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Middle America and the Emerging Republican Majority
Tonight, I would like to address myself to several questions.
First, is a Republican majority emerging in the United States; second,
does the Republican strategy aim at the so-called "Forgotten American"
or "silent majority"; and third, is this a legitimate strategy and
electorate upon which to base a political era?
As you probably know, I have made the idea of an "Emerging
Republican Majority" into a book. It is the book's thesis and mine
that the 1968 presidential election marked the end of the liberal,
New Deal era of American politics. I think we are beginning a new
cycle, an era of New Federalism, as the President has called it,
which will be rooted not in the fading big cities but in suburbia,
the American Heartland and the boom corridors of Florida, Texas,
Arizona and California.
For a century and a half, American politics has moved in 32-36
year regimes or cycles, and the time seems to be upon us again now.
Other recent developments support this concept. In the past, major
population shifts have generally triggered a new cycle. So has the
atrophy and obsolescence of an old regime. Let me be more specific.
As of 1968, thirty-six years, the usual life of a political cycle, had
passed since the start of the New Deal in 1932. Large scale movement
of Southern Negroes into Northern cities, together with a suburban
counter exodus of whites, has redrawn America's population map. More-
over, the once-innovative New Deal has become & tired affluent and
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 2 -
arrogant Liberal Establishment. If history follows precedent, the
confluence of these factors signals a political upheaval in motion,
the beginning of a new cycle.
I don't want to assert this cyclical framework as a rigid,
infallible rule. But I do think that it offers a useful, generalized
backdrop against which to consider the idea of an emerging Republican
majority.
The nature of the new majority or potential majority - seems
clear. It is largely white and middle class. It is concentrated in
the South, the West and suburbia. It is largely conservative, but it
has a number of unconservative outlooks as well.
On the basis of the 1960, 1964 and 1968 elections, the South,
the West and suburbia are the regional bulwarks of Republican presidential
strength. Political parties do not shift gears overnight, especially
when they have this degree of momentum behind them. They pursue the
impetus and trend which put them in office. And therefore I suspect
that the ruling politicians of the Grand Old Party will continue to
look in these directions.
Nevertheless, talk about the Nixon Administration writing off
the Northeast is foolishness. The President carried Vermont, New
Hampshire, Delaware and New Jersey in 1968, and I am sure that he is
aiming to do much better in 1972. The 1969 New Jersey election results
underscore this opportunity. The President may not do as well in the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 3 -
Northeast as he does in other regions, but he should still carry a
majority of the eleven Northeastern states.
Let me toss out another idea. Within the Republican party, a
major fight is raging between liberals and conservatives, between
Northeasterners and Southerners and Southwesterners. Indeed, one can
legitimately argue that it is within the ranks of the Republican Party,
and no longer the Democratic Party, that the great sectional, ideo-
logical and programmatic issues of the day are now being fought out
and resolved. If a shift of this sort is actually occurring, it will
have a profound meaning. Throughout American political history, one
of the parties has always been the major, decisionmaking one, and the
other has played a minor, responsive role. If the great decisionmaking
of the decade is shifting into the Republican Party, then that raises
still another sign of cyclical change.
I expect to discuss all of this in greater detail, but for now
I would like to turn to the next question: What is the strategy of
the Nixon Administration? Is it aimed at the "silent majority" of
"Forgotten Americans"?
Yes, but in a positive way. My belief is that the Administration
has given top priority to solving those problems which are of the greatest
concern to the greatest number of Americans, the problems for which an
action-constituency exists right now. In a list, I would include four
major items: winning an honorable peace in Vietnam; ending inflation
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 4 -
here at home without causing high unemployment; reclaiming our physical
environment; and reducing the current high and dangerous crime rate.
These are the problems the President talked about in his State
of the Union message, and, admittedly, they are also the greatest
concerns of "Middle America" or "the forgotten American". But solving
these problems on if indeed it can be done - would not just benefit
Middle America. The whole nation will benefit.
Now I realize that. to some people, the terms "Middle America"
and "forgotten American" are code words of reaction, constituencies
of negativism. I disagree.
True, they can be appealed to in negative terms. So can any
constituency. But Middle America is really "the people" as the man
in the street - and "the people" is an idea -- and a constituency -
central to American democracy.
If you picture Middle America in geographic and socio-economic
terms, it is a combination of the South, the West and the blue-collar
and middle-class North, quite similar to the coalition that Richard
Nixon put together in 1968.
Those critics who posit this Middle American grouping as
essentially negative would do well to look at their history books.
From the era of Thomas Jefferson right down to the New Deal, the
constituencies that now make up Middle America have been the horse-
power of national progress.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 5 -
In 1800, the South, the Appalachian frontier and the working
class Northeast launched Jeffersonian Democracy;
In 1828, the South, the trans-Appalachian West and the
working-class North launched Jacksonian Democracy;
In 1896, the South, the West and the working-class North gave
William Jennings Bryan support that almost put populism in the White
House;
And in 1932, the South, the West and the working-class North
launched Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal.
This is the political ancestry of Middle America, and of what
may be an emerging Republican majority. It is a good ancestry, a
positive ancestry.
Now I know the immediate reaction some of you must have. You
will say that the Jefferson, Jackson, Bryan, and Roosevelt revolutions
all came from the Left, and that they have nothing in common with the
slow-moving Middle American bent of the Nixon Administration. So let's
look at this idea.
Past political upheaval in the United States has not come from
the Left but from the people.
J
In the past the elites engendering popular revolt were economic
elites, landed or industrial elites committed to economic conservatism.
Thus, popular change had to come from the Left.
No more. Technology and economic growth have raised the old
working-class constituency to a new affluence, enlarging the old middle
class into Middle America.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 6 -
And at the same time, a separate and antagonistic new Establish-
ment has grown at the top of American society. This is the historically
unique Liberal Establishment. In the past, Establishments were toryhoods
of no-change: landowners, industrialists, people whose affluence was
rooted in stability. But this is no longer where the fast action is.
The new Establishment is liberal, a toryhood of change, people who make
their money out of plans, ideas, communication, social upheaval,
happenings, excitement.
This new Liberal Establishment - the media, the Knowledge
Industry, research and development, the universities and think tanks,
the foundations and corporate conglomerates a is to the Left of prevail-
ing American opinion. It is to the Left of dustbowl Oklahoma; it is to
the Left of Levittown; it is to the Left of Main Street. The average
American is fed up with the excesses of the Liberal Establishment. He
is fed up with change for change's sake, with calculated erosion of
middle-class values and standards, with fashionable liberal bigotry
towards Irish, Italians, Poles, farmers, suburbanites and blue-collar
workers. These values are not progress. They are progress perverted.
And for the first time in history, it is possible that corrective
popular upheaval can only come from the Middle American Right.
This is America's oncoming political revolution.
The target is Establishment liberalism, the phoney revolution
of the glossy magazines, which mocks Nixonism and Middle America as
cottage cheese and Sears Roebuck. Let's look at this self-proclaimed
coalition of futurism, humanism and progress. Who and what is it?
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 7 $
It is Scarsdale, Park Avenue, Wall Street, the Episcopal Church,
the major metropolitan newspapers and television networks, the best
suburbs and universities, the Beautiful People.
