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50
As a result, the actual effectiveness of the Yugoslav pro-
gram in the bloc is now rather limited. Most communists in East-
ern Europe realize that to accept the Yugoslav position. assuming
that the Seviet Union would allow then to do so, would involve the
risk of falling from power completely. In short, insofar as the
pattern of internal change in the communist cap is concerned,
the Yugoslav position represents an extreme alternative which, at
this moment. no communist regime can afford to emulate. At the same
time the Yugoslav policy of expediency has disillusioned many of
the communist intellectuals in Eastern Europe who formerly attached
great hopes to Yugoslavia's separate path.
It is interesting to observe that the position adopted by
the communist regines in Czochoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and
Albania, toward both Yugoalavia and Boland, has been more dogmatic
than that adopted by the Soviet Union. This was in large part due
to the fact that to them Titoism or even Gonulkaism appeared to be
a far more imminent threat than to their associates in Monoter.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union has on overall responsibility for the
unity of the bloc, stemming from its special position of leadership.
One of its primary tasks is the resolution of internal conflicts
and antagonisms within the camp. Even with respect to Yugoslavia,
the Soviet Union has not altogether abandoned hope that this nation
will return to the fold, possibly at some time after Tito's death.
This is why the Soviet Union has been more careful than the other
states to avoid a total rupture. But the Stalinist regimes in Czecho-
slovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria, construe both the Yugoslavian
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum.
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"ocrText": "50\nAs a result, the actual effectiveness of the Yugoslav pro-\ngram in the bloc is now rather limited. Most communists in East-\nern Europe realize that to accept the Yugoslav position. assuming\nthat the Seviet Union would allow then to do so, would involve the\nrisk of falling from power completely. In short, insofar as the\npattern of internal change in the communist cap is concerned,\nthe Yugoslav position represents an extreme alternative which, at\nthis moment. no communist regime can afford to emulate. At the same\ntime the Yugoslav policy of expediency has disillusioned many of\nthe communist intellectuals in Eastern Europe who formerly attached\ngreat hopes to Yugoslavia's separate path.\nIt is interesting to observe that the position adopted by\nthe communist regines in Czochoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and\nAlbania, toward both Yugoalavia and Boland, has been more dogmatic\nthan that adopted by the Soviet Union. This was in large part due\nto the fact that to them Titoism or even Gonulkaism appeared to be\na far more imminent threat than to their associates in Monoter.\nFurthermore, the Soviet Union has on overall responsibility for the\nunity of the bloc, stemming from its special position of leadership.\nOne of its primary tasks is the resolution of internal conflicts\nand antagonisms within the camp. Even with respect to Yugoslavia,\nthe Soviet Union has not altogether abandoned hope that this nation\nwill return to the fold, possibly at some time after Tito's death.\nThis is why the Soviet Union has been more careful than the other\nstates to avoid a total rupture. But the Stalinist regimes in Czecho-\nslovakia, East Germany and Bulgaria, construe both the Yugoslavian\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum."
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