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From the President to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Thoughts on memoranda from 1970 campaign. 30 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/22/1970
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From the President to H.R. Haldeman. RE: Thoughts on memoranda from 1970 campaign. 30 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/22/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Description
49
54
11/22/1970
Campaign
Memo
From the President to H.R. Haldeman. RE:
Thoughts on memoranda from 1970
campaign. 30pgs.
Monday, June 04, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
TYPE
DATE
RESTRICTION
NUMBER
NI
Morno
From the President to HRH
11/22/70
C
[DOC 13]
Re "....memanda submitted
by members of the staff on the
70 caropaign, and the
N2
Memo
From Ehrlichman to RN
11/24/70
"
[Doc 14]
Re: meeting with Secretary Hickel
Wednesday, November 25, 1970
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE FILES
83
FOLDER TITLE
Beginning November 22,1970
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: President's Office Files
Box Number:
83
Folder:
Beginning November 22, 1970
Document
Disposition
13
Return Private/Political
14
Retain Close Invasion of Privacy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 22, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
I have now had the opportunity to read all the memoranda submitted
by members of the staff on the '70 campaign, and the period
immediately ahead, and also to bring together some of my own
thoughts on those subjects. This memorandum will deal with the
problem generally and, in certain cases, quite specifically. You will
note that in several instances, it will require definite follow-through.
Where that is the case, I would like for you to give me a report on
what has or has not been accomplished. I do not expect you to follow
through in every respect, in most cases it will be a matter of your
delegating the project to someone you have confidence in. This brings
me to my first recommendation for the next two years.
1.
I can think of nothing more important than for you to have
four top-notch aides of the quality of Ed Morgan and Colson,
who will carry out the policies we may decide are appropriate.
I am suggesting here not people who are burdened down, as
will be the Ehrlichman staff with the problems of programs.
This is the least difficult of our assignments, because programs
in one Administration or another will always someway be
handled - sometimes better, sometimes worse. We probably
will do them better. But, in the final analysis, elections are
not won or lost by programs. They are won or lost on how
these programs are presented to the country, and how all the
political and public relations considerations are handled. Ed
Morgan is an ideal man for one of these posts - Colson may
be, to an extent, another, although he may be tied down with
too many other assignments. It is vitally important that you
get four, or preferably even five, men who are completely self-
less, who will swear on a bible that they will never talk to the
press under any circumstances, and who will work together for
our common goals. Each of them should have three or four
under them cf exactly the same quality, with the same commitment.
I cannot emphasize too strongly that the major weakness of our
H.R. Haldeman
- 2 -
White House staff has been the almost unbelievable passion,
which so many otherwise very good men have, for giving
some tidbit to the press. This would be understandable if
it were in the Kennedy Administration, when the press was
friendly. When the press is unfriendly, it is absolutely
inexcusable and self-defeating. The latest example of this,
of course, was the leak on Romney. This could have only
come from someone who had been told about it - probably
not in Romney's shop, although that will be the excuse I know
you will hear from members of the staff who were familiar
with what we were going to do. It simply wouldn't have
served his interests to put it out.
In any event, I emphasize again, able men like Morgan self-
less men who are not seeking anything, except to get the job
done, and completely anonymous men who will only show up
in what they do, and not because they are trying to make
points with the press by appearing to be in on the know. This
is one of the items I would like for you to report to me
personally on, perhaps within thirty or sixty days, as to what
men you have selected that we can depend upon for specific
assignments who will meet these specifications.
With regard to the memoranda submitted by members of the staff, my
first reaction which is most reassuring, is that each of them has shown
in his own way a great deal of understanding of all the problems involved
and has made some significant recommendations which we should
consider. I will comment on each of them as we go along in this memorandum,
but, all in all, I think you might well profit by bringing this group
together from time to time, probably through having them submit such
memoranda in advance and then having a meeting with them without my
being present, in which you distill their major recommendations and
adopt a line to be followed. I couldn't agree more that having people
in a meeting without forcing them to think the problem through, and putting
it down in writing, is useless and a waste of everyone's time. On the
other hand, once they have put it down in writing, you can then get four,
five, six, or maybe even seven major issues clearly delineated - bring
the whole group together so that they will have a feeling of participation
and contribution and discuss the policy to be adopted.
H.R. Haldeman
- 3 -
As I consider the memoranda, as well as the news columns which
are prepared in the news summaries, and my own reading since the
campaign, these conclusions seem inescapable.
1.
The rebroadcast of the Phoenix speech was an inexcusable,
technical error. On this score, I have already discussed
with you the heart of the problem - never let a speechwriter
have a vested interest in determining whether that speech
is to be used on television. He will always make the wrong
decision - even a man as experienced and as devoted to our
success as Safire is. The whole press campaign with regard
to "tone" of our activities in 22 states has grown out of that
one broadcast. For example, several of the press commentators,
prior to the time that that broadcast appeared, were writing
that the President's campaign was very different from the Vice
President's campaign - high-level, no personalities, etc.
You will recall that I urged you to get Ziegler, Klein, et al, to
emphasize this point. I know they tried, but obviously they
failed to get it across. The fault was not theirs - the one
broadcast allowed all of our enemies of the press to color the
entire campaign with that one failure. Completely forgotten
was the fact that in state after state, I never mentioned a
Democratic Senator by name, I never attacked the Democratic
Party, I always distinguished on the basis of the issues, as in
Utah, in the closing speech. I said over and over again, that
the choice was between two men who honestly disagreed on
those issues. This would have been the lasting impression of
the campaign had it not been for the final broadcast and, in that
connection, the technical factor was decisive. The content of
the speech that Safire wrote was actually recognized by the
press, who had been through the traumatic experience at San
Jose, as being one in which I had said some things that needed
to be said, but as a result of all the technical imperfections
our enemies in the press were able to sieze on this one booboo
and to color our entire campaign efforts with it.
2.
There is a good lesson out of this - apart from the fact that we
must never again allow a speechwriter have anything to do
with production. It is that in this age of television, technical
quality is probably more important than the content of what is
said. We learned this from the first debate with Kennedy, and
now we have had to relearn it in fortunately a less decisive
forum in our handling of this particular matter. The important
thing is for us not to brush it off as something that "wasn't all
that bad", but to recognize that it was a mistake and to be very
H.R. Haldeman
4 -
sure that kind of mistake is not made again. In that connection,
on an urgent basis, I want a full-time television man, even
if it costs $100, 000 to $150, 000 a year to have him. This
is the name of the game, and it is ridiculous for us to do this
on a hit and miss basis, as has been the case too often over
the past two years. The man from California seems to me
to be perfectly adequate if he will do the job. If not, we
could take Scott, who is unimaginative, but at least modestly
competent and easy to get along with. This is one of the items
that I would like a report on from you as soon as you have
a recommendation to make.
3.
It would be well to have Ron Ziegler read through these
memoranda, because he, and perhaps Herb Klein as well,
could get an idea as to where we need to do a more effective
job of getting across, in a public relations sense, our areas
of performance. For example, five of the memoranda
recommended that the trips to Key Biscayne and to California
should be taken only when there was some indication that
there was some other purpose than going for a vacation.
