ahead because he
11
was more closely attuned to the temper of a
larger segment of the electorate than was his opposition. He
was a man for the season. That may sound simplistic. It is
9
simplistic and accurate
The feelings that Nixon cap-
italized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a Border
State Strategy they were part of a national strategy that
was attuned to the national malaise we have discussed earlier.
It may be said in fact that Agnewism as a social thought won
the election for Nixon, while Agnew, the individual, almost
lost it for him. 11
Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats and
blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and
the union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace
or Humphrey, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among
one or the other of these groups.
The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to the Center
throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied campaigning
pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice, accusing
McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts forcibly integrated in
Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and Com-
munism. Say the authors, RFK was not selling out, but simply addres-
sing himself to concerns of a country where half the women are afraid
to go out at night.
WALLACE '72
In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million votes
from Nixon and three million from the Democrats.
PRIMER FOR DEMS
Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on precisely
how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:
10
Do Not Say: Well, I don't agree with the Students
for a Democratic Society when they invade a college presi-
dent's office, but I can understand their deep sense of frus- -
tration.
Do Say: When students break the law they will be
treated as lawbreakers.
Example:
The Democrats made a disastrous error in saying "Law and order
is a code word for racism. 11 This is a losing position on the Social
Issue they should say "I am for civil rights and against crime. 11 They
should not link the two.
ON CANDIDATES
A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy. 11
Humphrey would have been better off had he come down on one side or
the other on Vietnam - - rather than leaving the impression of being
wishy-washy.
THE AUTHORS' CONCLUSION
"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the
streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view about
blacks and civil rights because before moving to the suburbs
she lived in a neighborhood that became all black, to know that
her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that she does not
have the money to move if her new neighborhood deteriorates,
to know that she is deeply distressed that her son is going to a
community college where LSD was found on the campus - - to
know all this is the beginning of contemporary political wisdom. 11
11
ANALYSIS
Given this Scammon-Wattenberg thesis, Republican needs in the
campaign of 1970 seem crystal clear.
1. Republicans cannot allow the Democrats to get back on the
right side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do with
tough talk, etc. Republicans should brand the Democrats as permis-
sivists, as indulgent of student and black rioters, as soft on crime.
This can be accomplished with their record in the last Congress. For
Republicans to contest with Democrats primarily on the Economic
Issue -- Big Spenders, etc. as the major assault seems not a pre-
scription for success. Republicans for forty years have been tarring
Democratic Congresses with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats
have been winning those Congresses for these same Forty Years.
The Republican focus should be on branding Democrats with
"ultra-liberalism" and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue
where Republicans are strong and Democrats are weak.
2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? Republicans must
assume left-wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates
and Republicans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water.
The swing voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats,
conservatives on the "Social Issue, 11 but "progressive" on domestic
issues. This is the Wattenberg thesis and it is basically correct.
What, then, is the best Republican strategy?
Brand the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical"
label on social policy; brand them as well with the "obstructionist" label
on the President's programs for reforming society, for getting America
moving; brand them as for brutally enforced integration that leads to
violence rather than understanding and cooperation between the races.
Brand them for being against the Administration's crime control legis-
lation.
"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with Re-
publicans it is being used in all GOP literature but will it have any
12
real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may mean the medi-
care for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress does not seem
charged with much electricity, either.)
3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots, etc. by Democrats
may anger "liberals, 11 but liberals have no place to go anyhow except
the Democratic Party. Just so, in most cases regular Republicans
have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP.
4. Republican candidates and strategists should win these Demo-
crats to the Presidential banner contending that President Nixon is a
progressive on domestic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-
wing leadership of the Democratic Party; that the President is a hard-
liner on crime, drugs and pornography, whose legislation is blocked by
"ultraliberals" in the Senate who care so much about the rights of the
criminal that they forget about the rights of society; that the President
is a man trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but
is being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of inflation that would put Indonesia in its hey-
day in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy who is
moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being attacked
and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists who think peace
lies in an abject retreat from the world and the dismantling of the
Army, Navy and Air Force. This is said strong -- but these would be
the ways Republicans could best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-
medicare Democrats who are the missing element in the Grand New
Party.
5. There is no conflict between garnering national publicity and
helping local Senate candidates the two are thoroughly complimentary.
