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This is the feeling that one gets rom considering some of the approaches
to negotiations with Mussia, particularly as those negotiations either involve
"disengagement" or disarmament as the ne cessary alternative to the disaster of
general nuclear war. Sometimes the dichatory is made really absolute by saying
that disarmament itself is not the true object of negotiations, as the alter-
native of nuclear war; it is assumed that disarmament would be useless without
what is called "disengagement" and that this diseng.gement (giving up overseas
bases and military alliances, necessarily defensive) is the necessary price
of relaxing the so-called "tensions" with the Soviet system that are supposed
to be the matrix of all our difficulties with Russia; and the dangers of war,
The recent speech by Robert E. Matteson, Director of the White House
Disarmament Staff, before the University of Minnesota Conference on
"National Security in the Nuclear Age" (February 18, 1958) was called
"The Disarmament "ilemma". In the press reports, it was, in spite of denials
by Mr. Matteson and specific disclaimers in the course of the speech, treated
as a swaeping attack on the policies of the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles,
in that it called for (a) relaxing of tensions, and (b) negotiations leading
toward this objective through the acceptance of necessary compromises to
get some initial steps toward disarment agreed upon with the Soviet authorities,
It is true that one of the propositions in Mr. Matteson's closely
reasoned paper night have been interpreted to lead to the last conclusion
since he said in the syllogism which he presented,
*(a) A disarmement agreement in the mutual interest of the US and
USSR is possible primarily because both the US and the Soviet agree
that the chances are that the present arms race can end only in an
all-out nuclear war which neither of them wants.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum.
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"ocrText": "- 2 -\nThis is the feeling that one gets rom considering some of the approaches\nto negotiations with Mussia, particularly as those negotiations either involve\n\"disengagement\" or disarmament as the ne cessary alternative to the disaster of\ngeneral nuclear war. Sometimes the dichatory is made really absolute by saying\nthat disarmament itself is not the true object of negotiations, as the alter-\nnative of nuclear war; it is assumed that disarmament would be useless without\nwhat is called \"disengagement\" and that this diseng.gement (giving up overseas\nbases and military alliances, necessarily defensive) is the necessary price\nof relaxing the so-called \"tensions\" with the Soviet system that are supposed\nto be the matrix of all our difficulties with Russia; and the dangers of war,\nThe recent speech by Robert E. Matteson, Director of the White House\nDisarmament Staff, before the University of Minnesota Conference on\n\"National Security in the Nuclear Age\" (February 18, 1958) was called\n\"The Disarmament \"ilemma\". In the press reports, it was, in spite of denials\nby Mr. Matteson and specific disclaimers in the course of the speech, treated\nas a swaeping attack on the policies of the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles,\nin that it called for (a) relaxing of tensions, and (b) negotiations leading\ntoward this objective through the acceptance of necessary compromises to\nget some initial steps toward disarment agreed upon with the Soviet authorities,\nIt is true that one of the propositions in Mr. Matteson's closely\nreasoned paper night have been interpreted to lead to the last conclusion\nsince he said in the syllogism which he presented,\n*(a) A disarmement agreement in the mutual interest of the US and\nUSSR is possible primarily because both the US and the Soviet agree\nthat the chances are that the present arms race can end only in an\nall-out nuclear war which neither of them wants.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum."
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