Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
242845636
label
1969 Inbound To APB Part 2: July – Dec 1969 [3 of 4]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
242845636
contentType
document
title
1969 Inbound To APB Part 2: July – Dec 1969 [3 of 4]
citationUrl
collections
White House Staff Member and Office Files (Nixon Administration)
Alexander P. Butterfield's Files
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
242845636
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
feb4cdeb25fba413
ocrText
PLAYBOY
September 17, 1969
Dear Mr. Butterfield;
It is our pleasure to send you
the enclosed article "Experts
And Expertise" by Eliot Janeway,
reprinted from our October issue.
We would be delighted to hear --
and would certainly value -- any
comments you have concerning the
article which we might use in our
Letters to the Editor column.
Sincerely,
A.C. Spectorsky
A. C. Spectorsky
Editorial Director
THE PLAYBOY BUILDING . 919 N. MICHIGAN AVE. CHICAGO 60611
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
EXPERTS AND EXPERTISE
a president's decisions, the policies he forges and his place in the judgments of history depend not
on the electorate or its chosen leaders but on his own selection of advisors on whose counsel he relies
east of Southwest Texas State Teachers
intellectuals, led him to confuse the
article By ELIOT JANEWAY
College.
opinions of bank chairmen with the rec-
"THIS WHOLE JOB, which is never easy,
"Your job will be a damn sight eas-
ommendations of economic advisors.
will be a lot less difficult if you can
ier," he told the heir to his misfortune,
When Walter Heller, Johnson's holdover
figure out a way to run it without the
during their running dialog over the
chairman of the Council of Economic
help of expert advice-something I have
impending changing of the guard, "if you
Advisors, resigned in order to "go pri-
never been able to do."
can get rid of, at the start, all of your
vate" and make some money, Johnson
Lyndon Johnson was within days of
technicians, including Dave Kennedy."
made a man-bites-dog joke. "My econom-
finishing his term as President when he
A wide range of experts had earned
ic advisor needs an economic advisor," he
volunteered this advice to his successor.
Johnson's mistrust, but he felt a peculiar
said. So it seemed natural for Johnson to
Bitter experience had qualified him to
resentment against the practitioners of
lump bank chairman Kennedy together
testify as an expert on experts. For while
economic occultism, as he showed when
with the economists. But the irony of
Johnson could thank his own native
he singled out the Secretary-of-the-Treas-
Johnson's mention of Kennedy was
shrewdness for his success in accumulat-
ury-designate for special mention among
meant to convey a cabalistic warning
ing power, he had good reason to blame
all the experts to whose expertise he
to his successor. For, as the incoming
his failure to hold it on "the Harvard
attributed his fall. For one thing, the
President well knew, Johnson had been
crowd," which was his generic term for
awe in which Johnson held money, and
on the verge of asking the select club
any experts who had been trained north-
the insecurity with which he regarded
of major
Reprinted from the October 1969 issue of PLAYBOY magazine. Copyright © 1969 by HMH Publishing Co. Inc.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
commercial bank chairmen to nominate
which was his derisive term for the brass
appointed him most for their cursory re-
one of their number to serve as his own
during the Korean War.
view of the military plans. About [Allen]
next Secretary of the Treasury, if he had
In 1954, when Johnson sat in execu-
Dulles and [Richard] Bissell [of the CIA],
run for another term. And, as Nixon
tive session with his senior colleague,
he said little. I think he had made up his
also knew, the designee of the group had
Chairman Richard Russell of the Senate
mind at once that, when things settled
been David M. Kennedy. The banker
Armed Services Committee (both of
down, they would have to go.
He
expert who was the special target of John-
them acting as the all-powerful check-
set quietly to work to make sure that
son's sharp tongue was the very one
issuing duo of the Appropriations Sub-
nothing like the Bay of Pigs could hap-
Johnson would have picked to serve him,
committee), Johnson had not felt the
pen to him again. The first lesson was
if the cards had fallen differently.
need to consult any experts before he
never to rely on the experts."
Johnson spoke as the last individualist
vetoed an interesting request from Presi-
Unfortunately, Kennedy found this
easier said than done. He soon discov-
in the age of organization men when he
dent Eisenhower, personally conveyed by
ered that the White House cannot be
singled out the experts as the villains
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
responsible for his undoing. But Johnson
run without experts. By Kennedy's time,
The request was for Congressional ac-
a President's administrative ability had
had never been fooled by experts in
quiescence in America's first commitment
come to be measured by the reputation
fields he knew more about than eco-
to South Vietnam. It was the considered
of the White House staff for expertise;
nomics. Throughout his political career,
decision of Senators Russell and Johnson
and with inescapable administrative de-
he had known better than to let pundits
to reject Dulles' request and immediately
pendence on experts had come irresisti-
and pollsters mislead him about elec-
adjourn the 1954 session-in order to
ble political incentives to operate behind
tions. And early in his Congressional
free themselves from further pressure
a screen of continuity. A commitment to
experience, he had learned to scrutinize
from the President. As they were in-
continuity with the source of his prede-
military experts with tightly narrowed
formed to their dismay a few weeks later,
cessor's frustrations was enough to insu-
eyes. From the day in 1937 when he
their action prompted President Eisen-
late a new President from blame if he
arranged his assignment as a freshman
hower's decision to initiate America's
failed to solve problems he had inherit-
member of the House to its Naval Affairs
original involvement in Vietnam, with-
ed. Although Kennedy lacked Johnson's
Committee (as it then was), he began to
out Congressional concurrence, through
experience in auditing the propensity of
build a distinctive if small power base
the commitment of funds for which no
military experts to err, he was quick to
within the still tiny military establish-
Congressional grant was required. To
see that, just because they were a neces-
ment; and his power there grew steadily
Eisenhower's credit, he at least instructed
sary evil, the safest experts to have on
with the military's power over the Feder-
Dulles to tell Russell and Johnson what
display would be those whose presence
al budget. At the climax of Johnson's
he had done. A decade later, Johnson
supported a plea of innocence by associa-
Congressional career, his power was so
would not be SO considerate.
tion with Eisenhower. In other words,
conspicuous that its sources were easily
The military, who ended up being
the experts Kennedy decided to depend
overlooked or forgotten; and at the cli-
held responsible for the Vietnam escala-
on were the same ones who had per-
max of his Presidential career, Johnson
tion, never believed in-and always re-
suaded Eisenhower to adopt their blue-
was SO emotionally involved in the bitter
sisted-the battle plan for a land war in
prints for the liberation of Cuba. When
controversy over the Vietnam war that to
Asia, especially a war to be escalated on
Kennedy took office, Eisenhower's name
his critics-especially the younger ones
the installment plan. It was Johnson
still carried the imprimatur of authority
-he seemed merely the dupe of the
who ordered the step-up and at the same
stamped on it during World War Two,
"military-industrial-university complex."
time restrained its effectiveness.
the controversy over original sin in Viet-
He was in some ways, though, much
The dim view Johnson had learned to
nam not yet having carried back far
more its master.
take of military expertise during his 23
enough to have compromised the reputa-
While the generals and the admirals
years in Congress was unforgettably con-
tion for expertise he had brought home
had learned to count on Johnson to be
firmed during the first of his three years
from Europe. At that time, he was still
their best friend where preparedness was
of captivity in the Vice-Presidency. As
the principal military man in politics.
concerned, they had also learned to fear
John F. Kennedy's visible but silenced
But the public wanted more than the
him as their severest critic where unpre-
partner, he saw from the inside the disas-
assurance of continuity from Kennedy,
paredness could be made an issue. Over
trous Bay of Pigs episode, which was an
whose success story, after all, announced
the years, Senator Johnson used his stra-
entrapment Kennedy had invited as the
the long-awaited take-over by the now-
result of his reliance upon military advi-
mature post-War generation. The excite-
tegic vantage point in the Congressional
ment of change and the promise of
establishment controlling military appro-
sors whose credentials seemed unimpeach-
priations to establish himself first as the
able because they commanded bipartisan
accomplishment were expected, too. How
protégé of his seniors and then as "Mr.
acceptance and enjoyed bipartisan con-
to select the areas holding the promise of
Defense Appropriations" in his own
tinuity. According to Arthur M. Schles-
new accomplishment, and how to differ-
inger's definitive account of the Kennedy
entiate them from the atmosphere of as-
right, with whom those who wanted
slices of the defense pie would have to
Administration, A Thousand Days, Ken-
sured continuity, always constitute the
acid test of a new President's judgment.
deal in order to get anything. Like the
nedy exclaimed in uncharacteristically
beadles in the New England Puritan
illiterate dismay, "My God, the bunch of
The sustained ring of Eisenhower's
churches, who policed the aisles armed
advisors we inherited.
1952 call for Peace and Prosperity limit-
Can you im-
ed Kennedy's freedom of action in 1961.
with a double-purpose implement for tick-
agine being President and leaving behind
His choice of where to promise change
ling dozing ladies and slapping dozing
someone like all those people there?"
and where to preserve continuity was
gentlemen, Johnson used his large influ-
Johnson felt entitled to add, "I told you
dictated by the circumstances of his elec-
ence over defense expenditures to favor
so," and he made the point whenever the
tion victory. Kennedy's youth had been a
his allies, while simultaneously investigat-
opportunity presented itself. Schlesinger
decisive asset during the campaign of
ing miscalculations by the beneficiaries of
adds: "My impression is that, among
1960. The Affluent Society, whose Philis-
this patronage inside the "Chair Corps,"
these advisors, the joint chiefs had dis-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
tine achievements John Kenneth Gal-
teams of "the best brains" was made to
For 26 years Johnson had worked
braith had memorialized during the
order as a protective device for Johnson
in complete isolation from the influ-
quiet Eisenhower years, had become
when his turn came to make the same
ence of economists, while he built his
ready for a cultural revolution, and Ken-
choices between continuity and change.
personal empire inside other people's
nedy spoke with the voice it wanted to
Ever since his emergence as a national
power structures. Suddenly, he found him-
hear. Kennedy found the Affluent Society
figure, he had complained of his inabil-
self catapulted into personal control of a
taking Eisenhower's peace-keeping opera-
ity to win credit for his accomplishments
two-platoon team of economists-one
tion for granted but complaining about
-or to avoid blame for his methods. The
playing by the rules of the old economics,
the lean ration of the prosperity it deliv-
rise of the expert as a priestly caste,
the other by the rules of the new. The
ered. By 1961, the country had come to
privileged to administer power by advis-
business and banking representatives-
feel that it was stuck in a rut and it was
ing politicians on the uses of power,
devotees of the old economics-worried
increasingly impatient with the Republi-
offered him an overdue opportunity to
about inflation and "fiscal responsibility."
can Administration's obsessive fear of
redress the inequity in his public rela-
The academic types-advocates of the new
inflation, an inflation that, in fact, was
tions. Unfortunately, although Johnson
economics-sought to extend the real suc-
not to reach pernicious proportions for
had learned the easy way what Kennedy
cess of Keynes' contribution in preventing
a decade after premonitions of it sent
had learned the hard way-never to
mass unemployment into a fanciful ability
Eisenhower into a panic and prompted
trust experts-he failed to apply his
to "fine tune" the economy, as if the inter-
him to permit the Federal Reserve Board
knowledge beyond the specialized areas
play between the way it performed and
to plunge the country's markets into a
where he knew enough to mistrust them.
the way people expected it to perform
recession in 1957. During the 1960 Presi-
Johnson's approach to the Presidency
could be governed by a computer.