The Democrats see Scammon's book are only now coming
around to recognize what Republican strategists knew in 1966 and 1968
that a strong statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to
voters in New Jersey than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark
and Elizabeth. The way to help the Senatorial Candidate is to praise him
to the skies but also to hammer the national Democratic Leadership
in a manner that will keep the big press corps interested; that will get
13
network time every night if possible with the Republican message; and
so help every Republican Senatorial Candidate while helping the local
one.
All Republicans have to do to forfeit that national publicity is run
around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper, as might be suggested.
Republicans ought to remember also that when television time on the
networks is given up someone else, namely Democrats, get it.
A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and
Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, from the Scammon book, Republicans should brand
the liberal Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" in Vietnam
but the advocates of compulsory integration that leads to violence rather
than understanding, the party whose last Attorney General banged down
the door in Chicago in order to testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight,
the leadership that let this country turn into the pornography capital of
the world, and is blocking President Nixon's effort to change that. Also
the Democratic Leadership has altered its historic foreign policy posi-
tion to kow-tow to student radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders
in the streets of Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be
portrayed as selling out to the crazies in their own ranks -- and selling
out the interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number
in the millions. Republicans might even say LBJ was destroyed by the
"ultraliberals" in his own party.
7. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or not
the country is in a "recession" seems an utterly foolish idea for Re-
publicans since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not
going to help the GOP cause and since anyone who is hurt in the current
economic situation is not likely to be convinced by anybody's rhetoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and unem-
ployed are being hurt, Republicans ought to go after the Democratic
radicals whose wild schemes are frustrating the President's efforts to
stop the rise in prices. This is the Big Spender theme but in different
rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same kind
of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social Issue.
###
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE ELECTIONS OF '70 & 172
"The Real Majority" by Scammon and Wattenburg contains a
credible and workable blueprint for our defeat in 1972. This is a
volume the President cannot afford to overlook. Its three hundred
pages contain a realistic cogent strategy for a liberal Democrat in
1972. However, the presentation of that strategy points up a counter-
strategy which Republicans are going to have to adopt if they are
not to lose the historic opportunity we have had for the last five years.
We can no longer count on our democratic friends to co-operate
in their own demise -- as they have in recent years. Liberals are
waking up all over America. Columnists like Breslin and Harriet
Van Horne and Mankiewicz, peaceniks like Sam Brown, politicians like
HHH, Muskie and Lindsay are clearly moving on a new tough course -- a
course outlined in this book. They have begun talking of law and order;
they have ceased apologizing for student militants and black radicals;
they are silent on bussing. We are no longer going to win the race for
Middle America by default. The Democrats are moving to win back
their white collar and blue collar defectors and they are going about it
the Scammon-Wattenburg way.
Attached is a comprehensive review of their analysis and
strategy for Democratic victory. Appended is the outline of a
counter-strategy I believe we should follow in the 1970 elections.
-2-
THE HEART OF THE BOOK
Given the President's ability to wind down the war in 1972
and relatively stabilize the economy, presidential elections throughout
the coming decade will turn on the "Social Issue, 11 First discovered
by Goldwater and Wallace, the Social Issue is now the issue on which
Middle America will vote -- if one canidate is on the wrong side as
Humphrey was in 1968. This social issue embraces drugs, demon-
strations, pornography, disruptions, "kidlash, 11 permissiveness,
violence, riots, crime. The voters will not tolerate "a liberal, 11 on
these issues, and will vote against him on this issue alone as
victories for hard-liners Daley in Chicago, Maier in Milwaukee,
Stenvig in Minneapolis and Yorty in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated.
It is "in the center of American politics that victory lies" and
polls conclusively show that the center of American politics today wants
tougher administrators on campus, a crackdown on crime, pornography
and drugs. If the Democrats do not move into that center position on
the "Social Issue, 11 then "goodbye Democrats. 11
"It is the judgment of the authors that the manner in
which the Democratic Party handles the Social Issue will
largely determine how potent a political force the party
will be in America in the years to come. "
THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM
From 1963 to 1969 the number of those identifying themselves
as "conservative" has risen from 46 to 51 percent -- while those
identifying as "liberal" has nose-dived from 49 to 33 percent.
Summer 1969 (Gallup)
( The Way Americans Identify Themselves)
Conservative Moderate Conservative
Moderate
Liberal
No Opinion
Liberal
23
28
18
15
16
-3-
In, any normal election the moderate conservative (Republican)
should have an advantage over the moderate liberal (Democrat.)
