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From Richard McCormack to-. RE: November 13-14 Meeting of the American Association of Political Consultants to Discuss with Campaign Managers the Results of the Recent Elections in Texas, California, New York, Arkansas and Minnesota. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/20/1970
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From Richard McCormack to-. RE: November 13-14 Meeting of the American Association of Political Consultants to Discuss with Campaign Managers the Results of the Recent Elections in Texas, California, New York, Arkansas and Minnesota. 17 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/20/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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49
23
11/20/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Richard McCormack to-. RE:
November 13-14 Meeting of the American
Association of Political Consultants to
Discuss with Campaign Managers the
Results of the Recent Elections in Texas,
California, New York, Arkansas and
Minnesota. 17pgs.
Monday, June 04, 2012
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memo
Richard McCormack to-
11/20/70
c(nixon)
Doc 85]
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Political Articles [1970]
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
20 November 1970
MEMORANDUM FROM RICHARD MCCORMACK
RE:
November 13-14 Meeting of the American Association of Political
Consultants To Discuss with Campaign Managers the Results of
the Recent Elections in Texas, California, New York, Arkansas
and Minnesota
I.
The Overall Program
2:00
Contact Politics
"Knot Tying, Cook-outs
PROGRAM
PROGRAM
and Jamborees"
How the telephone can be used as the basic
tool of a campaign - recruiting volunteers,
surveying voter attitudes, telephone-mail; the
one-two punch.
A Profile View
A Profile View
Matt Reese
Matt Reese & Associates
of Politics -
of Politics- -
Washington, D.C.
"
1970
1970
3:45
Break
4:00
Election Day "Helping the Little Old Lady
across the street
But what if she doesn't
want to go?'
The best utilization of challengers, watchers,
A TWO-DAY SEMINAR
A TWO-DAY SEMINAR
ballot passers, drivers, telephone workers,
etc. What to do from before the polls open
presented by the
presented by the
until after they close: ballot security and
American Association
American Association
getting an honest count; what to do in bad
of Political Consultants
of Political Consultants
weather; working with volunteers and paid
workers. How campaigns can determine
election day strategy.
Jerry Harkins
Jerry Harkins & Associates
Washington, D.C.
5:30
Closing Comments
Matt Reese
F. Clifton White
5:45
End of Conference
Friday-Saturday
Friday-Saturday
November 13 and 14, 1970
November 13 and 14, 1970
Press Note: The conference will be opun to the
The Forum Theater
The Forum Theater
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 13th
SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 14th
THE 1970 CAMPAIGNS-
12:30
Lunch Break
NUTS AND BOLTS-
HOW WE RAN THEM
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER
(No lunches are scheduled as part of the
conference.)
9:30
Registration
9:00
Coffee
(Coffee will be served in the Lobby of the
2:00
The New York Senatorial Race
Forum Theater Lobby
Forum Theater during registration.)
Steven Berger,
9:30
Campaign Planning
"Be Prepared"
Campaign Manager for Richard Ottinger
10:00
Welcome
Strategy and tactics, research and p
Brian Conboy.
F Clifton White
targeting, organization and staff, sche
Campaign Manager for Charles Goodell
President, AAPC
and advance, press and public relations
niques of voter contact, advertising. b
F. Clifton White,
Campaign Manager for James Buckley
Edward Failor
10:15
Opening Remarks
Fred A. Niles Communications Ce
Chicago, Illinois
Matt Reese
3:30
Break
Program Chairman and Treasurer, AAPC
John Lorenz
Cyr Picard & Associates
3:45
The California Gubernatorial Race
Washington, D.C.
10:30
The Minnesota Senatorial Race
Thomas Reed,
Jack Chestnut,
10:45
Break
Campaign Manager for Hubert Humphrey
Campaign Manager for Ronald Reagan
Phillip Schott,
11:00
David Krogseng,
Using the Mails
"Smoke Signals and
:
Campaign Manager for Jess Unruh
Campaign Manager for Clark MacGregor
aphore"
Philosophy, statistics and mechanics o
11:30
The Texas Gubernatorial Race
4:45
Film and Commercial Screenings
cessful uses of direct mail in politics.
