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This file contains:
From Charles Colson to H.R. Haldeman RE: Political Strategy. 17pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/21/1971
1948 Revisited: A Political Lesson, by Henry Owens. Washington Post. 1pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 5/1/1971
From Charles Colson to RN RE: Democrats for Nixon. 3pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From John C. Whitaker to H.R.Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign Strategy. 8pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
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WHSF: Contested, 55-22
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This file contains:
From Charles Colson to H.R. Haldeman RE: Political Strategy. 17pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 5/21/1971
1948 Revisited: A Political Lesson, by Henry Owens. Washington Post. 1pg. [Subject: Campaign] [Newspaper], 5/1/1971
From Charles Colson to RN RE: Democrats for Nixon. 3pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/12/1972
From John C. Whitaker to H.R.Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign Strategy. 8pgs. [Subject: Campaign] [Memo], 7/21/1972
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Richard M. Nixon's Returned Materials Collection
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Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Contested Materials Collection
Folder List
Box Number
Folder Number
Document Date
No Date
Subject
Document Type
Document Description
55
22
5/21/1971
Campaign
Memo
From Charles Colson to H.R. Haldeman RE:
Political Strategy. 17pgs.
55
22
5/1/1971
Campaign
Newspaper
"1948 Revisited: A Political Lesson," by
Henry Owens. Washington Post. 1pg.
55
22
7/12/1972
Campaign
Memo
From Charles Colson to RN RE: Democrats
for Nixon. 3pgs.
55
22
7/21/1972
Campaign
Memo
From John C. Whitaker to R.Haldeman
and John D. Ehrlichman RE: Campaign
Strategy. 8pgs.
Monday, June 25, 2012
Page 1 of 1
DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
N-1
MEME
Colson to HRH, re Political Strategy"
5/21/87
C(NIXON)
71
[30]
N-2
Memo
Calson to RN, re; "Remoorats for
Nixon"
7/12/72
e(NIXON)
[31]
N-3
Mena
Whitacker to HRH, JDE, re: Compaign
7/21/72
C(NIXON)
[32]
strategy
FILE GROUP TITLE
WHSF: WHCF
Subj. Files: confidential Files
BOX NUMBER
48
FOLDER
[CF] TITLE PL-NiXON [10F2] [1971-74]
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NA FORM 1421 (4-85)
Presidential Materials Review Board
Review on Contested Documents
Collection: WHSF : WHCF : SubF: [CF]
Box Number:
48
Folder:
[CF] PL-Nixon [1 of 2] [1971-74]
Document
Disposition
30
Return Private/Political
31
Return Private/Political
32
Return Private/Political
C.F.FG,
Ph/Nixon
FG6-11-1/ olson
FG6-11-1/Gale,K.
May 21, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Political Strategy
This is in response to the President's request for "some free
thinking" on how to make our programs more meaningful to the
people. This can only be done effectively in the context of the
overall campaign strategy; hence this analysis attempts to
broaden the question somewhat -- and to examine several ways
in which the President's base of political support can be
strengthened for 1972.
The primary emphasis here is on domestic issues; we obviously
have the greatest control in this area and there is more certainty
in the political effect of what we do. This by no means suggests
that international issues may not be decisive -- they very well
could be but with international conditions as volatile as they
are it would be foolhardy to predicate a total strategy on them.
The following is an effort to identify some of the major factors
that have proven decisive in prior elections, assess where we
stand today in relation to those factors and suggest certain
strategic considerations for 1972.
A. RECENT PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
At the risk of oversimplifying history, successful Presidential
politics in modern times have been generally built on one (or a
combination) of four dominant factors.
1. Personal Image - Charisma: Kennedy is the classic
example. Despite a mediocre Administration, an
undistinguished record in foreign affairs and a poor
legislative tally, he might well have been re-elected
in 1964; if so it would probably have been largely due
to the successful mystique he created(with the help of
a friendly press). The fact that he was able to main-
tain a substantial base of political support a year before
the election would suggest that even a relatively inef-
fectual President can support himself on personality
alone.
2. Respect for Leadership: Clearly FDR was the master in
this category. A large majority of the people were con-
vinced that FDR was the Nation's only salvation; it was
irrelevant that most New Deal programs didn't work and
that we were so preoccupied at home that we watched the
world drift into the most dangerous war in history.
Roosevelt's gift was the believable promise -- setting
the great goals which he would inspire the Nation (a very
important point which you made in our meeting). The
1941 "Four Freedoms" speech, for example, became the
national credo; young and old alike knew what the four
freedoms were. (Even though it was 30 years ago I can
still remember the Four Freedoms Saturday Evening Post
cover.) With a few well chosen phrases he was able to
rally enduring support through difficult times. 1
3. Success on the Big Issues: There were at least two elections
in modern times decided principally on the grounds that times
were good, the President had done a satisfactory job of
running the country and there was no great public demand
for a change; the big issues of the day were well in hand.
The first was Coolidge's election in 1924; the second, Ike's
in 1956. The Peace, Progress and Prosperity slogan clearly
reflected the public mood in 1956. Ike had the big issues
well under control; he had restored the country to a period
of normalcy. He was obviously also greatly helped by his
powerful "Father image". Ike fit the times and the times fit
Ike.
1It was all the more remarkable in that the "Four Freedoms"
were enunciated by Roosevelt, after he had been in office for eight
years, at the tag end of a speech in which he outlined the dismal
state that the world was then in, that we were at war or would be
soon, that great sacrifices were necessary, that our defense pro-
duction program was a disaster, that we weren't equipped to fight
the war and that all hell was breaking loose.
3.
4. The Voters' Self Interest: On certain occasions in
modern times the people have been moved to vote
primarily according to their own economic self-interest.
1948 is the classic example. Certainly President Truman
had little charisma (at least at the time); the times were
not that good and there was a strong sentiment for
change in the country. Although Truman was a strong,
tough individual, it can hardly be said that in 1948 there
was widespread public respect for his leadership as
there had been for Roosevelt's. Yet he won -- largely
because he made his own re-election important to the
economic interest of large segments of the voting pppula-
tions In 1964 Lyndon Johnson succeeded in appealing to
the economic interests of key groups and in frightening
the electorate as to the economic (and international)
consequences of electing his opponent.
