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This file contains:
From Bryce Harlow to the President. RE: Re-election efforts. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Jim Keogh to the President. RE: Postelection thoughts. 7pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
From Lyn Nofziger to the Presidnet. RE: The President's Election efforts. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/10/1970
From Patrick Buchanan to the President. Further analysis of election. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
From Tom Charles Huston to the President. RE: 1970 elections and prospects for 1972. 16 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
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26146673
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WHSF: Contested, 49-41
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1
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26146673
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WHSF: Contested, 49-41
description
This file contains:
From Bryce Harlow to the President. RE: Re-election efforts. 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], no date
From Jim Keogh to the President. RE: Postelection thoughts. 7pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
From Lyn Nofziger to the Presidnet. RE: The President's Election efforts. 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/10/1970
From Patrick Buchanan to the President. Further analysis of election. 9 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/18/1970
From Tom Charles Huston to the President. RE: 1970 elections and prospects for 1972. 16 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/13/1970
citationUrl
collections
Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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26146673
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nara-archive
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ae4463dea6f7cc88
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
49
41
>
Campaign
Memo
From Bryce Harlow to the President. RE:
Re-election efforts. 8pgs.
49
41
11/13/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Jim Keogh to the President. RE: Post-
election thoughts. 7pgs.
49
41
11/10/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Lyn Nofziger to the Presidnet. RE:
The President's Election efforts. 7pgs.
49
41
11/18/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Patrick Buchanan to the President.
Further analysis of election. 9pgs.
49
41
11/13/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Tom Charles Huston to the President.
RE: 1970 elections and prospects for 1972.
16 pgs.
Monday, June 04, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
NUMBER
TYPE
RESTRICTION
NIO
MEMO
From Hallet to Rase
5/6/70
C(NIXON
[94]
Re: Ventative thoughts on
Presidents Present situation
N2
MEMO
from Garlow to RN
N.D.
C(NIXD)
[95]
Re: Assessments af slection
efforts
N3
MEMO
from Keagh to RN
11/13/70
C(NIXOR
[96]
Re: Post-slection thoughts
N4
MEMO
from Nafziger to RN
11/10/70
[97]
C(NIXOM
Re: Response to request
from Hrsaldeman
N5
MEMO
from Buchanan to RN
11/18/70
C(NIXDA
[98]
Re: Election results
N6
MEMO
From Keogh to RN
11/12/70
c(NIxon
[99]
Re. Harts manuscript
N7
MEMO
from Buston to RN
11/13/70
C(NIXON
[100]
Re: 1970 Election & Prospects
FILE GROUP TITLE
for 1972
BOX NUMBER
POF
8
FOLDER TITLE
President's Handwriting RESTRICTION CODES November 1970
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
N8
MEMO
from Maynihan to RN
11/13/70
C(NIXON)
[101]
Re: Dear experience 4the
past two years.
N9
MEMO
from Chapin to RN
11/19/70
C(NIXON)
[102]
Re: Lewis called
N10
MEMO
from Buckauan to RN
11/20/70
C(NIXON)
[103]
Re: Forthcomeng analysis
of the election
NII
Memo
from Leonard to attorney Several
11/24/70
C(NIXON,
[104]
Re: Kent State
N12
MEMD
from Timmons to RN
11/24/90
C(NIXON)
[105]
Re: foreign Policy Support
N13
from Harper to Earlichman
N.D.
[106]
Ra: Some Base Park numbers
C(NIXON)
N140
MEMO
from Flaxigan to RN
4/30/70
C(NITON)
[107]
Re: Memo from Charls Wasker
N15
MEMO
from Walked to RN
11/30/70
C(NIXDN)
[108
Re: administrations starrce
FILE GROUP TITLE
POF
BOX NUMBER
8
FOLDER Presidents TITLE Handwriting November 1970
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT)
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
from Holderean to
9/14/72
C(NIXOM
Ebclichman
[109]
Re Given
FILE GROUP TITLE
POF
BOX NUMBER
8
Presidents FOLDER TITLE Handwriting November 1970
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection:
President's Office Files
Box Number:
8
Folder:
President's Handwriting November 1970
Document
Disposition
94
Retain
Open
95
Return
Private/Political
96
Return
Private/Political
97
Return
Private/Political
98
Return
Private/Political
99
Return
Private/Political
100
Return
Private/Political
101
Retain
Open
102
Retain
Close
Invasion of Privacy
103
Retain
Close
Invasion of Privacy
104
Retain
Close
Invasion of Privacy
105
Retain
Close
Invasion of Privacy
106
Retain
Open
107
Retain
Open
108
Retain
Open
109
Retain
Open
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
CONFIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12065, Section 6-102
By MH
NARS, Date 1/21/80
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRYCE HARLOW
You have already received, I am sure, far better assessments
of the elections and the rest than I can furnish, in part
because I was preoccupied with the Vice President's campaign
and therefore didn't share in your effort or watch it as
closely as I otherwise would have. So I will make my comments
as brief as I can on the points raised in Bob Haldeman's
November 7 memorandum.
1. Your election efforts:
a. To all the VP's crew, it appeared that your
campaigning did very excellently what the VP wasn't supposed
to do and couldn't do -- stir up the general public and pre-
empt both the national and local media. Assuming that the
main objects of campaigning, aside from fund-raising, are to
remind and stimulate, I believe the timing, execution and
placement of your efforts are not challengeable even in
hindsight.
b. I fear we may have been guilty of overkill in
such places as Texas (perhaps the only place) ; the heavy
involvement of both the President and Vice President may
have flushed out more opposition votes than supporters, and
I believe it was agreed from the beginning that a small vote
was desirable in Texas. Nonetheless, the Bush people have
no basis for complaint; you and the VP did precisely as his
campaign crowd asked.
C. I feel a bit lame in making this point, since I
was not in Washington to share in the decision-making and
suspect there are considerations I am unaware of -- but I have
the uncomfortable feeling that the Vice President had already
driven home, powerfully and effectively, the law and order
theme by the time you hit the trail and that he had already
2
peaked with that message to the country. So by mid-October
all of us might have been better advised to swing away at
least partially from this issue we may have already won
(even the most radical Democrats had joined us on law and
order by that time) and clobber the economic issue, plus
bragging on Administration achievements. That is a gut
feeling -- sheer smoke-shoveling -- but by the time you took
to the road we were already in worried conferences in the
VP's group on what to do about newly adverse developments in
the economy and farm areas (the announcement of low parity
in the closing days of the campaign was a disaster!) In
other words, I vaguely sense even now (as the VP did in the
last two weeks of the campaign) that we were overstressing an
issue we had already won and on which the Democrats had
covered themselves, and we failed then to modify course to
take on escalating troubles in agriculture and the economy.
Bob Haldeman may recall my distraught telephone call ten days
or so before election about the economic problem -- which gave
rise to Bill Safire's excellent statement for our candidates
to use (and which we did use at Hartford and Tuscon) - but I
rather suspect we might well have charged on these other issues
in the closing days, or at least given them greater emphasis,
instead of sticking overlong to law and order.
d. Even if we had done what (c) above suggests, I
must concede that local candidates would have raised plu-
perfect hell on the ground that you were campaigning too
blandly; certainly everyplace the VP went, the local lust was
for raw meat. Moreover, the press was hovering about with
pencils poised, eager to charge that the campaign had been
so nasty, so bitchy, that you and the VP had to confess
wrong-doing and turn tail and run. So even if the country
had drifted away from law and order in the closing days, had
you and the VP changed subjects or muted the attack, there's
no telling what the national reaction might have been. It
could have been a disaster for you or the VP or both. There's
no way to tell.
e. The bottom fell out in the Midwest and West.