dential campaign, the overconservative
was conditioned by the circumstances un-
Johnson was shrewd enough to know
der which he took over. As with Kenne-
miscalculations of Eisenhower's eco-
how to play on the politics of expecta-
nomic advisors had swung the delicate
dy before him, his chance of vaulting
tions more expertly than the economists
onto the right side of any potential plau-
Election Day balance from Nixon's to
had yet learned how to calculate the
sibility gap hinged on his shrewdness in
economics of expectations. On the tragic
Kennedy's favor. The country was ready
selecting areas of continuity and of
night of Kennedy's assassination, when
for the stir and bustle of inflation-in
change. Johnson decided that continuity
Johnson established his first connection
ideals and aspirations as well as in in-
called for a fight to put Kennedy's pro-
across the airwaves with a shocked and
comes and profits. Kennedy's memorable
gram across and, meanwhile, to keep
overwrought public, he was quick to
campaign promise "to get the country
Kennedy's expert staff-his link with
shift his appeal from animal faith to the
moving again" exploited popular dis-
Kennedy's constituency. At the same
less chancy area of the pocketbook. He
satisfaction with Eisenhower's economic
time, he bet that the demand for change
passed from eulogy to practicality and,
advisors and freed Kennedy from any
would be satisfied by a demonstration
by way of assuring the country that it
temptation to select them or their eco-
that he could succeed where Kennedy
was going to "get moving again," he
nomic theories as the area of continuity.
had failed-first, in moving the compli-
cited Dr. Pierre Rinfret, then still a
At the same time, Kennedy's youth
cated, inertia-bound machinery of govern-
comparatively unknown young econo-
had burdened him with a corresponding
ment and, then, in winning the support
mist, for his encouraging (and, as it
liability. Johnson had blown it up to
of business. Johnson killed both birds
turned out, accurate) forecast that "capi-
potentially embarrassing proportions in
with one stone. Moreover, he got the
tal expenditures in 1964 alone will be 20
his challenge to Kennedy's nomination
stone back when he showed the country
percent higher than last year." The
in Los Angeles, where he warned that
that he could produce a pragmatic con-
country had been shocked into a state of
"no man is qualified to be President in
sensus within Washington. The evidence
desperate susceptibility to any concrete
that he did won him an emotional con-
the nuclear age who does not have a
reassurance that bore the mark of official-
touch of gray in his hair." So while
sensus outside Washington. Kennedy had
dom. Johnson's stratagem worked.
Kennedy selected his own advisory corps
failed to keep his promise to get the
"Follow the leader" being the name of
of new economists to emphasize the
country moving because he had failed to
the game the Wall Street money manag-
work with Congress. Johnson kept Ken-
changes he meant to make, he elected to
ers play, the stock market reacted to the
nedy's promise because he managed with
establish continuity with General Eisen-
word that corporate management was
Congress where Kennedy had not known
hower's old team of military advisors to
putting up its money by doing the same.
how to try.
show his maturity. Even after the Bay of
The game even extended to Congress.
Because Congress is oriented to serve
Opinion on Capitol Hill took this joint
Pigs, notwithstanding his angry outburst
the special interests of its constituents,
and spontaneous expression of confidence
against Eisenhower for "leaving behind
business is sympathetically oriented toward
from corporate managements and investors
someone like all those people there,"
Congress. Johnson's success with Con-
as evidence that Johnson's persuasiveness,
Kennedy disregarded the moral Schlesin-
gress won him a double success with
which they recalled so vividly, was work-
ger reports that he drew from the deba-
business. In fact, Johnson's success in
winning the confidence of the business
ing with businessmen as they had seen it
cle his experts had organized. In fact,
and financial establishment at the outset
work in the Congressional cloakrooms. So
Kennedy's failure to make a success of
the Cuban liberation plan, formulated
of his Presidency was so electrifying that it
the legislative consensus decided that the
by Eisenhower's military advisors, put
prompted him to return the compliment
old Johnson magic would prevail on
and express his confidence in business-
business to keep the money coming, and
him in even greater need of the protec-
by giving his confidence to its economic
Congress jumped aboard the new Johnson
tive cover of continuity after the Bay of
advisors. Although Johnson regarded ex-
band wagon, relieved to think that this in-
Pigs than before. Consequently, he let
them lead him further down the road
perts on political theory with contempt,
creasingly unpopular responsibility would
that Eisenhower, disregarding the veto of
and experts on military theory with suspi-
no longer fall upon it. When the new
Senators Russell and Johnson, had let the
cion, he became vulnerable to the claims
academic economists saw the business
advisors pave for him into the Asiatic
and presumptions of the fraternity of
establishment lead Johnson's legislative
land bog.
economic advisors. Their more promi-
cronies onto the band wagon, they made
nent spokesmen commanded ready access
the vote of confidence unanimous, on the
The new practice of delegating Presi-
dential responsibilities to specialized
to him.
practical enough assumption that, if
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
more business investment would substi-
overestimated the capacity of the eco-
ularly between economic and military ex-
tute for more Government spending, the
nomic mind to function in the political
perts and their political clients-arises
most fruitful contribution Government
jungle under wartime conditions-espe-
from the fact that the formulation of
could make would, indeed, be the tax
cially when it did not know that there
policy generally requires an exercise in
cut they had been advocating anyway.
was a war on and when he had no
qualitative analysis, while its implemen-
Johnson's new best friends in the busi-
intention of telling it that there was.
tation at the working level always calls
ness establishment and the Kennedy aca-
The old saw about no one being able to
for quantification by the technical staff.
demics he inherited shared a common
pull out of a hat anything that wasn't in
But again and again, the politicians put
enthusiasm for strong stock markets, the
it to begin with applies to computers:
their experts to work quantifying old
corporate executives because they wanted
No matter how high-powered they may
problems after the politicians have already
stock prices to go up enough to make
be, their findings are only as usable as
moved on to the formulation of new ones.
their options worth exercising and the
the premises that are fed into them.
This was what went wrong during the
Johnson jammed the computers of his
new economists because they wanted
formative phase of the Vietnam crisis. It
economists by dictating the premises to
their new boss to trust their recommen-
be used. Little wonder that at the end he
was where Johnson went wrong and it was
dations. But if sometimes the two groups
how he misled his experts. After he set
felt disserved and actually cheated when
agreed, other times they did not. At the
out to win the war in Vietnam, he told
the conclusions they fed back to "their
outset, Johnson was not aware that he
his economic advisors to take the measure-
President" failed to alert him to the con-
was better off when his old and his new
sequences of his own deception. Clients
ments of the Great Society-as if he
economists disagreed, neutralizing each
consult counsel at their peril when they
meant to keep the war small enough to
other and insuring him against the high
fail to tell counsel what it must know in
spare the economists the need to worry
cost of acting on the advice of either.
order to serve them. Johnson's arrogant
about it. Moreover, he neglected to alert
Not until it was too late for him to
recoup his losses did he realize that any
handling of his military advisors and his
his economic advisors to the advice he
time a President acts on a consensus of
prayerful reliance on his economic coun-
was getting from his military chiefs that
old and new economists-as Johnson did
selors exposed him to double jeopardy.
the war was winnable. The patter of his
Right down to his last day in office, his
running dialog with the members of his
in going all out for his ill-timed and
generals took his orders as unflaggingly
Pentagon team went on about "how
ineffective surtax of 1968-he takes his
as he took the advice of his economists.
much more we need to do to scare them
political life in his hands.
The war was lost in Vietnam and the
off" and "if we do a little more, maybe
Where Johnson all along handled as-
surances from the military with care, and
Affluent Society was defeated at home-
they'll back off." Bill Moyers, who was
all because of what was essentially an er-
Johnson's most intimate staff aide at that
kept his military advisors on a tight rein
from the day he took office (going as far
ror in programing.
stage of his Presidential career, and also
The unmistakable mark of both pro-
the one most alert to the entrapment
during the Vietnam war as to veto deci-
grammer and expert, as well as their
threatening in Vietnam and most anx-
sions on which hills to bomb and specify-
fatal flaw, is a willingness to execute
ious for a commitment of priorities to
ing at what angles airmen were to circle
authorized targets), he was as reckless at
assignments rather than questioning the
domestic welfare projects, looked back
the outset in acting on the assurances of
policy behind them. Errors on the part
on what happened during that fateful
his economic advisors as any eager stock-
of the experts are generally small enough
time as "an expression of the worst side
to be quantitative and are more or less
of Johnson's nature, as a commitment to
market newcomer ever was in mistaking
a hot tip as a certainty. Where Johnson's
cheaply corrected without forcing sea
action for action's sake. He got in too
sophisticated sense of the military power
changes in social direction. When the
deep and kept getting in deeper," Moy-
structure alerted him to the built-in class
economic experts set their sights on a four
ers recalled early in the Nixon Adminis-
percent rate of unemployment among a
tration, "without having any idea how
distinction between presentation makers
work force of 75,042,000 and a 31/2 percent
he meant to get out." At the same time,
and decision makers, his parting shot at
rate results instead, the miscalculation
the better side of Johnson's nature led
Nixon's incoming Secretary of the Treas-
stirs up more or less good-natured second-
him to reach, with frenetic overenthu-
ury revealed that he was unaware of a
guessing among the professional frater-
siasm, for sycophantic exercise in utopian-
corresponding class distinction between
nity, but no permanent harm is done and
ism, publicized at the time as "the TVA
advisors and chiefs in the financial pow-
no upheaval is forced. But when the com-
on the Mekong Delta." A former New
er structure. Johnson made the double
plaint is tolerated at the policy level and
Deal assistant to Abe Fortas, by that time
mistake of treating his military chiefs as
the need for a cure is denied until the
a permanent United Nations official, had
if they were personal instruments whom
numbers themselves become less important
presented the Mekong Delta project to
he could control once they were activat-
than the condition of joblessness, the
Johnson as reassurance that, like Roosevelt
ed, while he treated his economic advi-
problem outgrows the reach of quantita-
before him, he could, indeed, keep his war
sors as gurus whom he could count on for
tive analysis and its solution becomes de-
an authentic New Deal crusade. Of course,
infallible guidance.
pendent upon a new qualitative analysis-
his economic advisors could meanwhile
In short, Johnson behaved as if he
by new policy makers. Social breakdowns
have read in the public prints that Gen-
were unaware of the existence of the war
big enough to be demoralizing result from
eral Goodpaster was insisting publicly,
he was masterminding on his own pri-
policy failures: like the Depression, these
as all the generals were advising Johnson
vate wires. Because he looked down on
are breakdowns too big to need measuring.
in private, that "Victory can be won in
military expertise from his own experi-
If experts at the computer-tending lev-
Vietnam."
ence of it, he underestimated the power
el could only be assured that their clients
As the great debate over Vietnam
that gravitates to the military in time of
at the policy-making level would ask
flared up and superseded every other
war, even when the orders they follow
them the relevant questions, they could
consideration, first establishing the war
limit their freedom of action. And be-
assure their clients that they would always
as the issue and then focusing on John-
cause Johnson looked up to economic
come up with workable recommendations.
son's plausibility as the issue overshad-
expertise as long as he remained inno-
The difficulty built into communication
owing even the war, Johnson's most
cent of firsthand experience of it, he
between experts and their clients-partic-
authoritative spokesman was Defense Sec-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
retary Robert McNamara. By that time,
to localize his Korean War militarily,
of an American tradition, far predating
McNamara had become de facto deputy
even though his economic mobilization
Lyndon Johnson. Slavery had represent-
President by virtue of his self-advertised.
for war represented a studied exercise in
ed an obvious abuse; and, after the abo-
officially respected and properly accepted
expansion. Nevertheless, notwithstanding
litionists and the moderates had finally
reputation for expertise in quantitative
the massive inflationary consequences of
combined at great cost to legislate a
analysis. McNamara employed the logic
the Korean economic mobilization, the
prohibition against it, it remained an
of the computer to minimize the impor-
crisis was limited in its military, political
obvious abuse, but at least it was illegal.
tance of Vietnam. The smaller he
and economic consequences, SO that the
In the post-Civil War era, big-business
claimed it to be in public (while in
test of strength in Korea did not weaken
combinations had made too much of a
private supporting the assertions of the
the American social system to the point
good thing for themselves and enough of
generals that making it bigger was the
of exposing it to an infection too viru-
a bad thing for others to pose a problem.
way to win it), the less of a diversion his
lent to be confined.
