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This file contains:
From Safire to Haldeman RE: "Campaign" 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Finch to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: Response to Views on Campaign 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign 72" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: " '72 Campaign" 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: Analysis on Presidential Campaign 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: Analysis on Campaign 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Haldeman to Buchanan RE: Summarized View Points on Campaign 1 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Buchanan/Khachigian to Haldeman RE: "Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972" 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 53-20
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WHSF: Contested, 53-20
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This file contains:
From Safire to Haldeman RE: "Campaign" 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/14/1972
From Finch to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: Response to Views on Campaign 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign 72" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/16/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: " '72 Campaign" 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: Analysis on Presidential Campaign 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/20/1972
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: Analysis on Campaign 3 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
From Haldeman to Buchanan RE: Summarized View Points on Campaign 1 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/12/1972
From Buchanan/Khachigian to Haldeman RE: "Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972" 7 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/18/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
Contested Materials Files
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
53
20
6/14/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Safire to Haldeman RE: "Campaign"
3pg
53
20
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Finch to Haldeman RE: "Campaign
Strategy" 4pg
53
20
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Flanigan to Haldeman RE: Response
to Views on Campaign 2pg
53
20
6/16/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign 72"
4pg
53
20
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: " '72
Campaign" 5pg
53
20
6/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haig to Haldeman RE: Analysis on
Presidential Campaign 4pg
53
20
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan to Haldeman RE: Analysis
on Campaign 3pg
53
20
6/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haldeman to Buchanan RE:
Summarized View Points on Campaign 1pg
53
20
6/18/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Buchanan/Khachigian to Haldeman
RE: "Response to HRH Memo of June 12,
1972" 7pg
Monday, June 18, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
TYPE
NI
Memo
[DOCH135]
Haig to Haldeman (4pp.)
7-24-42
C
N2
memo
Clawson to Haldeman (2pp)
7-22-42
C
[DOC#134]
11
[Doc N3 # 133]
Hallett to Haldeman
7-21-42
C
N4
"
Hallett to Haldeman (5pp.)
7-20-42
U
[DOCH132]
N5
11
Price to Haldeman (2pp.) returst Family
7-21-72
C
[Doc*131]
w.att. no. N-6
Scheduling
N6
"
Price to Haldemon (2pp.)re Campaign
7-21-72
C
[ DOC. 130]
(w. pages af attachments) strategy
NY
11.
Whitaber to Haldeman and
7-21-42
J
[DOC*129]
w.att.no N-8
N8
11
[DOC # 129]
Highy to Whitaker (1p.)
4-19-42
C
N9
11
[DOC#128]
Whitaker to Haldenau (4pp.)
6-21-42
T
w.att.no. N 10
NIO
"
(DUCH128]
Haldenan to Whitaleer (1p.)
6-12-72
C
NII
11
Klein to Haldeman (4pp.)
6-17-72
P
[DOCH127]
N12
"
Buchanau to Haldeman (3pp)
6-18-42
C
[DOCH126]
w.att.noo. N13-N14
N13
"
Haldeman to Buchanan (10.)
6-12-72
C
[DOC [DOC #126] # 1263
N14
"
Buchavian/Khachigian to Haldeman (7pp.)
6-18-42
(
(Doc#126)
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
Stall Secretary
90
FOLDER TITLE
Campaign Staffing Strategy 1972, BAK's copies of answers to campaign strategy memo
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
[DOC,"125] N15
memo
Weinberger to Haldeman (4pp.)
6-15-42
J
N16
d
Cole to Haldeman (4pp)
6-19-42
J
[POCH124]
N17
"
[DOC#123]
Haig to Haldeman (4pp.)
6-20-72
C
N18
"
[DOC (DOC#122] = 122]
Clauson to Haldeman (5pp.)
6-17-72
C
N19
"
Price to Haldemon (4pp.)
6-16-72
C
[DOCH121]
N20
11
Flanigan to Haldeman (2pp.)
6-16-42
C
[DOCH 119]
"
N21
Rumsdeld to Haldeman (6pp.)
6-16-72
C
[DUC 1203
"
(Doc#118] N22
Chapin to Haldeman (10pp.)
6-14-42
(
N23
"
Finch to Haldeman (4pp.)
6-16-72
J
[DOCH N24 "2
11
Colson to Haldeman (5pp.).
6-16-72
P
[DOC#116]
w.att.no.N25
N25
"
Collonto Haldeman (.9pp.)
5-17-42
P
[DOC*116]
N26
^
Dent to Haldeman (5pp.)
6-16-72
C
[Docriis]
ND7
is
Hallett to Haldeman (5pp.)
6-15-42
C
[DOC# IN]
N28
"
Safire to Haldeman (3pp.)
6-14-72
J
[Doc#8]
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
Staff Secretary
90
FOLDER TITLE
Campaign Strategy - 1942, BAK's copies of answers to campaign strategy Meino
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection:
Staff Secretary
Box Number:
90
Folder:
Campaign Strategy -- 1972 BAK's Copies of answers to
Campaign Strategy Memo
Document
Disposition
8
Return
Private/Political
114
Retain
Open
115
Retain
Open
116
Retain
Open
117
Return
Private/Political
118
Retain
Open
119
Return
Private/Political
120
Retain
Open
121
Return
Private/Political
122
Return
Private/Political
123
Return
Private/Political
124
Retain
Open
125
Retain
Open
126
Return
Private/Political
127
Return
Private/Political
128
Retain
Open
129
Retain
Open
130
Return
Private/Political
131
Return
Private/Political
132
Return
Private/Political
133
Retain
Open
134
Return
Private/Political
135
Return
Private/Political
DETERMINED TO BE AN
THE WHITE HOUSE
ADMIG STRATIVE MARKING
WASHINGTON
E.O. 12005, Section 6-102
By
NARS, Date
1/4/83
confidential
June 14, 1972.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
BILL SAFIRE
SUBJECT:
Campaign
You will be receiving all sorts of memos revealing the wisdom of
the President acting like a President, not campaigning for sheriff,
etc., and I will not belabor that point.
Instead, let me pass along two items of advice from Thomas E.
Dewey, whom the President sent me to talk to in 1969.
1. Get a villain. With FDR, it was "economic royalists, 11
as it might well be again this year; with Truman, it was the "do-
nothing 80th Congress. 11 With Nixon, Dewey suggested inflation --
in more specific terms, the price-gougers and union bosses who
greedily pursue their own concerns to the detriment of the public
interest.
If the opposition is McGovern, I would not select Meany as the
villain, since the chance exists he will take a passive role in the
campaign. On anybody else as the opponent, he will come after
us hard with all labor's money, and we should go after him harder.
2. Don't act so Presidential as to be out of touch. FDR
tried this in 1944, got a good scare, and wound up campaigning
hard; Dewey, of course, learned this the hard way. There is an
anomaly we should recognize: While people are titillated and
fascinated by mystery and distance from a leader, they are also
warmed by attention he pays them and evidences of humanity. It
is a mistake to go exclusively one way or the other -- a leader
should be neither a remote authority nor a buddy-boy. Nixon's
greatest danger is to disappear into the high clouds.