If that area had held up as I, at least, anticipated, we
would have done excellently -- the 5 to 8 seat gain I
personally expected in the Senate. The only constants in
3
that region that can explain this collapse, best I can
figure, are: unemployment (spotty), high interest rates
(epidemic and very basic), inflation (general), farmer
surliness (a sleeper; never once even mentioned to us by
any campaign manager or candidate in the entire area), and
maybe a regional disinterest in law and order, inasmuch as
both Democrats and Republicans are law abiding and square
in that part of the country. It is easy to particularize
on the races out there and conclude that oddities in each
state account for the poor showing, but I can't buy that.
I believe that, while state peculiarities obviously in-
fluenced every race in the western reaches, so also did they
in the rest of the country where we fared far better -- so
there are bound to be special troubles out west which did us
in. I can't help but wonder what might have happened in
North Dakota if our thrust had been not law and order, where
Burdick was immune, but on the arrogance and cynicism of the
Democrats' refusal to pass the farm law. But even there, as
you know, both the Farm Bureau and the Farmers' Union oppose
this legislation, so that, too, might have been a loser.
That tends to force me back to the desirability of the economy
argument - that you had wound down both inflation and war
while avoiding recession, and the Democrats are plainly
incompetent on both counts. It is conceivable that we might
have salvaged a race or two in the mountains and plains if
we had done that.
f. The fact remains, whatever happened, that the
whole campaign was directed toward one goal - unshackling
you in the Senate. You did precisely that -- a far better showing
than the pillar of political gold, Eisenhower, made in 1954 and
1958 - indeed, the best off-year showing of any Republican
Administration in memory. So liberal pundits notwithstanding,
your object was achieved, and the proof will be seen in 1971
and 1972 in the performance of the Senate. That is all that
matters; the rest is only hostile rationalization and yearning.
g. Finally, I reject as inane the argument that
your campaigning demeaned the Presidency and will plague you
through 1972. Never has this been so before, and unless the
media take it upon themselves to make it SO (even that won't
4
work, in my opinion) the whole orgy of 1970 will be dead
and gone except for (1) the wholesome Senate results and
(2) the gubernatorial disadvantages, by the time you deliver
your State of the Union Message. It is true, of course, that
the Phoenix film was a well-rounded disaster, but everybody
knows that, and it too is an isolated episode that soon
will pass.
2. Presidential posture for the future:
I don't think the election of 1970 influences your
future posture in any significant aspect other than (1) you
can now move more surely in national security affairs; (2) law
and order are now politically neutralized unless you wish to
test the Democratic commitment to their sudden campaign turn-
about; and (3) Party regularity is enhanced a bit by the
Goodell shafting. Otherwise, your posture, I believe, should
be just what it would otherwise have been anyway - that of a
deeply concerned President earnestly devising sensible solutions
for overriding national problems, and that will automatically
come to be as public and press attention turn to issues in the
rump session of Congress and your programs for 1971 and 1972.
For the future, I anticipate that your removal of
American ground forces from combat will be a vast political
plus in 1972 -- that a healthy economic situation will be
critical for success, for it will likely be the centerpiece
of the 1972 campaign -- and that matters of the environment,
race and the cities will be peripheral, though crucial in key
spots around the country. I needn't add, I know, that the
farm situation requires almost as much attention as the general
economy, because so much of your strength resides there, and
I would hope for tremendous emphasis on rural development plus
a greater sensitivity to farm needs (such as continuation of
the ACP, now scheduled for the axe) My hope remains that
you will "come clean" with Congress on the economy and the
fiscal situation and will brace them with the same hard
alternatives that you have had to wrestle with, making them
shoulder responsibility right along with you for inflation,
5
deficit financing, full employment troubles and high interest
rates -- all versus sharply higher taxes plus a withered
federal establishment. I feel the country is incredibly mixed
up over all this -- insistent upon vastly costly new programs
but adamantly against the high cost of government. If next
year you can hit just two or three of the sexiest domestic
programs with all your might and main and slough off the rest,
and assure adequate financing, 1972 ought to take care of itself.
3.
Changed relations with media:
a. I urge only that you handle them, as you have
sought to do, cooly, fairly and at arm's length, excepting
your obvious friends who are entitled to special care and
feeding. I would foreswear severe retaliatory attempts
against journalistic malefactors, because I think this in-
evitably backfires, and anyway reporters declared off-limits
are seen by your Administration people despite the ban. I
do press for more frequent press conferences (once a month,
on average), and far less daily concentration on this or that
critical column or article or, even, leak. I have long had a
feeling that we overreact to daily drivel and in the process
not only consume energies and time that could be fruitfully
used in other ways, but also in this way we tend to spotlight
the very problems we try to smother. Said differently, I feel
we ascribe too much importance to a columnist or commentator -
that we only flatter them and hurt ourselves when we spend
time countering their writings and broadcasts.
I do hope your regional backgrounders with the press
out in the countryside are carried forward. These, I have
felt, are the most rewarding innovation with the media that
you have hit upon since taking office.
4. Use of Vice President and Cabinet:
a. I have suggested to the Vice President that
(a) he work really diligently with minority groups, devoting
not less than two-thirds of his time on this (not only the
blacks, but also the Indians, Mexicans, etc. ) ; (b) he spend
half his remaining time on youth (which ties in with the
minorities) ; and (c) he use such time as he has left for
6
intergovernmental relations, serving as your political
(not operational) nexus with Republican governors and
your political counter-weight against the strengthened
Democratic governors. On this point, I have told him it
is important to avoid operational responsibilities because
the problems of governors range across the entire government
and require far too elaborate a staff and too much time for
him to oversee it.
None of the foregoing has his approval, and he may
reject all of it. I have urged that whatever he concludes
must have, first, your very clear-cut personal blessing -
plus, second, hard notice to the Executive Branch and White
House staff that whatever areas you agree upon are definitely
made the exclusive responsibility of the Vice President.
b. I feel the Cabinet has been insufficiently used as
such and that the Cabinet members feel isolated from you
by layers of staff. The all-important "personal relationship
with The Boss" has gone out of it. I urge at least one
conventional Cabinet meeting a month (with an Administration-
wide agenda, not a technical, specialized topic or program),
plus one or two hours set aside weekly for Cabinet officers
to visit personally and privately with you on matters of their
own choosing whether official or personal. I believe the
team-spirit values of the foregoing would well justify this
investment of your precious time.
5. Relations with Congress:
a. I suggest that a hard decision is overdue here:
either use Bill Timmons in keeping with his offial status, or
take on someone who will be so used. I have sensed a
reluctance to use Timmons directly with you, in connection with
the most important issues and members of Congress. He is often
left out of meetings and breakfasts, etc., on Congressional
matters in favor of others not charged with Congress -- and
contacts with Congress by the White House staff increasingly
bypass Timmons instead of going through him.
7
No Congressional man can be worth his salt if the
Hill feels he is ineffectual with the President or lacks easy
access to the President. Therefore, I urge that Bill be so
used, but if this can't be, a more acceptable person should
be installed in his place. Success in this area requires not
only Bill's open and frequent identification with you, but
also acceptance as a prime mover by your Staff -- for example,
his inclusion in Bob's eight o'clock staff meeting on the
same basis as Ehrlichman, Shultz et. al.
The Congressional function is so immensely important
to you. If it is kicked around, ignored, or handled as a
subordinate White House activity, the cost is excessive.
b. Some means needs also to be found to involve
the Congressional group more effectively in program formulation,
instead of being often used as clerks to cart bad news to the
Hill. A great deal of needless trouble can be avoided by the
early imput of Congressional people. While this is attempted
now, I feel it is inadequately done and intensifies your Hill
troubles. Involved here also is the instinctive reaction in
every Executive Branch activity (it is chronic in every depart-
ment as well as in the White House) that the Congressional
side of things is a confounded nuisance, therefore in time it
gets pushed into a corner. In my opinion, it should have at
least the same attention and emphasis as the press in all
areas of the White House.
