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From RN to Tricia and Julie RN: Suggested anecdotes when asked about political events and also of personal anecdotes of Nixon that are not publicly known. 3 pgs. 2 copies. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From RN to B. Haldeman RE: Limiting registration efforts to non-college youth. 2 pgs. 2 copies. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
From RN to B. Haldeman RE: Guidance in handling the press. 3 pgs. 2 copies. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/30/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 50-15
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This file contains:
From RN to Tricia and Julie RN: Suggested anecdotes when asked about political events and also of personal anecdotes of Nixon that are not publicly known. 3 pgs. 2 copies. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
From RN to B. Haldeman RE: Limiting registration efforts to non-college youth. 2 pgs. 2 copies. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/23/1972
From RN to B. Haldeman RE: Guidance in handling the press. 3 pgs. 2 copies. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/30/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
50
15
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to Tricia and Julie RN: Suggested
anecdotes when asked about political events
and also of personal anecdotes of Nixon that
are not publicly known. 3pgs. 2 copies.
50
15
7/23/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to B. Haldeman RE: Limiting
registration efforts to non-college youth.
2pgs. 2 copies.
50
15
7/30/1972
Campaign
Memo
From RN to B. Haldeman RE: Guidance in
handling the press. 3pgs. 2 copies.
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
N-1
memo
RN to Tricia ? tulie u anecdotes
7/24/72
Ca
[138]
N-2 N. 2
diaft
copy of Doc # N-1
7/24/72
C
[138]
N-3
memo
[139]
RN to HRH Gallup Poel on youth
7/23/72
C
N-4
[139]
diaft
copy of Doc # N-3
[7/23/72
JC
N-5
memo
RN to HRH re Lou Cannon's acticle
[140]
in Washington Post
7/30/72
C
N-6
diaft
copy of Doc # N-5
[7/30/72]
C
[140]
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
PPF
4
FOLDER TITLE
Memor July 1972
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: President's Personal Files
Box Number:
4
Folder:
Memos - July 1972
Document
Disposition
138
Return Private/Political
139
Return
Private/Political
140
Return
Private/Political
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR TRICIA AND JULIE
FROM THE PRESIDENT
Rr
It occurs to me that from time to time you may be asked
for anecdotes which would relate to some of the political
events that have occurred over the years.
One of the best ones is a Churchill quote which could well
be used by each of you when the question is raised as to how
you felt after the 1960 campaign. As you will recall,
Churchill in 1945, after the allies had won the war came up
for election. To the great surprise of the whole world and
of everybody concerned, the Labor Party won and Churchill
lost. Churchill's wife, the next day, said to him, "This
may be a blessing in disguise. " Churchill's response was,
"If this was a blessing it was very well disguised. " You
might say that that is the way that both of you felt after the
election defeat in 1960.
Another line that is very useful is with regard to the come-
back after the defeat in California. You could tell of how
President de Gaulle gave a luncheon for your mother and
me, and that after the luncheon he told some of his very
close associates that he thought your father had a position of
political leadership ahead of him despite what had happened
in the 1960 and 1962 elections. You can also point out that
in his informal toast that he gave at the luncheon he surprised
everybody concerned by referring to his past friendship for
your father and said that he felt that there was more
responsibility for leadership in the years ahead.
- 2 -
Of course, de Gaulle had his ups and downs as well. After
leading the French resistance forces to victory in World War
II and serving as the head of government in France for a
period, he lost the election and went into total retirement.
He then came back many years later when France needed him
to hold the country together and to give a new spirit to the
French people.
Also, on a personal side, you might mention some of our
Christmas parties where I played the piano for group singing,
etc., always by ear. In fact, one particularly interesting
anecdote was an occasion in New York when Tom Dewey
was there and Monsignor Ahearn as well as Bishop Cooke,
who later became Cardinal. Ahearn had a beautiful tenor
voice and Dewey was an excellent baritone. I played the
piano and the two of them sang a duet to the delight of 75
to 100 of our guests who were present.