-2-
For example, the President, the First Lady, and the two girls
should fan out across the country on the Fourth of July, each
involved in some Bicentennial activity (a whole list of grassroots
stuff is now in Chapin's hands); it's patriotic, it is visible and it
is running for office in a way that cannot be criticized.
I think we would do well to drop our uptightness about campaigning.
It is not something to be ashamed of. Jefferson and Madison, on
a political trip through New York before the Constitutional Con-
vention, held to the fiction that they were on a scientific expedition
looking for varieties of butterflies; JFK nicely turned that one into
"I'm not looking for butterflies, I'm looking for votes. "
We don't have to be crass about it, but should not be coy, either;
the President should begin to say now, well before the convention,
that after the convention he'll be campaigning with zest. He wants
to get out there and renew his strength. He gets a lift from meeting
people. Nixon is no stiff-necked Coriolanus, too proud to ask the
electorate for support -- by SO doing, he shows respect for the
S ystem that shows respect for him. If on the other hand, we take
the attitude that affairs of state make it difficult to take the time to
campaign, and that campaigning is a necessary evil in getting re-
elected, we will be pious, dull, insulting, arrogant -- and dead.
Now for a couple of other thoughts not based on Dewey:
If McGovern is the nominee, we have a unique opportunity to take
New York State. Keys are Jews and Puerto Ricans. As to Jews:
Humphrey has wounded McGovern on this one; Scoop Jackson's
attacks, though not publicized, can be utilized later. He's weak
on Israel, the first time that can be said of a Democratic nominee
ever and with Ambassador Rabin's statement that sure looks
like a Nixon endorsement, we can exploit this opening as never
before. Every switched vote is two votes, and 175, 000 of those
wins New York. We should use up-and-coming Jewish office-
holders in positions of leadership in our NY campaign: Roy
Goodman, the only Republican State Senator from Manhattan,
about 40, excellent credentials, and Rita Hauser (she's only half
Jewish, and that's good enough) come to mind. Let's not rely on
oldtimers who have a defeati st attitude about Nixon and Jews
this is a new ballgame, and we could get up to 30%.
-3-
We should also make a hard pitch at the Puerto Rican vote in New
York as part of our Spanish-speaking campaign. Although there
is some friction between Cubans and Puerto Ricans, we should,
for example, have Manolo Sanchez and Bebe Rebozo interviewed
in Spanish on every Spanish station about Nixon just about every
week between now and November. We tend to think of our
Spanish effort aimed only at Texas and California -- New York is
important, the PR registration is rising, and we have a fresh
chance there.
I will do a Charlie Regan memo, on how to beat Nixon from a
Democratic manager's point of view, in a couple of weeks. (When-
ever I do one of those, people look at me strangely for awhile.)
The issues that worry me most are health and crime -- we shouldn't
gear ourselves up to answer an attack on inflation and unemploy-
ment to the neglect of other gut issues that can be exploited by a
smart opponent.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
ROBERT H. FINCH
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
Point 1: What should be the President's posture between
conventions?
In my mind, there is no question but that the President
should remain "the President" not only between conventions
but during the entire campaign. From now, until as late
in the campaign as possible, the President should be a
"working President," remain mostly in Washington attending
to the business of the nation.
From a tactical standpoint, our campaign apparatus must
be geared to exploit openings in the opposition and their
platform as we move into the Democratic convention. The
tax conscious, elderly, Jews, labor, and the South can be
ripened for Administration support. Careful use of
Presidential "surrogates" can be effective in setting the
stage to capture these dissaffected voters.
Point 2: What should be the President's posture during
the campaign?
Presidential detachment from the political wars I believe
should be the keystone of most of the early campaign.
Particular care must be taken, however, to insure that the
President's stature does not appear "stagey" or "phoney."
The "non-political" non-credible, cross country jaunts that
President Johnson took in 1964 and 1966 should be avoided.
We can tolerate the whining of those who want the President
out on the stump early, then; like FDR, when the President
does move, it will have a heightened impact.
-2-
Improved use of Presidential "surrogates" can protect the
President's position - - up to a point. In order to
orchestrate and maximize their effectiveness they must have
better communication with campaign headquarters and the
White House. The "Answer Desk" for the "surrogates" must
have up-to-date positions on changing issues and late-breaking
world events.
As soon as the Democrats pick their ticket, the "surrogates"
should mobilize and articulate the areas of our record that
will appeal to the "swing" constituencies. The Democratic
nominees will be formulating their strategy during that
period and the Administration will have an opportunity to
capture and lock-in the swing constituencies. Some groups
can be appealed to particularly during the summer. The three
million graduating high school seniors, for instance, will
hear only anti-Administration rhetoric once they enter
college. If our campaign can reach them before they begin
college, however, we have a good chance of gaining a higher
percentage of their votes.
These early efforts should be limited to specific constituen-
cies. The dangers of peaking our campaign too early,
especially against a fast moving Kennedy/McGovern type
campaign, are all too real.
With the base already established, we should use the Republican
Convention as the kick-off and build support for the President's
re-election. With special mailings, highly structured
organizations, vertically and horizontally, we can generate
an exciting, positive, and effective campaign for the President,
building in momentum, until the President himself does decide
to enter the lists.
Point 3: What issues should we stress during the campaign?
To insure victory we should convey the images of (1) strong
leadership, and (2) responsible change. Specific programs
and issues sort out under these two broad headings.
The media would have us believe many Americans are totally
dissatisfied with the "old Politics. It is now the fashion
to describe this unrest in the rhetoric of the old Populists.
That is only partially true; what Wallace and McGovern are
exploiting is a strong ambivalence towards "The Establishment,"
i.e. "things as they are." In 1972 many middle class
-3-
Americans have obtained a standard of living that their
parents only dreamed about during the 1930's. Yet in the
midst of their success many middle class (and especially
lower-middle class) voters are irritated. They are troubled
by high prices, high taxes, their fear of drug abuse,
busing, militant minorities, poverty, and expensive health
care. For many of these voters irritation has led to
frustration, a general feeling of helplessness, and a
visceral reaction against the "ins."
These voters will respond to "responsible change" and/or
the security of strong leadership. The President has laid
the groundwork brilliantly for this case.
An aggressive campaign emphasizing substantial Administration
achievements and proposals can advance the image of
responsible change. By utilizing the appropriate slogans
and publicity, such programs as the EPA, the Higher Education
Act, FAP, and Revenue Sharing should be exploited to the
fullest.
The President's record as a strong, bold leader does attract
support. We should not be seduced into attempting a
"charismatic, Kennedy-type" campaign. What we offer is
substance. The fundamental concept here is moral strength
and determination. The foreign policy initiatives of the
President accurately display the courageous and bold
qualities that Americans are seeking and which produce real
results because the President bargains from strength.
Two major weaknesses are the "rising cost of food"and
"unemployment." The food cost affects every American family
and we are obviously vulnerable. There is nothing that we
can do about food costs except what has been done and
obviously the Democratic nominee will be equally unable to
solve the problem. We must therefore concentrate on getting
the voters to think about other issues.
Unemployment will be better because of the expanding economy.