As you know, I have had a concern about this matter for the
past year and a half, and have emphasized on a number of
occasions the necessity to build up the "hardworking"
President. I think that the reaction of all of our staff has been
colored by the fact that our close friends say "the President
is working too hard. 11 On the other hand, where these people
on our staff, who should know better, have the impression
that we need to create a working image on these trips, then
we have obviously failed rather dramatically. This does not
pose any particular problem to me, because as time goes on
I, more and more, prefer to go to Camp David for a day, or
a day and a half, than to go all the way down to Florida for two
and a half, three days. And, of course, as far as California
isconcerned, I would under no circumstances consider going
there unless it was for a week, in which work would be the
primary purpose. The problem in handling the trips to
California and Florida is not great. In the future, I simply
will not go either to California or Florida unless I am
satisfied by what Ziegler is going to put out, that a working
trip is going to be the outcome in the press. This will be easy
as far as California is concerned, because we will always
have a meeting out there. It should not be too difficult as far
as Florida is concerned, for you can always have a staff briefing
or a staff meeting, or something of that sort and perhaps run
a picture with it, if necessary. It will simply mean that I will
H.R. Haldeman
- 5 -
not go to Florida quite as often - something which is not
particularly a problem, due to the fact that I have now
found Camp David to be just as relaxing as I pointed out
above. But, in view of the fact that our trips to Florida
and California, except for those few times when I fly
over to Walker's Cay for 24 hours, have been primarily working
trips, our failure to get this across to the press, and even
members of our own staff, shows our virtually insurmountable
media problem. We have to continue to work on it, but the
best answer is simply not to give them something to shoot at.
I think one mistake we have made is Ziegler's understandable
desire to make it pleasant for them in both California and
Florida - give them plenty of notice - let their families go,
etc. In the future, in the case of both places, I am going to
make decisions at the last moment as to when to go and let
them pack their bags and go if they want, and then make it
a working trip all the way.
The other side of this coin, however, is more fundamental.
I think Ziegler simply has to do a more effective job of
getting out my schedule in terms of its work prospects.
Perhaps he should start putting out the time that I start in
the morning. He could say that the President began his work
day at 8 o'clock in the Residence, where he either had
breakfast with somebody, or if that were not the case, he
worked until 8:30 and was in the office and that he left the
office at 7 o'clock at night - that he had dinner for an hour
and worked from 8 until midnight in the EOB. I think just
putting this out bland, without any attempt to oversell might
have a salutary effect. In any event, except for your piece
in U.S. News, this idea of the working President has
thoroughly failed to get across and we have to take the
responsibility for that failure since we were aware of what
the press was doing to us on this. score. This should be our
easiest public relations problem in 1971 and 1972, because
it happens that the facts are 180 degrees different from the
myth. It is time for us to recognize that we have completely
failed in getting across the facts, and have allowed a myth
to be built up, not only in the press, but in the country at
large, but one that is so effective that even members of our
own staff areconcerned about it.
H.R. Haldeman
- 6
4.
The wisdom of our trying to get across our version of
the campaign results is shown by the fact that over half
of the staff memoranda understandably reflect the current
mood among the columnists in Washington - that we had
"lost" in 1970 - the gain of two in the Senate, the minimal
loss of 9 in the House, obviously failed to get through
to most of the people who listened to the media, including
members of our staff, except for the political sophisticates
like Chotiner and Dent. This means, again, emphasis
needs to be given to what I have mentioned on several
occasions previously the need for staff members who work
and live in Washington, and who are constantly exposed to
the Washington press corps and the Washington chit chat,
to get a balanced point of view. Otherwise, they are going
to reflect the downbeat attitude of most of Washington to
everything that we are doing. We went through this same
thing on a much greater scale at the time of Cambodia,
when only two of the group who submitted memoes on this
occasion really supported what we were doing in Cambodia.
That does not mean that the others were wrong - it simply
means that they were completely overwhelmed by the public
opposition, and it has taken them six months to recover
from it. As a matter of fact, the failure of the great
majority of our candidates to use their opponents' opposition
to the Cambodian venture effectively is an indication of how
we failed from a public relations standpoint to get this one
across. Let me be very fair in pointing out that the failure
is not due to a lack of trying, but to the insurmountable
problems we face with the media. Again, however, we must
recognize that our whole staff needs to be bucked up every day
or they are going to buy the current media line. That is one
of the reasons why I thought that a good editorial or column,
or some other statement that is circulated virtually daily
among members of the staff, with a particular mark on it,
might be helpful. In addition to that, we need a holler guy on
the staff who constantly speaks in an upbeat way about what
we are doing, just as we need a holler guy on the Cabinet to
do exactly the same thing.
H.R. Haldeman
- 7 -
I am now going to take each one of the memoranda and pick out
those items I would like followed through on.
Timmons' memo is somewhat superficial, but it has a couple of
points that are worth commenting upon. He suggests that a plan
should be devised to divide the hostile working press, and comments
that attacks on the media as a group solidifies their opposition.
This comment has been made by others, and I agree with it. It
is essential to develop a more coordinated and effective program
of getting what Jim Keogh describes as calculated leaks to our
friendly reporters, and don't limit them to newspapers - sometimes
we might give one to ABC network, for example. And a plan also
to ha ve Cabinet Officers, and on occasion, White House staff, on a
very controlled basis, give stories to friendly journalists. I cannot
emphasize too strongly on this point that there must be absolute
discipline in this respect. In the future, all members of the White
House staff are to report to Ziegler before seeing members of the
press, and if they see them socially, they are to give Ziegler a
rundown so that he will not be caught with some story in which he has
no advance information. Our attitude toward the press, however,
should be cool, correct, and not belligerent. On an individual basis,
we should be absolutely ruthless in not rewarding and punishing our
enemies by not giving them special treatment, and rewarding our
friends by giving them special treatment. Here it will be necessary
to bring Klein in line so that he understands what the game is.
Because it doesn't make sense to have Ziegler be tough, and then
have Klein or other members of the White House staff like Finch, or
Shultz go running off in the other direction.
All of the memoranda, including Timmons', make recommendations
with uregard to the Vice President. I shall touch upon each of these
as I go through them, indicating those areas where I think the Vice
President could effectively be used in those areas, and where he should
not be used. In general, he should continue to speak in the South on
the right kind of occasion, and should step us his contacts with Labor
organizations where he has a national entre. In terms of his duties
on the Hill, I think one area where he could be very useful is to
cultivate good relations with all the Republicans, including even those
doves who are not completely out in left field, and particularly with
the senior Democrats who are Chairmen of committees in the Senate.
They would be highly flattered if he were to pay some attention to them.
H.R. Haldeman
- 8 -
A number of the memoranda, including Timmons', comment upon
Presidential travel. In general, I believe we should plan no foreign
travel in 1971, unless some special event comes up which requires
it. Insofar as travel within the U.S. is concerned, it should be to
special functions, in accord with our bringing government to the
people. In this instance, more emphasis on domestic issues would
be in order. Timmons, of course, is completely wrong when he
suggests that I should visit all fifty states by the time of the 1972
election. I should visit a couple of smaller states, just for symbolism
purposes, but in the final analysis our efforts must be made in the
big battleground states, and visits should be made to them primarily.