If the list is familiar, it should be. These are the places
and institutions that have attacked virtually every great popular
political movement that America has produced. Some of them are now
attacking popular conservatism and the Nixon Administration. They
laugh at Vice-President Agnew like their forebears laughed at Social
Security, Harry Hopkins and the WPA.
If you look at the national strongholds of Democratic liberalism,
you get a similar portrait.
In 1968, the richest precincts in America, Beacon Hill, Scarsdale,
East Side Manhattan and Philadelphia's Society Hill, all voted solidly
against Richard Nixon. But these are not precincts of progress. They
all have a record of opposing popular change. They voted against
Jefferson, against Jackson, against Bryan and against Roosevelt.
Then there is New England, historic seat of America's political,
economic and cultural establishment. No part of the country gave
stronger support to the liberalism of the Democratic Party in 1968
and no part of the country can match New England's record of backing
old regimes, institutionalized ideologies, worn-out establishments.
Regionalism has no place in Federal policymaking, but it is an instruc-
tive fact of political history. Let me cite some of that history:
In 1800, New England gave the nation's top backing to John
Adams and the fading politics of Federalism;
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 8 as
In 1828, New England led the nation in supporting John Quincy
Adams against the popular revolution of Andrew Jackson;
In 1896, New England led the nation in defending Robber-Baron
Republicanism against the populist assault of William Jennings Bryan;
In 1932, New England was the only section of the United States
to give majority support to the bankruptcy of Hoover Republicanism.
This is a pattern which sheds a little light on the extent to
which liberalism has become a status quo. Liberalism is now ensconced
in the proven political geography of privilege, obsolescence and defeat.
Let me emphasize that the purpose of this analysis is not to
laud or condemn any region or cultural group. It is simply to set a
context for the idea of Middle America as a constituency upon which a
new and positive political era can be built.
Now I would like to draw my own theory into a little bit of
doubt. The emerging Republican majority a or at least the emerging
Republican coalition - is a unique combination of the two American
political mainstreams.
It reaches beyond the South, the populist West, the lower-
middle-class urban areas and other parts of the historic Jeffersonian,
Jacksonian, New Deal mainstream of popular politics. Both Middle America
and the emerging Republican majority also include the rural, small-town
and suburban North. And much of this electorate is the historic con-
stituency of the Federalists, the Whigs and the old conservative Republican
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 9 -
Establishment. This is the old standpat electorate. The traditional
status quo vote.
Although elements of the conservative and popular mainstreams
seem to be joining together in a new politics of Middle America, they
have never meshed before in any lasting way. If the new coalition
works, this could be another creative and enduring popular political era,
one that tears down obsolescence and builds anew. If it doesn't, this
could be a short-lived Whig era, a basic marking of time, a standpattism,
a mere re-arranging of existing programs and institutions that breaks
no really new ground.
No question is more crucial to the American political future
and to the legitimacy of the idea of Middle America. "The People"
have always stood for forward motion. Is this where the GOP is going?
Or will a kind of organization-man, Madison Avenue Whiggery prevail?
Many parts of the Republican Party are not confortable with the
new popular politics of the South, West and lower middle-class city
sidewalks. They prefer the Whiggery of moderation, of reshuffling the
status quo.
This presents a real and important paradox. Many of the areas
of the country that today claim the label "conservative" are the uncon-
servative areas of our political history, the areas of anti-Establishment
insurgency. And liberalism is most outspoken in many of the old
status quo conservative bailiwicks. But if history is procedent, only
the popular cause can shape a creative new era.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 10 -
Granted it is confusing to talk about popular, progressive
conservatism. Perhaps we should throw away our political labels. They
are not really of much use and new ones would make more sense. However,
we are probably stuck with existing terms, and it may well be that a
new political era of Middle America $2 rooted in the historic anti-
conservative sections of the nation - will have to mobilize under the
banner of "conservatism." However, this will not be the old conserva-
tism, but a new popular ideology of pragmatic combat with status quo
liberalism.
This, I think, is what the Nixon Administration is trying to do.
This, I think, is the hope of the "silent majority" which the Adminis-
tration is trying to translate into action. The test of this new politics
will be positive achievement on behalf of the great, ordinary Lawrence
Welkish mass of Americans from Maine to Hawaii. Its programs must aim
at Middle America as society's new constituency of forward motion, not
reaction. It must aim at making the city sidewalks smile again as in
the days of Al Smith, at wiping the coal soot off the face of Appalachia,
at equally cheering the lives of poor Italians, Southerners and Negroes,
and at making the Arkansas bus driver think that our government is his
as well as The New York Times'. In the end, I believe, the strategy
of the Republican Party, the idea of Middle America, the incumbent
Administration's place in history, will all be judged by the strides
made toward these simple and ordinary objectives.
In closing, I would like to say that Middle America is not just
a strategy or a coalition. It is the essential bedrock of American
society. Its failure will be nobody's victory. Its success will be
the renaissance of an entire nation.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
The Constituency and Significance of
the 1969 Republican Gubernatorial
Victory in Virginia
By Kevin Phillips
February, 1970
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Introduction
In 1965, Linwood Holton ran for Governor of Virginia on
the Republican ticket and was defeated, receiving 41% of the
total vote.
Four years later, Holton ran again and won, amassing 54%
of the total vote and forging a quite different regional and
ideological support pattern.
The political circumstances of 1969 differed considerably
from those of 1965, and therein lies the explanation of Holton's
victory. In his first campaign, the GOP candidate had run slightly
to the left of moderate conservative Democrat Mills Godwin. As a
result, Holton won his votes from Negroes, anti-organization
Tidewater liberal Democrats, northern Virginia suburbanites (both
liberals and Republican loyalists) and Western Virginia traditional
Republican voters. Except in traditionally Republican counties and
some suburban areas, the 1965 Holton vote did not strongly correlate
with 1960 Nixon strength because Holton had captured few votes among
the conservative Democrats who constituted (and still constitute) a
large bloc of those Virginians who vote Republican for President.
Holton's first candidacy ran against the re-alignment grain of
both Virginia and national Republicanism.
However in 1969, Holton's opponent was no conservative but
moderate Democrat William Battle, victor in a bitter primary and
runoff. This enabled Holton to take a position more consonant with
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 2 -
national and state GOP re-alignment, and he ran slightly to Battle's
right. As a result, Holton's 1969 support pattern, built mostly
on Republican and conservative Democratic backing, correlates quite
strongly with 1960 and 1968 Nixon support.
Several facts stand out clearly in an analysis of Holton's
victory. First, wherever Richard Nixon was strong in 1968, Holton
was strong in 1969. The correlation between Nixon support and
Holton support is emphatic. "Nixoncrats" furnished Holton's crucial
1965-1969 gains. Back in 1965, Holton had been opposed by many of
these conservative Democratic Nixon voters (not a few were adherents
of the conservative Democratic Byrd machine). In 1969, they sup-
ported him first because the conservative (Pollard) had lost the
Democratic primary, but also because of his new identification
with Richard Nixon, national Republicanism and the Nixon GOP's image
of moderate conservatism and non-hostility towards the South. The
Nixon visits to Virginia those of both the President and his
family - played an essential role in firming up the Nixon electorate
for Holton. The GOP contender and Democratic nominee Battle were
quite close in ideological position, and without the essential link
to Nixon and national Republicanism, Holton (who trailed Battle in
the polls before the President's visit and election eve Vietnam
speech) would probably have won far fewer votes from hesitant Demo-
cratic conservatives.