Otherwise, there is also little that we can do that is not
already set in motion. We have offered the FAP and
imaginative ideas in manpower training, but those facts
offer little comfort to an unemployed worker.
-4-
Point 4: Weaknesses and strengths of opposition strategy.
A McGovern candidacy will cause divisions in his party that
even an attractive running mate will not repair. The South,
for instance, will be out of reach as even members of the
McGovern organization in the South will admit.
A Wallace candidacy in a third party will be a disruptive
element that could both hurt and help our campaign depending
upon how many states he can achieve ballot position. Wallace
could damage our effort by siphoning off conservative votes
in industrial states where the election might be close. But
some argue a physically handicapped Wallace may also help
the re-election of the President where he does appear on
the ballot by attracting seriously alienated voters away
from McGovern. The theory behind this argument is that
angry voters will go for McGovern while "really mad" voters
will support Wallace.
As we saw in the televised debates during the California
primary, McGovern's soft-spoken, apparently candid thoughtful
manner prevents him from easily being labeled a "wild-eyed
radical." Yet his simple answers to the complex problems
of the world does reflect a dangerous naivete and a total
lack of ability to lead this nation.
Thus, McGovern's weakness lies in the very simplicity that
makes him attractive. His massive spending programs, for
example, will defeat the thrust of his tax reform package.
The most important tax reform is lowering taxes. McGovern's
programs will require higher taxes. If the Administration
can drive home the cost and froth of his proposals and push
him catagorically into far left field, we can turn the
onslaught on the "McGovern crusade" into a landslide for
the President.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PETER FLANICAN The
This memo is in response to your request for my views as
follows:
1. The President's posture between the conventions should
be that of "President". In my view he would be doing his candidacy
a great disservice by engaging in political activity during that
period.
To the extent that the McGovern phenomenon is a reflection
of the electorate's disillusionment with "politics and politicians",
political activity by the President would be a negative. To the
extent that he casts himself as the country's' leader and an experienced
statesman as contrasted to the inevitable political discord of the
Democratic Convention and political dullness of the Republican
Convention (my brother Bob's efforts notwithstanding) it will be a
positive.
2. As to the President's posture after the Convention, to
some extent the thoughts expressed above continue to be valid.
Nevertheless, once nominated even the President will be expected to
get on with the business of politicking. This President, however,
can remain sufficiently in the public eye that the kind of intensive
saturation campaign used in 1960 and 1968 should not be necessary.
Assuming there is no issue which we are trying to obscure, as we tried
to obscure the issue of the economy by an over-concentration on law
and order in the 1970 campaign, I would suggest the following percentage
of time dedicated to campaigning:
From September 15 to October 1 - 1/3 of the President's time
From October 1 to October 20 - 2/3 of the President's time
-- From October 20 to Election Day - Substantially all of the
President's time.
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
With regard to the time devoted to campaigning, I would have
it include a very substantial amount of travel. Given the ease of
movement available to a President, as well as the national and
regional impact of Presidential visits, I would not rely heavily
on Washington-based activities. In the early part of the campaign
I recommend considerable reliance on so-called "non-political"
activities. This has been used effectively in the past by incumbent
Presidents (i.e. Roosevelt) but failed in 1960 when, you will
recall, Eisenhower took an abortive 6 week non-political trip. The
1960 failure proves that non-political tours are ineffective when
they attempt to transfer the incumbent's support to another candidate
rather than the ineffectiveness of non-political type activity for
the incumbent.
3. To some extent the campaign issues and points of attack
will be determined by the opposition, as well as by domestic and foreign
developments. However, assuming our commitment of men to Vietnam
continues to diminish and the progress of the South Vietnamese continues
to appear successful, and assuming the economy continues to recover,
I would recommend a fairly simple campaign - the President's record
against the Democrats. In this I would point out his accomplishments
in foreign affairs and the strength of the economy, plus the
frustrations of his legislative programs (including busing) by the
Democrats. As to timing, I would begin stressing the campaign themes
right at the beginning of the campaign and keep pounding them through
to the end.
4. The opposition will of course attempt to attach Vietnam
and unemployment. Frankly, I believe the demonstrable facts of the
matter will make this attack ineffective. They will then move to the
general dissatisfaction with government, where the credibility of the
voters will be the decisive factor. Always admitting the gullibility
of the American electorate, in the 1972 campaign the incumbent will
have both the Presidential platform and the facts in his favor. This
might well force the opposition, particularly if it is McGovern, into
relatively extreme positions which will appeal to his supporters and
are his natural inclinations anyway. It should be our objective to
create conditions in which the Democrats will be encouraged to take
these positions, rather than allowing them to succeed in any attempt
to move to the middle.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
BOB HALDEMAN Rusq
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
Campaign 72
I'd like to expand more fully in a subsequent memo on the
points you asked my thoughts on in yours of June 12, but here
for a starter:
1. Posture between the conventions: Still Presidential,
statesmanlike, holding rigorously to his announced intention not
to do political things until after the Republican convention. Take
the position that there's work to be done running the country, and
there will be time later for campaigning. McGovern, of course,
will be hitting him, and probably hitting hard; during this period
he should not answer directly, but rather let others do the hitting
back while he goes about the people's business. Try to establish
the sharpest possible contrast between RN the President and
McGovern the politician.
2. Posture after the GOP Convention: Be a candidate, but
continue to be President first and candidate second. Remember
at all times that he comes across to the public more sympathet-
ically and more positively as President than as campaigner. Keep
campaign travel limited, and do as few rallies as possible. Rallies
are bad TV too much phony hoopla, too much like a hard sell for
Dr. Hoogan's Snake-Oil. Do some symbolic events that demonstrate
concern with selected, identifiable problems, and that give an oppor-
tunity to say something specific about them. Use radio: the campaign
itself will give the peg, the excuse, that's been lacking during this
pre-campaign period. Remain Presidential; resist the temptation
to respond in kind to the attacks that will be made. Have others
-2-
carry the attack and make maximum use of outside organizations,
individuals and ad hoc committees to blast the opposition's crazier
schemes. As the campaign draws to a close, let RN show increasing
irritation not with attacks on him personally, but with the monkey-
wrenches the opposition is throwing into the machinery of govern-
ment, and depending on the nature of the opposition's campaign
-- be prepared in the closing days to stand up on behalf of the nation
and alert the electorate to the disaster that the accumulated nonsense
of the campaign suggests a Democratic victory would visit on the
United States, on the world, and on the next generation.
3. Issues, timing, points of attack, etc. : Assuming McGovern
to be the nominee, I agree that we should try to nail him for his left-
wing radicalism -- but his vulnerability in this regard is not so much
on an ideological basis as it is in what the positions he's staked out
reveal about his basic preconceptions and his sloppy thinking: we
should make the public fear a McGovern Presidency in much the way
that they feared a Goldwater Presidency -- which wasn't so much a
matter of disagreeing with him on the issues as it was fearing that
his approaches revealed a shallowness and a shoot-from-the-hip
tendency that the Nation can't afford in the Presidency.
McGovern of course will be more careful -- but if he does start
a dance toward the center we can hit him not only as an instinctive
extremist, but also as one who leaps before he looks, and only after-
wards tries to climb back out of the hole he's fallen into. That's not
what people want in a President.