B. WHERE WE STAND
These four categories give us some yardstick -- albeit arbitary --
to examine where we stand and our opportunities.
1. Image-Charisma: We cannot and should not try to make
the President something he isn't. (I gather this is the
point of Buchanan's memo, as it was the point made in
the Pierson column.) It would be foolish and counter pro-
ductive to try to build a Kennedy-type mystique there
isn't time, the press would never let us get away with it
nor is it necessarily a very reliable source of political
strength. A President doesn't have to be likeable, have
a sense of humor or even love children. It is important
only that his personal qualities engender confidence.
2. Respect for Leadership: There is an important distinction
between this and the image point above (a distinction we
haven't clearly made). We can and we should make people
better understand the President -- why he is the strong,
determined, disciplined and self-confident leader that he is.
The Connally thesis in this respect is absolutely
valid. Those who know the President and work with
him as we do, recognize his brilliant, extraordin-
arily retentive and perceptive mind, his long-range
strategic view of problems, his high purpose and we,
in turn, come to have enormous confidence in him.
We must try to get this across; the electorate can
develop some of the same confidence if the story is
told correctly. The obvious handicap in developing
the Connally thesis is that it will almost invariably
be filtered out, discounted and at times rediculed by
a very hostile press. The press have painted so many
negative images over the years that even if we do the
most superb job in the world, I doubt that we can shift
enough opinion in the next 18 months to make this the
decisive factor in the election. Whatever we can do,
however, will help and is important.
The great goals approach is perhaps the toughest.
Roosevelt's speech caught the public imagination at
a time when the country was uniting in the face of a
common danger. The President has used some truly
great phrases a "Generation of Peace" etc. Maybe
because of the press or because the country has be-
come excessively blase, these haven't become national
rallying themes. Between now and next year's State of
the Union, we should study in depth those things the
people of the Nation most desire and the way in which
we can state the goals for the country that will, in fact,
inspire and gain confidence. None of us should shoot
from the hip in this area. We must know the public
mood, not just what the polls report, but by examining
it in depth. If there is any one thing peculiar to our
times it is the extreme volatility of public attitudes,
caused more than anything else by the constant impact
of the electronic media which can cause very dramatic
almost overnight shifts in attitudes.
5.
What people may want more than anything else is to
have their confidence in the future re-established and
our constituency at least wants to believe in America
and in what they regard as fundamental values. They
are tired of constantly being told what is wrong with
society and of having their consciences wracked with
continuous recrimination. We are on the right side of
this issue but the real question is how to lift 200 million
people out of their seats.
In short, I believe that this is a terribly important area
for us. We must work to develop public confidence in
the President personally, to gain respect for him as a
leader and to give the nation an uplift; the obstacles are,
however, very great and this, therefore, should be but
one of several strategies.
3. The Big Issues: Obviously the war (foreign policy
generally) and the economy are the two big ones; our
domestic program next.
A. The War. Even if we are virtually out of Vietnam the
Democrats will cynically argue that we could have ended it
much sooner, that we dragged it out to no avail and that we
got out only because the Doves in the Congress forced us
out. A war weary people are likely to want to turn their
attention to other things and forget Southeast Asia. What
they will be more concerned with is who can best keep the
peace. It is obvious to us that by remaining strong, by
getting out of Vietnam on a responsible basis, by preserving
the credibility of the United States we are doing a better
job of building a lasting peace. On the other hand n an
era of growing isolationism, people might well feel that
our firmness and our resolve to do those things necessary
(Laos and Cambodia) run a greater risk of getting us into
another war than the head-in-the-sand Dove line. We can
be vulnerable to demagoguery on this issue.
Moreover the war is, in a sense, a negative issue.
We are badly hurt if we don't end it but we may not
gain a great deal of credit if we do. 2
Obviously if major events -- SALT, Disarmament,
a summit, Vietnam, China -- go our way there could
be such an overwhelming positive reaction in the
foreign policy area that the President would be un-
beatable regardless of anything else. While we are
hoping this happens, we should not rely on it since 80
much of this is beyond our control.
B. The Economy. Even if the economy is back in full
swing by next year, as I personally expect it will be, the
Democrats will argue that we still have inflation and we
had more unemployment through the Nixon years than
under the Democrats. The Democrate will traffic heavily
on the public's traditional suspicions about economics.
In almost every issue poll the Democrats outscore us in
public confidence with respect to handling of the economy
and thus this is at best always at uphill issue. Whether
we win on this will depend on whether we are able to allay
fears about the future, convince people that unemployment
will not again rise and that prices can remain relatively
stable.
C. The Domestic Program. This may well be our biggest
problem at the moment but, at the same time, our biggest
opportunity. Our domestic programs are "managerial
oriented" not "people oriented". In my view this is both a
PR and a substantive problem with a much heavier emphasis
on the latter. As you pointed out, there is very little "what's
in it for me" in our domestic program.
²It is very much like the recent demonstrations. Had there been
a disaster, we would have been hurt; we handled it beautffully and gained
little not because the people don't associate the President with the
handling of the demonstrations (because they did) -- but rather because
it is a negative issue and there is little profit in what the public regards
as something basically unpleasant. Two pollsters have told me that even
though the public overwhelmingly agreed with out stand on the demonstra-
tions entirely and even though people associated the President with the
demonstrations, that this does not translate into a positive response with
respect to the President.
Our domestic program is, on the merits, excellent;
the six great goals are strong. Reform, change, local
decision making -- these are our strong points but it is
hard to make a plausible, understandable case of what
they do for the pocketbook. Revenue sharing, for
example, could be made appealing as a way to stop
rising property taxes but it is not being sold that way,
probably now can't be sold that way and is a very
indirect and obtuse argument as long as it .8 structured
the way it is in our proposal.
We have a fantastically good record in the area of
governmental reform but this too is managerial, not
economic, and once again it is what people expect of us;
that is, Republicans run the Government better but
Democrats do things for people.
A second deficiency in our domestic program has been
our apparent vacillation. The public never gets one,
clearly perceived consistent image of the Administration.
There is no real substance to the allegation that we have
been expedient, but from a PR standpoint, we do in fact
often give legitimacy to the charge perhaps because we
ourselves are still seeking that central thrust that, in
fact, will capture the public imagination.