A similar but second key point about Holton's 1969 vote
profile is that his Democratic supporters, save for the unique
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 3 -
Richmond Negro situation, were conservatives rather than liberals.
From Virginia Beach to Winchester, Holton's support and 1965-1969
gains typically correlate with Democratic primary support for de-
feated conservative Pollard and successful moderate Battle rather
than with support for defeated liberal Democrat Howell. Most Negro
and white working class Howell backers remained within the Democratic
party, casting November votes for Battle. It is crystal clear that
conservative rather than liberal Democrats shifted to the Virginia
GOP in 1969.
In this connection, it is important to detail Holton's low
level of Negro support. Except in Richmond, where he won the en-
dorsement of Negroes out to topple the state and local Democratic
machine so that they could take over, Holton won only about 20% of
the Negro vote (see Chart 3). In Richmond, he won about 58%, for
a statewide total of approximately 25%.
Another factor is the relationship of the Holton vote to the
1968 Wallace vote. Those who voted for Wallace in 1968 appear to
have divided as follows in 1969: middle-class voters, suburbanites
and rural (mostly Southside) Pollard-Byrd supporters to Holton; blue-
collar workers, labor (Norfolk-Portsmouth-Newport News), poor whites
and most Henry Howell primary supporters to Battle. In general, the
1968 Wallaceites who voted for Holton profile more like the Nixon
electorate. Indeed, many were probably 1960 Nixon supporters who
will presumably back the President again in 1972.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 4 -
As for the geographic pattern of Holton's 1965-1969 gain,
it was predominantly conservative, being sharpest in "Southside"
Virginia. This is the Southern-oriented part of the state, in. turn
the stronghold of the Dixiecrats, George Wallace and the once-
powerful Byrd machine. Whereas in 1965, Holton had captured only
10-20% of the Southside vote, conservative increments of Nixon-Byrd-
Pollard voters pushed the Holton total up to 45% in 1969. Both
Chart 3 and Map 2 illustrate the Southside surge. Other major Holton
gains occurred in Richmond and its burgeoning, fiercely conservative
suburbs, the nearby Tidewater and the conservative Shenandoah Valley.
There was no particular Holton surge in suburban Northern Virginia
where Holton's percentages closely approximated those of 1965, and
his vote totals, though well above 1965 levels, lagged far behind
Nixon's 1968 levels.
The whole thrust of the 1965-1969 change in Holton's vote
pattern is conservative, a coming together of the Republicans
and much of the state's conservative Democratic electorate. The
support registered for Holton by 58% of Richmond's Negroes (in
other races they went 5:1 Democratic as usual) is one of the handful
of exceptions that prove the rule.
The nature of Holton's new coalition suggests that his
victory was principally a reflection of A) his identification with
Nixon Republicanism and B) the splintering of and conservative
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 5 -
exodus from the Democratic Party. Linwood Holton's victory was
not personal but situational. Clearly his conservative, Byrd
Democrat gains were situational. And in areas where Republicanism
was already established and the Democratic Party was not splitting
apart - - Northern Virginia suburbia, the mountains Holton's vote
was much like that of other 1969 GOP candidates and very much in
the pattern of (although smaller than) Nixon's 1968 electorate.
To fully amplify and explain the 1969 Virginia results
and the future configurations they suggest, it is useful to
structure group and regional perspectives. In the first vein,
analyses follow of the 1969 Virginia behavior of A) Republicans;
B) conservative Democrats; C) liberal Democrats; and D) Negroes.
On a regional basis, analyses follow for A) Northern
Virginia suburbia; B) the Shenandoah Valley; C) Greater Richmond;
D) the Western Mountains; E) Southside; and F) Norfolk-Portsmouth-
Newport News-Hampton Roads.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 6 -
I. Group Behavior
During the late Nineteen-Sixties, Virginia's electorate
broke down roughly as follows.
Race: White - 85%; Negro - 15%
Politics: Republican - 30%
Conservative White Democrat - 35%
Liberal White Democrat - 20%
Negro (Democrat) -- 15%
The 30% Republican ratio represents an estimate of the
average GOP share of the vote for local and lesser state offices.
On the other hand, the ideological breakdown of the Democratic
electorate is necessarily imprecise. A higher ratio of Democrats
can be rated "conservative" on the race issue than on questions
of economics and fighting the "big boys" of the state's financial
power structure.
In the past, Republican gubernatorial candidates in Virginia
usually sought to augment their own moderate-to-conservative white
party constituency by aiming at anti-organization (liberal) Democrats
and Negroes. Conservative Democratic votes went to the candidates
of the conservative (Byrd) machine that controlled the party. And so
long as the Democratic Party remained the vehicle of Virginia con-
servatism and the state power structure, its gubernatorial candidates
always won. This situation prevailed through 1965, even though con-
servative Virginia Democrats were becoming increasingly disillusioned
with the national Democratic Party as well as increasingly unable to
control their own state Democratic Party.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 7 -
Then in 1968, only 15-35% of white Virginia supported the
Democratic presidential nominee, and the conservative exodus from
the party accelerated. With more Negroes voting than ever before
and conservatives switching to the GOP, the conservative gubernatorial
candidate lost a three-way Democratic primary in 1969, and a moderate
ultimately triumphed in the run-off.
This set the scene for the Republican Party to assume a new
role in Virginia politics as the state vehicle of the moderate-to-
conservative Virginia majority that had already abandoned the
Democrats on a national level. The different reactions of Republicans,
conservative Democrats, liberal Democrats, Negroes and Wallaceites
illustrate the re-alignment process.
A. Republicans
Virginia's Republican Party strength centers in two areas -
Northern Virginia's Washington, D.C. suburbs and the traditionally
Republican western highlands. These are the sections of the state
that, in addition to voting for GOP presidents, elect local Republican
county officials, state legislators and congressmen. Map 1 shows
the areas in question.
In 1965, a number of these counties gave majorities to
Linwood Holton. As the map shows, no other counties in the state
did so. Holton's first race was very much in keeping with the GOP's
unsuccessful past: wholly inadequate support in Vírginia's large
majority of traditionally Democratic counties.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 8 -
Virginia's traditional and suburban Republicans probably
accounted for at least three quarters of Holton's 41% vote share.
Although the great bulk of Virginia's Republicans voted for Holton
in 1965, a small percentage backed conservative Democrat Godwin.
In 1969, Holton's Republican support was probably well nigh com-
plete. Infinitely more meaningful was his ability to go beyond
it and tap conservative Democrat support.
B. Conservative Democrats
Conservative Democrats are probably the largest single voter
bloc in Virginia. Their greatest numbers are concentrated in the
predominantly rural area which rolls south from Leesburg and
Winchester to Petersburg and Suffolk in the east and Lynchburg in
the west (see Map 2).
In 1948, this was Virginia's best Dixiecrat country; in 1968
most of Wallace's best areas fell within these bounds. This geographic
sweep has always been the bulwark of Democratic gubernatorial victory.