Rumsfeld, in his memo, emphasizes first the importance of quality
candidates. He makes one suggestion that I think should be analyzed
immediately. Where there are House, Senate or Gubernatorial
incumbents who come up in 1972, who should not run again, efforts
should be made now to offer them Federal jobs, or to move on them
in other ways to keep them from running, and thereby to avoid a drain
on the national ticket. In addition, a better program, probably through
the National Committee and the Senate and House Campaign Committees,
must be developed for selecting candidates - particularly for the House
and the Senate. Don't waste time on the Governors, because we
simply haven't got the kind of manpower to bring that about. In selecting
candidates, have in mind the fact that in 1970, men like Dodd, Murphy,
Tydings, McKneally, and the whole State ticket in Ohio, went down
because of personal ethics problems. We cannot afford to have anybody
on our ticket in 1972 who will pose this problem to US. We must be
absolutely ruthless in bringing such matters to the attention of
candidates and getting them cleaned up, or getting the candidate off the
ticket if he has such a problem and cannot clean it up.
Rumsfeld also mentions that we have not done as effective a job as we
might have in indicating the success of our Vietnam policy. I would
like for him to talk to Kissinger on this to see what more can be done.
My guess is that nothing more can be done, except by our announcements
which are planned during the coming year. On the other hand, despite
the fact that Kissinger will claim very properly that foreign policy
was a plus for us in the last campaign, it was not nearly as great a
plus as it might have been. The handling of Vietnam in the great crisis
of October and November of 1969, the enormous success of the bold
Cambodian venture, the handling of lesser problems like Jordan, etc.
never really got across adequately. Safire covers this in his memorandum
and indicates several steps that he thinks might be taken. I would suggest
that Safire and Rumsfeld sit down with Kissinger and see if some thing
can be done to develop a more effective program to play our strong suit
H.R. Haldeman
9 -
more effectively than we have as long as we have it to play.
Rumsfeld's constructive critici sm that the positive theme in the
domestic field has not come through is right on the mark. The
Generation of Peace has come through - the positive theme with
regard to our vision for America for the future at home has not
come through. Our rhetoric should be forward-looking,
emphasizing the hopes and aspirations for the future, not the
disappointments of past. This cannot be done through programs to
clean up the water and the air, which was our major thrust of last
year. That is purely a holding action, but everyone of these
memoranda, with the exception of two, recognizes that the environment
issue is going to have a decreasing impact as the year goes out.
Rumsfeld's comment with regard to the Vice President is reflected
by virtually every one of the memoes "he should maintain visibility
so that people do not think he is trotted out to do a job, and then
shelved". His speeches should remain bold, but the expressions
should be carefully drawn and the subjects changed to positive,
domestic needs. I will touch upon this more as I come to the other
memoes.
As far as relationships with Congress are concerned, Rumsfeld follows
exactly the line I have already laid down. It will be the responsibility
of Finch, Colson, Ehrlichman, et al, to work with all the Republican
Members of Congress, and to avoid any fueds with any of them, if
possible. This, however, must be taken on as a special assignment
at a very high-level, and not left to Timmons, who should have our
complete backing as our Legislative Liaison man for the day-to-day
votes, but who cannot be the man we rely on for the big plays with
individual members of the Senate.
Len Garment makes a point which might be the subject of a column if
we could get it across - that, ironically, between October 1969, when
the White House was literally preparing for a siege, the authority and
respect for the Presidency has been restored; mass demonstrations
have faded; near agreement has emerged on issues, such as Vietnam,
law and order, campus disruption, and virtually all successful
candidates of both parties ran on a platform largely fashioned by the
President. This, of course, is an overstatement insofar as economic
issues are concerned, but it has a great deal of substance to it.
H.R. Haldeman
- 10 -
This leads me to another point that I think has been under-emphasized
in our public relations effort. The restoration of respect for the
Office of the Presidency at home and abroad. The fact that the President
is able to travel at home and abroad, does travel at home and abroad,
and is received with respect in the overwhelming majority of cases.
This is a complete turnaround from what the situation was when we took
office in January of 1969. How this can be gotten across I do not know,
but it should be listed among those goals we should try to emphasize
more in the next year.
Jim Keogh's memo is one of the best. Along with our Democratic friends,
we probably went too far overboard on the Scammon/Wattenberg line.
I am not referring to my own activities which were, of course,
emphasizing the peace line, but to the advice that was given to candidates.
Long after the Democratic candidates joined us in supporting that line
our candidates were still hitting it, and they were really striking at
straw men. His analysis of the Phoenix Rally was honest and probably
very well balanced. It was a bad blunder and it made the President seem
angry, harsh, and almost mean, because of technical problems. It
probably had little effect on the results, but it was damaging to the
Presidential image in long-term if we don't rectify it. As I pointed out
at the opening of this memorandum, we allowed the press to interpret
the whole campaign as bitter and harsh. In that connection, going back
to the earlier part of this memorandum, perhaps a small book on the
campaign of 1970, and particularly the President's participation would
be in order. When you look at what was actually said in each case, the
tone was at a very high level, not personal, and on the issues throughout,
as distinguished the Democratic campaigns, which were all-out assaults
on our side through the years. In that connection, one good column
subject would be the one that didn't get through in the press the complete
partisan and political tone of Kennedy's activities throughout 1962
until the Cuban missile confrontation. I think it would be well for some
columnist to write the facts, which I understand you have with regard
to the number of fund raising dinners he did, and the number of
appearances that he made, and compare them with the number of days we
were out. This is only a holding action, and should not be something that
should come from the White House, but it is good column material for
purposes of setting it in historical perspective.
One of Keogh's telling points, which I would like to have him discuss
with Colson, is with regard to our efforts to woo the leaders of
organized Labor. It may be that we have gone too far in this direction,
and also it could well be that the leaders of organized Labor are not
only unpopular with all the unorganized workers, but also with a great
H. R. Haldeman
- 11
of their own members. On the other hand, if we pick and choose,
as in the case of Jim Suffridge, and perhaps some of the Building
Trades people, unless we decide to take on Davis Bacon, which
of course would be the great mistake if we moved entirely in the
direction that Jim suggests. This could be a subject for discussion
between Jim, Colson, George Shultz, and possibly Ehrlichman, if
he has the time.
Keogh also makes a very telling point when he says that "it is no
longer profitable to emphasize what the Administration is against,
and that from now on the emphasis must be on what the Administra-
tion is for, what it has done, and is doing.
On the PR side he makes a suggestion which runs contrary to some of
the recommendations that John Ehrlichman made in his memorandum.
He says that he feels we have been using too many gimmicks - that
we should be more straightforward. I am inclined to agree. I think
we had too many scenarios and too many game plans. I realize that
I, myself, have been talking about the need for better PR, but I think
the PR failure has not been in what we have done, but actually in just not
having one or two men on the staff who had the ability to quietly and
effectively get it across to the press. When we do something very
obvious like running out to the Negro Junior College, or something of
that sort, I think it is a short-range story for the night TV, but
probably a long-range
because everyone figures that it was done
for exaxtly the reason it was suggested, show that we were concerned
about Black education in the District of Columbia. I do not mean by that
that we do not have an occasion bill signing outside of the White House,
but, generally speaking, I would like to see less gimmickery in the
months ahead, and a more effective job done in simply selling what we
are doing. In a sense, this really puts the monkey on the back of the
press man and members of the White House staff. I think their tendency
is understandably one of saying "What will the President do to get a
story across? We simply cannot use the President for the purpose of
getting a story across. When he acts, it is the responsibility of others
to get it across. If they can't get it across, the story just isn't worth it.