You can say that these kinds of events are not publicly known
but they have been part of the Nixon story that is to you most
heartwarming. And also point out that when you had your own
birthday parties, etc., that I from time to time played a
happy birthday song for you.
I think another personal note that could be made is that when
I come in to dinner at the White House - before dinner I
will often make telephone calls. I call people who may be
sick, who have had hard luck like losing an election or not
getting a promotion in business that they expected, or some-
times the mother of someone who has been killed in action.
These calls never, of course, are publicized because they
are personal in nature, but I feel this is one of the responsi-
bilities of the President. As a matter of fact, one of the most
rewarding things about the position is to be able to call
people, not only when they have been very successful and to
congratulate them, but also when they have fallen on hard
times or had back luck one way or another. To me these
personal calls never given to the press are the most rewarding
ones I make from a personal standpoint. Everybody, of course,
calls an individual when he does well and when he is successful.
I know from experience that you receive very few letters or
- 3 -
calls when you suffer a defeat. It is in that period that
you find out who your real friends are, and a President
should always be the first one to recognize this fact -- to
stick by people or to remember them on those occasions
when they have reason to believe that everyone else has
forgotten them.
RN Tape 7/24/72
Memorandum to Tricia AND Julie
It occurs to me that from time to time you may
be asked for anecdotes which would relate to some of the political
events that have occurred over the years.
One of the best ones is a Churchill quote which
cai Id well be used by each of you when the question is raised
as to how you felt after the 1960 campaign. As you will recall,
Churchill in 1945 after the allies had won the war came up for
election. Britain, to the great surprise of the whole world and
of everybody concerned, the Labor Party won and Churchill lost.
Churchill' S wife the next day said to him "this may be a blessing
S in disguise. " Churchill's response was, "if this was axbedisxx
blessing it was very well disguised. " You might say that that is
the way that both of you felt after the election defeat of 1960.
Another line that is very useful is with regard
to the comeback after the defeat In California. You could tell
of how President de Gaulle gave a luncheon for your mother and
me and that after the luncheon he told some of his very close
associates that he thought that - your father had a position of
political leadership ahead of him despite what had happened in
the 1960 and 1962 elections. You can also point out that in his
f informal toast that he gave at the luncheon he surprised
everybody concerned by referring to his past friendship for your
- 2 -
father and said that he felt that there was more responsibilities
for leadership in the years ahead.
Of course, De Gaulle had his ups and downs as
well. After leading the Freech resistance forces ***** to victory
in Worl d War II and serving as the head of government in France
for a period he lost the election and went into total retirement.
He then came back many years later when France needed him to
hold the country together and to give a new spirit to the French
people.
Also on a personal side, you might make mention
some of our Christmas parties where I played the piano for
groups singing, etc., always by ear. In fact, one particj ularly
interesting anecdote was when- an occasion in New York when
Tom Dewey was there and Monsignor Ahearn as well as Bishop
Cooke who later became Cardinalf. Ahearn had a beautiful tenor
voice and Dewey was aN excellent baritone. I played the piano
and the two of them sang a duet to the delight of 75 to 100 of our
guests who were present.
saythat
These kinds of events are not publicly known but
they have been part of the Nixon story that is to you most
heartwarming. And also point out that when you had your own
birthday parties, etc. that I from time to time played a kpapx happy
birthday song for you.
- 3 -
I think another personal note that could be made
is that when I come in to dinner at the White House - before
dinner I will often make telephone calls. I call people who may
be sick, who have had hard luck like losing an election or not
getting a promotion in business that they expected, or sometimes
the mother of someone who has been killed in action. These
calls never, of course, ar publicized because they are personal
in nature, but I feel this is one of the responsibilities of the
President. As a matter of fact, one of the most rewarding things
about the position is to be able to call people not only when they
have been very successful and to congratulate them, but also
when they have fallen on hard times or had back lunck one way
or another. To me these personal calls never given to the press
are the most rewarding ones I make on-a-personal- from a personal
standpoint. Everybody, of course, calls ixxx an individual when
he does well and when he is successful. I know from experience
that you receive very few letters or calls when you suffer a defeat.