However, what this simple analysis fails to take into consideration is
that when individuals consider themselves "conservative, " it is
"conservative" on the Social Issue Americans will not abide a
"liberal" on the social issue. At the same time, however, polls
show Americans clearly favor medicare, aid to cities, anti-poverty
efforts, aid to education issues traditionally defined as "liberal. 11
How do we explain the dichotomy. Say the authors:
11
the attitudional center of American politics today
involves progressivism on economic issues and toughness
on the Social Issue. 11
The party that can hold this center will win the Presidency.
THE SOUTH
"When the Democratic vote goes from 72 percent in 1944 to
31 percent in 1967, something has happened, and it has been some-
thing tidal
The Democrats in the South were hurt by being
perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were
also hurt by the other nonracial aspects of the Social Issue that had
become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash, 11
morals and disruption
The villans in Agnew's tirade were almost
exclusively white (kids) -- but throughout the South bumper stickers
blossomed reading "Spiro is my hero," and a Southern politican was
quoted as saying he was voting for Agnew in 1972 and if that meant
voting for Nixon, so be it
In no Southern State are there enough
Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority
Although the divorce may not be final the question now is which
of the two suitors the South will accept: Wallaceite or Republican. 11
CRUCIAL QUESTION FOR '70S
"The key election fact of the seventies is that Democrats,
by carrying non-Southern States of Quadcali (California plus the
Northeast Quadrant from Wisconsin to Massachusetts*) can win
national elections without the South, although it is more difficult than it
used to bc. Assuming that Republicans stay near the center, the
-4-
electoral question of the seventies is whether the Democrats will be
able to cope with the Social Issue electoral forces at work in the
society and, by coping, hold together the FDR Coalition and build
upon it.
"As this book is being written in the early part of the year 1970
the votes of the unyoung, unpoor, unblack Quadcalians are still very
much up for grabs. The machinist's wife in Dayton may decide to
leave the Democratic reservation in 1972 and vote for Nixon or
Wallace or their ideological descendants. If she thinks that Democrats
feel that she isn't scared of crime but that she's really a bigot, if
she thinks that Democrats feel that the police are Fascist pigs, and that
the Black Panthers and the Weathermen are just poor, misunderstood,
picked-upon kids, if she thinks that Democrats are for the hip cultures
and that she, the machinist's wife, is not only a bigot but a square, then
goodbye; lady -- and goodbye Democrats. 11
(Quadcali consists of the Northeast Quadrant of the country
from Wisconsin to Massachusetts including California; the authors
say it is the key to victory in presidential elections; and they dump
generously on Border State Strategies. and "Sun Belts" etc. This
is the weakest part of the book. It is. an effort to contrast their
approach with the Phillips Approach by suggesting Phillips wants
to trade Illinois for Alabama, or New Jersey for Mississippi, which
is nonsense. Basically, there is much in common between the two
strategies more than Scammon and Wattenburg would care to
admit.)
ON LOW-KEY & "LOCAL" CAMPAIGNING
"And how many people can be assembled to hear or even
glimpse a candidate in the flesh on a given day ? Twenty-five thousand ?
Fifty thousand A hundred thousand? Two hundred and fifty thousand ?
A two minute clip on each of the three network news shows during the
campaign will yield the candidate an audience of many tens of million
Americans! Hubert Humphrey or Richard Nixon will be seen by more
residents of New Jersey if he says something fairly noteworthy in
Oregon than if he says something banal in Trenton, Montclair, Newark,
Camden; and Tenafly all in the same day. 11.
-5-
What about the shot in the arm given party workers by the
personal appearance ?
"There is probably some limited truth to this, but again one
must remember that far more party workers throughout the nation
are enthused seeing their candidate in an effective two-minute spot
on a news-broadcast appearance on television than can be enthused by
a candidate's visit to Weehawken, Union City, Bergen and Short Hills
11
"The people in New Jersey, like the rest of Americans will be
judging their Presidential choices largely on the basis of national
television, national magazines, national columnists, and national
reporters appearing in their local newspapers and largely on national
issues and national images. 11
"LIBERALISM AND BUSSING"
"All of this represents the beginnings of a strategy for liberals
in the seventies. Beware of the 'liberal' label but do not be despondent
about the liberal program
Beware of the Social Issue. It cuts
deep and must be approached on little cat feet. There is learning as
well as leading to do. There can be no pandering to disruption or
crime; the public is not buying the notion that there are not bad boys,
only bad environments
11
REPUBLICAN AWARENESS
"There can be no question that a good deal of Republican
gardening will be done on the Social Issue. When Vice President
Agnew says:
'The rank-and-file Democrat in this country does
not share the philosphy of permissiveness expressed
by the best publicized ral and intellectual leaders of
our society. He read with disgust all the rave reviews
the press gives the latest dirty movie or dirty book
1
than it is clear that the Republicans are aware of this strategy. 11
-6-
FORMULAS FOR SUCCESS
"This is the nature of contrism. Democrats must heal the
wound of the Social Issue. Republicans must prove that they are
t he party of Middle America and not of the fat cats. "
A FOURTH PARTY
"Furthermore, unlike the Wallace situation, an extreme left
party would take almost all its votes from one party -- the Democratic
party. If it ever got strong, then, it could only be a "spoiler" ensuring
Republican victories. As a weak party, however, an extreme left
party might be helpful to Democrats, by getting the crazics out of
the tent, decreasing the identification of 'Democrats' as radicals.'