H.R. Haldeman
- 12 -
Keogh makes a very strong point when he says that most of the media
are against us and that "it is very difficult for us to put anything over
on them - it is practically impossible for us to subvert them. " I
would suggest for the next two months we put our cases as straight-
forwardly as possible, that we not try to be cute and just see what
the press does with it. I couldn't agree more, however, with Keogh's
suggestion that we use the "honest-to-God calculated leak". This
we have not done effectively in the past, and I think it is necessary for
you to sit down with Klein, Ziegler, and others involved, and see
where we can get a better break on some of our news stories through
the calculated leak.
Klein's memo is somewhat superficial for the most part, stating the
obvious. The only thought worth adding to what the others include in
their Imemoes is to emphasize regional television with the major
states coming up. An analysis should be made as to how appearances
in Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New York, Wisconsin, Texas, Florida,
California and Missouri on TV, or with very, very key newspaper
types in those areas could be used by the Vice President, top White
House personalities like Finch, Klein and by Cabinet people. I get
back to my point to Klein's best use - in addition to occasional
appearances on TV is to move around the country talking to top editors,
publishers, and key people in TV. He is extremely capable in this
respect and is listened to.
Among memoes from the staff is a strong recommendation that 1971
and most of 1972, at least until the late summer, should be Presidential
and not political.
This, of course, is my own conclusion and I intended to follow it.
Apparently, however, the fact that some columnist suggested that I
might move in the other direction caused some of our own people to
wonder. This brings me to a minor, but nevertheless important PR
point - the fact that throughout 1969 and 1970 I did the absolute minimum
that I could for Party functions - only one fund-raising event, a quick
foray into New Jersey and Virginia in 1969, and the seven-day trip in 1970.
However, having failed to get across that point to the press, there is no
use to try to sell it now. The PR line has already been set and the thing
to do is go on and fight new battles. But, it is imperative now for us
to get the politics out of the White House - something I felt should have
been done even before the 1970 campaign, and either into the National
Committee, the Senatorial or House Campaign Committees or in
H. R. Haldeman
- 13 -
possibly a National Citizens Group, if one is set up. This means
the decision on Chotiner must be made soon and executed just
as quickly as we possibly can in the first two weeks of December.
I want to be in the position where I can honestly say the White
House does not have its hand in the political manuevering that is
going to begin the moment the new Congress comes in session. This
raises the question on Colson. He must be very careful not to be
involved in strictly political activity and must keep his actions in
the field or organizations across the party lines. As far as my own
schedule is concerned, we must make a final decision now, that I
am not going to do any Party functions in 1971. The only possible
exception I can envisage would be to shake hands with some of the
women when they come down for their conference. Under no
circumstances will I do the big Republican fund raiser in 1971. I
think we have to realize that if the money now can't be raised
without my presence, it can't be raised at all. As far as my political
activities are concerned, they must be limited to dinners that are
private and remain private, like the one we had the other night, with
Mulcahy et al. Whether this is possible remains to be seen. If it is
not possible, let's not have any of those dinners until the Fall of 1971.
We must not have any in the first six months of 1971.
The problem of the National Committee is still open until Bryce makes
his decision. If he decides against taking it, I would be inclined to go
to McGregor, rather than Bush, for the simple reason that I think
McGregor would be less inhibited in cleaning up the staff, and also
would be a better spokesman as against O'Brien. Houston points out
very correctly in his memo that we were completely outgunned by
O'Brien, not only in this campaign, but in 1968. We must not let this
happen again. Rumsfeld also must be considered due to his brilliant
organizational ability, but it might be possible that Rumsfeld would
be a better man to handle the general campaign, assuming, of course,
that we do not make a decision to have Romney leave HUD. If that
happens, I think we are committed to have Rumsfeld go there. I want
you to give particular attention and urgent attention to thinking up the
proper position for Dole. Talk it over quietly with a few of our very
top people. He would by far be the best Nixon man in the Senate that
I want to give him a small staff, see him regularly, give him a title
and turn him loose. Perhaps you, Ehrlichman, Mitchell, and Dent
should sit down and talk about how we could put these players in their
H.R. Haldeman
- 14 -
proper positions. But above everything else when the recommendation
comes to me, let it be a bold one, and not just the usual business as
usual kind of approach.
Chotiner's memo, like Klein's, is somewhat superficial. One point
he mentions that is worth following up on is with regard to off-the-
record breakfasts, lunch and other meetings with bi-partisan GOP
groups. I do not favor the breakfast and lunches, of course, but the
afternoon 5 o'clock meetins in the Oval Office are a good idea,
particularly prior to the time we get ready to launch our offensive
with regard to the new fiscal policy. We really want to mobilize
the troops on this one. His emphasis on GOP groups should not be
the primary one, however. I should work as much as I possibly can
with those Southern Democratic Chairmen and other Democratic
leaders to whom wewill have to turn for support on critical votes.
They will be greatly complimented if we continue to keep contact
with them. Even when they happen to be against us.
Nofziger's memo is punchy and to the point. His suggestion that the
"posture with Congress should be one wanting to work with Congress,
but at the same time refusing to surrender to it" is correct. However,
our attitude should be one of cooperation so that Congress is in the
position of appearing uncooperative rather than ours in the first
instance. His suggestion that we meet with small groups of friendly
columnists from time to time has possibilities, except for the fact
that I again wonder whether this puts too much emphasis on the writing
press, and not enough on the TV press. I like the idea of including
a few reporters from friendly papers like Jack Jerrold (sp?), George
Embrey (sp) Lou Heinrich (sp?), etc. where they come from states
which matter to us. I think it is important, however, to find a way
to include a fellow like Semple, and also a Harry Reasoner and Herb
Kaplow should be considered. Also, in this connection, the possibility
of bringing in a powerful regional commentator from Los Angeles,
Chicago, or some other key city in a key state might be in order.
Gunnerback (sp) of Philadelphia comes to mind in that respect. Here,
what we need is a list which is really meaningful, and then we can sort
the thing out and figure up occasions where I might want to have meetings
with them. The purpose of such meetings would not be to get across a
line, but really more to let them get out and positively talk about what
kind of a man the President is, how his mind works, etc. This is
H.R. Haldeman
- 15 -
perhaps the most effective way to get across the idea of warmth,
knowledge, etc., which sometimes we can't get across with the
press conference device, due to the fact that a few leaders who
are generally opposed to us set the line and the others rather
slavishly follow it. I would suggest that you discuss this with
Nofziger and possibly Klein and Moore and give me a recommendation.
His statement about the Cabinet seems almost cruel, but unfortunately
it is correct. The fact that "not one has aroused enough excitement
to be considered by the press as a possible successor to the Vice
President, or as a possible Presidential nominee", is a devastating
and perceptive conclusion. What we must do is to build up two or
three Cabinet Officers as he suggests and maybe four or five members
of the House and Senate, on a deliberatel planned and executed effort.
