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From Klein to Haldeman RE: "Campaign 1972" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: "First Family Scheduling" 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: "Larry Higby's Request of July 19" 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy Recommendations" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 53-21
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This file contains:
From Klein to Haldeman RE: "Campaign 1972" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 6/17/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 8 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Price to Haldeman RE: "First Family Scheduling" 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: "Larry Higby's Request of July 19" 5 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/20/1972
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy" 2 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/22/1972
From Haig to Haldeman RE: "Campaign Strategy Recommendations" 4 pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/24/1972
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
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Document Type
Document Description
53
21
6/17/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Klein to Haldeman RE: "Campaign
1972" 4pg
53
21
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: "Campaign
Strategy" 8pg
53
21
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Price to Haldeman RE: "First Family
Scheduling" 2pg
53
21
7/20/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Hallett to Haldeman RE: "Larry
Higby's Request of July 19" 5pg
53
21
7/22/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Clawson to Haldeman RE: "Campaign
Strategy" 2pg
53
21
7/24/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Haig to Haldeman RE: "Campaign
Strategy Recommendations' 4pg
Monday, June 18, 2012
Page 1 of 1
THE WHITE HOUSE
DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
WASHINGTON
By
E.O. flw 12065, Section 6-102
NARS,
Date
1/4/83
June 17, 1972
CONE IDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
HERBERT G. KLEIN
RE:
Campaign 1972
Between Conventions
1. Between Conventions I would suggest that the President
concentrate on domestic duties in Washington. Congress will
be in frenzied session, and this will be the time to build
on issues concerning congressional failures. It also will
be the time to build the case between the Democratic platform
and the Democratic performance in Congress.
I would suggest one excursion out. of town. This would be
an ideal time to emphasize the President's concern for the
environment and to point up his legacy of parks program
while people vacation. The trip should include a stop
in perhaps two national parks to check facilities and to
inspect two or three of the new "legacy" parks closer
to cities, such as in California and Texas. In the national
parks, we should stress pool press coverage of some events
where he and Mrs. Nixon and Julie could check trailer
facilities, see some animals, etc.
Post Convention
2. After the convention and into the fall the President
should continue to stress the duties of office, particularly
on foreign policy, but I believe he must campaign visibly
SO as not to give the impression of overconfidence which
might be conveyed to workers and contributors. He should
maintain a high level posture, but it must also be a
fighting pose. Both can be done with the battle emphasis
on rallies and quiet talk on television.
CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY
- 2 -
I would use the week after the convention for meetings
with party and campaign leaders, ala Mission Bay. This
could be done at San Clemente or Washington. This would
give the feeling of gearing up and would show strong
Presidential interest. I believe the President should
launch his campaign efforts with a week of major activity
in key states during the first week in September. This
would knock down the idea of apathy. During the remainder
of September, I would suggest that he work in Washington,
invite in key groups here, and travel on long weekends only.
We also have the fund raiser on September 26.
In early October I would step up the President's campaign
activities to travel one or two days during the week and
then again on Friday and Saturday with Sundays off. I
think this should lead up to intensive travel and
campaigning in the last two weeks. If he plans to
campaign intensively prior to the election, the idea should
be dropped to many of the newsmen much in advance so it
won't appear to be last minute panic.
Travel should emphasize the key states, of course, but
particularly in September, it should emphasize places
which will bring good visibility with minimum trouble.
Saturdays, for example, he could touch some states close
by such as Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey, Tennessee,
Ohio and upstate New York. He should mix this with some
time in California, Texas and Illinois.
Some of the first week of September activities should be
rallies to tie down the Nixon supporters early since the
President will be leading in the polls. We have the
early majority, as in 1968. The President might tie some
events to tours of facilities such as high trade manu-
facturing plants (computers, etc.). Republicans haven't
done this. He should have one or more events each
emphasizing Black, Mexican American and, perhaps in some
way youth. Early contact with these voting segments would
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 3 -
avoid the idea we are not seeking their votes. Throughout
the campaign, I would look for special ethnic opportunities,
particularly if Muskie is not on the ticket. The Vice
President should work these areas hard, also.
General Thoughts
3. I would hope that the President personally would use
informal television considerably, interspersed with short,
direct television talks to the public. I would avoid most
rally television even on a state basis. If the President
is to answer questions on television, either regionally
by community leaders or by newsmen, he should emphasize
more press conferences this summer to avoid the charge
that he will not answer newsmen but will handle the
other programs.