6. Presidential Travel:
a. I have no competency in this area, other than to
state the obvious -- that where you will need the greatest
strength in 1972, you should manifest the greatest personal
involvement. This would include special identification with
agricultural regions over the next two years, adequate attention
(with the Vice President also) to the South, continued appeal
to blue collar people by open identification with them at var-
ious places in the country, an improved relationship with the
business community (speeches to business organizations here
and there in the country), and some overt actions making very
8
clear your concern for the little folk and disadvantaged
in the society. Trips abroad should be, I believe, very
widely spaced, because we are entering a season in which
national concerns will probably rivet more on domestic
problems than on foreign troubles.
All in all, I believe you are entering a period in
which you will wish to keep on winding down the war as you
wind up the economy, get both shipshape not later than
August 1972 (earlier if at all possible), and devote your
other efforts to proving to the country that you are President
of all the people, whether they are for or against you and
your Administration. If the country believes you are doing
well with the war and the economy and are seeking selflessly
for sensible progress in just a few other areas of particular
concern, you will, I believe, win going away in 1972.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
JIM KEOGH
In answer to the request for some post-election thoughts, I
would like to take the liberty of spinning out my personal reactions
without necessarily trying to establish their general validity.
First, I believe that the campaign schedules of the Vice
President and President were almost exactly right. It was wise to
start the Vice President early and tough and -- considering the
gravity of the situation - - to have the President come in with an
intensive move at the end.
Looking first at the Vice President's campaigning, it seems
to me that he came on as he should have -- hard and natural. But
then he tended to overdo it.
First and perhaps a minor point - he piled up too much
alliteration. A little about pusillanimous pussyfooting and nattering
nabobs of negativism was fine -- it got attention - - but then he did
so much of this that it became a joke and even many of our good
friends got to be a little embarrassed about it.
Beyond this, he seemed to be indulging in overshrill and over-
kill. Instead of landing a good hard punch and letting his target
-2-
drop, he pounded and pounded. The media began dwelling on this and
eventually many of our supporters began to feel that maybe the Vice
President was hitting too hard. The Christine Jorgensen line about
Goodell is an example. By then Charlie was bloody and reeling, and
that line left the Vice President open to charges of cruelty and bad
taste that made even some of his best fans wince.
Fairly early in the campaign, we made a hard turn - and in my
opinion, it was too hard a turn. At the meeting with the Cabinet on
August 19 when political matters were discussed, the President struck
what seemed to me to be a very good tone. The President said the
economy would be the most important factor in the election. Above
all, the President urged, spokesmen should take a positive position on
what the Administration is doing and is trying to do, should also be
positive about our candidates, should hit what the Congress has not
done but should beware of building up opposition candidates by attack-
ing them in a negative way.
Then, along the way, we bought Scammon and Wattenberg. And,
in my judgment, we bought more of their theory than we should have.
The opposition soon saw what we were up to and moved toward joining
us.
In our intense concentration on the Scammon and Wattenberg
thesis, we did not pay enough attention to the fact that the economic
-3-
issue - fear of depression -- was cutting us to the bone in a broad
sweep across the west. The irony of this is that the President had
warned repeatedly about this issue -- the fear of what might happen
in the economic situation, not necessarily what the present situation
was. The opposition exploited this fear expertly. We did not pay
enough attention to the issue.
Despite all this, I think the President's campaigning was --
in the main -- close to target. Ultimately it came through the
media as too negative -- and that's a serious problem - - - but anyone
who was really paying attention knew there was a great deal of the
positive, too. The Anaheim rally was generally fine on national
television a bit too much of Reagan and Murphy for national con-
sumption -- but the President was just right.
Then we made a shattering error. Putting the Phoenix rally
speech on national television the night before the elections was a
dreadful blunder. First of all, a taped rally speech is basically not
a good piece of material for national use on TV. In this instance,
the sound, the setting, the approach made the President seem angry
and harsh and almost mean. The substance was unobjectionable
but the effect was not Presidential. And the strategy gave the oppo-
sition an opportunity to put on Muskie who seemed very statesmanlike,
even if quite dull.
-4-
It was a mistake to have the President on television at all the
night before this election. By then the people had heard enough cam-
paigning. But if the President felt it was necessary to go on, then
the format should have been a quiet chat in a studio or office setting --
the kind of presentation in which the President has proven that he has
no peer.
In the last analysis, I do not think that the Monday night mistake
had much effect on the results. But I am concerned that it was damag-
ing to the President's image in the longer term. It left the wrong tone
and opened the way to the interpretation that the whole campaign was
bitter and harsh.
Turning from the general tone to a specific area, I believe that
in retrospect it was a mistake for the Administration to be wooing the
leaders of organized labor. We throw a big Labor Day dinner for them
and they go out and bludgeon us with rhetoric and money spent for the
opposition. Besides, they are on the wrong side of a very big issue:
inflationary pressure. I realize there are other factors involved here,
but I fear that when the Administration cozies up to the labor bosses
it only tends to alienate a lot of other people who are more likely to be
on its side.
As for the future, I think the Administration must now realize
that it is "the Government in Washington, D. C. From now on,
there should be intense concentration on achievement and solid
-5-
accentuation of the positive. It is no longer profitable to emphasize
what the Administration is against; from now on, the emphasis must
be on what the Administration is for -- what it has done and is doing.
I fear that with our constant feeling that we do not do a good enough
selling job we have come too close to the attitude that it doesn't
make much difference what we do SO long as we sell it right.
In terms of the Administration's relationships with the media,
I can do no better than repeat what I wrote in a memo in June:
"I believe we are relying too much on what -- to use
a crude term I can only describe as gimmicks. We
would do ourselves more good by being more straightfor-
ward.
Too many people are spending too much time draw-
ing up too many game plans. This may make us feel better
and it may make a record on paper -- it seems to show
action -- but I doubt that it is getting results that are worth
all that effort.
Let's face a few facts. Most of the working media
people are 1) against us, and 2) suspicious of us. In the
main, they are hard to fool, although they often fool them-
selves - and that usually gives them an even more negative
stance SO far as we are concerned. It is very difficult
for us to put anything over on them; it is practically im-
possible for us to subvert them. If they were for us we
could do these things; since they are not, we can't.
When we try a gimmick they usually are waiting
at the entrance to the alley and they wind up making us
look more devious than we are. This gives us a credi-
bility problem. The results more often turn out to be
counter-productive And the media wind up being more
suspicious of us than ever.
I think we should do what we're going to do and
present our case for it straightforwardly and not try to
be quite so cute. In the long run, this could be a big
plus with the media. They would be unbelieving at first,
then startled when they realized that we really were
playing it straight. In the end, while they might not be
any more for us, I believe they would respect us.
One tactic that I believe we should use more is the
honest-to-God calculated leak. I don't mean a contrived
leak where we are just trying to sell a line, but a factual
leak of a coming development. This is probably the best
way to get a favorable first story out in a big way. The
-7-
I
reporter and editor who have the story are too anxious
to protect it to let our opposition tear it apart before
they deliver it. And a reporter or editor who knows that
he is getting a big break on some important stories is
a little less apt to be negative.
All this may seem too simple and too direct but
I believe that in the long run it would be a better approach
than trying to con a cynical media corps that has seen SO
many gimmicks for so many years. A straightforward
approach might shock them toward straight reporting. "
###
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 10, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Lyn Nofziger
R
In Response to Request from H. R. Haldeman
1. The President's Election Efforts. I believe his decisi
was 100 percent correct. I believe the average American
previstes
a fighter and a man who is loyal to those under him. Too atten, levalty
is thought of as a one-way thing -- from the troops to the leader.
The President has made loyalty a two-way street; it will pay-off in the
long run.