We need here a game plan which should be submitted to me within
30 to 60 days - the sooner, the better, of course. I think regarding
Congressional relationships, in addition to strengthening Timmons'
hand,and, incidentally, everybody agrees that he needs more staff -
give him what he needs - we should see that our senior staff members,
Cabinet members and sub-Cabinet members are more accessible,
more cooperative and, where the White House is concerned, less
abrasive. We must not get into the position we were in 1969 and 1970
where the President is called upon over and over again to try to save
a situation on a close vote. It is particularly important that Kissinger,
Rogers and Laird work on the new Republicans, as well as on the
Democrats like Bentsen and Childs, as well as some of our Republican
defectors in the past, like Percy. Brief them constantly and try to
bring them into our orbit where we can. In that connection, the major
thing I may be able to do is to see Aiken and Cooper - perhaps
together on one occasion. This should be within the next two or three
weeks. But they should be told now. A brief meeting with Percy,
which I understand he has requested, is of course in order. In this
case, however, Finch, who I would think would be our best contact,
should see him first and bring him in. At such a meeting, a fellow like
Ehrlichman and/or Shultz should be there, so that we can start enlisting
Percy on some of our domestic programs.
H.R. Haldeman
- 16 -
Nofziger really hits the mark when he talks about our weakness in
the research area. I strongly urge that paragraph 8 of his memorandum
be read, and that some program be developed on a follow-through basis.
One thing that has occurred to me in this respect that we might
consider, is a rather way-out idea - a column written by one of our
own people like Buchanan or Nofziger which is sent out on a regular
basis to editors and TV people throughout the country, as well as to
members of the House and Senate. Here, just a straight-out
presentation of the Administration position, as well as building up the
President in those areas of hard work, concern for minorities, etc.,
might be enormously effective. You will recall Ralph de Toledano had
such an operation for Goldwater which was quite effective in 1964. I
am not thinking of setting up an outside office for this purpose, but
I would like for you to talk with Nofziger, Buchanan and Keogh and see
if they can come up with an idea as to how we can get our line across.
What I really need here is something in writing quite regularly, which
gives our side of the story without apology, and with great forthright-
ness. We have tried the other line of trying to plant the story with
someone like Thimmesch and that, of course, should continue. But,
I think more than that might be needed as we go along. I would be
interested in whatever recommendation the group comes in with in this
respect.
Colson's memorandum makes a point on page 3 which we should have in
mind, "the proposed vast environmental program, new schemes to help
the poor, expanded aid to the cities, give us absolutely nothing
politically. 11 Of course, I still buy the idea that a defensive action here
in the field of the environment is needed, and I also buy the idea that I
ought to have symbolic meetings with all types of minority groups,
Negroes, Mexicans, Youth, as well as selected Labor groups. This is
still in order in terms of the need for the President to be at least
appearing to make an effort to communicate with all segments of the
society, even when we know there is little to be accomplished with that
particular group.
His recommendation with regard to an independent TV news service
should also be considered - discuss this with Dick Moore and see what
he thinks of it.
H.R. Haldeman
- 17
His suggestion of the meeting with the chief executives of the three
networks might be considered but, again, more than anything this
is not worthwhile. I would be willing to do so if there was any mileage
in it.
Colson's suggestion with regard to the Vice President being the leading
spokesman for the revenue sharing proposal is excellent, and should
be among those items to give to the Vice President for his positive line.
His comment to the effect that after Cambodia our standing in the polls
had more effect with the Congressmen than anything else, is on the
mark, but this, as we know, is something we cannot depend upon.
Although, when we do get anything favorable in the polls we have to
make the most of it.
In that connection, Ed Brooke is one that should be brought in at an early
time. He has been very responsible since the election and, according
to Chuck, he even supported our position on Goodell! I should like for
Colson and Rumsfeld to sit down and discuss with Finch present
where they think we ought to concentrate in order to have the greatest
impact on the heavy industrialized states. Colson suggests the White
ethnic middle-class working man family. Rumsfeld, on the other hand,
puts primary emphasis on what he calls the suburbanite, who are not
members of Labor unions and are generally White Collar.
Of vital importance there is no question but that we should continue to
cultivate Catholics clearly apart from whether they are Labor or White
Collar, and that we should work hard on the ethnics, particularly East
Europeans and Italians. Here again, we need a plan which will make
maximum use of my time and have maximum impact with these groups.
On a completely unrelated subject, I would like to have John Connally
come in for a private visit to discuss his appointment, ostensibly, to
the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which will give me an
opportunity to get his views on the reorganization plan, as well as
some of the political problems. Here again, it is vitally important
that the cover be a clear one, so that there is no speculation to the
effect that the purpose is solely political. I want to see Connally
everytime he comes into the city for one of the Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board things. Usually the meeting should be off-the-record -
something he will completely approve of and understand.
H.R. Haldeman
18 -
Houston's memorandum is more perceptive that I expected it to be.
He is correct when he says we take the media too seriously, and
when he says that we make a mistake in assuming that idealogical
hostility can be overcome by advertising techniques. Above
everything else, as he points out, we should use the media to
portray RN as a working President in a way that conveys candor.
I, as you know, have already approved more press conferences, and
we shall examine the possibility of another discussion with network
commentators, fireside chat is a possibility that can be considered,
but I think we need considerably more study before we jump into
that one.
His comments in regard to the Vice President is on the mark when
he says that he sould de-escalate the rhetoric without de-escalating
the substance of his message. He should not be concerned with national
coverage over the next few months, because he can have an enormous
impact in regional visits, something that I think he can very properly
undertake, while at the same time spending considerably more time
in the Senate, meeting with leading Democratic Chairmen, as well
as with some of our Republicans. He does not have to go overboard,
however, in "sticking to his job" in the Senate. This is a charge
that is always made about Vice Presidents and it seldom has had too
much effect. What does have effect is the charge that the Vice
President's activities are solely partisan and political, and do not deal
with substance. I avoided this by having some pretty substantive
assignments and comments in the foreign policy field, as well as on
domestic problems like settling the steel strike. We must find some
areas where the Vice President can have similar opportunities.
Nofziger is correct in pointing out that a line may eventually have to be
drawn with Congress in foreign and defense policy. However, we must
not draw this line until it becomes apparent that we are faced with
straight-out opposition, and then we must draw it in a statesmanlike
way, in which we lay the choices before. the people and indicate why
we have chosen one line, and why that line, regardless of partisanship,
should be followed by the Congress. His rather ruthless suggestions
with regard for the need for a purge in sub-Cabinet level and in the
Party organization, of course, are already underway. We must move
on the Allison problem just as soon as we can get the Morton assign-
ment worked out. Allison's appearance the morning after the election
and his press comments generally have really broken it off, and where
H.R. Haldeman
- 19 -
we should not say anything about it, once Morton moves, the new
Chairman should come in and simply insist on bringing a new staff
with him. His conclusion that we need "a national Chairman who
is a fighter, who is effective on the stump, who can use the media,
who is loyal to the President, but not too closely identified with him
personally, who is a good administrator, and who will do as he is
told" is exactly what I am looking for. That is why I tend to lean
more to a McGregor or a Rumsfeld, than to a Bush or a Harlow,
although the latter two have assets that we must not overlook. This
is another one of those subjects which should be discussed with you,
Ehrlichman, Finch and Mitchell, with a recommendation made to me.