Legislation-all the way from the crea-
tion of the Interstate Commerce Com-
critics could charge it was from the man-
The paradox of Johnson's Vietnam
mission to the reduction of the tariff-
date Johnson had won in 1964. Mc-
war (he bitterly resented that designa-
Namara's response to the passions stirred
tion, insisting that it was "America's
had promised to solve the problem. But,
as the lawyers say, the case was won and
up by the Administration's miscalcula-
war" just as American opinion was repu-
the client remained in litigation.
tion in Vietnam was to present a ratio:
diating the war) was that, while it re-
The most celebrated fiasco of instant
If the Gross National Product had come
mained limited militarily, it did not
lawmanship was staged during the com-
to be counted in the hundreds of bil-
remain limited socially. More paradoxical
bined phase of synthetic hedonism and
lions, the budgeted cost of Vietnam
yet, the restraint that limited its military
puritanical revival that maintained the
could still be reckoned as a nominal
scope was the very infection its economic
"noble experiment," as it was called, in
percentage (which he originally calculat-
and intellectual backlash spread through
the prohibition of alcoholic beverages.
ed at nine percent when Vietnam was
America's social system. The infection
Alcoholism had been identified as a so-
admitted to be costing only 20 billion
proved fatal to Johnson's promise to
cial abuse, and therefore the hoodlums
dollars a year, and which he adjusted
create a Great Society and, in the process,
made common cause with the reformers
downward by something like half when
it killed America's older promise to ad-
to pass a law that made the bootleggers
the real cost of the war was admitted to
minister the Pax Americana.
rich and gave organized crime its start as
be something like twice as much, justify-
Because McNamara's appeal to the
a major growth business.
ing the statistical exercise because the
quantitative logic of the computer ig-
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal was
resultant inflation had driven the Gross
nored the qualitative logic of the spread
addicted to instant lawmanship-it was
National Product up more). If the budg-
of a virulent infection, Johnson was un-
sophisticated in its standard technique of
eted cost of Vietnam was admittedly
prepared to see his commitment to Viet-
mobilizing redundant legislative programs
creeping upward, McNamara argued,
nam become so overpowering that it
to fill the gap left by ineffective and self-
nevertheless the Gross National Product
reversed his domestic priorities and
contradictory economic policies. Roose-
was continuing to jump by tens of bil-
frustrated his original commitments to
velt's repeated response to evidence of
lions at a time, guaranteeing to keep the
stabilize the economy and to expand it to
sluggishness in the economy was to pass
burden minor. In other words, Mc-
the ghetto. The ideals of America's Afflu-
a new set of laws to create a new set of
Namara invoked the very inflation Viet-
ent Society had wandered far afield in the
alphabet agencies, instead of groping for
nam had irritated to talk down the
decade since its age of innocence, when,
simple policies that would avoid such
alarm the war provoked and to demon-
under the protective cover of Eisenhow-
increasingly complicated and unworkable
strate that its impact was easing when, in
er's assurance of Peace and Prosperity.
administrative complexes. Truman had
fact, it was sharpening.
Galbraith had discussed its conspicuous
an alibi for his systematic retreat from
Despite the pretensions of the war-
virtues. Johnson's calculated exercise in
policy making to slogan slinging while he
game players, the logic of the computer
political deception-no doubt it was also
out-Roosevelted Roosevelt in his advocacy
is singularly unsuited for analyzing the
an exercise in personal self-deception-
of instant lawmanship. He was happily
complicated phenomenon of warmak-
rationalized the propaganda about paci-
spared the responsibility for administering
ing. War is not an abstract hypothesis or
fication in Vietnam as if Saigon could be
the lost causes that he fought for during
a rigorously rational proposition. Wars
merchandised as a model city for democ-
his term.
and crises are infections, and their logic
racy in the Asiatic jungle. This bet that
When Eisenhower's turn came, he
is the logic of pathology. The question
it could doomed the hope that America
hewed stubbornly to one policy line:
about a war or a crisis arising from a war
could finance model cities for itself in
never to yield to the temptation to be
is whether the head of the government
time to shield its affluence from the de-
drawn openly into a military engage-
has the power to localize it-as, for ex-
spair and violence latent in American
ment. (His start-up venture in Vietnam
ample, Bismarck demonstrated that he
society. Johnson's miscalculations reversed
was an exception to his policy only in
had and as, in fact, Johnson admitted
the terms of the test of strength he had
substance, because the commitment was
that he did not, when he and McNamara
set out to impose on Vietnam. The ques-
kept secret.) In the domestic area, he
based their dealings with Russia on the
tion he had originally posed-about how
substituted drift for both policies and
assumption that she would take time out
long North Vietnam could stand the strain
programs.
from arming his enemy to end his war
-became the question he forced America
Kennedy had captured the imagina-
for him. A war is the military equivalent
to ponder for itself.
tion of the country on TV at a time of
of an infection. If localized, it calms
Johnson's failure, which led to Nixon's
critical transition from the years of Eisen-
down and is forgotten; if not, it flares up
take-over, confronted not merely Nixon
hower's passivity, when the overorganiza-
and becomes a carrier of poison through-
but every participant in the crisis over
tion of society had left the individuals in
out the system. McNamara's blunder lay
which Nixon found himself presiding.
it haunted by a sense of inadequacy, if
in confusing the algebra measuring the
Johnson had left a legacy of "instant
not downright irrelevance. At the level
infected area with the pathology of the
lawmanship": Pass a law and solve a
infectious process. Truman had managed
of popular fantasy, Jack and Jackie had
problem. Actually, this was something
staged a revival of the glamorous legend
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
of Camelot, in modern dress and in real
bers depended on television for their
violence ordered from Washington could
life, for everyone to see. To their fellow
connection with the worlds of both reality
hope to rule it. But as long as the Big
adventurers in opinion making, they had
and make-believe. A continuous circus was
Society looked better than it was and
promised, as Gloria Steinem said, nothing
staged. The spectators could not be manip-
had a chance to grow into a Great Socie-
less than a new Periclean age.
ulated by rations of bread-they had all
ty without falling apart, Johnson was
Like Kennedy, Johnson started out by
the cake they could eat.
free to govern its members, to keep his
capturing the imagination of the coun-
Every man's home had become a castle
mandate and to hold the Affluent Society
try. Unlike Kennedy, he owed the hold
crackling with power. Every man could
together as a going society. It was intelli-
he won on public confidence to no glam-
play at being a king, sitting in front of
gible philosophically and it was doable
orous posturings. On the contrary, his
the tube, enforcing his decrees on politi-
politically. It was not too good to be
personality was downright repulsive, em-
cians, policies, products and the pollsters
true, but it did depend on what Lyndon
bodying the typical television watcher's
who rate them all. The kingfish in the
Johnson's sponsor and mentor, Franklin
caricature of a political wheeler-dealer.
White House was on notice that any
Roosevelt, liked to call "an iffy proposi-
But for just this reason, Johnson gener-
management failure on his part would
tion." For the trouble was that the inde-
ated a distinctive and respectful appeal,
turn the lonely crowd into a lynch mob.
pendence that the Affluent Society gave
which was irresistible while it lasted.
To keep them quiet and watching from
its President from the politics of princi-
The public's confidence in Johnson last-
outside the orbit of power, a manipula-
ple left him dependent on the experts
ed as long as Johnson's political magic
tor was wanted at its center-and, in the
who dominated the practical mechanics
worked where it counted-with Congress
person of Lyndon Johnson, he was ap-
-specifically those of fiscal politics. Po-
-and not a day longer. Kennedy had
preciated for what he was as long as he
litically, Johnson was as vulnerable to
represented a reversion to the Truman
functioned as what he was. Before the
violent change as he seemed invulnera-
technique of instant lawmanship advo-
loose alliance of the establishment of
ble, as long as he operated behind the
cated but not passed-and thus not
bigness-beginning with Big Govern-
façade of continuity. Socially, the veneer
needing to be administered. Johnson
ment, including Big Business, Big Labor,
of the Affluent Society was as flimsy as it
represented a reversion to Roosevelt's
Big Agriculture, and by no means ex-
seemed solid. When the political storm
reliance upon legislative overkill; like
cluding Big Education and Big Welfare
that drove Johnson from power cracked
Roosevelt, Johnson got his laws passed,
-faced the challenge to grow into the
society's surface, it revealed a whirl of
and thus was held responsible for admin-
Great Society, it had come to be held
confusion and activity against a back-
istering them. And like Roosevelt, John-
together by the belief that a master poli-
ground that was big, rich and prone to
son ran his version of instant lawmanship
tician could be trusted to hold it together
violence-but no longer a society.
without policy guidance. No one could
and by the evidence that the economic
Johnson's failure determined the shape
have passed more laws than Johnson, but
pudding being enjoyed by everyone had
of the challenge Richard Nixon found
the policies he stumbled into finally ne-
been baked by the experts who talked
awaiting him. In assessing the options
gated the benevolent thrust of them all.
only to him. Earlier societies had tried and
open to him for selecting the areas of
Looking back on Johnson's 1964 hon-
failed to fulfill the promise of continuous
continuity and change, instant lawman-
movement toward a better life for their
eymoon with Congress, while he was still
ship obviously seemed the course to avoid.
citizens. But they, less ambitious than
persuading his former associates to legis-
For after a full generation of growth,
the Affluent Society, had aspired merely
late Kennedy's programs, one after the
the apparatus of Big Government had
to continuous betterment, not absolute
other, Daniel Patrick Moynihan recalled
taken on elephantine proportions. Every
greatness.
one of its functions-from the making
that what surfaced as the all-important
In order to tranquilize and lead the
of strategic policy to manning the end-
poverty legislation "represented not a
Affluent Society, Johnson needed only to
less crazy quilt of duplicative and com-
choice among policies so much as a
finance his programs to provide policy
peting welfare agencies, and including the
collection of them." Legislative action
continuity for his experts and atmospher-
agencies wielding the authority to regu-
for action's sake, Moynihan complained,
ic continuity for his crowd of silent fol-
late the various sectors of the economy
came to dominate a program-packaging
lowers. The mechanics of fiscal politics
and to finance the Government-had lost
operation, SO that priority of purpose
had replaced the need for any philoso-
the capacity to work with one another,
was lost in the ensuing shuffle of excite-
phy of social purpose-that is, as long as
much less to work toward the solution of
ment.
the mechanics of fiscal politics worked.
the problems plaguing American society.
The average voters who gave Johnson
The mechanics of fiscal politics had
Kennedy's characteristically ironical com-
a good "job rating"-until they turned
become the crucial framework holding
plaint, uttered in reaction to his own
against him and wanted him fired-did
the Affluent Society together as the plau-
recognition that his Administration was
not know how Johnson did his job any
sible precursor to that Great Society over
developing into an exercise in showman-
more than he knew how to explain it
the horizon. And, for a brief time, fiscal
ship rather than performance, was that the
to them. They were the members of
politics did work, in miraculous defiance
President, although expected to run the
what David Riesman called "the lonely
of remembered assertions and expected
Government, could no longer even find
crowd"; and they participated in its
reassertions about the economic equiva-
out what was going on inside it. Johnson
moods and decisions in the solitary con-
lent of the law of gravity. Suddenly,
finement of their living rooms, linked to
subsequently insisted that he not only
what went up did not come crashing
could manage Government by meddling
one another, to the White House and to
down. As long as these policies worked,
in it at all levels but that he meant to
the violence in Vietnam and in the
the momentum of money flows animating
know every last detail of what was going
streets by the television tube. The insti-
the economy was accepted as a reliable
tutionalization of the modern television
on inside it, right down to what he could
measure of the effectiveness of national
audience built a sensitive and continu-
fathom from personal scrutiny of the
purpose.
ous new dependence on political man-
daily logs the White House drivers
If, however, the methods of politics
turned in, in order that he might check
agement into economic society. Many
once failed to finance the continuous
up on who had been driven where and
provocative old themes and slogans won
circus, and if the lonely, well-fed, well-
when. The reaction of the Nixon Ad-
an uneasy new lease on life-subject to
housed, tranquilized, respectable army
ministration was less personal and more
the moods and whims of the well-fed,
participating in the TV fun turned vio-
in keeping with the professional charac-
respectable, tranquilized mob whose mem-
lent and took to the streets, no counter-
ter of auditors; namely, that merely to
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
identify the endless administrative arms
Nixon was shrewd enough to opt for
of the Federal apparatus was enough to
policy making as the source of his own
explain the impossibility of making any
expertise. He stood pat on programs and
of them work.
concentrated on finding policy priorities.