We should try to nail him as soon as possible on his radical
positions -- on the assumption that he's going to back off, as he
already has begun to do. Our aim should be fourfold:
-- To cement the identification of him with positions that
are perceived as radical, scary or hairbrained;
-- To make it clear, when he does back off, that he is
backing off, not merely "clarifying;"
-3-
-- To plant the impression that he too readily embraces
schemes that have been only half-thought through; that he's
not only radical, but imprudent, and therefore not to be trusted
with the power of the Presidency.
-- To undermine his image (which is a great part of his
strength) as a plain spoken prairie preacher who, by God, at
least says what he thinks -- and to show him as an opportunist
who follows the polls, which will cut directly to one of his
principal issues: trust.
4. Opposition strategy and how we should meet it: They'll
probably portray RN as insensitive to human needs; as calous toward
the poor, the black, the young, the working man; as a war President,
who needlessly sacrificed 10, 000 lives in Vietnam. Heavy emphasis
on the economy, on which it looks as though we'll still be vulnerable
-- jobs, inflation, taxes.
A central part of the opposition campaign will be a focus on
trust, with the theme that you can't' trust RN: that he's a calculating
political manipulator, who uses the Presidency for policical purposes
first and for public purposes second; the President ofITTof secret
campaign contributors, of big business, for the big guys and against
the little guy.
I think we've got to be very careful about backlash to some of
the issues we've been staking out. For example, pushing too hard
on marijuana could cost us California, with its huge youth vote
(including those out-of-State students who'll be voting in California).
This is even more of a gut issue to them than it is to their anti-pot
elders; and I also think there are a hell of a lot of parents who don't
like the idea of their kids smoking pot, but like the idea of their being
thrown in jail for it even less. I suspect that people are getting a lot
more sophisticated now about the distinctions between marijuana and
hard drugs, and thus more sympathetic to the argument (which I think
is true) that criminal penalties for use of pot increase rather than
decrease hard drug usage. Similarly, the right to abortion is a
highly emotional gut issue for millions of women, of all political
-4-
persuasions, and a lot of them are getting very angry at us -- and
there are more women who vote than there are conservative Catholics.
If we don't nuance our stands on these and similarly cross-cutting
issues with a sufficient sensitivity to the feelings of the other side,
we can get in real trouble.
As for how to meet the opposition strategy, the basic way is
to do our best to keep the campaign on our issues: proven perform-
ance, world statesman, remember how bad things were in '68 (Don't
Let Them Do It Again), don't take a chance on McGovern. We've got
a great thing going with the summits as the first big step in a series
that can only be completed by the man who started it off Give
Peace a Chance - - Don't Throw It Away. One counter to the "trust"
issue is to be doubly careful not to let another ITT-type thing crop
up between now and election; another is to make it our issue by
focusing a spotlight on McGovern's race from previous stands to
popular stands.
Essentially, though, I think our strongest pitch is a larger re-
flection of the theme of Rockefeller's highly successful "Governor
Rockefeller for Governor" campaign in 1966: "President Nixon for
President. 11 The central focus of our campaign should be on one
thing: to make people proud of their President.
DEVERMINED TO BE AN
ADMIN RATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12005, Section 6-102
By
1/4/83
THE WHITE HOUSE
NARS, Date
CONF IDENTIAL
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 17, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON
SUBJECT:
'72 CAMPAIGN
BETWEEN CONVENTIONS
The President should maintain a very "Presidential, above
the battle" posture during this period, focusing on his
innovative and meaningful domestic programs that have met
with both partisan and cavalier attitudes on behalf of this
very unproductive Congress. Using the Democratic Party
platform planks for ammunition -- althought never publicly
identified as such -- the President should focus on his
compatible domestic initiatives and publicly question why
they languished in Congress. At the same time, our surrogates
as well as Republican Members of the House and Senate should
draw the specific "copy-cat" analogies over what the Democrats
have proposed and what the Democratic Congress has refused
to pass.
I think the President can remain above the partisanship
involved in this effort by scheduling domestic-related
events around the Presidency but with our spokesmen
responsible for actually focusing on a lethargic Congress
during a period when the legislative body will be most vulnerable.
POST GOP CONVENTION
I am convinced that even during the prime campaign period,
the President should, as much as is politically possible,
maintain the posture of the professional, business-
like Chief Executive going about his very important duties;
and while I understand it will not be possible to sustain
this posture throughout the campaign, I do believe that at
no time should the President drop to the level of the
contortions the challenger will be forced to perform.
-2-
I believe the axiom that an incumbent President only can
lose an election; that a challenger cannot defeat him,
that an incumbent President only can defeat himself.
That is why I am concerned that the dignity of the Office of
the President be maintained regardless of how much or how
little the President should "slug it out" with the opposition.
That job, it seems to me, is for our surrogates who ought
to willingly and enthusiastically perform "any" function
that would be politically desirable.
After the Convention, it seems to me that the President
ought to spend the next week to ten days personally meeting
with key national, regional and local Party officials to
give them his personal marching orders. This should be
done in a closed atmosphere, but one which will stimulate
the press to hover on the fringes and speculate intensely
about what is going on, thereby providing for our own
Party faithful an intense interest and focus on what may
be in the wind.
Until an evaluation of the caliber of our campaign, I suggest
that any Presidential travel be geared to bonafide events of
interest and concern to the Nation as a whole. I would stick
to this format until the quality of our effort is evaluated
and then be flexible enough to adjust to campaign conditions.
However, I still think that as much as possible, the image
of the hard-working Chief of State should be maintained
as long as possible.
To sum up the above, my two basic points are that (a) the
President should be highly selective of the activities
involving himself and that they should have a broader
gauged raison d'etre other than partisan politics for as
long as possible, and (b) the 132 Presidential surrogates
and all other spokesmen aligned with us put on the most
intensive campaign this country has ever witnessed.
-3-
CAMPAIGN ISSUES
Unless events go awry in Vietnam, I don't think that there
is any question but that the main issue for the Democrats
will be the economy and the related issue of unemployment.
The Democrats have historically lived off these issues and
even though McGovern is a likely candidate, I see no reason
to believe the Democrats will abandon their traditional
stress on the economic issue.
I think that we are in a parallel situation to the last
six months of 1959 in which the economy indeed was improving
although the government wasn't able to convince anyone that
this was true. I think we have a major problem in selling
the concept that economic conditions in this country are
good and that the economy will actually be better than our
ability to convince the public of this fact.
I propose that we seriously create an almost separate,
well staffed, well financed internal group whose job will
be solely to create an image of economic well-being in
this country. I guess you can call this the merchandising
of the economy, and I think that it is essential that it
be done.
Remaining with the economic issue, I am disturbed that
this government has itself caught in a position where
mechanisms have been set to spew out economic reports on
a periodic basis, with our credibility rising or falling
on the output of some machine or neutral or unfriendly
career civil servants. This routine economic reporting
is going to hamper our efforts to convince the public that
the economy is better than it seems to them.