Ray Waters
Eddie Mahe,
Screening of films and spots used In the
Demographics, Inc.
Campaign Manager for Paul Eggers
campaigns reviewed during the day.
Little Rock, Arkansas
Mickey Smith,
Campaign Manager for Preston Smith
5:45
End of Day's Program
12:30
Lunch Break
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS, SUITE 618, 1028 CONNECTICUT AVE., NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 / (202) 296-3
4
II. A. A General Comment: Because of the large number of outsiders
at the meeting, including members of the press on an "off-the-
record" basis, there was less than absolute frankness on the
part of many participants, as well as a good deal of glorification
of individual candidates. The large number of spectators (150)
made impossible in-depth questioning of individual speakers.
B. Summary of Main Ideas Derived from the Seminar
1. Visits by outsiders to help candidate are most valuable
when restricted to fund raising and to delivering general
non-controversial speeches cleared in advance with the local
people. Otherwise, outside "help" is often quite counter-
productive and leads to a waste of scarce staff time to advance
the outsider's speech. This was a pretty general feeling.
2. The lack of early money caused severe problems for the
campaigns. Perhaps the National Committee could raise
a slush loan fund for selected candidates to be repaid at the
end of the campaign. Careful controls to ensure ultimate
repayment.
3. There is no national recipe for winning local elections.
Outside meddling is usually counterproductive. Winning
campaigns are usually those which did a thousand details
well.
4. It would be useful to do a telephone poll of campaign managers
all over the country to investigate the details of each campaign:
what went well, what went badly, what the national party could
have done to improve things.
III. Significant Comments by Various Speakers
A. Clifton White
Outlined the purposes of the seminar-- to exchange technical
information and to identify key campaign mistakes.
B. Jack Chestnut, Campaign Manager for Hubert Humphrey
5
The Humphrey campaign effort began in January with the crea-
tion of an organizational manual which defined the tasks, respon-
sibilities and individual authority of each key staff member.
Campaign was broken down into three phases: Pre-primary
with emphasis on organization and research. Primary phase
stressing high visibility for candidate. Campaign itself relying
on use of media.
Initially did very thorough voter breakdown using computer and
registration information to locate potential areas and population
groups for concentration of effort.
Had to overcome the fact that HHH hadn't visited. some areas of
his state in many years.
On the basis of this poll decided on HHH theme - You Know He
Cares.
Attempted to reach voters by Humphrey booths at county fairs,
sending out 120, 000 computerized "personal" letters containing
an explanation of why he wanted to run, bumper sticker, and
return envelope for donations.
Held fundraising dinners in each Congressional district but left
money in the district where it was raised for use by Congres-
sional candidate and HHH jointly.
To avoid problems, HHH took no part in the Governorship pri-
mary and thus, after the primary, was able to establish a single
campaign office in each area for all D.F.I L. candidates.
Gained a great deal of free media time by exploiting talk shows
and news programs all over the state.
Held only one press conference during entire period - one
announcing his candidacy.
Established an effective phone bank operation which made
140, 000 contacts.
Alleged GOP errors in campaign:
6
1.
The primary left scars.
2. The Governor and Senatorial candidates didn't work together.
3. "Fear" theme fell flat.
4. GOP theme "Would be a full-time Senator" totally ineffective.
5. People could see that HHH was not a "sick, sick, sick, tired
old man" as alleged by GOP.
6.
Outside help by Administration visits totally ineffective.
C. David Krogseng, Campaign Manager for Clark MacGregor
The main reason for the Democratic victory was not the activi-
ties of the campaign manager, but rather the personality, back-
ground, and prominence of Humphrey himself.
The Republican organization was in excellent shape.
The campaign made several hundred thousand telephone contacts.
Republican National Committee had vast quantities of informa-
tion on HHH's past speeches and positions. Too much to be
able to handle.
Poll data on voter attitudes turned out to be accurate. But it
was difficult to cause the 28 percent who felt that HHH talked
too much, or the people who felt he had sold out to LBJ, etc.
to feel strongly enough about these things to vote against him.