In an interview I published with Dr.
The prudence that prompted Nixon to
Arthur Burns, President Nixon's counse-
draw back from the expected speculation
lor, in the May 8, 1969, Chicago Tribune,
on instant lawmanship drew critical fire.
Burns summed up a new Administration's
But his selection of priorities drew the
problems in this way:
lines of battle for the 1972 Presidential
There is an extraordinary conti-
contest before 1969 was many months
nuity in American government. This
old. "Do-nothingism" was not the issue
is both good and bad. A new Ad-
raised against Nixon. On balance, he
ministration appoints new Cabinet
had far and away the winning side of the
members. They come from all walks
argument provoked by his renunciation
of life and at the start know very
of instant lawmanship. His critics bene-
little about the intricacies of their
fited from the freedom his emphasis on
new jobs. They depend on assistants
policy gave them to concentrate their fire
to fill them in, and these in turn
on his priorities; and his policy-making
depend on their assistants. Conse-
operation benefited reciprocally from their
quently, you get a cadre of career
criticism. The old war he had inherited
staff people who stay on from Ad-
in Vietnam started out claiming his top
ministration to Administration and
priority; and the new war he had pro-
provide continuity. The drawback is
claimed against inflation claimed his
that they become entrenched and
second priority. "People" finished a poor
given to doing things in their own
third. But the experts in each area
way, so that when a new Cabinet
finished first-both in the department of
member wants to make changes, he
policy making and in the department of
has trouble getting his staff to go
policy implementation, where the ex-
along.
perts are pre-eminent. Altogether, there-
The pendulum had, indeed, swung
fore, while Nixon's strategy for harnessing
since Roosevelt had set out in 1933 to
the uses of Presidential power benefited
make Government effective by giving it
from Johnson's failure, he himself had
more jobs to do. Nixon set out to make
ignored Johnson's advice.
Government more effective by stripping
it down to workable simplicity. The root
of the difficulties Nixon faced grew from
three decades of simplistic faith in in-
stant lawmanship. Each new assurance,
from Roosevelt to Johnson, that a prob-
lem had been solved because a law had
been passed achieved a brief public-rela-
tions success for the lawmaker; and each
success transferred the burden of respon-
sibility-and the onus of prospective
bankruptcy-to the innocent and help-
less arms of the bureaucratic octopus
charged with fulfilling the promises of
instant lawmanship. Roosevelt made the
most of this buck-passing process to shift
the burden of responsibility from his
Presidency to the Government bureaus
for which the people's Congress appro-
priated their money. In his Senate days,
Johnson had parlayed his power-oriented
legislative leadership and a passive Presi-
dency into an empire strong enough to
supplement, if not actually to rival, the
Presidency itself. But when he fell heir
to the Presidency, he, too, exploited the
technique of instant lawmanship to saddle
the executive apparatus with the respon-
sibility for future aimlessness of purpose
and paralysis of function. The achieve-
ments of instant lawmanship proved easi-
er to legislate than to operate.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FORMAT -- PRESIDENTIAL MEETING BRIEF
THE WHITE house
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Meeting with (Name of Individual or Group)
September 26, 1969 (Date)
10:00 a. m. (20 minutes)
(Time meeting to start and, in parenthesis,
time allotted for President's participation)
I.
PURPOSE
State concisely (in one or two sentences) the true purpose or purposes
of the meeting.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Pertinent general background information 'which you
feel the President should be aware of before the meeting
...
if any.
But include here at least a short statement telling who requested the
meeting. If necessary to submit more than 3-4 sentences of back-
ground information, attach other than the most essential details at
a Tab, and so indicate.
B. Participants: A listing of all programmed participants and a very
brief identification of each. List too the name(s) of the staff mem-
ber(s) who will sit in. (Always confirm these names with Mr.
Chapin's office during final preparation of the paper.)
If there are to be more than 5 total participants, attach the list of
names at a Tab, and so indicate.
When the President should know of particular personal matters
relevant to one or more of the participants, such information
should be included in this section.
C. Press Plan: State very simply the press plan which has been coor-
dinated and approved; for example "There will be a brief photo
opportunity at the beginning of the meeting, and Messrs. Shultz and
Ehrlichman will brief the press afterward"
or
"Ollic Atkins
will take 2-3 quick photos"
or
"After a mid-meeting photo
opportunity you will state to the press the purpose of the conference
and the goals of the two task forces"
or
"No photos; no press
Reproduced atlthe Richard Presidential Library and Museum 11 with Mr. Ziegler,
FORMAT -- PRESIDENTIAL MEETING BRIEF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Meeting with (Name of Individual or Group)
September 26, 1969 (Date)
10:00 a. m. (20 minutes)
(Time meeting to start and, in parenthesis,
time allotted for President's participation)
I. PURPOSE
State concisely (in one or two sentences) the true purpose or purposes
of the meeting.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Pertinent general background information 'which you
feel the President should be aware of before the meeting
...
if any.
But include here at least a short statement telling who requested the
meeting. If necessary to submit more than 3-4 sentences of back-
ground information, attach other than the most essential details at
a Tab, and so indicate.
B. Participants: A listing of all programmed participants and a very
brief identification of each. List too the name(s) of the staff mem-
ber(s) who will sit in. (Always confirm these names with Mr.
Chapin's office during final preparation of the paper.)
If there are to be more than 5 total participants, attach the list of
names at a Tab, and so indicate.
When the President should know of particular personal matters
relevant to one or more of the participants, such information
should be included in this section.
C. Press Plan: State very simply the press plan which has been coor-
dinated and approved; for example -- "There will be a brief photo
opportunity at the beginning of the meeting, and Messrs. Shultz and
Ehrlichman will brief the press afterward"
....
or
"Ollie Atkins
will take 2-3 quick photos"
or
"After a mid-meeting photo
opportunity you will state to the press the purpose of the conference
and the goals of the two task forces"
or
"No photos; no press
involvement. If (Always confirm the "press plan" with Mr. Ziegler,
Mr. Warren, or Mr. Whelihan during final preparation of the paper. )
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
NOTE:
Continue numbering in
order, but beyond this point include
only the appropriate sections.
III.
ACTION SEQUENCE
(optional)
This section is applicable when the designated meeting place is other
than the President's Oval Office
....
or when a programmed Oval Office
meeting is to involve actions which vary significantly from those which
are considered "standard". When including this section, you should
strive to make the President fully aware of the precise chronology of
planned major and minor events -- with the emphasis, of course, on
his actions.
IV.
PROBABLE TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION) OF
(optional)
VISITOR(S), AND RECOMMENDED RESPONSES (RR)
A. A major talking point or point of discussion which you expect the
visitor to bring up.
RR: State concisely the response recommended for
the President.
B. A second major topic, talking point or point of discussion. If you
think it essential that the President have more information on these
items than the basic briefing paper will permit, attach the material
at a Tab, and so indicate.
RR: It will be the responsibility of the person preparing the
brief to insure that recommended responses are well-
staffed, i.e. that they reflect the judgments of appro-
priate staff and Cabinet members.
V.
RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION)
(optional)
A. Identify a recommended talking point or point of discussion
prefe
ably in words sufficient only to convey the thought or idea.
B. Identify the next topic or talking point.
VI.
OTHER POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE
(optional)
A. A statement relative perhaps to a personal matter if the President's
mentioning the subject will serve a worthwhile purpose.
B. A word or two about a particular administration program or policy,
or about a legislative matter, when doing so will be beneficial.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
VII.
ISSUES (TOPICS, POINTS, ITEMS, etc. ) TO AVOID
(optional)
A. Cite only those subjects which should not be discussed
(or
mentioned).
B. State the reason(s) for your word of caution if you believe that
information will be important to the President.
VIII.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
(optional)
This section should be used only when it becomes necessary, or
appears prudent, to add something (a point of discussion, a reminder,
an important information item, etc.) to the paper after its final
preparation and typing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FORMAT - - PRESIDENTIAL MEETING BRIEF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Meeting with (Name of Individual or Group)
September 26, 1969 (Date)
10:00 a. m. (20 minutes)
(Time meeting to start and, in parenthesis,
time allotted for President's participation)
I.
PURPOSE
State concisely (in one or two sentences) the true purpose or purposes
of the meeting.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Pertinent general background information 'which you
feel the President should be aware of before the meeting
...
if any.
But include here at least a short statement telling who requested the
meeting. If necessary to submit more than 3-4 sentences of back-
ground information, attach other than the most essential details at
a Tab, and so indicate.
B. Participants: A listing of all programmed participants and a very
brief identification of each. List too the name(s) of the staff mem-
ber(s) who will sit in. (Always confirm these names with Mr.
Chapin's office during final preparation of the paper.)
If there are to be more than 5 total participants, attach the list of
names at a Tab, and so indicate.
When the President should know of particular personal matters
relevant to one or more of the participants, such information
should be included in this section.
C. Press Plan: State very simply the press plan which has been coor-
dinated and approved; for example - - "There will be a brief photo
opportunity at the beginning of the meeting, and Messrs. Shultz and
Ehrlichman will brief the press afterward"
or
"Ollie Atkins
will take 2-3 quick photos"
or
"After a mid-meeting photo
opportunity you will state to the press the purpose of the conference
and the goals of the two task forces"
or
"No photos; no press
involvement. 11 (Always confirm the "press plan" with Mr. Ziegler,
Mr. War Reproduced the Richard Nixon PresidentialiLibrary and Museum paration of the paper. )
NOTE:
Continue numbering in
order, but beyond this point include
only the appropriate sections.
III.
ACTION SEQUENCE
(optional)
This section is applicable when the designated meeting place is other
than the President's Oval Office
or when a programmed Oval Office
meeting is to involve actions which vary significantly from those which
are considered "standard". When including this section, you should
strive to make the President fully aware of the precise chronology of
planned major and minor events - - with the emphasis, of course, on
his actions.
IV.
PROBABLE TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION) OF
(optional)
VISITOR(S), AND RECOMMENDED RESPONSES (RR)
A. A major talking point or point of discussion which you expect the
visitor to bring up.
RR: State concisely the response recommended for
the President.
B. A second major topic, talking point or point of discussion. If you
think it essential that the President have more information on these
items than the basic briefing paper will permit, attach the material
at a Tab, and so indicate.
RR: It will be the responsibility of the person preparing the
brief to insure that recommended responses are well-
staffed, i.e. that they reflect the judgments of appro-
priate staff and Cabinet members.
V.
RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION)
(optional)
A. Identify a recommended talking point or point of discussion
prefe
ably in words sufficient only to convey the thought or idea.
B. Identify the next topic or talking point.
VI.
OTHER POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE
(optional)
A. A statement relative perhaps to a personal matter if the President's
mentioning the subject will serve a worthwhile purpose.
B. A word or two about a particular administration program or policy,
or about a legislative matter, when doing so will be beneficial.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
VII.
ISSUES (TOPICS, POINTS, ITEMS, etc. ) TO AVOID
optional)
A. Cite only those subjects which should not be discussed ...
(or
mentioned).
B. State the reason(s) for your word of caution if you believe that
information will be important to the President.
VIII.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
(optional)
This section should be used only when it becomes necessary, or
appears prudent, to add something (a point of discussion, a reminder,
an important information item, etc.) to the paper after its final
preparation and typing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FORMAT - - PRESIDENTIAL MEETING BRIEF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT:
Meeting with (Name of Individual or Group)
September 26, 1969 (Date)
10:00 a. m. (20 minutes)
(Time meeting to start and, in parenthesis,
time allotted for President's participation)
I.
PURPOSE
State concisely (in one or two sentences) the true purpose or purposes
of the meeting.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Pertinent general background information 'which you
feel the President should be aware of before the meeting
...
if any.