As extensively and as loudly as we can, I think we ought
to pound on the theme that individuals in this Nation are
better off economically at this particular time than at any
other time in their lives. I think our surrogates should
ask their audiences to look inward and make their own
judgments on the economic well-being. The honest answer
to that question is that indeed most people are better
off now than ever before.
-4-
If the Democratic nominee is McGovern, we obviously must
subject him and his position to the utmost scrutiny.
With the resources of this government, there is no excuse
for there existing a single miniscule detail about George
McGovern, his positions, his wife, his friends, his staff
and/or his mistress escaping us.
I hope there exists some internal task force of investigators
who have already compiled everything there is to know about
George McGovern, or any other potential Democratic candidate.
If there isn't, one should be established immediately.
There also has to be a counterattack mechanism throughout
the campaign, which I presume would be handled by Colson
in collaboration with John Mitchell. I see a great value
in this although this is obviously one of the more ticklish
areas -- where the President could beat himself -- and should
be most carefully controlled. If McGovern is nominated, we
should do everything within our power to woe the American
trade union movement as well as to convince George Meany
that the AFL-CIO millions would better be spent on
congressional, state and local campaigns and should not
be poured down the drain on a man who can't win and who is
not even ideologically compatible with the principles of
trade unionism.
To deny McGovern labor's money and, more importantly, its
manpower, is almost a singular key to winning the election.
I would pull out all the stops in our efforts to obtain support
from labor on all levels. Meany cannot be expected to publicly
disassociate himself from McGovern, but it would be no surprise
to see him deny labor's resources.
OPPOSITION STRATEGY
It seems to me that McGovern has two very important assets:
(1) A nearly unlimited supply of liberal money and (2) an
instinctive support from the liberal news media.
With this in mind, we are not going to get any breaks caused
by lack of campaign funds, and we had better be ready to spend
it all in every area.
Addressing the media problem, it seems to me that our major
effort should be to discredit and to spotlight the unworkability
of almost everything McGovern proposes. The hard questions
-5-
just aren't going to be asked by the press, and therefore
ultimately it will be Administration officials who are going
to have to publicly ask the hard questions. In that regard,
I wonder if the establishment of a GOP truth committee
should be established to hold regular press conferences
and take McGovern on each of his issues and utterances.
We also have an obligation to discredit the news personnel
who commit documentable instances of being McGovern
"sweethearts. 11 I don't think the broad gauged attack is
productive, but every time we can prove media bias or
inaccuracies, we should prove it publicly. This should
be done in a straight forward, calm manner that is very
specific and to the point. It should not go beyond the
specific error or article to which we are addressing.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY
June 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM;
AL HAIG
@
Here are my views and accompanying analysis on the four points raised
in your memorandum of June 12:
1. What should the President's posture be between the
Conventions?
Unquestionably the events between now and the Democratic Conven-
tion and most importantly events at the Convention itself will influence the
ultimate strategy on the President's posture. Nevertheless at this juncture
it is quite evident that the President is in a very strong position which is
best retained and reinforced by maintaining a posture which is totally
consistent with the achievements that have most decisively contributed to
his popularity. These achievements are a solid statesman-like performance
in the international area. They have been premised on flexible and progressive
attitudes and the willingness to take risks in search of world peace and were
masterfully combined with: (a) strength and decisiveness when U. S. interests
are challenged; (b) the retention of initiative and momentum which has
consistently enabled the President to stay ahead of the pessimism normally
associated with stagnation, inactivity and lack of imagination; (c) the
solidification of the world statesman role through which the President has
captured national empathy based on his masterful performances in Peking
and Moscow which were well-covered on national television; and (d) the
development of a "Mr. & Mrs. " team image which would not have been
possible had total emphasis been on the President alone.
Based on the foregoing, the President's posture should be one of
a statesman who is above the frantic gut-fighting and politicking of the
campaign, whose strength and competence is taken fully for granted by a
Party machine whose major task should be to engage in the cool organiza-
tional arrangements which are designed to exploit a solid posture of
accomplishment.
I sense one possible distortion creeping into current assumptions
about the Democratic candidate. Many of our political strategists are
taking for granted that McGovern will emerge as the Democratic candidate.
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-2-
This was evident in the strategy discussions held in last week's Cabinet
meeting. We must be prepared for an emotional convention consensus in
favor of Teddy Kennedy. It is difficult to conceive of the old Democratic
Party machinery, which relies essentially on a power base of Labor,
Jewish money and nouveau riche resources, merging to support a candidate
of McGovern's ilk since each of these sources of power could be seriously
threatened by his stated policies. For this reason our contingency planning
must not overlook the possibility of a surprise popular surge in July which
would settle on Kennedy as the only hope for the Democratic Party.
2. What should the President's posture be from the Republican
Convention to the election? When should he start campaigning?
How much travel should he do, where should he go, what type
of activities should he engage in?
Following the Republican Convention in August and taking full
cognizance of events between the Democratic and Republican Conventions,
I think the President should pursue a strategy totally consistent with that
of a self-confident, competent statesman who is above frantic political
campaigning. This means that his travel and public appearances should
be most carefully contrived. Above all, they should be paced to avoid
over-exposure in the national media, especially television. I do not believe
we should succumb to a strategy which would portray him rushing from one
adulatory situation to another. Rather, these should be carefully paced
and only those which can guarantee maximum effect should be undertaken.
That should involve exposure situations which underline the President's
attention to the affairs of state and which avoid any appearances of contrived
ballyhoo. In my view the greatest danger will be over-exposure and
excessive campaign energy.
3. Any general thoughts you have as to strategy for the
campaign on issues, timing, points of attack, etc.
Obviously McGovern is our most vulnerable opponent. We should
therefore be very careful about adopting too strong an anti-McGovern
posture between now and the Democratic Convention. The one theme which
I believe is best stressed between now and the Democratic Convention is
McGovern's irresponsible posture on the war in Vietnam in which we
emphasize the fact that he is pushing a strategy which can only encourage
the enemy not to negotiate and which in many respects is less stringent
on Hanoi than even Moscow and Peking contemplate. Concurrently, we
should prepare, but not use, a host of themes which attack McGovern's
strategy on domestic spending, inheritance, welfare programs, busing,
aid to schools, national defense, etc., that can be used following the
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-3- H
Republican Convention in August. The most important aspect of our anti-
McGovern strategy should be to keep the homerun balls to the last phase
of the campaign in a way which ensures that the President peaks off in
the last three weeks of October. Television will dominate this year more
than in any campaign in the past and it is conceivable that national attitudes
can be influenced at the last moment in an overriding way. We should also
have themes in reserve which can be used on a contingency basis to counter-
balance bad news for us which is bound to occur in unforeseen patterns
between now and November. A compulsive tendency to exploit McGovern
vulnerability from the outset should be tightly controlled to ensure that we
do not end up on a wave of criticism against the Republican Party and most
importantly that we are able to quickly adjust to unforeseen setbacks which
can come from scandle, setbacks in the international environment, or
domestic shortcomings. To ensure this is done, a most careful analysis
should be made of all McGovern vulnerabilities, a program should be
tailored to exploit each of these then the exploitation program should be
tightly time-phased to ensure continuing and growing momentum rather
than to fire all of our shots simultaneously thus enabling the Democrats to
develop compensatory neutralization programs:
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition strategy will be
and how we should meet it.