His suggestion with regard to getting such people as Kevin Phillips,
John Sears and other young intellectuals to make recommendations
may have some merit, but this must be very carefully handled
outside the White House, and the advice must be given to whomever
is Chairman of the National Committee and, of course, made
available to us. The major purpose of this is not so much to get their
views as it is to enlist them as advocates as we go into the next two
years, making use of the Buckley organization, including Cliff White,
of course, in this same category.
With regard to organization generally, I emphasize again the necessity
of having one man in charge of each of the major target states. This
requires 8 or 10 men - they can be in or out of the White House,
provided any political activities they engage in are clearly independent
of the White House. I would like for you to work up, along with the
other key political people, a plan for each of the states I have mentioned
previously, so that we will have someone in the case of each major
state who is in charge and on whom we can put responsibility. For
example, Harry Dent will be in charge of a number of Southern states
and possibly we will want a special man in charge of Florida. However,
this is a matter on which I will await your recommendations.
Incidentally, I believe that you could include Harry Dent in the small
group that you talk with in regard to organization, but I would not include
Chotiner. We know that Dent will not leak and Chotiner might.
H.R. Haldeman
- 20 -
Dent's memorandum makes one suggestion that I would like followed
up. I share his high regard for Dick Richards of Utah and he should
be enlisted for the National Committee at an early date. Dent also
suggests that an effort should be made to organize and get out the
18-year-old vote. This is a mixed bag, however, and under no
circumstances should it be done through the Republican National
Committee because the Republican Party has less popularity with
the 18-year olds than the President has. However, Finch, LeTendre,
and some of the rest of you should be thinking about this since it will
be a problem with which we are confronted in 1972. Dent made a
couple of other suggestions that might be worth considering - the
obvious one that we should try to get some friends to invest in news
media purchases. Some follow-up with people like Helen Hill might
be in order here, but only where the purchases are in states that
matter to us. His suggestion of a Black PR assistant to work on the
Black news media might be considered, provided we have one for
Mexicans and also one for Italians. But, in any event, if there is such
an assistant it should be in the National Committee and not in the
White House. With regard to Cabinet meetings, Dent makes a useful
suggestion. I think the idea of the regular monthly Cabinet meeting
probably is in order since we can only in that way keep the Cabinet
involved and informed. On the other hand, I think the Cabinet might
have another meeting each month in which the Vice President presides
and you also should talk to Kissinger with regard as to whether there
could not be some National Security Council meetings where the Vice
President could preside. President Eisenhower worked this out with
me to my great advantage, and the fact that I had presided over
Cabinet and NSC meetings at the President's request had considerable
effect. I realize that we are doing this to an extent with our domestic
council setup, but I am wondering if the mid-monthly Cabinet meeting
and an NSC meeting about once a month might be used for the purpose
of giving the Vice President a chance to preside, and also for the
purpose of bringing the Cabinet into closer relations with the White
House. Henry will object to any NSC meeting unless I am present,
but I am thinking of some of the NSC studies, like those meetings where
the Vice President might well preside and I can attend when the matter
gets closer to a decision.
H.R. Haldeman
- 21 -
Dent properly suggests that we might try to find a Democrat to work
on Democrats in the Congress. This could be of great assistance
to Timmons, if we could find one. A man like Jack Marsh comes
to mind, but he has an outside assignment which everyone thinks is
more important. At least let's look into it to see what we might
develop. Dent's idea of a few Congressional friends who secretly
listen for us on the Hill is a good one, if it can be implemented
without getting the leadership out of sorts - also having some Nixon
talkers in the cloakrooms makes sense. Timmons, Dent and you,
as well as Finch, might have a talk on this point.
Dent makes a point that there should be "more political input" on
White House dinners, entertainment and church. I thought we were
doing quite well in this respect, but I am inclined to think that we
need a shakeup here. Perhaps you should put Butterfield in charge
and have him ride herd until we get the proper input. For example,
with the Church Service Sunday, at least a third of those present
had been recommended by Dent. This, of course, is alright
insofar as I am concerned, except at a Catholic service I would have
loaded it more with Italians and others who would have appreciated
the fact that we had the head of the Catholic War Veterans, probably
through Colson's recommendation, and the two Conservatives from
New York. But, generally speaking, we were long on Protestants
and short on Catholics, at a service which gave us a great opportunity
to bring some of our potential Catholic supporters from Philadelphia,
from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, as well as New York,
into the White House. We should have another Catholic soon and
when we do, let's rectify this mistake. I think the problem with a
church service is an activist like Dent or one like Colson get their
names in and a lot of others who have responsibilities in this respect
simply do not come through.
Dent's criticism with regard to the need to project a warmer and more
human image hits the mark. The problem here, however, is definitely
simply one of not getting across what we have been doing until it
practically runs out of our ears - not just the Thanksgiving Dinner,
but the boat rides on the Potomac, the infinite number of events Mrs.
Nixon has in the White House for underprivileged groups, etc. have
been handled by Connie and filtered through the women's press with
very little national effect. The fact that Dent was not aware of some of
these things is an indication of our failure. I want to continue to have
H.R. Haldeman
- 22 -
events of this type, but we must find a more effective way of getting
across our point.
Dent's final point about the need for some humor is also constructive.
It gets back to my constant emphasis on the need for more E.Q.
(enthusiasm quotient) to match the high I.Q. of our White House
staff and our Administration generally. Perhaps it is necessary for
the White House staff and the Cabinet to have functions in which the
press has a chance to peak in that are really more upbeat. Also,
of course, along this line it gets back to the need on our White
House staff for people like Bush, McGregor, etc., who will be upbeat
and act as if they were having some fun in carrying out assignments.
Dent makes the point that the Buckley family has been very successful
in projecting a positive and human image, while being conservative.
Perhaps we ought to examine our situation there. Dick Moore might
be the man to make this study for us.
It seems to me that as we look over the past two years, we have had
more events in two years than previous Administrations have had in
four, including our Evenings at the White House, our special
Christmas parties, etc. etc. But somehow, perhaps due to our
inadequate press relations (not the fault, of course, of our press
people), we don't get much of this across to the people generally.
Perhaps it is not possible to do so, but at least we ought to examine the
problem and see what can be done. This must be done incidentally
without trying to make the President a laughing boy, and without having
Martha Mitchell appear to be the only one who seems to enjoy being in
Washington! With her going on the cover of TIME, I think we may be
running into some dangerous waters here, because she obviously is
in one of her rather erratic moods - this time her Friday A.M.
telephone call to Connie Stuart.
