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From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Tips for the Campaign of 1970 regarding democrats, swing voters, vice president, etc. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Campaign of 1970 strategies regarding economy, governors, advertising, etc. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
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From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Tips for the Campaign of 1970 regarding democrats, swing voters, vice president, etc. 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 8/24/1970
From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Campaign of 1970 strategies regarding economy, governors, advertising, etc. 14 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 11/6/1970
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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50
19
8/24/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE: Tips
for the Campaign of 1970 regarding
democrats, swing voters, vice president, etc.
4pgs.
50
19
11/6/1970
Campaign
Memo
From Patrick J. Buchanan to RN RE:
Campaign of 1970 strategies regarding
economy, governors, advertising, etc. 14pgs.
Thursday, May 24, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
N-1
memo
Buchanan to RN re VP! compaign
8/24/70
C
[178]
of 1970
N-2
Buchanan to RN re 1970 Campaign
11/6/70
memo
C
[179]
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
PPF
I
FOLDER TITLE
CAMPAIGN of 1970
RESTRICTION CODES
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financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection:
President's Personal Files
Box Number:
6
Folder:
Campaign of 1970
Document
Disposition
178
Return Private/Political
179
Return Private/Political
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 24, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan
THE VEEP AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1970
Given this Scammon-Wattenburg thesis -- which I believe is
right on the mark for Democrats we are in serious danger of
being driven back to our minority party posture. Our needs seem
crystal clear.
1. We cannot allow the Democrats to "get back on the right
side of the Social Issue. This they are attempting to do right now
with tough talk, etc. They have to be branded and the brand must
S tick as permissivists, as indulgent of students and black
rioters, as soft on crime. This can be accomplished with their
record in the last Congress I believe. But for us to contest
with them primarily on the Economic Issue - - Big Spenders, etc. --
Jagra
as the major assault seems to me not a prescription for success.
Republicans for forty years have been tarring Democratic Congresses
with "Big Spender" labels, and Democrats have been winning those
Congresses, lo, these same Forty Years.
The focus should be on tarring them with "ultra-liberalism"
and "radicalism"
especially on the Social Issue where we are strong
and they are weak.
2. Where are the swing voters in 1970? We must assume left-
wing Democrats are going for their Democratic Candidates and Repub-
licans are going for Republicans, come hell or high water. The swing
voters are thus Democrats -- law and order Democrats, conservatives
on the "Social Issue, " but "progressive" on domestic issues. This
is the Wattenburg thesis -- and I think it is basically correct. How
to conduct ourselves then.
-2-
Tar the Democratic Leadership specifically with the "radical"
label on social policy; tar them as well with the "obstructionist"
label on the President's programs for reforming society, for
getting America moving.
Frankly, we should go after the "Daley Democrats. 11 No one
can do this better than the Vice President but we cannot get these
voters by using rehashed Republican arguments or stale
Republican rhetoric.
"Big Spenders" is a theme that might work, will work, with
right
our Republicans we are using it in all our GOP literature but
will it have any real bite with the union guy to whom big spending may
mean the medicare for his mom or old man? (Foot-dragging Congress"
does not seem charged with much electricity, either.
3. Scammon contends that a hard-line on riots etc. by
Democrats may anger "liberals, 11 but liberals have no place to go
anyhow except the Democratic Party. Just so, regular Republicans
have no place to go in 1970 (no Wallace) but the GOP. So, let's
go straight after the Daley Democrats.
4. The Vice President should win these Democrats to the
Presidential banner by contending that RN is a progressive on
dome stic policy blocked by "obstructionists" in the left-wing leadership
of the Democratic Party; that RN is a hard-liner on crime, drugs and
p ornography, whose legislation is blocked by "ultraliberals" in the
Senate who care so much about the rights of the criminal that they
forget about the rights of society; that the President is a man
trying with veto after veto to hold down the cost of living but is
being thwarted by radicals and wild spenders who would, given the
chance, create the kind of in flation that would put Indonesia in its
heyday in the shade; that the President is a man in foreign policy
who is moving toward peace with honor but whose efforts are being
attacked and undercut by unilateral disarmers and isolationists
who think peace lies in an abject retreat fromthe world and the
dismantling of the army, navy and air force. This is said strong
but these I would think would be the ways the Vice President could
best appeal to the patriotic, hard-line pro-medicare Democrats who are
the missing element in the Grand New Party.
-3-
5. There is move afoot to "low-key" the Vice President
campaign in 1970 -- to have him focus specially on the local issue
garnering national publicity and helping local Senate candidates
Condicts
or
and not seek the national publicity. There is no conflict between
the two are thoroughly complimentary.
The Democrats -- see Scammon's book -- are only now coming
around to recognize what we knew in 1966 and 1968 -- that a strong
statement in Oregon is more effective in getting to voters in New Jersey
than a banal statement in Trenton, Tenafly, Newark and Elizabeth. The
way for the Vice President to help the Senatorial Candidate is to
praise him to the skies, fine but to hammer the national
Democratic leadership in a manner that will keep our big press
corps excited and with us, that will get network time every night if
possible with our message; and so help every Republican Senatorial
Candidate while we are helping the local one.
Right now the Agnew tour is getting tremendous publicity as the
potential best show in town. All we hav e to do to forfeit that national
P ublicity is run around talking about "cattle and oil" in Casper,
never
as has been suggested already. We ought to remember also, that
when we give up the television time on the networks someone
else, namely our Democratic friends, gets it.
Mike Mansfield says the Democrats have no one to compete
with the Veep on the hustings. We have a tremendous advantage here --
which we should use, not throw away by talking about local issues
that carry no national wallop.
We should have something topical and tough for the national
media every day. If the Vice President can raise the Republican
Administration a few points in the polls and the President by his
decisions and actions raise it several more the effect will be like
raising the water level and all the boats in the lake will rise at once.
A hard-hitting tough campaign can help bring home Senators and
Congressmen who live or die on a few national percentage points.
6. Clearly, fromthe Scammon book, we should tar the
Liberal
Democrats as being not only the party of "bugout" but the party of
bussing, the advocates of "compulsory integration, 11 the party whose
last Attorney General banged down the door in Chicago in order to
testify on behalf of the Chicago Eight, the leadership that let this
bugant, bussing,
Separate Southern
-4-
Jemos fun
Northernt Watern
country turn into the porno capital of the world, and is blocking
RN's effort to change that. Also, the Democratic leadership has
altered its historic foreign policy position to kow-tow to student
radicals who bully-ragged those same leaders in the streets of
Chicago, etc. The Democratic Leadership should be portrayed as
selling out to the crazies in their own ranks and selling out the
interests and views of the good patriotic Democrats who number in
the millions. We might even say LBJ was destroyed by the "ultra-
liberals" in his own party.
7. We should stay on the offensive, taken the "out" (and
offensive)position even though we are the "ins" (and defensive) by
good
hammering at the "liberal Eastern Establishment" that is responsible
for what has happened to America, the Establishment' that is
frustrating our efforts to right the wrongs in Society, the Establishment
whose wards are tearing up the colleges, the Establishment that
indulges rioters, etc. (Of course, said in better phraseology, but
the need to be on the offensive, to act as "outs" seems to me vital.)
agreed
8. The Economic Issue. To get into a debate on whether or
not we are in a "recession" seems to me a utterly foolish idea
since the very discussion of "recession" is surely not going to help us
Pother
and since anyone who is hurt in the current economic situation is not
issues
likely to be convinced he is not being hurt by anybody's rhetoric.
Rather than debate whether or not the investors and brokers and
unemployed are being hurt, let's go after the Democratic radicals
whose wild schemes are frustrating our efforts to stop the rise
in prices. This is the Big Spender theme but in different
rhetoric, tougher rhetoric, equating the Democrats with the same
kind of ultraliberalism in spending that they follow on the Social
Issue.
9. Finally, to change the Vice Presi dent now into the
traditional Republican campaigner is to change a winning strategy for
a losing one.
ultra
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE 1970 CAMPAIGN
Memorandum to the President
From Patrick J. Buchanan
November 6, 1970
STRATEGY
Looking back, in my view, the Social Issue was clearly the right
one upon which to focus in the campaign. We took the lead on it with
the Vice President's speeches; forced one Democrat after another to
defend himself, to get on the right side of it -- and thus precluded
their taking the offensive on the only good issue they had - - the
economic one. Secondly, the issue clearly worked. Tunney spent
half the campaign getting out of police cars; Stevenson was talking
about his Marine Corps record by the campaign's end and wearing a
flag pin in his lapel; Humphrey ran on law and order -- and Kennedy
was calling campus militants "campus commandos. 11 (The President
might have noted on election night that the Senior Senator from
Massachusetts now has a haircut. ) What happened this campaign -
in a number of instances was that Democrats like Tunney and
Preservation Copy
2
Stevenson got themselves back on the right side of this issue,
through speeches and spots, as Scammon and Wattenburg had
urged them to do -- and once they got right on this issue; it became
a contest on personalities and on the economic issue, I would guess,
and they won hands down.
On the other hand, if Ottinger had gotten well on this issue he
would very probably be the new Senator from New York.
Those Democrats who did go hardline on law and order apparently
gave up nothing on their left - just as S-W contended (the kids have
nowhere else to go) and won the suburbs. Moreover they were able
to endorse the President's peace initiative and Mideast policy, thus
losing nothing there.
Those candidates, who came off in the election as out and out
liberals, Gore and Goodell and Duffy -- and did not get well on our
issues were defeated.
The legitimate question to ask the Mortons and others is what
issues they would have had us run on, take the offensive on. Had we
devoted our campaign to the economic issue - - those final statistics
about a seven billion deficit for the first quarter, the . 5 retail price
increase, the GM loss, the massive increase in industrial price
index would have been crippling blows. Had we devoted all our effort
right
to the economic issues, Gore would have won and Buckley very
probably lost.
Preservation Copy
3
As for our domestic programs -- from my travels around the
country with the Vice President -- everybody thought revenue
sharing was nice while most of our guys were running away from
the Welfare Plan and we constantly had to stress work incentives.
All through the South and Southwest this was hurting, not helping us.
My main reservation about the Social Issue campaign was that
we started too hard, too early. We threw the Democrats completely
on the defensive in the first two weeks -- but they still had six weeks
to get well on the issue, to alter their campaign spots to deal with
the issue; and like Tunney and Stevenson and Kennedy, they clearly
succeeded in doing this. Smith specifically started his hard-line too
soon, considering media's impact.
One thing we underestimated by a long shot is our ability to
command the media and get our points across -- we do not need to
hit something day in and day out for eight weeks now -- we can do it
in a matter of two-hours and be successful. In retrospect we might
have been better off to start out not full-bore -- but low-keyed,
light and positive, and then gone over on the all-out offensive around
the second week of October - which would not have given the opposition
enough time to re-orient their campaigns.
There is another point that should not go unanswered. The
"social issue" was not a "missile gap" issue -- i.e., a complete
Preservation Copy
4
creation of our campaign -- it was an issue created by the people
of this country who declared it to be their prime concern in state
after state after state. It would have been utter folly not to recog-
nize public concerns on this issue; recognize we were positioned
correctly and go after our opponents.
When one considers the other issues; the economy -- where we
had problems; foreign policy, where the Mideast could go up, where
the U.S. Soviet relations were cooling; and RN had proposed a cease-
fire which the doves could say they had called for long ago -- we had
nothing to draw a sharp line of division with them; nothing which we
could take to the country and say clearly -- here we stand; here they
stand throw them out for this reason and put us in. We have to
remember that we were trying to throw them out of office - not keep
ourselves in -- and in that kind of effort you have to go on the offensive
for the people are not going to understand why there is a need for a
change.
THE ECONOMY
Clearly, this must have hurt I see nothing else to explain why
Reagan did not get the margin everyone predicted -- after the dismal
campaign of Mr. Unruh. Also, it seems to me the only explanation
why our Western Senators went down so badly when we had felt they
might all run a close race.
Preservation Copy
5
(Incidentally, whoever was giving us the optimistic poll information
ought to be called upon for some ample explanation why they were so
far off.)
Looking at the races by State -- which we have to do I think
we can see what won or lost it. There were it seems no national
trends -- as this was not a national election.
Connecticut, the President certainly helped -- so also did the
Vice President in convincing conservatives and GOPers that Weicker
was acceptable and even desirable. This helped with the Dodd voters.
In New York, the White House and Vice President can legitimately
claim to have won this by the attack on Goodell, bringing liberals into
his camp, and by letting New York know that Buckley was both
acceptable and desirable. The Social Issue here finished the Demo-
cratic candidate what else explains why a young, good-looking
Democrat can't get 40 per cent of the vote in New York. Also, Rocky
hit hard on the Social issue.
In New Jersey, our friend, Gross injured himself with his
campaign tactics -- wherein he took left-wing anti-Nixon positions
and then shifted himself back. I don't know the ultimate reasons for
his defeat -- but a social issue campaign by Cahill against a drawing
board liberal won by half a million in that state.
Preservation Dear
6
In Pennsylvania, God knows why Scott won so narrowly against
an unknown we ought to find out. Perhaps economy.
In Maryland, the President helped certainly -- but this was an
"anti-Tydings vote" because in my view Tydings ran a hell of a good
strong campaign. The Mahoney people just couldn't hack him.
In Virginia we had a nice liberal Republican running and he got
15 per cent of the vote.
In Tennessee, we were running against a hell of a campaigner,
in Albert Gore; he had the best media and press of any campaigner
in the country; he ran as a fighting underdog, the "Grey Fox, 11 and
the only reason we beat this fellow was the issues not on candidates
or personalities.
In Texas, I don't know why George Bush lost - - but he lost to a
fellow who was as tough or tougher than he was on the social issues.
So, this surely did not lose Texas. Economy, desire for 1 Dem and
1 GOP Senator (originally won for Tower) and perhaps even rumor
about Bush for Agnew hurt.
Florida, we got beat because we beat ourselves with the Carswell
gambit, with the Kirk-Guerney-Cramer feud, which turned off the
voters of both parties -- and because the Democrats came up with two
populist conservatives who had no scars and a lot of attractiveness.
Preservation
7
If I were a Florida Republican, I would have been fed up with the GOP
nonsense and Kirk myself -- and the fellows elected seemed conservative
enough.
As for the nonsense that this proves the failure of the Southern
Strategy - my we ought to ignore it. Bentsen and Chiles are not liberals.
The only two Southern liberals in this election -- Gore and Yarborough
were defeated. Any Southern Strategy is part of a presidential strategy -
it does not apply to Democratic conservatives running at the State level -
indeed, RN and Vice President Agnew are as popular as ever south of
the Mason-Dixon line -- and would sweep that area still in a national
election.
In Indiana, we had a candidate who was not the most attractive
fellow in the world; some of his tactics brought out into the open were
questionable; if he wins it will be because of the issues, and because
of our visits. Certainly, it won't be on his personality.
In Michigan, the GOP had a disasterous primary and came out
with the worst possible candidate -- and Hart is attractive, without
enemies, and the Warren incident made it hard to handle the social
issue -- and Mrs. Romney's basic positions are unsuitable to that kind
of campaign.
In Illinois, Stevenson scrambled for his life after the first two
weeks of the campaign - and succeeded in getting well on the issue
by his flag pin, emphasizing his Marine career, hiring Foran as his
Preservation Copy
8
Deputy Campaign Manager and climbing between the sheets with
none other than old Law and Order himself, Richard J. Daley.
In Missouri -- money, and a young and attractive candidate
almost knocked off Symington, who has lost touch with the people of
the State of Missouri.
In the West, we went down like Ninepins in the Senate races -
the only thing I can see as the reason here is that perhaps the Social
Issue does not have the bite of the economic issues in the great plaines.
But the economic issue does as the President knows from hearing
the howls of GOP Senators at even the least mention of a cutback in
public works. Perhaps the farm vote let loose here. Shuman's gripes
and drops in farm prices had been ominous portents.
In California, it must have been the economy -- since everyone
agreed that Reagan ran a tremendous campaign, was popular, and
Unruh was a joke. Also, again, Tunney spent the campaign getting
out of police cars -- and if that issue was neutralized, then Murphy
was through, due to Technicolor, age, condition and economy.
THE HOUSE
Most analyses indicate that one percent in unemployment can be
translated into an additional loss of five House seats above and beyond
9
usual off-year losses -- well, we had two points of unemployment
higher than full employment -- and that might well explain our 10
defeats in the House. Also, a number of popular House incumbents
were put up for Senate races which contributes to that figure.
(US News showed that 51 seats were average off-year loss in those
years when unemployment was on the increase.)
THE GOVERNORS
Here is the big loss; here is the major problem - - along with
the State Legislatures. Again, we can go down them one by one.
Pennsylvania - - They had us on the State issues after the Shafer-
Broderick Administration.
Ohio -- The scandal plus a commonplace candidate against
Gilligan lost this even before it was started. (Note - - however,
Gilligan was outraged and went to court on that quote we were using
against him.)
Wisconsin--
X real disaster here, a real problem for 1972 - -
partially explained by the incredible showing of Proxmire, who gets
the entire Democratic vote; who does well on a national television;
and who has the image in Wisconsin of a fellow who saves the taxpayers
dollars. Erickson was regarded all along as a weak sister and his poor
showing pulled Olson down as well.