In trying to orient our efforts more to people and economic
issues we may be able to develop the thrust that it seems
to me we have been groping for.
It is possible -- there is time to reorient our domestic
pfforts and to capture the high ground. This leads directly
into the fourth category.
4. The Voters' Self-Interest: It is not hard to draw the profile
of what comprises the average individual's economic self-
interest today. Obviously jobs and employment rank on
the top of the list. High also on the list are taxes --
particularly real property taxes; this is now a nation of
homeowners -- 66 million. Moreover, most Americans
8.
work hard in the hopes that they will be able to educate
their children. The desire for education is strongest
among those adults who did not obtain a higher education
themselves; and they represent perhaps our most signi-
ficant political potential. Most Americans who work
resent those who do not and especially resent paying
higher taxes for loafers who abuse the welfare system.
Finally most middle class Americans fear a catastrophic
illness which can wipe out their savings and security.
Middle-aged people worry about their retirement; older
people worry about their ability to live on their retire-
ment and rising prices. The farmers have a set of
economic problems all their own. 3 There are things we
can do at this point to position ourselves and our programs
on the right side of many of the pocketbook issues that
such a profile suggests. For example:
a. Revenue Sharing. Most people today look at general
revenue sharing as simply another "hand out" from the
Federal Treasury to local politicians. If the public has
a poor attitude toward Federal bureaucrats, it has a
worse perception of local politicians.
Unfortunately our revenue sharing does not have any
tangible, economic meaning to the individual. We haven't
made the case that it could mean a reduced property tax
burden.
We had the choice originally of proposing what would have
been the purest form of revenue sharing, i.e. individual
tax credits by individual taxpayers for a portion of local
income, sales or real property taxes. After a very
extensive study, the Domestic Council and the Treasury
concluded that general revenue sharing involving grants
from the Federal government to states and local com-
munities was more equitable, more efficient and would
3 The social issues are perhaps equally important race, crime
ininthe streets and narcotics but these aren't economic and are
essentially negative. We are also postured correctly on these.
9.
provide the financial assistance needed more quickly.
It was clearly a better solution on the merits, but it
ran headlong into the opposition of Byrnes and Mills
who over the years had favored the credit approach;
it also ran counter to the traditional Republican philo-
sophy of revenue sharing, first advanced by Mel Laird
in the Fifties and subsequently endorsed by various
Republican Policy papers through the Sixties. Most
importantly it missed the political mark (a point Clark
MacGregor and I vainly tried to make before the final
decision was made).
A credit arrangement would give the opportunity (also the
burden) to state and local communities to increase their
levels of taxation. (The majority of which are now con-
trolled by the Democrats)
It is not too late to do this, although we would need an
excuse to shift our position -- perhaps if Mills scuttles
our bill or perhaps whenever we propose a value added
tax. With a new source of Federal revenue we could
couple with it a tax credit revenue sharing arrangement
arguing that the value added tax permits a much larger
(and different form of) revenue sharing.
It would be ideal if we could find a way to do this in the
present Congress - (it could pass since Byrnes and Mills
are committed to this approach) -- so that next April 15
every taxpayer would be able to check a new box on his
Form 1040 and receive a federal credit refund -- a direct
abatement for local taxes. We could argue that we - - the
Nixon Administration -- had brought tax relief to home-
owners and taxpayers all across the country.
b. Tax Credits for Education. Perhaps coupled with revenue
sharing tax credits we could include some tax credit or
deduction for educational expenses. Costs of higher
education are becoming nearly prohibitive for middle income
families, the group which offers us the greatest opportunity
10.
for political gain. For years there have been proposals
in the Congress to provide some tax credit or deduction
arrangement. The issue is there for the taking. Indeed
it is expensive, but once again, if it were coupled with
a substitute tax arrangement we could do it and still be
fiscally responsible. This is clearly a prime "what's in
it for me" issue.
c. Lifting the Ceiling of Earnings of Social Security
Recipients. What is better Republican philosophy than
to encourage Social Security recipients to earn more than
the current $1800 ceiling? We worry about all the little
things we can do to improve upon HEW's programs to
benefit the aging. These get us absolutely nothing
politically and really appeal only to the professional
senior citizens' lobby. The vast majority of retired citizens
couldn't care less about pilot programs for feeding the
elderly in Chicago. What they reall care about is making
ends meet when they retire. Lifting the ceiling, for
example to $3000, would be expensive and would probably
also have to be tied to something like the value added tax
to give us the fiscal rationale. The fact is, however, that
it is a very powerful "what's in it for me" economic issue
and particularly potent with a constituency whose support
is vital to us (remember too that the retired vote can be
decisive in California and probably is decisive in Florida).
d. Medical Program. Our present medical program is 80
complicated that as you point out few of us ever know what
is in it, let alone the vast majority of the American people.
We should seize upon one or two salient points like cata-
strophic health insurance, more doctors, and initiatives
like the cancer cure and then demagogue these points to death.
We mainly want to neutralize this issue because we can't
win on it; the Democrats can always offer more in the way
of national health insurance than we can responsibly accept.
The fact remains however that we can talk about it and
continually should the need for curing dread diseases,
better medical services and our health insurance program.
The key to this one is to keep it simple and understandable
and relate it always to the individual's economic (and health)
interest.
5. Welfare Reform. We own this issue presently; we must
keep on hitting it, constantly. People simply don't like
to pay taxes to support loafers. The tougher we are in
tightening the work requirements, the more the political
gain. It is indirectly, therefore, a "what's in it for me"
economic issue.
6. Special Interest Cultivation -- 1948 Example. In developing
those issues which appeal to the voters' economic self-
interest it is particularly instructive to examine the
Truman election of 1948. There are some interesting
political similarities with our own situation. Truman was
derided and scoffed at by the sophisticated opinion makers,
as we often are. He faced a hostile Congress, we do.
Based on results of the 1946 election, he could not count
on his party being in the majority. He was faced with a
third party threat. He had been forced to do unpopular
things in the international field and he had inherited the
difficult economic problems of converting from war to peace.