LINDSAY & CHARISMA
Charisma counts in an election, but it only makes the difference
when both candidates have acceptable positions on the Social Issue.
The Lindsay charisma did little for him when we consider that three
of five New Yorkers voted against returning him to the mayoralty in
the most liberal city in America. Had the "oppositionist" vote not
been divided, even the wholly uncharismatic figure of Mario Procacino
would have cleaned up the floor with him.
Lindsay, in effect, scored a "victory defeat. 11
"What other phrase better describes the results of an
election in which a politician with national aspirations pulls
only one in four votes of the 'white workingman, or if one
chooses to look at Lindsay specifically as a potential
Democratic candidate, what kind of recommendation is it to
say that he received fewer than half the Jewish votes the last time
out. 11
As of today, if Lindsay were nominated as a Democrat, RN would
crush him. If he were nominated as a Republican, he could conceivably
bring about the election of George Wallace -- so much for Big John.
-7-
MYTHS & ASSERTIONS
1. The authors proceed to explode one popular press myth
after another in this volume.
Myth No. 1: The vote in the primaries and general election
in 1968 was a vote "against Victnam. 11
McCarthy, the "dove" in New Hampshire, only got 18% of the
total vote in that state -- and a University of Michigan survey showed
that 60% of the McCarthy votes were from hawks dissatisfied that
LBJ had not done enough to end the war. In addition, at the time
of New Hampshire, by 51 to 40 percent Americans did not want to stop
the bombing; by 44 to 36 percent Americans favored an invasion of
North Vietnam. Candidates and press may have been talking
about it, but Vietnam was not the voting issue of 1968.
The contention that the McCarthy vote in the Wisconsin Primary
was an anti-war vote seems implausible on the following grounds:
That same day an anti-war amendment in doveish Madison was defeated
58-42; a law-and order pro-LBJ Mayor (Maicr) won over a liberal
anti-war candidate 86-14; LBJ was still leading McCarthy two-to-one
nationally; and Republicans who would later vote for "hawkish" RN
crossed over by tens of thousands to vote for Eugene.
F inally, in the last Wisconsin full page ads of RN, LBJ and
McCarthy, in the Wisconsin primary, not a single one mentioned the
word Vietnam -- though the media played it as the key to the election.
Myth No. 2: The Conventions were rigged -- the popular choices
Rockcfeller and McCarthy denied nomination by the bosses.
Nonsense Nixon and Humphrey were far and away the
popular choices of their parties (RN over Rocky 60-23; HHH over
McCarthy 58-38) -- and thus the only democratic choices. Rigged
conventions are exceptional. The only convention in the last twenty-
five years where the candidate with the widest support in his party was
not nominated was Goldwater in 1964.
Myth No. 3: By forging a coalition of the young, the poor and
the black and the intellectuals, the Democrats can put together a new
and winning coalition. Scammon and Wattenburg believe this a prescrip-
tion for disaster. First, the young and the poor and the black vote
-8-
is the lowest percentages of any groups in America. Secondly, the
young and the poor are hardly monolithic in voting patterns. A poor
white from the Midwest was a likely Nixon voter; a poor white in the
South a Wallace voter, and a poor black in the cities a Humphrey
voter. Neither are the young monolithic in their voting patterns.
More than any other group to vote, they tend to vote like their
parents. In addition, as a group 21-29 year olds are more hawkish
than the over-50s; Wallace did his best among the 21-29 group.
As for the intellectuals, those with college degrees are no re
likely to vote Republican than Democratic. If you are talking about
Ph. Ds the Democratic vote is greater here -- but the number of
voters is so miniscule as to be irrelevant.