But include here at least a short statement telling who requested the
meeting. If necessary to submit more than 3-4 sentences of back-
ground information, attach other than the most essential details at
a Tab, and so indicate.
B. Participants: A listing of all programmed participants and a very
brief identification of each. List too the name(s) of the staff mem-
ber(s) who will sit in. (Always confirm these names with Mr.
Chapin's office during final preparation of the paper.)
If there are to be more than 5 total participants, attach the list of
names at a Tab, and SO indicate.
When the President should know of particular personal matters
relevant to one or more of the participants, such information
should be included in this section.
C. Press Plan: State very simply the press plan which has been coor-
dinated and approved; for example -- "There will be a brief photo
opportunity at the beginning of the meeting, and Messrs. Shultz and
Ehrlichman will brief the press afterward"
or
"Ollie Atkins
will take 2-3 quick photos"
or
"After a mid-meeting photo
opportunity you will state to the press the purpose of the conference
and the goals of the two task forces"
or
"No photos; no press
involvement. 11 (Always confirm the "press plan" with Mr. Ziegler,
Mr. War Reproduced at the Richard Nixon and Museum paration of the paper. )
NOTE:
Continue numbering in
order, but beyond this point include
only the appropriate sections.
III.
ACTION SEQUENCE
(optional)
This section is applicable when the designated meeting place is other
than the President's Oval Office
or when a programmed Oval Office
meeting is to involve actions which vary significantly from those which
are considered "standard". When including this section, you should
strive to make the President fully aware of the precise chronology of
planned major and minor events -- with the emphasis, of course, on
his actions.
IV.
PROBABLE TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION) OF
(optional)
VISITOR(S), AND RECOMMENDED RESPONSES (RR)
A. A major talking point or point of discussion which you expect the
visitor to bring up.
RR: State concisely the response recommended for
the President.
B. A second major topic, talking point or point of discussion. If you
think it essential that the President have more information on these
items than the basic briefing paper will permit, attach the material
at a Tab, and so indicate.
RR: It will be the responsibility of the person preparing the
brief to insure that recommended responses are well-
staffed, i.e. that they reflect the judgments of appro-
priate staff and Cabinet members.
V.
RECOMMENDED TALKING POINTS (or POINTS OF DISCUSSION)
(optional)
A. Identify a recommended talking point or point of discussion
prefe
ably in words sufficient only to convey the thought or idea.
B. Identify the next topic or talking point.
VI.
OTHER POINTS YOU MAY WISH TO RAISE
(optional)
A. A statement relative perhaps to a personal matter if the President's
mentioning the subject will serve a worthwhile purpose.
B. A word or two about a particular administration program or policy,
or about a legislative matter, when doing so will be beneficial.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
VII.
ISSUES (TOPICS, POINTS, ITEMS, etc. ) TO AVOID
optional)
A. Cite only those subjects which should not be discussed ...
(or
mentioned).
B. State the reason(s) for your word of caution if you believe that
information will be important to the President.
VIII.
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
(optional)
This section should be used only when it becomes necessary, or
appears prudent, to add something (a point of discussion, a reminder,
an important information item, etc.) to the paper after its final
preparation and typing.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1969
TO:
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
BUD KROGH air
SUBJECT: SIX MONTH OBJECTIVES
I DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
A. To insure that the subway and freeway systems proceed according to
schedule.
B. To rectify current unacceptable staffing in the District of Columbia
Government.
C. To pursue all measures available to reduce crime in the District of
Columbia.
II JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
A. To urge quick implementation of improving correctional techniques
in the federal penal system.
B. To insure that a high-level effort to curtail heroin smuggling is begun
and showing substantial results by the six months period ending in
April.
III INTERIOR
A. To develop a comprehensive effort on environmental improvement
working with OST and other departments as well as Interior. To
insure that a satisfactory structure is located in the Executive Office
of the President which can consider broad-gauge environmental
questions.
B. To put together an effective water pollution abatement program con-
sistent with our budgetary restrictions.
IV TRANSPORTATION
A. To insure that legislation to increase the weight, width, and length
of buses and trucks is not based on any form inconsistent with the
President's position.
B. To follow implementation of the urban mass-transit program intro-
duced by the President in July.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1969
TO:
TOD HULLIN
FROM:
EDWARD L. MORGAN
SUBJECT:
SIX MONTH OBJECTIVES
The following are the most important goals and objectives of this
office for the coming six-month period, October '69 through
March '70;
1. Complete hearings on Welfare legislation
2. Evaluate interim reports on, and determine future course for:
Ghetto Insurance
Drugs under Medicare
3. Complete proposals for revamping the service provisions of
the Social Security Act
4. Complete the President's 1969 tax return and transfer all
bookeeping to Kalmbach's office.
5. Complete appraisal of Presidential Papers
6. Present for the President's signature a new Executive
Order on Emergency Preparedness
7. Continue review of Executive Orders, CAB Recommendations,
and other legal matters referred to this office for handling.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 9, 1969
TO:
JOHN EHRLICHMAN
FROM:
HENRY C. CASHEN II
SUBJECT:
Six-Month Objectives
1. Better and more efficient coordination and cooperation
between the various departments and agencies and the White
House. This would include framing Administration policy,
resolution of interagency conflicts, clearing testimony, etc.
Generally, insure that we know what the departments are
doing before it happens and also that the departments know
where to go at the White House to present their problems.
2. An evaluation of the present model cities program
to determine (a) whether the program can be improved and
exist successfully; or (b) whether it should be slowly phased
out. A good deal of this will depend upon the report of the
Banfield task force and give us leverage to move either way.
3. Determination as to whether the antitrust policy
presently voiced by Justice is headed in the right direction
and if not how should the policy be so adjusted to reflect
Administration positions. McLaren, Commerce and the
Council of Economic Advisers all being queried.
4. Continued coordination with the BOB and the
departments and agencies to do whatever possible to remain
within the projected fiscal budgets.
****
This list could keep going with issue comments but as we
have discussed paragraph 1 presents our basic objective.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 10, 1969
FOR:
Alex Butterfield
FROM: Bud Wilkinson
The goals for this office during the next six months are as follows:
1. To bring into being the recommendations of our memorandum to
the President of September 18, 1969, urging the establishment of youth
affairs offices in the appropriate departments and agencies, and the
creation of a quasi-governmental youth council.
2. To develop a basic Administration policy on the misuse of drugs
that would be supported by all concerned departments and agencies.
(I chair an ad hoc committee on drug abuse that is now working on this
problem.) In addition, this office will see that the Ad Council's campaign
on drug abuse gets under way.
3. To work closely with Secretary Romney to see that the National
Program of Voluntary Action is launched in the near future. This office
will continue to direct the college volunteer program until the National
Program can take it over.
4. To be sure that the 1970 White House Conference on Children and
Youth is organized effectively and focuses on meaningful problems. We
have already made considerable progress on this point.
5. To oversee the operations of the American Revolution Bicentennial
Commission, which must report to the President by July 4, 1970.
6. To work with the U.S. Olympic Committee, the sports federations
and the AAU to settle the current athletic controversy. (We are now
working on our plan to solve the problem, and are prepared to supply
full details.)
7. If approved by the White House, to set up a plan for visits to
various campuses by appropriate White House staff members.
8. To develop more effective summer programs for the President's
Council on Youth Opportunity. (I now serve as vice chairman of the Council.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Mr. Alexander Butterfield-- - -2
October 10, 1969
9. To improve the executive intern and White House intern programs
for next summer.
10. To continue to represent the Administration through political
speeches and appearances on TV shows.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
RICHARD NIXON PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY
DOCUMENT CONTROL SHEET
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED
FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM
REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT
DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER
3
ON THE DOCUMENT
WITHDRAWAL RECORD IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
TO: ALEX BUTTERFIELD (For the President)
FROM: P. J. BUCHANAN
NEWS SUMMARY
November 29, 1969
(AP & UPI, 11/27)
VIETNAM The S. Vietnamese government repeated that it will
never accept a coalition government in any form or
grant territorial concessions to the Viet Cong. The
Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement to clear
up what it termed a misunderstanding of remarks by
Ambassador Lodge after the Paris talks Wednesday.
* *
Izvestia blamed "the highest authorities of the U.S."
for the alleged massacre. Izvestia also said the
incident was not "the sole case of genocide" com-
mitted by U.S. troops in Vietnam. "If we are to
trace the whole chain of events, it was the highest
authorities of the United States that were behind
Lieutenant Calley, 11 the paper said.
* *
Cyrus Eaton said he is going to Hanoi "to find out
what the U.S. should do to end the war. 11
* *
Theodore Sorensen said he fears the alleged massacre
may tend to revive isolationism "as the details sink
into the American public. " "The people did not fully
grasp the horror of what happened in at least one
village and possibly in others, " Sorensen said. "I am
afraid America may have already lost her soul. "
* *
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
2
Porno publisher Ralph Ginzburg accused the Army
with refusing to investigate charges that American
helicopter pilots have been killing Vietnamese
civilians "for sport. " Ginzburg said the charges
were made in a 1967 article in his avant-garde
magazine, "But were completely ignored. 11
"Apparently the Army wanted to hush up the charges
in the same way that it hushed up the Song My
massacre for nearly two years, " Ginzburg said.
* *
A former infantryman says he "witnessed many
civilians being shot down like clay pigeons" while he
served in the Chu Lai area. In one incident U.S.
troops "shot into the village at people walking around.
There you are with machine guns and they have none. "
Afterward, Reid said, "We counted 60 dead bodies --
women, children and maybe a few old and decrepit
men. " He said that he witnessed action by U.S.
soldiers that "turned my stomach. 11 "I, with many
of my comrades, had seen at least 100 Vietnamese
lying in rice paddies shot -- women taken for inter-
course and then shot. A private cannot get up and
say what he thinks. You are a puppet on a string,
especially in a war zone. What I learned out of war
is that man does what he believes in. If I had been a
man, I probably would have gone to jail for five years.
So I played the game in order to get home. 11
* * * *
NATO
Brussels the US and its Western Allies plan a new
peace bid to the Soviet Union to end the cold war in
Europe, responsible Western allied sources said.
They will do SO at the annual session of NATO
Dec. 3-5. The Alliance plans to call on the Soviets
and their Warsaw pact allies to join it in balanced
mutual reduction of armed forces on both sides of the
Iron Curtain in Europe. It also will call on Moscow
to join in a serious effort to reduce the causes of
East- West tensions on the continent.
* * *
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
3
MIDEAST London diplomatic sources said US-USSR efforts to
work out a joint peace formula for the Middle East
have all but foundered. Prospects for any early
successful initiatives by the two powers are dim in
view of the worsening of the Arab-Israeli crisis.
*
HUNGER
Dr. Mayer has warned the head of a private anti-
hunger organization that it could lose its tax-exempt
status if it continues to attack White House aides and
Congressmen. The warning went to John Kramer,
Executive Director of the National Council on Hunger
and Malnutrition. An exchange of sharply worded
letters between the two was made public by the
Wash. Star. "I think the time has come, " Kramer
wrote Mayer, "for you to decide whether your con-
ference, as opposed to the rest of the government, is
going to be closed society. That is the policy adopted
in June when you excluded everybody but your close
personal friends from the planning structure for the
conference
Mayer said Kramer was complaining
that he was not involved. He also said that Kramer
told him "that you disliked our national administration
so much that you hated to think of anything it did
succeeding, even the conference. You have followed
up your candid statement with a most thorough hatchet
job. 11
* *
FCC
The FCC absolved the Post-Newsweek radio and tele-
vision stations of charges of news distortion and undue
concentration of media control. It voted 5-0 to renew
for three years the licenses of WTOP-AM, FM and TV.
The stations are owned by the Washington Post.