Safire's memorandum is excellent, particularly in regard to his
recommendation that we press our strength. In this respect I think,
again, we must have people other than the President and the President's
immediate staff, who can get across the idea of the restoration of
dignity, respect for the U.S. at home and abroad, etc. In addition
to hard-working and sure-footedness in foreign affairs and a deep
concern for the well-being of all people. I think one of the major assets
that we have not properly exploited is the fact that the President is
willing to step up and be bold when a problem presents itself. Cambodia
H.R. Haldeman
- 23 -
of course is the most striking example, and we tended to be driven off
at high ground because of the initial press criticism. But there are
other examples, such as the decision to submit the New Federalism
program, including the Family Assistance, the decision to fight it
out on ABM, etc. The people like a warm President and a competent
one, but they also want one who is a courageous, bold leader who
will step up and hit the hard ones. I am inclined to think that we
have made a pretty good record in that respect, but even in the foreign
policy area, where the record is outstanding, it just hasn't come
through. Incidentally, when I earlier suggested that you talk to Moore
and others about PR matters, I think Safire could be included in that
group with safety provided he has absolutely sworn to keep his mouth
shut and not to talk to some press man about the meeting. He has a
weakness in this respect. Safire makes an excellent suggestion on
page 6 of his memorandum as to how to continue to hit the theme of a
"Full Generation of Peace" - the idea of a USIA documentary, a book
of foreign policy speeches, of Rogers' speeches, etc. His idea of
tying it into the Bicentennial is worth considering and, of course, it
should be the theme of the White House Conference on Children and
Youth. Here naturally what happens in Vietnam and in our relations
with the Soviet, as well as in the Mideast, will have a massive effect.
But, again, we are not going to get the benefit of it unless we not only
do well, but cast it in words that raise it above the pragmatic decisions
made day-to-day, and put up an idealistic standard to sell people what
to follow. I would like Safire todiscuss with Shultz and McCracken
his suggestion on page 9 (at the bottom of page 8 and the beginning of
page 9) of his memo with regard to spelling out the employment figures
in a more meaningful way, so that part-time teenagers, voluntarily
unemployed job hunters, are separated from those who are really
unemployed among the Veterans. The need to get these figures cast more
in a way that will not be so damaging to us is imperative. I have been
talking about it for the last year and a half, but it is time for us to go to
work on it and I want them to really put their minds to it and come up
with an answer.
On page 11 of his memorandum, Safire makes a suggestion that indicates
that he is probably not familiar with the guest lists we've had for the
Evenings at the White House. My recollection is that we have had some
TV news editors, society columnists from out of Washington, sports
reporters, etc., honoring sports greats. If this has not been the case,
we should rectify this situation. If this has been the case, let's see
that we emphasize it more in the future. It simply does not make many
H.R. Haldeman
- 24
points for us to have these events for the gratification of those who
happen to attend.
I made a number of suggestions in here and, for my own purposes, if
it doesn't cause too much paper work, would you simply list those
in which some report to me might be made and return it to me. I
don't need to see the whole memorandum, although one could be made
available for my file. I would like to see a check list of the various
things I have suggested here so that I could follow up as to what
action has been taken on them.
Safire's general recommendations with regard to the Bicentennial should
be given very serious consideration because they do provide an
opportunity for the hope and idealism theme. Also, his suggestion for
a National Youth Service to come out of the Conference on Children and
Youth should be given serious consideration since it was something
we promised in the 1968 campaign. This could only be done if we could
get some projects based on voluntarism.
Harlow's memorandum shows very good perspective and balance, as
we might expect. One point which he made which John Ehrlichman has
to consider in terms of our budget, is with regard to the necessity
to try to keep some of our support in the rural areas. That means
emphasis on our rural development programs and the reconsideration
of the budget decision on the Conservation program. I don't know
exactly where we are going to come out with the farmers - we will not
know until we see what happens to the current farm bill. It seems
that we were trying to do everything possible to mitigate the opposition
of the farm belt, but we obviously fell short of the mark, if the returns
of the farm areas are any indication. Harlow, it seems to me, is one
of the best ones to examine this problem for us and to make a
recommendation. He makes the point, as others have made, that on
the media we can overreact to the press, thereby consuming energies
that might fruitfully be used in other directions. Perhaps we would be
better advised to change our tactics, not with the idea of trying to win
the press he agrees that our relations should be cool, fair, and at
arms-length but simply for all to follow the line of not caring what
the writers say, unless there is a clear misstatement of fact, in which
case we have to correct the record hard and fast.
Most of the points in Buchanan's memorandum have been covered already
in my previous comments. He perhaps shows the greatest intuition in
H.R. Haldeman
- 25
his conclusion that we tend to underestimate how much we can dominate
the media during a campaign, and also to underestimate the possibility
of overkill. He raises the point of having John Sears prepare a
memorandum. I do not want to get into this, but if you want to talk
to Pat about it and have Sears prepare a memorandum - no
obligation on our part - I would have no objection. Sears, as you know,
is useless if it comes to a well organized follow-through, but sometimes
may have some ability on analysis. There is one point that he makes
quite strongly that I would like to elaborate on. "We must not play
into the hands of our opponents with top-level White House discussions
of the campaign of '70 or the prospects of '72 in either party. We
must get back exclusively to the business of governing the Nation".
I agree with this insofar as I am concerned, and also as far as members
of the White House staff are concerned. That is one of the reasons why
it was necessary to remove someone like Chotiner, who is completely
political, out of the White House as soon as possible. What is also
vitally important is that Finch, Klein, Ehrlichman, Safire, and everybody
else who talks to the press, simply put a muzzle on with regard to the
political prospects for 1972. This will be the subject that everybody
will want them to get into. Also, all of the commentators will want
them to get into their estimates of the various Democratic challengers.
The best way to handle all of them is just leave them for the next
8 or 10 months, insofar as we're concerned. They will have plenty of
problems among themselves and, of course, there will be Republicans
on the Hill whom we cannot control, who will have something to say.
Above everything else, I would strongly direct that the entire White House
staff avoid any discussions with the press on the record, off the record,
at social occasions, and otherwise, with regard to 1970 and 1972. The
1970 campaign is over, the 1972 campaign has not yet begun.
His recommendation that we find occasion to demonstrate humanity and
heart go along with those made by several others, but the key here is
spontaneous, not planned meetings. How we can develop spontaneity
is a problem, but in this connection, as. I have emphasized previously,
I think that we will want to get away from our great feeling of
responsibility to the press, to inform the press of all of our movements
in advance, and not catch them off guard. I think some of the most
effective things I may have done in this field have been ones where I
haven't told the press in advance, and have allowed them to discover
what I was doing. This gets back to the point that we simply have too
much gimmickery and the press and public, too, are frankly turned off
H.R. Haldeman
26 -
by it. Incidentally, in this connection, one thought that occurs to me
is to make a visit to a prison, particularly where there a number of
young people involved. The problem of prison reform is a national
one, as Al Otten pointed out in a Wall Street Journal column of
several months ago. Simply highlighting it with a Presidential visit
might be very well in order. The Secret Service, John Mitchell
and Edgar Hoover would probably go up the wall, but I have visited
prisons often as a candidate before, both for the Senate and for
Governor, and I see no reason why we could not work something out
here. At least, put it in the hopper for consideration.