I think there is some merit to some of the second-guessing. First,
instead of making Vietnam pretty much of a nonissue, it : possible
we could have made it more our issue, although, in Tennessee where
Brock did it, he didn't win so big. Secondly, everyone I have talked to
says Muskie won the Monday night TV presentations. The criticism of
our presentation has been that our production was poor technically and
that Muskie came off as the reasonable man.
Overall, however, I believe the President's campaigning was a tremendous
plus. I believe the question to be asked of the critics is: Would you
have had him do less? The fact is, if he had done less and if the Democrats
had won more, they would have been kicking him around for not having
done enough.
The image of the President now is of a fighter. That is not a bad image;
it is one that breeds respect. If we equivocate, we lose that respect.
2. The President's Posture. It has to be one of continue to fight for
the things and principles in which he believes. I do not think he needs
any change in his modus operandi. However, a sterner public stance
- 2 -
toward inflationary actions by both business and labor might be helpful,
for the fact remains that most employed persons are not members of
unions.
His posture with Congress should be one of wanting to work with Congress,
but at the same time absolutely refusing to surrender to it. I believe
it is better to fight and lose than not to fight because win or lose the
buck always winds up on his desk.
3. Relations With The Media. My feeling is that the President should
have more televised press conferences.
1. He handles them well. Each one to date has been a plus.
2. The media is going to beat him over the head with this
issue, saying he is afraid to face them and/or that he is
denying the public the right to know.
3. He will eventually reach the point where, when he has a
press conference, the media will say that he knuckled
under to pressure.
4. All told, the scarcity of press conferences is creating
an anti-Nixon issue which we don't need.
5.
I don't think we need one every week, but certainly once
every 4-6 weeks is not unreasonable from our point of
view. It is infrequent enough to keep the press unhappy
but frequent enough so they don't have an issue.
I like the idea of meeting with small groups of friendly columnists from
time to time. I think it should be extended to small groups of friendly
reporters who write for individual papers. For instance, Jack Jarrell
from the Omaha World Herald; Ray McHugh from Copley, Lou Hiner
from Pulliam, George Embrey from the Columbus Dispatch, and others.
I do not believe in rewarding the President's enemies in the media; it
does not make friends of them.
4. Use Of The Vice President And The Cabinet.
The Vice President. The Vice President, I think, has functioned
effectively. However, recognizing always that he and we are up against
a hostile media, his effectiveness can be nullified if he is used solely
as a "hatchetman" because he will be labeled as such. Obviously, we
- 3 -
need a hatchetman, but he should not be exposed as the only one. The
National Chairman should carry a much larger share of this burden in
the future. At the same time, the Vice President should be given some
positive assignments during the next year to year and a half, so that
he will be more effective when he takes the stump in 1972. Considera-
tion might be given to making him the major day-to-day spokesman on
domestic affairs, thus taking some of this burden from the President.
The Cabinet. From p.r. and political standpoints, the Cabinet is a
weak one. For instance, not one has aroused enough excitement to be
considered in the press today as a possible successor to the Vice
President or a possible Presidential nominee. The only one who has
built any kind of a political name is Hickle, who did it in opposition to
the President. It is obvious that they cannot all run around getting
headlines, but we might consider arbitrarily picking two or three of
them, and set out to build their political images so they can be used
effectively in 1972 and thereafter. I do not believe we should leave
the building of strong party spokesmen to chance. The President can
build two or three Cabinet officers and half a dozen members of the
Congress, but it must be a deliberately planned and executed effort.
It must be a continuing thing.
Regardless, I believe all members of the Cabinet should continue to
be utilized on a programmed basis, and be provided with political
speaking engagements and political input. We need not only to sell
the President, but also to sell the Administration. If we minimize
the issues for the Democrats we minimize their chances, regardless
of who their candidate is.
5. Relationships With Congress. Relationships with the Congress have
gotten better as this Administration has become more familiar with the
attitudes of Congressmen of both Houses. A never-ending effort is
needed, however, to keep relations good. I believe the President al-
ready is accessible to members to about the maximum. However, we
should assure that senior staff members and Cabinet and subcabinet
should also be accessible and cooperative, especially where Republicans
are involved. I cannot see any reason to do anything drastically dif-
ferent, but I believe our people must be kept continually aware of the
need to be accessible and courteous, even if we can't do anything for
the individual Congressman at the time.
6. Presidential Travel. I believe there should be as much as possible
without it appearing that the President is neglecting his duties.
- 4 -
1. It takes the government to the people and this should be
the approach.
2. It counters the "isolation" charge which may be phony
but which must be countered.
3. It builds confidence in the people when they see that the
President can move about with impunity. It is good for
the country, and if the President is doing something that is
good for the country it is good for him.
7. The New York Election. It is apparent that the Buckley victory was
a Republican victory; not a Conservative victory. The Conservative
Party was poorly structured, and there was much internal bickering.
As a result the Buckley campaign was staffed, organized and run largely
by Republicans. The Conservative vote in New York is largely a dis-
sident Republican vote. I would suggest wrapping Jim Buckley close
to this Administration, in the hopes that we can use him to build a
strong middle-of-the-road base for the New York Republican Party,
with which we can wrest the Party from the liberals four years from
now. I think we can do better by bringing the Conservatives back into
a middle-of-the-road Republican Party then we can by creating a
permanent three-party situation there.
8. The Negative Aspects Of The Next Two Years. I believe, still, that
more people vote against than vote for. I believe we must, therefore,
begin actively to collect and disseminate information that will give
people reasons to vote against Muskie, Kennedy or whoever the Democratic
nominee for President may be. I believe we must do the same thing in
the key Senatorial races.
Our perennial weaknesses have been:
1. poor research
2. poor use of research
3. failure to attack on a continuing basis; people forget easily
We must say again and again and again that Muskie is a polluter, that
he is already running for President, that he has no standing in the
Senate, etc. We must never let the public forget Chappaquidick, or that
there is insanity in Tunney's family, or that Stevenson, McGovern and
Ramsey Clark are cop-haters. We must magnify and repeat the stories
of their every mistake and misstep.
- 5 -
This will take: 1) good research; 2) a few spokesmen who are willing
to attack regardless of the cries of outrage; 3) a continuing dissemination
of this stuff to the media and through the media. We must begin now
in all areas.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 18, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Patrick J. Buchanan
(1) The President already has my analysis of the election results.
Would reiterate several points.
First, where our operation was far ahead of the field in assessing
the impact of the mass media in the 1968 elections in the length
and intensity of the 1970 campaign we did not take into proper ac-
count the enormously enhanced power the Vice President, but
especially the President have to dominate the media as incumbents.
In past years, it took weeks and months to hammer home a single
issue. The same can now be accomplished in days. The 1972 cam-
paign should be thought out on the same kind of basis the President
thought out his entire 1966-1968 political profile. Now is our time
for a "political moratorium". Further, the fall campaign of 1972
should be so constituted as to emphasize various and changing themes,
saving the strongest pitch for possiby the last week (or two). We
should not underestimate our ability to make a case, our ability to
focus national attention on a single theme or the capacity of the pub-
lic for being turned off by "overkill. "
Second, reexamine the instruments of campaigning. Frankly, to
what degree, if any, does campaigning enhance an incumbent's
stature in the public mind? Is a rally with a cheering crowd and
an effective cheer line by the President on night TV as good a forum
for taking RN's case to the country as a nine p.m. press conference
telling the nation why RN needs these men. Will the nation respond
in better political terms to Nixon the campaigner, or to Nixon the
President making his campaign speeches quietly and forcefully in
prime time from the Oval Office? Has the day of the front-porch
campaign or its modern counterpart returned?
If I were to make a shotgun judgment now as to what kind of cam-
paign the President should run in 1972 I would recommend that
he wrap himself in the trappings of his office give once a week
major address on nationwide television at night and make not
more than a handful of separate campaign appearances at noon to
2
show the nation, via networks, the President has the confidence of
the people in the provinces -- he is their man.