In the international area the Democrats will probably exploit the
following:
(a) The war in Vietnam, bombing of North Vietnam, mining, etc.
The only sound way to attack this is to keep constantly in the forefront
Hanoi's intransigence and the solid pace of accomplishment represented by
our continuing disengagement. It is obvious that we will have to get some
break between now and November which will confirm the wisdom of our
policy. I am somewhat optimistic that this will occur and the question will
therefore become moot.
(b) The Democrats will try to exploit the inadequacy of the SALT
agreement with the Soviet Union by stressing the theme that the President
has favored an agreement which replaces a quantitative arms race by a
qualitative arms race. This charge should be taken head on with straight
factual elaboration on the provisions of the agreement.
(c) The Democrats, if McGovern is the candidate, will obviously
try to exploit the President's image as a knee-jerk patriot who is hidebound
by outmoded conceptions of U. S. honor and power. This attack is easily
blunted by a track record of accomplishments which should focus on the
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-4-
Peking and Moscow Summits and a carefully paced follow-up program of
improved relations with both the Soviets and Chinese. Barring no unforeseen
setbacks, this kind of momentum is definitely in the cards and should be
counted as a strong continuing asset.
(d) Perhaps the most serious danger area is that of international
economics, balance of payments, lack of progress in the monetary stabilization
and a growing unfavorable balance of trade. This area, I believe, affords
the Democrats the most fruitful grist for criticism. We will need a careful
assessment in the weeks ahead of where we are going with respect to inter-
national trade and economics and to develop some new initiatives which will
flesh out the initial philosophical advantage that resulted from the international
monetary agreement. We have a long way to go in the area and I doubt that
statistics which can be easily drawn upon by the Democrats will confirm
that we have not done more than scratch the surface. We should achieve
some advantages from improved US-Soviet trade but more dramatic steps
have to be taken with respect to our European and Japanese allies.
(e) Accomplishments in Latin America leave room for criticism
but we should not overreact to a vulnerability which does not have a particularly
strong popular base.
On the whole, the President's performance and accomplishments
in the international area constitute his strong suit. For this reason his
statesman and world leader role should be carefully but fully exploited.
EYES ONLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
June 18, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
In response to your memo of June 12 re: RN Posture --
A)
Have no hard feelings about what RN should be doing between
Conventions. He should of course maintain the Presidential pedestal,
eschew partisan activity, if not political. On this, however, we should
be flexible, spending the outcome of the Democratic Convention. That
is the event off which the President's activity should be keyed. If the
dominant theme coming out of that convention is, say, pro-marijuana,
abortion -- or pro-welfare -- then in our substantive actions, taken by
the President, there might well be the drawing of the issues. Again,
however, we will have to await the Democratic convention to determine
this.
B)
Post-convention to election, again, we should hold now to a
posture of flexibility. If RN is running a lead following the GOP Convention,
a good lead, his surrogates should handle the campaigning for him -- and
he should only do enough to defeat the charge of the "front-porch" campaign.
Since our strength is foreigh policy in a world where there is a deep
desire for peace -- RN should not rule out major foreign policy meetings,
high visibility, which cast him in the role of Statesman, in unspoken
contrast to McGovern, who one imagines will be waging a partisan
argumentative campaign.
C)
RN should hold off vigorous campaigning for as late as possible.
Perhaps a couple of days early in the campaign -- then a testing of the
effectiveness of this personal campaigning. I have a real question whether
RN on the stump tends to add uncommitted votes, or whether the benefit
is largely in terms of rallying troops, with the uncommitted tuned out. In
any event, stump speaking should be on a high, high level. Even the
drawing of differences between us and them should be on a high level.
-2-
D)
Would not rule out of consideration a half-hour televised
address by the President, or V.P. stating the "differences" between
the candidates, in non-partisan, but ideological ways. We have so
much on McGovern; we may want to take it directly to the people in
a single message even while our surrogates are hitting the individual
messages on the stump.
E)
Suggest consideration be given to a series of Oval Office
fifteen minute addresses, with the President using the sounding board
of the White House -- to make his campaign appeal to the American
people. Foreign policy, Social policy and more Government VS. less
Government (and less taxes) could be the Nixon appeal. They should be
candid, straightforward, and give the clear-cut differences between
the two of us, rather than a blurred type thing. (This corresponds with
my view that while many elections find both candidates ending up saying
the same thing -- this time we want to put some air between us and
McGovern, and paint him as honest, sincere, and way, way out.)
F)
Let's keep his travel schedule flexible. However, the President
in campaigning should not restrict himself to COP audiences at all.
The idea of a giant Catholic or ethnic audience a kick-off address
in Cadillac Square -- something symbolic to indicate the new GOP should
be actively considered. It would be wrong to rule out GOP audiences
but we have to assume that they are going to be ninety percent with us.
The President should seek out massive audiences of the swing voters
in this election who will not unlikely be the Northern Democrats who
cannot abide the elitist, permissive liberalism of George McGovern.
G)
One thought. Why not have the V.P. candidate, assuming that it
is Mr. Agnew, and John Volpe, right at the head of the Columbus Day
Parade down Fifth Avenue. From our polls, one understan ds that
what we risk losing to McGovern are upper income moderate GOP WASPs
(we have to scare them back with the "socialist" issue) and what we
stand to gain are the lower and middle income ethnics and working class,
many of them of immigrant origins, and many of them Catholic.
(One thing we could do for the President is to put that crazy Forest Hills
integration scheme over the side; it would help up immensely with
Jewish and ethnics, who don't want their neighborhood busted up by
liberal bureaucrats.)
H)
On strategy for attack my thoughts are already largely in
hand. However, just some reminders:
1. Don't shoot it all out of a canon at once; dribble it out so that
as soon as McGovern has spent four days answering one
charge, the next one is moved from the front burner onto
the serving board.
-3-
2. Avoid stridency and nastiness and partisanship -- some of
this is certain to creep in late in the campaign, but the press
here is intolerant of our attacks where it is indulgent of
the opposition's. Keep our cool for as long as possible.
3. A late start in the campaign unless we are behind in the
polls, would be my recommendation. I recall well how all
our people, and some press were saying, "Get the hell up to
New Hampshire; Romney is starting to make enormous gains. 11
We waited to the last minute, and then campaigned sparingly
and rolled up an eight-to-one margin. We ought to again, hold
our fire until they are right in front of the trenches.
4. We ought to have a formal reassessment of the strategy midway
in the campaign. And have what I do not feel we had in the
general election of 1968 or of 1970 the flexibility to shift
gears rapidly and move off one theme or one approach onto
another.
OPPOSITION LINE OF ATTACK
Already, they are signaling what it is. They are going to use the "trust"
thing, McGovern is a candid, honest.man whom you can believe, while
Nixon is shifty, and crafty and has a credibility gap and the character
of our leader is important. (This partially explains their reluctance to
move off their "tinkertoy proposals. 11 They don't want their man to be
in the position of being portrayed as another shifty politician. Some of
them fear that worse than the radical charge.)