True, blacks are solidly Democratic but it is also
true that among races black voting percentages are the lowest
11
the 'drop-off' alone in the Wallace vote in
the last six weeks of the campaign was about equal to the
total number of black votes cast in 1968. 11
We must face facts, say the authors: the average voter is unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, un-intellectual. The average voter is a 47-year-old
housewife from Dayton, Ohio, whose brother-in-law is a cop and who is
herself married to a machinist. Even if the voting age is dropped to
18 the average voter is still well over forty years of age.
"You can knock the 'liberal intellectuals' out of the
Democratic coalition, and you've lost the front bumper; knock
out the black vote, and you've lost the fenders and the back
seat; but knock out labor, Middle America, or the unpoor,
unyoung, unblack, and you've lost the engine, and the car
won't run. This is an unpleasant fact to some, but fact it is. "
Further, it is interesting to note that in 1968, 22 percent of the
papulation could be considered "poor"; by 1972 that figure will be
down to 15 percent; further
"
of the poorest dozen states in the nation, six went
for Nixon, five went for Wallace and only one for Humphrcy.
The richest state in the nation Connecticut went for IIHH. 11
-9-
(However, it is true that the pool of non-voting black
represents a great plus for Democrats if they can get them registered
and voting, since unlike the poor and young -- blacks do vote in blocs
Democratic blocs.)
"Six in seven voters are over thirty. Nine out of ten are unpoor,
nine out of ten are white. 11
'PACKAGING' NIXON
Myth No. 4: The "packaging" of RN won him the election.
Ridiculous. All candidates are packaged to one degree or another.
But Stenvig won in Minneapolis with $3600 spent. While HHH was
saying he was running poorly in the polls because of RN's TV,
Muskie was running 17 points ahead of Agnew in polls -- yet Agnew
had the same TV exposure as RN, and Muskie as Humphrcy. "Voters
are not nitwits. 11 RN was ahead because he
11
was more closely attuned to the temper of a larger
segment of the electorate. than was his opposition. He was
a man for the season. That may sound simplistic; it is
simplistic and accurate
The feelings that Nixon
capitalized on were not part of a Southern Strategy or a
Border State Strategy they were part of a national
strategy that was attuned to the national malaise we have
discussed earlier
It may be said in fact that Agnewism
as a social thought won the election for Nixon, while Agnew,
the individual, almost lost it for him. 11
Myth No. 5: The Kennedy victory in Gary, uniting hard hats
and blacks, showed how formidable he would be in a general election.
Again no such thing, contend the authors. RFK won the blacks and the
union workers; but he did not have to compete against either Wallace or
HHH, each of whom would have had tremendous drawing among one
or the other of these groups.
(The authors also go to lengths to show how RFK moved to
the Center throughout the primaries by abandoning his early frenzied
campaigning pace, by clipping his hair, speaking in low-keyed voice,
accusing McCarthy of seeking to have blacks from Watts foreibly integrated
-10-
in Orange County, talking to Indiana's concern about riots, war and
Communism. Say the authors, Bobby was not selling out, but
simply addressing himself to concerns of a country where half
the women are afraid to go out at night.
WALLACE '72
In 1972 Wallace should, as he did in 1968, take seven million
votes from Nixon and three million from the Democrat.
PRIMER FOR DEMS
Chapter Twenty of the book offers Democrats a Primer on
precisely how to phrase their appeal to the voters. Example:
"Do Not Say: 'Well, I don't agree with the Students
for a Democratic Society when they. invade a college
president's office, but I can understand their deep sense
of frustration. 1
Do Say: 'When students break the law they will be
treated as lawbreakers. III
Example:
The Democrats made a disasterous error in saying "Law
and order is a code word for racism. 11 This is a losing position on the
Social Issue -- they should say "I am for civil rights and against
crime. 11 They should not link the two.
ON CANDIDATES
A Presidential aspirant must above all be a "take charge guy. 11
Humphrey would have been better off had be come down on one side
or the other on Vietnam rather than leave the impression of being
wishy-washy.
-11-
CONCLUSION
"To know that the lady in Dayton is afraid to walk the
streets alone at night, to know that she has a mixed view
about blacks and civil rights because before moving to the
suburbs she lived in a neighborhood that became all black,
to know that her brother-in-law is a policeman, to know that
she does not have the money to move if her new neighborhood
deteriorates, to know that she is deeply distressed that her
son is going to a community college where LSD was found on
the campus -- to know all this is the beginning of contemporary
political wisdom. "
THE WHITE HOUS:
W/- HINGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970
Given this Scaimnon Wattenburg thosis which I believe is
right on the mark for Demock ats we are in serious danger of
being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem
crystal clear.