Preservation
10
Maine and Rhode Island the near losses here for Democrats
indicate the vulnerability of Governors in times of rising prices
and rising taxes; vulnerabilities which have little to do with whether
they are pro-Nixon or Democratic. (Muskie's coattails showed little
attraction here.)
Arkansas -- A populist Democrat got the Wallace vote, and
Mr. Rockefeller did not run on the Social Issue; indeed he would have
been especially hard put to hit permissiveness. He lost this one
himself and Bumpers is an example of the new breed of hard-
headed Democrat populists that did well all over the South.
Florida -- Kirk lost it for well-known reasons.
The Western Governors =- I don't know why some of these failed
to win; it would be worth a close investigation -- but ab initio I would
attach it to State issues, to the vulnerability of executive incumbents - -
who are blamed when things go wrong more readily than might a
Congressman or Senator be blamed.
FINAL POINTS
SOME TURKEYS
One reason we did not do better was that in many states, we did
not field our strongest possible candidate. George would have done
Preservation Copy
11
better than Lenore; Lugar better than Roudebush; Finch better than
Murphy; Laxalt better than Raggio; Andrews better than Kleppe; most
anyone better than Smith. We had a few turkeys out there -- and it
is not an easy thing to unseat an incumbent Senator; the odds are long
against it. (Something like 8-1.) Indeed, two of ours who lost were
appointed -- not elected to the job -- Goodell and Smith.
CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING
Much of this has become counterproductive because of the massive
nature of it; because of the negative publicity it gets from press and
networks. Also, some of the harsher attacks from our side are
certain to gather the irate attention of the liberal media -- just as
those gutting ads in the final weeks outraged all networks -- and they
said SO. The adverse reaction to campaign ads may not have helped
our last night's stump speech appearance. But clearly the technical
problems with that show outranked any gain or loss based on substance
of speech.
On the law and order issue -- clearly it can be overdone as we
believe Smith overdid it in the suburbs -- where he ran as poorly as
any Republican ever ran. There is a point of diminishing returns on
the Social Issue as George Wallace found out. But our problem
was that we began too early too hard in my view -- enabling the
Democrats to reposition themselves and effectively defend it.
12
SOCIAL ISSUE
It was the right issue for us in 1970 -- but we should remember
that in 1972 -- they will be using it against us to some effect, if
it is not visible that there has been a national change in either
climate or statistics.
THE PRESIDENT
We are getting a bum rap on the President's campaign -- being
accused of appealing to fears, of a divisive polarizing campaign --
that is simply not true - - but it is a result of our natural enemies in
the Media. The President however, did go out and fight for his
candidates, in the GOP and the presentation of RN as a partisan
necessarily involves some attrition in his national image as President
of all the people, above the battle. We ought to review here whether
the gains from this campaigning is worth the risk of depreciation of
our most vital political asset -- the Presidency.
THE CAMPAIGN
Victory has a thousand fathers; defeat is an orphan. Some of the
bitching and moaning are now coming from individuals who had no hand
in the selection of the strategy -- and much of what they say might
reflect certain sour grapes. This should be taken into consideration
just as the consideration that those who favored this strategy (i. e., me)
also have an investment in its vindication.
Preservation Copy
13
VICE PRESIDENT
He carried out his assignment to the letter. We kept the
national media off our backs -- gnawing at us - - until the final two
weeks by virtue of an unprecedented amount of fresh, useable copy.
We ran a rough hard-hitting campaign, which has been distorted by
the media -- but which raised both money and enthusiasm and good
publicity very nearly everywhere we went.
The President will recall that in 1958, with more serious economic
dislocation, and a popular Republican President, and a hard campaign
- we lost 57 seats in the House. We did one hell of a lot better this
year - and among the reasons is the aggressiveness of our campaign
against the Democrats, the media we received by virtue of the Vice
President's controversial positions and his out-spokenness -- and the
strategy we used which was devised and approved by the President.
But, just as the President suffered nationally, by his reputation
as a fighting partisan in the fifties -- so also, has this Vice President.
Strong recommendation is that he be given responsibility for some
domestic area where he can come off as a fighting progressive - also,
that he be authorized to deliver some speeches on new Nixon Adminis-
tration initiatives, in domestic policy. And perhaps a major speech
Preservation
14
or two outlining Administration foreign policy. All these things
he can garner great publicity for -- at the same time he broadens
his own national image -- and thus becomes a more effective
campaigner on the stump.
Because of the nature of the request -- I will withhold for the
time being thoughts both substantive and political -- looking toward
1972.
Preservation State