It is in that period that you find out who your real friends are, and
a President should always be the first one to recognize this
fact -- to stick by peope or to remember them on those occasions
when they have reason to believe that everyone else has forgotten
them.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Sunday - July 23, 1972
Camp David
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
Pm
In studying the New York Times release of the Gallup Poll
on youth one lesson comes through loud and clear -- it is
imperative that we limit our registration efforts wherever
possible, without announcing that that is our tactic, to the
non-college youth. Of course, some registration of college
youth on a very selective basis should be undertaken, but
generally speaking we have to realize that there is about a
two to one chance that college youth will vote for McGovern.
There is about an even chance that the non-college youth
will vote for us.
If a youth registration drive begins, pushed by the McGovern
forces, every effort should be made to get them to direct
that drive to non-college as well as to college youth. I
know that our plan is to register youth selectively by
finding out in advance which side they are on and then going
forward in the registration. Here it is very important that
the question asked not be on partisan terms. Over half of
all youth list themselves as Independents rather than
Republicans or Democrats. Consequently, it should simply
be a question of asking whether they are for McGovern or
Nixon and then registering those that are for Nixon.
Of course, it could be argued that the registration drive
among youth, even non-college youth, is not one that we
should undertake at all, since at the very best they would
split 50-50. This is much poorer than the national average
and much poorer than what we would do among older voters.
However, to avoid the effect on older voters of our conceding
the youth vote to McGovern, we need to make some effort in
this area. Let us limit it to the target states, particularly
- 2 -
the big city areas and the down-state areas where we might
pick up support and except for a token effort let us concen-
trate on non-college, blue collar youth, among ethnics and,
of course, among those few that might lean to our side
because of their background in a Republican family.
I emphasize again that the whole youth effort should be one
that gets across the idea that youth will not overwhelmingly
be in McGovern's pocket, that we have in the nation very
substantial support among younger voters and that we are going
to get more as they learn what the issues are. In fact,
something can be gained by pointing out that we are concen-
trating on registering all youth and that the McGovern
people are limiting themselves to the elite youth who have
gone to college or are in colleges and universities.
Halkeman
Date the membrandum - Sunday - Camp David
In studying the New York Times release of the
Gallup Poll on youth one lesson comes through loud and clear --
it is imperative that we limit our registration efforts wher ever
possible without announcing that that is our tactic, to the
non-college youth. Of course, some registration of college
youth on a very selective basis should be undertaken, but
generally speaking we have to realize that there is about a
two to one chance that college youth will vote for McGovern.
There is about an even chance that the non-college youth will
vote for us.
If a youth registration drive begins pushed by
the McGovern forces every effort should be made to get them
to direct that drive to non-college as well as to college youth.
I know that our plan is to register youth selectively by finding
out in advance which side they are onand then going forward in
the registration. Here it is very important that the question
asked not be on partisan terms. Over half of all youth list themselves
as Independents rather than Republican or Democrat. Consequently,
it should simply be a question of asking whether they are from
for McGovern or Nixon and then registering those that are for
Nixon.
- *xxx 2 -
Of course it could be argued that the registration drive among
youth, even non-college youth, is not one that we should undertake
at all, since at the very best they would split 50-50, this is much
poorer than the national average and much poorer than what we
would do among older voters. However, to avoid the effect on
older voters of our conceding the youth vote to McGovern, we
need to make some effort in this area. Let us limit it to the
target states, particularly the big city areas and the down-state
areas where we might pick up support and except for a token
effort let us concentrate on non-college, blue collar youth, among
ethnics and of course among those who tend to lean to our side
because of their background in a Republican family.
I emphasize again that the whole youth effort should
be one that gets across the idea in the nation that youth will not
inthe nation
overwhelmingly be in McGovern's pocket, that we have very
substantial support among younger voters and that we are going
to get more as WEXXX they learn what the issues are. In fact,
something can be gained by pointing out that we are concentrating
on registering all youth and that the McGovern people are
limiting themselves to the elite youth who have gone to college
or are in colleges and universities.
NOTE: Two copies. One for the President's file and one for Bob
Haldeman - not for distribution otherwise. That is always
the case where I dictate a political memorandum unless I
indicate that the political memorandum is to go to others. (RN)
CAMP DAVID
Sunday - July 30, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
In reading Lou Cannon's piece in the Sunday Washington Post
I think we can get some guidance as to the handling of the press on
campaign matters which should be followed strictly.
I do not want people who talk about the campaign to make the
mistake of cutting off representatives of periodicals, TV and newspapers
simply because they are generally against us. Consequently, I do not
object to an article, appearing from time to time, in unfriendly publications
which is based on conversations with our campaign people. Having said
this, however, we need some completely ironclad rules with regard to
who talks to media representatives that we know are antagonistic to us.
First of all, it is vitally important that only the most intelligent
and sophisticated person on our campaign staff dare to go in the ring with
one of these people. Second, we should not waste time with one of them
at the expense of turning down interviews with media representatives who
are our friends. Third, even when our most intelligent people are meet-
ing with people like Cannon they must constantly keep in mind that they
are confronting a political enemy and that everything they say will, there-
fore, be used against us. I have to emphasize this over and over again
because we never seem to get it across to our people no matter how
many times they get burned.
The Cannon piece is the best example we can have of why these
rules should be rigidly adhered to. In the first place, while we know the
Washington Post is totally gainst us it is just as well to have a piece that
has some favorable points in it as well as completely negative ones.
Therefore, I have no objections to the fact that Cannon was given interviews
by the Campaign Committee. On the other hand, it waa a stupid mistake
-which must never be repeated - to allow Cannon to have the run of the
White House staff, the campaign staff and the National Committee staff
in getting his story together. The PR types representative of each of
- 2 -
these groups must have a rule tha when media representatives, who
are antagonistic, come in for interviews they are treated courteously
but that only the top political man with great sophistication will be
allowed to talk to him. In addition, whenever that man talks to the
interviewer the press man should sit in on the interview so as to keep
it honest.
In that connection, incidentally, I was rather surprised to
find that we did not have a recording of Clark MacGregor's remarks
at the Press Club. It will be a very modest expense - but it is
absolutely essential that a man with a small recording device go with
him everywhere he goes so that we have a record of what he says which
he can put out in the event that we want to correct a misquotation or
get out a story that was not covered adequately. The same, I think,
should be true of Dole. As you know we have always followed this
custom with regard to my own appearances.
Now, looking at the Cannon story from both the plus and the
minus standpoints, we find a good headline "Nixon Running Scared,"
and a good thrust insofar as there being no complacency.
From a minus standpoint, it is obvious that Cannon had the
run of the shop and in addition to talking to Haldeman in the White
House and MacGregor at the Committee to Re-Elect, Dole at the
Republican National Committee, he talked to people up and down the
line and got a number of quotes that are both inaccurate and not helpful.
I am not, of course, referring to quotes that he has from Republican
Senators and Congressmen. We have no control whatsoever over this.
What I am referring to are quotes that he obviously had to get since
he has it in quotation marks - - from people on the campaign staff.
For example, as I have often emphasized, it is a mistake
constantly to run down my previous campaigns. We should not contri-
bute to the myth that I did not work hard enough in 1960 and 1968. The
quotation to the effect that before the election in November I had gotten
so confident that I was working on my acceptance speech, taking rests,
etc., is totally inaccurate, as you know, and very harmful.
With regard to MacGregor's own interview, I would like for
you to get together with him and Dole on one point and to have a rule
enforced throughout the balance of the campaign. He was putting out
polls from California and Texas as well as Ohio and Illinois. There was
no reason why he should not have done this since we have not indicated
in the past what our policy was in this respect. However, under
- 3 -
absolutely no circumstances are any polls whatever to be put out
showing us ahead or behind in any of the major states without my
specific approval. This is an area where well-intentioned people
will put out a poll for what they think is a good reason - in this case
to knock down complacency -- but where later on they are going to
be asked for polls in these states when they might not want to put
them out. Also, I don't want the impression to get across the country
that we are conducting our campaign on the basis of polls rather than
on the basis of principles. I want you specifically to see that this is
brought up at the next meeting where Mitchell, Dole, MacGregor, et
al, are present. Mitchell, of course, would not have made this mistake
MacGregor made it only because of lack of experience.
Along the same line, I noted where the statement was made
that abortion was a minus issue for the President because polls showed
that a majority of women favored it. This obviously comes from the
Harper group in the Domestic Council Staff. I want you to get hold of
Ehrlichman and tell him that he is to see that absolutely no one in the
Domestic Council talks to anyone in the press without his specific
approval and then a press man from Ron's office is to be present.
Ehrlichman, of course, would not make such a stupid mistake and the
only way he can control others is to put a tight reign on them.
For example, Syndlinger ran into outraged reaction the evening
that the National Committee put out findings from their Platform
Committee poll to the effect that a majority of the members of the
Platform Committee found out that bussing was not a significant issue.
I want some discipline enforced in this respect for reasons which should
be obvious even to the most stupid of our people.
Another line which we should knock down is that there is no
grass roots support for the President and that we have to get "volunteers
one at a time. " This probably comes from Sears or somebody in that
group. The question here is not whether this may be true - and I doubt
if it is in terms of getting volunteers one at a time - but it plays right
into the hands of our political enemies. I could give other examples but
I close the memorandum with this admonition: Let's quit tackling our
own ball carrier. 11
CAMP DAVID
Sunday - July 30, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN
FROM THE PRESIDENT
This is a post script to the memorandum I wrote to you
on the Washington Post story.
In laying down the rules that only our top people can talk to
antagonistic media representatives and then only under the very
strictest surveillance by one of the people from the press office, I
realize that this is difficult to enforce because people at other levels
in the campaign need a chance to express themselves and do not like
the idea of feeling that they cannot be trusted to talk to members of
the press. There is an easy way to handle this. Deliberately develop
occasions where they can talk to friendly representatives of the media.
I realize there are not too many but on the other side of the coin our
major problem, as you know, is that we give about twice as much time
to unfriendly people as we do to friendly press people. In this campaign
I want this thing reversed as much as we can. One way we can at least
reward our friends is to give them the opportunity to talk to second
echelon people - something that we will not allow to unfriendly people.
This way we kill two birds with one stone. Our staffers will get the
satisfaction of being able to sound off about their views in the campaign
and in addition our friends in the press and television will be getting
something that their competitors will not be getting.
There perhaps could not be clearer proof of the difference
between the kind of treatment we will get in the press and the kind of
treatment McGovern will get in the press than the Nixon/McGovern
articles in the Sunday Post today - July 30. The Nixon article, as I
pointed out earlier in the memorandum, makes some points that we
want to have made but does not miss an opportunity to make all the
negative points that are part of the mythology with regard to our
campaigns.
- 2
The McGovern article by Spencer Rich, as we might expect,
is a total puff piece. This comparison only demonstrates the wisdom
of my advice that we have to be much more careful in programming
interviews with unfriendly press people than we do with friendly press
people.
Incidentally, when I said earlier in the memorandum that I
thought we should see some of the unfriendly media people I meant
only those who reached fairly substantial audiences that we could not
afford to ignore. Under no circumstances, do I want any more time
wasted, for example, on John Osborne on the left or his counterparts
on the far right. I say this not because they are against us but because
the audience they reach simply is not that important to us.
XXX XXNX KX XXXgXXX XXXXX XXXX XX
KXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXX X XX XgaXnXx X XXXXXXXXXX XXeXXXXXXXXX
ON ANOTHER SUBJECT
This is a memorandum for Haldeman -- he is to be given one copy
and the other copy is for my xxxxxxx file -- it is not for file distribution
otherwise. That is always the case where I dictate a political
memorandum unless I indicate that the political memorandum is to
go to others.
In reading Lou Innin's piece in the
Sunday Washington Post I think we can get some guidance as to the
handling of the press on campaign matters which should be followed
strictly.
I do not want people who talk about the campaign to make the
mistake of cutting off representatives of periodicals, TV and newspapers
simply because they are generally against us. Consequently, I do not
in unfriently publications
object to an article appearing from time to time/which is based on
conversations with our campaign people . Having said this however we
need some completely ironclad rules with regard to who talks to media
representatives EXX who we know are antagonistic to us. First of all,
it is vitally important that only the most intelligent and sophisticated
person on our campaign staff dare to go in the ring with one of these people.
Second, we should not waste time with one of them at the expense of
turning down interviews with media representatives who are our friends.
Third, even when our most intelligent people are meeting with people
like Kannon (?) they must constantly keep in mind that they are confronting
a political enemy and that everything they say will therefore be used
against us. I have to emphasize this over and over again because we
- 2 -
never seem to get it across to our people no matter how many times
they get burned.
The Cannon (?) piece is the best example we can have of why
these rules should be rigidly adhered to. In the first place while we
know the Washington Post is totally against us it is just as well to have
axpiecexxa piece that has some favorable points in it as well as completely
negative ones. Therefore, I have no objections to the fact that Cannon
was given interviews with by the campaign committee. On the other
hand, it was a stupid mistake which must never be represtadxx repeated
to allow Cannon to have the run of the White House statt, the campaign
staff and the National Committee staff in getting his story together. The
PR types representative of each of these groups must have a rule that
when media representatives who are antagonistic come in for interviews,
they are treated courteously but that only the top political man with great
sophistication will be allowed to talk to him. In addition, whenever that
man talks to the interviewer the press man should sit in on the interview
so as to keep it honest. In that connection, incidentally I was rather
surprised to find that we did not have XXX a recording of Clark MacGregor's
remarks at the Press Club. It will be a very modest expense but it is
absenxx absolutely essential that a small recording device with a man
go with him everywhere he goes so that we have a record of what he says
which he can put out in the event that we want to correct a misquotation
or get out a story that was not covered adequately. The same should be
3 -
The same, I think, should be true of Dole. As you know we have always
followed this custom with regard to my own appearances.
Now looking at the Cannon story from both the plus and minus
standpoints we find a good headline - "Nixon Running Scared. " And a
good thrust insofar as there being no complacency.
From a minus standpoint, it is obvious that Cannon had the
run of the shop and in addition to talking to Haldeman in the White House
and MacGregor at the Committee to Re-Elect, Dole at the Republican
National Committee he talked to people up and down the line and got
a numberof quotes that are both inaccurate and not helpful. I am not
referring, of course, to quotes that he has from Republican Senators and
Congressmen. We have no control whatsoever over this. Rx What I am
referring to are quotes that he obviously had to get since he has it in
quotationsmarks from people on the campaign staff.
For example, as I have often emphasized, it is a mistake
constantly to run down my previous campaigns. We should not contribute
to the myth that I did not work hard enough in 1960 and 1968. The quotation
to the effefct that before the election in November I had gotten so confident
that I was working on my acceptance speech, taking rests, etc., is totally
inaccurate as you know and very harmful. With regard to MacGregor's
own interview I would like for you and him and Dole to get together on
one point and to have rule enforced throughout the balance of thecampaign.
- 4 -
He was putting out polls in California and in Texas as well as in Ohio
and in Illinois. There is no reason why he should not do this since we
have not indicated what our policy was in this respect. However, under
absolutely no circumstancses are any polls whatever to be put out showing
us ahead or behind in any of the major states without my specific approval.
This is an area where well intentioned people will put out a poll for what
they think is a good reason -- in this case to knock down complacency --
but where later on they are going to be asked if xtx xx for polls in these
states when they might not want to put them out. Also I don't want the
impression to get across the country that we are conducting our campaign
on the basis of polls rather than on the basis of principles. I want you
specifically to see that this is brought up at the next meeting where
Mitchell, Dole, MacGregor et al are present. Mitchell, of course,
would not have made this mistake. MacGregor made it only because of
lack of experiences.
Along the same binexxx line, I noted where thesxx statement
was made that abortion was a minus issue for the President because
pkbsxxxx polls showed that a majority of women favored it. This obviously
comes from the Harper group in the Domestic Council Staff. I want you
to get hold of Ehrlichman and tell him that he is to see that absolutely no
one in the Domestic Council talks to anyone in the press without his
specific approval and then a press man from Ron's affice is to be present.
Ehrlichman, of course, would not make such a stupid mistake and the
only way he can control others *** is to put a tight rein on them.
- 5 -
For example, Syndlinger ran into outraged reaction the
evening that the National Committee put out findsiox findings from
their Platform Committee poll to the effect that XXXXX a majority of
our members of the Platform Committee found out that busing was
not a significant issue. I want some discipline enforced in this
respect for reasons which should be obvious taxx even to the most
stupid of our people.
Another line which we should knock down is that there is
no grass roots support for the President and that we have to get "volunteers
one at a time. " This probably comes from S⁺ars or somebody in that
group. The question here is not whether this may be true - and I doubt
if it is xxbaxtxx in terms of getting volunteers one at a time - but it plays
right into the hands of our political enemies. I could give other examples
but I close the memorandum with this admonition - Let's quit tackling our
own ball carrier.
(End of Tape)
THIS IS A SECOND MEMORANDUM TO HALDEMAN a P.S. on
the one that I had written to brikxxx him on the Washington Post story.
In laying down the rules that only our top people can talk to
antagónistic media representatives and then only under the very strictest
survelliance by one of the people KIXIXIX from the press office, I realize
that this is difficult to enforce because people at other ***** levels in
the campaign need a chance to express themselves and do not like the
idea of feeling that they cannot be trusted to talk to members of the press.
There is an easy way to handle this. Del iberately develop occasions
where they can talk to friendly representatives of the media. I real ize
there are not too many but on the other side of that coin our major
problem, as you know, is that we give about twice as much time to
wwkeixedxxx unfriendly people as we do to friendly press people. In this
campaign I want this thing reversed as much as we can. One way we
can at least reward our friends is to give them the opportunity to talk
to second echelon people something that we will not allow to unfriendly
people. This way we kill two birds with one stone. Our staffers
will get the satisfaction of being able to sound off about their views in
the campaign and in addition bur friends in the press and television will
be getting something that their competitizxxxxx competitors will not be
getting.
There perhaps could not be clearer proof of the difference
between the kind of treatment we will get in the press and the kind of
treatment McGovern will get in the press than the Nixon-McGovern articles
- b -
axkx
in the Sunday Post today - July 30. The rxlx Nixon article, as I
pointed out earlier in the memorandum, makes some points that we
want to have made but does not miss an wpp9xxxxxxxopportunity to
make all the negative points that are part of the mythology with regard
to our campaigns.
The McGovern article by Spencer Rich, as we might expect,
is a total puff piece. This comparison only demonstrates the wisdom
of my advice that we have to be EXXXXXX much more careful in programming
interviews with unfriendly press people than we do with friendly press people.
Incidentally, when said earlier in the
memorandum that I thought we should see some of the unfriendly media
people I meant only those who reached fairly substantial audiences that
we could not afford to ignore. Under no circumstances, do I want anymore
time wasted, for example, on John Osb orne on the left or his counterparts
on the far right. I say this not because they are against us but because
the audience they reach simply is not that important to us.
end of memorandum