Our response. Wait a piece until they start up this attack; it will get
harsh. And then our top surrogates should go over on the attack
accuse McGovern and his people are using a campaign of character
assassination against the President of the United States -- and demand
that if they are going to whisper at rallies that the President is dishonest
and untruthful, by God they should have the courage to come out and say
it publicly. Accuse them of using "code words" to call the President an
evil man; accuse them of a gutless refusal to debate us on the issues, and
of a retreat into the politics of slander and smear. If they confront us
on the issues, I don't see how if they are clearly and politely and
consistently made we can lose this one.
Random thoughts of a summer afternoon. The important thing is to
keep our flexibility, not lock into a Schlieffen Plan at this particular
point in time. The old Eisenhower adage here is apposite. Planning
is essential; plans are worthless.
Buchanan
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Eyes Only
June 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
PAT BUCHANAN
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN H.
It has been requested that you summarize your views and
analysis on the following points:
L. What should the President's posture be
Note
between the Conventions?
2. What should the President's posture be
from the Republican Convention to the election?
When should he start campaigning? How much
travel should he do, where should he go, what
type of activities should he engage in?
3. Any general thoughts you have as to
strategy for the campaign on issues, timing,
Note
points of attack, etc.
4. Your thoughts as to what the opposition
strategy will be and how we should meet it.
Note
Note
Please let me have your memorandum by 5:00 p.m. Friday,
June 16.
Pat:
Bob realizes that your "Assault" memorandum covered some
of the questions above. Anything you would like to add should
be included in your response to this memo.
Thank you.
Larry Higby
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DETERMINED TO BE AN
June 18, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 120 6-102
By
yho
CONFIDENTIAL
1/4/20
MEMORANDUM TO:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN
SUBJECT:
Response to HRH Memo of June 12, 1972
Many of the points HRH mentions were omitted in our original Assault
Strategy memo for the basic reason that we were focusing exclusively
upon the "negative" rather than the positive. Some recommendations
in the HRH memo we would concur with -- others we do not. Let's
take them point by point:
"1. The Buchanan memorandum- fails to recognize the
necessity to keep our strength up front and center. In
other words, all of our attack lines on the opposition
should end up emphasizing our strengths. 11
We don't agree with this. For the following reasons. First, millions of
Americans vote not for, but against their hostility toward one candidate
is the compelling motive at the voting booth, not their enthusiasm for.
And a "negative" campaign -- largely directed from the positive one on
RN - would in our judgment be much more convincing to those swing
voters who have never been pro-RN, but who can be "terrified" by this
new phenomenom. LBJ could not conveivably have gotten his sixty per
cent against RN -- he got it against Goldwater, not because of the
positive LBJ "ads, 11 but because Goldwater was portrayed as a threat
to the Republic. We should, in our judgment, recognize that potentially
millions of knee- jerk Democratic voters are goingto come our way, if
they come -- because though they are not enthusiastic about RN, they are
anti-radicalism.
Secondly, when one observes that McGovern apparently lost 15 points
in one week in California -- among Democrats, it is clear that there is
tremendous room for movement downward by McGovern -- from a
relatively small investment. On the other hand, we see that RN -- from
the unprecedented China trip and attendant publicity, and from the historic
-2-
Moscow visit and SALT agreement -- has only risen seven or eight
points.
The lesson is clear. The potential for movement by McGovern --
downward -- is far easier and less costly, than the potential for
additional upward RN movement. In short, if it takes a Peking and
Moscow summit, and a SALT agreement and reams of hours of heroic
copy to move up up seven points -- while George can be dropped fifteen
in a week by some hard-nosed Humphrey attacks dollar-for-dollar
when it comes to McGovern this argues we ought to put our campaigning
dollars into attacking him, rather than boosting ourselves.
Third, and related: RN is known to the nation; impressions of RN have
hardened over a period of twenty-five years. There are not likely to be
any sudden new perceptions of RN by the masses, in five months. On
the other hand, the perceptions about McGovern have not even begun to
harden with the nation as a whole. We have a far better chance of
affecting a change in the present image of McGovern than we do in the
present image of the President.
Fourth, let's look at it this way. RN cannot possibly get below 40% of the
vote, and cannot probably exceed 60%. Those swing voters are more than
likely Democrats, or independents somewhat lukewarm toward the
President (a group that would probably split half for RN and half for JFK
in 1960.) What is most likely to convince them to vote 95% for RN: Is
it a major campa ign convincing them of what they already know farily
well that RN is competent, experienced and innovative in foreign
affairs. (Even many of RN's opponents would concede this.) Or is it
more likely to result in greater returns if we convince them rather that
the "alternative" is an utter disaster for the country. In short, anyone
who can be convinced that McGovern is a disaster is automatically a vote
for RN. While someone who can be persuaded that RN is an imaginative
foreign policy leader is not necessarily a vote for RN and he can still
vote for McGovern. My view is that the negative McGovern campaign
need not be -- and should not necessarily be - - tied to a pro-RN pitch
at the end. If there were five people in the race, I would subscribe wholly
to point one but there are only two; and anyone whom we can convince
that McGovern is a wild man is ours for certain -- even if he at the
same time thinks RN is a conservative square.
Fifth, and finally -- not only does the pro-RN approach tend to dilute an
anti-McGovern message; the President should not be twinned with
McGovern on those issues where our disagreements are of degree rather
than kind. For example, if we are going to say McGovern is toying with
the security of our country -- whereas we, too, have cut back, but only
responsibly on defense then we are weakening our case. Where the
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President can be contrasted with McGovern is where the breach is clean
as a whistle. I.e. McGovern favors abortion on demand -- RN thinks this
is morally wrong; i.e. McGovern favors legalization of marijuana; RN
thinks this is wrong, and a threat to the American family. We should
keep in mind that what we have is a President and a statesman and what
they have is a light-weight and a wild man -- and we ought not to be
comparing them too much in speeches, just as we don't want any debates
which would have the effect of putting them on the same plane.
Lastly, look at it this way. During the fall campaign the pro-RN news
footage of RN as President will probably amount to seven times the pro-
RN advertising footage. Thus, the pro-RN ad materials will only be a
minor reinforcement of the RN national image -- a minor fraction of the
time RN is seen. On the other hand, given the pro-McGovern disposition
of the liberal media, the anti-McGovern material from our campaign
is liekly to be a major and crucial segment of the entire anti-McGovern
materials that go out to the nation.
"2. We must not gettrapped into McGovern's bog of peddling
himself as a new face. If people want new ideas, this
Administration has the boldest initiatives in history. "
We agree with the first sentence, but not necessarily with the second.
The reason is this: We have spent CO untless hours and unrecorded effort
selling the bold dynamic "New American Revolution, 11 -- more effort
probably than we can duplicate between now and November -- and the
returns are, in my judgment, not encouraging. If we took a national
poll dealing with RN's domestic proposals -- and asked how many
considered them bold, new, imaginative and then further, how many were
going to go with RN because of them -- the returns, one assumes, would
not be particularly heartened. Dollar-for-dollar, again, it is not a
cost-effective investment of PR time, money or effort to attempt to
portray the Nixon Administration domestic program as "exciting". We
would be going against a public perception; we would be attempting to
convince millions of the attractiveness of "programs" when increasing
numbers have about had it with government "programs" in general.
