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Salt Agreement -- 2 Concessions. It is idle and misleading to speculate on who won what. Both sides won. The agreement announced on May 20 reflects the interests of both parties. This has to be the case in matters affecting both sides' national security. Soviet motive. The Soviet leaders apparently shared our desire that the negotiations move ahead on substance -- I believe this was their motive. Timing of agreement. Reasonably, there could be an initial agreement this year, but of course, there is no specific obligation to complete negotiations by December 31. In view of the progress in technical discussions, the political commitment should allow much more rapid negotiations. Details. The May 20 announcement speaks for itself. There will be substantially concurrent discussions on defensive and offensive controls and an agreement on both together. The precise terms will be the subject of negotiation in the Helsinki talks which start in July. Since each side is well aware of the concerns of the others, the outline of an agreement should emerge fairly soon. U.S.- Soviet relations. As for the effect on Soviet- American relations, I have said on several occasions that we both have

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    "ocrText": "Salt Agreement -- 2\nConcessions. It is idle and misleading to speculate on who won\nwhat. Both sides won. The agreement announced on May 20\nreflects the interests of both parties. This has to be the\ncase in matters affecting both sides' national security.\nSoviet motive. The Soviet leaders apparently shared our desire\nthat the negotiations move ahead on substance -- I believe\nthis was their motive.\nTiming of agreement. Reasonably, there could be an initial\nagreement this year, but of course, there is no specific\nobligation to complete negotiations by December 31. In view\nof the progress in technical discussions, the political\ncommitment should allow much more rapid negotiations.\nDetails. The May 20 announcement speaks for itself. There\nwill be substantially concurrent discussions on defensive and\noffensive controls and an agreement on both together. The\nprecise terms will be the subject of negotiation in the Helsinki\ntalks which start in July. Since each side is well aware of\nthe concerns of the others, the outline of an agreement should\nemerge fairly soon.\nU.S.- Soviet relations. As for the effect on Soviet- American\nrelations, I have said on several occasions that we both have"
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