MacGregor experienced a critical shortage of "early" money
which he badly needed to overcome Humphrey's voter identifi-
cation lead (76 percent to 99. 6 percent).
Early October showed promising MacGregor gains.
What went wrong?
1. Republican issues weren't effective. HHH killed the law-
and-order issue with a tough speech to the Bar Association.
HHH better able to convince voters to "vote your wallet".
7
2. MacGregor plagued by a "you can't win" image--worsened
by leaks out of Washington that MacGregor was written off.
3. GOP didn't work together in state.
4. "Outside assistance" apparently wasn't terribly helpful.
(Humphrey's manager said our Administration speakers
did little but tie up MacGregor's campaign staff.) When
pressed, MacGregor's man stated that outside assistance
was "on balance, helpful" in a most unconvincing tone.
NOTE: Subsequently we watched respective campaign spots for tele-
vision. MacGregor made a rather wooden impression. HHH's were
considerably more effective.
D. Eddie Mahe, Campaign Manager for Paul Eggers
Strategy was predicated on a low voter turnout--below 2, 000, 000.
Actual turnout: 2,250,000.
The Bush/Bensten race took most of the local interest.
Urging that Government works better when the Legislature and
the Governor are of different parties was contrasted by the na-
tional Republican election theme of "a Republican Senate" as
well as by the experience of other states where taxes soared
under these conditions.
Three newspapers out of 600 supported Eggers.
Eggers' stand on marijuana hurt (he favored lighter penalties.).
Democrats were united in campaign.
The referendum on "liquor by the drink" brought out a huge voter
turnout of liquor-hating, Republican-hating upstate Baptists.
Eggers was severely ill during the Spring which reduced his
vitality during remainder of campaign.
8
Eggers hated camaras and wanted to get the filming over early
in June. Later when the campaign changed, they didn't have
enough money left to scrap their old footage and make new, more
relevant films for TV spots.
2, 000, 000 newspaper supplements made for Eggers.
750, 000 telephone and canvas contacts made for him.
What went wrong?
1.
Campaign never jelled (changed campaign managers once).
2. Money came in very late in October.
3. Of 254 Texas counties, 125 had Eggers organizations of
note. 75 counties didn't even have token Eggers organizations.
4. Needed more money. Planned budget, $1, 000, 000; actual
budget, $620, 000.
E. Mickey Smith, Campaign Manager for Preston Smith
Governor Smith was well known throughout Texas.
Was described by press as a dull, plodding Governor.
Opposition came out early with their media approach, so it was
easy to counteract.
Stressed accomplishments of Governor.
Yarborough faction did not sabotage Smith, as feared.
F. Steve Martindale, Campaign Assistant to Senator Goodell
Financial difficulties were major reason for Goodell failure in
New York.
Vice President Agnew brought pressure on the President of the
Stock Exchange to dry up fund sources on Wall Street.
9
Daily News poll caused people to vote for Ottinger or Buckley
so as not to waste vote.
Goodell's "instant liberal" image didn't hurt him except among
conservatives.
Voters went conservative three to one in Goodell's old upstate
constituency.
Goodell seriously considered pulling out of campaign and allegedly
would have done so if he had believed this would have stopped
Buckley.
G.
Clifton White
Preliminary poll in New York indicated that 66 to 68 percent
of voters identified selves as moderates or conservatives.
Had to establish own organization across the entire state.
Buckley had serious voter identification problem.
Lacked early money for campaign.
Buckley hadn't made an impact on upstate Republicans before
1970 because he had never really visited the area politically.
Buckley went on TV before the other candidates to overcome
the voter identification problem.
Polls at one time gave Goodell 50 percent of vote during the
Spring. Ottinger had 47 percent of vote at another period of
early campaign.
Campaign strategy tried to make Goodell and Ottinger seem
like twins, idealogically.
Republican precinct workers and county chairmen sympathized
with Buckley.
Thirty daily newspapers supported Buckley, while only three
or four supported the other candidates, including the New York
Times.
10
Buckley scared Ottinger away from using the television during
a key period in the campaign by accusing him of buying the
election. The big spender image rarely affects voters, but it
does scare candidates.