But the President clear 1y needs an intensive analysis on the effects
of campaigning per se. The team we have put together is by general
judgments the best campaign team in history. Even our media
adversaries say they wish we could run the government as well as we
can run a campaign. The danger that lurks is that we shall become
so enamoured of our success at managing the techniques of campaigning,
1968 style, that we may lose sight of the fact that they may now be
irrelevant or worse, counter-productive - for a sitting President
in 1972.
Third, there are states such as Illinois, Wisconsin, Ohio and Florida,
essential to victory in 1972, where the Party has been mangled. We
have to begin now to move to resolve differences and bring these
parties together, or else begin almost at once organizing our own
political machinery for the elections of 1972. John Sears told me that
if the President were interested, he would draft a political memorandum
with his thoughts on what should be done now and in the coming year,
both on an organization basis and a strategy basis with regard to
downgrading Muskie, and perhaps building up Humphrey as our
opponent, on countering Wallace and strengthening our political
machinery in the swing states. If the President is interested
I will tell him to move on it right away.
(2)
Posture of the President through 1970 and into 1971.
The immediate necessity is to put politics and the campaign of 1970
behind us. Nothing we can do or way further is going to alter
judgments, already made, abo ut whether or not 1970 was a success
or a failure. Our case has been presented the other side has
presented its version of the results and the commentators and
columnists have by and large already staked out their positions.
Anything more is overkill.
This is consistent with my strong view that the time for Nixon the
politician campaigning for his party is over the time is now for
the President to represent himself to the nation as the elected
President of the American people above the political wars now
certain to ensue within the Democratic Party.
3
Through its gross distortion of the kind of campaign the President
conducted, the media has driven home the impression of Nixon the
partisan of the United States. We must not play into their hands
with top-level White House discussions of the campaign of 1970 or
the prospects for 1972 in either party. We must get back exclu-
sively to the business of governing and leading the nation.
The election-eve impression left of RN the strident partisan and
Muskie the national conciliator can be reversed in a matter of weeks.
My strong recommendation is that at the President's first press con-
ference, following the election which will be a bear-baiting exercise
he demonstrathumor, a relaxed attitude, exude confidence and
speak in terms of politics being behind us and now moving forward to
work together on the nation's business at hand. Speak of the national
need in calm reasoned terms for what the President has request-
ed for the defense of friendly nations; speak of the need for action in
areas where action has been delayed and people have unnecessarily
suffered for that delay. (Unless I hear otherwise, this would be the
kind of mood I would try to put into the Q. and A. for the next ap-
pearance.)
(With regard to Muskie, he suffers from the fact that he is not con-
sidered an outspoken leader by the ideological wing of his party
he is likely, as McGovern is doing now, to begin taking potshots at us,
which will be clearly political. We ought to simply dismiss them as
political not engage in head-to-head and let him go about destroy-
ing his media image by himself, which he may well be forced to do to
win the hearts of the ideologues that dominate the left wing of his
party.)
Looking at further horizons, I see a need for the President to move
back toward the role of national reconciliator symbolic gestures
toward the black majority should be made (not to win votes; we can't)
but to indicate to the great middle that the President is attempting to
answer the crucial needs of the entire nation none excluded.
We also need to have something positive and appealing for the work-
ing people of this country in the way of tangible major domestic
programs. Since, in any choice between a counterfeit liberal and
the real McCoy, the country will take the real McCoy we ought to
have some domestic initiatives of our own with the Nixon brand
clearly on them. Regrettably, we are now pouring billions into pro-
grams like OEO, Model Cities, Urban Renewal, etc. for which we
get no credit whatsoever.
4
My thought would have been to terminate or diminish as many of their
programs as possible in order to shift the considerable amount of dol-
lars into Nixon programs which would have a visible impact by 1972.
To this degree, I concur with Phillips: To put together a new majority
in American politics, we are going to have to provide the working men
and women, white and blue collar, with more than rhetoric; we have to
bring home the bacon; whether in the form of parochaid, or what.
Finally, to counter the impression being pushed by the media that this
is an Administration concerned only with cold statistics, an Admin-
istration long on public relations gimmickry and short on substance
and vision - I feel the President should seek out occasions to demon-
strate "humanity" and "heart" spontaneous occasions, not planned
meetings to demonstrate a symbolic affinity with, and concern for the
unemployed and the less fortunate.
The old Republican nemesis is the national image of the party of the
bankers, party of business, the party that doesn't really give a damn
about people. The Democrats are going to use this in 1972 as they
have in every election since 1932 and we need to consciously con-
sider words, deeds, symbolic acts that will give the lie to this charge
before it is made by the National Democratic Party in earnest.
(3)
Recommended Changes in Relations with the Media
The networks are not with us. NBC is openly hostile. The national
press is in an ugly mood over both the lack of press conferences,
and the feeling that we are B.S.-ing them about the election returns.
Given their natural affinity for a political fight, given their ideologi-
cal pre-disposition, given their normal enthusiasm for the challenger,
the underdog our situation here is not good.
On the plus side, it has never really been that good the hostility of
the liberal media was always one element we had to consider. What
to do.
We are never going to be loved by the national press corps that is a
given fact. Any transparent attempts to become buddies will fool no
one; will succeed nowhere. What our specific focuses should be, I be-
lieve are these:
(a) Go over the heads of the national press to the nation on more
televised press conferences. Where we run into a problem
of over-exposure, do them in the morning or at noon. Have
the national press in for more of the Presidential, non-tele-
vised press conferences. These carry risks but this
5
instrument is among our most effective; we are extremely good
at it; invariably the President scores with the people, if not with
the press.
(b) While our differences with the national media remain irreconcilable
we should take the initiative to ease tensions a bit. While there is
much psychologically satisfying in roasting them with regularity,
there is not much political profit in this. We have garnered much
of that already. If we intend to take them on and hard we
ought to first re-establish good relations, and wait until the fall
of 1970.
Any future attacks on the media should be rifle shots -- at NBC
for a specific abuse and not be perceived in such a way as
that we are roasting the entire corps. This tends to leave some
of them so browned off they make a special effort to gut us at
every opportunity.
Our best hope for a fair shake lies now with the Reasoner-Smith
team at ABC. We ought to give them our best leaks -- provide
them with the best breaks. If we have to pick one network to do
some major special on clearly it should be this one.
In attacking and supporting, we should as mentioned above, be
selective a Herb Kaplow who will do something fair for us
on the worst network, should not be slighted while Chancellors
and Vanocurs should get nothing. And if we move on the attack,
it should similarly be selective.
4. Use of the Vice President and the Cabinet
Like the President but to a far greater degree -- the Vice Presi-
dent should shift over from the political offensive to the policy of-
fensive. The time for combativeness, for political in-fighting, is
clearly over for now. In my view, the Vice President should be
given a good slice of the domestic franchise to oversee, an issue or
issues, a program or programs, to demonstrate the other side of
the man the capable and competent executive working to get things
done. His role as the President's Terrible Swift Sword should be
minimized; he should be used in this assignment only when necessary;
the President should utilize Cabinet Members and White House Staf-
fers with good liberal credentials to start carrying the fight. They
have capital in the bank to do it; the Vice President needs to re-
plenish capital.
6
The Vice President makes an effective low-key presentation on
television; when he is provided a new franchise, he should take
to the networks to argue his case. He should be shown fighting
for something not just against somebody. It would enhance
his stature if he were given a foreign assignment of some dura-
tion this would broaden his image with the public; he might
well make a campus appearance or appearances; he might well
make a surprise visit for a A. and A. session with black leaders;
he should be given the opportunity to demonstrate his abilities
other than as simply campaigner; he should be provided the op-
portunity to show the many other facets to his personality other than
fierce partisan.
The Veep is the most loyal of the President's soldiers; he took more
wounds and scored more direct hits in the campaign than any other
of the President's men this was his job. But, to continue to do
that job effectively, he needs to retire temporarily a political glad-
iator to show the nation that he is something other than the War
Lover of American Politics.