Buchanan is correct in saying that any future attacks on the media
should be rifle shots for specific abuses, and not proceed in such
a way as to roasting the entire corps. He is also correct in saying
that we should give our primary leaks to Reasoner and Smith, even
though they are not going to be with us the entire time. They will
be with us more often than the other two networks, and even though
they don't have near the listening audience, at least it will show
that trying to give us a break pays off. I agree with him, too, that
Herb Kaplow, as I indicated earlier in this memorandum, should be
brought in for something on occasion, but that the Chancellors and
the Vanocurs, and others of that type should simply be ignored.
His recommendation that the Vice President should be shown fighting
for something and not just against something or somebody, is
excellent. This is the posture we want to put him in. I particularly
believe it is important for the Vice President to do more I and A
sessions with any groups, including minorities, youth, or what have
you. He is extremely good in this form and should use it more often.
His point on page 9 would seem to go contrary to what I have told you
previously, but actually it does not. His idea that we should draw
in our horns on the PR operations is C orrect. Our weakness here is
not that we don't have a lot of people working on PR - actually we
have too many. The problem is that we are not subtle enough - we
don't have one big-timer who can handle the problem and we tend
always to be promoting on a PR basis. Perhaps we were all at fault
in getting Klein and in urging Klein, Finch, et al, to take the
defensive with regard to the election returns. On the other hand, I
feel that this is probably worthwhile because otherwise we couldn't
possibly have muted what was becoming the almost unanimous
conclusion that we had suffered a major loss in the elections, and it
H.R. Haldeman
- 27 -
was a major mistake, that our campaign at all levels was a major
mistake, and particularly a major mistake for the President.
However, having done our best to mitigate this situation it is time
to leave it alone, except for the possibility of a book by someone
like Keogh, or an article at a later time which would discuss it all
in perspective when people will be ready to give it a more fair
judgment.
John Ehrlichman has excellent ideas with regard to a better exploitation
of the activities we engage in (incidentally, his memo was probably
written before I had Humphrey and his wife in for a visit to welcome
them back). The difficulty I find, however, with some of his
recommendations is that they appear to exploit the events too much.
I frankly think that with regard to a White House Thanksgiving
Dinner, or a State visit, or the President's handling of a group that
comes to see him in the Oval Office or in the Cabinet Room - all
of these things have to be handled without being so obvious as bringing
in the TV camera. I think what have been called our "dog and pony
shows", like going out to see the dogs sniff the marijuana, turn people
off. My reaction here may not be typical, but I just had an uneasy
feeling about doing that, and I am not comfortable doing other things
of the same type now. I think what I must do is to carry on my duties
the way I think I properly should - to let the press cover them when we
consider it proper to do SO. When we do not have press there,
then we simply have to have somebody there, other than Ziegler, who
can go out and give them a fill-in. I do not believe that pushing a
story at the press, forcing them to put an event on TV is a good idea.
For example, several have suggested that we ought to have TV at
a Cabinet meeting. We tried that once or twice in the Eisenhower
Administration and I think Lyndon Johnson tried it once - they were
utter disasters from the public relations standpoint.
His National Parks Tour may be something worth considering, if it
doesn't appear to be too obvious. For example, Mike Mansfield wants
me to come to Montana to dedicate a couple of dams in Sea Glacier
Park (?) which I have never visited. This may not be a bad idea, but
running around to four or five parks and spending about a week at it
would seem to me would turn off a lot of people.
H.R. Haldeman
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With regard to our relations wit the press, I think we have one
asset that has not been properly exploited. I mentioned this to
Ziegler and Klein, but I don't think either of them have got it
through. The fact that in my entire public career, I have never
berated a reporter, his publisher, or his editor, and that I do not
do so as President. I, from time to time, will mention a column
or story to a reporter, but usually when it is one involving a member
of the family - seldom does it involve myself. This is in such direct
contrast to what both Kennedy and Johnson did, that I think we could
make a point or two here. I've put this one out before but you may
toss it about with your PR types, including Safire and Moore, and
see if a column making this point may not be in order. This might
be one where we would have to have our own Administration columnist
write and circulate broadly. Perhaps no one who has been in this
office has been more badgered by the press than I have - than has
been under more deadly and continued assault by the press than I
have been, and yet no one who has held the office has acted less
personally to these assaults.
John Ehrlichman's suggestion with regard to entertaining Congressional
families, rather than members makes sense. Here I want the Church
Service used through the year. We should be able to get most of the
members of the House and Senate to the White House with their families.
In this connection, incidentally, I would invite even the Democratic
Presidential candidates. The Church Service is a perfect instrument
for this purpose, because we do not allow the press to take pictures
and they are not supposed to ask questions. On the other hand, we
would not invite them to State Dinners, or to Evenings at the White
House, where the possibility of pictures or the press people talking
to them is much increased.
Ehrlichman makes a very good suggestion with regard to setting up
task forces of younger Congressmen to give them schooling on key
issues. T his should be explored. I would include, however, not
just younger Congressmen, but all Congressmen and Senators,
particularly those on our side and on whom we are going to have to
count on to see us through the battle on revenue sharing, taxes, etc.
John makes a very good point when he says that under no circumstances
must I become a candidate or a manager of the campaign before the
time the Convention acts. However, he is wrong in believing I would be
disposed to do SO. That was the strength of my position for 1968, and
it will continue to be our strength now.
H.R. Haldeman
- 29 -
The purpose of this memorandum is to give you, and others who will
have the responsibility in this field, my own thinking on some key
decisions. From now on, I simply don't want to hear about how
you implement those decisions and I, of course, would be the last
one ever to comment publicly or privately on those decisions.
This will, of course, drive the press up the wall and it will particularly
do so if we can get the rest of the White Hous e staff to follow exactly
the same line. What I am really suggesting here is that, except for
those who go over to the National Committee, everybody on the White
House staff simply declare a moratorium on political discussion with
the press, or with anybody who might talk to the press. I will expect
you to try to carry out this injunction to the letter.
I think Ray Price's memorandum better sums up my attitude as to the
posture we should take over the next two years, than any of the rest.
He understands the mystique of the Presidency in a profound way that
most others really are searching for. I would suggest that you re-read
it so that this can color your own instructions to others in the political
arena when you have discussions with them.
Now for some odds and ends. With regard to the press we have covered
that pretty thoroughly, but I think one point should be made which I
feel very strongly about. I recall, against my better judgment, I've
seen over the last three years, people like Whitcover, Wills, Sidey,
with results that we might anticipate. I simply don't think we ought
to waste Presidential time on any individual with that type when we
know that in the final analysis, regardless of something positive they
might write, the article and those that follow it generally will turn
out to be negative. With a Dick Wilson or a Stewart Alsop we have
honest men who will honestly disagree with my position, and from time
to time it is worth seeing one of them, but not people that we know are
hopelessly in the other camp. Up at Camp David this weekend I saw
a football game and then later on another program. What struck me
was how I was turned off by a repetition of a commercial. I think
that we should be developing now thoughts with regard to our
commercials, so that if we repeat them they not be on the same network
on the same day. I think we need a large variety of commercials and
not have repetition, particularly where that repetition should involve
me or my participation in any respect.
H.R. Haldeman
- 30 -
A final thought. Keep this memorandum for your own file only.
Discuss pertinent points with those who need to know only.
My final tape (?) is that if this long memorandum puts a much
too great burden on you, with all the other things you have to
do, it is not my thought