I would prefer to see more 5 to 10 minute addresses by
the President and few of 30 minutes duration. The addresses
should be of high tone--the Presidency and the record. A
contrast should be built between professionalism, calm
competence and achievement as opposed to radicalism,
uncertainty, confusion, and inexperience at a time when
the world can't afford to experiment. I'd take some
examples from the Roosevelt campaign in 1944 when you
didn't want to change horses in the middle of the stream.
A key point should be the high cost of McGovern.
4. The opposition (presuming McGovern) will hammer on the
economy, Vietnam in one way or the other, food prices, taxes
and, believe it or not, law enforcement (why haven't we done
more?). They will stress the honest George theme, frank
new face which is credible. They will try to focus on
distrust and credibility and relate it to the President.
One part of our strategy should be humor. At the leadership
meeting, for example, two jokes came up on whether the
nation is McGovernable. A Chicago item columnist tried an
idea I had: After this was printed without attribution,
several people mentioned it to me in Chicago. All this
has to be subtle and by word of mouth, of course.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
- 4 -
In a more major way, I believe the President should spend
most of his time emphasizing the positive. He is the leader
and has a great record. If he meets the attack by staying
above it, I think we gain. There must be hard punches taken
at McGovern, of course, and occasionally, particularly if
Q and A television is used, the President could do this
to give emphasis in the public mind. Most of the counter
battle should be carried in organized drum beat fashion
by the Vice President, surrogates and congressional
candidates. Regional drum beats carry nationally if they
are organized.
My recent soundings, documented in another memo, indicate
to me that at this moment, the people are interested more
in the big issues than the dissatisfaction supposedly shown
in the McGovern-Wallace vote. Much of the dissatisfaction
of Wisconsin may have been with other Democratic candidates
(particularly Wallace votes). I get fewer questions on
personal problems (social security, veterans benefits, etc.)
and more on foreign policy and the economy than I did even
three months ago.
CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
I've no changes in my June 16 memo, but would add a few
additional thoughts:
1. The target is McGovern, not the Democrats. I was
glad this point was made so forcefully this morning, and I think
it's essential that we stick with it. We should stress the open door
theme, and keep coming back to the argument that RN represents
the great, bi-partisan traditions of America -- the traditions not
only of Lincoln and TR and Eisenhower, but also of Wilson and FDR,
of Truman and Kennedy.
2. Whenever possible, RN should help cement this im-
pression by referring back to these traditions, and to positions
associated with them: to FDR's leadership of the free world in its
time of peril, to HST's forging of the Atlantic alliance, etc.
3. Throughout our history, there have been fringe move-
ments that were briefly and dramatically in the spotlight, then faded
back into the shadows from whence they came -- while the great
bi-partisan traditions were carried on. We should zero in on
McGovern's as the latest of these.
4. We should have a moratorium on discussion of forging
a new coalition that will make the GOP the majority party for the
next generation this will scare off those dispossessed Democrats
who see a resounding defeat of McGovern as the only way they can
take their party back.
-2-
5. Non-partisan forums are the best forums. The President
made this point to the surrogates; at this point it's doubly true for him,
if we're to make him the rallying-point for disaffected Democrats as
well as Republicans and Independents. To the maximum extent possible,
the forums we book him into should be ones associated with those great
bi-partisan traditions.
6. We should do our damnedest to avoid getting into situations
like the one we found ourselves in with Packwood and the Crippling
Strikes Prevention Act. This hurts us at our most vulnerable point: it
provides some of the most damaging support yet for the picture of RN
as an unprincipled politician who would sacrifice anything for electoral
support. We could use some fights on principle for unpopular causes
to offset it; or at least to resist some obvious pressures to take the
expedient course. I saw Packwood on two networks last night; it was
devastating. We shouldn't delude ourselves that we can do this sort of
thing (if we did) without getting caught at least part of the time, andbeing
severely hurt by it. I think Stew Alsop was right in his column when he
asked who could defeat RN in November, and concluded that only RN
could.
7. In general, I thought the presentation of strategy this
morning was right on target.
8. Attached is an outline I did last Sunday for the keynote
presentation at the convention, together with some notes explaining it.
It builds up to a direct appeal to dissident Democrats to join with us.
I think this kind of thing could also be the keynote of the campaign.