While Dewey went into the 1948 campaign talking about
national unity, peace and the need to make government more
effective, Truman devoted all of his resources to the break
4
and butter gut issues.
A recent column by Henry Owen (attached as Tab A) makes
the very perceptive point that Truman won the election because
people thought he would better protect their bread and butter
interests "pocketbook politics had carried the day, dignity
and efficiency came in a poor second. " The Owen column
interestingly enough makes the point that the same issues
that elected Truman are perhaps even more important today.
If, indeed, there is a valid lesson from the 1948 election, it
is that we can build the same kind of a political base to make
the President's re-election important to the economic self-
interests of large segments of the voting population -- and we
4
According to Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips, "Dewey
and his men believed that the concepts of the managerial revolution,
which had so captivated the eastern electorate in the post war years,
would captivate the rest of the country as well. "
12.
must escape the Republican managerial syndrome.
For example -- (these are only examples] a very
comprehensive analysis should be prepared to pick
our best targets and best issues):
a. Labor and Building Trades: We are on the verge of
being irreparably damaged with the "hard hats" even
though 6 months ago this represented one of our most
fertile fields for political gain. We had to crack them
hard on the wage issue and we did. We are not, however,
intensifying the minority hiring campaign in the building
trades. While most people view this as a racial question
it is, plain and simple, a pocketbook issue with the "hard
hats"; they interpret our efforts as an attempt to break
down the existing union structure, to destroy the appren-
ticeship program and to eliminate their job security.
There are approximately 3. 8 million building tradesmen
in the United States; at the moment they feel that we are
threatening not only wages but, miore important, job
security.
As with so many issues, this requires a tough political
choice. Do we play to the blacks, which in my opinion
will get us nothing, or do we play to the "hard hats",
a large percentage of whom we got in 1968 and as to
whom we had been making enormous political progress.
This is a natural "new" constituency, newly emerging
middle-class Americans, most of them homeowners
living in the suburbs, becoming increasingly conservative
on social, international and racial issues. The combination
of wage stabilization, Davis-Bacon and minority hiring
will make it impossible for any of their leaders to support
us or to make gains with the rank and file.
We have another opportunity with the building trades. Most
building tradesmen have discovered that their hourly wage
increases have been largely offset by the fact that they are
working less and less throughout the course of a year; the
higher their hourly wages, the greater the incentive
for labor saving devices and hence the less labor hours
available. Many of them are beginning to seek annual
contracts, rather than hourly wage increases. It is
argued that hourly wages could be significantly reduced
by annual contract negotiations, thereby benefiting
both the worker and the cost of construction. We don't
have to endorse this; wer merely have to recognize the
problem which we have not done. If we were merely
to announce a study of the feasibility of annual contracts
in the building trades, asking the Construction Industry
Collective Bargaining Council to come up with recom-
5
mendations, the political impact could be huge.
This is the kind of issue that we need with labor generally.
One of the recommendations that the Rosow Report made
was that we provide for vesting of pension plans after
perhaps 10 or 15 years. Every bl ue collar employee
has a direct economic stake in this. While it is a tough
issue with business it is one that could help us make real
inroads with the rank and file of labor. All we need are
a couple of major items like this, which represent very
direct pocketbook benefit to the individual worker and
regardless of what Al Barken and Cope do next year we
will make important gains with the rank and file.
b. Business Community. While the business community's
political clout is minimal it is a source of support we cannot
overlook; the attitude of business leaders has an impact on
the white collar, professional category as to which Muskie
has shown surprising strength in the polls.
This has been the most activist Administration in hibstory
in the field of anti-trust, the environment and consumer
issues. We can argue that had the Democrats been in power
5 Such studies have been conducted over the years in the
Department of Labor; merely recognizing them and grabbing the
issue is all that is required.
14.
they would have been worse, but that is a tough case
to make with politically naive businessmen. All we have
to do to help business in the pocketbook is to begin to
slow down dramatically in the anti-trust field, gradually
in the other two.
c. The Farm Vote. In 1968 we kicked hell out of the
Democrats on the issue of parity. It was 74; today
it is slightly below 70. Hardin tells us that there is no
way between now and next November to get back up to
the 1968 level. (This is in the nature of the parity
formula). This one fact alone tells us with certainty
that this will be a 1972 issue.
We can, however, get farm prices up; farmers have
been in a very severe price/cost squeeze. Farm prices
have to improve by the Fall of 1972 (regardless of the
impact on the wholesale price index) if we are to regain
our traditional support in the farm belt. It can be done
on a commodity by commodity basis as we know from
our experience with milk. We can further aid the farmer
by programs such as REA, home ownership loans, etc.
As to these, we have been acting as good Republican
managers, consistently cutting back on the farm budget;
the time is now at hand to begin increasing it.
c. The Retired Vote. In addition to the obvious -- an
increase in the earnings' ceiling of social security reci-
pients and cost of living social security increases
there are special retired groups we can appeal to: for
example the 850, 000 retired military personnel, a large
number of whom live in Florida (62, 000) and California
(145, 000). In 1968 we promised to support recomputation
of military pay; we have not. Finally we have underway
a study which will lead to some recomputation recommenda-
tions; it will be very modest but a step forward, correcting
some of the gross inquities in the present military retirement
15.
system. This is a real pocketbook issue. When the
recommendations come from the study committee in
July (approximate cost $150 million a year) there will
be strong opposition from OMB. If we want to practive
pocketbook politics, this is a very good place to start.
e. Veterans Groups: I have had a running battle for
months over cuts made by OMB in the VA hospital care
budget. The amount cut was slightly in excess of $100
million. Two months ago a head count of the Veterans
Affairs Committees in the House and the Senate revealed
that we would be rolled in both committees; it was clear
that not only would these funds be resored but the Congress
would probably add substantially to our budget requests
and would, moreover, attach a mandatory spending clause.
Had we been willing to restore the $100 million cut, we
could have gotten the agreement of the veterans organizations
to stick with our budget figures; we would have avoided a
confrontation with the Congress and we then simply could
have withheld funds during FY 1972. As it is now, we
will probably be forced to spend the money and will have
lost on a gut economic issue with the veterans organization
whose membership totals over 6 million. Their recent
publications point up theludicrous situation we find ourselves
in: on one page they strongly support us for our foreign
policy and on the next tear us apart for cutting health care
for the veterans. What's more, we gave Teague, Hartke and
Albert a marvelous issue -- you may recall two weeks ago
they were all on national TV networks blasting the
Administration for being "anti-veteran."