* *
AGNEW
The ACLU said Vice President Agnew's criticisms of
the media represent "a deliberate and concerted
attack.
on a central American freedom. " The
ACLU letter to "friends of the first amendment"
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
4
said Agnew's attacks indicate he and his supporters
"either do not understand or do not believe in the
free press. 11 It asked newsmen and editors to "stand
firm in their rights to resist pressures from the
government which intrudes upon professional news
judgment. "
* *
55% questioned in a Sindlinger poll said they believed
VP Agnew was doing a good job as Vice President and
agreed with his attacks on network news. 86% cor-
rectly identified Agnew as Vice President or a govern-
ment official. 14% said he was doing a bad job overall
and 31% gave no opinion.
* * * *
MINERS
Government investigators said that United Mine
Workers president Tony Boyle raised salaries of
some union officials without the required approval of
the Executive Board. The Labor Department also
said that union officials were routinely approved for
unvarified expenses. In addition, the Department
reported that the top three union officers had set up
a $1. 5 million fund to give themselves retirement
pensions at full salary, and that a number of relatives
of Boyle, other top union officers were on the union
payroll.
* * * *
COUR T
At least three women are among those being considered
for nomination to the Supreme Court now that
Haynsworth has been rejected, Attorney General
Mitchell said. Mitchell said he believes a law against
appointing members of Congress to positions for which
they have voted a pay raise would rule any lawmaker
out. "If you had a college professor, you wouldn't
have the same problem of going through Court cases
for possible conflict, 11 Mitchell said. He quickly
added that no inference should be drawn that a non-
Judge was a frontrunner for the nomination.
* *
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
5
The Attorney General smilingly attributed the contro-
versial comments of his wife about "liberal com-
munists" to the fact "she doesn't understand the
vernacular. 11 He said he had read some of the letters
to the editor in the Washington Post about Mrs.
Mitchell and chuckled over one which compared her
to Marie Antoinette.
* *
James Allison, Deputy Chairman of the RNC, said he
thinks Mrs. Mitchell "went a little too far" in quoting
her husband.
* * * *
FESTIVAL Gov. Kirk paid a call on thousands of youths massed
for a mud-bogged rock festival and ordered one of
them arrested with a warning that he wouldn't tolerate
Florida becoming a playground for hippies. He
ordered the boy's arrest following a brief conversa-
tion in which he asked the long-haired youngster how
he felt. The teenager responded "pretty good" but
refused to tell Kirk where he was from. "Take him,"
said Kirk, gesturing to the sheriff. "These kids think
they can play in Florida, 11 Kirk said. "Well, they are
wrong. You can't play anywhere in this State or in
Palm Beach County. 11 (also reported by CBS)
* * *
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SENSITIVE
December 3, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR ALEX BUTTERFIELD
FROM:
Al Haig
SUBJECT:
Additional Information on
My Lai Incident
Attached are some additional chronologies
on the Department of the Army's handling
of the My Lai incident.
Attachment
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
3 December 1969
SENSITIVE
Captain Murphy:
Attached, in response to your request, are
two chronologies:
1. IG investigation into the My Lai (4)
incident, and
2. CID phase of the My Lai (4) incident.
K. B. Cooper, Colonel, GS
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential
SENSITRE
1 December 1969
SUBJECT: IG Investigation into My Lai (4) Incident
The Secretary of the General Staff referred Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour's
letter to the Inspector General on 23 April 1969 and directed him to conduct
an investigation concerning the allegations contained in the letter and related
matters. The Inspector General's investigation was conducted by Colonel
William V. Wilson, one of the three field inspectors in the Office of The
Inspector General, between 23 April and 4 August 1969. It resulted in the
collection of more than 1000 pages of testimony and the referral of the case to
The Provost Marshal General.
A total of thirty-six (36) witnesses (twelve (12) civilians and twenty-
four (24) military) from all parts of the country were questioned during The
Inspector General's investigation.
Discussion
Following the referral of Ridenhour's letter to The Inspector General
on 23 April, the investigation proceeded as rapidly as could be expected.
Ridenhour was interviewed in Phoenix, Arizona, on 29 April, Gruver
(3 May - Oklahoma City); Terry (2 May - Orem, Utah); Doherty (5 May -
Fort Hood, Texas), LaCroix (2 May - Fort Carson, Colorado); and
Bernhardt (8 May - The Pentagon), all of whom were referred to in Ridenhour's
letter were interviewed shortly thereafter. During the course of Colonel Wilson's
investigation, he learned the names of other possible witnesses. It took a
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
substantial amount of time to interview these individuals, particularly
in view of the considerable amount of travel time involved because of
dispersion of the witnesses. (A list of the persons interviewed and the
location of the interview is attached. ) The last two witnesses (Meadlo and
Storms) were interviewed in Terre Haute, Indiana, on 16 July. Colonel
Wilson's report was prepared and arrangements were made to transfer the
case and all relevant documentation to the Provost Marshal General between
16 July and 4 August.
2
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
23 July 1959
SENSITIVE
LIST OF WITNESSES
(Pinkville Case)
Place Interviewed
Name
(Duty Station)
Date
1. Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour
Phoenix, Ariz.
29 Apr
2. Mr. Michael B. Terry
Orem, Utah
1 May
3. SGT (E-5) Lawrence C. La Croix
Ft Carson, Colo.
2 May
4. Mr. Charles D. Gruver
Oklahoma City, Okla.
3 May
5. Mr. Richard Wayne Wyatt
Oklahoma City, Okla.
3 May
5. SP 4 William F. Doherty
Ft Hood, Texas
5 May
7. CPT Thomas K. Willingham
OTIG (Ft Meade)
8 May
8. SGT Michael A. Bernhardt
OTIG (Ft Dix)
8 May
CPT Robert L. Hauck
Ft Benning, Ga.
12 May
10. CPT Ernest L. Medina
Ft Benning, Ga.
13 May
11. SSG Manuel Lopez
Ft Benning, Ga.
13 May
12. MAJ Charles C. Calhoun
OTIG (Ft Monroe)
19 May
13. SGT Jay A. Buchanon
OTIG (Ft Bragg)
20 May
14. SGT L. C. Bacon
Ft Jackson, S. C.
22 May
15. SFC Isaiah Cowan
Ft Jackson, S. C.
23 May
16. COL Oran K. Henderson
OTIG (USARHAW)
26 May
17. SSG David Mitchell
OTIG (Ft Hood)
25 May
18. LTC William D. Guinn, Jr.
OTIG (Pentagon)
28 May
19. MAJ Frederic W. Watke
OTIG (Ft Leavenworth) 2-3 Jun
20. ILT William L. Calley, Jr.
OTIG (Ft Benning)
91 Jun
SENSITIVE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SENSITIVE
Place Interviewed
Name
(Duty Station)
Date
21 CW2 Hugh C. Thompson, Jr.
OTIG (Ft Rucker) 11,12,13 Jun
22. Mr. Roy L. A. Wood
Richmond, Va.
11
23. Mr. Roger D. Murray
Waukegan, Ill.
14 Jun
24. Mr. John H. Paul
OTIG (West Collings-
wood, N. J.)
16 Jun
25. CW2 Dan R. Millians
OTIG (Ft Wolters)
18 Jun
25. PFC Lawrence M. Colburn
OTIG (Ft Hood)
19 Jun
27. SGT Esequiel Torres
OTIG (Ft Bragg)
20 Jun
28. CPT Stephen J. Gamble
OTIG (Ft Sill)
23 Jun
29. MAJ Glen D. Gibson
OTIG (HQ Sixth US Army) 25 Jun
30. Mr. Ronald D. Grzesik
Springfield, Mass.
26 Jun
Mr. Dennis R. Vazquez
Williamsburg, Va.
1 Jul
32. Mr. Diego Rodriguez
Fort Worth, Texas
9 Jul
33. Mr. Andress Delgado
Uvalde, Texas
10 Jul
34. Mr. Frederick Joseph Widmer
New Kensington, Pa.
15 Jul
35. Mr. Paul D. Meadlo
Terre Haute, Ind.
16 Jul
35. Mr. David M. Storms
Terre Haute, Ind.
16 Jul
SENSITIVE
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
3 December 1969
TALKING PAPER
CID Phase of the My Lai (4) Investigation
The Inspector General's investigation revealed that acts in
violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may have been
committed. Accordingly, on 5 August, the Provost Marshal General
assumed responsibility for continuing the Department of the Army
investigation. The Provost Marshal General directed his Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) to proceed immediately with a thorough
and detailed criminal investigation. The early part of August was
spent reviewing the testimony of witnesses interviewed during the
course of the Inspector General's investigation. However,
additional interviews, particularly with persons not interviewed
during the course of the Inspector General's investigation, were
conducted.* By mid-October five individuals assigned to the CID
were working on the case on a full time basis. One of the five
arrived in South Vietnam on 17 October to coordinate the investiga-
tion in that country. The CID group charged with the responsibility
for conducting this investigation has recently been augmented. On
1 December a CONUS task force consisting of 20 individuals was
assigned to help pursue the investigation. This augmentation will
* Lt. Calley was charged with murder on 5 Sept 69 and on 6 Sept 69
a story appeared in the Columbus, Ga. Inquirer. The charge was
confirmed by the public information officer at Ft. Benning pursuant
to information provided by the Department of the Army on 4 Sept 69.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
make available at least five additional field investigators.
Additionally, a task force consisting of an additional nine individuals
is being organized in Vietnam this week to expand the investigation
there. To date, more than 80 individuals, military and civilian,
have been interviewed during the CID phase of the Department of
the Army's investigation (A list of those interviewed to date is
attached). Every effort is being made to develop all the evidence
relating to the facts and circumstances involving the incident in
My Lai (4). This is a complicated, sensitive, and demanding
effort which is being conducted as rapidly as a thorough and pro-
fessional investigation will permit.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
AUG.
Haeberle, Ronald Lawrence
25 Aug 69
N. Ridgeville, Ohio 5763
Creekside Lane
Simone, Daniel (NMN)
27 Aug 69
22 Englewood Blvd,
Trenton, New Jersey
Allen, Joseph Boyce
28 Aug 69
502 Brinley Avenue,
Bradley Beach, N.J.
Dursi, James Joseph
29 Aug 69
715 E. 42nd St. Brooklyn,
N.Y. 11203
Olsen, Gregory Thomas
30 Aug 69
296th MP Company,
392nd MP Bn, Fort Lewis,
Washington
SEPT.
Sledge, Charles (NMI)
1 Sep 69
Route 2, Box 576, Sardis,
Mississippi
Roberts, Jay Alfred
12 Sep 69
4814 South 1st Street,
Arlington, Va. 22204
Garza, George Arsenio
17 Sep 69
507th Med Co (AA), Fort
Sam Houston, TX 78234
Lee, Robert James
17 Sep 69
CO A, 1st Bn, Medical
Field Service School, Ft.
Sam Houston, Texas 78234
Flores, Abel Jr.
18 Sep 69
1135 NW 36th St.
San Antonio, Texas 78228
Mauro, Robert Martin
18 Sep 69
1516 West 4th Street
Brooklyn, N. Y. 11204
Meadlo, Paul David
18 Sep 69
Route 4, Box 533, West
Terre Haute, Indiana
47885
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Maples, Robert Earl
18 Sep 69
40 1/2 Avenue A,
Freehold, N.J. 07728
Santellana, Eusebio Banda Jr.
19 Sep 69
1546 W Pyron Ave,
San Antonio, Texas 78211
La Cross, Jeffrey Urban
19 Sep 69
Lake Leelanau, Michigan
Polston, Larry Owen
20 Sep 69
Co A, 7th Bn, 6th Inf,
2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood,
Texas 76547
Bain, Chester Mack
20 Sep 69
Hq & Hq Co, 1st Arm Div,
Ft Hood, Texas 76545
Starkie, Preston Harris
21 Sep 69
Hq & A Co, 124th Maint B
2d Armd Div, Fort Hood,
Texas
Oliphent, John Lewis
21 Sep 69
C Co, 2nd Bn, 46th Inf,
1st Ard Div, Fort Hood,
Texas
Cabral, George Joseph Jr.
22 Sept 69
HHC, 7th Bn, 6th Inf,
2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood
Texas 76546
Lamartina, Salvatore Sgt.