Ra81
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
Attachments
PRICE
July 16, 1972
Notes on the keynote outline, and on the invitation:
1. Structure. This is broken into sections not by issue area, but to
make a logical progression leading up to what I think should be the
real "keynote" of the keynote, and of the convention: an explicit,
direct appeal to disaffected Democrats to take refuge with us.
One of our real dangers has been that we'd come across as
smug and complacent. This counters that, at the outset of the con-
vention, in two ways: first, by starting off identifying ourselves with
the dissatisfactions most Americans feel in one way or another,
saying we share those, and that's why we want another four years to
complete the unfinished task of combatting them; and second, by
reaching out to the Democrats rather than merely patting ourselves
on the back. There are more of them than there are of us, so we
need them; people like to be courted, and this does so -- showing that
we care about them.
The intro establishes an audience rapport by saying we know how
you feel; it brags a bit, but without smugness, and leads logically
into the film, which shows RN grappling with the inherited troubles
and making headway against them in his first term; the film leaves
us at 1972; Keynoter A then takes us from 1972 to 1976, in terms of
our hopes and plans; Keynoter B draws the sharp distinctions be-
tween what we're offering and what the opposition is; this sets the
stage for Keynoter C to make his appeal to the traditional Democrats
to come with us.
2. Advantages. Keying off with this unusual sort of appeal to
Democrats has several distinct advantages:
a. Being unusual, it makes news.
b. It plays against the weakness of the opposition candidate,
and highlights Democratic divisions.
C. It keys off our "party of the open door" theme.
-2-
d. It sets up some possible additional convention highlights
(see notes below on this).
e. It establishes a set of explicit rationales for dissident
Democrats to join with us.
f. It adds interest to what could otherwise be a dull convention,
by introducing an element of contest and confrontation -- but making
it confrontation among Democrats rather than among Republicans.
g. It provides a theme for the commentators to talk about, with
a cast of characters.
3. Convention follow-up. I'd like to see us issue this call to Demo-
crats at the outset, and then follow it up throughout the convention
-- not only returning to it in subsequent speeches, but adding some
items to the program that would pick it up. Examples:
a. A special, spotlighted appearance by Connally, speaking
as a Democrat to his fellow Democrats.
b. On the second night, a special series of short speeches by
Democrats responding to the Republican invitation -- assuming the
right people can be rounded up. Examples: a prominent labor leader,
life-long Democrat, saying the candidate who in 1972 best represents
what labor represents is not McGovern, but RN; an attractive, artic-
ulate young voice of the New South, saying his party has left him; a
respected academic or student leader, saying he's been a Democrat
but McGovern is too much, and we need responsible leadership;
Floyd McKissick saying the real road to black progress is not the
McGovern way, but the Nixon way.
C. Release telegrams and letters from dissident Democrats
during the convention, saying they're going Republican.
d. Plug dissident Democrats into the outside-the-hall schedule.
-3-
4. TV Coverage. Perhaps the biggest payoff, if we follow a course
like this, will be in the cud-chewing of the TV reporters and commen-
tators. They desperately need something to talk about, and if we can
get them talking about how many Democrats the Republicans are going
to get, and speculating about what Democratic switch-overs we're
going to parade out next, we've achieved four crucial goals:
a. We've used our convention to condition Democratic voters,
in explicit, personal terms, to thinking about voting Republican.
b. We've established a "prior approval" factor -- that is, we've
made switching seem respectable to the TV viewer by showing him
that other good Democrats are doing it.
C. We've injected a note of drama into the convention, and
we've done it by moving the battle to the other guy's turf.
d. We've got the commentators talking about our issues.
Not to mention that we've opened our convention in an even
better way than the Democrats opened theirs - - we've made it not
just a GOP Convention, but a convention of and for the new coalition.
#####
PRICE
July 16, 1972
Keynote Presentation: Outline
1. Moderator. There are discontents and dissatisfactions in the
land; Americans feel frustrated with the present, and often fed up
with government. We share these discontents and dissatisfactions,
and we too are fed up with what all too often have been the failures
of government. But we don't just complain. For three and a half
years we've been doing something about it; we've made progress;
the direction is set, the momentum is established, the players are
lined up, the openings have been made to Russia, China and others
abroad, and to new departures at home. Highlights of what we've
achieved. What we've accomplished is a beginning, and a credential;
now we're eager to get on with the job, and to finish what we've
begun. In the film you're about to see, you will see some of those
beginnings.