The Vice President was enormously helpful to Buckley by legiti-
mizing him as the Republican candidate, securing money and
party support for him.
Fifty percent of the county chairmen actively or passively helped
Buckley.
H. Tom Reed, Campaign Manager for Governor Reagan
Started fund raising in March so as to deny funds to Unruh and
to get the thing over with. Collected $2, 000, 000 from 250, 000
people (Others suggested that $4, 000, 000 was collected.).
Established a student organization for Reagan to prevent overt
anti-Reagan efforts on campuses.
United Republican Party. Kuchel endorsed Governor.
Issues: 1. Environment 2. Welfare abuse 3. Lower educa-
tion 4. Higher education 5. Tax reforms 6. Unemployment.
Spread Governor Reagan too thin by overconfidence on efforts
to elect state legislature candidates.
Late in campaign, Reagan lead dropped from 13 percent to
7 percent.
I.
Phillip Schott, Campaign Manager for Jess Unruh
Reasons for loss:
1. Had very little money.
2. Money all came in at the very end of the campaign.
3. Pundits predicted a Reagan victory--Unruh could never
shake the loser image.
11
Undertook a massive registration drive for Democrats (800, 000
registered Democrats).
Net change in statewide registration plus 400, 000 Democrats,
190, 000 Republicans.
Constant telephone tracking and polling. Twenty calls per day
tabulated once a month to isolate campaign planning from the
"flap-of-the-day" syndrome which often produces bad, hasty
changes.
III. Second Day: Nuts and Bolts
A. Edward Failor, Niles Communications Center
1. Candidate must initially cultivate opinion makers before
public campaign really gets started.
2. Mass contact must be governed by the following concepts:
a. Masses won't listen to long, windy commentary or to
a profusion of issues.
b. Image of candidate as achiever should be stressed by
affirmation, repetition.
C. Affirmation campaign cannot become bogged down in
"
logic. "Dewey gets things done. 11
3. Campaign advertizing
a. Analyze assets of candidate.
b. Analyze electorate's past voting behavior and current
attitudes.
c. A theme must be decided upon early and maintained.
d. Whole creative approach should be decided upon early
and stuck to.
e. Creative team should be enthusiastic supporters of
candidate, should know candidate well.
12
4.
Budgeting--urged realism and thoroughness.
5. Research divided into two phases: hard and soft data.
a. Hard data, past election results and voting patterns,
obtained from registration forms and should include
location of swing voters, ethnic breakdowns, how often
each bloc votes, easily computerized.
b.
Soft data
(1) Synchronic poll (whom do you prefer now?)
(2) Diachronic poll (what type of candidate and atti-
tudes do you generally prefer. Diachronic poll is
generally more reliable and useful.
6. It's imperative that the man in charge of the scheduling of
the candidate knows the area and local personalities.
7.
Advance men must inform candidate of local issues and local
concerns so that the speech will be relevant.
8.
To get a sense of the way the campaign is going, an occas-
sional systematic debriefing of campaign foot soldiers is
useful.
9. Get together from time to time with campaign managers
from other area races.
10. Polls are generally off by three to four percent.
11. Media advertizing should zero in on programs preferred
by target voters.
12. The press, the candidate himself, and the voters have ex-
pectations from a campaign. Each must be met.
B. Matt Reese: Election Day, the day of the organization
The precinct organization is still extremely important. Tele-
vision is obviously important, but to supplement, not supplant,
the vital work of the organization.
13
Election laws should be carefully studied to determine what is
permissible locally--an inquiry should be initiated as to what
is customary. You must know who controls the machinery on
election day and make provision in advance if corruption is anti-
cipated.
Absentee ballots procedures should be studied. If possible,
all your campaign workers should vote in advance to obviate
the necessity of their taking off an hour on election day to vote.
Make all assignments to your volunteer workers in writing and
keep the record, both to make sure that the workers get the
assignments straight and to give you a record as to whom your
people are.
It's also a good idea to make an organization chart and make it
public so that your volunteers feel some status and public onus
if they fail in their area.
Arrange in advance for the care and feeding of your campaign
volunteers.
Set aside money for a party for your campaign volunteers elec-
tion night (Even if you lose, there will be other elections).
