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    "label": "Memoranda for the President--Beginning September 26, 1971",
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    "title": "Memoranda for the President--Beginning September 26, 1971",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET/NODIS\n- 7 -\nof tensions throughout the world in general and in Europe in particular.\nHe would like to hear the President's views on this score.\nThe President said that the Foreign Minister had been correct in indicating\nthat now that we had made progress on the Berlin problem, we could look\nmore favorably upon consideration of other European questions on which we\nmight make some progress. He believed that once the Berlin situation had\nbeen completely resolved, and he understood that there were still some\nactions that needed to be taken for that purpose, then exploration of a\nconference could proceed. He felt that on this subject it would be very\nimportant for the two major powers to have preliminary discussions before\nconferring with our respective friends in NATO and in the Warsaw Pact.\nBy this he did not mean that we would not consult with our friends, but for\nthe two powers to participate in a conference without knowing how we would\ncome out of it would not be realistic. He believed that after the Berlin\nmatter had been settled completely we should on a very confidential basis\ndiscuss between us what such a conference would mean and what we expected\nto come out of it. Of course, neither one of us should act without consulting\nand agreeing with our friends, but if we were simply to proceed to hold a\nbig conference, it might turn out to be something like a United Nations\ngathering.\nSecretary Rogers said that Mr. Gromyko had the other day suggested con-\nvening a preliminary meeting for the purpose of planning a conference on\nEuropean security. The Secretary had replied that such a preliminary\nmeeting was likely itself to take on the character of a conference. If we\nwere to do any preliminary preparatory work, it would have to be done on\na private basis between our two countries. As the President had said, we\nneeded to have some idea of the possible outcome of such a conference.\nMr. Gromyko inquired whether he had understood correctly that what the\nPresident had in mind were bilateral consultations on a bloc basis between\nNATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. The Soviet Union was ready to enter\nupon consultations of some aspects of this conference, its preparation and\nits possible outcome. He asked whether upon his return to Moscow he could\nreport to his government that the U. S. Government was, in principle, in\nfavor of convening a European conference. If so, the Soviet Union would\nbe ready to proceed to discuss the questions of procedures, agenda, place\nand time, and this could be done without any further delay. He had in mind\nthat preliminary consultations would be held for these purposes in the\nimmediate future and that the conference would be convened next year. He\nasked whether he could report this as being the President's view when he\nSECRET/NODIS"
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