Then in 1969, these counties produced the highest ratio of primary
support for conservative (Byrd) candidate Fred Pollard. When Pollard
lost - the first gubernatorial defeat for the conservatives in many
years - the conservative Democratic element looked for a new power
base.
On the presidential level, an increasing number of conserva-
tive Virginia Democrats have been voting Republican since the first
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 9 -
"golden silence" of Senator Harry Byrd two decades ago. But not
until 1969 did a conservative Democratic primary loss trigger the
same movement on the state level.
In comparison with his dismal 1965 showing among conserva-
tive Democrats, Linwood Holton ran very well in 1969. He picked
up the conservative Democrats who have long voted Republican for
president - in terms of 1960 and 1968, call them the Nixoncrats as
and he added the Byrd-Pollard supporters among those who had backed
George Wallace in 1968. Midway in Holton's campaign, his conser-
vative Democratic support was fattened by the switch to the GOP of
several hundred prominent Richmond Democrats.
On a geographical basis, Holton's greatest 1965-1969 gains,
averaging 20-30 percentage points, came in Southside Virginia,
heartland of the old conservative Democrat hegemony. Map 3 shows
the counties where conservative Democrat Pollard won better than
30% of the July primary vote. And as Map 3 shows, this was the
same area where Holton scored his best gains. Southside counties
where Holton had received only 8-15% of the vote in 1965 gave him
40-50% backing in 1969.
This vote did not come from Negroes or white liberals. It
came from conservative Democrats and Nixoncrats. From one end of
Virginia to the other, with only a few exceptions (like black
Richmond and a few Tidewater areas), the best Holton precincts
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 10 -
were those that had produced three, four and five-to-one ratios
of primary support for moderate Battle and conservative Pollard.
The best Holton precincts were ones which had gone ten-to-one
against the liberal Democratic primary candidate, and the worst
Holton precincts were those which had voted ten-to-one for the
liberal primary candidate.
For example, in suburban Washington's Fairfax County, top
Pollard precincts like Thompson's and Lorton produced not only the
largest 1965-1969 Holton percentage gains but some of the top
Holton percentages. On the other hand, the precincts that produced
the top liberal percentages in the Democratic primary gave Battle
his only precinct successes in November.
In Norfolk, the pattern was the same. The best Pollard
precincts were the top Holton precincts, and the liberal, Howell
precincts were the worst Holton precincts. Likewise in Virginia
Beach, where the top Pollard precincts - Cape Henry and Linkhorn -
topped Holton's list.
In and around Richmond, the best Holton totals came in the
precincts Pollard had carried in July. Suburban Henrico County's
Tuckahoe and Rollingwood, the top two Pollard precincts, led
Holton's list. And within Richmond, the pattern again showed
the top Pollard precincts - Dover Road (2), University of Richmond,
Tuckahoe, Lock Lane - as Holton's best. All of these heavily
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 11 -
pro-Pollard areas went two or three-to-one for Holton. (As indi-
cated, Richmond also offers a unique instance of Negro Howellites
voting for Holton).
To the west, in Lynchburg, the precincts that went for
Pollard were also Holton's. The liberal precincts - Howell's in
the primary - voted for Democrat Battle in the election.
Chart 1 illustrates how, in Fairfax County and Norfolk,
two areas where the GOP potential is supposed to rest on liberal
Democrats, the 1969 Holton vote correlates not with liberal Demo-
cratic insurgence but with the crossing-over of conservative
Pollard and Battle supporters.
Whether in cities like Virginia Beach, Norfolk or Richmond,
or suburbs like Chesterfield-Henrico or Fairfax, or in rural South-
side Virginia, Holton scored well and made his major gains among
conservative Democrats. These gains brought the profile of Holton's
electorate more in line with the Nixon constituency he had been
unable to replicate in 1965. Moreover, it stimulated the more basic
state level re-alignment of the conservative wing of the Democratic
Party already moving towards presidential Republicanism.
C. Liberal Democrats
Holton did not make major gains among liberal Democrats,
and in some areas he actually lost some liberal support he had
enjoyed in 1965 against a more conservative opponent.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 12 -
The black vote will be described in a separate group
analysis, but suffice it to say that except in Richmond, Holton's
percentage was not high (and frequently fell below his 1965 ratios).
The white liberal Democrats of Virginia center in three
areas: Northern Virginia suburbia, the Tidewater (including
Norfolk, Portsmouth and Newport News) and the unionized mining
counties of the western mountains.
As for the Tidewater, Holton won most Tidewater counties,
scoring small to substantial gains over 1965. Generally speaking,
his gains came in more conservative areas, but in some counties he
carried Howell strongholds. Quite a few Tidewater counties (places
like New Kent, King and Queen, Gloucester, Mathews, James City and
Charles City) have very small populations. The voting strength of
the Tidewater lies in Norfolk, Portsmouth, Newport News and
Hampton Roads. In these areas, Holton won only one-fifth of the
Negro vote, and probably only one-quarter to one-third of the
poor white (economic liberal) vote. The large majority of anti-
Establishment poor whites - most voted for Wallace in 1968 and for
populist liberal Henry Howell in the Democratic primary - backed
Democratic candidate Battle in the general election.
The Tidewater Wallace vote appears to have split two ways.
On one hand, most of the poor whites, especially the labor union
/
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 13 -
members and other economic liberals who voted for Howell, appear
to have gone solidly Democratic. (Holton's AFL-CIO endorsement,
given to crack the Byrd machine, not the Democratic Party per se,
appears to have cut little ice.) The Wallaceites who backed
Holton were the lower-middle-class and middle-class elements,
mostly conservatives who opposed Howell in the Democratic guberna-
torial primary. The poor white Wallace electorate, populist by
nature, liberal in economic philosophy and pro-Howell in the 1969
Democratic primary, gave minimal support to Holton.
Nor did Holton do particularly well in the traditionally
insurgent and anti-Byrd machine mining counties of western Virginia.
In several - Russell, Scott - he fell below his 1965 ratios. Holton
lost Buchanan, Giles, Lee, Russell, Tazewell and Wise counties,
plus the cities of Norton and Bristol. Of these, Richard Nixon
had carried Giles, Lee, Russell and Bristol City in 1968. While
Holton improved his 1965 showing, his gains in the western mountain
counties were not great, and were principally confined to the
bloc of counties where Pollard had run fairly well in the Demo-
cratic primary.
Northern Virginia suburbia (see subsequent regional analysis)
has a number of liberal areas, and most of them gave Holton ratios
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 14 -
similar to or lower than those of 1965. As Chart 4 shows,
Holton's 1969 percentages in Arlington, Fairfax, Alexandria and
Falls Church were almost the same as those of 1965. And within
the region, Holton's 1965-1969 gains in conservative areas were
generally balanced by percentage slippages in strong liberal areas,
albeit the changes were not too great.
In Virginia's areas of liberal Democratic strength, Holton's
vote gains generally did not come from these groups but, as indi-
cated, from dissident conservative elements. Nor was there any
great pro-Holton turnout. Increases in the vote between 1965 and
1969 were similar to those in other areas of the state. Lastly,
as Chart 2 shows, Holton generally trailed Nixon's 1968 popular
vote - despite higher presidential turnout, it must be remembered
that Nixon was in a three-way race - across most of Virginia's more
liberal regions.