C. Jerry Hopkins: Fraud
1. Make sure your votes get counted and your opponent's votes
get counted only once. Ascertain that "local" voters really
are local voters. Check credentials.
2.
Check for mirrors over the machine.
3. Make sure that the machines register zero when polls open.
4. Secret ballot extremely important. Beware of those who
"help" people vote.
5. Paper ballots are a disaster in corrupt areas.
6. Get somebody infiltrated into the office where voting ma-
chines are stored to prevent fraud and quietly to inform
you if it is taking place.
14
7.
Send a first class mailing into particularly bad precincts
so that the dead and moved residents will have the envelopes
returned stamped accordingly so that you can check the re-
gistered rolls against them.
A book on vote frauds is badly needed, both to help guide the
public and to make those who perpetrate the frauds a bit uneasy.
D. Joe Napolitan, Matt Reese
Napolitan felt that the professional effort devoted to the re-
election of Governor Burns of Hawaii was the best in the country.
Problems of the Governor:
a.
He was 61 years old looking for a third term.
b.
He was opposed by Tom Gill, his former Lieutenant
Governor who had a 20 percent lead in the polls.
C. Polled interest groups on both sides of many-questions
felt that Governor Burns supported the other side.
d.
Public lacked knowledge of Burns' accomplishments.
e.
Hawaii had greatly grown and changed during the past
decade.
=
Governor's assets were:
a. He had a good organization with zeal and money.
b. He had a good record as Governor.
The campaign to reelect him was divided into three phases:
a.
The Plan
b.
The Plan and the Man
C.
The Man
15
The plan was to convince the voters that Hawaii had progressed
under Burns. Television was the leading media tool for this
campaign. Showed advances in environment protection, educa-
tion, industry.
TV was featured in short bursts of two-week duration.
The campaign media first showed only Hawaii and its improve-
ments for the first two-week blitz.
The second two-week blitz showed Hawaii's improvements and
Governor Burns.
The third two-week blitz showed only Governor Burns.
E. Use of Mails
Mailings with computerized letters are helpful when:
a.
Candidates are not effective speakers on television.
b. When a state is large and there is no way to cover the
state with one or two TV channels.
C. When a candidate is an unknown.
A form letter campaign should be conducted only after a careful
voter breakdown using registration forms to determine to whom
you should send the letter, i.e., your. potential supporters.
It's difficult to change people's minds with a letter. Letters
only tend to reinforce existing views.
The one-to-one relationship should be stressed in the mailing.
Mail bulk rather than first class because nobody notices what
the stamp says and even the Post Office Departments tends to
handle everything as first class.
Repetition is important in mailings.
Letters should be kept short and simple.
16
Every letter should include a request for funds and a return
envelope.
By planning ahead you can often save literally half the costs of
mailing.
You can often save by sharing the mailing lists with other candi-
dates of your party.
Too much mailing a la Rockefeller in Arkansas can be disastrous.
Mailing campaign must be closely related to the rest of the cam-
paign.
Precincts should be graded according to a ranking so that you
will be able to devote your time and money accordingly. Factors
in ranking include:
a. Party registration
b. Party allignment
C. Past election performance
d.
Turn out
e. Switch/split propensity
I
f.
Ethnic/economic makeup
as
Organizational effectiveness
h. Public opinion poll indicators
Based on this precinct profile, a percent-of-effort index to allot
time and money is made for each precinct.
The campaign should be thoroughly organized and planned.
Volunteer forces are established.
a. Block captains. Recruited through telephone contact.
17
Block captains are supposed to visit each family in
block.
You must constantly check up on block captain to make
certain that she does her job (3/4 are women, as a rule)
and should send them a kit including a badge, sample of
things to say, literature and a return card to let the
headquarters know that she has worked.
After the literature is sent to the block captain, a
followup call should be made to allay fears and urge
them to get on with the job.
Subsequently, block captains receive a letter from the
candidate's wife, thanking them for their past efforts
and asking them to get out the vote on election day.
b.
Cleanup captains. These agree to work the final three
hours for registered but lazy voters to pick them up
and get them to the polls during the last three hours
of the election.