FILM: THE NIXON YEARS
2. Keynoter A: What we will do for you. Our plans, our goals, for
the future, as we look from now to 1976. A new prosperity without
war and without inflation; the beginnings of a full generation of peace;
a rebirth of pride in America; a fair shake for the farmer, security
for the elderly, progress on the environment, etc.
-2-
3. Keynoter B: What we will not do to you. (The attack speech.)
All the McGovern nasties -- we won't take money out of the workers'
pockets for a $1,000 dole, we won't bus your kids, we won't let
America become a second-rate power whose President has to beg,
we won't spawn a new permissiveness that collapses moral values;
we'll work with the young, but won't ignore the old; we'll turn
America around without turning it upside down. We'll respect the
student, the professor, the farmer -- and also the worker who
wears a hard hat. Note: the focus of this will be entirely on the
sins of the present Democratic nominee, not on the sins of past
Democratic administrations.
4. Keynoter C. From the party of the Open Door, an Invitation.
From the podium of this Republican convention, we address this
talk to the millions of loyal Democrats left homeless by Hurricane
McGovern. Speaking to them directly, we invite them to make
their home with us -- try it, you may like it. Think about why
you're a Democrat. Is it because the Democratic party is the party
of FDR, Truman and Kennedy? If so, then ask yourself whether
Roosevelt or Truman or Kennedy would advocate crippling our
defenses and abandoning our allies -- Roosevelt, who led the defense
-3-
of freedom in World War II; Truman, the architect of NATO and the
Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and patron at the founding
of Israel; Kennedy, who declared we would "bear any burden, 11 etc.
Is it because the Democratic party is the party of labor? -- through
a litany of why people in the past have been Democratic, and why
those same reasons should now lead them to cast their lot with us
in 1972. Its tone is one of respect for the Democratic Party as a
great national institution, and sympathy with those members who
have seen it seized by a self-appointed elite determined to convert
it into a narrow ideological faction -- of warm and open-hearted
welcome to those left on the outside at Miami a month ago, and of
common cause with them because we share their hopes, their dreams,
their concerns about America. In his acceptance speech, George
McGovern said, "Come home, America. 11 To millions of Demo-
crats whose ideas no longer have a hearing in the national Democratic
Party, I say tonight, "Come home, Americans -- come share our
home -- give us not only your votes, but your hands, we will give
you ours in welcome. " This is the real keynote -- and it should
be echoed throughout the rest of the convention proceedings.
#######
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BOB HALDEMAN
FROM:
RAY PRICE
SUBJECT:
First Family Scheduling
I haven't thought this one through carefully, but would hope
that they'd be scheduled extensively. They've become a first-rate
asset. In particular, we should get them on as many talk shows as
possible. I caught Tricia on the Merv Griffin show the other evening
and she was a knockout -- real star quality, said all the right things,
and was stunning in all respects. At a time when average Americans
are worried about holding the family together as an institution, about
alienated kids, etc., simply demonstrating that RN has daughters
like these who are as loyal to him as they are is an enormous plus
-- especially with parents and grandparents.
Booking them into some political forums is fine -- but where
I think they can be most useful is in those situations that give them a
chance to express their (and RN's) concern for people. This sense
of caring about people is one that we're weak on, and that we've got
to bring through more successfully -- and they have the credentials
to help do it. In particular, as a result of the coverage of her travels
Mrs. Nixon has built up great strength in this regard. Merely by
visiting nursing homes, hospitals, disaster areas, etc., she can
remind people of it. We might again have her make non-political
visits to some outstanding volunteer projects, that are doing things
for people. Incidentally, I was rather forcefully struck a few weeks
ago, when looking at the pictures of Jacqueline Kennedy's visit to
Kennedy Center, surrounded by the "beautiful people, " etc., that
there might be a strong if somewhat subconscious vein we could tap:
I suspect that a lot of people today, comparing the two, might suddenly
come to realize how refreshing it is to have a working, gracious, in-
volved, concerned and mature First Lady, rather than a frivolous
pleasure-seeker from Camelot.
-2-
I'd like to see all three give a lot of attention to the elderly.
Not only are the elderly a big voting bloc, and the most conspicuous
non-quota group from the Democratic convention (where they were
represented by a token Colonel Sanders), but they in particular
would respond both to Mrs. Nixon and to the girls.