In sum, although Holton did win some liberal Democratic
votes, such a pattern consisted more of exception than rule.
Liberal Democrats are gaining increasing power within their party,
and most of them supported it in 1969.
D. Negroes
Negroes cast about 15% of Virginia's total vote in 1969,
and their support for Linwood Holton was about 25% statewide.
The one major Negro concentration where Holton scored well
was in Richmond, where the local Negro voter council backed Holton.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 15 - -:
Supporters of defeated liberal Democrat Henry Howell, they
endorsed Holton to break the back of the conservative Democratic
machine (by electing a Republican governor) so that liberals - in
Richmond mostly black could take over the Democratic Party.
Richmond Negroes voted four and five-to-one Democratic except in
the gubernatorial race, where, as Chart 3 shows, Holton won about
56-58% of the black vote.
Outside of Richmond - and 85% of Virginia's Negroes do live
outside the city Holton won only 15-20% of the black vote. As
Chart 3 illustrates, the black precincts of Portsmouth, Norfolk and
Newport News gave Holton only 13-20% support. In Danville and
Lynchburg, the major cities of substantially Negro Southside Virginia,
the largely black precincts gave Holton 20-25% support, part of which
probably reflects a small white minority. Out in the rural Southside
precincts that are at least two-thirds Negro, Holton's defeats were
by decisive majorities, although mixed residential patterns make
analysis more difficult than in the cities. All in all, Tidewater,
Southside and other rural Negroes appear to have gone only 15-20%
for Holton, a low level of Republicanism akin to the North. The
exceptional situation in greater Richmond, however, probably puts
Holton's overall statewide Negro support at a roughly 25% level.
Further evidence of the insecurity of Holton's 1969 Richmond
Negro vote came in a December, 1969 citywide state senate by-election.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 16 -
A black Democrat was elected to the state senate against the
opposition of a white Republican and a white conservative Democrat.
Negro Richmond, having gained its power within the Democratic Party,
bloc-voted for its own candidate against the Holton-backed Republican
who won the bulk of the white vote.
Black Virginia was a mainstay of the Democratic Party in
1969 and there is little indication of a contrary trend developing.
II. Regional Behavior
The highest levels of 1969 Republican strength in Virginia
came in the western mountains, the Shenandoah Valley, Northern
Virginia suburbia and greater Richmond. With the exception of
Richmond, these areas have few Negroes.
In the Norfolk-Portsmouth-Tidewater and in Southside, Republican
strength reached 55-65% among white voters, but Holton ran about even
with Battle because of Democratic strength among the large Negro
population.
On a statewide basis, the races in Virginia appear to have
divided as follows:
Virginia (Statewide)
Holton
Battle
Total
Vote Share
Vote Share
Vote
Whites (85% of State)
50%
35%
85%
Negroes (15% of State)
4%
11%
15%
54%
46%
100%
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 17 -
But in the Tidewater and Southside, Negroes cast 25-30%
of the vote, and the ratio appears to be more in the following
vein:
Southside-Tidewater
Holton
Battle
Total
Vote Share
Vote Share
Vote
Whites (75%)
45%
30%
75%
Negroes (25%)
5%
20%
25%
50%
50%
100%
The major phenomenon of 1969 is the high level of Republican
support among moderate-to-conservative white voters all over the
state.
A. Northern Virginia Suburbia
Northern Virginia's fast-growing suburbs are increasingly
prone to vote Republican in presidential, gubernatorial, congressional
and now state legislative contests.
As a general rule, the GOP support pattern mixes Republican
and conservative Democratic voters. Liberal Democrats (suburbanites
and Negroes), increasingly dominant in their own party, rarely
support Republican candidates.
The 1969 Holton pattern in Alexandria, Arlington, Falls
Church and Fairfax fits this moderate-conservative mold. Holton's
1969 percentages were very close to those of 1965, and his
pluralities were not much changed. Within the four cities and
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 18 -
counties, Holton generally scored 1965-1969 gains in conservative
areas and suffered small 1965-1969 losses in some activist, liberal
areas. Holton's largest leads over Nixon came in strong Pollard-
George Wallace precincts like Lorton. In silk-stocking suburbs,
Holton frequently captured lower percentages than Nixon. Chart 4
shows the 1965, 1968 and 1969 GOP two-party vote shares in
Alexandria, Arlington, Fairfax and Falls Church. Chart 5 compares
Nixon and Holton's vote shares in selected Fairfax precincts.
Holton's 1969 support was much more party than personal.
His statewide running mates and local candidates fared as well or
almost as well. Holton's percentages were much lower than those
won by conservative GOP Congressmen Broyhill and Scott. In com-
parison with President Nixon, Holton won about the same share of
the two-party vote. However, as Chart 2 shows, the gubernatorial
race elicited a much smaller turnout than the presidential election,
and Holton won far fewer votes than Nixon had in 1968.
Northern Virginia suburbia appears to be moving into the
Republican column with the key impetus coming from both the steady
influx of suburbanites and the changeover of conservative, oldline
Democrats (including lower middle-class whites).
B. The Shenandoah Valley
Reaching from Winchester to Lexington, the Shenandoah Valley
encompasses a prime conservative stretch of Virginia. The northern
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 19 -
section - Winchester, Clark County and so forth - is the homeland
of. the Byrd political dynasty and has a long Democratic tradition,
now eroding as the Democratic party changes coloration. The
southern part of the Valley, especially the old German-settled area
in Shenandoah, Rockingham and Page counties, is traditionally
Republican. The entire Shenandoah went strongly Republican in both
the 1960 and 1968 presidential races, giving Richard Nixon large
leads.
In 1965, Holton did not carry the northern Shenandoah counties,
and his victories were confined to the old German counties. He
carried the Valley by about one thousand votes, losing most of the
local conservative Democratic electorate to Battle. Three years
later, Nixon swept through the Valley like Civil War cavalry,
carring every city and county and amassing a thirty thousand vote
lead.
With the defeat of the conservatives in the 1969 gubernatorial
primary, the scene was set for conservative Democratic disaffection
and re-alignment to seep down to the gubernatorial level, and that
is what happened. Holton carried all the cities, lost only two
small counties, and won the Valley by fifteen thousand votes. His
increment came from conservatives, and was largest in the old Byrd
stomping grounds. As Chart 6 shows, Holton scored 15-30 percentage
point gains between 1965 and 1969 in the Byrd country of the Upper
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 20 -
Shenandoah and nearby Piedmont, counties where conservative Pollard
had done well in the primary.
No other section of the state matched these 1965-1969 GOP
gubernatorial gains except for Southside, greater Richmond and the
Tidewater, the other principal places where large numbers of con-
servative Democrats switched to the Republican candidate.
Area conservatism seems to be forming up on the Republican
side of the fence, and future years should see the GOP cement this
position. The GOP may pick up a conservative Democratic congressional
district.
C. Greater Richmond
The greater Richmond area has voted Republican in every
presidential race since 1952, however local GOP candidates have
not been able to tap much of this potential because of the con-
servative bent and appeal of the Richmond area and Virginia
Democratic Party.
Linwood Holton won only about 30% of the Richmond area vote -
Richmond City, Colonial Heights City, Chesterfield and Henrico
counties (suburbia) - in 1965. But he did not trail too far behind
Democrat Mills Godwin because a third party conservative candidate
won nearly a quarter of the vote. Holton's 1965 electorate was a
patchwork quilt of Negroes, liberal Democrats and Republicans.
