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    "label": "Memoranda for the President--Beginning October 31, 1971",
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    "title": "Memoranda for the President--Beginning October 31, 1971",
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    "seq": 49,
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\n2\nother hand, with each passing day the chances of a negotiated solution\nappeared less possible. If the other side maintained a position of\nintransigence, then the United States Government would have no other\nchoice but to proceed with other actions. This would involve whatever\nsteps were necessary to obtain the release of U.S. prisoners. The\nPresident emphasized that Hanoi should understand by now that the\nUnited States was prepared to withdraw totally from Vietnam but not\nat the price of overthrowing Thieu. If Hanoi remained dedicated to\nthe proposition that the United States must withdraw totally and at the same\ntime remove Thieu, then the alternative left to the United States was clear.\nHe noted that if Hanoi were supported by only one of the larger powers then\nthe problem would be greatly reduced. However, with both Peking and\nMoscow competing with each other in Hanoi the situation was more complex.\nMr. Haksar then asked the President about U.S. relations with the\nPeople's Republic of China. The President reiterated that no one\nshould expect the immediate normalization of relations with Mainland\nChina but merely the initiation of a process. The trip to Moscow, on\nthe other hand, was being undertaken on the basis of solid achievements\nin a number of areas. The Berlin Agreement was a significant breakthrough\nwhich made the Moscow Summit a logical step in a deliberate and careful\nU.S. - Soviet dialogue. In the case of our relations with Moscow which\ninvolved the full range of European problems the stakes were much higher.\nThe situation in Asia today represented a lesser order of criticality.\nFurthermore, U.S. and Soviet interests were more complex. The Soviets\nwere interested in trade, as was the United States. The Soviets needed\nU.S. technology since their economy was somewhat flat. If the right\nconditions developed, there might be some value in exploring the ramifications\nof a European Security Conference. Before doing so, however, the U.S.\nexpected agreement on the Berlin settlement by the two Germanys. Then,\nthe United States would be willing to consider the agenda for such a conference.\nThis was separate and distinct from the mutual balance of forces question.\nThe President commented that with respect to both of these issues there was\nprobably little chance for substantial movement before the Moscow summit.\nPrime Minister Gandhi then asked the President to discuss the Middle East.\nThe President stated that the United States wished to be as helpful as\npossible in maintaining the ceasefire and preventing the resumption of\nhostilities. At the same time, there had been little or no progress. The\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY\nTOP SECRET"
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