Whenever, there is a new program to be announced that the Presi-
dent is not going to announce the Vice President should be the
one before the cameras. Whenever RN is about ready to let some-
thing go of significance in the domestic arena the Vice President
might well be the one who gets the headlines by giving an inkling of
the new progressive direction of the Administration.
(The Cabinet)
Unless specifically asked, I would feel it presumptous to recommend
changes in the President's highest appointed body. But my views
briefly are these: The President's commitment to clean up the
Department of State has manifestly not been carried out by those
given the franchise the President's men are not the men domina-
ting that body the career service historically hostile to the
President has too many positions of power and we are going to
suffer damaging leaks in the 1972 campaign unless we do something
about it. The Secretary of the Interior does this President no good
and a great deal of harm with his transparent attempts to ingratiate
himself with the liberal media. While I continue to admire Secretary
Romney's tenacity and guts, he is a committed believer in the com-
pulsory integration of American society to solve the race problem.
My feeling is that this is socially dangerous at this time and politically
disasterous and we spend too damn much time and effort trying to
change peoples minds to change their policy to accord with the
President. We might attempt changing the men rather than the minds.
Finally, in the area of the economy, a mortal danger for 1972, we need
7
a man at Treasury who can articulate the President's policies, a
staunch loyalist, who has both credentials and capability in the
economic and political areas.
(5)
Relations with Congress
With regard to the regular Republicans, we are still in good shape.
As for the "Baker's dozen", they are going to make their own de-
cisions as to what to do depending on their own political hides;
they care as little about ours as we do about theirs. For example,
Hatfield a True Believer can be expected to depart little from
his former path. Percy, the Opportunist, who is up in 1972, is
already making friendly noises. My view is that we ought not to
wage war with them but to treat them in accord with the degree
of support they give us and not lean upon them. Where we can
find areas of agreement, exploit them; and see if we can convince
them in their and the party's interests to minimize the de-
gree of Goodellism that goes on.
As for the Democrats, as one of our aides put it, we are going to
be "walking through a vat of acid, 11 for the next two years. In the
Senate half a dozen have their eye on the President and all
their decisions, actions, statements, attacks and support are go-
ing to be on that basis. There is nothing at all we are going to be
able to do with them. We should have our Cabinet and White House
staffers programmed to answer their charges to deal with them
on the political warfare level.
As for our own Congressional Relations
in my view Bill Timmons
is not only absolutely loyal but also the most hard-working of the
President's men in the least enviable of Presidential assignments.
I think he needs more manpower over there; I think he needs more
visible identification as the President's man for Congressional re-
lations; I think he needs more access to the President himself and
his inner councils; I think he needs to be given more credibility for
his
job on the Hill by the President's visible demonstration that
he is our man on Capitol Hill.
Finally, the President should place the onus for starting the political
war on the Democratic Party in Congress by letting them fire the
first few shots. Perhaps, when this Congress fails to act, as it will,
and goes home for Christmas the President could, more in sor-
row than anger, go on the nation's networks or lead off a press con-
ference with a doleful recounting of its failures to act in the national
interest and the President's hopes that the new Congress will
serve the nation a little better.
8
(6)
Presidential Travel
Abroad: The exigencies of foreign policy will dictate if the President
must go abroad to advance the national interest. From the standpoint of
RN's political posture, I strongly recommend against any "Grand Tour"
trips ala the recent sojourn to Europe and the Mediterranean. The
President is generally conceded high marks for his handling of foreign
policy. The nation via television has already seen the President moving
through countless cheering throngs abroad. Repeat performances will
be redundant; they will be written off in the media as the last trip
was by some traveling reporters as politically motivated. We have
drawn down our balance in this account there is not much capital
left in foreign visits over the next six months. Lest we be charged,
as we have been charged, of going abroad in search of crowds while
the gnawing domestic problems remain unsolved, I recommend against.
Also, by not going abroad in the near future, the President will have
positioned himself well for a major foreign visit in early of mid-1972 --
when it would be perceived as something of a far greater interest, and
when it could more effectively underscore the President's successes
overseas in time for the 1972 elections.
At Home: Consistent with the view that the President must put the
partisan image back of himself, reflect the "humanity and heart" of
the Administration, reassume the posture of President of all the
American people, I would recommend spontaneous visits, stop-offs
to areas of social depression in the country whether of unemployed
whites or rural blacks.
Because of the appreciable amount of negative reportage we are
receiving for "staging" events -- these would necessarily have to be
truly spontaneous; symbolic of the President's personal concerns
for the people he leads. Democrats have consistently been superior
to Republicans with this sort of communication and given our party's
hereditary image as the Party of Big Business this is a woeful weakness.
Such visits will also blunt the inevitable charge of the 1972 elections
that Republicans are concerned only with cold statistics like 5.5 percent
unemployment -- that the President doesn't give a damn about poor
people.
Similarly, however, as the nation has seen the President in cheering
throngs abroad SO also, from the campaign, has it seen streets
lined with cheering people at home. Though the motorcading through the
crowds may serve as a rejoinder to any contention the President is
not popular with the people it also would seem redundant in the after-
math of the election.
y
(7)
Final Points.
First, we are getting some nasty criticism for having exploited
the San Jose incident, and for alleged being an Administration more
interested in image than substance -- long on P.R. and short on
accomplishment. If pressed, this attack could be very damaging
and I recommend we consider drawing in our horns on the P.R.
operation side of things. The nation is one that is very keen to
and very down on P.R. -- and the last thing we want in the
world is to have the press start picking up the McGinnis theme of
hucksterism. We should have a high level review of the effectiveness -
or again the word comes to mind, the possible "overkill" of this
side of the operation. At all cost we should avoid any tarnishing
of the President's image as President in the minds of the people --
and these attacks bother me.
Finally, at all costs we must avoid, in the wake of the election,
and in the pressure the President is assuredly getting from the left,
any kind of transparant public move to the left. This damaged us after
Kent State and such would now be tacit admission the Restons
and Sideys were right and we were wrong on the campaign. It
would be disheartening to the bulk of our support. Rather than any
left or right move it should be a forward move away from the
partisan role of the campaign toward fulltime President again.
ass
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
4:00 P.M. MTG WiTH JEFF HART
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 12, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: JIM KEOGH
JK
Jeff Hart is nearly finished with his manuscript for "The Great
Comeback" the book on your course from November 1962 to
January 20, 1969. He has interviewed all of the key people who
were part of that history, and it is my understanding that he has
been given thorough cooperation. What he would like to have from
you is some personal insight and feeling about those years, includ-
ing some material which he can use in direct quotes. He will have
some specific questions. Hart has excellent judgment, is friendly
toward us, and I am confident that he will produce a good book. I
recommend that you talk with him as freely as you feel appropriate,
Hobe Lewis tells me that if Hart produces a manuscript in January
as he intends it would be no problem to bring the book out
next October. On a rush basis, Hobe thinks he could get it out in
June. I believe that October would be better, since this timing
would put it on the Christmas books list for next year and would
give it a good spin into 1972. It would also avoid the problems that
might arise in a rush situation with regard to checking and revising.
The possibility that we might bring Hart onto the staff has been
discussed from time to time during this past year. In my opinion,
Hart would be a good man to have on the staff. He did well in the
things he wrote for us during the campaign. However, I think it
would be a mistake to bring him onto the staff before this book
comes out. The book will have a much better reception if Hart is
a professor at Dartmouth than it will if he is a member of the White
House staff when it is published. If he is a member of the staff, I
fear that a rather general reaction might be that he has merely
written what we wanted him to write. Therefore, I think that con-
sideration of whether he should be brought onto the staff should be
deferred until after the book is published and reviewed.