Then in 1968, Richard Nixon swept the area. The suburban
Richmond counties of Chesterfield and Henrico SO despised the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 21 $
national Democratic Party that they gave Hubert Humphrey only
15% of the vote. The rest divided 60:25 between Richard Nixon
and George Wallace. The City of Richmond, where Humphrey profited
from a Negro bloc vote, split 48:41:11 between Humphrey, Nixon and
Wallace. Colonial Heights almost obliterated Humphrey. The 1968
Nixon lead in the four counties and cities was 37,000.
A year later, Linwood Holton rolled up an edge of 33,000,
winning 64% of the total vote. His Richmond area support was
unique in that it came from both ends of the spectrum - white con-
servative Democrats moving into the GOP and Richmond City Negroes
voting for a Republican governor to hasten the demise of the con-
servative element and its control of the Democratic Party.
Black Richmond, as well as the small Negro population in
Richmond's suburban environs, gave Holton considerably more than
half of its vote in 1969, a marked increase over 1965 levels. But
Holton rolled up much higher support ratios - 70% or more - in the
middle-class and upper-middle-class prime Pollard precincts of
Richmond and its suburbs. This too represented a huge increase in
support over 1965. Greater Richmond's poor white areas, although
staunchly opposed to the national Democratic Party, divided about
evenly between Holton and Democratic gubernatorial candidate Battle.
The course of re-alignment seems clear enough, but it was
clarified by a December, 1969 Richmond citywide election for a
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 22 -
vacant seat in the Virginia State Senate. A black Democrat was
elected with a plurality; a Holton-backed Republican ran second,
a conservative Democrat third. Negro Richmond bloc-voted for the
black Democrat, giving the white Republican almost no support.
Less than 5% of the white electorate backed the Negro; the majority
voted Republican rather than conservative Democratic.
It seems very likely that Negroes will take over or play a
usually-dominant role in Richmond Democratic politics. In turn,
this should cement their Democratic loyalty and firm up the Repub-
licanism of the conservative white electorate of greater Richmond.
The greater Richmond congressional district, now held by a conser-
vative Democrat, could turn Republican soon.
Richmond's suburbs are growing at a huge rate, faster than
all other Virginia counties save Fairfax. Their escalating
Republicanism should be of increasing importance in statewide
elections.
D. The Western Mountains
Virginia's Western highlands are the one part of the state
that has very few Negroes and a tradition of Republicanism that
reaches back to Civil War days. The region has voted Republican
for president since 1948 (excluding 1964) and is currently repre-
sented in Congress by two Republicans. Democratic strength is
concentrated in a half-dozen mining counties as well as a few
machine-controlled counties.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 23 -
As Map 1 shows, this region together with the southern
Shenandoah, furnished most of the traditionally Republican counties
and cities that backed Linwood Holton in 1965. Holton inflated
his support in 1969 by only 5-10%, much less than his statewide
average gain.
This is not the part of the state where the GOP is making
major strides, however the Republicans are shoring up existing
strength and the Western Mountains should continue to favor
Virginia Republican candidacies.
E. Southside Virginia
Southside Virginia, once a fortress of conservative Democratic
tradition, has been moving away from the Democratic Party during
the Nineteen-Sixties. Most of the counties between Danville and
Norfolk clung to their old loyalties in the 1960 presidential race,
but since then they have not produced Democratic presidential
majorities.
Stalwartly southern in outlook, "Southside" is the most
strongly Negro section of Virginia. At least a dozen counties
are more than 40% black. Increasing black voting is the only
source of national Democratic strength. The local white population
is extremely conservative and voted about 8:1 against Hubert
Humphrey in 1968.
Despite considerable presidential Republicanism - concen-
trated in urban-suburban middle-class precincts - Southside has
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 24 -
until recently given almost no support to local and state house
GOP candidates. In 1965, Linwood Holton scored 10%-30% -- levels
in most of the Southside counties. His best levels came in a few
anti-organization areas.
Nixon and Wallace split the Southside white vote in 1968,
with the lion's share - 60% -- going to the Alabaman. Humphrey
won solid support from the black vote, which constitutes about a
quarter of the Southside electorate.
In 1969, many of the Southside counties were among the
state's strongest territories for conservative, Byrd machine
gubernatorial candidate Pollard. Map 2 illustrates the geography
of Pollard support and conservative Democratic tradition. With
Pollard's defeat, Southside conservative Democrats, like others
in Virginia, saw an era come to an end.
The November general election saw a majority of white
Southsiders swing to the GOP gubernatorial candidate for the first
time in many years. As Map 3 shows, Southside was the part of the
state where Holton scored his best 1965-1969 gains.
Most Southside counties gave Holton between 40-50% of the
vote, because although the Republican contender won about 60% of
the white vote, he lost the sizeable Negro vote by at least 4:1
ratios. In Danville, Lynchburg, Emporia, Greensville, Chesapeake
and any other Southside urban locales where the Negro vote can
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 25 -
be sorted out - almost all Southside rural precincts are racially
mixed an it went 4:1 against Holton.
Generally speaking, Holton's best precincts " this is true
throughout Southside - were the middle-class and upper-middle
class precincts that had produced Nixon's highest 1968 support
levels. In such areas, the middle-class and upper-middlë class
Wallace vote also broke in favor of Holton. In most counties,
the top Nixon precinct (or the top Nixon-Wallace precinct) turned
out also to be the top 1969 Holton precinct.
The large Southside Wallace vote divided raggedly, and by
locales as much as by economic class. The middle-class and con-
servative Byrd-Pollard element usually voted for Holton. The
poorer whites generally voted for Battle or for the two minor
party conservative candidates. A half-dozen or so Southside
counties gave the two rightwing minor party candidates 5-15% of
the vote. Back in 1965, the third-party conservative had done
much better. It is evident in the 1969 returns that Southside
conservatism is moving into the Republican Party.
F. Norfolk-Newport News-Hampton
The Tidewater and its major shipyard, navy and industrial
cities are one of Virginia's more liberal areas. Not only are
there large local Negro and organized labor groups but there is
a considerable local Democratic tradition of opposition to the
party's hitherto dominant conservative element.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
6
- 26 -
Eisenhower carried the Tidewater and its major cities in
1952 and 1956 (a sizeable GOP Negro vote helped him), but the
Democrats won narrowly in 1960 and more solidly in 1964. Nixon
and Wallace split most of the white vote in 1968, while Humphrey
won 95% black support.
Running for governor in 1965, Linwood Holton was badly
defeated in Norfolk, Newport News, Portsmouth and Virginia Beach.
He did not tap much Democratic insurgency on either the liberal
or conservative side. This changed in 1969.
July and August 1969 saw liberal Democratic gubernatorial
candidate Howell carry the urban Tidewater - his home base on in
both the primary and the run-off. However he lost the run-off to
moderate Democrat Battle.
Both conservatives and Howell liberals were disappointed in
the outcome, but they behaved differently in the general election.