1. We cannot allow the Democrate to get back on the right
side of the Social Issue, This they are attempting to do right DOW
with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded and the brand must
S
lick as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black
rioters, as soft on crime. This cau be accomplished with their
record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest
with them primarily on the Economic Issue
Big Spenders, etc.
as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success.
Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses
with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrate have been winning those
Congresses, Jo, these same Forty Years.
The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism"
and "radicalism" especially on the Social Issue where we are strong
and they are weak.
2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume left-
wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Repub-
licans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing
voters are thus Democrats Jaw and order Democrats, conservatives
00 the "Social Issue, :1 but "progressive" on domestic issues. This
is the Wattenburg thesis and 3 think it is basically correct. How
to conduct ourselves then.
-%
Tax the Democratic headeculip spre ilically with 11.g "redical"
Jabel 00 social pulicy ter 0 (iii) as well with the custions 1"
Jabel on the President's 1,"0, sens for reforming soci dy, for
getting And day mealing,
Fraul 1;, we should goalls the "Deley Democrate, 11 Ro one
can do this belief Dise the Vice President but we camnot get these
voters 1.3 using relv. 11: Republican arguin, n's or state
Republican whole ic.
"Big Spende !" is a theme that might work, will work, with
our Re publicans we are using it in all OUT GO literature but
will it have 211) real big with the union 89 to whom big spending 1093
mean 11.c medicare for his mom or old may? (Foot dragging Congress"
does not seem char ged with such electricity, either.)
3. Scammon contends that a In a. line on Tiols etc. by
Democrais may anger "liber als, 11 but liberals have no place to go
anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans
have no place to 80 in 1970 (ro Wallace) but the GOP. So, lef's
go straight after the Dalcy Democrats.
1. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the
Presidential banner by couler ding that RN is a progressive on
doine stic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership
of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and
P ornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the
Senate who care SO much about the rights of the criminal that they
forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man
trying with voto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is
being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of in flation that would put Indonesia in its
heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy
who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being
attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists
who think peace lics in an abject retreat from the world and the
dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong
but these 1 would think would be the ways the Vice President could
best appeal to the patriotic, hard- line pro-medicare Democrats whote
the missing element in the Grand New Party.
3
5. Then is move afost to "low-key" the Vice Preside it's
campaign in 1970 to have 1.: .1 focus specially on the local issue
and not such the national public There is PO conflict between
garnering national peblicity and helping local Senate candidate
the two are thoroughly complimatery,
The Democrats See Scanmon's book are only DON: couing
around to recognize what we has in 1966 and 1968 that a strong
statement in Oregon is mo. (: effective in getting to voter S in New Jersey
than a banal statement in Trenton, Tonafly, News) and Elizabeth, The
way for the Vice President to help the Senetorial Candidete is to
praise him to the skies, fine but 10 hammer the national
Democratic leader ship in a manner that will keep our big press
corps excited and with US, that will get network time every night if
possible with our measage; and SO help every Republic an Senatorial
Candidate while we are helping the local one,
Right now the Agrew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the
potential best show in town. All we has to do to for feit that national
P ublicity in run around talking about "caltle and oil" in Casper,
as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that
when we give up the television time
on the networks
someone
else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.
Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have 110 one to compete
with the Veep on the bustings. We have a tremendous advantage here
which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues
that carry no national wallop.
We should have something topical and tough for the national
media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican
Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his
decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like
raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.
A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and
Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, from the Scanmon book, we should tax the
Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of
bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration, 11 the party whose
last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to
testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this
..1..
country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking
RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has
aftered its historic foreign policy position to kow. low to student
radicals who bully ragged those same leader S in the streets of
Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayo as
selling out to the crazies in their OWN ranks and selling out the
interests and Views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in
the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-
liberals" in his own party.
% We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and
offensive)position even though we are the "jus" (and defensive) by
hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishnenl" that is responsible
for what has happened to America, the "Establishment" that is
frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment
whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that
indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but
the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital. )
8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether OF
not we are in a "recession" seems to me a ulterly foolish idea
since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us
and since anyone who is burt in the current economic situation is not
likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhotoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and
unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals
whose wild scheines are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise
in prices. This is the Big Spender theme but in different
rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same
kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social
Issue.
9. Finally, to change the Vice Presi dent now into the
traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for
a losing one.