My sole point is that we can do a much better job in
appealing to the economic self-interest of large groups of
citizens than we have done. We have to be just a little less
concerned about managerial efficiency and a little more
concerned about "people politics".
In this area we cannot ascribe fault to our public relations
effort; nor really can publicarelations help us. In some
cases it is downright dangerous to make a major PR effort
when substantively we have serious problems. Salute to
Agriculture is a very good case in point. The public
believes that most politicians are phoney and we only
give our critics an opportunity to exploit this when we
launch major PR efforts in an attempt to cover up a basic
economic or political problem.
The other side of this coin is equally valid. If we have
made the right political decisions, the public relations
effort is relatively painless. For example, if we were
to do something in the building trades area, we would
have no difficulty in getting our story told and getting the
credit. Through mailings, trade journals and speeches
every building tradesmen would very soon know what we
had done.
C. CONCLUSION
After two and a half years the die is farily well cast on the big
issues. Either we have or we have not done the things necessary
for those issues to be working for us next year.
We do have, however, two areas which we can most effectively exploit --
and there is time to do it. Revamping our domestic program to make
it more people oriented and making a major effort to cultivate the
economic interest of those voting bloks that either have represented
our traditional constituency or should be part of our emerging new
constituency. These are identifiable. They ways to reach them
politcally are no mystery and we have all the equipment -- the
advantage of incumbency -- with which to exploit them.
I am especially impressed, as you may have gathered, by some of the
fascinating parallels with the Truman re-election in 1948. Truman
rejected the advice that he try to reform his image or that he mount
a major sales effort. What he did instead, based on the Clark Clifford
memo of November 1947, was to analyze cynically, coldly and
shrewdly the rag-tag assortment of special interest groups and
minorities that FDR had welded together into a majority coalition;
he determined what political and economic favors were necessary
to retain or regain their loyalties and then met them head on. As
a result Truman devoted all of his resources to the subject which
most Americans cared most about then (and perhaps still do): How
to make a living.
17.
While I have emphasized the similarities with 1948, I, of course,
recognize that the circumstances then were quite different than
they are now. In April bf 1948 Truman had a 36% approval rating
in the Gallup Poll and for him, therefore, this was a last ditch
desperate effort. We are certainly not in that condition.
Nonetheless in formulating our strategy for 1972, there is the
political gain of explatingthe the fullest the advantages of incumbency --
which on the issues we have not done as well as we could.
WASHINGTON POST
May, 1971
1948 Revisited:
A Political Lesson
By Henry Owen
GOVERNOR Dewey did not. He talked in
a dignified way about peace, and national
GOVERNOR DEWEY'S death brought
unity, and the need to make government
back memories of the 1948 election. The con-
more effective. His advisers were not pas-
ventional wisdom is that he lost because of
sionately concerned about bread and butter
his personality. Maybe so; but a hard look at
issues; he mistook their highminded inter-
AFFLUENCE HAS, if anything, strength<
the voting results suggests an alternative ex-
ests for the voice of the country. To quote
ened the hold of economic issues on these
planation, which brings to mind Philip Gue-
Truman's biographer, Cabell Phillips,
lower middle class voters: The rise in their
della's remark that historians spent so much
"Dewey and his men believed that the con-
living standards (and in their borrowing) has
time wondering how Napoleon lost the bat-
cepts of the managerial revolution, SO capti-
made them highly vulnerable to shifts in the
tle of Waterloo that they forgot to ask how
vating to the Eastern elite in the postwar
economic tides. Fending off these threats is
Wellington won it: that the 1948 election
years, had captivated the rest of the country
concern number one. This is not only in the
wasn't SO much lost by Governor Dewey as
as well." As Phillips points out,
U.S. but in other major industrial countries.
it was won by President Truman. And that
"intellectually, his campaign was on a
Former Prime Minister Wilson had it all
the way in which it was won may have im-
higher level than Truman's, just as it was in
over Ted Heath on image; but he lost the
portant lessons for the future.
the matter of taste and decorum."
last British general election because voters
Shortly before the 1943 Democratic con-
Soon after the election, the Saturday Eve-
associated him with rising prices and unem-
vention, Arthur Krock summed up the pre-
ning Post sent Samuel Lubell out to inter-
ployment. In Germany, as Flora Lewis
vailing view: "A President whose defeat at
view voters and find out what had hap-
pointed out recently in The Washington
the next poll is generally prophesied faces
pened. His answer was simple: "People had
Post, worries over inflation and other do.
difficulties in performing his office that
voted for Truman because they thought
mestic issues have dominated recent
could conceivably bring disaster
At this
he would protect their bread and butter in-
elections; the press may be fascinated with
writing, the President's influence is weaker
terests. Labor rolled up the traditional Dem-
Brandt's image as the great practitioner of
than any President's has been in modern
ocratic majorities; farmers worried by the
Ostpolitik, but the veters aren't.
history." Although the country was fairly
80th Congress' refusal to extend grain stor-
President Truman won because he under-
prosperous, the conversion from war to
age, were seeking down to earth promises
stood the dominance of these economic is-
peace had been a rough one. and Mr. Tru-
which they didn't find in Dewey speeches."
sues, and spent more time addressing them
man's style in coping with these problems
Pocketbook polities had carried the day; dig-
than worrying about his image. IIis answers
seemed to a good many opinion-shapers-in
nity and efficiency came in a poor second.
may no longer be relevant, and they were
his own party, in the Congress, and among
Since 1948, large changes have taken place
sometimes wrong even in 1948, but he was
the press-to be crude, erratic, and bum-
in the country. Affluence and education have
asking the right questions. If recent elec-
bling.
increased; memories of the Great Depression
tions in the United States and abroad mean
A natural pre-election remedy would have
have receded. And SO it seems plausible to
anything, they suggest that winning candi-
been for the President to concentrate on im-
believe those who new tell us, as they did in
dates in the industrial world will still be
proving the areas where he was criticized
1948, that bread and butter issues no longer
those who give priority to these bread and
most-his style and image: trying to seem
dominate American political life. The trou-
butter questions, despite the continuing fas-
more business-like, dignified, and efficient.
ble is that most of this talk takes place be-
cination of well heeled political observers
But shrewdly, he judged that this was not
tween the relatively small number of Ameri-
with style and related matters. Here is a
the heart of the matter. Late in November
cans (less than 20 per cent) who have in-
good reason to review the memories of 1948.
1947, he had received from Clark Clifford a
comes over $15,000 a year. Their numbers
lengthy and perceptive memorandum outlin-
have grown, as the numbers of the poor
ing a proposed strategy for the coming cam-
have shrunk; but Census reports tell us that
paign. It ticked off the major voting blocs-
almost two-thirds of Americans are still in
farmers, labor, and Negroes-and the spe-
between, with incomes between $5,000 and
cific issues which concerned them. From then
$15,000 a year. If everything is going well,
on-in his 1948 State of the Union message,
these blue and white collar workers have
in his proposals to a special post-convention
the time and inclination to she affluent
session of the Congress, and in his election
Americans' concern with other Issues: but
campaign-the President zeroed in on these
when inflation or recession threatens, their
issues. He warned farmers about falling ag-
attention focuses sharply on a few key
ricultural prices; he spoke to workingmen
questions: What's going to happen to over-,
about the need for housing Social Security,
time pay? Will salary increases outpace
and minimum wage legislation. His oratory
inflation? Is the wife's part-time job in
and style were crude, but be addressed the
jeopardy?
subject which most Americans cared most
about:
in
2 Karen
THE WHITE HOUSE
EYES ONLY
WASHINGTON
C.F.
July 12, 1972
Coundly, John
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
Hardner, Wichey
FROM:
CHARLES COLSON
SUBJECT:
Democrats for Nixon
Wouroney, wike
During your meeting with John Connally, you might wish to get into
the question of Democrats for Nixon and Connally's role. Needless
to say, he is a virtually unanimous choice to head the organization if
he will do SO. Clark McGregor and I opened this question yesterday.
We didn't conclude anything but we discussed the question thoroughly
(separate detailed memo is attached).
We have been moving ahead, as you know, with efforts to recruit a
number of prominent Democ rats. We have done so because in the
immediate aftermath of the Convention the anti-McGovern feelings
will be the strongest and we can build momentum during this period,
creating the public impression of a wholesale defection from McGovern.
We have proceeded in the knowledge, however, that John Connally likes
to do things his way and that he might resent some of the efforts we
have made since he in effect was not running the show. We have, there-
fore, been walking a tightrope.
What we would like to come out of your meeting with Connally is his
ratification of what we have done to date and his willingness to in effect
take over what we have gotten started. Alternatively, we need a green
light to go ahead with our next best choices to head at least for now the
Democrats' effort.
All of the endorsements that we have sought thus far have been of indiv-
iduals. Jeno Paulucci went a little further than we had asked and formed
a Committee of Concerned Democrats and Independents with 7 other mem-
bers. We want to fold it into Democrats for Nixon on the assumption that
Connally approves; if Connally does object, we can, of course, keep it
independent but this will give us some problems with Paulucci, who is
sensitive to being in a subordinate position.
EYES ONLY
-2-
Paulucci, like Dwayne Andreas, expects Connally to run a national
operation; if, in fact, we ask Paulucci, Andreas and their friends to
be part of something other than the National Democrats for Nixon effort.
I fear they may feel we are downgrading their importance. Andreas
has a list of prominent former Humphrey supporters that he wants to
recruit immediately but once again he feels the need to find the mechan-
ism to bring them in. Max Fisher has at least a dozen prominent Jewish
Democrats that want to be folded into our organization. Once again, we
need a place for them to come.
We have also picked up the endorsement and/or commitment to endorse
of several labor leaders. In addition to the Teamsters, we have Calhoon,
Gleason, Ken Lyons, Mike May, Brennan, quite likely Rademacher and
a series of lesser lights, principally state level leaders.
Rizzo will be announcing soon as will Lausche. Smathers and Jack March
are working through the lists of former Members of Congress. We have
a bloc of former Jackson supporters headed by John Kenney who will
announce, but who would like to talk to Connally first. Balzano has a
group of reasonably prominent ethnics who can either be folded into
Democrats for Nixon or become part of the ethnic apparatus.
We have done nothing in terms of organization structure because once
again, knowing Connally's personality, we have not wanted to jump the
gun on him. We would like to get the organization established, set up
a national office, have Connally announce its existence and, of course,
his chairmanship as soon as possible. This will be the invitation to
disaffected Democrats whom we have not sought but who are looking
for a place to come.
It is the recommendation of McGregor, Mitchell and I that Connally move
as soon as possible so that he can become the catalyst we need. A series
of individual endorsements over the next two weeks is fine but none of
them will have the national impact of an announcement of a national
organization opening followed by a daily announcement of new recruits.
On the organization side, we have hired two young men, temporarily
running the effort out of an improvised office. One is a young Washington
PR man, former aide to Sargent Shriver by the name of Mickey Gardner.
I am very impressed with what I have seen of him so far and would hope
he would meet with Connally's approval. He has given up his PR job and is
available to us through the campaign. We also have John O'Neill, a first
year law student from Texas, for the next two months. (He made something
of a national name debating John Kerry.) To run the operation here, it is
-3-
BYLO ONLY
my strong recommendation that we bring in Mike Monroney, Jr. as
the principal chief, day to day operative. Gardner and O'Neill would
work for him. I have known Monroney for many years. Connally knows
his father. Monroney is 45, ran for Congress in Maryland and lost,
is a life-long Democrat, but conservative and a Jackson supporter.
He is prepared to fold up his own business to spend full time, but
needless to say, is unwilling to make that move without knowing he
has Connally's blessing. Mike also would like for personal reasons
to have Connally talk to his father, Former Senator Monroney. Mon-
roney's feeling is that a call from Connally would make his father more
understanding of Mike's desire to join the campaign and, more import-
antly, it will also result in his father joining Democrats for Nixon as
well. Monroney, Sr. was very highly regarded by his colleagues and
this would be a very significant defection.