Henry Howell ultimately endorsed Battle, and most Howellites voted
for Battle. In Norfolk, Portsmouth, Newport News and Virginia
Beach, Howellite poor whites went two-to-one for Battle and Negroes
about five-to-one for Battle. Chart 1 shows how the top Howell
precincts in Norfolk also became the top Battle precincts.
On the other hand, Norfolk's top Pollard precincts gave
Holton his best vote (Chart 1 shows the parallelism). Holton
won lower-middle class, middle class and upper-middle class votes,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 27 -
mostly conservative. His best precincts were usually also those
where Nixon had run strongest in 1968. In such areas, he combined
the Nixon vote and middle-class elements of the Wallace vote. In
the Tidewater area as in the rest of Virginia, Holton combined the
Republican and conservative Democratic votes. In so doing, he
followed the pattern laid down in the 1968 Norfolk-Portsmouth
congressional race, when the primary victory of a liberal Democrat
had enable GOP candidate Whitehurst to triumph by combining the
Republican vote and the conservative Democratic vote.
Like Northern Virginia suburbia, the Tidewater is an area
of liberal Democratic strength, however the Republican pattern
and opportunity is to combine with the conservative Democrats
leaving their party because of growing liberal influence.
III. Conclusion
For the first time, the GOP in 1969 achieved in Virginia
on a state level what it has several times recently achieved on
the presidential level: combination of the Republican and con-
servative Democratic electorates into a functioning majority.
Virginia is a basically conservative state - suburbanization around
Richmond and Washington is re-enforcing not weakening this bias a.
and the new conservative coalition should move towards statewide
dominance under the GOP label, making the Democrats into a shaky
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
- 28 -
minority coalition of Negroes, Tidewater Howellites, Western
Mountain miners and other Democrats and the liberal element of
Northern Virginia suburbia.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Map 1
Regions of Virginia Republicanism
INDEPENDENT CITIES
KAP KEY
CITY
CONGRESSIONAL
NO.
MAP KEY
DISTRICT
CITY
CONCRESSIONAL
NO.
DISTRICT
1.
ALEXANDRIA
10
of
DRISTOC
12.
LEXINGTON
.
7
2.
BUINA VISTA
20.
LYNCHBURG
7
G
4.
CHAMLOTTESVILLE
21.
7
MARTINSVILLE
is
IS.
22.
CHISAPIAKE
REMPORT NEWS
4
I
6.
CLIFTON FORGE
23.
WORFOLK
G
2
7.
COLONIAL WEIGHTS
24.
NORTON
4
a
G.
COVINGTON
25.
PITERSBURG
6
4
a.
DANVILLE
26.
PORTSKOUTH
is
2
10.
EXPORTA
27.
RADFORD
4
@
11.
FAIRFAX
20.
RICHMOND
10
a
12.
FALLS CHURCE
29.
ROANOKE
so
e
13.
30.
FRANKLAW
SALEN
4
6
PLOURICE
14.
31.
FREDERICKSOURG
SOUTH BOSTOM
0
$
CLARKE
15.
GALAX
32.
STAUKTON
37
$
7
10
16.
33.
LOUDOUN
HAWPTON
SUFFOLK
1
4
12
17.
34.
VIRGINIA BEACH
MAPPEN
MAPRISONBURG
7
1
18.
HOPEWELL
35.
WAYNESBORO
4
7
GMENANDOAN
AKLINGTON
36.
WILLIAMSBURG
37.
2
WINCHESTER
PRINCE
Washington, D.C.
7
FAUOUIER
PAGE
HANNOCK
BY/T7/M
Suburbia
ROCKINGHAM
CULPEPER
?
MADISON
STAFFORD
17
MIGHLAND
GREENE
AUGUSTA
ORANGE
Ca-32
POTSYLVANIA
Western Virginia
BATH
CAROLINE
NORTHUMBERLAND
Appalachian Mountain and
35
ALBEMARLE
LOUISA
ALLEGHANY
ROCKBRIC
ESSCA
Shenandoah German Traditional
8-0
FLUVANNA
19
NELSON
3-
HANOVER
ONIX
HILLIAM
KND
Republican Voting
QUELM
COMMUNITY
SECURITY
AMHERST
BOTETOURT
BUCKINGHAM
CUMBERLA
POWHATAN
CRAIG
3
NEW
20-
KENT
DANOR
APPORATION
JAWES
GILES
CHESTERFIELD
BUCHANAN
BEDFORD
AMELIA
cities
136
$000
CITY
PRINCE
am
MATHEWS
DICREASON
30
PRINCE
TAZEWELL
BLAND
CAMPBELL
EDWARD
NOTTOWAY
25
GEORGE
WISE
PULASKI
~
SURRY
DINWIDDIE
CHARLOTTE
22
0-24
16
RUSSELL
FRANKLIN
1
WYTHE
FLOYD
MIGHT
LUNENBURG
SUSSCI
SNYTH
HALIFAX
LEC
SCOTT
WASHINGTON
PITTSYLVANIA
CARROLL
31,
BRUNSWICK
10
ISLE OF
2
GRAYSON
9-15
PATRICK
4
MECKLENBURG
I
SOUTHANPTON
USE
34
33
HENRY
NANSEMOND
PRENSVILLE
13
Areas of pre-civil rights revolution
Republican strength in Virginia
Cities and counties giving a majority of the total vote
to Linwood Holton in 1965
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Map 2
Virginia's Belt of Traditionally Democratic
Rural Conservative Strength
INDEPENDENT, CITIES
WAP KEY
CITY
CONGRESSIONAL
NO.
BAP KEY
DISTRICT
CITY
CONGRESSIONAL
NO.
DISTRICT
1.
ALEXANDRIA
10
2.
BAISTER
19.
LEXINGTON
3.
BUT
20.
LYNCHOURS
4.
CHOLOTTESVILLE
21,
7
MARTINSVILLE
5.
CHESAPEAKE
22.
ALRS
4
6.
CLUTON FORGE
23.
NORFOLK
6
2
7.
COLTRAL HEIGHTS
24.
MORTON
4
B.
CONSIDER
25.
PETERSBURG
e
9.
BROWNLLE
26.
PORTSMOUTH
5
10.
INJURIA
27.
RADFORD
4
11.
FAIRAX
28.
RICHMOND
10
12.
FALLS CHURCH
29.
ROAMORE
10
13.
30.
FROMELIR
SALEM
4
14.
31,
PALMERICKSBURG
SOUTH DOSTOR
8
CLARK
15.
32.
BALEX
STAURTON
7
37
$
10
16.
33.
LOUDOUN
KAWTON
SUFFOLR
12
17.
34.
VIRGINIA BEACH
WARRE
18.
REFERELL
25.
WAYNESBORO
4
SHEMANDOAM
ARLINGTON
36.
WILLIAMSOURO
37.