A possibility that just occurs to me now: maybe we could
organize a Grandparents' Day at the White House, with Mamie as
an honored guest, and stir a lot of sewing-circle speculation that
maybe RN-PN are soon to be grandparents. They'd love it in
Peoria.
RaPA
Raymond K. Price, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
Doug Hallett
SUBJECT:
Larry Higby's Request of July 19.
The following is in response to Mr. Higby's request that I update and
amend my thoughts expressed in my response to your June 12 memo-
randum -- you seem to have a virtually insatiable appetite for advice
you have no intention of following. (That's a joke. No, it's only half
a joke. )
The first point I want to reiterate is relatively minor. As you may
recall, I suggested that the period between the conventions was a good
opportunity to focus on domestic issues with some dramatic, colorful
Presidential participation. To date, I have seen no such effort made.
My major point is more central. As you may recall again, my earlier
memorandum stressed the difference between a national strategy and a
local, regional and interest-group strategy. On a national level, I felt,
and feel, we should be aiming squarely at those peripheral urban ethnics
and upper-middle-class whites in the Northeast, industrial Middle West,
and California who are Senator McGovern's only hope for election and
that we should be aiming at them with a forward-looking, progressive
positive approach geared around reprivatization, getting government off
people's back, reordering priorities, decentralization, etc. On the local,
regional, and interest-group level, in turn, I felt, and feel, we should
be directing our negative issues -- abortion, acid, homsexuality, our
more extreme rhetoric about national security, tax reform, welfare
reform, etc. -- in carefully-designed, well-researched, probably
printed and front group formats so that we ourselves are not hurt by our
own efforts.
2.
To date, it has appeared as if this strategy were deliberately being
contravened. In particular, our positive national material the pamphlets,
the "Lift of Leadership" book, the speech inserts, etc. I have seen is
the same old, puffy bullshit which almost put the nation to sleep in 1968.
More seriously, the dominant tone of our national campaign, at least so
far, has been negative and negative in what I think is a counterproductive
way. Specifically, Secretary Laird's charge about the F-15 and Senator
Eagleton, his overly-lavish rhetoric "white flag budget" and under-
researched "analysis" of Senator McGovern's defense budget, the Vice
President's rhetoric "no-no-bird", Secretary Connally's charge about
Senator McGovern's Vietnam policy undermining the President's negotiating
posture (really now, who believes that?), and Clark MacGregor's Capitol
Hill Club Speech, to name only what I can cite off the top of my head, are
all counterproductive. They detract attention from Senator McGovern's
extremism and attract attention to our own. They are not credible. They
undermine the President's stature and the advantages of his incumbency
while giving McGovern the stature he lacks. They give an open invitation
to the media to screw us. Most importantly, they turn off the people we
know are going to be the swing voters in this election and leave the forward,
rogressive and potentiall/even the middle ground to Senator McGovern.
On the other side of the ledger, because we are doing the above, we seem
satisfied with not doing out in the boondocks, what we should be getting
irgorously analytical, well-documented statements of Senator McGovern's
views out to the various interest-groups on each of the major issues
Israel to Jews, parochial schools and abortion to Catholics, national
security to veterans, etc. In fairness, we have done a few mailings,
particularly of the Israel position and the overly-rhetorical Laird defense
budget analysis. We have not done nearly enough. And while I do not
know what we have done in the organizational sphere, I fear we are spending
a lot of time talking to, stroking, dining, and salivating over groups we
know are going to support us anyway while ignoring the opportunity to
expand our constituency -- at least if the fact that there is not one
Vietnam veteran on our Veterans' re-election committee is any example,
that is true.
There are some yard-sticks to measure the success of our campaign SO
far. It was my understanding that the President wanted us to begin going
after McGovern in a rational manner right after the California primary
how much was done? It was my understanding that we were going to use
the Democratic Convention that we were going to encourage division,
have our own demonstrations by front groups, etc. how much was done?
3.
And it was my understanding that we were not going to let Senator McGovern
get away with switching his positions and moving to the middle ground on
the particulars of his issues -- how much has been done?
In my humble view, this campaign needs a rather radical reorganization
and redirection. The Good Lord is watching over the President and is
going to get him re-elected if only because nobody else will but
there is no point in taking chances. My suggestions follow:
1.
Part of the problem is simply organizational. While you up there
may know what the hell is going on, those of us down here who do
the actual writing and telephoning, etc. do not. There is massive
duplication of effort, inter -office rivalry, competition, holding back
of material from one another, etc., etc. which is not benefitting
the President. We need some consolidation. I would suggest:
(a) Combining the Colson interest-group operation with 1701's
1701 would get lead responsibility -- and it would also get Colson.
Most of the White House-connected re-election efforts dinners,
funding requests, etc. have already been accomplished. (If
they haven't, it's too late. ) Now what we need is a hard-driving
organizational and political effort and that can only be done from
a campaign headquarters. Colson could take as ma ny people from
here as he needs, reorganize the operation, fire and hire people,
etc. Malek would retain his administrative role, but Colson would
have the lead in idea development and kicking ass.
(b) That is not all Colson would have. He'd be MacGregor's deputy with
authority to run all over the place. It needs it still.
(c) A skeleton Colson staff would remain here under Colson's direction
to provide such support activities as are needed agency contact,
White House mailings, writing assistance, speaker programming,
etc.
(d) Writing now being done at the RNC, White House, 1701, and
God knows where else -- would be consolidated under one chief
perhaps Bill Safire should take the job for the campaign. No
matter whose payroll anybody was on, he would be under one guy
and all requests for writing assistance would be funnelled to that
one guy.
4.
(e) Press and media relations have to retain a split identity -- and,
in any event, the Klein-Clawson operation seems to coordinate
pretty well with the Shumway operation. P. R. -types like
Rhatican, though, would go with the campaign. Such P. R.
activities as the Domestic Council or NSC need would be handled
within their own ranks or by the Colson support staff remaining
at the White House -- requests would go through Colson.
(f) For political purposes, the Domestic Council political operation
presumably Ed Harper would report to Colson at 1701.
(g) Democrats for Nixon should report to Colson and coordinate with
the 1701 interest-group operation. If it continues to develop as
it is now as a separate Connally-Colson preserve -- it is
going to be duplicative and maybe even competitive.
(h) The enthusiasm factor needs to be weighed in. You should be
visible to your staff (I've been writing memoranda to you for
two years and have, not once, ever met you). So should the
President. Starting now, the President should have a series of
afternoon pep session-cocktail parties and get everybody to at
least meet him in cycles of decently small groups. You couldn't
believe how lax people are around here and mainly, I think,
because they find it virtually impossible to have any personal
identity with the President.
2.
Not all the problem is organizational, however. We have got to
remember that Senator McGovern cannot win this campaign. Only
Mr. Nixon can lose it. That being true, we should not be so
response-oriented and SO quick to jump at every quiver in the
McGovern camp. A light travel and speaking schedule for the
President should be locked in and something attached to the
President SO he gets an electric shock if he tries to break it. The
same goes for everybody else.
3. Since our lack of ability to verbalize any positive themes and our
constant resort to the negative may be as much due to a lack of
awareness of what those positive themes should be as anything
else, Pat Moynihan should be asked to come down for the campaign,
with authority to write or assign to outside writers the President's
substantive speeches as suggested in my earlier memorandum. We
would also get the additional benefit of having somebody around
with a sense of humor.
5.
4.
Whatever the November Group is doing -- - and I don't know
anybody at the White House who knows -- should be available
for comment to people who are (a) political and (b) have been
around the President for more than one campaign.
I hope you will find these suggestions both annoying and helpful.
CC: Charles W. Colson
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 22, 1972
EYES ONLY/ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H. R. HALDEMAN
THRU:
L. HIGBY
FROM:
KEN W. CLAWSON KC
SUBJECT:
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
(1) The President has maintained a high-level, busy
executive posture between the conventions with the single
exception of greeting Frank Fitzsimmons and members of
the Teamsters Union Executive Board at San Clemente. I
think this exception to the generally high-level tone
the President has set was a justifiable one and really
quite valuable.
(2) I am still convinced that in general terms the high
level Presidential posture is still the most valid, but
it is only meaningful if all 100 plus surrogates and,
for that matter, the whole government apparatus is
campaigning like hell from this moment until election day.
I feel strongly that to "free" the President to comfortably
maintain his image as a Presidential candidate lies in
how effectively the surrogates and the government apparatus
really hurl themselves into the campaign. If we are less
effective than we should be, I envision it becoming necessary
for the President to come off his best posture and to, in
effect, take over the campaign by interjecting himself fully
into the fray. I find most Cabinet Officers and high-level
surrogates with whom we deal are anxious to campaign extensively,
but I think it is imperative that we monitor the surrogates
program extremely closely to make sure we are getting every
ounce of energy into the campaign.
As far as travel is concerned, I still believe that it
should be Presidential-related travel, keyed to our target
states and specific voting blocs.
-2-
(3) I think we should take great pains to paint McGovern
as a "minority leader of a minority constituency. " I
think we should give every indication that any "regular,
normal" American, whether he be Republican, Democrat or
Independent, can find leadership and solice under the
Nixon umbrella. I think that we should use words like
"elite, fringe, extremist" and even in some cases "radical"
to portray the constituency of Senator McGovern. Every
effort should be made to isolate McGovern's more vocal
backers from the mainstream of the Democratic Party and
the nation as a whole.
Whether McGovern is before his time or after his time
in philosophy and in substance, he and his followers
should be portrayed as a small, closely-knit cadre of
over-educated, lazy, fat-of-the-land type minority. In
foreign policy, where we are in my opinion, miles ahead,
McGovern should be portrayed as inexperienced, rural, yokel,
naive and isolationist. Personally, he should be portrayed
as an individual who is not the kind of man that world
leaders could respect. Indirectly, he should be portrayed
as womanish, weak and a waffler. In short, a man without
backbone, a candidate whose positions are never firm, who
lacks courage to make the hard decisions and to stick to
them in the face of adversity. For example, in Florida
when he indicated he would keep a residual force in
Southeast Asia on one day and then completely back away
from it in the face of opposition from some of his more
radical supporters in the Doral Hotel Lobby.
(4) As we were able to do in 1968, the McGovern people
will have the advantage of being able to attack every
little or big mistake from one end of the Executive Branch
to the other and pin all of the failures and errors and
foibles on the President. I personally think that Ted
Kennedy will still be McGovern's most effective campaigner
and that he will trumpet the health issue all over the
country if we don't preempt him to the best of our ability
starting now.
Kennedy, who seems bent on the '76 nomination for himself,
will probably be given press coverage equal to McGovern's
wherever he speaks, and I think we can count on his stumping
for McGovern extensively so that he may report after McGovern
loses in November that he did everything in his power to
elect the Democratic ticket. We probably ought to have a
team whose speciality is to monitor Kennedy and respond to him.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 24, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
AL HAIG
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy Recommendations
I would not substantially modify my earlier recommendations on the
subject of campaign strategy but rather would reiterate the following
points:
1.
The President should maintain a posture of being generally above
the political infighting not just because he has to conduct the business
of State but, more importantly, because his overall record speaks for
itself and his "stooping to conquer" will only serve to enhance the
McGovern prestige and tend to equate two totally unequal contenders.
The President's greatest personal asset is both the image and
reality of an experienced, thoughtful, unemotional and exceptionally
competent and tough national leader. Should he succumb to classic
partisan gut-fighting, the activity would detract from this optimum
posture. The tactics employed by the President himself should involve
a careful and continuous appraisal of the need for his personal role as
November approaches. It may be that the posture I am recommending
will in the natural course of events develop the need for a fighting,
tub-thumping, one-time Presidential speech in which the President
rolls up his sleeves and takes on McGovern head on. While such a
speech should be prepared and held for contingency use, a decision
to proceed should only follow a most careful assessment that there is,
in fact, a demand. If it is determined that a demand does exist then
the speech should be given as late as possible in the campaign to
prevent gutter type rebuttals which can again only result in an escala-
tion of this kind of activity. Under no circumstances should a "tub-
thumper" of this kind be considered for the President's acceptance
speech at Miami.
2.
With respect to campaigning and travel, obviously others will
have more refined and experienced perspectives. I still, however,
-2-
continue to believe that the President should avoid over-exposure
especially in contrived purely political environments. A non-frantic,
business-of-State schedule should insure plenty of preelection exposure
but great care should be taken to develop venues which are Presidential
in character and which will enable him to talk appropriately from a
statesmanlike position with the full weight of the Presidency behind
him, i. , not just as another candidate. Venues should focus pri-
marily on opportunities which can be nationally televized. These are
the opportunities which get impact. In this vein, nothing is of greater
importance than the timing (prime time) and substance of the President's
acceptance speech.
Themes to be exploited should cover: foreign policy, National
Defense and perhaps two or three domestic issues, such as law and
order, philosophy of government and welfare.
3.
In my view, the greatest single exploitable accomplishment of
the President is foreign policy but beyond that it is his demonstrated
willingness to make tough, courageous decisions in times of national
crises, i.e., Jordan, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, May 8th and South Asia.
For this reason, one of the greatest single dangers between now and
November would be a panicky posture on Vietnam. In my view, the
issue has been largely defused since American boys are not dying as
before, American youths are not being drafted and most Americans
attribute this to Presidential toughness above all else. Most Americans
sense an aroma of finality in the policies we are currently pursuing in
Vietnam. In a political sense, the benchmark for this American con-
fidence was the decision of May 8. The backdrop, however, is an accumu-
lative series of courageous decisions made all along the way which have
in large measure proven to be correct. Should we panic in the last five
minutes by accepting a compromise solution which is obviously detri-
mental to American and South Vietnamese interests there is a great
risk that much of our constituency will become disaffected.
4.
I agree completely with the theme that we should generally
posture cabinet members and advocates in the direction of not personal-
izing attacks on McGovern's radicalism but rather take him on, issue
by issue, in a repetitive fashion and being sure they credit him with his
most extreme earlier positions. A specific line should be developed
and approved for each issue and be repeated and repeated until it
acquires a reality of its own which the opposition must squander all
of its resources to counter.
-3-
The overall image of McGovern that we should attempt to develop
is one of a sincere, well-meaning but totally inadequate and unqualified
Presidential candidate. We must not permit the opposition to dig out
of the extreme positions which McGovern has already placed on the
record. The opposition is already launching a major effort to do SO.
Forcing the opposition to justify or in some cases to move away from
earlier stated positions will tend to alienate their own extreme con-
stituency and keep them in a defensive posture throughout.
5.
To me, the greatest weakness of the McGovern camp is also its
greatest strength. His current image is one of a loner who is honest
and uncompromising in his desire to shatter all preconceived political,
international, defense, management and welfare patterns of the U.S.
Government. Beyond this, he is viewed as favoring a fundamental
shift in the very life style of the American people. Unfortunately,
there are many Americans, including many well-to-do intellectuals
and even bureaucrats who live in a theoretical world which permits
them to savor a whole new approach. The youth and intellectuals are
obviously most attracted to this kind of logic. For this reason,
it is essential that we focus primarily on the impracticalities of this
approach, issue by issue and theme by theme. It is also important
that our own positive statements clearly portray the President as a
successful innovator who has himself, through skill and experience,
brought about more change than could ever be experienced be the ill-
conceived and pie-in-the-sky themes which characterize the McGovern
platform.
These are, of course, generalities which must be specifically
tailored for specific constituents. Labor, for example, must under-
stand that McGovern would suck away their hard-earned earnings
for the welfare parasite. The establishment must understand that
their hard-earned financial rewards could not be shared with their
heirs.
In the international area, the theme Secretary Rogers mentioned
at the Leadership Meeting is an especially good one, i.e., McGovern
seems to favor an extension and continuation of the large majority of
our international programs but would self defeatingly deprive the
country of the assets which have thus far made these programs succeed,
i.e., military strength and responsible international evolvement.
-4-
6.
I would again emphasize the Presidential family concept through
which the President, Mrs. Nixon and the daughters be employed at
every turn in the months between now and November. The President's
family man image and the public attractiveness of Mrs. Nixon and the
girls cannot be over-emphasized. It also contributes in an indirect
way to the great theme that Fresident Nixon represents the personifica-
tion of valued American family traditions which dramatizes by example
the inadequacies of an off-beat zealot whose main appeal can only be
to the misfits in American society.
7.
Finally, and above all, it must be recognized that the preceding
merely confirms a strategy for exploiting existing assets. Written
strategy of this kind and generalizations about what we have going for
us are meaningless without a detailed, well organized and, above all,
disciplined machine for carrying the strategy forward in an effective
way. Bad strategy can be overcome by effective management. A
perfect strategy implemented in an ill-disciplined, poorly timed or
sloppy way can be disastrous. I am not sure that our organizational
arrangements. and the detailed development of themes, scheduled
Presidential appearances, Advocate appearances, etc., are precisely
delineated or that a manned command and control mechanism is firmly
in place and properly functioning. If this has not been done, it is the
overriding task of the moment. This, you are best able to assess.