I have not attempted in the foregoing to enumerate all of the potential
Democratic defections that we believe we have. We believe prominent
sitting Democrats in Congress will work for us even if quietly or perhaps
will permit their associates to be involved in our effort (as is the case
with Rooney and Delaney). We also believe parts of the Daley operation
will support us publicly. We have enormous possibilities on Wall Street.
We have some Democratic political leaders like Esposito. We have
former Democratic office holders like Governor Gary of Oklahoma
and Governor McNair of South Carolina.
The problem in a nutshell is that we cannot move out and really do the
aggressive job we need to until we staff an operation and give people a
committee to join. We cannot set up the committee and staff the oper-
ation until we know where we stand with Connally; hence, we are really
very much in limbo at the very time when we should be actively and
publicly bringing Democrats into the fold.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
FROM:
JOHN D. EHRLICHMAN JeWhitaton
John C. Whitaker
SUBJECT:
Campaign Strategy
This is in response to Ken Cole's request for ideas on what the
President might do from now through November,, and Larry
Higby's memorandum of July 19 (Tab A) requesting an update
of my earlier thoughts on campaign strategy.
First, there are a number of things that the President can do
that McGovern can't, capitalizing on the fact of being President.
He can sign a bill, with a hoopla signing ceremony (or veto one
frowning into the free TV cameras); he can have substantive
meetings with international leaders, or their emissaries; he
can have substantive meetings with Governors or Mayors
(McGovern can meet with the latter group, but only in the
stance of being briefed or looking strictly political.)
The idea of speeches only from the Oval Office gives me some
problems. Beyond the obvious Presidential ones like veto mes-
sages or reports on the status of peace talks, on Vietnam, it
seems to me that other substantive dissertations, on either
domestic or foreign topics such as drugs, busing, crime or
international detente, whether on TV or radio, would, I assume,
have to be paid for. This is out of my field, but I think that,
particularly in the middle of a campaign, even truly national
addresses will have to be accompanied by equal time for Demo-
cratic rejoinder under the Fairness Doctrine. Thus I am not
- 2 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
sure how many of our eggs we want to put in the speech-from-the-
White House basket. As a partial alternative, it seems to me
that the plethora of fairly major Administration announcements
which we traditionally handle by a 2, 000-word handout from
Ziegler accompanied by a Cabinet Officer press briefing might
better be handled from now to November by the President him-
self making a 100-word statement to the TV cameras in Ziegler's
shop. This will net us purely news TV coverage -- no opportunity
for free reply -- and 30 to 90 seconds on the national evening news
which is as much as we could expect from a more exhausting
event like an all-day trip to St. Louis
At the Convention
I feel strongly that we should get the President in and out of
Miami Beach as quickly as possible because of the danger of
confrontation with demonstrators (assuming that our best in-
telligence is the same as what I pick up from the papers). The
relatively dull predictable show on the inside is bound to drive
the TV networks outside the Convention Hall looking for street
drama Even a minor fracas there, dull though it may be,
would probably be more photogenic than the business of the
convention. Any interplay between the President and the demon-
strators is going to be compared by the media and the viewers
with the scene of the McGovern confrontation with the hippies
in the Doral lobby which got pretty good notices. I think an
overnight at Key Biscayne would be running a real risk because,
even though you can seal off the causcway, there would probably
be a confrontation there or outside the President's compound.
Any defensive maneuver like that would just be played as the
President ducking these strident types whom McGovern at least
had the guts to talk to.
Thus my suggestion for the President's personal involvement with
Miami Beach would be for him to leave about eight o'clock on
Wednesday night (possibly with live TV from the South Lawn of
- 3 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
his departure, either consulting with HAK or JDE on pressing
State business, or even pouring over papers in his residence).
I would fly directly into Homestead Air Force Base (TV but
closed arrival and no comment to press), and chopper to the
convention site timed for the President to make his acceptance
speech about 10:15. (By 9:00 p.m. EDT people are not off the
Los Angeles freeways and in front of their TV sets.) Immediately
after his acceptance speech, I would have him make an unex-
pected visit to a separate location where a large, screened
youth group would be having a meeting, unwarned that the
President would join them. The point would be to have all
under 25, and even some screened long-hairs, to drive home
the point that everybody under 25 with long hair isn't for
McGovern. After about a 30-minute hard-hitting speech to
this group (maybe even some Q&A's, if we trust our screening
enough), I would have the President get back in his helicopter
and get back to Washington so that on Thursday he could be
back at his usual stand being President. On Thursday, I would
try to get lots of film in the White House (bill signing, National
Security Council or Cabinet Meeting) -- in other words, strictly
"playing President. 11
CHICAGO
If our media types have hard data showing that the Wednesday
TV audience will be a bust if we have a dull Tuesday night show,
I would like to see a scenario such as I have just outlined moved
up to Tuesday night if we can possibly get away with it without
ruining the convention to the extent that Wednesday is purely
anti-climax. Even a precedent-shattering move like having
a two-day convention would be better in my mind than having
the President spend two days in Miami Beach. One final thought --
if the problem is to build some drama into Wednesday night to
assure a good TV audience, might it be possible to delay announce-
ment of the President's choice of a running mate until then? --
That's "bassackwards" to tradition, but why not - provided the
President doesn't plan to announce the V.P. pre-convention.
Particularly if we restrict the President's time in town, the
risks of confrontation with hippies apply nearly as strongly to
Mrs. Nixon and the rest of the First Family and to the Vice Presi-
dent. I agree that we should do everything we can to avoid their
- 4 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
being in direct proximity to the demonstrators, but this kind of
defensive strategy argues even more strongly for having the
President do a youth-oriented event while in town such as the
youth forum described above.
General Campaign Strategy
We have become the heir of the old FDR coalition -- almost --
and the South for sure - ethnic groups in the North (Jewish and
Catholic in particular) and, to a lesser extent, Labor. We should
push Jewish and Catholic events for the President and embrace
the tax credit for private schools more visibly -- beyond just
endorsing the Mills bill. -- I know some Christian Scientists
who don't buy this.
Assuming that the President's lead in the popularity polls is now
about 16%, I think that we should run a low-risk campaign unless
that gap gets down to 8%, or is dropping toward 8% precipitously.