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
THE WHITE HOUSE
E.O. 12085, Section 6-102
By MH
WASHINGTON
NARS, Date 1/21/80
November 13, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Tom Charles Huston TH
SUBJECT: 1970 Elections and Prospects for 1972
Perhaps the most significant result of the 1970 elections is that the
rank-and-file Democrats came out of it convinced that they can win the
Presidency in '72. It is only necessary to remember the difference in
attitude among Republicans in the dark days following the Goldwater
debacle and in the jubilant days following the 1966 elections to realize
that the psychology of victory should not be underestimated as a political
factor.
The fact that many folks now believe that a Democrat can win in '72
could, however, work to our advantage. Our best hope is that the ambition
of the Democrat contenders will re-open the ideological wounds self-
inflicted upon the party in 1968. Of particular interest is the possibility
that the Kennedy people may decide that 1972 is the year for a Democrat,
and if Teddy doesn't move, he will be out for eight years and that is too
long to wait. Initially I would think this impulse to move would be stronger
among the Kennedy camp-followers than with the Senator himself, but he
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might very well be convinced that all is forgiven and he should go for the
big one. Should this happen, I would look for the Kennedy allies in the
media to pull a "Romney" on Muskie and knock him out of consideration as
a serious contender. Broder is already warning Muskie to be on the alert
for such a move.
POSTURE THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAINTAIN IN 1971
The President's posture in 1971 should not be much different than it was
in 1967 he should maintain a relatively low profile and leave the arena to
the hustling contenders. A Democrat aspirant will be pressing hard to make
out an independent record in the Senate that qualifies him as the preferable
nominee, which means he will have to promote himself at his colleagues
expense. This may work in several ways. For example, I would not be
surprised to see Senator McGovern open up on Muskie on the grounds that he
compromised on the law and order issue at the expense of principle. The
left-wing of the Democratic Party is not at all happy with the shift many of
their candidates made on the law and order issue; after all they have a
considerable investment in the repression issue. If we played our hand
properly, we could see a fine row going among the Democrats over who has
yielded to political expediency at the expense of the young, the black, and
the poor.
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If we wish to pursue a policy of leaving the Democrats enough rope for a
family lynching party, it follows that the President should strike a posture of
studied statesmanship and bold leadership. The contrast should be between a
working President coping with tough problems and bickering Democrats
jockying for partisan advantage.
If I had to select a single word to characterize the posture the President
should assume, it would be "candor." Candor requires that one take others
into his confidence, that one convey a sense of partnership, of shared
experience; it requires an openness of opinion as well as of deed, a willing-
ness to admit mistakes as well as to claim success. The best illustration
is the November 9, 1969, address on Vietnam. It was a masterpiece pre-
cisely because the viewer had the impression that he was being talked with,
not to; that the President was taking him into his confidence, explaining the
problem and discussing the solution, asking for understanding without
demanding support.
In pursuing a policy of candor, it is not necessary to ignore political
realities. The political battle is waged on two levels. Where the public
interest is demonstrably at stake, the appearance and the reality must be
one. What is done and how it is done are equally important and both must
be clearly visible and credible. However, where the problem is strictly
political (i. e., tactical) the appearance must often be at odds with the reality.
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It was said of President Van Buren that he rowed toward every objective
with muffled oars. This is a wise and necessary political tactic, one
which we appear to have foresworn in the recent election, but it is a
difficult and dangerous one, for the temptation is to confuse the tactic
with the strategy. The distinction is between political objectives and
national goals. Candor is a philosophy of government, "muffled oars" a
practice of politics -- and practice should always be the servant of
philosophy.
THE MEDIA
We take the media too seriously. It is hostile, it is irritating, it is
even on occasion demaging, but there isn't much we can accomplish by
worrying that David Brinkley is going to burp in our face. We have
attempted to neutralize the media by employing tactics that presuppose
that ideological hostility can be overcome by advertising techniques. We
should deal with the media on our terms and in a manner that is conducive
to presenting the image we want to get across, not the image that someone
else (usually our enemies) expects of us.
There are several dangers from a concentrated effort to maximize
media coverage. First, the risk of over-exposure. Studied aloofness is
often the best politics (DeGaulle certainly understood this). The President
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doesn't have to intrude on everyone's supper to earn their respect, confi-
dence, and support. Second, there is the risk that an extensive media
effort will look contrived. We are already seeing columns accusing us of
attempting to substitute a media-created image for substantive programs
and policies. We are rather overt in our media orientation and the public
might conclude that we are trying to con them.
We should use the media to project the image we want on the terms we
desire. In this respect, I believe we should concentrate on portraying RN
as a working President, as an educator who uses the media as a means of
reaching and educating the people and not as a means of exploiting or
deceiving them. Obviously, what I am saying is that the media should be
used to convey the candor of the President. Specifically, we should have
more televised press conferences, more in-depth discussions with network
commentators, and some televised "fireside chats. 11 Moreover, we should
not go to the people only when an issue is burning and we should not go
simply to solicit overt support. We should try some new formats. In short,
we should use the media as a precise and targeted weapon.
The burden of carrying the day-to-day message to the people on the
programs and policies of the Administration should fall to the Veep, the
Cabinet, the National Chairman, and the Congressional leadership. It is
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not enough to say that they don't do the job -- we should see that they do it.
The President should not be burdened with the inadequacies of daily television
news coverage. Unless we are prepared to go all the way and buy a network,
we ought to quit worrying about the problem. It is fruitless to attempt to
meet Brinkley, et. al. on their own terms and all we can get in the process
is ulcers. It's not worth it.
THE VICE PRESIDENT
The Vice President did his campaign assignment well, but he may have
committed political suicide in the process. To an increasing portion of
Middle America, he is coming across as radical as those whom he attacks.
He needs to develop an image as a reasonable and credible man, a task which
he can easily handle if encouraged to do SO.
Many people believe the Vice President has told a lot of truth, albeit in
language that they regard as excessive. However, people can tolerate only
so much unpopular and disconcerting truth. They want to be reassured, not
alarmed. More importantly, they want to believe in the man as much as the
message. The Vice President should shift his emphasis without yielding an
inch on the substantive issues he raised. He should de-escalate the rhetoric
without de-escalating the substance of his message.
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The Vice President should take four steps in the months ahead. First,
he should address himself to proposed solutions to the problems he has
outlined. He should indicate that having identified various problems, he
is now ready to offer possible solutions. Second, he should make a
conspicuous effort to resume the exercise of his official responsibilities,
i.e., presiding over the Senate, presiding over the various councils he
chairs, etc. He needs to reassert himself as a working as opposed to a
campaigning Vice President. One area where he should concentrate his
efforts is in the field of inter-governmental relations. He should be our
principal spokesman for the New Federalism. Third, the President might
consider giving the Vice President a more prominent role in the formula-
tion and articulation of our domestic programs. And finally, the Vice
President should arrange to appear on as many interview-type television
shows as possible where he can develop his image as a rational, reasonable,
and believable man.
The risk of such a course is that the Vice President will be ignored by
the national media. However, I don't think that is too important. If he
gets out in the country he will get local coverage by virtue of his office.
Moreover, if he begins to play a prominent role in substantive policy
and program areas, he will have to get national media attention by virtue
of the newsworthiness of the subject matter.
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Consistent with my view that the President ought to maintain a rather
low and select profile, it might be advantageous to let the Vice President
assume a more prominent substantive role. Not only would this enhance
the prestige of the Vice President, but it would buffet the President and
enable him to avoid exposure except on the big ones where we want to make
a decisive point.
CONGRESS
We are going to have to get along with Congress if we want to get our
legislative program through. In addition, we want to encourage the Senate
Democrats to fight among themselves in anticipation of securing advantage
in the race for the nomination. We should avoid institutional attacks of
affronts; we should also avoid making a major fight out of minor issues.
However, on carefully selected issues of major importance to the success of
the Administration, we should not hesitate to fight like hell. Although beyond
the scope of this memorandum, I might note in passing that I believe there
is political profit to be gained from drawing the line with Congress on
foreign and defense policy.
The key to our success on the Hill will be our ability to forge a fairly
united Republican team in the Senate. We should make every effort to
pacify the liberals consistent with the policy posture of the President.
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However, I think we should not overlook the possibility of putting pressure
on the deviants within the ranks of the party, making use of Dole, Tower,
and other loyalists for this purpose. In addition, we should not let Hatfield,
et. al. forget what happened to good old Charlie. We should also emphasize
that we must all sink or swim together in '72 and it is certainly not in the
interests of those seeking re-election to be publicly at odds with their
President. If possible, we might consider our own "shadow" leader, a
loyalist in the Senate who is unofficially recognized as the President's
personal spokesman, a man who can count noses SO that when it is obvious
we have the votes we can leave the deviants alone and let them do their own
thing. This would probably get Hugh Scott's nose out of joint, but since he
is so expert at looking after his own skin, I don't see why we should be
reluctant to do the same.
PRESIDENTIAL TRAVEL
Consistent with my suggestion of a low profile, I would recommend
against extensive travel except where demonstratively purposeful. While
the exposure when abroad is extensive, I am not convinced that it has any
lasting impact unless associated with concrete accomplishments. I keep
thinking of LBJ and the Spirit of Glassboro -- what a fleeting moment of
glory that was!
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THE CABINET
We need some changes in the Cabinet. While perhaps I am vindictive
and narrow-minded, I have never forgiven Secretary Hickel for the letter
he sent during the Cambodian operation which was a gratuitous embarrass-
ment to the President. He should have been fired upon receipt of the
letter and he has no claim to his seat by virtue of estoppel. He still
should go.
If Secretary Romney persists in his plan to launch a massive federal
integration drive in northern suburban housing developments, he should be
sent back to Michigan to discuss the political wisdom of his plan with the
voters of Warren, Michigan.
There are a couple of other potential nominees for retirement, but
Hickel and Romney are initially adequate to get the message across that
loyalty and good judgment are values highly regarded in this Administration.
At the sub-Cabinet level there should be a major purge. We are being
screwed daily by people who have been held over or (I say this reluctantly)
by people whom we appointed. HEW could afford a complete house-cleaning
from Under-Secretary on down, and I suspect that I could put together a
list of two dozen top-notch candidates for purging without even bothering
to consult Senators Goldwater and Thurmond.
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While I am on the purge kick, I would like to put in a word for a man
who should be first on any list: Randy Thrower. The best argument against
Thrower is that there is no one in the White House who dares call IRS for
information without fear that word of the inquiry will be leaked. I am a
strong admirer of Van Buren's "muffled oar" strategy, but it is only
possible if you have control of your own Administration. I assume that we
intend to play for keeps in '72 and that means we need to have the goods on
the guys who are determined to do us in. We need control of IRS. It is
less important that the Commissioner be a tax whiz than that he be willing
to follow orders. Thrower can't. He is arrogant and insubordinate and
should go immediately.
Finally, a word about method. The impression is abroad that we are
afraid to purge disloyal or incompetent personnel. This is dangerous for
it breeds contempt as well as insubordination. Certainly there will be
screams of outrage if we have a massive purge, but the screams will last
about 10 days and we will have a loyal team for the next two years. Surely
we can afford to take the heat when the stakes are SO high. Cabinet shake-
ups are not unusual in American history. Jackson fired his entire cabinet
save the Postmaster General. Truman fired Wallace when he was the
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darling of the liberals, progressives, and communists. Roosevelt had
no compunction about throwing overboard anyone whom he regarded as
a political liability. We should draw up a list of those who are either
disloyal or incompetent, find suitable replacements, and strike with a
single sudden blow. While the screams in the liberal press would be
awesome, the long-term benefits would be more than compensating. We
have to get control of the government; there are too many Trojan horses
within the walls as we prepare for what could be a close election in '72.
PARTY ORGANIZATION
I am beginning to sound like Stalin, but we also need a purge at the
National Committee. Larry O'Brien stands head-and-shoulders above
our man as a party chairman. He is a gut fighter and he is effective.
During the past campaign, many of us were appalled at the inability of the
National Committee to produce. And Jim Allison's appearance on tele-
vision the morning after the election where he admitted to our major
defeats and discounted the impact of the President and Vice President was
hardly helpful. Moreover, there have been so many columns about how
the White House refuses to listen to the sound advice of Morton and Allison
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that one must surely conclude that they are inspired by National Committee
personnel who are more concerned about their own interests than the
President's. We need a national chairman who is a fighter, who is
effective on the stump, who can use the media, who is loyal to the
President but not too closely identified with him personally, who is a
good administrator, and who will do as he is told. We also need a new
management team at the committee which is efficient, loyal, and able to
make use of the resources that are potentially available. We attempt Lo do
too much here that should and could be done at the National Committee if they
had the proper staffing and leadership.
STATE PARTY ORGANIZATION
We took it on the chin in some states with potential serious consequences
in 1972. States like Ohio, Wisconsin, Indiana, Florida, and Texas are
vitally important to us in 1972. We should take a direct interest in party
rebuilding efforts in those states to ensure that we have a viable organiza-
tion ready to field strong candidates in '72.
INTELLECTUALS AND ISSUES
The anti-war types have a song which begins, "Give Peace a Chance, 11
We should consider giving selected conservative alternatives a chance.
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Jim Buckley's campaign suggested that large numbers of traditionally
Democratic voters are searching for alternatives and not merely on the
law and order issue. In fact, the interesting thing about Buckley's
campaign is that he, as a professed conservative running on a third party
ticket, came across as a more reasonable and credible candidate on a
variety of issues than many regular Republicans who thought they were
waging a "conservative" campaign. These fellows were about as successful
in their efforts as I would have been running as a New Leftist, for the
voters can spot a phony. The heavy-handedness of their campaigns
suggested that they thought the conservative alternative was what the
New York Times said it was.
Since 1964 there has emerged a new generation of principled but
practical conservatives of whom Buckley is but one. On many university
faculties there are young intellectuals who are developing alternatives to
current programs whose intellectual well spring is the New Deal. We ought
to consider opening some lines to these people and soliciting their ideas and
suggestions. There is doubtless going to be a big push for a program of
national health insurance. I fear we may respond with a proposal that
merely splits the difference with Meany, that accepts his major premises
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and opens the door to socialized medicine. On such major issues where
it is obvious we should do something, we ought to look beyond the
bureaucracy of HEW and consider other alternatives. We ought not let
Buckley and Reagan become the spokesmen for an emerging conservative
program. We don't have to make any sharp swing to the right, but we
ought to translate some of our conservative rhetoric into a few conserva-
tive programs. We might find as Reagan did that they don't hurt us
politically. And if we choose those that are directed to ethnics, blue
collar workers, and Catholics, we might find they help us considerably.
A FINAL SUGGESTION
It might be worth the trouble and expense to ask a group of talented
political types on the outside to take on the assignment of keeping their
ear to the ground and passing on their thoughts and recommendations for
your study on a regular basis. I have in mind such people as Kevin
Phillips, John Sears, a couple of young intellectuals with public opinion
analysis backgrounds. These people might be able to give us an insight
on a regular basis that would be helpful in gaining a fresh perspective on
what is happening in the country. Perhaps this is unnecessary, but it
might be of some help.
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In conclusion, I would suggest we take the following steps over the
near-term: (1) get control of the government; (2) emphasize substantive
policy and minimize media exposure; (3) start organizing for '72 by
establishing a working organization at the White House, putting in a new team
at the National Committee, identifying key states that require special
party-building attention, and considering the use of outside analysts; and
(4) have the Vice President shift his emphasis to a positive tone in order to
establish himself as a reasonable and believable man and a working member
of the policy team.
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