WINCHESTER
STATE
FAUQUIER
PAGE
C
beery
ROCKINGHAM
CULPEPER
MADISON
STARFORD
Generalized area of heavy
17
MIGHLAND
GREENE
conservative Democratic
AUGUSTA
ORANGE
CL-32
(Byrd) strength
BATH
CAROLINE
WORLLAND
MORTHUNSERLAND
35
ALBEMABLE
LOUISA
OF
Counties giving Pollard
ALLEGHANY
ROCKBRIDGE
ESSER
1-0
FLUYANNI
NELSON
atnleast 30% support,
HANOVER
AND
28
AMMERST
July 1969
BUCKINGHAM
FOWHATAN
I
QUELH
ACCOMACK
BOTETOURT
CRAIG
CUNTER
m
"ENT
20-
JANOR
JANES
GILLS
CHESTERFIELD
BUCHANAN
BEDFORD
ANELIA
CHES
535
4023
CITY
MATHEWS
47
PRINCE
NORTHAMPTON
DICKINSON
30
PRINCE
TAZEWELL
BLAND
CAMPBELL
22
EDWARD
NOTTOWAY
25
GEORGE
WISE
M
SURRY
PULASRI
DINWIDDIE
0-24
CHARLOTTE
16
RUSSELL
FRANKLIN
-
WITHE
FLOYD
SNYTH
$
LUNENBURG
SUSSEX
HALIFAX
LEE
SCOTT
WASHINGTON
PITTSYLVANIA
CAPROLL
312
BRUNSWICK
10
CRAYSON
15
PATRICK
4
SOUTHAUPTON
34
33
MENRY
NECKLENBURG
D
No.
RANSEMOND
RECEIVIELE
13.
Map 3
The Region of Principal 1965-1969
Republican Gubernatorial Gains
FREDERICK
CLARKE
37
LOUDOUN
10
12
WARREN
ARLINGTON
SHEMANDOAM
FAUQUIER
PRINCE
Generalized area in which
PAGE
Holton's share of the total
ROCKINGHAM
CULTIPER
MADISON
STAFFORD
17
gubernatorial vote increased
MIGHLAND
GREEN
14
25% or more between 1965
AUGUSTA
ORANGE
Class
SPOTSYLY
BATH
CAROLINE
NORTHUMBERLAND
and 1969
35
ALBEWARLE
COUISA
esser
ALLEGHANY
ROCKBRIDGE
FLUYAWNI
8-8
B
MERSON
HANOVER
KING
13
MILLIAM
ACCOMACE
OUEEN
AMHERST
BUCKINGHAM
BOTETOURT
2
CRAIG
20
CUMBERLA
POWHATAN
3
KENT
CHESTERFIELD
JANOR
AMELIA
CITLES
1
T
GILES
BEDFORD
CITY
MATHEWS
BUCHANAN
TGOMERY
NORTHAMPTON
4523
PRINCE
PRINCE
30
CAMPBELL
EDWARD
DICRENSES
NOTTOWAY
25
GEORGE
TAZEWELL
BLAND
27
SURRY
~
DINWIDDIE
22
16
2
WISE
PULASE:
CHARLOTTE
8-20
RUSSELL
FRAMALIN
FLOYD
LUNENBURG
SUSSEY
WITHE
SMYTH
HALIFAX
34
PITTSYLVANIA
31
BAUNSWICK
TO
SCOTT
WASHINGTON
111
CARROLL
Q-15
PATRICK
NECKLENDURG
GRAYSOM
MEARY
HANSEMORO
D
REENSYALLE
13
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
CHART 1
Norfolk City and Fairfax County - the
Parallel Between Holton General Election
Support and (Conservative) Pollard Primary
Support and Between Battle General Election
Support and (liberal) Howell Primary Support
A. Norfolk City
Top Five Holton Precincts
Top Five Pollard Precincts
(1969 General Election)
(1969 Democratic Primary)
20th Precinct
26th Precinct
19th
=
19th
11
15th
11
30th
11
26th
11
15th
11
33rd
"
20th
"
Top Five Battle Precincts
Top Five Howell Precincts
(1969 General Election)
(1969 Democratic Primary)
17th Precinct
2nd Precinct
4th
11
6th
11
9th
=
4th
11
42nd
"
17th
11
2nd
"
14th
11
B.
Fairfax County
Top Five Battle Precincts
Top Five Howell Precincts
(1969 General Election)
(1969 Democratic Primary)
Kirkside
Kirkside
Sugarlands
Bailey's
Bucknell
Sugarlands
Westlawn
Barcroft
Sherwood
Westlawn
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
CHART 2
A Comparison of the 1969 Holton Vote
and the 1968 Nixon Vote in Liberal
Areas of Virginia
Northern Virginia Suburbia
Nixon 1968
Holton 1969
Alexandria
13,265
8,987
Arlington
28,163
18,311
Fairfax
57,462
38,032
Falls Church
2,005
1,370
Norfolk-Tidewater
Newport News
12,744
11,678
Norfolk
22,302
20,683
Portsmouth*
9,402
9,638
Western Virginia Mining Area
Bristol City
1,930
1,113
Lee County
4,450
3,955
Scott County
5,345
3,869
Washington County 6,665
4,680
Wise County**
5,004
5,149
* George Wallace won 12,000 votes in Portsmouth.
Holton's old home county.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
Chart 3
Holton and the Negro Vote
City/County (Precinct/Ward)*
Holton Vote Share, 1969
Richmond, Precinct 18
61%
11
11
62
62
11
11
63
56
"
11
64
53
11
11
66
53
11
"
67
58
1
Charles City County
27
Danville, Ward 3
21
11
=
9
21
Hampton, Phoenix Precinct
31
11
Aberdeen Precinct
34
Lynchburg, 1st Precinct, 3rd Ward
25
"
1st Precinct, 2nd Ward
23
Newport News, Dunbar Precinct
17
"
Jefferson Precinct
19
"
Newsome Park Precinct
19
"
Chestnut Precinct
20
11
Lee Precinct
22
Norfolk, 2nd Precinct
19
11
4th Precinct
17
11
6th Precinct
21
Portsmouth, 26th Precinct
15
=
27th Precinct
13
*
Included in this list are the top Negro wards and precincts
of all of Virginia's major cities.
1 - Charles City County, the most heavily Negro in the state,
is roughly 70-75% Negro.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
CHART 4
1965-1969 Trends in Northern
Virginia Suburbia
Republican Share of the Two-Party Vote
1965
1968
1969
City/County
(Holton)
(Nixon)
(Holton)
Alexandria
52%
48%
51%
Arlington
53
52
52
Fairfax
55
56
55
Falls Church
53
52
49
CHART 5
Comparison Between 1968 Nixon Percentages
and 1969 Holton Percentages in Selected
Fairfax Precincts
1969 Nixon
1969 Holton
Share of
Share of
Precinct
Total Vote
Total Vote
Silk-Stocking Suburban
Waynewood
60%
58%
Cooper
61
64
Chain Bridge
57
59
Chesterbrook
59
58
Cardinal
60
58
Substantially Jewish Suburban
Barcroft
47
55
Sugarland (Reston)
37
41
Substantially Negro and
Federal Employee
Kirkside
30
33
Lower-Middle Income White
Lorton
38 (Wallace-32) 58
Jermantown
41 (Wallace-33) 65
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum
CHART 6
1965 - 1969 Trends in the Upper
Shenandoah and Adjacent Piedmont
Holton Share of
Holton Share of
City or County
Total Vote 1965
Total Vote 1969
Clarke County
28%
46%
Culpeper County
26
51
Fauquier County
29
49
Fluvanna County
21
53
Frederick County
40
66
Madison County
38
62
Orange County
30
57
Warren County
37
51
Staunton City
47
62
Winchester City
38
58
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum