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66
was becoming fluid, and opportunities for meaningful action
were being created. Furthermore, time to weigh a variety of alter-
native programs of action was not lacking.
If further proof were needed to show that the formula of 11-
beration did not meet the criteria of a foreign policy. it was
supplied within a few days by the events in Hungary. Here again
for two fateful and bloody weeks the United States attitude was
one of almost complete paralysis. Ten days passed between the first
and second Soviet interventions. During these ten days the country
which four years earlier proclaimed its official policy to be one
of liberationalimited itself to recommending in the United Nations
on November 3 the studying of "suitable moves." No serious warning,
as far as is known, was dispatched to Moscow to advise the Soviet
government that its military intervention against the Nagy govern-
ment. which was desperately appealing for help, would be viewed as
a serious threat to world peace. The Hungarian question was repeatedly
postponed in the United Nations, and when the Suez crisis broke, the
Soviet regime was successful In great measure through its threats
in making it the central issue. During the ten-day interlude no
effort was made to fly United Nations observers into Hungary, there-
by placing it indirectly under some form of international supervision.
In brief, no effort was made to maximize Soviet doubts as to the
nature of our response to a Soviet intervention, while thewerbose
formula of liberation simply served to convince the communist elites
elsewhere that they must swim or sink with the USSR.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum.
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"ocrText": "66\nwas becoming fluid, and opportunities for meaningful action\nwere being created. Furthermore, time to weigh a variety of alter-\nnative programs of action was not lacking.\nIf further proof were needed to show that the formula of 11-\nberation did not meet the criteria of a foreign policy. it was\nsupplied within a few days by the events in Hungary. Here again\nfor two fateful and bloody weeks the United States attitude was\none of almost complete paralysis. Ten days passed between the first\nand second Soviet interventions. During these ten days the country\nwhich four years earlier proclaimed its official policy to be one\nof liberationalimited itself to recommending in the United Nations\non November 3 the studying of \"suitable moves.\" No serious warning,\nas far as is known, was dispatched to Moscow to advise the Soviet\ngovernment that its military intervention against the Nagy govern-\nment. which was desperately appealing for help, would be viewed as\na serious threat to world peace. The Hungarian question was repeatedly\npostponed in the United Nations, and when the Suez crisis broke, the\nSoviet regime was successful In great measure through its threats\nin making it the central issue. During the ten-day interlude no\neffort was made to fly United Nations observers into Hungary, there-\nby placing it indirectly under some form of international supervision.\nIn brief, no effort was made to maximize Soviet doubts as to the\nnature of our response to a Soviet intervention, while thewerbose\nformula of liberation simply served to convince the communist elites\nelsewhere that they must swim or sink with the USSR.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum."
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