22 Sep 69
HHC, 7th Bn, 6th Inf,
Fort Hood, Texas 76546
Fagan, Martin Edward
22 Sep 69
Co C, 4th Bn, 46th Inf,
3rd Bde, 1st AD,
Fort Hood, Texas 76544
Maroney, Leo Milton
23 Sep 69
Co B, 1st Bn, 41st Inf,
2nd AD, Fort Hood, Texas
76544
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
OCTOBER
Emerson, James Henry
6 Oct 69
123 Middle St.
Old Town, Maine
Mower, John Richard
6 Oct 69
P.O. Box 107, Shippenburg
Pa. 17257
Holland, David
7 Oct 69
821 - 3d Ave. , Duncanville, P
Grezesik, Ronald David
8 October
469 Beech St. ,
Holyoke, Mass.
Widmer, Fredrick Joseph
8 Oct 69
221 Crescent Drive, Lower
Burrell, Pa.
Tucker, Robert James
9 Oct 69
228 Janet St.
Auburn, New York
Fastiggi, Kim
10 Oct 69
688 Ringwood Avenue,
Wanaque, N.J.
Cox, Bruce Umber
10 Oct 69
89 Burgundy Terrace,
Amherst, N.Y. 14120
Delpome, Peter Robert
10 Oct 69
Newark, N.J.
Widmer, Joseph P.
11 Oct 69
221 Crescent Drive,
Lower Burrell, Pa. 15068
Holland, Howard David
11 Oct 69
821 3rd Avenue
Duncanville, Pa, 16635
McBreen, James Michael Jr.
11 Oct 69
177 Covert St., Elmont, N.Y.
Stanley, Harry
14 Oct 69
Apt 28, 1324 Peterson St.,
Long Beach, Calif.
Lagunoy (Aquilino), Lenny
15 Oct 69
94459 Kahualena St.
Battallones
Waipahu, Oahu, Hawaii 96797
Marshall, Richard Grant
15 Oct 1969
230 Joseph St.
San Jose Calif., 95110
Webster, Jimmy Nolan
16 Oct 69
Intelligence Division, G2,
HQ, USARPAC, APO SF 96558
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Martin, Louis Bernard
16 Oct 69
Apt 202, 623 Tully Road
Modesto, Calif. 95350
Blackledge, Richard Kurt
17 Oct 69
500th MI Group, Ford Island
APO SF 96558
Johnson, John Parker Jr. (SPS) 20 Oct 69
Fort Hauchuca, Arizona
Roberts, Randal Wayne
20 Oct 69
1709 Boyden St.,
Greensboro, N.C.
Alaux, Roger L. Jr.
21 Oct 69
416 W. Parkway Blvd,
Tempe, Arizona
Partsch, Thomas Richard
21 Oct 69
12720 Wanda Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
Stewart, Johnathan
21 Oct 69
3721 146th St., Cleveland
Ohio
Winninger, Randy M.
23 Oct 69
72 Hamilton Park,
Columbus, Ohio
Oden, Leonard Guy
23 Oct 69
10324 Eastwood St.
Dallas, Texas
Hall, Charles Wayne
24 Oct 69
144 Calshan Rd,
Columbus, Ohio 43207
Moss, Tommy Lee
25 Oct 69
380 Caulder Avenue,
Spartanburg, S.C.
Doines, Rennard
25 Oct 69
2709 Belzise Terrace
Fort Worth, Texas
Konwinski, Joseph Norbert
26 Oct 69
HHC, 11th BDE,
Americal Div, APO 96217
Johnson, Dennis Harvey
27 Oct 69
Co D, USINTS, Fort
Holabird, Md.
PHU, Nguyen Denk (SGT)
27 Oct 69
CHU LAI, South Vietnam
Wood, Roy Lee Augustus
28 Oct 69
302 West Baker Street,
Richmond, Virginia
Hutson, Max Dean
28 Oct 69
Company A, Infantry School
Battalion, The Student Brigade
SENSITIVE
Fort Benning, Georgia
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Burnett, Henry Jr. (PSG)
29 Oct 69
The Student Brigade, Fort
Benning, Georgia
Lopez, Manuel (PSG)
29 Oct 69
Fort Benning, Georgia
Wan, Isaiah (NMN)
30 Oct 69
Company E. 10th Bn,
2d Bde, BCT, Ft Jackson, S. (
Conti, Dennis Irving
30 Oct 69
HHC, USA Depot, Qui Nhon,
APO 96216
Brown, Harold (NMN)
30 Oct 69
Company A, 10th Bn,
2d BCT Bde, Fort Jackson
S.C.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
NOV.
Buchanon, Jay (1SG)
3 Nov 69
Fort Bragg, N. C.
Bergthold, James Robert
3 Nov 69
624 6th St. Niagara Falls,
New York
Flynn, James Michael
3 Nov 69
207 Paramount Pky
Kenmore, N.Y.
Schiel, Kenneth (NMN)
3 Nov 69
Hq Hq Co, 1st Bn, 504th
Inf, 82 Abn Div, Fort
Bragg, N.C.
Stevenson, Leon James
3 Nov 69
B Troop, 7th of the 1st
Air Squadron, 1st Avn Bde
APO SF 96357
Anderson, Bruce Michael
4 Nov 69
374 Foxhurst Rd,
Oceanside, N.Y.
Cornwell, Smith William
5 Nov 69
6 Baily Drive, Amityville,
Long Island, N. Y. 11701
Hunley, Ronnie Victor
5 Nov 69
761 Prospect Place
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Carter, Herbert Louis
6 Nov 69
Hou-Tex Hotel, 1206 1/2
Prairie St., Houston,
Texas
Graham, Robert B.
6 Nov 69
82d MP Det, 6th Spec Fcs,
Ft Bragg, N.C.
Millians, Dan Richard
7 Nov 69
Flight Department A,
Flight A-3, US Army
Primary Helicopter School
& Center, Ft. Wolters,
Texas
Thiele, Patrick Allen
7 Nov 69
HHC, 1st Bn, 299th Inf.
Schofield Barracks,
APO 96557
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Brown, Jimmy L (CW2)
7 Nov 69
Ft. Wolters, Texas
Poteete, Wallace F (CW 2)
7 Nov 69
Ft. Wolters, Texas
Carney, Billy Earl
9 Nov 69
1203 22d Avenue
Meridian, Miss 39301
Simpson, Varnado (NMN)
9 Nov 69
1815 Ave K, Jackson,
Mississippi 39213
Lloyd, William Calvin
10 Nov 69
4005 34th Street, Tampa,
Florida 33610
Jolly, Joe Ted
11 Nov 69
677 Avenue B, S. W.
Winterhaven, Fla.
Van Toan, Nguyen BG
15 Nov 69
Commanding General
2nd ARVN Infantry Divisi on
Hutto, Charles Edward
17 Nov 69
Hq & Hq Co, 3rd AIR Bde,
Ft Lewis, WA 98433
Bernhardt, Michael Arnold
20 Nov 69
Co A, 1st Bn, 3rd Bde,
USATC, Ft. Dix, N.J.
Trinkle, Patrick M.
24 Nov 69
Department of Tactics,
USMA, West Point, N. Y.
Koster, Samuel William (MG)
24 Nov 69
Superintendent, U.S.
Military Academy, West
Point, New York 10996
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
3 December 1969
SENSITIVE
Captain Murphy:
Attached, in response to your request, are
two chronologies:
1. IG investigation into the My Lai (4)
incident, and
2. CID phase of the My Lai (4) incident.
K. B. Cooper, Colonel, GS
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Procide
SENSITIVE
1 December 1969
SUBJECT: IG Investigation into My Lai (4) Incident
The Secretary of the General Staff referred Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour's
letter to the Inspector General on 23 April 1969 and directed him to conduct
an investigation concerning the allegations contained in the letter and related
matters. The Inspector General's investigation was conducted by Colonel
William V. Wilson, one of the three field inspectors in the Office of The
Inspector General, between 23 April and 4 August 1969. It resulted in the
collection of more than 1000 pages of testimony and the referral of the case to
The Provost Marshal General.
A total of thirty-six (36) witnesses (twelve (12) civilians and twenty-
four (24) military) from all parts of the country were questioned during The
Inspector General's investigation.
Discussion
Following the referral of Ridenhour's letter to The Inspector General
on 23 April, the investigation proceeded as rapidly as could be expected.
Ridenhour was interviewed in Phoenix, Arizona, on 29 April, Gruver
(3 May - Oklahoma City); Terry (2 May - Orem, Utah); Doherty (5 May -
Fort Hood, Texas), LaCroix (2 May - Fort Carson, Colorado); and
Bernhardt (8 May - The Pentagon), all of whom were referred to in Ridenhour's
letter were interviewed shortly thereafter. During the course of Colonel Wilson's
investigation, he learned the names of other possible witnesses. It took a
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
substantial amount of time to interview these individuals, particularly
in view of the considerable amount of travel time involved because of
dispersion of the witnesses. (A list of the persons interviewed and the
location of the interview is attached. ) The last two witnesses (Meadlo and
Storms) were interviewed in Terre Haute, Indiana, on 16 July. Colonel
Wilson's report was prepared and arrangements were made to transfer the
case and all relevant documentation to the Provost Marshal General between
16 July and 4 August.
2
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(
SENSITIVE
23 July 1959
LIST OF WITNESSES
(Pinkville Case)
Place Interviewed
Name
(Duty Station)
Date
1. Mr. Ronald L. Ridenhour
Phoenix, Ariz.
29 Apr
2. Mr. Michael B. Terry
Orem, Utah
1 May
3. SGT (E-5) Lawrence C. La Croix
Ft Carson, Colo.
2 May
4. Mr. Charles D. Gruver
Oklahoma City, Okla.
3 May
5. Mr. Richard Wayne Wyatt
Oklahoma City, Okla.
3 May
5. SP 4 William F. Doherty
Ft Hood, Texas
5 May
7. CPT Thomas K. Willingham
OTIG (Ft Meade)
8 May
8. SGT Michael A. Bernhardt
OTIG (Ft Dix)
8 May
CPT Robert L. Hauck
Ft Benning, Ga.
12 May
10. CPT Ernest L. Medina
Ft Benning, Ga.
13 May
11. SSG Manuel Lopez
Ft Benning, Ga.
13 May
12. MAJ Charles C. Calhoun
OTIG (Rt Monroe)
19 May
13. SGT Jay A. Buchanon
OTIG (Ft Bragg)
20 May
14. SGT L. G. Bacon
Ft Jackson, S. C.
22 May
15. SFC Isaiah Cowan
Ft Jackson, S. C.
23 May
16. COL Oran K. Henderson
OTIG (USARHAW)
26 May
17. SSG David Mitchell
OTIG (Ft Hood)
26 May
18. LTC William D. Guinn, Jr.
OTIG (Pentagon)
28 May
19. MAJ Frederic W. Watke
OTIG (Ft Leavenworth) 2-3 Jun
20. ILT William L. Calley, Jr.
OTIG (Ft Benning)
9 Jun
SENSITIVE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SENSITIVE
Place Interviewed
Name
(Duty Station)
Date
21. CW2 Hugh C. Thompson, Jr.
OTIG (Ft Rucker) 11,12,13 Jun
22. Mr. Roy L. A. Wood
Richmond, Va.
11
23. Mr. Roger D. Murray
Waukegan, Ill.
14 Jun
24. Mr. John H. Paul
OTIG (West Collings-
wood, N. J.)
16 Jun
25. CW2 Dan R. Millians
OTIG (Ft Wolters)
18 Jun
26. PFC Dawrence M. Colburn
OTIG (Ft Hood)
19 Jun
27. SGT Esequiel Torres
OTIG (Ft Bragg)
20 Jun
28. CPT Stephen J. Gamble
OTIG (Ft Sill)
23 Jun
29. MAJ Glen D. Gibson
OTIG (HQ Sixth US Army) 25 Jun
30. Mr. Ronald D. Grzesik
Springfield, Mass.