The question, as I see it, is how to run such a low-risk campaign
without appearing to be doing so. Here is my list of don'ts:
-- Don't do any large political rallies - not one.
-- Don't engage in any debates.
-- Don't hold any press conferences for only the national press
that are advertised in advance. -- East Room format.
The press is vital. The President has won when the press was
with him (1968) and lost when the press was not (1960 and 1962).
(1) I think he has to give them some deep-think liberal red
meat to pontificate about and give at least the appearance of ac-
cessibility. The thought pieces, I think, can be delivered as
radio addresses. The theme would be of a thoughtful, forward-
looking President winning the peace abroad and of solving our
domestic problems, but with the job only half donc. Interviews
with pundits would be good.
- 5 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
(2) As for press conferences, on the national level maybe
2 or 3 from now to the election. I would have the President do
quickie press conferences in the Oval Office so that the national
scribes don't come in loaded for bear.
(3) In addition, I would concentrate on the regional media
in places like, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Dallas, St. Louis,
Detroit and New York by calling press conferences without warn-
ing. While the national press would have to be included in these,
and would be primed with their questions in advance, the softer
questions from the more numerous regional reps should pre-
dominate. In addition, properly chosen regional sessions like
these can ensure that the President's message gets to the voters
in areas which he needs to win, but can't afford the time to pick
his way through personally. For example, we could cover the
southern media effectively from Atlanta and New Orleans, and
New England by visiting Boston (a town which is tough to get in
and out of because of the huge numbers of students, but where the
New England impact should be worth the aggrevation). -- Denver
for the Rocky Mountains and Portland for the Pacific Northwest.
We may want to consider paying for campaign air time to televise
these in the particular region. The first few we might get away
with scheduling without any advance notice on staff time in areas
where the local media speaks to a particular constituency without
having to pull the reporters out of the boondocks (such as Chicago
for the farm belt). The strategy of suddenly-called press conferences
in cities could change to announcing press conferences in advance --
buying regional TV time and sucking in reporters from the boondocks
if his point spread with McGovern narrows, and he wants to increase
the risks.
I recognize that the appearance of large crowds applauding the
President is desirable on the nightly TV news. While I think the
risk of rallies (hippies and a bore to the press) to produce them
is too great to run, I think we can accomplish the same result in
the eyes of the TV cameras by doing motorcades on the way to
substantive events. The motorcade can stop occassionally and,
if the crowd is friendly, the President could step up on his car
- 6 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
and deliver a short general purpose speech. (By this time we
must have something better than the old LBJ bullhorn.) This
will require us to develop a pithy five-minute speech, or a
series of them -- but not the 25-30 minute "the speech" for
rallies that he has used in past campaigns.
One thing that we often talk about but seldom get done is a local
color event. This is another easy way to free TV time and can
help portray the President as a human being as opposed to the
Machiavellian politician that McGovern will seek to make of him.
I remember the success of the President's early morning visit
to the peace demonstrators at the Lincoln Memorial, and hope
that we can be imaginative enough to work in some similar
"unplanned" scenes like dropping by a local diner at 7:00 a.m.
and sharing a cup of coffee with a couple of truck drivers.
I have a general aversion to telethons, but if we are looking foro
a television extravaganza, I like the format of the international
town meeting. By satellite, we could have the network repre-
sentatives in a rumber of international capitols relaying live
questions answered by the President here in Washington. This
would play to his strength -- international affairs, and even
hostile questions, unlike those that come from domestic hecklers,
tend to unite our citizens as "us" against "them. 11 A "foreign
heckler" will unite the country just like the Jews and Arabs would
love each other if attacked by moon men. I like that format so
much that I think we should consider paying for it. If we can
get it free (and equal time for McGovern), then let him sympathize
with the foreign heckler -- a good trap.
Pace of Campaign
Before the convention I think the President should schedule one
major domestic event out of town. He should also continue to be
visible going about the serious business of Government. Right
after the convention, on Friday, August 25 (the day after his re-
turn from Miami), I think he should do a substantive domestic
- 7 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
event in either Philadelphia or Chicago. (I would prefer Chicago
because I think we ought to save Philadelphia for Labor Day,
although I don't have any specific event in mind for that important
date -- I'm just tempted by the Rizzo angle.) The Chicago event
could be a meeting with midwestern farm media together with
Butz and Peterson highlighting the Russian grain deal. Although
I don't know how, it would be nice to get Daley involved. A noon-
time motorcade sounds like a natural, but that brings echoes
of '68 which is a definite negative. On August 29, I think he should
go off to Texas to do screwworms with Escheverria and John
Connally (don't laugh, it's really a good regional story), but be-
cause that would be a joke as a national newslead, we need
another event besides screwworms with a Mexican-American flavor
done the same day.
As the campaign progresses, I would attempt to schedule no more
than one trip a week -- and always substantive. 'The only out-of-
country trip I can foresee might be one to Mexico, depending on
how we read the effect on and need for the Chicano vote. The rest
of the newsleads would come from Washington and, with the
exception of paid radio talks and paid TV, would be natural outgrowths
of being President.
The First Family
I think we should bend every effort to get them out of Washington
and keep them on the road. Human interest shots in the Washington
papers aren't going to be of any help. The only specific thought
I have is that Mrs. Nixon's Legacy of Parks national tour was so
successful that we may want to replay it -- if there is one thing
that we can find in all of the key states, it's parks.
Theme of Campaign
From the disarray of the Democratic years, the President has made
an important start at restructuring international and domestic
affairs to bring us peace, stability and progress. But his reforms
- 8 -
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL
are still in the process of becoming -- his Presidency is only
halfway home. We need to put that theme into a catchy phrase
to compete with McGovern's (Fauntroy's? "Come home,
America. 11 The major danger, as I see it strategically, is that
McGovern will succeed in identifying himself as a general spokes-
man for discontent and the need for change -- a mood that the
polls show is shared by a majority of the people. We have got
to avoid being cast as defenders of the status quo. We should
try to show, rather, that the President's first term has been one
of change -- in restructuring international relationships, in pro-
posing basic governmental reform, in salving the American spirit
from the divisiveness of 1968 -- but that his type of change builds
on the past that has made our country great and does not repudiate
it.