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leaders of other systems by holding then up as "obstacles to peace", using every
effort to avoid dealing with them by putting the realm of diplomacy into the
realm of propaganda with all its totalitarian tricks.
The President, and, fortunately, the leading members of the Senate and
the Congress properly rebuked this crude and brutal maneuver; though we have
properly refrained, in order not to be drawn into this game, from retaliating
by addressing a letter to Mr. Kruschev, rather than addressing it to Mr.
Bulganin, which would be a way of pointing out that the real head of the state
was the "K" of the "3 and K" combine. But since the Bulganin tactics will
undoubtedly be continued, the United States no doubts feels compelled to reply
rather than adopt a silence that would be construed as merely sulky. To this end,
it would be better to clarify our own understanding of what is behind the
Russian objectives and whether or not they are not trying to impose on us a false
dichotomy. This dichotomy, many of the proponents of disarmament and relaxing of
tensions would tend unconsciously to turn into a dilenna fatal to American
security and to the preservation of freedom and justice in our world.
One of the first traps that we ought to avoid is to accept two fallacies,
One is that real tensions, which arise from the very nature of preventing the
Soviet system from destroying the freedom of other systems, can be in any way
really removed by merely relaxing then by continuous concession to Soviet demands.
Nor is it true that history is an unbroken record which shows that arms races
inevitably lead to war. On the contrary, appeasement has led to wars, or
surrender without war. Behind appeasement the lack of amments by the United
States has been the most direct temptation leading to World wars I and II, and
probably to the Korean hostilities, When Europe enjoyed a reasonable balance of
armed forces and war seemed a bad gamble, as it did in much of the twentieth
century, the effort to maintain a deterrent strength did not lead to ar, but to
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum.
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"ocrText": "- 5 -\nleaders of other systems by holding then up as \"obstacles to peace\", using every\neffort to avoid dealing with them by putting the realm of diplomacy into the\nrealm of propaganda with all its totalitarian tricks.\nThe President, and, fortunately, the leading members of the Senate and\nthe Congress properly rebuked this crude and brutal maneuver; though we have\nproperly refrained, in order not to be drawn into this game, from retaliating\nby addressing a letter to Mr. Kruschev, rather than addressing it to Mr.\nBulganin, which would be a way of pointing out that the real head of the state\nwas the \"K\" of the \"3 and K\" combine. But since the Bulganin tactics will\nundoubtedly be continued, the United States no doubts feels compelled to reply\nrather than adopt a silence that would be construed as merely sulky. To this end,\nit would be better to clarify our own understanding of what is behind the\nRussian objectives and whether or not they are not trying to impose on us a false\ndichotomy. This dichotomy, many of the proponents of disarmament and relaxing of\ntensions would tend unconsciously to turn into a dilenna fatal to American\nsecurity and to the preservation of freedom and justice in our world.\nOne of the first traps that we ought to avoid is to accept two fallacies,\nOne is that real tensions, which arise from the very nature of preventing the\nSoviet system from destroying the freedom of other systems, can be in any way\nreally removed by merely relaxing then by continuous concession to Soviet demands.\nNor is it true that history is an unbroken record which shows that arms races\ninevitably lead to war. On the contrary, appeasement has led to wars, or\nsurrender without war. Behind appeasement the lack of amments by the United\nStates has been the most direct temptation leading to World wars I and II, and\nprobably to the Korean hostilities, When Europe enjoyed a reasonable balance of\narmed forces and war seemed a bad gamble, as it did in much of the twentieth\ncentury, the effort to maintain a deterrent strength did not lead to ar, but to\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Library and Museum."
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