The first sentence -- about knocking down the "new face, " is right on
the money. McGovern has been part and parcel of the Congress which
has sat on its duff for two years; he has been a member of the Democratic
majority which has controlled both houses of Congress, since McGovern
came to Washington.
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Who wrote the loopholes in the law; who raised the taxes; who failed
to provide relief; who is now sitting on its can doing nothing for
the average man but waste his dollars. Why who, other than the
Congress of which George McGovern has been an integral part sinc e
1956, the Congress he and the left-wing liberals have been in control of,
absolutely, ever since McGovern came to Washington. Wallace hit
them on this, and so can we. McGovern should rightly be portrayed as
not someone with new ideas, but someone with a plan to dump new
billions in tax dollars down the old ratholes, he and his friends constructed
over the last 16 years.
(Both the Broder and Drummond columns hit the nail on the handling of
this issue.)
"3. The Buchanan memorandum deals almost entirely with
domestic matters and totally misses our big issues which
are foreign policy. Who is the bold leader? Who is the
fresh leader? Who is the dramatic leader in foreign policy?"
Bascially, we agree that foreign policy will be a long suit for the President
and we mentioned specifically attacks on McGovern on Israel, Europe,
defense and Vietnam. But, again, the same question arises. The entire
nation has seen RN in China, seen RN in Moscow, seen RN sign SALT the
coverage has been sweeping and massive. Can we really advance that
appreciably with speeches and verbal references to what the nation
already knows and already believes that RN is an imaginative statesman.
We should in our positive advertising, and in RN's posture during
the camapign, publicly, emphasize the Somber Statesman, the imaginative
statesman, who has mastery over the issues of peace and war. But
we don't need to constantly draw explicit comparisons. The implicit one
is satisfactory. If we can get individuals like Rockefeller, liberals
and moderates, saying that McGovern is naive and a madman, if he thinks
we can gut the Sixth Fleet, without Israel going down the tubes. If
George can be portrayed as something totally out of his element in
questions of foreign policy, a man who is both too soft and too much of a
light-weight, a foolish man whom Brezhnev would eat for breakfast
than anyone who is convinced of that is automatically an RN voter. There
is no other choice.
There are two foreign policy problems we see. One Vietnam. Polls
show McGovern's support is tied inextricably to the desire to get out of
Vietnam. In our view, the "wrong from the start" materials in the
Assault Book, portraying McGovern as repeatedly duped, and misled by
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Communist profession of good intentions, and his "abandoning" of our
prisoners should help neutralize his potential strength here. Also,
if RN pulls the rug out on McGovern, with a settlement we should lace
into him as a "squalid nuisance" who only harassed and nit-picked and
back-stabbed the President who brought America out of the war while
McGovern and company got us into a war they could not win or could not
end.
The second serious problem is that McGovern is milking the old right
and the new left isolationism both. Frankly, foreign aid truly has no
constituence left -- and McGovern recognized this. The argument
against spending our money for exotic weapons, whe n we need to re-build
here at home; the argument that maybe our allies should do more for
themselves -- these arguments hit home far beyond the McGovern
constituency. (The McGovern endorsement of that 1% of GNP foreign
aid [$11 billion] with "priority on Africa" ought thus to be hung around
his neck. Like Mr. Wallace used to say, "Those fellows want to give
mor billions of dollars away to Hottentots. ")
Given the necessity for foreign military assistance and its growing
unpopularity, we may have to out-demagogue George on this one, case
him in that role, and use the arguments that the only way to prevent
Americans from fighting future wars is to provide the natives with the
guns to defend themselves. If we don't we'll have American Marines,
rather than South Vietnamese Marines defending South Vietnam, as we
did when McGovern's men sat in the White House.
"4. We should attack McGovern in a way that surfaces our
point, not just hit his points. We should not get trapped
into putting out the enemy line. "
We concur. We think this is covered in our earlier points.
"5. We have to build the foreign policy issue in terms of
the question of changing horses in mid-stream. In other
words, President Nixon has launched some very major, far-
reaching, foreign policy initiatives. We can't afford to let
an inexperienced novice come in and pick up the reins at
this point. We cannot afford to have McGovern in the White
House in terms of foreign policy. His inexperience and
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naivety in the foreign policy field would be disasterous.
Do we really want "White Flag McGovern" in the White
House?"
Excellent here. This is one area where we can contradict No. 3
especially in a possible RN speech. How should we build RN up
while tearing McGovern down. Here are several ideas:
The theme that RN has brought 500, 000 boys out of Vietnam, ha S saved
that little nation from collapse, has opened the door to China, has
neogitated a truce in the Cold War, has brought into bearing the most
historic arms agreement in history and, for God's sake, let's not
throw this away by putting into the White House, some rank amateur
and clown who doesn't know his fanny from first base about foreign
policy.
We can buil up this theme, and should. The United States today stands
on the threshhold of building a structure of peace that can last for the
remainder of this century. There is a chance, a good chance, but not
a certain chance, that if RN can finish the structure which is now half
built that for the remainder of this century no more American boys
will be dying in places like Vietnam. But for God's sake, to fire the
architect when the cathedral is half finished, and replace him with an
engineering student is insane. This is like firing the research physicians
at NIH right at the point at which they may have a cure for cancer and
replacing them with some hippie medical students.
This could serve as a counter to the McGovern argument that RN's
initiatives in foreign policy are good -- but that job is done. We must
now turn to the home front. Our argument has to be the job is not done
and anyone who thinks it is and acts on that belief, is likely to bring down
the entire structure just before it is completed. The concrete is still
soft it has not yet hardened; now is not the time to change builders.
Further, along these lines, we should emphasize the incredible naivete of
McGovern who thinks that the wayyou negotiate with the Soviets is to cut
your fleet in half, reduce your army to pre-Pearl Harbor level,
mothball half your bombers, scrap much of your nuclear deterrent and
then negotiate. RN and the people high up around him can say We
have been there in Peking and Moscow and candidly, they will not be
impressed by a nation which strips itself naked to show its good will.
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They will not treat an America that abandons its strength with respect,
but with contempt. They will not then be convinced that the path of
peace is best, but the path of hostility and testing. My friends, a
weakened and softened and beseeching America is not the kind of America
that can keep the peace. Only a strong and resolute and tough nation will
be respected, and be treated with respect. If we throw our arms into
the sea -- the enemy response will not be to love us, but to laugh at us --
and to treat our friends and allies as totalitarians and bullies have always
treated the weak.
Lines such as, "My friends, the price of peace cannot be unilaterally
reduced by the United States, or George McGovern. Youcannot buy
security in a nuclear world by cutting your defense budget in half --
and doubling your hopes. "
"My friends, the greatest threat to peace today is not the American
defense budget; it is the mistaken and indeed naive belief that permanent
peace is guaranteed and we need not make any great sacrifices or
efforts to maintain. That is not reality. That.is a dream from which
Americans will awake with a terrible shock, if we believe it is reality. "