26 Jun
Mr. Dennis R. Vazquez
Williamsburg, Va.
1 Jul
32. Mr. Diego Rodriguez
Fort Worth, Texas
9 Jul
33. Mr. Andress Delgado
Uvalde, Texas
10 Jul
34. Mr. Frederick Joseph Widmer
New Kensington, Pa.
15 Jul
35. Mr. Paul D. Meadlo
Terre Haute, Ind.
16 Jul
35. Mr. David M. Storms
Terre Haute, Ind.
16 Jul
SENSITIVE
2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
3 December 1969
TALKING PAPER
CID Phase of the My Lai (4) Investigation
The Inspector General's investigation revealed that acts in
violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may have been
committed. Accordingly, on 5 August, the Provost Marshal General
assumed responsibility for continuing the Department of the Army
investigation. The Provost Marshal General directed his Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) to proceed immediately with a thorough
and detailed criminal investigation. The early part of August was
spent reviewing the testimony of witnesses interviewed during the
course of the Inspector General's investigation. However,
additional interviews, particularly with persons not interviewed
during the course of the Inspector General's investigation, were
conducted.* By mid-October five individuals assigned to the CID
were working on the case on a full time basis. One of the five
arrived in South Vietnam on 17 October to coordinate the investiga-
tion in that country. The CID group charged with the responsibility
for conducting this investigation has recently been augmented. On
1 December a CONUS task force consisting of 20 individuals was
assigned to help pursue the investigation. This augmentation will
* Lt. Calley was charged with murder on 5 Sept 69 and on 6 Sept 69
a story appeared in the Columbus, Ga. Inquirer. The charge was
confirmed by the public information officer at Ft. Benning pursuant
to information provided by the Department of the Army on 4 Sept 69.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
make available at least five additional field investigators.
Additionally, a task force consisting of an additional nine individuals
is being organized in Vietnam this week to expand the investigation
there. To date, more than 80 individuals, military and civilian,
have been interviewed during the CID phase of the Department of
the Army's investigation (A list of those interviewed to date is
attached). Every effort is being made to develop all the evidence
relating to the facts and circumstances involving the incident in
My Lai (4). This is a complicated, sensitive, and demanding
effort which is being conducted as rapidly as a thorough and pro-
fessional investigation will permit.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
AUG.
Haeberle, Ronald Lawrence
25 Aug 69
N. Ridgeville, Ohio 5763
Creekside Lane
Simone, Daniel (NMN)
27 Aug 69
22 Englewood Blvd,
Trenton, New Jersey
Allen, Joseph Boyce
28 Aug 69
502 Brinley Avenue,
Bradley Beach, N.J.
Dursi, James Joseph
29 Aug 69
715 E. 42nd St. Brooklyn,
N.Y. 11203
Olsen, Gregory Thomas
30 Aug 69
296th MP Company,
392nd MP Bn, Fort Lewis,
Washington
SEPT.
Sledge, Charles (NMI)
1 Sep 69
Route 2, Box 576, Sardis,
Mississippi
Roberts, Jay Alfred
12 Sep 69
4814 South 1st Street,
Arlington, Va. 22204
Garza, George Arsenio
17 Sep 69
507th Med Co (AA), Fort
Sam Houston, TX 78234
Lee, Robert James
17 Sep 69
CO A, 1st Bn, Medical
Field Service School, Ft.
Sam Houston, Texas 78234
Flores, Abel Jr.
18 Sep 69
1135 NW 36th St.
San Antonio, Texas 78228
Mauro, Robert Martin
18 Sep 69
1516 West 4th Street
Brooklyn, N. Y. 11204
Meadlo, Paul David
18 Sep 69
Route 4, Box 533, West
Terre Haute, Indiana
47885
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Maples, Robert Earl
18 Sep 69
40 1/2 Avenue A,
Freehold, N.J. 07728
Santellana, Eusebio Banda Jr.
19 Sep 69
1546 W Pyron Ave,
San Antonio, Texas 78211
La Cross, Jeffrey Urban
19 Sep 69
Lake Leelanau, Michigan
Polston, Larry Owen
20 Sep 69
Co A, 7th Bn, 6th Inf,
2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood,
Texas 76547
Bain, Chester Mack
20 Sep 69
Hq & Hq Co, 1st Arm Div,
Ft Hood, Texas 76545
Starkie, Preston Harris
21 Sep 69
Hq & A Co, 124th Maint B
2d Armd Div, Fort Hood,
Texas
Oliphent, John Lewis
21 Sep 69
C Co, 2nd Bn, 46th Inf,
1st Ard Div, Fort Hood,
Texas
Cabral, George Joseph Jr.
22 Sept 69
HHC, 7th Bn, 6th Inf,
2nd Armd Div, Fort Hood
Texas 76546
Lamartina, Salvatore Sgt.
22 Sep 69
HHC, 7th Bn, 6th Inf,
Fort Hood, Texas 76546
Fagan, Martin Edward
22 Sep 69
Co C, 4th Bn, 46th Inf,
3rd Bde, 1st AD,
Fort Hood, Texas 76544
Maroney, Leo Milton
23 Sep 69
Co B, 1st Bn, 41st Inf,
2nd AD, Fort Hood, Texas
76544
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
OCTOBER
Emerson, James Henry
6 Oct 69
123 Middle St.
Old Town, Maine
Mower, John Richard
6 Oct 69
P.O. Box 107, Shippenburg
Pa. 17257
Holland, David
7 Oct 69
821 - 3d Ave. , Duncanville, P
Grezesik, Ronald David
8 October
469 Beech St.
Holyoke, Mass.
Widmer, Fredrick Joseph
8 Oct 69
221 Crescent Drive, Lower
Burrell, Pa.
Tucker, Robert James
9 Oct 69
228 Janet St.
Auburn, New York
Fastiggi, Kim
10 Oct 69
688 Ringwood Avenue,
Wanaque, N.J.
Cox, Bruce Umber
10 Oct 69
89 Burgundy Terrace,
Amherst, N.Y. 14120
Delpome, Peter Robert
10 Oct 69
Newark, N.J.
Widmer, Joseph P.
11 Oct 69
221 Crescent Drive,
Lower Burrell, Pa. 15068
Holland, Howard David
11 Oct 69
821 3rd Avenue
Duncanville, Pa, 16635
McBreen, James Michael Jr.
11 Oct 69
177 Covert St., Elmont, N.Y.
Stanley, Harry
14 Oct 69
Apt 28, 1324 Peterson St.,
Long Beach, Calif.
Lagunoy (Aquilino), Lenny
15 Oct 69
94459 Kahualena St.
Battallones
Waipahu, Oahu, Hawaii 96797
Marshall, Richard Grant
15 Oct 1969
230 Joseph St.
San Jose Calif., 95110
Webster, Jimmy Nolan
16 Oct 69
Intelligence Division, G2,
HQ, USARPAC, APO SF 96558
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Martin, Louis Bernard
16 Oct 69
Apt 202, 623 Tully Road
Modesto, Calif. 95350
Blackledge, Richard Kurt
17 Oct 69
500th MI Group, Ford Island
APO SF 96558
Johnson, John Parker Jr. (SPS) 20 Oct 69
Fort Hauchuca, Arizona
Roberts, Randal Wayne
20 Oct 69
1709 Boyden St.,
Greensboro, N.C.
Alaux, Roger L. Jr.
21 Oct 69
416 W. Parkway Blvd,
Tempe, Arizona
Partsch, Thomas Richard
21 Oct 69
12720 Wanda Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio 44135
Stewart, Johnathan
21 Oct 69
3721 146th St., Cleveland
Ohio
Winninger, Randy M.
23 Oct 69
72 Hamilton Park,
Columbus, Ohio
Oden, Leonard Guy
23 Oct 69
10324 Eastwood St.
Dallas, Texas
Hall, Charles Wayne
24 Oct 69
144 Calshan Rd,
Columbus, Ohio 43207
Moss, Tommy Lee
25 Oct 69
380 Caulder Avenue,
Spartanburg, S.C.
Doines, Rennard
25 Oct 69
2709 Belzise Terrace
Fort Worth, Texas
Konwinski, Joseph Norbert
26 Oct 69
HHC, 11th BDE,
Americal Div, APO 96217
Johnson, Dennis Harvey
27 Oct 69
Co D, USINTS, Fort
Holabird, Md.
PHU, Nguyen Denk (SGT)
27 Oct 69
CHU LAI, South Vietnam
Wood, Roy Lee Augustus
28 Oct 69
302 West Baker Street,
Richmond, Virginia
Hutson, Max Dean
28 Oct 69
Company A, Infantry School
Battalion, The Student Brigade
SENSITIVE
Fort Benning, Georgia
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Burnett, Henry Jr. (PSG)
29 Oct 69
The Student Brigade, Fort
Benning, Georgia
Lopez, Manuel (PSG)
29 Oct 69
Fort Benning, Georgia
Wan, Isaiah (NMN)
30 Oct 69
Company E. 10th Bn,
2d Bde, BCT, Ft Jackson, S. (
Conti, Dennis Irving
30 Oct 69
HHC, USA Depot, Qui Nhon,
APO 96216
Brown, Harold (NMN)
30 Oct 69
Company A, 10th Bn,
2d BCT Bde, Fort Jackson
S.C.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
NOV.
Buchanon, Jay (1SG)
3 Nov 69
Fort Bragg, N. C.
Bergthold, James Robert
3 Nov 69
624 6th St. Niagara Falls,
New York
Flynn, James Michael
3 Nov 69
207 Paramount Pky
Kenmore, N.Y.
Schiel, Kenneth (NMN)
3 Nov 69
Hq Hq Co, 1st Bn, 504th
Inf, 82 Abn Div, Fort
Bragg, N.C.
Stevenson, Leon James
3 Nov 69
B Troop, 7th of the 1st
Air Squadron, 1st Avn Bde
APO SF 96357
Anderson, Bruce Michael
4 Nov 69
374 Foxhurst Rd,
Oceanside, N.Y.
Cornwell, Smith William
5 Nov 69
6 Baily Drive, Amityville,
Long Island, N. Y. 11701
Hunley, Ronnie Victor
5 Nov 69
761 Prospect Place
Brooklyn, N.Y.
Carter, Herbert Louis
6 Nov 69
Hou-Tex Hotel, 1206 1/2
Prairie St., Houston,
Texas
Graham, Robert B.
6 Nov 69
82d MP Det, 6th Spec Fcs,
Ft Bragg, N. C.
Millians, Dan Richard
7 Nov 69
Flight Department A,
Flight A-3, US Army
Primary Helicopter School
& Center, Ft. Wolters,
Texas
Thiele, Patrick Allen
7 Nov 69
HHC, 1st Bn, 299th Inf.
Schofield Barracks,
APO 96557
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
SENSITIVE
Brown, Jimmy L (CW2)
7 Nov 69
Ft. Wolters, Texas
Poteete, Wallace F (CW 2)
7 Nov 69
Ft. Wolters, Texas
Carney, Billy Earl
9 Nov 69
1203 22d Avenue
Meridian, Miss 39301
Simpson, Varnado (NMN)
9 Nov 69
1815 Ave K, Jackson,
Mississippi 39213
Lloyd, William Calvin
10 Nov 69
4005 34th Street, Tampa,
Florida 33610
Jolly, Joe Ted
11 Nov 69
677 Avenue B, S. W.
Winterhaven, Fla.
Van Toan, Nguyen BG
15 Nov 69
Commanding General
2nd ARVN Infantry Divisi on
Hutto, Charles Edward
17 Nov 69
Hq & Hq Co, 3rd AIR Bde,
Ft Lewis, WA 98433
Bernhardt, Michael Arnold
20 Nov 69
Co A, 1st Bn, 3rd Bde,
USATC, Ft. Dix, N.J.
Trinkle, Patrick M.
24 Nov 69
Department of Tactics,
USMA, West Point, N.Y.
Koster, Samuel William (MG)
24 Nov 69
Superintendent, U.S.
Military Academy, West
Point, New York 10996
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum